



A STUDY OF PARADIGMATIC SYSTEMS OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND
ASSOCIATED RELIGIOUS SOCIAL GROUPS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

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SUMMARY

An objective investigation of systems of religious knowledge has been undertaken. Religion is defined as a meaning-seeking activity, which resolves itself into a pattern of meaning that is imposed on experience. It is this total pattern of meaning which is the system of religious knowledge. Such a system is found to have discrete moments, and models of these are provided. The interplay between system of knowledge and social group is discussed.

By scrutinizing a religious group's symbolism its inherent system of knowledge can be deduced. From empirical evidence the basic experiential model of religious knowledge can be constructed in two possible forms - the mediatorial and the immediate. The experiential model generates the primary expressive model. Both are pre-reflective. It is maintained that the acceptance of a core-myth, in which the primary expressive model is encapsulated, is the core value which determines membership of the religious social group. The adherence to a particular system of knowledge brings about various types of religious collectivity.

When a primary expressive model has become entrenched in a social group then a process of Tradition takes place, evaluating the cultural heritage. Such evaluation, and its elaboration, gives rise to secondary expressive models. In its evolved form it can be termed a research tradition, as it marshalls educational elements from the secular culture to its own ends. When an entire system becomes normative, stabilized by religious authority, then it can be termed a paradigmatic system of religious knowledge.

This theory has been applied to Christianity which developed a distinctive research tradition to produce its secondary expressive model. This is charted historically until the innovative intervention of Aquinas. Subsequently discrete areas of ecclesiastical learning developed embryonic research traditions and rival research traditions caused paradigmatic confusion.

Attention has been focussed on the Roman Catholic Church after the Reformation stabilizing its system of knowledge by the social group known as the Tridentine seminary. In the nineteenth century the research tradition of Aquinas was enforced, both within the seminary and without, in the form of Neo-Thomism. In the 1940s new developments were allowed in the field of Biblical Exegesis and in fact a new research tradition was introduced. By migration scholars so formed influenced other fields. By the 1960s there was a paradigmatic shift and the beginning of an intellectual ferment in the educational sphere of the Roman Catholic Church.


STATEMENT

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

FOREWORD

I wish to express my gratitude, in the first instance, to Dr. J.J. Smolicz of the Department of Education, University of Adelaide. Dr. Smolicz has been invaluable in suggesting new avenues of thought and new possibilities of approach. The thesis owes much to his critical appraisal. I would also like to thank Sister Deidre Jordan who first saw the feasibility of the study and who has maintained a scholarly interest in its development. The thesis would not have been undertaken had it not been for the encouragement and consideration of the Director of Salisbury College of Advanced Education, Mr. R.S. Coggins and of the Head of the Department of History and Religious Studies at the same College, Dr. A.D. Hunt.

INTRODUCTION



This thesis is an endeavour to investigate the theological educational process within Christianity, and specifically within Roman Catholicism, up to the 1960s. At that stage it became apparent to those involved in that process that a revolutionary change was taking place. There was no absolute break with the past but there was more than pedagogical innovation. Since much has been written about such revolutionary changes in other scholarly disciplines, particularly the sciences¹, it seemed that a survey of such literature and an application of significant findings would be rewarding.

The end result has involved a multi-disciplinary approach. It would be a primary contention that only in such a way could the complexities of the problem be unravelled. Very broadly, the thesis is situated in the area of Sociology of Knowledge. This asserts that there are regular relationships between perspectives and motives of social groups, on the one hand, and philosophical, legal and religious (or ideological) systems of knowledge on the other. It is not maintained that the social perspectives and motives determine directly the systems of knowledge; they may do so indirectly. The interaction of the social groups with the respective system of knowledge must, of course, bring into play the question of education. Novices are initiated into a particular system of knowledge by education. The educationist is interested in what such a novice is taught and why he is so taught. This interest increases in a time in which significantly new things are taught to the novice.

It is not intended that any judgement should be passed on the system of knowledge that is primarily under scrutiny. In this context Florian Znaniecki wrote :

For an objective investigation of systems of knowledge in their composition, structure, and relationships must take fully into consideration that which is an essential characteristic of every system of knowledge: its claim to be true, that is, objectively valid. The sociologist, however, is not entitled to make any judgments concerning the validity of any systems of knowledge except sociological systems. He meets systems of knowledge in the course of his investigation only when he finds that certain persons or groups that he studies are actively interested in them, that they construct, improve, supplement, reproduce, defend, or popularize systems which they regard as true or else reject, oppose, criticize, or interfere with the propagation of systems which they consider untrue. In every such case the sociologist is bound to abide by whatever standards of validity those individuals or groups apply to the knowledge in which they take an active share. For, as an observer of cultural life, he can understand the data he observes only if he takes them with the "humanistic coefficient", only if he does not limit his observation to his own direct experience of the data but re-constructs the experience of the men who are dealing with them actively. Just as a conjugal relation which he observes is to him really and objectively what it is to the conjugal partners themselves, or an association what it means to its members, a given system of knowledge must be to him also what it is to the people who participate in its construction, reproduction, application, and development. When he is studying their social lives, he must agree that, as to the knowledge which they recognize as valid, they are the only authority he need consider. He has no right as a sociologist to oppose his authority to theirs: he is bound by the methodical rule of unconditional modesty. He must resign his own criteria of theoretic validity when dealing with systems of knowledge which they accept and apply. It does not matter whether the type of knowledge which he finds these people cultivating be technical, normative or theoretic, theological, metaphysical or empirical, deductive or inductive, physical or humanistic, nor whether the particular system which they regard as true be the physics of Thales, of Democritus, of St. Thomas, of Newton, or of Einstein, the biology of Aristotle or of Darwin, the psychology of Plato or of the behaviorists: it is their judgement, not the sociologist's, which conditions whatever influence their knowledge has on their social life, and vice versa.²

Znaniecki goes on to point out that there are two kinds of connection between systems of knowledge and social life. On the one hand, participation in some social system can depend upon participation in a certain system of knowledge. On the other hand, participation in certain social systems often determines in which systems of knowledge individuals will participate and how they will participate.³

Systems of knowledge, in other words, cannot really be divorced from the men who construct them, maintain them by transmission and application, develop them or even neglect them.

Hence, certain elements of the investigation already distinguish themselves. First of all, there must be a delineation of the system of knowledge under review, with any significant changes which have historically occurred in it. Secondly, there must be an identification of that social system which is primarily responsible for the construction and development of the system of knowledge. The mechanism of relationship between systems of knowledge and social systems also requires investigation if the reasons for drastic, revolutionary change in systems of knowledge are to be explained.

The drastic change that has taken place in the theological system of knowledge within Roman Catholicism in the 1960s, and at various times in the past, is more often than not explained by some immanent logic of theological thought.⁴ Four models in particular have been put forward to explain such revolutions in thought. The first model is based on explicitation of what was formerly only implicit.⁵ The second model is some analogy of organic growth.⁶ A third is change through alteration of perspective.⁷ A fourth is the transference of a body of theoretical statements from one set of circumstances to another set.⁸ In this latter case a point is reached in theological thinking in which the alleged reality, to which propositions are said to point, is not able to bear the weight put on them. However, another reality can appear and it is recognised that the same propositions are more appropriately applicable to it. They are then transferred.

Such models of drastic change in theological systems of knowledge do not acknowledge the intimate connection between a social system and a system of knowledge. It is as if the system of knowledge is able to survive independently of the community of individuals who give rise to it. An investigation of drastic change in a system of knowledge must take into account, in our view, the whole interaction of system of knowledge and social system.

The thesis will first deal with the theoretical issues relating to religious systems of knowledge. Then, it will turn to their relationship to social systems. It will then, in particular, investigate the system of knowledge of Judaeo-Christianity and its relationship to Jewish-Christian social systems. Finally, with a model established for the investigation of theological systems of knowledge, the history of Christian thought and, in particular, Roman Catholic thought, will be studied in an endeavour to isolate and explain the principal moments of revolutionary change in the past and the reasons for the revolutionary change in the 1960s. Throughout this study, as will be seen, the question of education will be paramount.

1. See in particular T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962; 2nd ed., 1969) of which much more will be said below; A. Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (New York, 1958).
2. F. Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge (New York, 1940), pp. 5-6.
3. Ibid., pp. 8-10 It has been rightly pointed out that Sociology of Knowledge ought to be called the Sociology of Meaning for what is socially determined is not the nature of conception but the vehicles of conception. C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), p. 212.
4. A fine proponent of this type of approach is M. Wiles, The Making of Christian Doctrine (Cambridge, 1967); The Remaking of Christian Doctrine (London, 1974).
5. The analogy would be with a deductive argument. Widely maintained in the past, this model is rarely proposed today in scholarly circles.
6. Material on this approach can be found in O. Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman: The Idea of Doctrinal Development (Cambridge, 1957).
7. See M. Wiles, The Remaking of Christian Doctrine.
8. See J. Moiser, 'Propositional Transference', Irish Theological Quarterly, 46 (1979), pp. 198-210.

1.

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE
IN RELIGIOUS CULTURES.

The first difficulty that must be faced in a theoretical delineation of religious systems of knowledge is that neither in social theory in general nor in more specialized fields of religious theory is there any agreement on the definition of religion. The main division is between those who opt for a substantive definition and those who opt for a functional definition, although no absolute cleavage can be made between the two approaches. The functional approach tends to be much more inclusive. Our own approach, since an option must be made, tends towards a sociological variant of substantivism.

1.1 Definition and Description of Religious Culture

There is an experience—a complex of action, emotion and intellect—common to all religion. This experience can be found both on the individual and the communal levels. The core of this human activity is a response. The religious person is primarily aware that he responds to some external principle which has 'intruded' or 'broken into' his life pattern. It will be our contention that such responsiveness, bearing the qualifying note of 'religious', has been proper to man since homo sapiens emerged. There never was a primordium in religion. It has been said that men have birthdays, Man has none. Religions may have birthdays, too, but Religion has none.
1

To what is the activity of responsiveness directed? The homo religiosus responds to Ultimacy. Beneath the variety of experiences, things and values he seeks a final unity of being, a final value that is not found in everyday experience and which is the explanation of all else. Ultimacy is that which is most

fundamental most comprehensive, most enduring of all realities.

It is the maximum of being and power.² Thus Thomas Aquinas, in a final attempt to define the Christian God wrote: Deus est ipsum esse subsistens.³ God is the ultimate in existence, whose essence is his existence. There was, in the God of Aquinas, no potentiality, no avenue for further activation, since God was actus purus. In similar vein we have this description of Hindu ultimacy:

Para (higher) Brahman is unborn, eternal, abiding and ancient ...
It is greater than the greatest, and subtler than the subtlest.⁴
It is farther than the farthest and nearer than the nearest.

Reviewing the phenomenology of religious experience van der Leeuw could comment:

Thus the first affirmation we can make about the object of Religion is that it is a highly exceptional and extremely impressive 'Other'.⁵

Even the Buddhist, who would at first seem to be an exception, responds to his own form of Ultimacy. Despite the doctrines of anatta and anicca, Ultimacy is still present in the final realization of ultimate impermanency and non-substantiality.⁶

Our interest lies in this confrontation of man with Ultimacy and the system of knowledge to which such an opposition gives rise. In order to elucidate our approach it will be necessary to clarify with more precision why man is religious. Perhaps the simplest answer is that religion is one of man's meaning-seeking activities. Clifford Geertz has written:

The view of man as a symbolizing, conceptualizing, meaning-seeking animal which has become increasingly popular both in the social sciences and in philosophy over the past several years, opens up a whole new approach not only to the analysis of religion as such, but to the understanding of the relations between religion and values. The drive to make sense out of experience, to give it form and order, is evidently as real and as pressing as the more familiar biological needs. And, this being so, it seems unnecessary to continue to interpret symbolic activities - religion, art, ideology - as nothing but thinly disguised expressions of something other than what they seem to be: attempts to provide orientation for an organism which cannot live in a world it is unable to understand.

This identification of religion as a meaning-seeking activity by Geertz needs to be seen against his general view of culture which he sees as comparable to:

plans, recipes, rules, instructions (What computer engineers call 'programs') for the governing of behaviour.

While animals, to a large extent, have their behavioural patterns predetermined by genetic structure, man is less physically regulated. He must put a construction on events and he does so by means of symbols. Human thinking consists of the use of significant symbols, which are largely presumed within a human community. Again, Geertz writes:

Undirected by culture patterns - organized systems of significant symbols - man's behaviour would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless. Culture, the accumulated totality of such patterns, is not just an ornament of human existence but the principal basis of its specificity - an essential condition for it.

Man is essentially an incomplete animal. He completes himself through culture and, indeed, through particular forms of culture.

Culture (is) the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experiences and guide their action.¹⁰

Finally, in alignment with this concept of culture, Geertz is able to define religion in this way:

Religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts (2) to establish powerful, persuasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.¹¹

Religion, seen as a meaning-seeking activity, finds itself pitted against 'chaos'.

Man depends upon symbols and symbol systems with a dependence so great as to be decisive for his creatural viability and, as a result, his sensitivity to even the remotest indication that they may prove unable to cope with one or another aspect of experience raises within him the gravest sort of anxiety.¹²

'Chaos' in this context is the tumult of events that lacks interpretability. A man's religion would allow him to order those events, interpret them, in terms of Ultimacy. However, Geertz sees three points at which chaos could reassert itself. He calls the first point 'bafflement', situated at the limits of man's analytic capacities; he calls the second 'suffering', situated at the limits of his powers of endurance; and he calls the third 'a sense of intractable ethical paradox', situated at the limits of his moral insight. Ignorance, suffering and the problem of evil (and concomitant injustice) can therefore, at any time, threaten the order and the interpretability of a man's experiences. At that point chaos replaces order.

Chaos, understood in this way, can only be held at bay by the meaning-seeking activity of religion. Life, of course, can still be looked at, and the world construed, in many ways. Homo religiosus has his own particular view and construction of reality. He construes specifically in terms of Ultimacy, of which there is no explanation given or required. Such Ultimacy is not found by him, but intrudes upon him in his experience. His response is to encounter it (not to define it, not to analyse or explain it), and such encounter brings him meaning.

1.2 Meaning of Models of Knowledge in a Religious Culture.

Thus, religion is a culture pattern, one set of significant symbols, which provides a model of reality. Culture patterns can be called models in that they parallel and simulate entities and processes in physical, organic, social and psychological systems. However, a philosophical distinction can be drawn between a model-of (reality) and a model-for (reality). The first refers to the manipulation of the symbol system until it most nearly resembles the pre-established non-symbolic system. The second refers to the manipulation of the non-symbolic system in terms of the relationships established in the symbolic system. Thus a builder, about to build a house, requires plans that are a model-for reality. An antiquarian, endeavouring to convey the reality of an ancient mansion, constructs a model-of reality. Culture patterns, in so far as they are models, have an intrinsic double aspect. They give meaning to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves.¹³

Religion has this double aspect of model-of and model-for.

Under the first aspect, model-of reality, it generates distinctive conceptions of the world, of selfhood, of relationships between the world and self. Under the second aspect, model-for reality, it generates certain human dispositions and attitudes towards life.

Relying upon this understanding of the religious culture pattern, Geertz outlines a methodology:

The anthropological study of religion is therefore a two stage operation: first an analysis of the system of meanings embodied in the symbols which make up the religion proper, and, second, the relating of these systems to social structural and psychological processes. 14

If, therefore, religion, in our acceptance of that term, is seen as a culture pattern which is, at base, a meaning-seeking activity of a particular type, then it must resolve itself into a pattern of meaning that is imposed upon experience, interpreting that experience in a form that appears valid and real to the participant. It is this total pattern of meaning, interpreting experience for the religious individual and the religious group, which is primarily the system of knowledge peculiar to that religious aggregation.

Following Geertz' methodology, a religion must first be scrutinized in its symbols for its inherent meaning system, and the principal symbols of a religious community are its myths and rituals. While at times myth and ritual complement each other they are not necessarily concomitant. Rituals also convey meaning.

Rituals reveal values at their deepest level ... men express in ritual what moves them most, and since the form of expression is conventionalized and obligatory it is the values of the group that are revealed. I see in the study of rituals the key to an understanding of the essential constitution of human societies. 15

Amid a particular group's myth and ritual collection there is always a core-myth and a core-ritual which presumably convey the principal meaning system possessed by the religious aggregation. Hence the methodology suggested by Geertz would demand that, beyond perusing the entire collection of myths and rituals, the investigator should decide which is the core-myth and which is the core-ritual. Such a decision could only be based upon the view of the participants.

For the purposes of this thesis the total pattern of meaning which interprets human experience in terms of Ultimacy is called a 'system of religious knowledge'. Such a system of knowledge is capable of discrete moments in its activity. It will be our endeavour to analyse each of these moments and to provide a model for each. Such models will be termed 'models of knowledge'. Hence a 'system of knowledge' will be composed of various 'models of knowledge' which cannot be further elucidated until empirical investigation has taken place.

1.3 Empirical Investigation of Models of Knowledge in Religious Cultures

The empirical study of specific religious cultures, which now follows, will endeavour to uncover the general model or models of religious systems of knowledge. The initial areas chosen are taken from classical anthropological studies on tribal religions and ancient Near Eastern religious cultures, since these provide the remote context for the emergence of Christianity, which will be the principal focus of the later section of the thesis.

In general, the myth and ritual process within each religious

culture will be scrutinized, with the participants' own judgement as to the core-myth and core-ritual being respected. These symbols are the matrix of the pattern of meaning provided by the specific religious tradition.

1.3.1 Classical Anthropological Studies on Tribal Religion

An anthropological study of many primitive cultures shows, in the first place, that a High God exists, in their myths, under various forms.¹⁶ The High God is usually depicted as a sky-god, a creator-god,¹⁷ a god of fate and a bestower of fertility. He is the founder of the established order of the cosmos and the guardian of law within that order. In these cultures, there is, invariably, a total view of the cosmos and the totality of the cosmic order is attained¹⁸ through the symbol of the High God.

Inevitably it happens, as has been ascertained from observation of primitive societies, that various positive characteristics of this High God are emphasized and tend to splinter off into hypostatizations which thereupon constitute new gods. Consistently, fertility tends to be hypostatized. Thus, as interest in fertility (or war, since victory in war was seen as a prerequisite for prosperity and fertility) heightened within a particular community, the High God became increasingly a deus otiosus and there emerged an active god of fertility. The High God's ritual then tended to be limited to the annual festival. This splintering process could continue further until a pantheon of gods was formed, with its own hierarchy. However, the splintering could well be imperfect with only vague lines of demarcation between deities, and confusion could exist, in the non-specialist mentality, between the High God and the subsidiary

deities. Of course, the possibility always remained that, under some later stimulus, the High God would be reactivated and re-
 19
 assume his former position.

Further anthropological study reveals a basic structure underlying this process. Evans-Pritchard's work among the Nuer is an illustration. The Nuer possessed a High God, conceived of as a sky-spirit who was universal and all-pervasive in nature. Lesser
 20
 spirits were merely local aspects of this High God. Since the High God expressed such a very general idea of spirit or 'power', the concept naturally tended towards depersonalization. This gave rise to the splintering process. As the impersonal High God became less involved in the affairs of men, the possibility of human relationship with him became remote and, in the instance of fertility in particular, a new god tended to be formed. Various myths expressed this growing remoteness of the High God: the High God withdraws from the universe, dissatisfied with his handiwork, or men cut themselves off from the High God by an act of severance,
 21
 a 'fall'.

All religious cultures, as was said above, feel the need for some form of contact with Ultimacy. The need becomes imperative in those cultures where a given High God has become, or is on the way to becoming, in the manner described above, a deus otiosus. Since contact is primarily effected in the ambient of ritual, whose purpose is to establish that area where such interaction can effectively take place, there is a certain need for sacred expertise, derived from tradition or in other ways, whereby the symbols of the High God, or at least of the active gods, are activated and a process

of mediation is undertaken. In this way the presence of the gods would be realised amongst men for the benefit of the community. Thus, a religious community experiences a theophany in its legitimately organised ritual.

Within ritual, constituted primarily by the theophany, the contact with Ultimacy could be attained through certain central figures such as culture heroes, including Urmensch and the First King. There is a corresponding need, in the social structure of the community, for designated sacral personages. It is here that sacral kingship, priesthood and prophetism find their ambient. In a basic description of such sacral personages, three primary roles can be distinguished: spirit possession, spirit mediumship and shamanism. In spirit possession, a person assumes a state of apparent auto-hypnosis or dissociation and his behaviour is understood to be due to control by some spiritual agent. Spirit mediumship means that the spirit not only possesses a person, but also communicates with others through the possessed person. Shamanism occurs when the medium is not only the vehicle for the spirit but is believed to be able to command that spirit himself. ²² These three forms attain contact with the divine forms.

Shamanism requires some explanation. Its structure depends on the abovementioned concept of a 'fall', to which it is a response. Such a 'fall' depicts, mythologically, the gulf that exists (to some extent) between the High God and the human community. In ecstasy, the shaman reproduces, in his personal experience, the primordial situation of the human condition prior to the 'fall', and participates in the primordial communication between the divine and the human which then obtained. This ecstasy is the specific element

that distinguished shamanism. The shaman is therefore that
 functionary in a society who experiences a privileged 'seeing' of
 the world of the sacred and conveys the experience of this contact
 to others. His role is not passive; he actively controls the area
 of divine to which he has access. It must be stressed that the
 shaman's experience is, above all, personal and not corporate. His
 personal act of 'seeing' the divinity is equivalent to the corporate
 theophany in a more developed ritual.²³

Shamanism is useful in understanding the ritual process.
 By whatever way he might be designated (spontaneous vocation;
 hereditary transmission; personal 'quest'; call of the elders),
 the shaman must undergo an initiation which involves two phases.²⁴
 The first phase is ecstatic and in this the shaman breaches time
 and space and enters the Urzeit. This involves certain trials and
 ordeals which induce in the novice shaman an 'initiatory illness',
 the beginning of his shamanistic voyage to the Urzeit. The second
 phase of initiation is the training of the novice in certain techniques
 which will be part of the shaman's skills. The shaman, when he has
 passed through his initiation, offers the community a ritual per-
 formance which, in fact, re-enacts the 'call' he originally received.
 It is not a simple miming of that event but a reliving of the
 initial crisis with all its vividness. In order to explain this,
 C. Lévi-Strauss makes use of the psychoanalytical term 'abreaction'.²⁵
 Just as a psychiatric patient can be made to relive an initial
 situation from which a personality disturbance originated (for which
 the technical term is 'abreaction'), so the shaman is able to relive
 the initial ecstatic experience of transcendence. Further, he is
 able to induce an 'abreaction' in others - an individual or community -
 by ritual. In this way he fulfils a mediatorial role in the community.

The study of shamanism is important in so far as it shows how contact is effected with the divine order on an individual level. That same process can take place on a corporate level. Individual forms, such as shamanism, tend in time to take on more communal expression. Formal instruction can be given by experts to groups of initiates in the recognition of divine manifestation and the manner of making contact. Certain personality types are found more ready to assimilate such knowledge. In this way the process of contacting the divinity is perpetuated and schools of practicans, able to make contact, are formed.

Assimilation and control of the divinity, which is the characteristic of shamanism, is found, however, only in more advanced cultures. In more primitive forms of religion, contact is restricted to spirit possession and spirit mediumship. Identification is never permanent and remains on the level of a means and not an end. Indeed, in most primitive religion, the role of the medium is to provide apotropaic protection to the community rather than to encourage the approach of the divinity. Shamanism therefore denotes a sophistication in contact with the divine by a religious group, because of the permanent quality of the institution and because of the institution's control of the numinous.

This control of the divine by contact thus develops, in a religious community, from simpler forms to shamanism. There is, thereafter, the tendency for communal forms to emerge which have the ability to perpetuate themselves. The earliest origins of the priesthood can be understood from this viewpoint. Surveys of primitive societies show that the guardians of sacred places have,

in many regions, particularly in the ancient Near East, pioneered the
²⁶
 institution of priesthood. Since such holy sites were considered
 to have been the dwelling-place of gods or spirits, the guardians of
 such places took on the function of contacting the numinous. Their
 function was similar to that of the shaman but there was a special
 proclivity, in the localized sanctuary and its attendant traditions,
 for continuity and perpetuation. Just as shamans developed certain
 efficacious rites and these could be learnt by others, so too the
 priesthood of the sanctuaries developed an established ritual as the
 proper means for communicating with the spirits and gods of that
 place. The function of such ritual would develop from placation
 to the more advanced activity of establishing fellowship with the
 deity.

While priesthood could, in this way, represent a communal phase
 of earlier shamanistic contact with the divine, the charismatic
 element of shamanism was continued in the various forms of prophecy.
 Groups of charismatics would tend to coalesce into ecstatic guilds
 and to be institutionalized. Rites and techniques, relating to
 ecstasy, would then be learnt. The line of demarcation between
 the early priest and prophet would thus be very tenuous. The
 priesthood would simply be more reliant on a cultic tradition attached
 to a particular sanctuary.

Those societies which had a High God often had, beside these
²⁷
 other communal forms of contacting the sacred, sacral kingship.
 The sacral king was a symbolic person, engaging the entirety of the
 cosmos; he was caught up with a whole gamut of symbolic activity
 which testified to his situation.

The relationship between the sacral king and the High God is well illustrated by data deriving from the Nilotic Shilluk. ²⁸ Juok, their Supreme Being, is the ultimate source of beneficence. However, it is the culture hero, Nyikang, the First King and the creator of the Shilluk, who is the point of contact between Juok and the human community. Nyikang participates in both the divine order of things, personified in Juok, and in the line of sacral kings, in each of whom his spirit resides. As the High God of the Shilluk tended, de facto, to become a deus otiosus, secondary figures such as Nyikang took on a more important position in the practical affairs of life. Juok was depicted as too lofty, unapproachable and ultimately functionless.

Nyikang was re-incarnated in each reth (king) and every reth ²⁹ was the medium through which Nyikang and Juok were approached. The sacral king thus functioned as the point of contact with divinity on the human side. At the same time, sacral kingship embodied the founder of the nation and consolidated the community into a single entity, since supernatural potency flowed through the actual king to the entire human community, establishing thereby a state of harmony, equilibrium and beneficence. In this way Shilluk society and the natural cosmic order found integration through the activity of the king.

This participation of Nyikang in the kingship removed it from any sectional interests. All the Shilluk shared in it, no matter in what way their loyalties were otherwise divided, because in Nyikang all common interests were centred: success in war, fertility and health. When a king died the Shilluk said: 'there is no land'.

Their mode of contact with the cosmic order and cosmic life had been disrupted. Such contact was restored by the investiture of the new king, since kings might die but kingship, which was Nyikang, endured. ³⁰

Amongst the Shilluk, the reth's kingdom was considered to consist of two halves, with the capital in the middle. The most dramatic element of the investiture ritual was a mock battle fought on the banks of a watercourse. Supposedly, this was the mid-point of the kingdom. In the battle, the reth's army was defeated by a victorious army bearing the image of Nyikang, who thus defeated the king, prior to entering into him. ³¹ This fusion of king and Nyikang then initiated a new phase of interaction between the divine and the human community.

There are certain elements that emerge from such a study of tribal religions with more clarity than would be the case in evolved religious traditions. The two principal constants in the religious construct are the High God, as presented particularly in and through the cosmogonic myth and the ritual, and the human community. The human community is distinguished, in its institutions and societal structures, according to the posture it adopts before the High God. Differentiation of such structures is vindicated and perpetuated by sacred tradition and sacred ritual but these are open to reconstruction should the basic posture change. The principal problematic area for such communities is that of contact with the divine. There is a need to make contact with the sacred and ensure its continuance. This contact between a human community and Ultimacy cannot be separated from religious knowledge. It is the contact which galvanizes the total pattern of meaning which, in turn, interprets

human experience in terms of Ultimacy. If there should be no contact, then such a pattern of meaning would be absent and there would be no true religious knowledge. Once the centrality of the problem of contact has been proposed, and the anthropological data has been surveyed, a mediatorial model proposes itself. The mediatorial model would be that construct describing the interaction between the High God and a specific human community.

We can outline the principal facets of this mediatorial model. Mediatorship linking the human community to the High God is basically required in a community to allay religious fear at the possibility of chaos. The contact between the human community and the divinity takes place essentially in the theophany, where the god is 'seen'. This theophany can take place in the traditional ritual, but it is also possible for the 'seeing' to take place in a personal context. The particular form of the mediatorial structure will depend on the general religious structure of the society. Depending upon the community's concept of the god-structure and its view of the world order, the gulf between the divine and the human will be more or less wide, and the fear of the community will be proportionate. From the side of the divine the gulf can be partially bridged by hypostatizations and from the side of the human community by sacral personages who, again depending upon the social structure of the community, can fulfil either a personal or communal role (within a fixed office). Mediatorship is the phenomenon whereby the human community, through such personages, makes contact indirectly with the divinity and directly with hypostatizations of the divinity. This mediatorial model can be traced within the ambit of Near Eastern religion.

Historically, Christianity took its rise within ancient Near

Eastern culture. Although it was eventually to become a phenomenon of Western culture, its origins were in the Near East and it is there that the basic system of knowledge must be researched. Our methodological approach will be to see the general context of ancient Near Eastern religion, which was the remote context for the development of Israel's myth, and then the more proximate context of West Semitic religion. The remote context will entail an overview of Egypt and Mesopotamia.

1.3.2 The Religious Culture of Egypt

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Egypt was, until the twenty-fifth Dynasty, a land of local gods. Each god was considered to be immanent in his place of origin, even if his worship could change locality. Popularity of any particular god waned and waxed and the position of High God was held by various deities.

Against this background we will examine the position and function of the Egyptian pharaoh. In earlier Egyptian history there is evidence that the pharaoh was seen as an incarnation of the sky-god, Horus. This is best reflected in the titulary evidence. Thus, in the twelfth Dynasty, Sesostris I bore the title:

Horus 'Life-of-Birth', Two ladies 'Life-of-Births',
Horus of gold 'Life-of-Birth', King of Upper and
Lower Egypt 'Kheperkere^C', (Ka of Re^C comes into being'),
Son of Re^C 'Sesostris' ('man of Wosret'), (may he be)
granted life, stability and wealth like Re^C eternally.³⁴

Thutmosis III of the eighteenth Dynasty had a similar title:

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Horus 'Strong-bull-arising-in-Thebes', Two Ladies
'Enduring-of-kingship-like-Re^C-in-heaven', Horus of gold

'Powerful-of -strength, holy-of-diadems', King of Upper and Lower Egypt 'Menkheperre^C' (the form of Re^C 'remains' (?)), Son of Re^C, 'Thuthmosis ('Thoth is born') beautiful-of-forms', beloved of Hathor, lady of the turquoise.³⁶

These titles convey the idea that the pharaoh was, in the first instance, a temporary re-incarnation of Horus, of the goddesses described as the Two Ladies and of golden Horus. However, the same pharaoh exhibited his own individuality by manifesting the divine nature under some aspect peculiar to himself. Thus, in the example above, Sesostri³ I was the Horus who infused life into all who are born, while Thuthmosis III was the golden Horus, powerful of strength and whose diadems were holy.

From the fifth dynasty the name 'Son of Re^C', had been inserted³⁷ into the divine titulary. The pharaoh was represented as begotten by Re^C who then assumed the form of the pharaoh in order to procreate an heir. This titulary of the pharaohs remains our best means of access to both their religious and political status.

Apart from the titulary evidence there is other inscriptional and iconographic evidence that throws light on the role of the pharaoh. At the Ptolemaic temple of Horus at Edfu, there is a narrative of the battles fought between Horus and Seth. According to the myth, Horus is travelling in the solar boat with Re^C-Harakh³⁸te when the cohorts of Seth are sighted ahead of them. Horus seeks permission to attack from Re^C, which is granted. He then ascends into the heaven in the form of a winged disk, throwing the enemy into confusion. They begin to attack each other.

The winged sun-disk is Horus in mythopoeic form and he is
³⁹ also the reigning Ptolemy. It is a double image, as the disk
 not only represents Horus and the king, but also Re^C 'united into
⁴⁰ a trinity of solar and kingly domination'. This motif first
⁴¹ appeared during the fifth Dynasty in the reign of King Sahure.
 In a depiction of Amenemhet III the eyes of the king are surmounted
⁴² by the winged sun disk. Gardiner has maintained that the forerunner
 of the motif was found in a representation of King Djet in which a
 pair of wings surmount a falcon on the king's comb and he saw here
 the point of fusion between the sun god Re^C, the falcon god Horus
⁴³ and the reigning king. In fact, the winged disk described, in
 mythological fashion, the deification of power in the institution of
 kingship in Egypt.

The divine power of the pharaoh, as illustrated in the titulary
 and the iconography, was due primarily to his divine filiation and
 his power of mediatorship derived from this position of sonship.
 As mediator, the pharaoh was responsible for the welfare of the
 people, the maintenance of order and the propitiation of the cosmic
 powers. In short, it can be said that the role of the pharaoh as
 mediator was inextricably caught up with Ma-a-t.

The Heliopolitan myth relates that Re^C established Ma-a-t,
 the world order, in primordial times. Ma-a-t was both a concept
 and a goddess. It expressed order in society, maintained by the
 societal values of truth and righteousness, but these values were
 also personified in the goddess Ma-a-t. Ma-a-t was the inherent
 order of creation. At first Ma-a-t was seen as a passive quality -
 the changeless perfection of the world and society. During the

troubled times of the First Intermediate Period, however, in which political turbulence and change became the order of the day, Ma-a-t became an active force. It became that quality that needed to be searched out by man and utilized, if the perfection of the cosmos was to be attained. By contrast, when, during the Middle Kingdom, prosperous times returned, and life again acquired stability and perdurance, Ma-a-t, became the passive quality of a changeless and unchallengeable world once more.⁴⁴

The principal role of the pharaoh was to conform his government to Ma-a-t. To this end Amenemhet I organized his shire boundaries to be inalterably fixed 'because he set such store by Ma-a-t', and Ramses IV declared:

I have brought Ma-a-t into this land which did not exist (previously).⁴⁵

In general, then, the Egyptian view of the cosmos revealed a reassuring periodicity. This has been explained by Wilson as due to a uniformity and balance which the very geographical setting of Egypt imparted.⁴⁶ Their art and their theology were likewise affected by this attitude. The Egyptian mind believed that, despite occasional interludes of social disturbance and moral deterioration, Ma-a-t would prevail in the end. Thus the concept of 'salvation' in Egypt could only be framed in terms of living in harmony with Ma-a-t. In the case of a dead person, judgement was enacted by weighing his heart against a feather, the symbol of Ma-a-t, in the presence of Osiris and the forty-two judges, while Thoth assisted and recorded the result.

Egyptian mythology does not, as a consequence of Ma-a-t, reveal explicit evidence of a primordial 'fall' from a previous golden era, or of primordial sinfulness. Confessions of sin and guilt are, however, found in a series of texts dating from the Nineteenth Dynasty in the Theban necropolis.⁴⁷ A typical confession from the Theban necropolis is one inscribed on a stela dedicated by Nefer-'abu to the 'Peak of the West', the putative home of a serpent goddess Meretseger.

(I was) an ignorant man and foolish,
 Who knew neither good nor evil;
 I wrought transgression against the Peak,
 And she chastised me.⁴⁸

These instances of confession of sinfulness arise solely in contexts where the person concerned has been afflicted. There is no real appreciation of moral fault but rather an appreciation of a certain foolishness that has led the 'sinner' away from the true manner of living⁴⁹, that is, away from Ma-a-t.

The basic reason for this lack of a concept of sinfulness was that the ancient Egyptian, imbued with the concept of Ma-a-t, had little awareness of insignificance before the deity. Certainly there was religious awe as the temple architecture, such as the temple of Amon at Karnak, must have aroused. Also the Pyramid texts⁵⁰ sometimes picture the gods as demanding a fearful respect. However, through all of this, there was the firm Egyptian belief that the nature of the gods was shared by themselves. This is⁵¹ clearly demonstrated from the spells in the Book of the Dead. At the end of spell 147 we read:

If these things shall be done for any deceased person he shall have his being there like a lord of eternity in one body along with Osiris, and at ⁵²no place shall any great fight be made (concerning him).

While he was not the equal of the godhead the Egyptian certainly ⁵³viewed himself as of the same nature as the divinity.

Since, therefore, the Egyptian had no awareness of a primordial 'fall' he did not look to any notable future transformation. What ⁵⁴there was of future expectation must be seen in the myth of Osiris. There is no account of the Osiris myth in extant Egyptian literature, only allusions to the fate of Osiris which are found scattered throughout funerary texts such as the Pyramid texts, the Book of the Dead, hymns and rituals. The sole arrangement of the constitutive elements, in a Greek form doubtless different to the original ⁵⁵Egyptian, was that of Plutarch. The general line of the myth ⁵⁶seems to have been as follows. Geb and Nut had four children - two sons, Osiris and Seth, and two daughters, Isis and Nephthys. ⁵⁷Isis became the wife of Osiris while Seth was attended by Nephthys. Osiris and Seth were at enmity and eventually Seth killed his brother by the stratagem of enclosing him in a body-fitting sarcophagus. Osiris was put into the Nile and carried to Byblos before his corpse was recovered by the action of Isis. The two sisters, Isis and Nephthys, then uttered a dirge over the corpse. The magical potency of this dirge, together with the solicitude of Anubis, awoke Osiris to new life. Isis had meantime conceived Horus by the dead Osiris. Seth once more gained possession of Osiris and divided his corpse into fourteen pieces. Two of these were found by Isis and buried, giving validity to two Osirian sanctuaries. Meantime, Horus was secretly nurtured, and after reaching maturity he came before the

court of the gods. At a trial, at which Thoth was counsel for Osiris and Horus, Seth was condemned and Horus recognized as his father's heir. Osiris accepted the position of Lord of the Underworld and Supreme Judge of the Dead. It was this mythical event which expressed and determined the attitude of the Egyptian towards the future. Various texts expressed the wish that in death a deceased man, and primarily the king, might be justified by Thoth, in the same way as Osiris and Horus were justified.

The whole funerary pattern was, accordingly, determined by this myth. In the Pyramid texts, ⁵⁸ dating from around 2500 Osiris became the central figure of a complex ritual. The funeral liturgy of King Unas, for example, contains an invocation addressed to Atum, who was associated with the sun god Re^C:

Recite: O Atum, it is thy son - this one here, Osiris whom thou hast caused to live (and) to remain in life; he liveth (and) this Unas (also) liveth; he (i.e. Osiris) dieth not, (and) this Unas (also) dieth not. He (i.e. Osiris) nhp not; this Unas (also) nhp not. He (i.e. Osiris) nhp; this Unas (also) nhp.⁵⁹

Similar texts, addressed to other deities, maintain similar parallels between Osiris and the deceased. Later texts direct the appeal to Osiris himself:

Osiris, turn around thy face (that) thou mayst see this Unas.⁶⁰

The parallelism, which was the principal feature of the earlier texts, evolved into an identification between Osiris and the deceased man:

Thy (i.e. Osiris') body is the body of this Unas. Thy flesh is the flesh of this Unas. Thy bones are the bones of this Unas. (If) thou walkest, this Unas walks; (if) this Unas walks, though walkest.⁶¹

In this way, the deceased king could follow the path established by Osiris and escape the disintegration of death:

Recite: The Great One has fallen on his side. He moves himself, he who is Nd. His head is raised by Re^C. His abhorrence is to sleep: he hates to be tried. The flesh of this Teti, let it become not foul, not decay. Let not thy odour be bad.⁶²

The assimilation of the deceased king to Osiris was intended to bring about a rising from the immobility of death. The ritual involved intended to reproduce, in an individual case, what was believed to have been done in the mythological revivification of Osiris.⁶³ Thus, the ritual washing of the corpse was not a rite of purification, but a reanimation, reproducing the essential part of the action that had originally revivified Osiris⁶⁴ and it was the basic constituent of the mortuary ritual employed around the middle of the third millenium to accomplish the revivification of a deceased king. Each king became, at death, Osiris and so his potency continued beyond death, while a new king was both Horus, son of Osiris, and son of Re^C. The epithet 'Son of Re^C', stressed his divine nature while the epithet 'Son of Horus' explained his succession in the legitimate line.

Gradually, a democratization of this ritual revivification took place, giving rise to a more popular hope of sharing the power of Osiris. The earliest identification of a commoner with Osiris was at the end of the Sixth Dynasty.⁶⁵ This development can be explained by the loss of confidence in the human king particularly in the first Intermediate period.⁶⁶ By the time of the Coffin Texts, which document the mortuary faith in the Middle Kingdom, complete identification between the deceased man and Osiris was reached. The deceased was directly addressed as Osiris:

Raise thyself to life, (for) thou diest not! Raise thyself from thy left side, lay on thy right side (and) receive all the goods with which my father ⁶⁷Geb had endowed thee and with which Hathor has invested thee.

Despite our ignorance on many of the rituals and their implication, it is clear that a myth of Osiris, who was raised after death to life by certain specific actions of Isis, Nephthys, Anubis and Horus, was re-enacted in the lives of later Egyptians and influenced significantly the cult of Egypt. His life beyond the grave was not identical to his earlier life, but a Jenseits existence. ⁶⁸ Since the death of Osiris, caused by Seth without any particular motivation, was never stressed in the mythology it cannot be interpreted as signifying a substitution-sacrifice for others; the stress lay on Osiris' revivification. Through the agency of Osiris, others - in the first place, the king - could obtain well-being beyond the grave. Such salvation was attained by the efficacy of the acts of ritual simulation; patterned on what, in the myth, had been done by the deities to Osiris.

This study of Osirian influence shows that the Egyptian believer hoped to be treated like Osiris and this eventually issued in the belief that he was identified with Osiris and would share his mythological fate. Osiris was, in the first instance, a mediator with the world of the human. In the end, the process had advanced beyond indirect mediatorship to practical identification.

In order to appreciate fully the role of the pharaoh in Egyptian religion something now needs to be said on the coalescence ⁶⁹ of priesthood and kingship in the person of the pharaoh. In the first place the pharaoh was the high-priest of Egypt and, as such,

he took the principal role in the celebration of festivals. It is interesting to see the position of the regular priesthood vis-a-vis the kingship. It is conjectured that, originally, priestly duties were delegated by the pharaoh to hereditary heads of clans or shrines so that the priesthood was handed on, together with the rulership of a particular area. Gradually, from these beginnings, a class of priests evolved, whose members were united into colleges.⁷⁰ Their talents included a comprehensive knowledge of cultic duties and insight into the meaning of religious symbols. The Egyptian priest was not himself a mediator, in the way in which the pharaoh was, but was subsidiary to the pharaoh in the essential role of the maintenance of the cosmos in the form in which the gods created it. In other words, the priest assisted the pharaoh in his essential role of maintaining Ma-a-t. This explains the absence of priests from scenes on temple walls depicting rituals and offering rites.⁷¹ It was the pharaoh⁷² who, directly or indirectly, performed such tasks.

Certain conclusions can be derived from this study. The Egyptians perceived, in the world of experience, the presence of Ma-a-t. They expressed this mythologically and saw the dire need to preserve Ma-a-t at all costs. This was the principal function of the pharaoh, both as king and priest. But Ma-a-t already expressed an optimistic view of man. The cosmos was not in a state of a 'fall' but essentially it retained the order and harmony of Ma-a-t. The king, as mediator with the divine, found a certain identification with the world of the divine, as can be seen in his relationship with Re^C, Horus and Osiris and so he became a divine mediator, Son of Re^C, Son of Osiris.

A mediatorial model can be established with some security in the

case of Egypt. Confronted with the world of experience, the Egyptians were aware of a distance between the human community and the divine. Yet they also maintained, against the empirical evidence of death, a harmony and changelessness in human experience. This was expressed through the myth of Ma-a-t. The role of kingship was then seen as maintaining Ma-a-t, and historically there was no reason, apart from periodic disturbances, to question the efficacy of the kingship in performing this role. All other societal structures, therefore, remained subservient to the pharaoh and this led to identification of the pharaoh with the divinity. Gradual democratization of this identification was caused by the waning potency of the pharaohs. The social and political structures of Egypt normally found continuity and stability because of the success of the structure of kingship and of his mediatorship. By means of a mediatorial model the scope and evolution of the various structures and institutions of ancient Egypt can be adequately explained.

1.3.3 The Religious Culture of Mesopotamia

Two groups of people have controlled the cultural development of Mesopotamia - the Sumerians and the Semitic peoples, the Babylonians and the Assyrians. The Sumerians settled sometime before 3000 BC and had least intermittent contact with Semitic tribes until the collapse of their civilization. About 2350, Sargon, a Semitic prince, founded a new and powerful kingdom with its capital at Agade. This kingdom collapsed about 2150 due to Gutian invaders. These were eventually assimilated and independence regained around 2100. A little later Sumerian culture underwent a rebirth in the third dynasty of Ur. Around 2000 Ur was captured and destroyed and Sumerian culture, as an independent thing, was never to revive.

The Sumerian power was replaced by largely independent city-states. Because of this historical interaction between the Sumerians and the Semites there is difficulty in drawing a line between what is distinctively the possession of one or the other. Sometimes, deities that originally belonged to the Sumerians continued to be worshipped by the Babylonians and Assyrians under adapted names.

In the Sumerian god-lists four gods usually stand in the first place as the creating deities. An was the god of the heaven, constantly tending to become a deus otiosus; Enlil was the god of the atmosphere or storm; Enki the god of water and Ninhursag, the mother goddess. These were accompanied by three astral deities - the moon god Nanna (also known as Su'en), the sun god Utu and the goddess of fertility, Inanna, who represented the planet Venus, the morning and evening star.

Sumerian mythology, in its depiction of creation, presented two quite different representations. The first derived from the north in circles of nomadic culture. It depicted the beginning as an embryo-like universe which could be designated also as a cosmic mountain. From this, the heaven, An, arose and united with the earth in a cosmic marriage. The offspring of the union was the collection of other gods and mankind. The second representation came from the south and depicted creation as the union of the water Abzu and Mother Earth. Man was formed from the earth. Conflation between these two representations took place.

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Between the world of the numinous and the human world there were gods who acted as intermediaries. They were personal gods and during

the second half of the third millenium, we know at least the names of the personal gods who protected the interests of certain Sumerian rulers. It would seem, from inscriptional evidence, that in cases of suffering and personal adversity the sufferer could only glorify his personal god, even in those instances when the affliction was clearly unjustified.

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The cosmogonic myth, together with the existence of these personal gods, are indications of the gulf that existed, in Sumerian mythopoeic thought, between the human community and the numinous world. There was difficulty in contacting the world of the greater gods; man needed the lesser, personal gods for confronting the problems of life.

Sumerian mythology held that man was created in order to allow the gods to rest and, in the epic of Enki and Ninmah, to provide the gods with food and drink.

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This gulf between man and the gods was depicted above all by their Flood Story. Warned by the gods,

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Ziusudra built a boat whereby he escaped from cosmic devastation and acquired 'life like (that of) a god'. This myth was firmly entrenched in the collective mentality of Sumeria. Faced with the world of the sacred and divine, the Sumerian felt a sense of dread at the possibility of imminent chaos that was in contrast to the basic optimism of the Egyptian.

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Turning to the Sumerian community itself, we will examine the societal structures, for which evidence can be found. The city-state structure in Sumeria, with its political diversification, brought about a complex pattern of leadership which does not seem

capable of simple analysis.⁷⁹ The local temple was regarded as the ruling god's dwelling place in the midst of his personal estate. All land and its produce belonged primarily to the god who acted as a landowner acting through his temple and its officials. The vice-⁸⁰gerent of a god was the ensi, the sacral leader in a Sumerian city-state.

The monuments of the proto-historical period describe the function⁸¹ of the ensi as both priestly and political. Other titles of leading functionaries were en, which can be translated as 'lord' or 'high priest',⁸² and lugal, who was seemingly a leader in war. Both the en and the lugal would be best interpreted as special offices, created under exceptional circumstances, when the ensi was not able to cope. The priestly activity of the ensi and the en was, at a later date, delegated to the sanga, who served as temple officials and administrators, although the texts from Ur III do not assign any distinctively priestly role to them.⁸³ This confusion in titles would seem to be indicative of a confusion in roles.

The institution of the Sumerian king must have emerged within this complex development. The king, in fact, is shown to have⁸⁴ combined both the titles of the en and the lugal in himself, but this role was said to have been from the gods, who bestowed⁸⁵ the royal insignia.

The king's coronation was viewed as a new birth. Texts described the king as the 'son' of a god or a goddess: son of Enki, son of Su'en, 'the one begotten of the Great Mountain(Enlil)'.⁸⁶ The same king could be the son of An, Enlil and Nanna. Such convergence meant that the king had been crowned in the city of each

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of these gods - Nippur, Uruk and Ur. Through his call and election by each of the gods in turn, and through his intimacy with them, he was deemed to have entered the realm of the gods and so acquired the title of 'son'. It can be said that the path was being paved for the deification of the person of the king.

Explicit deification did take place during the Sumerian renaissance of Ur III. We know of divine worship being paid not only to the ruler but also to his predecessors. There were temples dedicated to god-kings in Eshunna and, from inscriptions, we are able to infer that there were similar ones in Lagash, Umma and
 88 Drehem. In Ur, however, during this period, the king was regarded as only the 'servant' of the city-god, Nanna, a notion that has its own importance.

Behind such attempts to describe the divine nature of the Sumerian king, and behind the attribution of fertility to him, lies the implicit belief in his mediatorship. The blessings of the gods came to the human community only through the king and without him
 89 the human community was bereft. Despite obvious confusion in assigning exact functions to titles, a mediatorial model, similar to that in Egyptian religion, does assist in interpreting both the development in the god-structure and the development in the societal structures of the human community in Sumeria. It was not by historical chance that sacral kingship emerged, nor by theological speculation that it took on divine overtones. Such development marked the Sumerian striving to close the gap between themselves and the world of the divine.

When the West Semitic Amorites triumphed over the Sumerian centres

of Isin and Larsa, new religious developments took place. The gods of Sumeria tended to be worshipped in Babylonia and Assyria under new, Akkadic names and, to a great extent, institutions of a religious nature were parallel in the two nations. Babylon was more stable and settled and this was reflected in its more static institutions, while Assyria tended towards more dynamic institutions and structures.

The library of Assurbanipal, in the seventh century, listed about 2500 names of gods, and others were known as well. Many were simply servants or attendants of the better known gods while some were nothing more than the figments of priestly theory. Three cosmic gods headed the pantheon: Anu, who was the Sumerian An, tended to become a deus otiosus; Enlil, who was also known by the Akkadic name of Bel; Ea, who was the Sumerian Enki. There was also three astral gods: the moon-god Sin, corresponding to Nanna (or Su'en), the sun-god Shamash and the goddess of the morning and evening star, Ishtar, who was the Sumerian Inanna. The storm-god Adad was often associated with Shamash and Ishtar.

From the time of Sargon there was a stress on the divine election of the king. Later, the Assyrian king also saw himself as divinely elected and 'sent' by the gods to the human community. From Sargon until the period of Hammurapi, the name of the king was written with the divine determinative, DINGIR. The king was recognised as the divine representative among men and the Sumerian title ensi continued to be used in the Semitic form of issaku (a representative). Representation tended towards identification

since, at times, kings and gods were shown in the same clothes. Naram-Sin wore a horned mitre which bore similarities to the typical garb of the gods.⁹⁴ His action, in transferring the centre of the Mesopotamian confederation from Nippur to Akkad and replacing Enlil by Ishtar, was designed to appropriate even further the god-structure to himself. However, from the time of Hammurapi, the divine determinative was no longer applied to the king. The movement towards identification had been halted. The king still remained a sacral person, but was not himself divine. This period coincided with the rise in status of the god Marduk.

The origins of Marduk are obscure. He was described as the son of Ea and had his temple in Babylon. He could not have achieved any real prominence until after the time of Hammurapi, since the only mention of him in the Code of Hammurapi is of little moment. The purpose of the Creation Epic, Enuma elish,⁹⁵ was to demonstrate how Marduk became the leading god in the pantheon with the title of king. He overcame the powers of chaos, headed by Tiamat, and the other gods transferred their powers to him. In this way, Marduk was enthroned as the city-god of Babylon and attained a special relationship to mankind. This was described as his being 'sent' by Ea and endowed with the necessary qualities to become the powerful helper of men.

The ritual setting for this myth, in Babylon, was the akitu festival, held during the first eleven days of Nisan. On the fourth day, Enuma elish was recited and, on the fifth day, the temple of Marduk was cleansed. All impurities were transferred to a slain sheep which was then disposed of. The king presented himself before the image of Marduk, deemed to be the instrument

through which Marduk manifested himself. A priest removed the insignia of kingly office from the king and humiliated him in a ritual fashion. The king then made a ritual confession and received absolution from Marduk via the priest. Later, on the tenth day of the feast, the king 'took Marduk's hand' and led him to the akitu-house outside the city. A cultic re-presentation of the creation struggle took place. Marduk, in the image, was then led back to the city by the king.

The role of the king, as it was understood after Hummurapi, was further described in the myth of Etana, which told of the time when there was no king. Then kingship descended from above:

They (the gods) had not yet set up a king for the beclouded
 No headband and crown had (yet) been fashioned ...
 No sceptre had (yet) been studded with lapis lazuli ...
 Sceptre, crown, headband, and staff
 Were (still) placed before Anu in heaven
 So that there was no counselling of its⁹⁶ (i.e. kingship's) people
 (Then) kingship descended from heaven.

The king was clearly seen not as a god but as a mortal. He received veneration because of the action of the gods in bestowing kingship, but kingship was a gift which could be removed at any time. It was the office of kingship that was divine in origin and not the human office-bearer. Through assumption of the office, the king received strength to fight against the enemies of the gods, those 'who slandered the name of his god'.⁹⁷ On a more positive level, it was the function of the sacral king to bring about security and stability among the community. Thus, Hammurapi could say that he was the 'king of righteousness (mesaru) to whom Shamash had entrusted justice (kettu)'.⁹⁸

The situation was similar in Assyria, except that Assur held the place of Marduk and the Assyrian version of the Creation myth replaced Marduk with Assur. The Assyrian king showed similar strength and awesomeness to his Babylonian counterpart. In Assyrian sources, during the ninth century, there are frequent references to the melammu of the king, which terrified and overwhelmed the enemies of the state. The melammu was the dazzling aureole which surrounded that which was divine. All things sharing in divine power also shared the melammu. In the particular case of the king it gave legitimation to his royalty. A similar notion was found in the puluhtu, a garment of flame which surrounded either the god or the king as was probably identified with a red garment in cultic contexts. At times the puluhtu was used as a substitute for the person himself.¹⁰⁰ Functionally the melammu and the puluhtu could be compared to the horned mitre of Maram-Sin. The melammu could not itself be seen. It was a concept that expressed both the divine glory and the royal glory.

Together with the emphasis on melammu there was also found, in Assyrian iconography, references to the winged sun-disk. An enameled tile from the reign of Tukulti-Ninurta II (890-884) shows Assur riding in a winged disk with drawn bow aimed at the king's enemies.¹⁰¹ This art reveals, in a striking fashion, a certain religious identification between the king and the god, the power of the state and the power of the god.¹⁰² Such identification was never absolute since the melammu of Assur could act outside and beyond the actions of the human king, but the Assyrian king was still seen as the image of the god:

The shadow of the god is the man, and men are the shadows of the man. The man, he is the king, who is as it were an image of the god.¹⁰³

The god, in this particular case, would have been Marduk or Shamash.

The progression in Assyria, that would possibly explain such a movement towards qualified identification, would have begun with a leader who was originally no more than a primus inter pares among tribal chieftains, linked in some loose amphictyonic league. Such were certainly known at Hama and possible at Na'iri. The chieftains would have lived around a sanctuary of Assur and acted there, in the earlier period, as kings and priests, each for a year.¹⁰⁴ But within Assyria, as in Babylon, there was felt the need to bridge the gulf between man and the gods. From such a need there emerged the sacral king, given legitimacy by his divine calling and representing, in his person, a god.

Both in Babylon and Assyria, the king was not only the representative of the gods to the people, he was also the representative of the people before the gods and so one of his main tasks was to build and maintain the temples, where the gods were considered to dwell. Because of this function he received his principal priestly titles - enu and sangu.¹⁰⁵ Hence, kingship and priesthood cannot be distinguished in the person of the ruler.

Where Babylonian priesthood developed separately from the kingship, however, it remained subservient to the crown. The categories of priesthood continued those established in Sumeria, although more is known of the actual tasks assigned to the Babylonian types.¹⁰⁶ Gradually the classes of priests became hereditary. Their influence

on the kingship varied according to different historical eras but the kings of Babylon, and of Assyria, never surrendered their prerogative of appointing officials among the priesthood.

The Assyrian king, as issaku of Assur, had delegated power which was sacerdotal. He was, in fact, the high priest of Assur, performing sacrifice and other ritual. He played the part of Assur in the creation myth during the enthronement ritual. But, although the king had this supreme role, representing the people before the gods, he did not have exclusive access to the gods. Recent literature from Mari has indicated the separatedness of a prophetic role.¹⁰⁷ There are examples of prophets who, having spontaneously received messages from a deity, were commanded to pass them on to the king. The god would thereby take the initiative, not directly through the king, but through the prophet. In these instances, however, it is of interest to note that the action ultimately desired by the god was to be implemented by the king and not the prophet. Sometimes the same type of message was received directly by the king from the god in dreams. The prophet's intermediary role was still subsidiary to that of the king.

These developments must be seen against the world-view of the time. The gulf that was felt to exist between the world of the gods and the human community, in the thought of the Babylonians and Assyrians, is well exemplified by the Epic of Gilgamesh.¹⁰⁸ This text expressed man's vain striving for the ability to live forever, thus sharing the life of the gods. Such a need to bridge the gulf gave rise to the forms of kingship, and subsidiary priesthood and prophetism, of which we have evidence. Moreover, in the re-writing of myths and epics there was even more emphasis on man's sinfulness

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and his need for intercession before the gods. While both the Babylonians and the Assyrians held to a concept of retribution - sin was punished while fidelity was rewarded by prosperity and long life - there were problems in accepting the justice of a simple equivalence between sin and its retribution. ¹¹⁰ The problem of the suffering of a righteous man was dealt with in a poem - Ludlul bel nimequ ¹¹¹ ('I will praise the lord of wisdom'). The sufferer could not find the cause of his sinfulness from any oracle-priest nor could he receive any help from the lesser gods. It was finally Marduk himself who intervened and directly saved the sufferer. The poem ends with a eulogy addressed to Marduk. While such a plight reveals the break-down of a mediatorial system, it also indicates that such a system would have been the first recourse.

Although in its earlier stages Akkadian kingship tended to parallel Egyptian kingship, the stress on the human and transitory character of the king was much more noticeable. It was possible for the human office-bearer to be clearly distinguished from the office of kingship. The human office bearer required a renewal of office and a vindication of his office in a way that was not true of the Egyptian pharaoh. The human community and the divine order made contact through kingship. It was through kingship, too, that prosperity and victory, the fruits of the gods, could be obtained and this remained valid apart from the qualities of the actual person who held the office of kingship.

1.3.4 West Semitic Religious Culture

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In order to understand the major facets of West Semitic religion, it is first necessary to appreciate the god-structure.

Throughout the western area the god 'El had supreme authority.¹¹³
 He was given various titles, one of which was 'ab snm which is¹¹⁴
 illustrative, even if it has created difficulties. The title
 probably refers to the exalted position held by 'El, as father of the
 divine pantheon.¹¹⁵ Other epithets bestowed on 'El at Ugarit were¹¹⁶
 'father of men', 'Creator', 'King' and 'Bull'. All these titles
 and epithets demonstrate the superior position of 'El. Further,
 the title 'King' expresses mythologically the active notion of
 regular government and the maintenance of order against the forces
 of disorder.¹¹⁷ 'Bull' is not completely divorced from this and
 signifies strength and vigour in maintaining such order.

'El and his wife, Asherah, gave rise to a large family. The
 gods Yamm and Mot appear to be the most original of this family,
 and indigenous to Canaan. Perhaps ^cAttar is just as primitive.
 'El and his family constituted the pantheon of Canaan and various
 members were assigned dominion over the different parts of the cosmos
 by 'El. They took care of all divine functions, of which the most
 important was the provision of fertility.¹¹⁸

It is possible to chart, in a vague fashion, the path followed
 by 'El. As early as 2500 BC there is mention of 'El (ór Il) in¹¹⁹
 cuneiform texts. It is clear from such names that 'El was a
 leading deity among the Semites of Mesopotamia before they entered
 Canaan. There had been a movement of Semites into Babylonia and
 Egypt shortly after 3000 BC, although infiltration of the Fertile
 Crescent seems to have been a comparatively constant phenomenon.¹²⁰
 Between 2500 and 2300 a new movement of a nomadic people, called
 the Amurru, began moving into Northern Mesopotamia from the semi-arid

fringes of the Fertile Crescent. This movement led to the foundation of the empire of Akkad. By the time of Ur III there was a more war-like incursion of Amorites into Mesopotamia and, moving into Syria, they established states such as Alalakh, Carchemish, Aleppo, Qatna and Ugarit. Urban civilization was seriously disrupted at this time, and the new arrivals developed their own culture and religion.¹²¹

A fourth movement of Semitic migration took place between 1400 and 900. These were the Aramaeans. They penetrated into the territory east and west of the Jordan and they would account for at least part of the earlier settlement of the Israelites.¹²²

It is reasonable to conjecture that 'El was the god of these nomadic Amorites since an analysis of Amorite personal names from Mesopotamia reveals that those dating from Ur III characteristically contain Il-'El while those from the Old Babylonian period contain Hadad-Dagan.¹²³ Among the Semites in Mesopotamia the worship of 'El would have died out when they took over the Sumerian pantheon and their gods virtually became Sumerian gods with Semitic names. But while the worship of 'El faded out in Mesopotamia it flourished among those Semites who had left and migrated to the west.

Conflict developed, in the west, between 'El and Ba^Cal. Ba^Cal, at Ugarit, was the ancient Semitic god Hadad. He was the storm-god and bore the epithet 'rider of the clouds'¹²⁴ in order to signify this. In the storm Ba^Cal manifested his powerful control over all the waters of the heaven, with which he was able to render the earth fertile. The storm was his theophany and in it he demonstrated himself to the council of heaven in order to affirm his own kingship.

Ba^Cal required a heavenly structure within which he could operate with effectiveness as king amid the storm and he obtained permission from 'El to build this structure. Its location was in the north of Ugarit, at Mount Sapan, the site of the Assembly of the gods.¹²⁵

Ba^Cal maintained a war between himself and the sons of 'El-Yamm and Mot.¹²⁶ Yamm desired to take over Ba^Cal's claim to royal status and 'El finally capitulated to Yamm's pleas and allowed him to engage Ba^Cal in conflict. In this conflict Ba^Cal was victorious, and victory gave him eternal rule over the cosmic waters, thereby establishing his kingship. Because of his victory over Yamm, Ba^Cal had control over life and creative activity.¹²⁷ This mythological battle and subsequent victory reflected historical changes. The Amorites of later infiltrations would have brought Dagan, Hadad and 'Anat into Canaan.¹²⁸ Dagan did not achieve any importance; Hadad became Ba^Cal and by approximately 1900 BC he must have attained some priority since by then his temple at Ugarit was built.¹²⁹ The conflict of Ba^Cal and the sons of 'El reflected the amalgamation of two groups of Amorites. The first group retained the nomadic worship of 'El while the second had acquired the worship of Ba^Cal-Hadad, but the 'El worship was difficult to maintain, as 'El had the tendency to become a deus otiosus.¹³⁰

The myth of the conflict between Ba^Cal and Yamm reveals something of the former's principal attribute. Yamm sent messengers to the council of the gods saying:

Deliver, O gods, the one whom you obey,
whom the multitudes obey,
Deliver Ba^Cal and his anan¹³¹
The Son of Dagon, I shall succeed to his paz.

There is doubt over the translation of ¹³²C_{anan} but usage shows that it designated something closely identified with the divine beings, a substitute for them or an aspect of them. ¹³³ While there is no semantic equivalent, it would seem that the sense is best conveyed by something analogous to the Akkadian ¹³⁴melammu.

Thus the relationship of Ba^Cal to 'El is somewhat clarified. Ba^Cal took over those functions of 'El which were closely associated with man's welfare. As an active god he had an ^{C_{anan}}, and this ^{C_{anan}} might best be defined as his self-manifestation. We must now see the other aspect of the divine-human relationship in West Semitic religion, namely divine kingship.

In the West Semitic area large size kingdoms never eventuated. Small city-states were the normal form of political and social organization. However, the kings of these city-states did have a sacral character, claiming that they had been elected by the gods. ¹³⁵ Such kings also were responsible for temple building and received the title of 'priest', in a way similar to the Mesopotamian instances. This sacral character of the Canaanite king was reflected in the legend of Krt, in whatever way the text should be interpreted. ¹³⁶ Krt was regarded as the son of 'El. When the king had offspring ¹³⁷ these were suckled by the goddesses Athirat and 'Anat.

In short, the king was the representative of 'El in the human domain and was nurtured on the divine power. Thereafter, he became the source of divine power and blessing for the human community. The father-son relationship between 'El and Krt was reproduced in each human king. Further, Krt, as king, became

the centre of both good and evil influence in the natural order. When Krt was prevented from attending to his duties by illness, the whole community suffered: the rain did not fall and the crops did not grow. The influence of Krt on nature and fertility reflected the relationship that the sacral king had toward the natural order.

The relationship of Krt and 'El throws further light on the institution of kingship.

And let her bear offspring to Krt
 And a lad to the Servant (^Cbd) of 'El
 Krt awoke and (lo, it was) a dream; 138
 The Servant of 'El and (lo, it was) a fantasy.

What ails Krt that he weeps,
 The Beloved, Lad of 'El, that he cries?
 Is it a kingship, like Bull, his father's¹³⁹ he desires
 Or authority like the Father of Man's?

Krt thus had the epithet 'Servant of 'El' applied to him. While the term 'servant' expresses a peculiar relationship between Krt and 'El, relationship was not exclusively limited to Krt as 'El was also the 'Father of Man'. Hence, he was primarily the father of the community and, secondarily, father of Krt in whom that community was embodied. It was this latter aspect that seems to be conveyed
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 by 'Servant of 'El'.

Little more can be said on the divine-human relationship. The extant literature of the West Semitic religions differs from the Mesopotamian evidence in as much as there is no human creation account and few conclusions can be drawn concerning the nature and destiny of man. The 'Aqht Epic emphasises the mortality of man, while viewing immortality as the privilege of the gods. The gods

were able to lengthen or shorten the life span of man, since life was a gift. There is no myth of a Fall, which would explain their view of the human condition, but since the Israelites were later to make use of elements of the Mesopotamian myth of a Fall it is likely that that same myth would have been known and used in the West Semitic region generally.

The interesting factors in this study have been, in the first place, the tendency for 'El to give way to Ba^Cal. Ba^Cal, the god of the storm and, therefore, the god of fertility, had taken over those aspects of the divine which were required for the perpetuation of mankind. No matter what complex reason can be found for the intrusion of Ba^Cal worship into the west, the important fact is that the divine structure tended to fragment and to move closer to mankind. Ba^Cal, further, had his C^{an}an which would seem to be functionally associated with the Mesopotamian melammu and similar phenomena. The second interesting factor is the human king, whose role can be understood in the light of Krt. His kingship shared in the power of the divine.

A model would depict, on the divine side, Ba^Cal moving away from 'El towards the human community. On the human side, there would be the elevation of the sacral king to the special status of 'servant', which does not indicate dissociation from the human community but a special relationship with the god. The fusion of the divine and human orders could well have been thought of as occurring in the C^{an}an or some similar phenomenon.

A consistent pattern relating to systems of knowledge can be perceived within the study we have completed so far. The religious

reaction to the gulf that exists between the human and the divine is to establish a mediatorial link. This bridges that gulf. The extreme points of the divine-human continuum are the High God and the undifferentiated human community. On the part of the human community there is a sense of awe and fear, a profound need to bridge the gulf in order to obtain perpetuity, well-being and prosperity, which are the fruits of a total and consistent pattern of meaning, of a religious system of meaning

The mediatorship structure consists in a movement from the numinous to the human community and, reciprocally, a movement from the human community to the numinous. This mythopoeic movement specifically differentiates both the god-structure and the human community. From the side of the High God, there is a 'sending'. The 'sending' gives rise to an intermediary god or divine being, who can take such forms as Urmensch, First King or an active god of war or fertility. From the onset of such a 'sending' the High God tends to become a deus otiosus. From the side of the human community, there is the designation by some accepted process (election, dynastic descent etc.) of an intermediary personage (or institution). The human institution can take on more or less complex forms, depending on historical exigencies. The simplest form, of course, was the absolute ruler-king in whom the power of mediatorship was totally vested. In the course of time such a one tended to delegate mediatorial powers to others - priests and charismatic prophets. Sometimes these latter themselves partitioned his total role. It was possible for various institutions to share the mediatorial powers unequally, therefore, and then the social structure of community would be more complicated. A fusion occurs between the

emissary of the High God and the elected representative of the community. That fusion had occurred would be indicated by such mythopoeic devices as the winged disk, the melammu, the puluhtu, and the ^Canan. These are all functionally analogous; they illustrate the ability and availability of the god-structure to interact ritually with the human structure. This fusion can vary in intensity in different communities.

In the example from anthropological research, Nyikang was the emissary of the High God, Juok, as the First King. The human king, in so far as he was king, fused with Nyikang at any particular point of time. Through their human representative the Shilluk had access to Nyikang and therefore to the High God and from such access they derived salvific harmony. In the case of Egypt, the emissary was principally Osiris. The tendency towards fusion was strong, to such an extent that the pharaoh became divine in his own person. This simplified the structure and ensured that the social structures would remain relatively simple. This identification was primarily due to lack of dread before the divine, the lack of a true sense of sinfulness or of a 'fall'. In the other cases in the ancient Near Eastern material, the emissaries were Marduk, Assur and Ba^Cal. The fusion in these cultures was less well-developed than in Egypt, and this can again be attributed to the historical and cultural milieu.

The primordial act of emission from the High God takes place in mythological time. The election or accession of the king, or other intermediary person, takes place in profane time. The fusion, denoted by phenomena such as the winged disk, was the act of in-

breaking of the divine order into the human. Mythical time became contemporary with a particular community.

1.3.5 Ancient Israelite Religious Culture

When ancient Israel is examined, a phenomenological study of the High God, YHWH, shows basic similarity to the West Semitic God, 'El. YHWH derived from 'El, living a new life within the new context of Israelite history and culture.

The putative ancestors of Israel, the groups behind the Patriarchal stories, entered Palestine as part of one or more of the Semitic migrations into the Fertile Crescent. They accepted and were integrated into the culture of the settled area. Culturally they were not of different stock to the Canaanites who had settled around the same time. The religion of these semi-nomadic groups can only be conjectured from the extant sources in the biblical literature. In the biblical, pre-Mosaic nomenclature there is an absence of names compounded with YHWH and, indeed, the sources speak of a deity of the type 'god of my (your, his) Father'.

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A. Alt had first proposed that this type of divinity was found elsewhere in the ancient Near East. Alt's basic material was drawn from Nabatean and Palmyrean sources and this limitation to a time span much later than Israel, and to a locale that differed from Israel's caused objection. The theory was substantially
¹⁴²
modified by J. Lewy who concentrated rather on the evidence from Kultepe and the north-west Semitic world.

From this research it has been found that the 'god of the Father' was a deity that was associated with the head of a dynasty,

thereby becoming the major deity of the people or tribe. In the case of the King of Qatna the 'god of the Father' seems to have been Re^C or Shamash. The Kultepe evidence is concerned with the major deity of the local Amorites, sometimes denoted by Ilu. In Sam'al the third major deity was named 'god of the Father', where 'Father' referred to the king.

The Patriarchal narratives give other similar formulae in which the names of the ancestor are specifically mentioned. Thus we find 'God of Abraham', ¹⁴³ 'God of Abraham, your Father', ¹⁴⁴ 'God of Isaac', ¹⁴⁵ 'God of my/his Father Isaac', ¹⁴⁶ 'God of Nahor', ¹⁴⁷ But the more formal and primitive names were certainly 'ābir ya'āqob, ¹⁴⁸ paḥad yishāq, ¹⁴⁹ 'eben yisrā'ēl ¹⁵⁰ and māgēn 'abrāhām. ¹⁵¹ Such names would have indicated a personal relationship between the particular deity and the ancestral figure of the clan. ¹⁵²

The earliest discernable stage, therefore, in the religion of ancient Israel would have been clan worship, with each clan having its own particular god. The earliest religious traditions of Israel would have reflected the assimilation of gods by specific clans. Typically, there would have been a revelation of a deity, manifesting himself to an ancestor in some experience. There would have been an act of choosing that deity on the part of the group led by that ancestor, with an assurance of his protection. To this assurance would have responded the cultic worship of the clan. Such traditions exist in the patriarchal narratives of Genesis.

The clans of what was to become Israel, having taken part in the Amorite infiltration of Palestine, settled in new, permanent locations. It became necessary to transplant earlier traditions

of god-manifestations to a new locality. Ancient cultic sagas belonging to the clans were replaced by sanctuary legends and in this way various sanctuaries were given legitimacy for later generations. In the case of sites dedicated to 'El, the clan gods were simply equated with the local manifestations of 'El. The sanctuary legend was assimilated to the clan legend. Thus, B^eer-lahai-ro'i in the Negeb, a sanctuary dedicated to 'El Ro'i, was equated with the god of the clan of Isaac. B^eer-sheba, with its local 'El C^olam became equated with the god of the Abraham clan as well as with the god of the Isaac clan. At Bethel, 'El 153 Bethel became the god of the Jacob clan. This assimilation of the clan deities to the 'El religion of the already established and developed Caananite cult brought into being a new form of the 'El religion in which certain features of the two forms of cult could be found.

But the decisive moment of the metamorphosis of Israel's religion came about through a 'Moses-group'. The origins of this group will doubtless remain obscure. Egyptian evidence clearly shows that during the period 1500-1200 there was considerable interaction between Egypt and Asiatic nomads, who sought refuge there. The Egyptians brought C^apiru back as prisoners and slaves. 154 The existence of a Moses and of a Semitic group in Egypt is therefore quite plausible. One other item in the tradition deserves comment. The traditions concerning Moses insist on a marriage to an alien woman, the daughter of a Midianite priest named Jethro. 155 This would hardly have been a fabricated tradition and probably points to

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a sojourn by Moses in the land of Midian. The Midianites, in the time of Moses, were quite strong. They had established a protectorate over Edom, the Kenites, Moabites and other southern Transjordanian tribes and had control of the caravan routes of Western Arabia between Palestine and Egypt, on the one hand, and between Dedan and Sheba on the other.

Moses, like the Patriarchs, had a theophany of a god, YHWH. The Israelite explanation for the name of this god was an endeavour to find some semantic basis in the actual text. 157 The many subsequent attempts by modern scholars to give further elaboration to the expression 'ehyeh āser 'ehyeh indicates that the name YHWH was already incomprehensible to the Israel that handed it on. Turning to our resources which might be relevant to this etymological problem (and we do have more resources than the Israelite theologians) we are still beset by lack of evidence. There is no conclusive evidence that the name YHWH was used in cuneiform literature prior to the eighth century. However, from the early second millenium there are certain indications that would allow a 158 substantial hypothesis.

In the West Semitic area there were certain expressions, approximating the form of YHWH, which were used in a cultic context. 159 Babylonian and Akkadian texts supply us with Yaum-ilum and Yawi-ilum, 160 meaning 'mine is the God' and 'God is'. By no means is it suggested that these names could be exactly equated with YHWH in the Israelite context, however.

Of more proximate interest are certain theophoric names of

rulers of Aramean states in Syria, from the eighth century, incorporating either Ya'u or Yah. Assyrian inscriptions mention
 161
 Ya'ubid'di of Hamath, who was also known as Ilu bi'di. There
 was also Azriya'u of the northern state of Sam'al and possibly
 162
 Ga'yah, the father of King Katya. Since the Arameans developed
 from the same kinship line as Israel, these names are of some importance. Azriya'u assassinated the king and usurped his throne in a manner reminiscent of the usurpation of northern Israel by Jehu. In both cases the coup d'état could well have been an act of resistance to the course of political submission and cultural assimilation to Assyria. It could be conjectured, granted without solid foundation, that Aramean elements, like the earlier Moses group, had come into contact with the Midianites and so discovered the worship of YHWH. Thus both Jehu and Azriya'u could have been acting for the same motive of defending the god YHWH.

More interest centres on recent archaeological findings at
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 Soleb in the Sudan, where the earliest certain extrabiblical appearance of YHWH, in the form Jhw3, occurs as a nominal form among Asiatic place-names on an Amenhotep III (1413-1377) temple of Amon. The place name is associated with the Shashu of the Seir-Edom region of southern Palestine. This could be an indication
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 that the Shashu-tribes were worshippers of YHWH.

Nor is the Soleb finding isolated. Excavations have recently taken place at Arad, a biblical town about twenty miles from Beersheba. An early Bronze Age city goes back to the first centuries of the third millennium. Settlement was renewed in part of the ancient city in the Iron Age, about the eleventh century. Amongst the finds in this

citadel has been an Israelite sanctuary. It dates from the ninth century and was probably destroyed during the cultic reform of Josiah. B. Mazar has connected this sanctuary with information in Judges 1:16:

And the children of the Kenite, Moses' father-in-law, went up out of the city of palm-trees with the children of Judah into the wilderness of Judah, which is in the Negeb of Arad.

Mazar sees a connection with Judges 4:11 and Jael, the wife of Heber the Kenite, who separated himself from the family of Hobab and set up his tents in Galilee at a place called elon b^esa^c annim. He sees it as coincidental that members of the family of Hobab, whose relationship with Moses is widely attested, are connected in two places with worship (references to oak trees signify places of cult). It is possible, in Mazar's opinion, that the reason for the establishment of the Israelite sanctuary at Arad was the previous
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establishment of a YHWH sanctuary there under Kenite aegis.

These new findings have revived interest in the so-called 'Kenite' hypothesis - that YHWH had originally been the god of the
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Kenites, or the Midianites. Difficulties still remain with that hypothesis. The tradition of Moses' contact vacillates between Kenites and Midianites. This could be solved if the Kenites were a sub-group of the Midianites, since there is considerable fluctuation in the geographical setting assigned to the Kenites in the biblical tradition.

However, on a more general level, we are able to provide an outline hypothesis for the emergence of YHWH worship. In the ancient Near East, god-names sometimes derived from what were, at an earlier

date, merely epithets attached to the names of gods. Thus, in Sumerian litanies, epithets applied to a particular god in one list appear as subsidiary names of the god in other god-lists. This may provide a clue to the name of YHWH. Amorite personal names make use of a verbal form yawi to construct such instances as Yawi-ila, Yawi-Addu, Yawi-Il, Yawi-An. Probably the meaning of yawi was 'The god X has brought (a child) into being'. It is at least possible that there was a parallel verbal form attached, as an epithet, to 'El giving YHWH-'El. Later, the epithet became the name and so YHWH was formed as the distinctive name of a god, although the original meaning would have been lost. The attempts at interpretation, as found in the tradition in the book of Exodus, would have been of no more consequence than the naive etymologies applied to other proper names in the Pentateuch.

When we compare YHWH, as known to the early Israelites, to various gods of the ancient Near East, it would seem clear that the closest parallel would be with 'El rather than other deities that have been suggested such as Enlil, Ba^Cal-shemen, Hadad or Qos. This would not go counter to a strongly supported theory, based on internal evidence, that YHWH was the son of 'El. Perhaps the strongest hint in the biblical literature that YHWH and 'El are one and the same is found in the Balaam narratives. In these 'El is identified as the one who brought Israel out of Egypt and is depicted with the typical bull horns ruling out an interpretation that 'el is simply a generic term. In pronouncing blessings, Balaam identified 'El with YHWH, on two occasions.

Various authors have pointed out the connection between YHWH

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and Ba^Cal in the text of Exodus 15. In that text YHWH is presented as a warrior and his battle is against the historical forces of Egypt. The Sea (yām) and the Storm become the pawns of YHWH as he espouses the cause of downtrodden Israel. The emah of YHWH paralyzes the opposition and YHWH leads the people to the 'holy encampment', either Canaan or Zion. There he is regaled with kingship. Thus, the narrative would endeavour to explain the kingship of YHWH from an historical experience.

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A parallel cycle of motifs is associated with Canaanite kingship: Ba^Cal triumphed over Yam in battle and received kingship. The pattern is the same but while Ba^Cal's triumph is in mythical time with a mythical opponent, YHWH's activity involved historical time and an historical opponent, Egypt.

However, it should not be taken as certain that all such warlike reference at Ugarit is attributable to Ba^Cal alone. While Ugaritic texts do not explicitly endow 'El with warrior qualities, Philo describes him as 'El gibbor and there is a warrior army associated with him in his battle against his father. There is thus the suspicion that this aspect of 'El continued to be remembered in southern Canaan into the first millenium, while at Ugarit 'El had become a deus otiosus.

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And so the likely solution to the question of development is as follows. At Ugarit the warrior 'El became a deus otiosus and was replaced by the more active Ba^Cal, who had entered Canaan as Hadad from Mesopotamia. Ba^Cal assumed the procreative and the warrior functions of 'El and while the latter maintained principality

in the pantheon, Ba^Cal was the god to whom normal recourse was made. In southern Canaan 'El also tended towards a functionless state. However he was replaced in an active capacity not by a newly imported god, but by a god who was simply another manifestation of 'El. YHWH was therefore a warrior-god who then took on a new direction when he was enmeshed in historical event by the Israelite traditions. 174

The identification would explain the absence, in the biblical tradition, of any polemical attitude towards 'El and the facile accommodation of the cult of YHWH to the 'El cult of the Patriarchal tribes after the time of Moses.

A third stage in the religious development of ancient Israel was effected by the ferment of the arrival of the Moses-group into Palestine. They brought with them the basic epic of their god YHWH, preserved today within Exodus 15, telling of YHWH's victory over the enemies of the Moses-group and his acquisition of kingship. This epic is of crucial importance for an understanding of Israel's religion. No other Near Eastern religion could identify an historical moment of beginning, knowledge and contact with the deity being based on nature and experience of the cosmos. YHWH had not manifested himself to Israel in cosmic time but in historical time. Therefore the Creation myth and annual cycle of the other religions were replaced, within Israel, by the Exodus epic and the cultic agricultural feasts changed, under Israelite direction, from a celebration of the annually occurring activities of harvest and in-gathering to the actualisation of the once-and-for-all historical events of the Exodus. The deliverance from Egypt was the functional correlate of the creation. 175

The Exodus-event took on the character of myth.

There was, therefore, an uniqueness about the Israelite faith

in YHWH from the time of Moses. YHWH, no matter what his earlier 'history', entered personally via certain identifiable historical events into fellowship with Moses and the first 'Israel'-group through him.¹⁷⁶ The Exodus event became the primordial act of YHWH in founding his relationship with his people.

We are now in a position to reconstruct the myth of Israel. A group of semi-nomadic people, whom we will designate as the Moses-group, attributed a deliverance from the Egyptians to a god YHWH. If he had not been originally YHWH-'El then he was at least of the 'El type of god, pertaining to that god-structure that had preceded the functionless form of 'El in Canaanite culture. From the time of Israel's deliverance he was activated in a new direction,¹⁷⁷ as was true of other deities in the ancient Near East. He became YHWH of the Exodus, who brought the Moses-group out of the bondage of Egypt.

Most probably the earliest manifestations of YHWH were conveyed, in mythological terms, by means of the Cānān or cloud,¹⁷⁸ analogous to the melammu of Mesopotamian divine theophanies. The Cānān of YHWH is identifiable with YHWH himself: he comes in it and through it. There is also, in the context of Exodus, a warrior aspect to the Cānān which was true of the winged disk, the melammu and puluhtu.

The basic theophanic experience of Moses was of a warrior-presence of YHWH in Cānān (cloud) and 'ēs (fire). These manifestations travelled with the Moses-group; they were the means whereby¹⁷⁹ the presence of YHWH could be validated. Moses led the group in the manner of a pharaoh who had contact with the winged-disk, or an

Assyrian king who had contact with the melammu or puluhtu. Because of this manifestation in historical event there was a freedom about YHWH that had not been evidenced in other Near Eastern religions. YHWH was certainly not a deus otiosus; he could not be manipulated. Hence there was an insistence in the myth of Israel that YHWH himself was not seen. No image therefore of YHWH could be tolerated since an image focused the power of a deity to a point of manageable proportion.

The Moses-group activated YHWH and entered into an alliance with him, the purpose of which was his aid and guidance in war. The original deliverance, as described in Exodus 15, became the prototype of other future deliverances. ¹⁸⁰ In the original event the Cānān of YHWH first became visible. Such a primal event can be compared to the creation of the cosmos by Marduk's overpowering of the chaos in the Babylonian myth. The victory of YHWH was lifted out of its unique context of historicity and became a mythical account. The original moment of contact with the Cānān could be reconstructed at later times by myth and ritual.

Such contact with YHWH was the possession, at first, of a small group. Eventually it was to become the common property of those who formed the confederacy of later Israel. The tribes of Palestine were forming and struggling against opposition, when they were faced with the missionary zeal of this immigrant group. It would only have been at that stage, when the emerging tribal structure in Palestine was accepting the faith-commitment in YHWH of the immigrant group, that 'Israel' became an historical reality.

The immigrant group had taken its rise from an historical

event that was not in itself repeatable since it was not a cosmic event. In perceiving the action of the god YHWH in an historical event the Moses-group were not unique. Their uniqueness came from the need to perpetuate the pattern of the original War of YHWH. At first the pattern was continued in other wars or skirmishes, since warlike adventurers must have been part of the way of life that fell to the wanderers. But after their installation in Canaan and their acceptance by the tribes there must have been periods of comparative peace. It was precisely this experience of non-war that led to the organisation of Israel. Just as the later wars were interpreted according to the pattern of the primordial war at the Sea of Reeds, so too the organisation of Israel required a primordial founding event.

Organisation meant that the inaccessible YHWH could be brought, in a stable fashion, into regular contact with the human community through ritual. The Sinai tradition took its shape as the basis for such a paradigmatic form of ritual. It was, at a later stage, inserted into the Exodus tradition. The Exodus tradition reflects therefore the War of YHWH pattern; the Sinai tradition reflects the development of ritual in a more established and peaceable Israel.

The Sinai tradition was the attestation that at a certain primordial point of time YHWH had made himself present to the first group in the ¹⁸¹Cānān. The warrior aspect of this original theophany remained.¹⁸² The Sinai theophany was paradigmatic for all of Israel's cultic contact just as the primordial War was paradigmatic for all other wars. The structure consisted of a visibilisation of YHWH in a theophany, a direct contact being established with Moses alone (and those who later represented the Moses-office), an ensuing

dialogue between YHWH and the 'Moses' of the cultic celebration and the bringing of a message to the community. The visibilisation of YHWH (originally the cānān and 'ēs) took on various cultic forms such as incense, smoke, fire and the sound of the śōpār, but, secondarily, it was realised in particular historical events which were then seen in the light of the primordial theophany. Such an event was known as a 'word', dābār. The message took on the historical form of the codification of law and the interpretation of historical events.

The Sinai tradition was the essential bridge in meeting the problem of continuity in Israel. YHWH had been a nomadic god of the desert region. He was zeh sīnay, 'The One of Sinai',¹⁸³ linked in some definite way with the geographical locale of Sinai.¹⁸⁴ He had become YHWH of the Exodus. The human community living in Canaan could not maintain sufficient contact with Sinai, although it is probable that pilgrimages continued until the time of the monarchy. This problem was solved by the Sinai tradition which gave a basis for repeated contact with YHWH and also issued the promise that YHWH would travel, in some form, with the people to Canaan.¹⁸⁵ The original form of this travelling presence would have been the cānān.¹⁸⁶

Analysing this material from ancient Israel, in the same way as was done with the earlier Near Eastern evidence, reveals a similar mediatorial structure. It can be described by means of the mediatorial model. The religious need within Israel was, primarily,

to establish and maintain contact with the god YHWH. From the side of YHWH there were hypostatizations - the ^cānān or cloud, the Angel, and, at a later date, the [^][^]dabār or word. From the part of the human community there was Moses, the guide and leader. 187
Of his role more will be detailed below.

1.4 Definition of the Experiential Model of Religious Knowledge

As a conclusion to this chapter, it is now necessary to outline more definitely the structure revealed by the empirical research of religious cultures. In short, a religious community takes up a particular stance or posture before what it regards as the manifestation of Ultimacy in its experience. In so doing, it aims to achieve contact from which derives meaning and knowledge. It expresses that relationship by means of its myth and ritual and so, logically, an analysis of this symbolic expression should lead to a structure or structures of the particular kind of knowledge to which religion gives rise. We will now designate such structures as experiential models of religious knowledge.

Experiential models communicate the basic forms of religious experience prior to any particular expressions. Thus, various historical expressions of religion, spatially and temporally distant from each other, could share the same basic experience or posture before Ultimacy and thus share the same experiential model.


An experiential model, however, demands expression. Religious experience requires expression in symbols - myths, ritual action, concepts, privileged verbal expressions, artifacts. We could call

this total expression the expressive model. In fact, the expressive model will invariably be composed of subsidiary models, integrated into a system. Outside of that system the individual models do not have meaning. Within the system each model will be organically linked to the entire system and derive meaning from the general context. Each identifiable religious group will have a primary expressive model. This is stabilized through and in the core myth of the group. In those societies which are literate the primary expressive model will take on a written form which will remain privileged.

1.4.1 The Mediatorial Experiential Model of Religious Knowledge

The empirical study of tribal religion and the more evolved, and literary-based ancient Near Eastern religion, has revealed a mediatorial structure whereby contact could be achieved and maintained by a human community. This peculiar form of contact effects a religious knowledge, structured in a generic manner but capable of varying expressions.

As a conclusion we can identify the general model of a mediatorial religion in this way:




The High God is always omniscient and conscious. Therefore contact, by means of the theophany, becomes a form of knowledge


and so, for the mediatorial religious community, knowledge begins with the experiential contact that is realised by and in symbols, primarily myth and ritual. The realisation effects the primary expressive model.

The religious communities that have been studied can be analysed according to this pattern, and a variety of primary expressive models extracted.


In the first instance there is the Shilluk:




In Egyptian and Mesopotamian religions the following parallels are evident:



In West Semitic religion the following structure emerge:




In the case of Israel the first mediatorial structure would have followed this outline:



This is simply a reduction of the Exodus myth to structural form.

The structure would be activated, and contact take place, primarily by means of celebration of the ritual of the Passover with the concomitant recitation of the myth, bringing the Exodus event into the here-and-now experience of the celebrating community.

In general the core-myth of any community would reveal the specific form of the mediatorial model that obtained in that community and it would validate and affirm the theophany through which this community specifically found contact with its High God. Other, subsidiary myths would relate to other aspects of the model or indicate that a revolutionary change had taken place in the mode of contact. The general relationship of myths to the model would be as follows:



1.4.2 The Immediate Experiential Model of Religious Knowledge

Phenomenology of religion however gives instances not only of this mediatorial model but of another which could be termed an 'immediate model' which is more or less identifiable with what most scholars would term the mystical religious tradition. Studies in 'mysticism' have, in latter times, become broader. For example, recently Andrew Greeley¹⁸⁸ foreshadowed psychological research he is jointly undertaking into the phenomenon of human mysticism which will endeavour to show that every man is capable of mystical experience, although it can be heightened in some individuals, repressed in others and entirely absent from a minority (in the same way that colour blindness can be found in individuals without denying the statement that 'men see colours'). Greeley describes the activity under investigation as 'an attempt to come to grips experientially with the Way Things Really Are'.¹⁸⁹ He maintains that it can be triggered by an experience - for example of goodness, truth, beauty or pleasure - so long as that experience is of such a quality as to predispose the individual by taking his mind off mundane things, thus rendering him passive before Reality.

While Greeley does not see that the mystical experience needs to be religious in the sense of having a 'theological or denominational context',¹⁹⁰ he does see an innate religiousness in an individual having a direct and immediate contact 'with Fundamental Reality that operates within the physical properties of the universe'.¹⁹¹ He holds to no specific 'Other' to whom the mystic responds, nor does he maintain the need for 'such intermediaries as propositions or symbols' as being endemic to the mystical model.

It is this latter facet of his model which shows how abstracted it is from its contextual setting. Greeley's 'mysticism' is purely and simply a subdivision of knowledge, to be distinguished from cognitive, metaphysical and mythopoeic knowledge. He relies to a great extent upon Maslow's concept of a 'peak-experience' and Ludwig's
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 'altered state of consciousness'. As abstraction from the context progresses there is the danger that various genres of 'immediate' consciousness will be classed together and this is precisely what has happened.

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 Rudolf Otto certainly did not fall into this acontextual error. He stressed the subject's response, as did Greeley, and distinguished between 'the mysticism of introspection' and the 'mysticism of unifying vision'. The first form occurs when the subject withdraws from outward things and finds the Ultimate within himself; the second occurs when he seeks unity under the multiplicity of the world of things.

Other attempts at providing a model of mystical experience
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 focus on the object of the vision. Thus Zaehner makes a three-fold division of mystical experience. First, there is panenhenism, the sense of the All in an undifferentiated One, a union without any specifically religious object which could, Zaehner proposes, be induced by drugs. A second category is panentheism, wherein all is God and God is all. Thirdly, there is Pantheism, in which the deity is contained within the confines of created things.

Whether the model of mysticism is approached subjectively or objectively there should be no gainsaying the context. The above

mentioned divisions do just that. Neither knowledge nor experience develop in a vacuum. Religious mysticism is religious not because of some innate quality but because it is a form of knowledge that operates within a religious context and with a religious purpose. Geertz' methodology¹⁹⁵ would ensure that this dimension was respected, with symbols being investigated from their contextual viewpoint in order to ascertain their meaning-structure. Then, these meaning systems are related to social structure and psychological processes.

Investigation therefore shows that in examining the symbolic systems of various religious communities a fundamental distinction imposes itself. There are, de facto, two possible structures whereby a religious community orders itself vis-à-vis Ultimacy. Various terms have been used by those who have perceived the distinction. So, Smart refers to the numinous and the mystical structures;¹⁹⁶ King distinguishes between symbols of relationship and symbols of identification.¹⁹⁷ After this survey we prefer another nomenclature: the mediatorial model and the immediate model.

Why should religious knowledge take on these two basic forms? This evokes the most contentious of all epistemological questions: is Being within the individual or outside the individual? A legitimate variant of this would be: is Ultimacy within the individual or outside the individual? There can be no clear-cut answer to either question. There is no subject-free objectivity of a 'thing in itself', no pure immediacy, since what is received by man is already mediated through the performance of the human subject. The way in which external objects are seen, against the background and within the context in which they are seen, already

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determines that object as it discloses itself. An epistemological stance can be taken in which being is said to be apprehended immediately and intuitively. Thus E. Gilson could write:

'L' apprehension de l'être par l'intellect consiste à voir directement le concept d'être dans n'importe quelle donnée sensible.'199

When confronting his experience of the world, man basically finds that his relationship with Being is both immanent and transcendent. The world is not himself, yet he is part of the world. His mental structure can be defined by the preponderance of one or other of these two fundamental aspects of experience, which together determine complete human experience. To each of these two possible human attitudes there corresponds a certain type of religion and culture, with a certain type of religious knowledge. When the relationship is of a transcendent nature then the High God acts as a symbol of totality, standing off against the individual and his community. The need to effect contact brings about the mediatorial model of religious knowledge. When the immanent structure obtains, then there will be a tendency towards the immediate model of religious knowledge.

Comparing the two experiential models of religious knowledge we have the following:

High God
↓
Hypostatizations
X
Mediator
↑
Community

Undifferentiated Ultimacy
↑↓
Undifferentiated Community

There are sufficient examples to show that one model can be commuted into the other. Charismatic and millenarian movements within established mediatorial religions can bring about a transition to an immediate model. The evolution of Mahayana Buddhism from Therevada Buddhism, and similar, more original Buddhist sects, is an example of a reverse process. The immediate model is simply a short-circuited version of the mediatorial model, which reversion we would prefer to call the 'collapse-effect'. When, for some reason, confidence is lost in the ability of the mediatorial model, it is possible for the 'collapse-effect' to take place. But, it would seem evident, the undifferentiated community associated with the immediate model is less stable and structured than its counterpart and there will always be the tendency for the reforming of a mediatorial model.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

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5. Religion in Essence and Manifestation (London, 1938), Vol. 1, p.23.
6. J.A. Martin, 'What do We Study When We Study Religion?', Religious Studies, 2 (1975), p. 469.
7. C. Geertz, 'Ethos, World View and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols' in A. Dundes, Every Man His Way (New Jersey, 1968), p. 314.
8. C. Geertz, 'The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man' in J.R. Platt (ed.), New Views of the Nature of Man (Chicago, 1965), p.1.
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11. 'Religion as a Cultural System', ibid., p. 206.
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13. Ibid., p. 207.
14. Ibid., p. 216.
15. M. Wilson, 'Nyakyusa ritual and symbolism', American Anthropologist, 56 (1954), p. 241.
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17. R. Pettazzoni, 'The Supreme Being: Phenomenological Structure and Historical Development' in M. Eliade and J.M. Kitagawa (eds.), The History of Religion. Essays in Methodology (Chicago, 1959), pp. 59-61; G. Van der Leeuw, 'Die Struktur der Verstellung des sogenannten höchsten Wesens', Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, 29 (1931), pp. 70-107; M. Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (London and New York, 1958), pp. 109-111; id., Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (London and Glasgow, 1968), p. 136.

18. K.A. Hidding, 'The High God and the King as Symbols of Totality' in The Sacral Kingship (VIII International Congress for the History of Religions) (Leiden, 1959), pp. 54-62.
19. I. Engnell, Critical Essays on the Old Testament (London, 1970) pp. 18-21.
20. E. Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Religion (Oxford, 1956), pp. 123-135,
21. J. Beattie, Other Cultures (London, 1964), pp. 227-228.
22. This distinction is made by R.W. Firth, Human Types sec. ed. (London, 1956).
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24. M. Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation. The Mysteries of Birth and Rebirth (New York, 1965), p. 87
25. C. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (New York and London, 1963), pp. 180-181.
26. Sabourin, op.cit., p. 4.
27. Hidding, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
28. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan (Cambridge, 1948); R.G. Lienhardt, 'The Shilluk of the Upper Nile' in D. Forde (ed.), African Worlds (London, 1954), pp. 138-163.
29. P. P. Howell and W.P.G. Thomson, 'The Death of a Reth of the Shilluk and the installation of his Successor', Sudan Notes and Records (1946), p. 8.
30. Evans-Pritchard, op.cit., p. 75.
31. Mair, op. cit., p. 212.
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C. Aldred, The Egyptians (London, 1961); C.J. Bleeker, Egyptian Festivals. Enactments of Religious Renewal (Studies in the History of Religion, XIII) (Leiden, 1967); id., 'The Religion of Egypt' in C.J. Bleeker and G. Widengren (eds.), Historia Religionum, Vol. 1. Religions of the Past, (Leiden, 1969); G. Posener, Dictionary of Egyptian Civilization. (London, 1962); id., De la Divinité du Pharaon (Paris, 1960);

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Cont. E. Baumgartel, The Cultures of Prehistoric Egypt (Oxford, 1947); W.C. Hayes, The Scepter of Ancient Egypt (2 Vols., New York, 1953); E. Massoulard, Préhistoire et protohistoire d'Égypte (Paris, 1896-7); W.M. Flinders Petrie, A History of Egypt (London, 1923); id., Prehistoric Egypt (London, 1920); id., Prehistoric Egypt Corpus (London, 1921); The Cambridge Ancient History, rev. ed. (2 Vols. Cambridge, 1961-1971); H. Frankfort, The Birth of Civilization in the Near East (New York, 1950); id., Ancient Egyptian Religion (New York, 1961); id., Kingship and the Gods (Chicago, 1948); A.H. Gardiner, Egypt of the Pharaohs (Oxford, 1961); S.R.K. Glanville (ed.), The Legacy of Egypt (Oxford, 1942); H. Kees, Ancient Egypt, (London, 1961); S. Donadoni (ed.), Le fonti indirette della storia egiziana (Rome, 1963); W.S. Smith, Ancient Egypt (Boston, 1961); E.F. Wente, Late Ramesside Letters (Chicago, 1967); G. Steindorff and K.C. Seele, When Egypt Ruled the East (Chicago, 1957); J.H. Breasted (ed. and tr.), Ancient Records of Egypt (5 Vols., New York, 1962); id., Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt (New York, 1959); A. Erman, The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians (London, 1927); J.A. Wilson, The Burden of Egypt: An Interpretation of Ancient Egyptian Culture (Chicago, 1951); J. Cerny, Ancient Egyptian Religion (London, 1952); W.B. Emery, Archaic Egypt (Middlesex, 1961).

33.

General material on the titulary of the pharaoh is contained in A. Moret, Du Caractère Religieux de la Royauté Pharaonique (Paris, 1902), chapter 1; H. Müller, Die formale Entwicklung der Titulature der ägyptischen Könige (Gluckstadt, 1938). This latter is now modified by S. Schott, Zur Krönungstitulatur der Pyramidenzeit (Göttingen, 1956). The Egyptian titulary can be broken down into five elements. The pharaoh bore a Horus name, representing the king as an earthly embodiment of Horus, the dynastic god of Egypt and one who was similar to Re^c. From the fifth dynasty, under the influence of the Heliopolitan priesthood, Horus became identified with the sun-god Re^c. The second name was the nebty name, wherein the king was identified with two principal goddesses of the period immediately preceding the first Dynasty, when Egypt was still divided into two kingdoms. One of these was the vulture-goddess Nekhbet and the other the cobra-goddess Edjo, representing Upper and Lower Egypt. The third name was that of golden Horus, whose significance is not clear. Then followed the prenomen, almost always being compounded with Re^c, and the nomen, being the name of the king prior to his accession to the throne. A. Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar, sec. rev. ed. (Oxford, 1950), pp. 71-76.

34. Cited in L. Sabourin, Priesthood: A Comparative Study (Leiden, 1973), p. 79.

35. After Thuthmosis I the Horus name regularly contained the epithet 'Strong Bull' which is appropriate for a personification of vital force. Cf. Frankfort, Kingship, p. 72

36. Sabourin, ibid.

37. J. Zandee, 'Le Messie. Conceptions de la royauté dans les religions du Proche-Orient ancien', RHR, 180 (1971), p.6.
38. A.M. Blackman and M.W. Fairman, 'The Myth of Horus at Edfu', JEA, 21 (1935), pp. 26-36; 28 (1942), pp. 32-38; 29 (1943), pp. 2-36; 30 (1944), pp. 5-22.
39. This interpretation is convincingly offered by G. Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation. The Origins of the Biblical Tradition (Baltimore and London, 1973), pp. 33-34.
40. The phrase belongs to A. Gardiner, 'Horus the Behdetite', JEA, 30 (1944), p. 51. Gardiner proposed that the myth of the winged disk was local and provincial, but certain of its motifs were current from India to Greece in the Iron Age. Cf. Mendenhall, op.cit., p 34.
41. W.S. Smith, A History of Egyptian Sculpture and Painting in the Old Kingdom (London, 1946), p. 324.
42. J.H. Breasted, The Dawn of Conscience (New York, 1933), p. 57 and fig. 6.
43. Gardiner, loc. cit., p. 49.
44. During the First Intermediate Period the anarchy of the time was described by Ipuwer who reproached the king for the lawless state of affairs, even though Ma-a-t was with him:
 Hu, Sia and Ma-a-t are with thee. (Nevertheless)
 confusion is what thou dost put throughout the land
 together with the noise of tumult. Behold one used
 violence against another. (Yet) people conform to
 that which thou has commanded.
 A. Gardiner, The Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage (Leipzig, 1909), p.84. A general treatment of Ma-a-t is found in H. Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods pp. 52, 277-278; C.J. Bleeker, 'The Religion of Ancient Egypt', pp. 42-44.
45. Cited in Bleeker, art. cit., p. 79.
46. J.A. Wilson, 'Egypt' in H. Frankfort and others, Before Philosophy (Middlesex, 1949), pp. 39-70.
47. A. Erman, Denksteine aus der thebanischen Gräberstadt, (Berlin, 1911), pp. 1086ff.; B. Gunn, 'The Religion of the poor in ancient Egypt', JEA, 3 (1917), pp. 8ff.
48. The text is quoted in C.J. Bleeker, 'Man and his Salvation in the ancient Egyptian Religion' in E.J. Sharpe and J.R. Hinnells (eds.), Man and his Salvation (Manchester, 1973) p. 69.
49. Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, pp. 73ff.
50. K. Sethe, Die altägyptischen Pyramidentexte (Leipzig, 1908-22).
51. E.A.W. Budge, The Book of the Dead, sec. ed. (3 vols., London, 1949).

52. Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 479
53. There is one text preserved on the walls of the tombs of Seti I, Ramses II and Ramses III at Thebes concerning the deliverance of mankind from destruction which might seem to challenge this optimistic interpretation of the Egyptian attitude. Cf. ANET, pp. 10-11. Re^C felt that his authority was being belittled by mankind. Accordingly he sought advice from the gods and eventually Hathor was sent to smite mankind. Re^C did not desire man to be completely destroyed and so he devised a stratagem of mixing red ochre with barley-beer in order to give the appearance of blood. When Hathor saw the fields awash with this imitation blood she drank to satiety and mankind was saved from the impending destruction. The nature of this account is debatable. It could have had the status of a myth or it could merely have been a piece of folklore which concerned the protection of graveyards. In its present form it seems to be dated to 14-12th centuries. However the language and the corruption of the text would indicate a dependence on an older original. On the walls of the three royal tombs the text accompanies certain charms intended to protect the bodies of the dead rulers, and its purpose would therefore seem to fall into the category of magical incantation. The text is not, then, of the same nature as other Near Eastern myths of a 'fall'. Hathor, the 'mistress of the necropolis', was proffered a beverage and refreshment in order to ensure the deliverance of the dead from destruction. Cf. S.H. Hooke, Middle Eastern Mythology (Middlesex, 1963), pp. 73-74 for this interpretation.
54. General material on Osiris has been obtained from the following sources:

C.J. Bleeker, Egyptian Festivals. Enactments of Religious Renewal; id., 'The Religion of Ancient Egypt', pp. 40-114; S.G.F. Brandon, 'Redemption in ancient Egypt and Early Christianity' in R.J.Z. Werblowky and C.J. Bleeker (eds.), Types of Redemption (Leiden, 1970), pp. 36-45; id., 'The Ritual Technique of Salvation in the Ancient Near East' in S.G.F. Brandon (ed.), The Saviour God: Comparative Studies in the Concept of Salvation (Manchester, 1963), pp. 17-36; H. Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods; J.G. Griffiths, The Origins of Osiris (Berlin, 1966).
55. Cf. T. Hopfner, Plutarch über Isis und Osiris (Praha, 1940-1).
56. Bleeker, op. cit., pp. 61-63.
57. Isis' name indicates that she was originally the deified throne. K. Sethe, Urgeschichte und älteste Religion der Ägypter (Leipzig, 1930), p. 85.
58. Texts are in K. Sethe, op.cit.
59. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
60. Ibid., p. 186.

61. Ibid., p. 193
62. Ibid., pp. 721-722
63. Ibid., pp. 12-14; cf. pp. 1329-1330; J. Vandier, La religion égyptienne (Paris, 1949), pp. 113-114.
64. S.A.B. Mercer, The Pyramid Texts (New York, 1952), Vol. IV, pp. 54-56.
65. H. Kees, Totenglauben und Jenseitsvorstellungen (Leipzig, 1926), p. 202. A description of participation in the cultic dramatization of Osiris has been given by Khenofret, a courtier of Sesostris III. The text is contained in H. Schafer, 'Die Mysterien des Osiris in Abydos' in K. Sethe (ed.), Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Altertumskunde Ägyptens (Berlin-Leipzig, from 1952), Vol. IV. There was a similar ritual during the festival of the month of Khoiak. The essential component of this ritual was the justification and vindication of Osiris and Horus by Thoth, still following the myth. The text is from the Ptolemaic temple at Denderah and is found in V. Loret, 'Les fêtes d'Osiris au mois de Khoiak', Recueil de Travaux, Vols. III-V (Paris, 1884). Cf. also C.J. Bleeker, 'Isis and Nephthys as Wailing Women' in The Sacred Bridge (Leiden, 1963), pp. 190-205. At a later date, Sokaris, a god related to Osiris, was introduced into the ritual. In the temple of Hathor at Denderah, Sokaris-Osiris was represented as a mummy with a falcon-head and the white crown, lying in a sarcophagus. A. Mariette, Denderah (Paris, 1870), Vol. IV, pl. 66, 89, 90.
66. A. de Buck, The Egyptian Coffin Texts (Chicago, 1936).
67. Ibid., p. 191.
68. Ita, Brandon, op.cit., p.23.
69. See G. Posener, De la Divinité du Pharaon; C.J. Bleeker, 'La fonction pontificale du Roi-Dieu' in The Sacred Bridge, pp. 220-224; A. Moret, Du caractère religieux de la royauté pharaonique.
70. Since Egyptian society tended to be so stable, we are able to assume that the organizational patterns of priesthood known from later sources reflected a much earlier model. Cf. Sabourin, Priesthood, pp. 82-83.
71. Sabourin, op.cit., p. 79.
72. The climax of the sd festival was the draping of the sd-robe around the king who then seated himself successively in two chapels wearing the red crown in one and the white crown in the other. Usually the interpretation of this ceremony has been along the lines of a renewal of his kingship. However such renewal would have been done not at the sd festival but at the annual Min festival. In the sd festival kingship was renewed but under its specifically priestly aspect. The

72. Cont. priesthood of the pharaoh was an essential element of his kingship. Information on the sd festival is contained in Bleeker, Egyptian Festivals, pp. 115-121; id. The Religion of Ancient Egypt, p. 89; Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods, especially pp. 79-88. Texts of the sd festival are found in Moret, op.cit., p. 256. Reliefs from the temple of Nonserve are found in F.W. von Bissing (ed.), Das Re-Heiligtum des Königs Ne-Wose-re (3 Vols., Berlin 1905-1928). The situation is more complicated than envisaged by E.O. James, The Ancient Gods (London, 1960), p. 115, where the author maintains that the purpose of the sd festival was the renewal of kingship simpliciter. This is also the position held by Frankfort, op.cit.
73. The following works were consulted on Sumerian religion: H. Ringgren, The Religions of the Ancient Near East (London, 1973), pp. 1-47; S.N. Kramer, History Begins at Sumer sec. ed. (London, 1961); id., Sumerian Mythology rev. ed. (New York, 1961); W.H.P. Römer, Sumerische 'Königshymnen' der Isin-Zeit (Documenta et Monumenta Orientis Antiquae, Vol. 13) (Leiden, 1965); A. Falkenstein and W. von Soden, Sumerische und Akkadische Hymnen und Gebete (Zurich and Stuttgart, 1953); A. Falkenstein (ed.), Sumerische Götterlieder (Heidelberg, 1959); S.N. Kramer, The Sumerians (Chicago, 1963); T. Jacobsen, 'Formative Tendencies in Sumerian Religion' in G.E. Wright (ed.), The Bible and the Ancient Near East (London, 1961), pp. 267-278; id., 'Ancient Mesopotamian Religion: The Central Concerns', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 107 (1963), 473-483; M. Lambert, 'La Littérature Sumerienne', RA, 55 (1961); C.F. Jean, La Religion Sumerienne (Paris, 1931); A.L. Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia (Chicago and London, 1964); W.H.P. Römer, 'The Religion of Ancient Mesopotamia' in C.J. Bleeker and G. Widengren (eds.), Historia Religionum, Vol. 1, pp. 115-194.
74. J. van Dijk, 'Le motif cosmique dans la pensée sumerienne', Acta Orientalia, 28 (1964-5), pp. 1-60.
75. The role of one such personal god is revealed in a poetic essay, pieced together from five Nippur tablets and fragments. It dealt with the problem of suffering and, while it was inscribed around 1700, it should be dated to perhaps 2000. Cf. S.N. Kramer, '"Man and his God." A sumerian variation on the "Job" motif' in M. Noth and D.W. Thomas (eds.), Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East (Leiden, 1969), pp. 170-182. Retribution in Sumeria is dealt with by H.A. Frankfort and Others, Before Philosophy, pp. 227-231; S.N. Kramer, 'Sumerian Theology and Ethics', HTR, 49 (1956), pp. 45-62.
76. ANET, pp. 37-41; W. Harrelson, 'The Significance of Cosmology in the Ancient Near East' in H.T. Frank and W.L. Reed (eds.), Translating and Understanding the Old Testament (Nashville, 1970).
77. ANET, pp. 42-44.

78. ANET, p. 44
 79. A general introduction to the problem is found in E.O. James, The Ancient Gods (London, 1960), p. 117; id., The Nature and Function of Priesthood (London, 1955); Sabourin, Priesthood, pp. 48-58.
 80. Sabourin, op.cit., p. 58. The Sumerian ensi is the equivalent of the Akkadian iss(i)aku and has the meaning of 'regent' or 'vicar'. Cf. Sabourin, op.cit., pp. 110-115. The position of Gudea, who was ensi of Ningursu and prince of Lagas, can be evaluated from texts in ANET, p. 165, Cf. pp. 268-269. Gudea statues are found in ANEP, pp. 430-431.
 81. A. Falkenstein, 'La cité-temple sumerienne', Cahiers d'histoire mondiale, 1 (1954), p. 796.
 82. Sabourin, op.cit., p. 56; J. Renfer, 'Untersuchungen zur Priestertum in der altbabylonischen Zeit', ZA, NF 24 (1967), pp. 110-188; 25 (1969), pp. 104-230.
 83. Sabourin, op.cit., p. 48.
 84. This is asserted in the royal hymns. Römer, Sumerische Königshymnen, p. 153.
 85. Der sehr weise Gott, der Herr, der das Schicksal entscheidet,
hat getreulich zu ihm gesprochen, An (hat) zu Ur (ninurta)
getreulich (gesprochen),
im Lande Sumer hat er ihn zum Höchsten gemacht, An (hat)
(Ur) (ninurta (?) zum Höchsten gemacht (?)),
einen königlichen Thron auf ewig gefestigtem Fundament,
den höchsten Hirtenstab, der alle 'göttlichen Kräfte' des
Landes Sumer eisammelt,
ein gerechtes Szepter, das die zahlreichen Menschen hütet,
hat er Urninurta hinzugefügt. (ibid., p.11)
- The king was obviously the centre of stability and of renewal. The 'göttlichen Kräfte' are the mes, the divine laws or powers which govern the world-order, every event and every occupation having its specific me. In Sumerian myth Enki governed all the mes of Sumeria. Such a function was now bestowed on the sacral king. There was an emphasis on the power that adhered to the person of the king, whether he was dead or alive. Special interest was even paid to the graves of dead kings since it was felt that after their death the divine power of fertility derived from them. Cf. Jacobsen, 'Ancient Mesopotamian Religion: the Central Concerns', p. 477, n.8.
86. Römer, op.cit., p. 56; A. Falkenstein, 'Sumerische Religiöse Texte', ZA, NF 16 (1952). p. 65.
 87. Ringgren, op.cit., p. 38.
 88. Information on this point is contained in T. Fish, 'The Cult of King Dungi during the Third Dynasy of Ur', BJRL, 11 (1927), pp. 322-328.

89. Thus, in a text of self-proclamation of Ismedagan we read:
 'Ismedagan, für An geboren, den (er) ins Herz berufen, (bin ich), wie ein Vater gut, wie eine Mutter (sorgsam) einhergehend (?) bin ich,
 die höchste Mauer (der (?)) Lebewesen des Landes Sumer bin ich, ein höchster mes-Baum mit dicken (?) Wurzeln, mit strahlenden weit (ausgebreitet) en Zweigen bin ich.
 der Schirm Summers, sein susser Schatten bin ich, ein 'Ort', den (selbst) der höchste Mann (?) nicht erreicht, bin ich'. (Römer, op.cit., pp.51-52)

A further hymn is addressed to Iddindagan:

'Dein (L)ob ist in aller (M)und gelegt,
 dein König(tu)m ist den (Mens)chen gut,
 nachdem dein Hirtentum den Herzen gut geworden,
 werden sich die Menschen unter deiner Regierung vermehren,
 werden sich die Menschen unter deiner Regierung ausbreiten,
 werden dir alle Feindländer auf uppiger Wiese liegen,
 werden dir die Menschen in Überfluss die Tage verbringen,
 wird der 'Schwarzkopfigen' Blick wie (auf) (dei)nen Vater auf dich, Iddindagan, gerichtet sein.' (Ibid., pp. 213-214)

The king in Sumeria was therefore viewed as the shepherd of his people, with the task of leading and protecting, and was deemed to have all wisdom and power.

90. In general the following works on Babylonian and Assyrian religion were consulted:

E. Dhorme, La religion assyro-babylonienne (Paris, 1910);
 id., Les religions de Babylonie et d'Assyrie (Paris, 1945);
 B. Meissner, Babylonien und Assyrien (2 vols., Heidelberg, 1920-1925); J. Bottéro, Le religion babylonienne (Paris, 1952);
 S.H. Hooke, Babylonian and Assyrian Religion (Oxford, 1962);
 H.W.F. Saggs, The Greatness That Was Babylon (London, 1962);
 A.L. Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia (Chicago, 1969); S. Fiore, Voices from the Clay (Oklahoma, 1965); G.R. Castellino, Le civiltà mesopotamiche (Venice and Rome, 1962); W.W. Hallo, Early Mesopotamian Royal Titles (New Haven, 1957); R. Labat, Le caractère religieux de la royauté assyro-babylonienne (Paris, 1939); J. Laessle, Peoples of Ancient Assyria, their Inscriptions and Correspondence (London, 1963); J. Lewy, 'Les textes paleo-assyriens et l'Ancien Testament', RHR, 110 (1934), pp. 29-64; Sv. A. Pallis, The Babylonian Akitu Festival (Copenhagen, 1926). J. Klima, Gesellschaft und Kultur des alten Mesopotamien (Prague, 1964).

91. L. Oppenheim in V. Ferm (ed.), Forgotten Religions (New York, 1950) pp. 50-51.

92. Thus, a legend circulated concerning Sargon

Sargon, the mighty king, king of Agade am I. My mother was a changeling, my father I knew not. The brother(s) of my father loved the hills ... My changeling mother conceived me, in secret she bore me. She set me in a basket of rushes, with bitumen she sealed my lid. She cast me into the river, which rose not (over) me. The river bore me up and carried

92.

Cont. me to Akki, the drawer of water. Akki, the drawer of water lifted me out as he dipped his e(w)er. Akki, the drawer of water, (took me) as his son (and) reared me. Akki, the drawer of water, appointed me as his gardener. While I was a gardener, Ishtar granted me (her) love, and for four and (...) years I exercised kingship. Text in in ANET, p. 119.

93. Thus Assur-nasir-pal (1050-1032) addressed Ishtar:

I was born amid mountains which no one knew,
 I did not recognize thy might and did not pray to thee.
 The Assyrians did not know of thy godhead and did not pray to thee.
 But, thou, O Ishtar, fearsome mistress of the gods,
 Thou didst single me out with the glance of thine eyes:
 thou didst desire to see me rule,
 Thou didst take me from among the mountains, thou didst call me to be a shepherd of men,
 Thou didst grant me the sceptre of justice.

Text is in H. Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods, p. 239.

94. ANEP, p. 309.

95. The text of Enuma elish is in ANET pp. 60-72. The text is discussed in Jacobsen's contribution to Before Philosophy, pp. 182-199. See also H. Ringgren, Religions of the Ancient Near East (London, 1973), pp. 69-71.

96. This translation is taken from Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods, p. 237.

97. Fiore, Voices from the Clay, p. 70.98. Code of Hammurapi, ANET, p. 178.

99. Assur was the name of the god, the capital and the country. Perhaps, originally, Assur had been a tribal deity, who bore the name of the tribe. Whatever his origin, he is to be found in the most ancient Assyrian documents.

100. A.L. Oppenheim, 'Akkadian pul(u)h(t)u and melammu', JAOS, 63 (1943) pp. 31-34; id., Ancient Mesopotamia, p. 98; E. Casin, La Splendeur divine (Paris, 1968); G. Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation, pp. 44-53.

101. W. Andrae, Coloured Ceramics from Ashur (London, 1925), plate 8.

102. There is further evidence of such identification in that the Assyrian king was identified, at times, with Ningusu or Adad. 'For two days I thundered against them like Adad ... and I rained down flame upon them. My warriors flew against them like Zu'. D.D. Luckenbill, Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylon (Chicago, 1926), p. 156. The king referred to in the text was Assur-nasir-pal. Other texts are found on pp. 79 and 113.

103. Quoted in Dhorme, La religion assyro-babylonienne, p. 169.
104. Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia, p. 99.
105. Sabourin, Priesthood, p. 50.
106. There were asuppu or purification priests, whose role was to ward off evil spirits and demons by ritual and incantation. There were also kalu-priests, who appeased the gods by chanting hymns and liturgies to the accompaniment of musical instruments. Associated with these were baru-priests who interpreted signs and omens.
107. W. von Soden, 'Verkündung des Gotteswillen durch prophetisches Wort in der altbabylonischen Briefen aus Mari', Die Welt des Orients, 1 (1947-1952), pp. 397-402; G. Dossin and A. Lods, 'Une tablette inédite de Mari' in H.H. Rowley (ed.), Studies in Old Testament Prophecy (Edinburgh, 1950), pp. 103ff.; H.B. Huffmon, 'Prophecy in the Mari Letters', BA, 31 (1968) pp. 101-124; W.L. Moran, 'New Evidence from Mari on the History of Prophecy', Biblica, 50 (1969), pp. 15-56.
108. ANET, pp. 72-99. Gilgamesh was a king in Uruk, two thirds god and one-third man. He eventually befriended Enkidu who was killed, after the two had shared many adventures. Gilgamesh feared that he would share the fate of Enkidu and so he sought out Utnapishtim, the survivor of the great Flood. Utnapishtim disclosed to Gilgamesh the secret of the plant of life, and Gilgamesh went off in search of this plant. When he found the plant he bathed and the plant was stolen by a serpent. Gilgamesh returned to Uruk with mortality still a reality.
109. Jacobsen, 'Ancient Mesopotamian Religion: The Central Concerns', pp. 482-483; E. Bergmann, 'Untersuchungen zu syllabisch geschriebenen sumerischen Texten', ZA, NF 23 (1965), p. 35.
110. This topic is treated passim in B. Albrektson, History and the Gods (Lund, 1967).
111. The text is found in ANET, pp. 434-437. J. Nougayrol, 'Une version ancienne due "juste souffrant"', RB, 50 (1952), pp. 242ff. contains another fragment with a similar theme.
112. In general, the following works were consulted as a basis for this study: W.F. Albright, Yahweh and the Gods of Canaan (New York and London, 1968); J. Aistleitner (tr.), Die mythologischen und kultischen Texts aus Ras Shamra (Budapest, 1964); G. Buccellati, The Amorites of the Ur III Period (Naples, 1966); U. Cassuto, The Goddess, Anath. Canaanite Epics of the Patriarchal Age. (Jerusalem, 1971); J. Gray, The Canaanites (London, 1964); id., The Legacy of Canaan (Supplement to Vetus Testamentum, vol. V) (Leiden, 1966); N.C. Habel, Yahweh Versus Baal. A Conflict of Religious Culture (New York, 1964); H. Halдар, Who Were the Amorites? (Leiden, 1971); A.S. Kapelrud, The Violent Goddess. Anat

112. Cont. in the Ras Shamra Texts (Oslo, 1969); id., The Ras Shamra Discoveries and the Old Testament (Oxford, 1965); id., Baal in the Ras Shamra Texts (Copenhagen, 1952); U. Oldenburg, The Conflict between El and Baal in Canaanite Religion (Leiden, 1969); M.H. Pope, El in the Ugaritic Texts (Supplement to Vetus Testamentum, vol. 11) (Leiden, 1955); R.G. Ruggia, 'Alcune osservazioni sul culto di El a Ras-Samra', Aevum, 15 (1941), pp. 559-575; J. Gray, 'Canaanite Kingship in Theory and Practice', VT., 2 (1952), pp. 193-200; R. de Langhe, 'Myth, Ritual and Kingship in the Ras Shamra Tablets' in S.H. Hooke (ed.), Myth, Ritual and Kingship (Oxford, 1958); O. Eissfeldt, El in Ugaritischen Pantheon (Leipzig, 1951).
113. That 'El was a specific deity and not simply a general name for 'god' can be seen from an old Minaean inscription:
- 'Aws, son of Aws'il, of the clan of Rayman, priest of 'El and of ^CAttar, minister of Yadh-murmalik and Watar'il, dedicated 'Absafaq to Mutibbnatiyan. In the name of Wadd and of Yad'sumhu and the gods of Haran.'
- Cf. Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum (Paris, 1881), pars IV, p. 512. Another interesting text is found in a Qatabanian inscription describing work carried out on a temple estate according to the command of "^CAttar sargan, of ^CAmm of Dwnm and of Nswer and of 'El fhr". Repertoire d'Epigraphie Semitique (Paris, 1900ff), 3856:4,6. The meaning of 'El fhr is "El of the Divine Assembly" referring to a stage when 'El was head of a pantheon which surrounded his throne. By the time of this inscription (about second century BC), 'El was the least of these gods. An older image of 'El and ^CAttar can be seen in Job 15:15 and 25:5 Cf. N.M. Sarna, 'Epic Substratum in the Prose of Job', JBL, 76 (1957), pp. 13-25.
114. Usually it is translated 'father of years', but the plural of the Ugaritic is invariably snt and not snm. Pope maintains however that snm may be a masculine plural participle from the root sn, cognate with the Arabic 'to be exalted'. Ringgren, Religions of the Ancient Near East, p. 34; J. Gray, The Legacy of Canaan, p. 156.
115. M. Pope, El in the Ugaritic Texts, p. 32-33.
116. The terms used in Ugaritic are: 'ab adm, bny bnwt, mlk, tr.
117. J. Gray, op.cit., p. 156.
118. U. Oldenburg, The Conflict between El and Baal, pp. 15-45.
119. J. Gelb, Old Akkadian Writing and Grammar (Chicago, 1961), pp. 6-7. 'El and Il are identical as is demonstrated by the comparison of Akkadian and Amorite names. G. Buccellati, The Amorites of the Ur III Period gives the following equivalents:

119. dad-um-pi-il-um (=dad-um-pi-el) 'favourite is the word of Il (El)', p. 129.
 Cont. nuh-i-il-um (=nuh-i-el), 'Il (El) is my rest', p. 139.
 ab-um-il-um (=ab-um-el), 'Il (El) is father', p. 176.
120. In general, on the movement of Semitic peoples:
- A. Bea, 'La Palestina preisraelitica: storia, popoli, cultura', Biblica, 24 (1943), pp. 231-260; S. Moscati, The Semites in Ancient History (London, 1959); id., I predecessori d'Israele. Studi sulle più antiche genti semitiche in Siria e Palestina (Rome, 1956); J.R. Kupper, Les nomades en Mesopotamie au temps des rois de Mari (Liège-Paris, 1957); M. Liverani 'Per una considerazione storica del problema amorrea', Oriens Antiquus, 9 (1970), pp. 5-27; G. Fohrer, The History of Israelite Religion (London, 1973), pp. 28-34.
121. T. Bauer, Die Ostkanaanäer (Berlin, 1926). Bauer calls the newcomers 'East Canaanites'; M. Noth, Die Ursprünge des alten Israel im Lichte neuer Quellen (Cologne, 1961). Noth gives them the designation of 'Proto-Arameans'. In 'Die syrisch-palästinische Bevölkerung des zweiten Jahrtausends v. Christ im Lichte neuer Quellen', Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins, 65 (1942), pp. 9-67, he maintained that the newcomers took over as a new ruling class during the 19-18 centuries. They were nomadic in organization and were related to the contemporary ruling class in Mesopotamia.
122. There is an Aramaic stratum in the personal names of many Israelites and certain of the ancient Israelite traditions associate Israel with Aramaean origins. Cf. Fohrer, op.cit., p. 29.
123. H.B. Huffmon, Amorite Personal Names in the Mari Texts (Baltimore, 1965); Buccellati, op.cit., passim. During the Amorite rule on the middle Euphrates, Dagan, the storm-god was worshipped. In Babylonia he was closely associated with Anu and in Assyria with Enlil. When we examine the texts dealing with Dagan at Ugarit, we find that his real home was considered to be Tutul, while at the same time he was said to be the 'father' of Ba^cal and 'Anat. Since Dagan was relatively unimportant at Ugarit, this paternity must have meant that in an earlier period, in Mesopotamia, he had held priority. Cf. E.O. James, The Tree of Life. An Archaeological Study (Leiden, 1966); Oldenburg, op.cit., pp. 47-57.
124. rkb^c rpt. Cf. Ringgren, op.cit., pp. 131-132.
125. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
126. Oldenburg, op.cit., pp. 135-136.
127. Habel, Yahweh versus Baal, pp. 52-54.

128. The change from the domination of 'El to that of Ba^Cal-Hadad is reflected in certain texts. In some of the Egyptian Execration Texts, dating from around 2000 BC, the god Hadad is completely absent from personal names; while from those which can be dated from 1800 BC personal names with Hadad as the theophoric element are quite common. K. Sethe, Die Ächtung Feindlicher Fürsten, Völker and Dinge auf altägyptischen Tongefassscherben des Mittleren Reiches (Berlin, 1926); M. Posener, Princes et pays d'Asie et de Nubie (Brussels, 1940). It has already been pointed out that Amorite personal names from Mesopotamia, belonging to the Old Babylonian period, contain Hadad-Dagan rather than Il-El as they did during Ur III.
129. Oldenburg, op.cit., pp. 154-163.
130. Ibid., pp. 164-182.
131. C. Gordon, Ugaritic Handbook (Rome, 1965), text 137, lines 18-19, which are duplicated in lines 34-35.
132. Thus G.R. Driver, Canaanite Myths and Legends (Edinburgh, 1956), pp. 79 and 141, translates it as 'lackeys' which does not suit other contexts. J. Aistleitner, Wörterbuch der Ugaritischen Sprache, sec. ed., (Berlin, 1965), s.v., translates it as 'Bote'.
133. There are only five other places where it occurs in the Ugaritic material :
- i) 'Cⁿⁿ, atrt.'
 - ii) 'Cⁿⁿ ilm.'
 - iii) 'lk Cⁿⁿ ilm. (Yours in the C^{anan} of the gods!)
 - iv) '...hb C^{lm}. C^{ipi} ...
...hd d^{Cnn} n ...'
- This last instance is merely a fragment and the only information that can be salvaged is that the C^{anan} of Ba^Cal is paralleled by the C^{ipi}, which would seem to be a cloud. Cf. Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation, p. 55.
- v) '... at. brt. lb. k^{Cnn} ... (You are pure of heart like the anan of ...) For texts see 11 AB IV 59-60; 11 AB VIII, 14-17; Anat IV, 76-77; IV AB 11 32-33; ibid., 32:4 in Gordon, op.cit.
134. Ita, Mendenhall, op.cit., p. 55.
135. Yehawmilk of Byblos, for example, claimed his kingship derived from Ba^Cal at Gebel. H. Donner and W. Röllig, Kanaanäische and Aramäische Inschriften (3 vols., Wiesbaden, 1962-4), 44.2.
136. J. Gray, The Krt Text in the Literature of Ras Shamra. A Social Myth of Ancient Canaan (Leiden, 1964). Various interpretations of the Krt text have been abandoned. For example the attempts to find historical precedents have met with little success. Secondly, the attempt to associate the text with the amalgamation of Semitic and Hurrian elements has been put aside. The third line of interpretation would seem to be the more probable: the Krt text offers a mythological prototype of the sacral king in Canaan.

137. J. Gray, The Canaanites, plate 9.
138. ANET, p. 144.
139. Ibid., p. 143.
140. Another epithet applied to Krt is n'mn glm 'El. Cf. ANET, p. 143. N'mn is applied not only to Krt but also to 'Aqht, the son of Dan'el who also had royal status. Glm could possibly have meant 'worshipper' of 'El par excellence, as ^cbd does in a similar context in the Ras Shamra literature. N'mn indicates the physical beauty of the king or his power to excite sexual desire. It may imply the ability of the king to perpetuate the sacral dynasty. The king, not in isolation from the human community, took up a special position before the god 'El, as shown by ^cbd, and this relationship seems to have had cultic overtones, as shown by glm. Cf. J. Gray, op.cit., p. 35.
141. 'Der Gott der Väter' in Kleine Schriften zum Geschichte Israels (3 vols., Munich, 1953-7), vol. 1, pp. 1-78.
142. 'Amurritica', HUCA, 32 (1961), pp. 31ff.
143. Gn. 31:53.
144. Gn. 26:24; 28:13; 32:10.
145. Gn. 28:13.
146. Gn. 32:10; 46:1.
147. Gn. 31:53.
148. 'Mighty One of Jacob', Gn. 49:24.
149. 'Kinsman (?) of Isaac', Gn. 31:42; 31:53. See W.F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity, sec. ed. (New York, 1946), pp. 188-89.
150. 'Rock of Israel', Gn. 49:24.
151. 'Shield (?) of Abraham', Gn. 15:1. E.A. Leslie, Old Testament Religion in the Light of its Canaanite Background (New York, 1936), p. 37.
152. Proper names verified in the biblical text, up to the tenth century, are very commonly compounded with ^cam, 'ab and 'ah. Thus we have Abinam/Ahiwam ('my (divine) father/brother is exalted' or perhaps 'my father/brother on high'); Abiezer/Ahiezer ('My father/brother is my help); Abimelech/Ahimelech ('my father/brother is (my) king'); Eliab ('my God is (my) father'); Elisur ('my God is (my) rock'); Ammiel ('(the god) of my clan is (my) God'). Such names clearly illustrate the relationships of kinship which the people felt existed between themselves and the tribal deity.
153. O. Eissfeldt, 'Der Gott Bethel', Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, 28, (1930), pp. 1-30.

154. Texts are found in M. Greenbert, The Hab/piru (New Haven, 1955), pp. 56-7.
155. In another line of tradition Jethro is referred to as Hobab, the son of Reu'el and he is a Kenite. This confusion was most probably due to the borrowing of a Kenite tradition. The Kenites were also worshippers of YHWH. See B. Mazar, 'The Sanctuary of Arad and the Family of Hobab the Kenite', JNES, 24 (1965), pp. 297-303; H. Schmodel, 'Jahve und die Keniter,' JBL, 52 (1933), pp. 212-229.
156. This point is affirmed by L. E. Binns, 'Midianite Elements in Hebrew Religion', JTS, 31 (1929/30), pp. 337-350.
157. The text of Ex. 3:14 explains the name of YHWH as 'ehyeh ^äser 'ehyeh. Some typical explanations of the biblical name YHWH are: S. Mowinckel, 'The name of the God of Moses', HUCA, 32 (1961), pp. 121-133 (= "O He!", a cultic shout); C.F. Burkitt, 'On the Name Yahweh', JBL, 44 (1925), pp. 353-356. (= 'He who creates'); the same interpretation is offered by F.M. Cross Jr., 'Yahweh and the God of the Patriarchs', HTR, 55 (1962), pp. 225-269, and D.N. Freedman, 'The Name of the God of Moses', JBL, 79 (1960), pp. 151-156; J.P. Hyatt, 'Yahweh as the "God of my Father" ', VT, 5 (1955), pp. 130-136 (= "Preserver"); S.D. Goiten, 'YHWH the Passionate', VT, 6 (1956), pp. 1-9 (= 'I will passionately love whom I love'); J. Lindblom, 'Noch einmal die Deutung des Jahwenamens in Ex 3,14', Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute in Jerusalem, 3 (1964), pp. 4-15 (= the unchanging presence of God); T.C. Vriezen, 'Ehje ^aser 'ehje', Festschrift Alfred Bertholet (Tübingen, 1950), pp. 498-512 (= the actuality and existentiality of God); O. Eissfeldt, 'Ah ^eyah ^asar 'ah ^eyah und 'El ^cOlam' in Kleine Schriften (4 vols., Tübingen, 1962-1969), Vol. IV., pp. 193-198 (= fullness of being); R. Mayer, 'Der Gottesname Jahwe in Lichte der neuesten Forschung', BZ, NF 2 (1958), pp. 26-53 (= active, existential being); E. Dhorme, 'Le nom du Dieu d'Israel', RHR 140 (1952), pp. 5-18 (= "He is"); W.A. Irwin, 'Exod. 3:14', American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, 56 (1939), pp. 297-298 (= "I am that is what I am"); W. von Soden, 'Jahwe "Er ist, Er erweist sich" ', Die Welt des Orients, 3, (1966), pp. 177-187.
158. Attestations of the name of YHWH are found on the Moabite Mesha inscriptions in the ninth century, ANET, p. 320, line 18 and on the Lachish ostraca, ANET, p. 322, No. 2, line 5; No. 3, line 9; No. 4, line 1; No. 5, line 1; No. 6, lines 1 and 12; No. 9, line 1.
159. G.R. Driver, 'The Original Form of the name 'Yahweh'. Evidence and Conclusions', ZAW, 46 (1928), pp. 7-25.
160. Yaum is the possessive pronoun of the first person singular in Akkadian. W. von Soden, loc.cit., pp. 177-187; G. Buccellati, The Amorites of the Ur III Period, p. 150. Canaanite and Aramean inscriptions give Yw and Yawi. J. Gray, 'The God Yw in the Religion of Canaan', JNES, 12 (1953), pp. 278-283.

161. Inscription of Sargon II. D.D. Luckenbill, Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylon (Chicago, 1926), *55.
162. Inscription found at Sefiré. A. Ronzevalle, 'Fragments d'inscriptions araméennes des environs d'Alep', Mélanges de l'Université St. Joseph, 15, (1930), pp. 235ff.
163. R. Gibeon, 'Toponymes ouest-asiatiques à Soleb', VT, 14 (1960), pp. 244-255; J. Leclant, 'Les fouilles de Soleb', Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, (1965), pp. 205-216.
164. S. Hermann, 'Der Alttestamentliche Gottesname', EvT, 26 (1966), pp. 281-293.
165. B. Mazar, 'The Sanctuary of Arad and the Family of Hobab the Kenite', JNES, 24 (1965), pp. 297-303. Mazar's opinion is challenged by Aharoni. The latter surmises that the reason for the establishment of the temple at Arad was the custom of building sanctuaries on the borders of the nation. 'The Israelite Sanctuary at Arad' in D.N. Freedman and J.C. Greenfield (eds.), New Directions in Biblical Archaeology (New York, 1971), pp. 41-2.
166. A good bibliography on this question is contained in H.H. Rowley, From Joseph to Joshua (London, 1940), pp. 153ff.
167. The evidence is taken from M.B. Huffmon, Amorite Personal Names in the Mari Texts (Baltimore, 1965), pp. 70-3; F.M. Cross, 'Yahweh, and the God of the Patriarchs', HTR, 55, (1962), pp. 225-259; A. Finet, 'Yawi-ila, roi de Talhayum', Syria, 41 (1969), pp. 117-142. In this latter instance Finet maintains that Yawi is nominal and that the god-name means "El, that is Yawi", 'El is therefore being identified in a syncretistic manner with the newcomer, Yawi.
168. T.C. Vriezen, The Religion of Ancient Israel (London, 1967); id., 'The Edomite Deity Qos', OTS, 14 (1965), pp. 330-353.
169. R. Dussaud, Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, (Paris, 1940), p. 370; id. 'Yahwe, fils de El', Syria, 34 (1957) pp. 233-242. Dussaud bases his opinion on Dt. 32:8-9 which has attracted the attention of other scholars. He interprets it in the sense that YHWH was the son of 'El and had the protection of Israel assigned to him. Without any doubt the passage represents one stage in the assimilation of the particularist cult of YHWH to the universalist cult of 'El Elyon in the settled land. Cf. O. Eissfeldt, 'Partikularismus und Universalismus in der israelitisch-jüdischen Religionsgeschichte', TLZ, 89 (1954), cols. 283ff. There is still the possibility that b ne 'el means 'divine beings' rather than the more technical 'sons of 'El'.
170. The bull's horns are mentioned in Nm. 23:22 and 24:8. The identification of 'El with YHWH is clear in the synonymous lines of Nm. 23:8 and 23:19-21. That YHWH was, phenomenologically, another form of the West Semitic 'El is supported

170. Contd. by Ps. 10:12 where the Massoretic accentuation indicates that we should read the two names YHWH and 'El as the same term: 'Arise YHWH-'El, set thy hand (to the task) do not forget the ^Canawim.'
171. Material on Exodus 15 is contained in N. C. Habel, Yahweh Versus Baal, pp. 58-64; G.W. Coats, 'The Song of the Sea,' CBO, 31 (1969), pp. 1-17; F.M. Cross, 'The Song of the Sea and Canaanite Myth' in H. Braun and others, God and Christ, Existence and Providence (New York, 1968), pp. 1-25.
172. There seems to be little ground for attributing the kingship of YHWH to Jebusite influence, as if YHWH received this attribute from 'El ^CElyon. Some authors attribute the title melek, as applied to YHWH, to the influence of 'El ^CElyon. Thus, H. Schmid, 'Jahwe und die Kulttraditionen von Jerusalem', ZAW, 67 (1955), pp. 168-197; A Caquot, 'Le psaume 47 et la royauté de Yahve', RHPR, 39 (1959), pp. 311-337. In the case of Exodus 15 kingship, as attributed to YHWH, indicated a dependence, in demythologised form, on the Ba'al cycle.
173. Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, vol. 1, section 10, 17-19.
174. Similar conclusions are put forward by F.M. Cross Jr., 'Yahweh - the God of the Patriarchs', HTR 55 (1962), pp. 225-259; J.P. Hyatt, 'The Origin of Mosaic Yahwism' in E.J. Vandaman and J.L. Garrett (eds.), The Teacher's Yoke: Studies in Memory of Henry Trantham (New York, 1964), pp. 85-93.
175. The idea of divine action taking place within history was not unique to Israel. See B. Albrektson, History and the Gods (Lund, 1967), passim. But the idea of historical events as divine manifestations taking such a prominent part in religious cult was unique. For Israel, the locus of revelatory action progressed from the once and for all historical event to its cultic re-enactment. In this way the Exodus became analogous to the myths of other cultures.
176. Vriezen, The Religion of Ancient Israel, p. 74.
177. I. Engnell, Critical Essays on the Old Testament (London, 1970), p. 38.
178. Cf. above pp.46-49 on the Ugaritic understanding of ^Canan. ^Cānān occurs 86 times in the Hebrew scriptures. It occurs once as a denominative verb in the Flood story and nine times as a participle although this usage may derive from another root. All references to the ^Cānān of YHWH as an active agent occur in the account of the Exodus and wanderings of Israel. They are found in all of the literary strata. The word is not used in narrative contexts after the death of Moses. The only other usages are in the context of the Jerusalem cult. In the prophetic texts its meaning takes on the sense of a future punitive theophany.
179. In Exodus 14 there was a further development in which the leading-force of YHWH, which was manifested to men, was designated not only as ^Cānān but also as mal'āk. F. Stier, Gott und sein Engel in Alten Testament (Munster, 1934);

179. Contd. W. Baumgartner, 'Zur Problem des "Jahwe Engels"', Schweizer Theologische Umschau, 14 (1944), pp. 97-102; R. North, 'Separated Spiritual Substances in the Old Testament', CBQ, 29 (1967), pp. 419-449. Both are parallel representations of the manifestation by which YHWH became functional in the experience of Israel.
180. Ex. 14: 14-17 refers to the wars of Israel in Palestine.
181. This can be seen in Ex. 19:9.
182. G. von Rad, Der Heilige Krieg im alten Israel (Göttingen, 1955). Texts reveal that the later ritual of Israel centred on a theophany. In Leviticus 9:23-24 Moses and Aaron enter the 'ohel mo^Ced. See n. 186. When they emerged and blessed the people there was a theophany of the k^ebod YHWH accompanied by the 'es which consumed the sacrificial offerings laid out on the altar. The tradition can be considered as an aetiology for Israelite cult. P.D. Miller Jr., 'Fire in the Mythology of Canaan and Israel', CBQ, 27 (1965), pp. 256-261.
183. Jg. 5:5.
184. Recent discussion on the location of Sinai is found in J. Koenig, 'La localisation du Sinai et les traditions des scribes', RHPR, 43 (1963), pp. 2-31; id., 'Itinéraires sinaitiques en Arabie', RHR 166 (1964), pp. 122-141; id., 'Le Sinai montagne du feu dans un désert de ténèbres', ibid., 167 (1965), pp. 129-155.
185. In Dt. 33:2, when reconstructed by means of the LXX, it is expressly stated that YHWH came from Sinai to Kadesh.
186. A later form of the travelling presence was the mal'āk or Angel. See n. 179. The stable presence of YHWH among the people was described, in what would seem to be a more Canaanite form, through the 'ohel mo^Ced. It was the forerunner of the physical shrines and ultimately of the Jerusalem Temple. J. Morgenstern, 'The Ark, the Ephod and the Tent of Meeting', HUCA, 17 (1942-3), pp. 153-165; E. Sellin, Das Zelt Jahwes (Stuttgart, 1913), pp. 476-498; F. M. Cross Jr., 'The Tabernacle, A Study for an Archaeological and Historical Approach', BA, 1 (1947), pp. 47-68; M. Haron, 'The Nature of the 'ohel mo^Ced' in the Pentateuchal Sources', JSS, 5 (1960), pp. 50-65; R.J. Clifford, 'Tent of Meeting and the Israelite Tent of Meeting', CBQ, 33 (1971), pp. 221-227; M. Gorg, Das Zelt der Begegnung (Bonn, 1976); R. de Vaux, 'Ark of the Covenant and Tent of Reunion' in The Bible and the Ancient Near East (London, 1972), pp. 136-151.
187. See below, pp. 146-152.
188. A. Greeley, Ecstasy. A Way of Knowing (New Jersey, 1974).
189. Ibid., p. 48.
190. Ibid.

191. Ibid., p. 60.
192. A. Maslow, Religion, Values and Peak-Experiences, (Ohio, 1964); 'The "Core-Religious" or "Transcendent" Experience' in J. White (ed.), The Highest State of Consciousness (New York, 1972); A. Ludwig, 'Altered States of Consciousness' in R. Price (ed.), Trance and Possession States (Montreal, 1968).
193. R. Otto, Mysticism: East and West (New York, 1972).
194. R. Zaehner, Mysticism Sacred and Profane (London, 1961)
195. See reference to Geertz below, p. 11-12
196. N. Smart, The Yogi and the Devotee (London, 1968).
197. W. King, Introduction to Religion, p. 151. Something similar has been put forward by J. Campbell, The Flight of the Wild Gander (Chicago, 1951). He distinguishes Religions of Identity and Religions of Relationship. Of the former he writes:

'Their mythologies and associated myths, philosophies, sciences and arts, are addressed, in the end, not to the honor of any god "out there" but to the recognition of divinity within. a ≠ x.' (ibid., p. 198).

And of the latter he writes:

'But now, in irreconcilable contrast to the current, practically universal mode of experience of the world's and one's own dimension of divinity, which I have termed "mythic identification", there is the order of beliefs derived from the biblical tradition, when Yahweh, as we know (arriving very late on the scene), cursed the serpent of the Garden, and with it the whole earth, which he seems to have thought he had created. a R x! (ibid., p. 202).

Campbell maintains the medium of relationship of such a divinity is the local social group.

198. E. Coreth, Grundfragen der Hermeneutik: Ein philosophischer Beitrag (Freiburg, 1969), pp. 82-83, 104-106. See also, 'Immediacy and the Mediation of Being: an Attempt to answer Bernard Lonergan' in P. McShane (ed.), Language, Truth and Meaning (Indiana, 1972) pp. 33-48.
199. É. Gilson, Realisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance (Paris, 1939), p. 215.

2.

SOCIAL GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEMS OF
RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

The investigation of systems of religious knowledge, up to this point, has shown the necessary connection between religious knowledge and social groups. This community structure of religion must now receive more close attention. Something analogous has already happened in the field of philosophy of science. Reviewing¹ the effect of his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, T.S. Kuhn wrote:

If this book were being rewritten, it would therefore open with a discussion of the community structure of science.²

Likewise there is a need to recognise and analyse the community structure associated with religious science or knowledge. There is, at least, prima facie, a parallel between science and religion. While science can be said to analyse the world and its process, with puzzle-solving as its goal, religious knowledge analyses the relationship of the community of believers to Ultimacy and, within this limited context, puzzle-solving is a goal.³ There is value in following through some of the more recent developments in philosophy of science which have indicated an interest in community structure.

2.1 Previous Studies on the Community Structure of Science.

2.1.1 The Work of T.S. Kuhn

As a natural science matures, Kuhn maintains that its practitioners cease to reiterate the fundamentals, which are by that time acceptable to all initiates, and they concentrate on the further expansion of the subject in depth. It is at this stage that publications cease to be understood even by educated laymen and there is an inevitable restriction in the number of people who can follow the

progress of any particular subject. Such a unit is a group of practitioners of a given specialty:

men bound together by common elements in education and apprenticeship, aware of each other's work and characterised by the relative fullness of their professional communication⁴ and the relative unanimity of their professional judgement.

Since a similar process can be described in theological science it is of some value to trace the path of Kuhn in arriving at his identification of the social unit which is the producer and validator of scientific knowledge. Some writers have, in fact, either directly or indirectly, pointed out the correspondences between Kuhn's⁵ description of a scientific community and religious communities.

Kuhn maintains that, in general, the process of science is not unilinear, a steady and continuous accumulation of data with modification of theory. Instead, he perceives that every scientific community is dominated by a cluster of very broad, conceptual and methodological presuppositions, embodied in the standard exemplars through which students learn the prevailing theories of the field. To this Kuhn gives the name of a paradigm. A paradigm defines for a given scientific community the types of question that may be legitimately asked, the types of explanation that are sought, the types of solution that are acceptable.

Some accepted examples of actual scientific practice - examples which include law, theory, application and instrumentation together - provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.⁶

At a later date Kuhn clarified what was meant by paradigm,

acknowledging the more general earlier use which had led Masterman⁷ to distinguish twenty-one separate meanings. The basic meaning

of the Kuhnian paradigm is a shared crucial example, an exemplary past achievement or, as Kuhn puts it technically, an 'exemplar'.

Newton's experimental work in mechanics would be such. By learning such an exemplar, a practitioner of science would 'learn to see situations as like each other'. The second, subsidiary meaning of a paradigm is the 'disciplinary matrix', a constellation of group commitments.⁸ It is 'disciplinary' in so far as it belongs to

practitioners of a particular area of science or a discipline and it is a 'matrix' in so far as it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts each requiring further specification. The matrix is made up in the first place of 'symbolic generalisations',

'those expressions deployed without question or dissent by group members'.⁹

These look like laws of nature, but while they function in part like laws they also function as definitions of some of the symbols they use. Thus, for example, Ohm's Law not only describes how nature works, but also requires a re-definition of 'current' and 'resistance' if its application is to work. The matrix also includes 'beliefs in particular models' and values. In other places, Kuhn speaks of values of simplicity, self-consistency, plausibility and compatibility with other theories currently deployed. These values are the 'good reasons' which determine paradigm choices. However, Kuhn says that scientists who share common values may not always apply them in the same way.¹⁰ Masterman had already divided the twenty-one usages into three categories. The first was a meta-paradigm, a *Weltanschauung*,

a way of seeing. The second was a sociological paradigm, a set of habits observably adopted by one section of the scientific community which differentiated its members from other scientists, and a construct paradigm was the third - anything that contributes to the task of puzzle-solving. It is the last which Kuhn now identified as crucial to his concept of paradigm.

Exemplars, or construct paradigms, are concrete problem solutions which students encounter in many ways during their scientific apprenticeship - in laboratories, examinations, ends of chapters and sometimes in technical problem-solutions in the periodical literature which show how the job is to be done.¹¹ From such problem solutions the student learns to see situations as like each other, subjects for the application of the same scientific law or law-sketch.¹² Indeed, at this point, Kuhn broadens the aspect of paradigm considerably, at least hinting at possible developments to other fields:

One of the fundamental techniques by which the members of a group, whether an entire culture or a specialist's sub-community within it, learn to see the same things when confronted with the same stimuli is by being shown examples of situations that their predecessors in the group have already learned to see as like each other and as different from other sorts of situations.¹³

For Kuhn, normal science is therefore work done within the framework of a paradigm which defines the coherent tradition for research. Scientists sharing a paradigm and involved within the normal science of its tradition form a community.

A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, and conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm ... Scientific communities can and should be isolated without prior recourse to paradigms; the latter can then be dis-

covered by scrutinising the behaviour of a given community's members.¹⁴

Kuhn then describes the characteristics of such a scientific community:

A scientific community consists, on this view, of the practitioners of a scientific specialty. To an extent unparalleled in most other fields, they have undergone similar educations and professional initiations; in the process they have absorbed the same technical literature and drawn many of the same lessons from it. Usually the boundaries of that standard literature mark the limits of a scientific subject matter, and each community ordinarily has a subject matter of its own. There are schools in the sciences, communities, that is, which approach the same subject from incompatible viewpoints. But they are far rarer there than in other fields; they are always in competition and their competition is usually quickly ended. As a result, the members of a scientific community see themselves and are seen by others as the men uniquely responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared goals, including the training of their successors. Within such groups communication is relatively full and professional judgement relatively unanimous.¹⁵

Change comes about in normal science, according to Kuhn, because of a mechanism associated with anomalies. In normal science fundamental assumptions are not questioned. Anomalies tend to be set aside or accommodated by modifications. When the list of anomalies grows, however, a sense of crisis develops within the community of scientists and this leads the community to examine the assumptions and to search for alternatives. A new paradigm may then be proposed. Such a transformation is a scientific revolution and the successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science. There are two effects of crisis in normal science:

All crises begin with the blurring of a paradigm and the consequent loosening of the rules for normal research. In this respect, research during crises very much resembles research during the pre-paradigm period, except that in the former the locus of

difference is both smaller and more clearly defined. And all crises close in one of three ways. Sometimes normal science ultimately proves able to handle the crisis-provoking problem despite the despair of those who have seen it as the end of an existing paradigm. On other occasions the problem resists even apparently radical new approaches. Then scientists may conclude that no solution will be forthcoming in the present state of their field. The problem is labelled and set aside for a future generation with more developed tools. Or, finally, the case that will most concern us here, a crisis may end with the emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and with the ensuing battle over its acceptance.¹⁶

While, for Kuhn, the choice between alternative theories relies upon the values mentioned before, such as accuracy, simplicity, coherency and so on, he also allows for 'personality, education and prior pattern of professional research'.¹⁷

Both normal science and revolutionary science involve the activity of a scientific community, meaning a group of intercommunicating specialists, unrestricted in time or space.

When it does happen that rival paradigms emerge, such rivals are incompatible.

Successive paradigms tell us different things about the population of the universe and about that population's behaviour ... paradigms differ in more than substance, for they are directed not only to nature but also back upon the science that produced them. They are the source of the methods, problem-field, and standard of solution accepted by any mature scientific community at any given time. As a result, the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a redefinition of the corresponding science. Some old problems may be relegated to another science or declared entirely 'unscientific'. Others that were previously non-existent or trivial may, with a new paradigm, become the very archetypes of significant scientific achievement. And as problems change, so often, does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word game or mathematical play. The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone before.¹⁸

In other words, the paradigm determines the way in which the scientist sees the world, and a paradigm change is like a gestalt switch. Rival paradigms offer differing judgements as to what sorts of solutions are acceptable. Later, Kuhn was to modify the incommensurability element so that the incompatibility was similar to that between two language communities. Communication would be
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difficult but not impossible.

Kuhn's general thesis shows a shift from autonomous areas of knowledge, each governed by the paradigm, to discontinuous communities similarly governed by a paradigm. Each such community is a distinct, knowledge-producing unit. It could be very small, numerically.

Others are not so content with Kuhn's rather static social unit, with its stable membership apart from gradual replacement of
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older researchers by younger ones. Diana Crane made a sociometric survey of scientists within the research area of diffusion of agricultural innovation. Data on different types of scientific relationships were obtained from scientists, all of whom had published in the particular problem area. The social group was found to be neither tightly knit nor closed to external influences.

That a social group within the problem area existed was principally apparent from the number of choices (i.e. of a scientist for collaboration with another) received by a relatively small number of members of the group. It appeared that members of the area were not so much linked to one another directly but were linked to each other indirectly through these highly influential members. The importance of these scientists was not obvious, except in terms of productivity, unless one examined their many and varied influences on the remaining members of their field,

each of whom might be affected in only one or two ways and for short periods of time.²¹

In order to conceptualise this social group Crane makes use of the 'social circle'.

The social circle is not well instituted, compared to the bureaucracy or even to less formalised entities such as the tribe or the family. Members come together on the basis of their interests rather than propinquity or ascribed statuses. Indirect interaction, mediated through intervening parties, is an important aspect of the social circle. It is not necessary to know a particular member of a social circle in order to be influenced by him. Certain characteristics are more common to members of a particular social circle than to non-members, but members do not necessarily share all or even most of these defining characteristics. Each member is usually aware of some but not all other members. The exact boundaries of the social circle are difficult to locate.²²

Crane's work has been carried out on a group of social scientists and hence her application of social structure to the wider field of science may be called into question. The latter task has been undertaken by M.J. Mulkey and W.O. Hagstrom.

2.1.2 The Work of M. Mulkey and W.O. Hagstrom

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Mulkey sees the basic research community of science divided into a great variety of social groupings. There are, in the first instance, broad academic disciplines. Initiates who might enter any one of these disciplines would undergo a socialization process within a firmly fixed intellectual framework. The framework would be largely unchallenged and unchallengeable. However, as the personal research of the initiates advances, they are increasingly involved in ever more specialized intellectual concerns. Within the parent discipline

they find that they belong to a specialist confraternity. The speciality experiences social control. Mulkay quotes Kuhn at this point on the socialization of the scientist:

Various textbooks that the student does encounter display different subject matters, rather than, as in many of the social sciences, exemplifying different approaches to a single problem field. Even books that compete for adoption in a single course differ mainly in level and in pedagogic detail, not in substance or conceptual structure.²⁴

Graduate study, in Mulkay's view, gives students that sort of inside information which has not yet been incorporated into the standard textbooks. It also forms the graduates in acceptable ways of pursuing knowledge, making use of experimental and mathematical tools common in the field of study. Gradually, the graduates come to an understanding of exactly what aspects of the existing intellectual framework may still be legitimately regarded as problematic.²⁵

The education process, as outlined above, is, in effect, controlled by social exchange. Scientists supply information to their colleagues, by means of publications. In return they receive recognition which is experienced as a reward and this recognition is granted to those contributions which conform to the current cognitive and technical norms. Hence, there is a closed circle of control over the work of the specialists. Mulkay, to a great extent, relies on the work done by W.O. Hagstrom on this point.

Not only does the desire for recognition induce the scientist to communicate his results; it also influences his selection of problems and methods. He will tend to select problems, the solutions of which will result in greater recognition, and he will tend to select methods that will make his work acceptable to his colleagues.²⁶

In fact, therefore, Mulkay sees such a group as dominated by certain 'cognitive and technical norms' and he himself draws the parallel between such a constellation and the 'paradigm' of Kuhn.²⁷ However, he also recognises certain advantages in making use of his broader terminology. In the first place it leaves open the degree to which the basic assumptions of a community are connected. It allows for partial and gradual change of intellectual commitment which would not be possible with Kuhn's idea of a paradigm, at least in its earlier formulations. Mulkay also sees the specific use of 'norm' as drawing attention to the parallel between radical innovation and social nonconformity. The emergence of new ideas, is, in part, controlled by social mechanisms. This point is of extreme importance.

If intellectual innovation is closely akin to social deviance, it is likely to be associated with systematic variations in the way in which the processes of control operate. Kuhn himself, of course, stresses the importance of scientific education in maintaining intellectual conformity. Normal science, he suggests, is the process of fitting nature into the boxes provided by a rigid professional education. Accordingly he argues that radical innovations come predominantly from those who are new to a particular area or new to research altogether and who have not yet acquired a strong commitment to the current paradigm. This argument is, I think, correct as far as it goes, but it ignores entirely the part played by social exchange in maintaining conformity and consequently fails to consider the possibility that processes of exchange might be involved in the occurrence of innovation.²⁸

Mulkay then identifies the social structure of basic research communities as a complex web of problem networks.²⁹ This is, for Mulkay, the most basic of all social units in the field of scientific research. Within such a unit a specific problem limits the scientific competence and interest of most researchers to the few networks bordering their own.³⁰ However, unlike Kuhn, Mulkay sees little stability in such networks. Mulkay, in fact, sees this instance as

part of a wider view of the social processes involved in a great variety of scientific innovations. Behind such processes there lies the interpersonal competition for professional recognition. The writing of scientific communications, the planning of research, the selection of problems and methods are motivated and controlled by the latent function of seeking personal recognition.

When the current paradigm is gradually filled in then, obviously, social exchange as a social mechanism becomes ineffective. Those working in the field, dominated by the latent function of social exchange, look to new fields and more interesting and rewarding problems. The very effectiveness of normal science brings about the dismantling of the mechanism of intellectual control. The end result is thus migration and consequent cross-fertilization.

Mulkay can isolate several models for the growth of science by migration. In the first instance there is migration to new fields of ignorance. Then, secondly, there is movement by scientists into established networks bringing with them preconceptions and techniques which they have learned elsewhere. They would ordinarily be met with resistance. Possible results would be that a distinct, co-existing network would be set up by the newcomers and this would be more likely if the cognitive structure of the receiving community is relatively imprecise or, if no social separation takes place, then the intellectual change tends to be of a revolutionary type. Thirdly, the Kuhn-like change would only take place when special conditions apply. If few significant problems remain to be solved and there are few opportunities for recognition and if skills acquired in the process of research are not easily transferable to another field while, at the same time, cognitions are very precise, limiting any possibility of

redefinition, then only might such an internal revolution in
 31
 thought take place.

Hagstrom's investigations have brought to light another, yet similar, type of network change which is described on the analogy of cell division in living organisms. Professional recognition is the motivating force. Scientists search for problems and places of work that have not been already worked over. Within a particular network there may, therefore, be dispersion. Such sub-speciation eventually will lead to group differentiation when the new unit will
 32
 break off.

2.1.3 Reservations of J.J. Smolicz on the Use and Application of Kuhn

While these studies centre on the structural divisions within academic science, it has been said that they ignore the effect of the external, non-scientific factors on the structure and function of the
 33
 scientific community. Other types of reward, beside professional recognition, can be initiated and directed from outside the community structure of science.

The question that must now be raised is this: To what extent can the description of the behaviour of scientific communities, as found in Kuhn and others, function heuristically in the study of communities organised for purposes other than the doing of science? Are the tightly organised and clearly successful research communities
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 of the natural sciences unique?

Smolicz questions whether the scientific paradigm, as applied to the natural sciences by Kuhn, can be applied without reservation

to the social sciences. Certainly the social sciences do have conceptual models, which influence sociologists and educationists in what they look for, what they observe and what they do with their observations. But this does not mean that conceptual models in the social sciences are therefore paradigms. In the first place no conceptual model is universally accepted in the way Kuhn describes the acceptance of a natural science paradigm. There are competing models and rival factions backing each model. Then, although both paradigms and conceptual models direct research along predetermined channels, their directing power varies in intensity. For a sociological model, for example, such power is greatly diminished by the lack of agreement on the way it should be interpreted even among those who ostensibly belong to the same school and follow the same general orientation. The existence of alternative approaches is hardly ever lost from view. Conformity to a single conceptual model could be enforced externally by authority

but this type of conformity represents the very antithesis of the environment necessary for flourishing scientific research.³⁶

Both the scientific paradigm and the social sciences' conceptual model are very difficult to dislodge even after they have outlived their usefulness, but science does have a mechanism which would eventually lead to the displacement of paradigms which cease to perform in a satisfactory manner. As indicated earlier, research brings to light fundamental anomalies which cannot be accommodated within the existing theoretical framework and the displacement mechanism takes over. However, in the social sciences, it is almost impossible to discard a model. The evidence for anomaly never appears

sufficiently conclusive because there is not the factual element to the data that is found in natural science.

While any work performed within normal science is never wasted, in the sense that it contributes to the building of a new paradigm, the same cannot be said of work done within one conceptual model of the social sciences. Further, theories which emanate from the social science models frequently lack the predictive, or even the purely explanatory value which is found in the scientific paradigm. Finally, the paradigm in science is generally of an impersonal character. There is, at least on the surface, no personal involvement in the paradigm as such. In the social sciences, models have much more political, personal and moral implications. The social scientist finds himself personally involved.

In short, Smolicz has warned against the simplistic proliferation of comparisons between Kuhn's paradigm and other models in other fields, as well as the comparison between Kuhn's scientific community and other knowledge-producing communities. Kuhn, and others who deal with the same basic question, have focussed attention on the relationship between performance and change, the relationship of knowledge to the culture in which it is embedded, the relationship of history to value. He has isolated one instance of the many cases in which cultural activities are defined and controlled by tradition and that tradition consists of a set of devices, or principles, which have proved their ability to order the experience of a given social constituency.

Any community finds that it is faced with a common experience which is contingent, presenting itself as a series of 'problems'.

It is the role of tradition to transform the contingency of experience
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 into something comprehensible and subject to maximum control. In
 organising the experience of a community, tradition also organises the
 community. Hence, Kuhn's instance of a paradigm and of an organised
 scientific community is but one example of tradition at work. Tra-
 ditions can lose their constituencies and Kuhn's 'scientific revolution'
 was one instance of such a drastic change. Hence, it would seem
 that the more logical approach would be to delve into the theory of
 tradition rather than simply take the particular instance that Kuhn
 has uncovered (and that with some reservations). Much of the pro-
 liferation of paradigm-applications have done just that.

When we come to the particular instance of religion, for example,
 we have some direct applications of Kuhn. The principal effort would
 39
 be that of I. Barbour. Barbour accepts the thesis of Kuhn that
 all data are theory laden, that comprehensive theories are highly
 resistant to falsification, that there are no rules for choice between
 research programmes. He makes three assertions, by which he claims
 to cover the ambit of Kuhn's theory. The assertions are that rival
 theories are not incommensurable, that observation exerts some
 control over theories and that there are criteria of assessment
 40
 independent of particular research programmes.

Barbour then sees the parallel between science and religion as
 relying upon interpretations of scientific practice paralleling
 interpretations of religious philosophy or theological practice.
 In short, Barbour is dealing with a select group of religious
 practitioners - professional philosophers and theologians. At
 certain points he makes the assumption that members of religious

communities are co-extensive with professional philosophers. He speaks of the 'Christian community' as being the source of such philosophical research and in doing so, he destroys any basis for comparison with the Kuhnian social unit, which is vastly different
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from such an amorphous collectivity.

Rather than follow the rather dubious path charted by Barbour, against which Smolicz has rightly warned, it would be preferable to begin with a more fundamental and broader investigation of the nature and philosophy of tradition, its ability to organize and control a specific community and to indicate the possibility that tradition can lose its constituency.

2.2 J. Szacki's Theory of Tradition

In order to give some direction to the meaning of tradition we
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will make use of the theoretical categories devised by Jerzy Szacki. Within a broad concept of tradition, Szacki has focussed, first of all, on its functional meaning, namely the act of transmitting certain values from one group or generation to another. Szacki calls this social transmission. In this context, a value is that which is consciously sought; it therefore contains a specifically human element. In the particular case of tradition, valuation related to antiquity must be included. Other values may accompany antiquity, but the latter is essential.

Szacki identifies a second meaning for 'tradition' by describing the actual content of what has been transmitted. This can be called cultural heritage, or simply the culture that has been acquired from a group's past. A third meaning approaches 'tradition'

from a subjective point of view and describes the attitude of any given generation to its past. This attitude may amount to either approval or disapproval of its heritage. The current generation either identifies with its predecessors, the 'ancients' from whom the heritage has derived, or dissociates itself from them. Within the ambit of this third meaning, the present generation can select a certain aspect of the heritage and evaluate it, reform it or adjust it to present needs. Sometimes the aspect of the heritage so selected could even be invented without negating the process. It is only to this last meaning, which is concerned with evaluated heritage, that Szacki gives the scientific title of tradition. Tradition is, therefore, in the strict sense, only that portion of the heritage which has been handed on and which is subject to active evaluation, exciting feelings of approval or disapproval in the

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present generation.

In a pre-literate society only that tradition which is being presently valued, can be retained. The rest of the heritage is irreparably lost and forgotten. In literate societies and societies manifesting social differentiation there is a more complex pattern. Since records of the past heritage are preserved in literate societies, retrospection becomes possible. Reversion to the original heritage is possible and there may thereby be more than one single heritage available for evaluation. Further, within a socially differentiated society, individuals can belong to discrete sub-societies and these can presently value different heritages or variant forms of the one

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heritage. In this sense the past can have different meanings for different sections and sub-groups of society.

What is actually handed on in these cases, the heritage, has been well described by Ossowski as 'certain patterns of muscular, emotional and mental responses which shape the dispositions of the group members'.⁴⁵ This definition excludes any external objects, which are thereby deemed to be simply correlates of the heritage. Each generation then selects some part of this heritage and evaluates, reforms and adjusts it according to its circumstances. It can therefore happen that some original heritage has been repeatedly evaluated and adjusted to new needs, bringing about considerable change in its content. Eventually it may hardly resemble its original format, perhaps the only link being the firm belief that the past has been preserved, in its unchanged form.

If the process of tradition, as analysed by Szacki, is deemed acceptable, then it follows that any cultural system can only be adequately investigated by considering the intentions, the experiences and the activities of its participants over an historical period. Human consciousness must be taken into account in deciding what is being presently evaluated, provoking an active display of the sentiments of acceptance or rejection. Such analysis is not as subjective as might first appear. According to Florian Znaniecki, human values are facts, as real as things, and can be accepted as such. But values can only be validly seen in the form in which they function⁴⁶ in the consciousness of those who produce and maintain them. Unless such values are highlighted in their human dimension, the process of tradition will remain illogical, a haphazard series of changes throughout the history of a group.

In order to see at more depth the working of tradition within a cultural system we must distinguish between personal and group cultural systems. The group cultural system is the collection of cultural and social values maintained by a particular group. This can be distinguished from the personal cultural system, which individual members construct for themselves by selecting those cultural items supplied by the group system which meet their own particular situation in life. The personal cultural system may, therefore, be regarded as a mediator between the culture of the group and the private world of the individual.⁴⁷ The personal cultural system can take different forms. It can be culturally homogenous, deriving from one group cultural system, or it can be heterogeneous, deriving from more than one. In the latter case, we can visualize the process of cultural interaction occurring in two possible ways: coalescence of values drawn from two cultural systems, varying in importance perhaps, to form a new, hybrid type of personal system, or the formation of a personal dual system of cultural values in which the two components co-exist within the individual and are activated by him in different cultural and social contexts.

Such drawing upon a variety of cultural stocks can be explained by the special role of the ideological system. The ideological system refers to the group's standards of value and norms of conduct. Some part of that system, because of its connection with the social system, may represent the group's core values. Whenever a group feels that there is a direct link between their identity as a group and what they regard as the most crucial and distinguishing element of their group culture, the element concerned becomes an ideological⁴⁸ core value for the group. Core values and the social system are connected by the collective group identity, therefore, effectively

differentiating between members and non-members and indicating that the collectivity in question has some kind of definite identity.

One of the principal functions of these core values is to act for each generation as the evaluating agent for the presently esteemed heritage, as well as structuring both the individual's and the group's social systems. Core values can therefore be regarded as the very heartland of tradition; if they cease to be used for evaluating they no longer form part of their living tradition and pass into the realm of heritage (which may however be reactivated at some future date).

As each individual activates group values in a somewhat different way, the range of tolerated deviation may be quite considerable. However, individuals are expected to operate within the basic context of the ideological system of their group, suppressing any notable deviation from group norms. Otherwise, they are regarded as activating what the group perceives as external, hence deviant, values. When a sufficient number of such deviant individuals are involved and they become influential, however, a newly organized group system can emerge, despite the fact that this system may be in conflict with previously established group norms. Assessed by the new group values, the heritage will inevitably then undergo either minor or major modification.

No matter what modification takes place there will still be some continuity, at least in the firm assertion of antiquity. The reason for such constant affirmation of continuity is to be found in the human need for order. The group acts to retain its cultural identity with the same tenacity shown by individuals in maintaining

physical life. In order to survive, both individuals and groups must adapt to the present environment and, for the group, this requires at times adaptation of the received heritage, which is then evaluated as tradition. However, continuity with the past is then necessary unless the identity of the group is to be lost and a fundamental lack of order introduced.

2.2.1 Application of Szacki's theory to religious social groups.

We now need to connect this theory of tradition with what has been said previously. Religious heritage enjoys longevity, by this argument, because of the human need for order within a group. The order within a particular religion consists in the firm maintenance of contact between the human community and some manifestation of Ultimacy.⁵⁰ From this contact there derives religious knowledge which bestows order on experience. Relationship with Ultimacy, as has been seen, constitutes the basic religious experience, but for this relationship to be established Ultimacy must be symbolized, rendering it specific and tangible, and capable of being experienced. A particular religious community would then be differentiated on the basis of such symbolization of Ultimacy and its normative description of the mode in which contact with Ultimacy can be achieved.

Symbolization of Ultimacy and the effective mode of contacting it constitute the basic 'event' for the group. This event is contained and transmitted in the core myth or myths of the religious community, while the mechanism of contact is handed on through knowledge of its basic ritual. Myth and ritual would therefore constitute, in the main, the cultural heritage of a religious community. Using Szacki's categories, religious social transmission would

begin with rites of initiation and be continued through repeated recitation of the myth and performance of ritual.

Such an approach to the topic of myth and its accompanying ritual would be at variance with the principal theories in circulation. There are three directions evident in present day scholarship on the nature of myth and its function in society: the charter theory, the structuralist theory and the psychological theory.

The charter theory has derived from the anthropological investigations of B. Malinowski, who stressed the practical function of myth.⁵¹ Myth, in his view, was not involved in scientific interpretation or logical interpretation. Instead a myth simply validated customs and institutions in a society, stating a precedent with arbitrariness but thereby putting an end to the community's anxiety and dispute.⁵² Mircea Eliade, following the same line, saw the purpose of all myths as creating the primordial era of the beginnings. Through mythical recitation and accompanying ritual, a community could reconstitute that era and thereby revive the unique power of the past in the present. For Eliade, all myths are in some way myths of origin.

Periodically the most important events were re-enacted and so relived; thus, one recited the cosmogony, repeated the exemplary gestures of the gods, the deeds that founded civilization. There was a nostalgia for the origins; in some cases one⁵³ could even speak of a nostalgia for the primordial Paradise.

The charter theory does attempt to explain the complex inter-relationship between the human community and its myth but it does not adequately explain the phenomenon of change in myth or the fluidity

of myth. Further, the arbitrariness of the mythical content would seem to require refinement. Does the charter also explain something to the community that uses it?

The second line of thought, the structuralist, stresses more the explanatory content of myth. It is basically historical, showing no interest in the origins of myth or in the historical connection between a myth and this particular historical community. The way had been paved for the structuralist view by Ernst Cassirer, who recognised in myth a special form of expression in which the human mind opposed a world of its own construction to the world of factual

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experience. Myth therefore expressed those basic human concerns which assist in integrating the individual with his social and physical situation.

More significantly, the structuralist view has been developed
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by Claude Lévi-Strauss, who has turned the search for myth's origins inward to the structural consistency of the human mind itself. Because of the universality of the mind-structure the social machine is necessarily structured along the same lines. Such a structure imposes itself on all experience and in fact polarizes experience into sets of opposites so that the mind can grasp it. The function of myth is to mediate contradictions that men inevitably uncover in such polarization. Myths set up pseudo-logical models whereby such contradictions can be resolved.

Structuralists stress that, despite the variety of myths, the basic structure of polar opposition being resolved remains in all of them. The mythical structure remains unalterable throughout the course of mythical transmission. Such continuity is guaranteed

by the constancy of the esprit humain which asserts itself. But the structuralist theory does not explain why change should take place.

Finally, following Freud's insistence on the significance of the unconscious mind, theories explaining myth in psychological terms have proliferated. ⁵⁶ Particularly fecund was the parallel between myth and dream, the one being communitarian and the other individualistic. Myths, therefore, have been seen as community dreams, adjustive responses of the human psyche, resolving anxiety-producing situations or sublimating anti-social tendencies.

⁵⁷ Development of this trend was accomplished by C. Jung. Myths and dreams, he contended, reveal certain configurations of the human mind, revealing eventually the collective unconscious. They demonstrate the continuing involvement of man with certain key symbols or archetypes, such as the earth-mother, the divine child, the sun, god, self, the cross, the number four. Deployment of archetypes, whether in the individual dream or the collective myth, is an index of the unconscious psychic drama. While this approach does have attractive features, the mechanism of change remains unanswered.

The theories themselves tend to perpetuate a false polarization of myth as charter and myth as explanation, whether logical or psychological. ⁵⁸ The limitation inherent in these theories is their inability to explain the fact of drastic change in myth.

⁵⁹ There have been few notable studies on change and fluidity in myth. At times these changes are minor, resulting in the variation of names or the addition of supplementary episodes. But at other times the

changes are significant and drastic. While superficial reasons - such as the arrival of a new ethnic group, the emergence of a new stage of cultural development - are variously put forward to account for the observed changes, there has been no real work done on the mechanism whereby such change is effected. Indeed, it would seem that it is our own optical illusion that deceives us into believing that any myth was stable in situ. Fluidity could well have been endemic to the mythological phenomenon, with drastic change an ever present fact of life.

An example of change in myth, from a living tradition, is that
 60
 of the Peruvian Campa. Their myth relates that in the beginning the god Oriatziri created the world, the animals and the Campa together with other neighbouring tribes. The myth then tells of the arrival of the white men emerging from subterannean, watery darkness. They are identified, in the myth, with the monstrous dragon Nonkhi, principle of evil and the author of disease and death. The white men exterminated the Campa with the exception of their primordial shaman. Eventually, the myth relates, the shaman will triumph over the white man since, in the time of the beginnings, the shaman had defeated the dragon Nonkhi.

The original myth can be reconstructed. It would simply have told of the god Oriatziri, creator of all that was known, and the evil principle Nonkhi, responsible for everything in the world that was not good. Nonkhi was kept at bay only by the shaman. Campa tradition then added to the original myth the identification of white men with Nonkhi.

A further version identified the primordial shaman with an

eighteenth century national leader, Juan Santos Atahualpa, who led a revolt against the Spanish colonial troops and the Christian missionaries. He obtained freedom for the Campa for about ten years and then he was 'transformed into smoke', presumably to return again when required.

At some period the changing myth received an addition. In the time of the beginnings, when the Campa were poor, they were able to obtain food only by barter or from the god Pachamaite. He was the author and owner of all foods and tools. However, reaching Pachamaite involved an initiatory ordeal of entering a dark cave and defeating the monster who defended the goods. The myth then relates that today the road to Pachamaite is blocked by the white man's barricades and the Campa do not have the traders or the shamans to reach him. The white men intercept the goods and sell them. The Campa therefore are waiting for the return of the primordial shaman to rectify this situation.

This subsidiary myth obviously expresses a new millenarian hope that has spread though the Campa as they have become aware of the good things enjoyed by the white man. But the mechanism whereby such new trends are expressed in the basic myth of a people requires investigation.

It is myth and ritual which form the essential components of tradition, in the sense used by Szacki. Drastic change in myth and ritual would simply indicate that the process of evaluation, on the part of a social group, has been ongoing and reached a turning-point. The myth and ritual system cannot, therefore, be divorced from the particular social group that evaluates it.

2.3 The Approach of Classical Sociology of Religion to Religious Social Groups.

In this light some of the earlier studies within Sociology of Religion call for a review. They happen to deal, almost exclusively, with Christianity and acknowledge that various forms of community have derived from that particular ideology, but they differ in distinguishing the various types of collectivity that have emerged and they differ in explaining the rise of the variant forms of such collectivities.

In this field of Sociology of Religion some earlier ideas demonstrated similarity to those of Kuhn but with more stress on the social aspect. Karl Mannheim had distinguished two mentalities which he called the ideological and the utopian.⁶¹ The ideological mentality is bound to existing structures as 'absolute and eternal and blind to all anomalies'.⁶² Any questions can satisfactorily be answered by rationalization. This is similar to Kuhn's 'normal science'. On the contrary those imbued with a utopian mentality are

so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it.⁶³

This utopian mentality leads to the destruction of the existing situation in an attempt to realise some utopian ideal.⁶⁴

Mannheim, and he would be accompanied by Weber, point to an alienated social group, disprivileged in some way, who gain identity by a

promise for the future which implies the assignment of some function, mission or vocation to them. What they cannot claim to be, they replace⁶⁵ by the worth of that which they will one day become ...

It is this distinction of mentalities and associated social groups which has given rise to the question, in the field of Sociology of Religion, of typology of religious groupings. The principal distinction, following the ideas of Weber and Mannheim above, is between Church and Sect.

The Church-sect typology was put forward in an attempt to devise a set of categories that would allow an analysis of religious organizations. The typology was first outlined by Max Weber. He defined 'church' as

a sort of trust foundation for supernatural ends, an institution,⁶⁶ necessarily including both the just and the unjust.

He defined 'sect' as a group which saw itself

solely as a community of personal believers of the reborn, and only⁶⁷ these. In other words, not as a Church but as a sect.

Weber, in several books and articles over a long period, outlined certain characteristics of the 'sect' as it stood in contradistinction to a 'church'. The following could be mentioned:

personal charisma preferred to charisma attached to an office, an anti-authoritarian strain, the principle of the sovereignty of the local community of believers, notable smallness in numbers.

The smallness in numbers characteristic was developed further
 68
 by G. Simmel. He noted that a sect necessarily stood off against
 the community as a whole and that the members' personal behaviour
 was affected substantially by this stance. Thus, paucity of numbers
 69
 was of the very essence of the sect structure.

Weber noted other sociologically remarkable traits of the sect.
 There tended, for instance, to be a very strict moral discipline in
 70
 the sectarian community. The sectarians tended to introduce
 probationary periods to test the newcomer and there was a distinct
 tendency for the lay element to become dominant in the sect.

Although Weber foreshadowed later problems with the church-
 sect typology he had really only isolated a possible sociological
 category without elaborating on it. He did, for example, consider
 other non-Christian religious traditions, such as Judaism and
 Brahminism, and did think it possible to apply his sociological
 types to these, but the work of further elaboration and distinction
 71
 was left to others.

One important figure who developed the basic insight of Weber
 was E. Troeltsch. He made use of materials from earlier study on
 the later mediaeval period and from Reformation Christianity to define
 72
 further the difference between church and sect. Like Weber before
 him, he saw a church as an institution endowed with grace and sal-
 vation. Such an institution was able to receive the masses who
 flocked to it and, importantly, it was able to adjust itself to the
 surrounding world and its values. Troeltsch saw that subjective

holiness was of less importance since the church-institution carried, within itself, objective holiness. Because of its ease with the world the church would tend inevitably towards conservatism, and because of its appeal to the masses it would engender universalism.

Troeltsch was able to identify both conservative and radical elements in early Christianity. On the one hand there was a radical indifference or even hostility towards the rest of the social order as the community set out to actualize its ideal of love in a small group. On the other hand there was basic conservatism as the group, with an ever increasing range of influence, found that it could not ignore secular institutions and must indeed utilize them for its particular purposes.

The conservative trend tended to give rise to the church, while the radical trend gave rise to the sect. Troeltsch further referred to

two sociological forms of the sect-type, the Religious Order and the voluntary association.⁷⁴

He did not see the two types as being functional equivalents but as having an analogous relationship.


Sects, for Troeltsch, were voluntary societies. The basic nexus that identifies them is the experience of 'new birth'. They are marked by smallness of numbers, living apart from the world even though in it. Their attitude towards the world is that of indifference or aggression. They emphasise personal fellowship, which also tends to dissociate the sect from the existing social order.

Troeltsch saw sects as deriving, for the most part, from the lower and uneducated classes. They were deficient in theological theory, but a strict moral code and a deep-seated future perspective replaced such intellectual satisfaction.

Already the thinking of Weber and Troeltsch had stressed not only the distinction of church and sect (on which they agreed for the most part) but also the internal dynamic that related the two. Weber used his theory of 'routinization of charisma' to describe the process whereby a sect tended, in time, to become a church. His view can be schematically expressed:



Troeltsch was also intrigued by the internal dynamic but he did not see it in terms of a direct transformation. There was rather a dialectical opposition between the two polar extremes that gave rise to a new religious organizational form - mysticism. Troeltsch's thinking on the dynamic can be thus outlined:



'Mysticism' rejected the communal features of both sect and church.

The typology of church organization was taking shape but it required further refinement. Both Weber and Troeltsch had written on the question from their rather insular western European experience. The American scene offered a new religious testing-ground for the model since sects tended to develop more church-like characteristics there without, however, conforming to the polar type of church.

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It was H.R. Niebuhr who took up a lead in the insistence made by earlier scholars on the characteristic of voluntary membership and the consequent smallness of size. He applied this to the American situation.

Niebuhr stressed the essential transiency of sects. They were born, he maintained, out of a line of protest against worldliness and were composed of volunteers who were attracted out of personal devotion to a charismatic leader. But, inevitably, the sect would dis-integrate or else develop into a new category - denomination. This category designated a group less at odds with the surrounding society and less rejected by it. It was not universalistic (as was the church) and its ethic was more in keeping with the accepted standards of society in general. Lay domination and the influence of charismatic leaders, characteristic of the sects, were replaced by the guidance of an hierarchical ministry. Further work on 'denomination' was done by Martin.⁷⁶ He defined the principal characteristic of denomination as a failure to lay claim to exclusive possession of religious truth and the means of salvation. This was accompanied by a non-total commitment and a less revolutionary social ethic.

The modification that took place, in the change from sect to denomination, could be attributed to certain factors. The first was the fact that the original volunteer members would be inevitably replaced, in one generation, by members born into the sect. Thus Niebuhr wrote:

By its very nature the sectarian type of organization is valid only for one generation. The children born to the voluntary members of the first generation begin to make the sect a church long before they have arrived at the years of discretion. For with their coming the sect must take on the character of an

educational and disciplinary institution, with the purpose of bringing the new generation into conformity with ideals and customs which have become traditional.⁷⁷

Secondly, there is an inevitable social mobility movement upwards. A sect, that has by definition a strict moral code, will encourage hard work and thrift. This engenders wealth and security and, in turn, these lessen the hostility felt towards the world. At once millennial hopes begin to retreat into the background; the reward is already present. The group becomes more conservative in outlook. There is a demand for a more educated ministry with, consequently, less emotional worship and less biblical fundamentalism. In short, the organization can no longer be properly described by the category of sect but by that of denomination.

The contribution to the theory of church-sect typology offered by Weber, Troeltsch and Niebuhr have been further systematized by H. Becker and others.⁷⁸ Troeltsch's definition of a sect has been both widened and simplified. The principal criterion of sect now tends to be defined as a radical divergence from existing religious groups or from secular society. That divergence could be doctrinal, ethical or political. Various combinations of sub-groups, arranged either in the form of a continuum or in more elaborate schemata, describe the newer analysis of church organization. Thus, Becker acknowledges four sub-types; ecclesia, sect, denomination, cult. Basically ecclesia, sect and denomination follow the earlier lines of definition. On the origin of denomination, however, Becker writes:

It should not be forgotten, however, that any denomination is a sect in historical origin and doctrine, and only failure or unwillingness on the part of the clergy to emphasize the grounds of division can obscure this fundamental fact.⁷⁹

'Cult', as used by Becker, describes that stage of purely personal ecstatic experience, similar to 'mysticism' in Troeltsch's schema. Cult is a progression from tendencies within sect, while denomination is merely a mature sect that has changed character. Becker's position could be outlined thus:



Since the time of the Second World War there have been further attempts to improve the comprehensiveness of the range of the typology. Experience with church organization has demonstrated the poverty of the earlier simple structures. Yinger introduced a new category of 'universal church', that is a church that achieves a high degree of universality both as regards the social groups it incorporates and the religious tendencies it can tolerate. ⁸⁰ B. Wilson ⁸¹ has researched the maintenance of sectarian characteristics in sects. He typifies a sect as a voluntary association formed by members whose calling has been verified by sect authorities. The membership is exclusive in character and expulsion is used as a real device. The sect sees itself as an elect group with its own gnosis. The lay members, seeking personal perfection, are responsible for administration. The sect is hostile to the world and a totalitarian hold maintained by the sect over its members tends to retain this distance.

Wilson perceives sects as springing from stresses and tensions which are experienced differentially in a general society. Such stress and tension cause, among a certain section of the population, the emergence of a sect. He later emphasised that while it is true that sects arise in conditions of social change, they arise in con-

texts of very different types of social change. In face of a struggle to attain salvation men respond, and certain responses are sect-establishing. Wilson therefore offers a categorization of sects according to the quality of this response. He distinguishes: conversionist (need for dramatic conversion); revolutionist (demand for change in world not individual); introversionist (salvation found in the esoteric and occult); thaumaturgical (demand for miracles to achieve salvation); reformist (rational procedures are justified by some religious inspiration); utopian (hope for a return to the basic principles which God intended). Not all sects, Wilson would maintain, are likely to move towards denomination. While conversionist sects tend towards becoming denominations, the American religious context demonstrated that some sects can become 'established sects' which maintain their sectarian character for several generations.

The basic recognition that a sect is the response of a religious system, under certain stress, to a 'deviant' world is underpinned by the work of P. Berger. Berger stresses, in his discussion of religious organization, that each religious 'world' requires a social base if it is to be viable. This is a 'world' that is real and 'habitable' for the religious members of the group. He calls this base the 'plausibility structure'. Faced with a subjectively-apparent, deviant world, groups need to construct and maintain a sub-society that will serve a plausibility structure for their emerging religious system. Such plausibility structures typically have a sectarian character. They set up their own institutions of education, sociability and voluntary group intermarriage. In this way

the subsociety finds legitimacy and defines itself in contrast with the world at large.

Following this review of the formation of typology of church-sect our discussion must turn to the vital question of its utility outside of a Christian context.⁸⁵ It is true that these sociological categories derived from an analysis of specifically Christian church organizations and the very terminology has been borrowed from theological jargon. But if the typology adequately covers a range of empirical data within one religious tradition, it would be illuminating to see its application to another range.⁸⁶

If the typology is so formulated as to concentrate principally upon social relations and not upon doctrinal aspects then it would seem that the transfer from one religious tradition to another can be made.⁸⁷ R. Robertson reformulates not so much the categories but the bases for a typology in order to give the typology a more comparative scope. The new criteria he offers are the self-conceived basis of legitimacy and the membership principle. The first refers to just how effective leaders regard the sect - as one of a number of acceptable religious paths or as the only one. The second refers to relatively demanding standards of admission or religious performance.⁸⁸ Robertson, on the basis of these criteria, outlines these categories:

Self-conceived basis of legitimacy

Membership principle	Self-conceived basis of legitimacy		
		Pluralistically legit.	Uniquely legit.
	Exclusive	Institutionalized Sect	Sect
	Inclusive	Denomination	Church

We could consider that Robertson has gone further than others in developing the possibility of a comparative use of the church-sect typology.

In the terminology that we have been using the 'self-conceived basis of legitimacy' would refer to the attainment of paradigmatic normalcy. At a certain point the process of evaluation of the cultural heritage would reach an analogous stage to 'normal science' in the Kuhnian usage. Simultaneously there would be a movement towards social control. Whereas, in the field of the natural sciences, social control was seen to be maintained by social exchange, in the field of religion social control is primarily maintained by authority exercised within the community. The 'membership principle' simply denotes that, at a certain moment of greater stability, authority is transferred from the individuals as such to the religious corporation and its representatives.

Thus, a 'church', in the sociological sense, becomes that social group where a system of knowledge is firmly established, having an authority structure built into it. A 'sect' can be of two types. In general, the type indicates a social group whose system of religious knowledge is as yet not firmly established and where authority is still vested in the individuals who are in the process of accepting the system of knowledge. However, such a social group can result from a movement towards 'church' or from a breakdown of a previously existing 'church'. 'Sect' is necessarily therefore unstable.

It would be our contention that the most fruitful approach to

the collectivities associated with the natural sciences, the social sciences or religion is through the philosophy of tradition. This yields an analogue, in the case of religion, to Kuhn's 'paradigm' or Mulkay's 'cognitive and technical norms', namely myth and ritual. In Szacki's terms the content of myth and ritual forms the social heritage of the group. Social transmission is effected by recitation of the myth and performance of the ritual.

Smolicz' reservations about the application of Kuhn's paradigm to other fields would seem to be met in the case of religion. In tribal societies and many modern religious social groups, the core myth and ritual are universally accepted, in a way akin to the acceptance of the scientific paradigm. They continue to have a directive power except in times of drastic change. Notoriously, the myth and ritual process is difficult to dislodge and even after it has become outmoded it contributes to a revitalization process whereby elements of the past are continued into the present. Within its own field of endeavour, the myth and ritual process is explanatory and predictive. The hesitation shown by Smolicz towards the personal involvement of the social scientist in his models would not apply to the same extent, since in the field of religion myth and ritual are always 'given' and 'revealed'.

In the case of a mediatorial religion, in particular, there is a stability about the basic myth and the basic ritual. The basic myth of such a mediatorial community will recount the official symbolization of the High God, the forms of hypostatization, the validation of sacral persons or institutions and will validate the contact with the High God. Its ritual will encapsulate the official

means of making contact.

The heritage of such a religious group would be the patterns of response shaping the dispositions of the group members so that they would take up a particular posture before a High God. The patterns of response would be contained in myth and transmitted by means of recitation of myth and performance of ritual. But, most importantly, in the third sense of Szacki, there is 'tradition' which evaluates what each generation receives. In fact, the basic myth and the ritual do change. A priori, change will take place when the ideological system, which evaluates the heritage, has itself undergone a change. This would be due to values, coming from outside the system, being of sufficient number and sufficiently influential to activate a new system against the prevailing group system.

This fluidity can be explained by the current generation either identifying with its predecessors or dissociating itself from them. The present generation can select a certain aspect of the social heritage and evaluate it, reform it or adjust it to their present needs. This process is well documented by the studies on sect, for example those of Wilson. The sect is simply the religiously immature community, not yet dominated by its established 'paradigm' of myth and ritual. The other types, as identified by sociologists above, would be various stages of community along the way to establishment, perhaps tangentially delayed.

The collectivities of which we are speaking would be analogous to the broad discipline within the mature natural sciences. They

would include the personnel who would accept and make use of the myth and ritual process. The analogue of the 'graduates' in the natural science discipline would be the theologians, usually the trained clergy. In the process of their training they are inducted into one or other speciality, learning its jargon, its techniques and approaches. They learn what can legitimately be questioned and what problems remain to be solved. They become closely associated with the myth and ritual of their group and become principally responsible for identifying anomalies, providing rationalizations or bringing about drastic change. Such groups could also be characterized typologically as either Church-types or sect-types and more will be said of this later.

2.4 Complete Description of Systems of Religious Knowledge in their relationship to associated religious social groups.

Having established above the experiential model of knowledge in religious culture, we now wish to elaborate further on the expressive models of knowledge. ⁸⁹ The primary expressive model of religious knowledge is generated from the experiential model, which ⁹⁰ takes on one of the alternate forms - mediatorial or immediate. The nexus between these two models is a 'given', revealed and unchallengable. Chronologically, the experiential and primary expressive models cannot be distinguished. What is revealed or given, in some way, is the primary expressive model, but it bears the experiential model within itself, although this latter can only be disengaged from it by logical reflection. Acceptance of the models in their cohesion is the prerequisite for belonging to the associated social group, since it constitutes the core-value of such a social group.

The primary expressive model, encapsulated in the core myth of the social group, will remain the privileged bearer of the basic experience of contact with Ultimacy. The expressive model should be seen as one, very important, form of metaphor. It has been written of metaphor that it is

one means of effecting instantaneous fusion of two separated realms of experience into one illuminating, iconic, encapsulating image. ⁹¹

In this vein, the term 'root metaphor' has been coined by Stephen Pepper:

The method in principle seems to be this: A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries to see if he cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. The original area then becomes his basic analogy or root metaphor. ⁹²

Some of these root metaphors are more fertile, more resilient and able to adjust to new situations. They become entrenched in popular usage. In the same way, we would propose that the primary expressive model acts analogously with relation to the religious social group who thereby establish contact with Ultimacy. Those religious myths that have survived have been sufficiently fertile, resilient and flexible.


Once a primary expressive model has become entrenched, with the consequent formation of a social group who accept it as their core value, then Tradition, in the sense of Szacki ⁹³ comes into play. Tradition is concerned with enculturation and ensures that successive generations evaluate the social heritage that they receive. Evaluation is an ongoing process which, in the case of religion, is moti-

vated by the need for realized contact with Ultimacy and the consequent derivation of knowledge. By such evaluation there is generated other forms of the primary expressive model, more or less identical with it, but always with the appearance of antiquity. These are the secondary expressive models. Dissident religious groups are therefore differentiated by the fact that they esteem different secondary models. They can remain within the one religious heritage but they form discrete social groups. There will be variation in community structures because of the ability of the secondary expressive models to generate church-type and sect-type communities and an infinite variety within those categories.

Tradition performs its task of enculturation by means of education. Normally, this education will be effected by the particular format of core-ritual that is accepted within the group and by the recital of the core-myth. However, for those more advanced, there will be more evolved and reflective elaboration and vindication of the secondary expressive models. In time, the process of this advanced education, required to rationalize all aspects of the particular secondary expressive model, as it is esteemed in the social group, may then borrow or adapt an educational methodology from outside the religious culture.

The need to vindicate, rationalize and explicate the subsequent secondary expressive model will marshall theories of language and predication from within a particular culture. This is now termed a Research Tradition. In time, this effort at correlation can itself develop into an established model which may be termed a Research Model.

At first the model may simply be a borrowing from the secular culture but later develop into a specifically religious research model. The religious education of adherents, particularly of skilled practitioners, will comprise essentially an induction into such a methodology. The entire process can be diagrammatically portrayed thus:



Hence, the Research Tradition consists, in its earliest format, of the recitation of the core-myth and the performance of the core-ritual. At some point, as evaluation becomes more particularized, the secondary expressive model will become noticeably variant with respect to the primary expressive model. In non-literate social groups the primary expressive model will then be displaced by the secondary expressive model and only a later investigator would be able to restore it, if it were possible. However, in literate societies, there is the ability to stabilize the primary expressive model and this takes place by written record. It is thereafter necessary for the research tradition not only to evaluate its social heritage but also to vindicate the correlation between the secondary expressive model and the archetype.

As vindication, rationalization and correlation proceed it could be necessary for subsidiary expressive models to be established

which, aptly or not, are attached to one or other element of the secondary expressive model.

In those societies where there is a distinction between secular and religious cultures an overlap is possible with the research tradition. The research tradition assimilates educational elements of the secular culture and eventually transforms these into its own distinctive synthesis. However, there is a tendency for the religious research model to appear similar, even identical, to that in the secular culture. In an evolved society, the two processes can proceed, with parallel induction and enculturation of the initiate, into both realms of culture.

Social control over the social group, maintaining the secondary expressive model, is effected by authority.⁹⁵ Authority is a natural concomitant of the idea of 'givenness' which establishes the primary expressive model in the first instance. Authority, in the religious mode, corresponds to social exchange in the scientific mode.⁹⁶ Eventually, it can be empirically demonstrated, this element of authority is inserted into the secondary expressive model in the way in which it historically manifests itself.

When an expressive model becomes established and normative for a particular social group, analogous to 'normal science', then it can be termed a paradigmatic model. When the entire system, as outlined above, becomes established and normative for a particular social group, then it can be termed a paradigmatic system of religious knowledge.

2.5.1 The mechanism of change in systems of religious knowledge.

However, despite the dominating influence of authority in perpetuating the paradigmatic model, it is possible for a secondary expressive model to become lifeless and abstract. By participating in it, a social group no longer has the experience of contact with Ultimacy. This experience is the analogue of the influence of anomalies in the scientific endeavour. Goaded by non-contact, a social group will revert to the primary expressive model, repudiating⁹⁷ the secondary expressive model which has failed to fulfil its need. The process of tradition will then generate, in time, a new secondary expressive model.

This would mean that the myth, in which the primary expressive model was encapsulated, would undergo scrutiny. If the community were non-literate then a new form of myth, after evaluation and adjustment, would replace the former. It would become normative and canonical and the earlier form would be lost, perhaps forever. If the community were literate, then a new form of secondary expressive model would be proposed as a 'truer' expression of the original myth, which has been stabilized in writing.

This description coincides with what R.A. Nisbet has to say about drastic change in secular culture. He maintains that what are called drastic revolutions in thought are

quite often no more than the mutational replacement, at certain critical points in history, of one foundation-metaphor by another in man's contemplation of the universe, society and self. Metaphoric likening of the universe to an organism in its structure

will yield one set of derivations, derivations which become propositions in complex systems of philosophy. But when, as happened in the seventeenth century, the universe is likened to a machine, not merely physical science but whole areas of moral philosophy and human psychology are affected. ⁹⁸

We would then maintain that drastic change in the paradigmatic system of religious knowledge of a particular religious social group takes place primarily when loss of contact with Ultimacy occurs. This deficiency in contact may be countered by the intervention of authority, ever intent on stability and perpetuation. If this latter element also weakens, then change is inevitable. The change can take several forms:

a) The secondary expressive model can be displaced and the research tradition will need to validate the correlation between the primary expressive model and a new secondary expressive model. In non-literate societies, the new secondary expressive model simply replaces the primary expressive model.

b) A new research tradition can replace the former model. This will necessarily bring about a new secondary expressive model and takes place in particular when the loss of contact is experienced by the graduates in the social group.

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c) It would be possible for a collapse-effect to take place. Since contact through the secondary expressive model is felt to be impossible, even the primary expressive model loses its constituency. There is a shift within the experiential model itself from mediatorial to immediate (or vice versa). This will consequently have the effect of producing a new primary expressive model. This is the most drastic of all religious revolutions.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962; second ed. 1969). Kuhn's theory was first aired in 'The Function of dogma in scientific research', in A.C. Crombie (ed.), Scientific Change (London, 1963). The full thesis was then exhibited in the 1962 edition, which was Volume II of the International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science. The original theory was modified by the addition of a Postscript to the second edition. Kuhn's further elucidations and reconsiderations, together with critical reflections by others, have been gathered in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge, 1970).
2. Ibid., p. 176.
3. See above, pp. 6-7.
4. Kuhn, 'Reflections on my Critics' in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), op.cit., pp. 231-278.
5. J. Watkins, 'Against "Normal Science"', in Lakatos and Musgrave, op.cit., p. 33:

'My suggestion is, then, that Kuhn sees the scientific community on the analogy of a religious community, and sees science as the scientist's religion'.

K. Popper, 'Normal Science and Its Dangers' in ibid., pp. 56-57:

'The Myth of the Framework is, in our time, the central bulwark of irrationalism... In science, as distinct from theology, a critical comparison of the competing theories, of the competing frameworks, is always possible'.
6. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 62.
7. Masterman, 'The Nature of a Paradigm' in Lakatos and Musgrave, op.cit., pp. 59-60.
8. Kuhn, op.cit., p.181.
9. Ibid., p. 182.
10. Ibid., pp. 178-180.
11. Ibid., p. 187.
12. Ibid., p. 190.
13. Ibid., pp. 193-4.
14. Ibid., p. 176.
15. Ibid., p. 177.
16. Ibid., p. 84.

17. Kuhn, 'Reflections of my Critics', p. 287.
18. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 103.
19. Ibid., p. 202. This is a corrective to p. 103.
20. D. Crane, 'Social Structure in a Group of Scientists: A test of the "Invisible College" Hypothesis', American Sociological Review, 34 (1969), pp. 335-352.
21. Ibid., p. 348.
22. Ibid.
23. M.J. Mulkay, The Social Process of Innovation (London, 1972).
24. Kuhn, op.cit., p. 344.
25. Mulkay, op.cit., p. 21.
26. W.O. Hagstrom, The Scientific Community (New York, 1965), pp. 16-17.
27. Mulkay, op.cit., p. 33.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 54.
30. Ibid., p. 55.
31. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
32. Hagstrom, 'The Differentiation of Disciplines' in B. Barnes (ed.), Sociology of Science (Middlesex, 1972), pp. 121-5.
33. J.J. Smolicz, 'Fragmentation in Science and Education: An Analysis of the Community Structure of Science' in S. Murray-Smith (ed.), Melbourne Studies in Education 1974 (Melbourne, 1974), p.18.
34. N. Perry, 'A Comparative analysis of 'paradigm' proliferation', British Journal of Sociology, 28 (1977), pp. 38-50.
35. J.J. Smolicz, 'Paradigms and Models: A Comparison of Intellectual Framework in the Natural Sciences and Sociology', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 6 (1970), pp.100-119. There is a more positive identification of Kuhnian paradigms in Sociology by A. McLee, Towards Humanistic Sociology (New Jersey, 1973), ch. 7. He isolates the managerial-bureaucratic paradigm, the problematic-technical paradigm and the humanist-existential paradigm.
36. Smolicz, art.cit., p. 106.
37. Some prominent examples of proliferation would be : I. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms (London, 1974); H. Hodysh 'The

- Kuhnian Paradigm and its Implications for the Historiography of Curriculum Change', Paedagogica Historica, 17 (1977), pp. 75-87; B. Kuklick, 'History as a Way of Learning', American Quarterly, 22 (1970), pp. 609-628; G.A. Lindbeck, 'Theological Revolutions and the Present Crisis', TD, 23 (1975), pp. 309-319; M.G. Murphy 'On the Relation between Science and Religion', American Quarterly, 20 (1968), pp. 275-295; H.W. Paul, 'In Quest of Kerygma: Catholic Intellectual Life in Nineteenth-Century France', AHR, 75 (1969-1970) pp. 423 ff.; J.G. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (New York, 1971); T. Sanks, Authority in the Church: A Study in Changing Paradigm (Montana, 1974); G.W. Stocking, Race, Culture and Evolution (New York, 1968); A.V. White, 'The Tasks of Intellectual History', Monist, 53 (1969), pp. 619 ff.; R.G. Willis, 'Pollution and Paradigms', Man, 7 (1972), pp. 369-378; S.S. Wolin, 'Paradigms and Political Theories' in P. King and B.C. Parekh (eds.), Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Professor Michael Oakshott on the Occasion of his Retirement (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 125-152.
38. D.A. Hollinger, 'T.S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and its Implications for History', AHR, 78 (1973), pp. 370-393.
 39. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms (London, 1974).
 40. Ibid., p.118.
 41. Perry, art.cit., pp. 45-46.
 42. J. Szacki, 'Three Concepts of Tradition', Polish Sociological Bulletin, 2 (1969), pp. 17-31.
 43. J.J. Smolicz, 'The Concept of Tradition: A Humanistic Interpretation', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 10 (1974), pp. 75-83.
 44. Even the modes of social transmission can cause variation. There can be a literate national heritage, transmitted by specifically literate institutions, and a pre-literate folk heritage, transmitted by more primitive existential contact. On this distinction of 'great' and 'little' traditions see R. Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago, 1961).
 45. S. Ossowski, cited in Smolicz, art.cit. Describing the social heritage as a set of patterns in this way highlights the group aspect.
 46. See F. Znaniecki, The Method of Sociology, new ed. (New York, 1968). In his terminology, the 'humanistic coefficient' needs to be taken into consideration.
 47. For a longer discussion of personal cultural systems see J.J. Smolicz, Culture and Education in a Plural Society (Canberra, 1979).

48. J.J. Smolicz and M.J. Secombe, 'Cultural Interaction in a Plural Society', Ethnic Studies, 1 (1977), pp. 1-16. Core values form a fundamental component of a group's culture. They are the indispensable link between the group's cultural system and social system. In their absence both systems would eventually disintegrate. There is no strictly one to one correspondence, however between the core values and the ideological system. Solidarity could, for example, be engendered by a particular language or type of social structure rather than a social charter or a system of philosophy. However, attachment to a core value, such as the former, usually acquires special ideological meaning. The use of such core values for evaluation confers upon them a status within the group's ideological system. In considering core values in a particular culture it is important to record that more than one core value may be involved and it may be possible to establish a relative hierarchy of importance among them.
49. E. Shils, 'Tradition', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 13 (1971), pp. 122-169.
50. See above pp. 6-7.
51. B. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion (New York, 1954).
52. M. Eliade, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (New York, 1961).
53. Op.cit., p. 33.
54. E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (New Haven, 1955), esp. vol. 11; id., Language and Myth (New York, 1964).
55. C. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (Middlesex, 1972) ch. 11; id., Mythologiques (four vols., Paris, 1964-72).
56. C. Kluckhohn, 'Myth and Ritual : A General Theory', HTR, 35 (1942), pp. 45 ff.
57. C.G. Jung (ed.), Man and his Symbols (New York, 1964).
58. On this point see M. Hesse, 'Criteria of Truth in Science and Theology', Religious Studies, 11 (1975), pp. 385-389.
59. Th. P. van Baaren, 'The Flexibility of Myth' in Ex Orbe Religionum (Leiden, 1970), pp. 199-206.
60. This myth is described by M. Eliade, 'The Dragon and the Shaman' in E.J. Sharpe and J. Hinnells (eds.), Man and his Salvation (Manchester, 1973), pp. 99-105.
61. K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: an Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York, 1936). First German edition was 1929.
62. Ibid., p.40
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., p. 192.

65. M. Weber, Sociology of Religion, fourth ed. (Boston, 1964), p. 106.
66. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London, 1930), p. 144. The distinction had been made earlier, though less explicitly, in 'The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism' in H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (trs. and eds.), From Max Weber (London, 1948) esp. pp. 145,152,254. This was first published in German in 1920.
67. Ibid., pp. 154-5.
68. See K. Wolff, The Sociology of G. Simmel (New York, 1950).
69. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
70. This element was to be developed later by B. Wilson to describe the totalitarian hold that the sect maintained over its adherents. Religious Sects (London, 1970), pp. 26-7.
71. Economy and Society (three vols., New York, 1968), p.1204
72. E. Troeltsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches (New York, 1931; first German edition, 1911). Weber and Troeltsch interacted in their viewpoints. Weber's most detailed accounts of church-sect differences were published after Troeltsch's Social Teachings and clearly reflect his ideas.
73. Troeltsch, op.cit., vol. 1, p.82.
74. Ibid., vol. 11, p. 723.
75. H.R. Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (New York, 1957).
76. D.A. Martin, The Religious and the Secular (London, 1969).
77. Niebuhr, op.cit., pp. 19-20.
78. An outline of the position adopted by Becker is found in M. Hill, A Sociology of Religion (London, 1972), esp. pp. 60-64.
79. Quoted in Hill, op.cit., pp. 62-3.
80. J.M. Yinger, The Scientific Study of Religion (London, 1970).
81. Sects and Society (London, 1961); Patterns of Sectarianism (London, 1967); Religious Sects (London, 1970).
82. Religious Sects, p. 212.
83. Ibid., ch.3. Wilson has expanded his list of sects from four originals in Sects and Society.
84. The Social Reality of Religion (Middlesex, 1973). p. 58.

85. On this see B. Johnson, 'On Church and Sect', American Sociological Review, 28 (1963), pp. 539-49; A.W. Eister, 'Toward a Radical Critique of Church-Sect Typologizing', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 6 (1967), pp. 89-9.
86. Thus Eister, art.cit., finds a difficulty in the application of 'sect' to Judaism in as much as there is nothing to parallel 'church'.
87. The Sociological Interpretation of Religion (Oxford, 1970), pp. 120-123.
88. Robertson, op.cit., p. 124.
89. See above pp.69-73. The contrasting terms 'experiential model' and 'expressive model' are taken from E. Cousins, 'Models and the Future of Theology', Continuum, 7 (1969), pp. 78-92. However, the meaning assigned in this chapter is not the same as that given the terms by Cousins. There has been a great deal written on the topic of models as applied to the natural sciences, to social sciences and religion. A selective list would include: R. Braithwaite, 'Models in the Empirical Sciences' in E. Nagel and others (eds.), Proceedings of the Congress of the International Union for the Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Stanford, 1960); J. McIntyre, The Shape of Christology (London, 1960) which is an application of the model method to theology; B. Kazemier and D. Vuysje (eds.), The Concept and the Role of the Model in Mathematics and Natural and Social Sciences (Dordrecht, 1961); M. Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, 1962); F. Ferre, 'Mapping the Logic of Models in Science and Theology', The Christian Scholar, 46 (1963), pp. 9-39; I. Ramsay, Models and Mystery (London, 1964); M. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, 1966); W. Austin, 'Models, Mystery and Paradox in Ian Ramsay', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 7 (1968), pp.41-55.
90. See above, pp. 71-73.
91. M. Black, Models and Metaphors, p.4. Black speaks also of 'conceptual archetypes' which are
 'Systematic repertoires of ideas by which a given thinker describes, by analogical extension, some domain to which those ideas do not immediately and literally apply'.
 (Ibid., p. 241.)
92. S.C. Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley, 1942), p. 91.
93. See above, pp. 109-111.
94. See above, pp. 119-132.
95. See above, p. 129
96. See W.O. Hagstrom, The Scientific Community. See above, pp. 101-102.

97. See the concept of virtuoso religion in M. Hill, The Religious Order (London, 1973) and below, pp.
98. R.A. Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (Oxford, 1969), p. 6.
99. See above, p.73.

3.

THE PRIMARY EXPRESSIVE MODELS OF JUDAISM AND

CHRISTIANITY

Having established the theoretical basis for the examination of systems of religious knowledge and their associated social groups, we now turn to the particular instance of Judaeo-Christianity. Christianity developed from Judaism, and more will be said on that. Hence it is necessary to examine Judaism's primary expressive model in order to understand that of Christianity. To do this we must scrutinize, at some considerable depth, the basic myth of Judaism and extract from it the primary expressive model which, of course, implicitly contains the experiential model.

3.1 The Primary Expressive Model of Judaism

The Sinai myth and the Exodus myth both circulated as a collective¹ core-myth in ancient Israel. The literary precipitation of these myths is to be found in the book of Exodus, namely chs. 19-20, 24, 32-34. We will apply to this written material the theory on tradition which has been developed from Szacki. This will be integrated with modern literary methods of discerning levels of redaction in the ancient Hebrew scriptures.

3.1.1 Textual Analysis of the book of Exodus

We will follow the analysis of a typical breakdown of the² material in these chapters and integrate the findings into the³ theoretical framework on tradition. Exodus 19 is made up of various strata of literary material, each with its own proper Sitz im Leben. Vv. 1-2a can be distinguished as belonging to P, since it shows a typical Priestly interest in stopping places of the Exodus and a hint of cultic datation.

In the third month after the Sons of Israel had left the land of Egypt, on this day they came into the desert of Sinai. They set out from Rephidim and they came to the desert of Sinai and they pitched their tents in the desert.

The double statement concerning the pitching of Israel's tents in v.2 would indicate that this stratum had ended. Vv. 2b-8 was originally E material that has been considerably revised by Deuteronomomic editors. It describes a simple act of contact between Moses, the mediator, and Elohim on Sinai. Side by side with this account is a separate description of a theophany in v. 9, very abbreviated and possibly from a J source.

And Israel pitched their tents opposite the mountain. Moses went up to Elohim and YHWH called to him from the mountain: "Thus speak to the House of Jacob and tell this to the Sons of Israel: 'You have seen what I have done to the Egyptians and how I have carried you on eagles' wings and brought you to myself. Now, if you will indeed obey my voice and keep the covenant you will become to me a special possession above all peoples. For the whole world is mine. You shall be my priestly kingdom and a holy people'. These are the words you are to speak to the sons of Israel". Moses came and summoned the elders of the people and set before them all these words which YHWH had commanded him. And all the people answered in unison: "Everything which YHWH said we will carry out". Moses brought back the words of the people to YHWH.

The principal description of a theophany occurs in 10a α , 11. 14a. 16a α , 18. 20-21. Deriving from J, it describes an act of contact between Moses and YHWH in the midst of smoke, fire and earthquake which are manifestations of the presence of YHWH.

YHWH said to Moses: "Be ready for the third day because on the third day YHWH will come down in the sight of all the people on to the mountain of Sinai". Moses went down from the mountain to the people. He said to the people: "Be ready for the third day". It came to pass on the third day that the mountain of Sinai was completely engulfed in smoke because YHWH had come down upon it in Fire. The smoke went up like the smoke of a furnace and the entire mountain trembled a great deal. YHWH came down upon the mountain of Sinai, on to the top of the

mountain, and YHWH called Moses to the top of the mountain and Moses went up. YHWH said to Moses: "Go down and warn the people lest they should break through to YHWH and see him. Many of them would perish."

This J account has, interspersed through it, some Priestly additions (10a β b. 12. 13a. 14b. 15b) which elaborate on the J. theophany, describing the ritual mechanism whereby a 'holy people' can be created through contact with YHWH. Vv. 22-24 are a still later expansion, also deriving from P circles.

"Go to the people and make them holy today and tomorrow and make them wash their clothes. You shall set up boundaries for the people around about and say: 'Be careful not to go up The Mountain, nor to touch its edge. Anyone touching The Mountain must be put to death. No hand shall touch him but he shall be stoned or hurled to his death. Whether it be an animal or a man, neither shall live!' He made the people holy and they washed their clothes. He said: "Do not approach a woman."

The corresponding E description of a basic theophany is found side by side in Vv. 16 a β b. 17. 19, taken together with 20: 18-21. It uses other hierophanic terminology to describe the moment of contact between the mediator, Moses, and YHWH while describing the religious fear of the people at that moment.

In the morning all the people who were in the camp trembled. Moses brought the people out of the camp to meet Elohim. They stood at the base of the Mountain. The sound of the sôpâr sounded long and grew even louder. Moses spoke and Elohim answered by a voice. All the people saw the thunders, the lightning, heard the sound of the sôpâr and saw the mountain engulfed in smoke. When the people saw, they withdrew and stood at a distance. They said to Moses: "You speak with us and we will listen, but do not let Elohim speak with us lest we die." Moses said to the people: "Fear not. Elohim has come to test you so that your fear of him, being in your mind, may stop you from sinning." The people stood at a distance and Moses approached the Carapel where Elohim was.

Exodus 24 contains two interwoven accounts of Moses' ascent

of Sinai, clearly interrelated. In the first account, Moses, together with Aaron, Nadab, Abihu and seventy elders are called to ascend the mountain. A theological correction, from a later hand in vv. 1b-2, makes it clear that actually only Moses went near the mountain.

"You will worship at a distance and only Moses will approach to YHWH. They shall not approach and the people shall not go up with him."

This account, from J, concludes in vv. 9-11 with a vision of the God of Israel on the mountain. The corresponding E account, in vv. 3-8, is not completely homogeneous. In one strand, sacrificial acts are performed by young men, presumably cultic officials, at the foot of Sinai. A second strand describes a separate blood-sprinkling ceremony. The two strands have been combined into a single cultic activity, not corresponding to any known Israelite ritual.

So far the religious heritage has described the basic act of contact and the elements of fear, awe and reverence that should characterise any Israelite's posture before YHWH. Exodus 32⁴ further elaborates on the posture by telling of the 'ancients' in their worship of the Golden Calf. Vv. 1-6 detail the sin of Israel at the foot of the mountain. There is an account of the intercession of Moses in vv. 7-14, which would seem to have come from E, reworked perhaps in Deuteronomic circles. However, the later block of material in vv. 15-20 gives the reaction of Moses to the sin without presupposing that he knows of it, as he does in vv. 7-14. Moses institutes an ordeal to isolate the guilty parties. Vv. 21-24 would seem to be later accretion, although still in the E line of thought, and a conclusion is given in vv. 30-34, with Moses offering himself

to YHWH in place of the erring people. Hence we are dealing with an E account of apostasy in vv. 1-6. 15-20. 21-24. 30-34.

When the people saw that Moses delayed in coming down from the mountain, the people gathered to Aaron and said to him: "Up, make us gods to go in front of us because we do not know what has become of this Moses, the man who brought us up out of the land of Egypt". Aaron said to them: "Strip the golden earrings from the ears of your wives, your sons and daughters and bring them to me." All the people stripped off the golden earrings from their ears and brought them to Aaron. He took them out of their hands, cast the metal in a mould and made it into the image of a calf. "Here is your God, O Israel", they said, "who brought you up out of the Land of Egypt." When Aaron saw it he built an altar before it and Aaron made a proclamation saying: "Tomorrow is a feast for YHWH".

Moses turned and came down from the mountain with the two tablets of the testimony in his hand. The tablets were inscribed on both sides; on the front and the back they were inscribed. The tablets were the work of Elohim and the writing was the writing of Elohim engraved upon the tablets. When Joshua heard the sound of the people shouting, he said to Moses: "There is the sound of war in the camp". He said: "It is not the sound of victory, nor the sound of defeat, but the sound of chanting that I hear". When he drew near to the camp and saw the Calf and the dancing, Moses' anger grew and he threw the tablets from his hands and broke them at the foot of the mountain. He took the Calf which they had made and burnt it in the fire and ground it to powder. He sprinkled it into water and made the Sons of Israel drink it.

Moses said to Aaron: "What has this people done to you that you should have brought such a great sin upon them?" Aaron said: "Do not grow angry, my Lord, you know the people and their proneness to evil. They said to me: "Make us gods which will go before us for we do not know what has become of this Moses, the man who brought us up from the land of Egypt". I said to them: "Whoever has gold, strip it off", and they gave it to me and I cast it into the fire and this Calf came out."

It happened that on the next day Moses said to the people: "You have committed a great sin. Now, I will go up to YHWH and perhaps I shall be able to atone for your sin." Moses returned to YHWH and said: "Hear me. This people have committed a great sin and made for themselves golden gods. Now, if you should forgive them ... But if not, blot me out, I beseech you, from the book you have written". YHWH said to Moses: "I will blot from my book whoever has sinned against me. Now go and lead the people to the place I told you. Behold, my Angel will go before you and on the Day of my Visitation I will punish them for their sin".

This account has a variant inserted in vv. 7-14 (influenced by D terminology). Vv. 25-29 would have come from Levitical circles of P, while v. 35 is a stray fragment from some unknown, post-Exilic hand.

5

The same E material is continued through ch. 33. It deals with the perplexing problem of the guidance of the people through the desert to the promised land. Behind this problem of the 'ancients' stands the perennial need within Israel to ascertain that YHWH, who had been localised at Sinai, was in fact present in the cult in Canaan. The answer was given in additions to the basic myth, dealing with a transfer of YHWH from Sinai to a new setting in Canaan. However, there is evidence of various answers given to the question at various points of time. In vv. 1-4 an 'Angel' is to lead the people. The Angel was originally YHWH in travelling form. Later, it was seen as a substitute for YHWH, a deprivation of his presence.

The rest of the material shows further discrepancies. Vv. 12-14 explain that the guidance will be direct - YHWH's 'face' will guide them. Similarly, in vv. 15-17 YHWH accedes to a request for direct guidance and the chapter concludes with refined theological reasoning concerning the subtle question of whether an Israelite can see YHWH and live. There is clearly enough evidence here of successive evaluations of the heritage.

Finally, chapter 34⁶ introduces new J material, possibly variants of the theophany in chs. 19 and 24, but rewritten to appear as a renewal of the covenant-relationship with YHWH. It introduces a body of law similar to the Elohist code. The final unit, in vv. 29-35 is P material describing the absolute uniqueness of Moses, the mediator.

This analysis of the religious heritage of Israel, from both a literary and traditionsgeschichtlich point of view, can be revealing when placed in the context of the earlier theory. The earliest form of the heritage, to which we have access, was the J account of the theophany and the making of the covenant on Sinai. Moses was presented as the mediator whose role it was to complete the covenant with YHWH and, when the covenant was broken, to remake it. Between this Moses-figure and the kings of the Jerusalem line there are undoubted similarities.⁷ Analysing kingship in the south we find that there was a tension caused by the dynastic perpetuation of the office in David's family and the sacralization of kingship. Again and again the texts assert in justification that the role of the king is to be the servant (C_ebed) of YHWH and to assure the covenant with people. The king is a Moses-like figure (Moses being the C_ebed par excellence)⁸ when the J model is appreciated. We became aware, then, of the office of kingship developing in the southern kingdom from the earlier position of military commander (nāgîd) and being justified by evaluation of the heritage so that Moses appears as a king. Kingship, accepted as a value in limited circles, had become a core value for a group cultural system. This had required a new assessment of the heritage and a drastic change in that heritage.

The E stratum in Exodus, on the other hand, gave voice to the typical prophetic protest against false forms of cult. The northern⁹ cult at Dan and Bethel had included bull-worship, and this was seen in prophetic circles as a repudiation of the covenant with YHWH. As the prophetic community, with their own cultural group system and core values, assessed the situation in the North they also evaluated the heritage and 'Moses' in E became a prophet in this form of the

myth. He had to contend with an erring people and with a distant YHWH, who did not manifest himself directly.

The institution of Israelite prophecy, in its typical form, depended upon a theophany in which the prophet was instructed in what he had to say to the people. The Elijah tradition even made an explicit parallel between the Sinai experience of the first Moses and the later experiences of an Israelite prophet.¹⁰ Thus in the north, in E circles, this understanding of 'Moses' circulated, in contradistinction to the 'Moses' in the south. As would be expected, the D presentation of Moses (especially in the book of Deuteronomy)¹¹ followed much the same lines. Behind E, therefore, there stood another socially discrete community, with its group cultural system and core values, assessing the received heritage in a distinctive fashion.

In the period after the Exile the importance of the priesthood was greatly accentuated. Zadokites took control of all specifically priestly functions in the Temple and, by a genealogical fiction, they derived their origins from Aaron, the brother of Moses.¹² Once more a significant group cultural system was being formed. By re-valuation of the heritage, Moses was seen as the founder of the worshipping structure of Israel and the Exodus narrative culminated in the establishment of the Tent of Meeting, in which YHWH was present for contact with Moses and Aaron. The Tent of Meeting was simply a forerunner of the Temple. In fact, 'Moses' became a priest, in this new form of the heritage, according to the pattern of the post-Exilic priesthood. The final depiction of Moses, in ch. 34 of Exodus, is the epitome of P's ideal.

King, prophet and priest all found their validation and vindication in the myth of Moses as contained in the book of Exodus. As successively, the material was evaluated anew, according to the theory we have put forward, there was a conglomeration of heritage content. However, there was constancy in the affirmation by each group that Moses had been the supreme mediator with YHWH and that each one's assessment of his role was the most ancient.

It is an appreciation of 'tradition' in Szacki's third sense, which throws light on the intricate process of analysing Israel's sacred writings. The cultural heritage of ancient Israel was the mediatorial attitude underlying the Moses-myth. The mediatorial model designated the required posture of the people before YHWH.. Various elements in that heritage could be, and were, stressed. Values came from outside the community. There was the need for an established monarchy in the face of enemy infiltration. There was the austere cultic reform, seen by prophetic circles in the north as vital to the religious vigour of the people, against the fertility trends favoured by the establishment. There was the need for security and power in the circles of Zadokite priests. These values, accepted first by individuals into their personal cultural systems, eventually became so influential that they entered the group cultural system and assumed the role of core values. Such change in core values then brought about a re-evaluation of the cultural heritage. A monarchy with attendant priesthood and subservient laity, a freelancing prophetic community holding a loose aegis over some of the populace, a theocracy under the leadership of a priestly clan each in turn formulated its own evaluation of the past and thereby propounded its own version of the cultural heritage thus establishing its own special tradition, which they claimed to be 'original' and

and derived from the most 'ancient' sources. The present book of Exodus is the repository of such successive evaluations.

3.1.2 Description of crises in Pre-Christian Judaism's models

In the period after the Exile, Judaism suffered societal disintegration due to successive occupations by foreign nations. The priesthood remained the final bastion of cultural stability, but not all Israel was willing to support its ever increasing exclusive claims. Hence it is possible to detect a search for new identifications of hypostatizations and 'Moses', identifications which were not necessarily successful.

Returning to our theoretical explanation, we would maintain that the social heritage - the Exodus myth and the Sinai myth - underwent renewed evaluation by particular groups. The core-values of the Zadokite clergy were not acceptable to these groups and so they sought to re-assess the myth. We are able, by careful literary sifting, to find evidence of this process in three sources: the book of Job, the second section of the book of Isaiah and the second section of the prophecy of Zechariah. We will now perform this literary dissection and disengage the process of evaluation that took place in Israel's pre-Christian era.

13

We would hold that the earliest evidence is found in Job. The pattern of the book of Job consists of a Prologue and an Epilogue, both in prose, and, within these sections, a series of speeches, all in verse apart from a brief introduction to the speech of Elihu which is in prose. The Prologue introduces Job as a patriarch, a man of opulence and great progeny.

In the second scene of the Prologue YHWH presided over his heavenly court. He received a report from The Satan. It was the function of The Satan to test the virtue of men and, in the case of Job, his report cast doubt on the depth of his integrity. He asked leave to inflict hurt on the possessions of Job. This leave was granted by YHWH but, despite such affliction and loss, Job remained sinless before YHWH.

A third scene of the Prologue reveals The Satan still doubting the reality of Job's virtue and requesting permission to afflict personal, physical harm. Leave was granted and Job, destitute and covered with a skin-disease, sat on an ash-heap outside the city as a mendicant. Three friends came to him - Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar. They sat with him in silence for three days. The Prologue ends at this point.

The speeches of the three friends consists of two complete cycles of six speeches each, which are variously divided, while the third cycle of speeches is incomplete and variously arranged by different
14
authors. Rather precipitately another character, Elihu, has been then introduced. He makes four speeches in succession. At their conclusion YHWH speaks to Job alone, in a new cycle of speeches, delivered by himself and Job. The book concludes with an Epilogue, in which Job intercedes for the three friends, Elihu being disregarded. They receive pardon, although it is uncertain what their sin was; Job received restoration of his fortunes. One curious feature of the Epilogue, however, is the introduction of all of Job's brothers

sisters and acquaintances in 42:10. They come to him bearing a coin and a golden earring and expressing comfort and sympathy. They do not seem to fit in with the rest of the Epilogue.

A. Alt first recognised that 42:7-10 and 42:11-17 were not
¹⁵homogeneous. He linked together the first chapter and 42:11-17 and the second chapter with 42:7-10. This did not remove, however, all the irregularities in the story. There is no reason for the three friends to require any intercession or pardon, since their advice consisted simply of the orthodox opinions concerning suffering current in Israel. Equally unexplained is the sudden disappearance of the three friends and the equally sudden disappearance of family and acquaintances.

¹⁶
 A more satisfying solution is offered by N. Snaith. He maintains that a first edition of Job contained the Prologue, up to 2:10. This was taken up again in the Epilogue at 42:9. Mention of the friends in v.10 is out of place and its exclusion opens the way for a good sequential reading. It would seem to have been added when the present first three verses of the Epilogue were inserted, so as to reconcile any conflict in statement. Thus, a first edition had nothing about the friends. All the speeches of Job directed towards them should be considered as a later interpolation.
¹⁷
 Likewise the Elihu speeches are an interpolation and most recognise that the wisdom-poem in chapter 28 sits loosely in its context. ¹⁸
 The first edition would have been an account of the patriarchal Job, who, at the behest of The Satan, was stricken in his possessions and

his own person. He surrendered before YHWH, acknowledging his submissiveness. He was then restored to his fortunes and health. The simple message of this first edition would have been that if man submits, in his weakness, before YHWH then all will, in the end, turn out well. It was a first response to the problem of suffering.

A second edition of the Job story introduced the three friends, together with miscellaneous matters in chs. 24-28. By this stage the problem had become more sharply defined. It was not sufficient to let the matter rest at the point that YHWH knows all things and that all will eventually work itself out. Experience pointed to the contrary. The three friends represent every facet of the orthodox solution to the problem of suffering known in ancient Israel. In an extensive dialogue between Job and these friends the question - why had Job suffered so much? - was variously posed. Job asserted, against the many arguments of the friends, that there was an answer to his dilemma and that the answer would be forthcoming if only he could make contact with the High God. Thus the problem of suffering, which had been proposed in the first edition, became entwined with the problem of communication with the High God. A third edition interpolated the Elihu speeches. In these speeches the whole problem of communication with the High God was heightened and made into the central issue.

We will consider, within the ambit of this proposed progression in the development of the book, certain passages which

relate to the question of the mediatorial structure. There are
 19 four relevant texts, which have a certain connection between them.
 The first text occurs in the initial cycle of speeches. The three
 friends propose the orthodox solution to the problem of evil and
 suffering in the world. Job's responses are also of an orthodox
 nature. He considers that God was just, but he questions the
 findings of the friends on the grounds of experience. Bildad,
 denying the charge made by Job that God was unjust, suggests that
 Job should make his appeal directly to YHWH. Job counters that no
 man can possibly win a case against YHWH, who is incomparable in his
 power. Despite his innocence, therefore, Job is confident that he
 20 would win such an appeal made to the High God. Thus Job states :

"There is no arbiter ([^]môkiah[^]) between us, who might lay his
 hand on us both." (9.33)

The basic problem is the identification of the [^]môkiah[^], the 'arbiter'.
 Terrien gives as a definition:

un juge impartial qui donne un verdict et aussi qui reproche,
 corrige et convaincre!

The root ykh is generally used in the sense of disputation or
 litigation. In the line of mediation, such as we have here, it
 is enlightening to compare two other usages - Gn. 31:37 and Is.
 2:4.

Gn. 31:37 is part of a disputation between Laban and Jacob.

Jacob had been pursued by Laban, who discovered that his teraphim were missing. Jacob was wroth with Laban and demanded that he bring forth evidence of theft and lay it between their respective followers so that they might be 'arbiters' between the two disputants. In Is. 2:4 YHWH is depicted, in an eschatological setting, as being the final 'arbiter' among the nations. In these cases the issue is clear: the 'arbiter' is someone superior in authority to the parties in dispute. The action of laying-on of hands signifies that the arbiter is taking both parties under his jurisdiction and is exercising his authority over them.

In Job 9:33, cited above, the call was for an arbiter who could settle the matter between the High God and Job. Job maintained that his case before YHWH was prejudiced because of the arbitrary power of YHWH. It was a futile wish since Israel had no provision for any mediating gods who could assume such a function of arbitration.

22

The second text is in Job 16:19-21.

19. Even now, behold my witness (^cedî) is in heaven, my advocate (śahādî) is on high;
20. my friends scorn me.
My eye pours out tears to God
(Or:Interpreter (^mēlîs) of my thoughts to God
toward whom my eye drips.)
21. Let him plead for a man with God as a man
will plead for his friends.

If the alternative reconstruction is accepted, then the passage identifies three individuals cēdî, śahādî, mēlîs. What is the identification of these figures in the three verses? The cēdî

and śahādī of v. 19 would seem to be identical. For example in Gn. 31:47 an accord was drawn up between Jacob and Laban and they erected a pile of stones as a testimony. The Aramaean Laban called the cairn y^egar sāhādūta while the Hebrew Jacob named it gal^{cēd}, both terms meaning the 'cairn of witness'. Thus, sāhādūta stands parallel to gal^{cēd}, both meaning a 'witness'.

Job hoped that a witness in heaven would restore his honour on earth. There are many commentators who maintain that Job is here appealing to God against God. Thus, Dhorme ²³ contrasts the witness-God of this verse with the false witness who had accused Job in v.8. Others oppose the God of justice and love with the God of wrath. ²⁴ Job is depicted as appealing to the former against the latter. But v.21 with its use of ykh shows that the witness-interpreter, who pleaded for Job with God, was other than God. He was an intermediary. Further, v.20 shows that the interpreter to whom Job appealed was, in fact, the same figure as the witness of v.19.

Our attention is now drawn to the use of mēlis. Apart from the two usages in Job, here and 33:23, there are only two other pertinent biblical passages. In Gn.42:23 the meaning is clear enough - 'interpreter' in the usual sense. In Is. 43:27 the meaning is more obscure:

"Your first father sinned and your
m^elīseka sinned against me."

m^elīseka is variously translated. The Revised Standard Version ²⁵ simply suggests 'mediators'. McKenzie identifies them more specifically with the priests, on the basis that they were respon-

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sible for the interpretation of the law while Westermann suggests the prophets of the monarchial period. Possibly the closest we will get is 'spokesmen', who are paralleled, in this particular instance, with the 'first father', who is most likely Jacob. The three terms used in this passage - ḥēd, mēlīs, śāhēd - would therefore designate an intermediary between Job and the High God. Job was hoping for some sort of personalised figure who could deal with YHWH on his behalf.

28

The next Job passage is the crux interpretum, 19:25-26. Job had accused YHWH of active hostility. Then his mood changed. He was sure that when he came in contact with YHWH, all would be changed. YHWH would be on his side and Job would be filled with joy. Our interest centers on the intermediary by whose agency Job hopes to come to his vision of YHWH:

29

I know that my redeemer (gō'ēl) lives and at last ('ahārôn) he will stand upon (yākūm) the earth (ḥāpār).

The first difficult term is gō'ēl. Such a designation referred to the nearest relative who was obliged to obtain vengeance in a blood feud, or to maintain the social or legal rights of a kinsman - redeeming him from slavery or regaining property. This was extended to the obligation of providing a deceased kinsman with offspring through his widow. The term had been at times applied to YHWH in order to describe his relationship to Israel, but the context does not allow its application to him in this particular passage. There are other difficult terms. 'ahārôn is usually translated as an adverbial phrase but the term is used in contemporary literature, by Deutero-

Isaiah, as a substantive. In fact in one passage of Deutero-Isaiah, 44:6, the substantive 'aharōn stands in apposition to gō'el. Pope appeals to the later Mishnaic and Talmudic term 'ahara y which has the sense of 'guarantor'. ³⁰ ḥāpār is also obscure. It could have a general sense of 'earth' or, in this context, the more precise meaning of 'grave' (i.e. of Job). This seems more likely and makes better sense. Thus the text would read:

I know that my gō'el lives,
and, as guarantor, will stand upon my grave.

31

V. 26 has its own textual difficulties. The text is:

And after my skin has been thus destroyed
then from my flesh I shall see my God.

Thus, Job places his hopes in an intermediary being who, in the manner of a committed kinsman, would raise himself up on Job's tomb and be his vindicator. This was in despite of Job's knowledge that She'ol or the grave was non-existence. He had a certitude that through the agency of this intermediary he would see God and indeed live beyond the instant of death.

The final Job text is 33:23-4. It is part of one of the Elihu speeches in which he tries to establish a personal intermediary between God and man. He depicts a sick man, on the very brink of the grave, but between such a man and God there is an intermediary whose function is to protect him from the divine anger. The intermediary is called a mal'āk (angel or messenger) and a mēlīś (mediator).

If there be for him a messenger (mal'āk)
 a mediator (mēlîs), one of the thousand,
 to declare to man what is right for him (yōšrô)
 he will be gracious to him and will say,
 "Deliver him (p^edā^cēhû) from going down into the Pit,
 I have found a ransom."

Mediation by an angel or messenger was nothing new. The personal god in Mesopotamian religion provided a background, and a guiding angel was already present in one form of the Exodus myth. Such a personal god would care for his client in the divine assembly. If one of these angels were to realise that a man was near to death, although he was just and righteous, then he could take it upon himself to declare such a man's rectitude to God. The yōšrô denotes that which makes a man yāšār or upright. The function of the angel-mēlîs is, first, to explain to the man the meaning of his suffering. Next, recognising the deep misery of the man, he must have compassion. Finally he must intercede with God and ask that the man be spared death, offering a ransom for him. The term p^edā^cēhû in 24a is difficult, a hapax legomenon. Perhaps the original reading was pedēhû from the root 'to buy back liberty'.

We have also to explain the Targum's translation of mēlîs by the Hellenism prqlȳt.³² In other literature of this period 'paraclete' was being attached to various media of intercession such as the cry of a man before God, a cup of water given in mercy or an act of repentance. Now, in this instance, it is used to translate mēlîs, and it refers to a personal rather than impersonal medium of intercession, the angel of death.

Our interest has been focussed on that particular level of editing in Job at which the distance between the High God and man had

become the central issue. The mokiah of 9:33, the ḥed, ṣahēd, mēlīs of 16:20, the gō'ēl of 19:25 and the mēlīs of 33:23 were all attempts to define a possible intermediary. Our task is not to identify the intermediary, if such a project were even possible, but to affirm that a need was felt in later Israel for such a function of mediation. With the normal structures of mediation destroyed, Israel, according to the author of Job, sought to reconstruct contact with YHWH. The various intermediary figures correspond to analogous divine hypostatizations in other cultures.

In line with the theory on tradition, we would postulate that a group within Israel, obsessed with the pitiable state of their oppressed nation, rejected the prevailing paradigm, which was probably that of the priestly caste. This new group's core-value was a belief in the willingness of the High God, YHWH, to provide a new divine intermediary, replacing earlier institutions which did not seem to be operative. Accordingly, they evaluated the cultural heritage, in particular the Sinai myth, in order to affirm their perception of a divine hypostatization at work in history.

Similar re-evaluation can be found in Deutero-Isaiah with its insistence on the role of the 'Servant of YHWH'. The identification of the 'Servant of YHWH' has presented a perennial problem. Almost every conceivable individual, collective and individual-³³ collective interpretation has been proposed at some time. Both royal and prophetic features have been confidently recognized in the Servant and these have been used to establish particular historical identifications. Our method will entail, first of all, a critical examination of the four songs in which the Servant appears (42:1-9; 49:1-6; 50:4-11; 52:13-53:12). From this analysis we

will endeavour to see the Servant in the line of enquiry adopted so far, in order to offer what would seem to be a more satisfying identification.

34

The first Song, reveals a preliminary structure, which dis-
engages itself once the structural importance of the term mišpāt,
35
'justice', is acknowledged:

- a YHWH designates his C_ebed (1a)
- b YHWH equips his C_ebed for the task (1b)
- c The C_ebed's mission: mišpāt (1b)
- d The modus operandi of the C_ebed: no shouting,
no violence against the oppressed. (2-3a)
- cl C_ebed's mission: mišpāt (3b)
- bl C_ebed's destiny: oppression (4a)
- al C_ebed's mission: mišpāt and tôrâh (4b)

This chiastic structure ³⁶ shows the unity of the pericope, centering on the activity of the Servant. It is clear that vv. 5-9 are not of one piece with the preceding verses. They speak of the Servant in the third person instead of the second. Certain elements of vv. 1-4 need to be seen in greater depth. In v.1 the term bhr, 'uphold', signifies the giving of one's own strength to another. YHWH gives a share of his strength, or power, to his Servant. The purpose of such an 'upholding' is to bring about Justice, mišpāt. Mišpāt is a
37
many-sided term. It can mean a legal decision that requires subsequent proclamation, but the present context would not seem to warrant this translation. The usage with ys' refers to the implementation of an ordinance that has already been promulgated, and which functions as the juridical statute of a new situation or state

of justice still to be realized.

The issue at stake in the preceding section, Isaiah 40:12-41:29 was that the mispāt of Israel had been violated by the invading enemy, under the aegis of their gods. Therefore it seemed a legitimate conclusion that YHWH had no part to play in the life of Israel. The meaning of the first Servant Song is clarified: YHWH promises to implement a state of mispāt, but through his Servant. The Song therefore stresses the novelty of YHWH's mode of action. Israel had suffered, during the Exile, domination by aliens, but the paradox of the new situation was that YHWH would give strength not to the strong but to the weak. A divine action would strengthen the weakness of those who were wearied, tired and powerless. YHWH's salvation would transform the Exilic situation, with its oppression, and, unexpectedly, such a transformation would take place through the ministry of the Servant. The role of the Servant is defined by means of mispāt and law, torah. YHWH is to effect a new saving situation for his people Israel and this saving situation is mispāt. The norm that regulates such a saving situation is the torah. The saving situation will not be effected directly by YHWH, but by the Servant.

The Servant, as described in the first Song, has certain distinguishing characteristics. According to the LXX he is to be identified with Jacob-Israel.

Iakōb ho pais mou ...
Israēl ho eklektos mou.

Jacob-Israel was a common enough designation for the exiles. In vv. 6-9 the Servant's mission is more directly associated with the blind and those imprisoned in dungeons. It would therefore seem that

the interpretation of vv. 5-9, and of the LXX, is that the Servant is a collectivity, the first group of exiles, who would be the instrument responsible for the deliverance of all the exiles.

40

The Second Song explicitly identifies the Servant as 'Israel' in the MT and there is insufficient textual basis for omitting this identification, even though it is frequently done.⁴¹ The structure of the Song is as follows:

The election and equipment of the Servant (1-3)
 The despondency of the Servant over his role (4)
 The new task of the Servant. (5-6)

The Servant speaks in the first person and describes his election and his mission. He is to restore Jacob-Israel and to be a guiding light to the whole of the Gentile world, in order that YHWH's salvation may spread to all parts of the world. The literary form of the divine proclamation in v.3 recalls the designation of the king in Ps. 2:7:

YHWH said to me: "You are my son; today I have sired you".

The Second Song is completed by a response in vv. 7-12 and a hymnic piece in v. 13, indicating liturgical usage at some period.

42

The form of the third Song recalls the Hebrew lamentation style. The Servant reflects on the cause of his sorrowful situation, which is the office to which he has been called. He describes his role in distinctively prophetic terms. Although the translation is uncertain, the Servant is described as learning lessons in the manner of a pupil. Isaiah had similarly described his own disciple-group

in Is. 8:16. The main division is in v. 5b. The Servant has suffered in the discharge of his office and yet he is full of confidence in ultimate vindication.

43

The fourth song is considered to be, textually, the most difficult of the Hebrew Bible. ⁴⁴ It relates in detail the suffering and humiliation of the Servant, but also confidently asserts his ultimate justification and vindication. It does not have any addendum which could be assigned to a liturgical context.

These four hymns raise, collectively, the problem of the identification of the Servant, the C^cebed YHWH. C^cebed was one of the more frequently used terms for Israel to describe her relationship with YHWH. This could be explained by the social stratification of ancient Near East, in which slavery was considered to be an integral ⁴⁵ element in both agricultural and commercial activities. Because of this, ancient Near Eastern kings were regarded as 'servants' of the gods. Krt, as we saw, was called the 'servant of 'El'⁴⁶ and Idrimi, the king of Alalakh, was the 'servant of Adad and Hepat'.⁴⁷ In all these instances, the social stratification of the human sphere was simply being applied to divine relationships.

In the biblical texts only Israelites, albeit of a wide variety, were called C^cebed: the patriarchs, Moses, Caleb, Joshua, David, Hezekiah, Eliakim, Zerubbabel, Ahijah, Elijah, Isaiah, Jonah ben Amittai, Job.⁴⁸ However, statistics shows that the title is applied principally to Abraham, Jacob, Moses and David, whose common trait is clearly that they were founders. Abraham was the first Hebrew called by YHWH; Jacob was the ancestor of the tribes of confederated Israel; Moses was the leader of the Exodus people; David was

the founder of the Judean dynasty. The apposite nature of the title can be appreciated from the fact that C^ebed expresses a specific personal relationship between the servant and the master and imports a sense of belonging.⁴⁹ This new belonging superseded all previous relationships.⁵⁰ In this sense, political submission or even humble self-depreciation⁵¹ could be expressed by C^ebed. In the cases cited above the use of the title would be most fitting where a man was called by YHWH to perform a new task in Israel's history.

Even more illuminating are the statistics referring to the usage of the fuller title C^ebed YHWH. It is applied to Moses seventeen times⁵² (and four times the parallel title C^ebed ha 'ēlōhîm is used),⁵³ to Joshua twice,⁵⁴ to David twice⁵⁵ and to Israel once.⁵⁶ The David texts can be discounted, being found in the titles of two Psalms, undoubtedly of late origin. It then becomes clear that the fuller title C^ebed YHWH or C^ebed ha 'ēlōhîm was used primarily, in the biblical era, as a technical term for Moses. This function of Moses was handed on to Joshua. Thus, in Nm.12:7-8, which is pre-Deuteronomic, Moses is differentiated from the prophets who know God only in dreams or visions: he is C^abdî, 'my servant'. In Ex. 14:31, which is a Yahwistic passage, YHWH accomplished his action only through Moses while the people's response was submitted to Moses, in the first instance, since he was C^abdî, 'my servant'.

Turning once more to Deutero-Isaiah, we see that the general context of his writing is his own personal commission, derived from the divine council, to announce to the exiles the new direction that Israel's history will take.⁵⁷ He is a Moses-like figure. Throughout chapters 40-55 he speaks like Moses in calling on the people to flee from the oppression of Babylon,⁵⁸ announcing a new crossing of the water,⁵⁹

complaining about the stiff-necked lack of response among the people.⁶⁰
 He offers the renewed hope of water from the rocks,⁶¹ and there is a
 stress on a new theophany of YHWH, with the contrast drawn between
 the previous indirect vision of the Exodus experience and the new direct
 vision.⁶²

The context of Deutero-Isaiah's writing is therefore the departure
 of the exiles from Babylon, depicted as a new Exodus, a new historical
 action of YHWH. In such a context it does not seem possible that the
 term C^ebed could have originally been applied to any other person
 than the prophet himself. He found his identity as a Moses-figure.
 No other individual figure of the past could have fulfilled the function
 of mediating the saving action of YHWH to the exiles.

When we examine the regal characteristics of the Servant in the
 text we find that a strong case can be made out for such an identifi-
 cation. The description of the Servant, in the first Song, bears
 formal similarity to the regal designation of Ps. 2:7. Mispat, the
 leitmotiv of the first song, was also one of the characteristic tasks
 of the royal office,⁶³ as it was also the characteristic task of
⁶⁴ Deborah and of Samuel.⁶⁵ The main prophetic characteristics of
 the Servant have been noted. He is given the ability to speak the
 word and his ears are opened, both of these being typical of the pro-
 phetic experience. Who then was the C^ebed of Deutero-Isaiah's
 Songs? The first three songs indicate a figure who is endowed with
 certain regal and prophetic characteristics. The title and the
 characteristics find their point of original adherence in Moses.
 Moses, in Israelite tradition, was the C^ebed par excellence. But
 Moses, as we have seen, became more than an historical personage

in their tradition. Moses denoted a function within Israel, which function was verified in both royal and prophetic circles. In both circles the developing Moses tradition was enlarged by new interpretation. Both king and prophet could be described as C^ebed since they fulfilled the basic function of Moses, which was to bring about contact between YHWH and Israel.

An unknown prophet of the exile described himself and his task by the Mosaic title. As the prophecy lived however, perhaps in oral form, among his followers, the three songs inspired a new interpretation as the original prophet of the exile faded into the background and the returned Israelites experienced new hardship and new oppression in the land. The work of these disciples is reflected in the collection known as Third Isaiah, Is. 56-66. They saw their own function also as that of C^ebed, and they interpreted the Songs in their own favour. A very early midrashic interpretation is thus seen in 49:3, and in the LXX developments in 42:1. From this group came also the Fourth Song which extolled the suffering (and perhaps the death) of the original servant in a more total view. The first three songs were used as a source of inspiration, as can be seen by the evidence for their ritual usage.

This study in Deutero-Isaiah has shown how the mediatorial pattern expressed itself in the figure of the C^ebed, which reactivated the earlier Mosaic function. The Exodus myth and the Sinai myth, the cultural heritage of ancient Israel, were radically re-interpreted and re-evaluated by a group whose core-values derived from the suffering experience of the Exile. They saw their destiny in terms of mission and accordingly described their role as mediators, servants. More evidence for the need of a renewed mediatorial function in ancient

Israel is supplied by Deutero-Zechariah.

The prophecy of Deutero-Zechariah, Zechariah 9-14, is made up of a variety of prophetic utterances, deriving from several hands and from different provenance.⁶⁶ It is even possible that some of the material could have been written at a much earlier time and then been redacted in the post-Exilic period.

Several of the passages in Deutero-Zechariah introduce mysterious intermediary figures who warrant investigation as they also indicate the direction in which thinking on mediatorship developed in the last post-Exilic period. The chiasmic literary structure of Deutero-Zechariah, presented by P. Lamarche,⁶⁷ uncovers a curious fact about these intermediary figures - they are related in the structure quite consistently, which would seem to be more than coincidence.

1. Triumphant intervention of the Lord: his Shepherd rejected (9:1-11:17)
 - a Judgement and salvation of neighbouring peoples (9:1-8)
 - b Arrival of the King (9:9-10)
 - c War and Victory of Israel (9:11-10-1)
 - d Presence of idols: judgement (10:2-3a)
 - c¹ War and victory of Israel (10:3b-11-3)
 - b¹ The shepherds rejected by the people (11:4-17)
11. Final Intervention on the Lord and the Suffering Involved (12:1-14:21).
 - c² War and victory of Israel (12:1-9)
 - b² Yahweh's representative pierced : Mourning and purification (12:10-13:1)
 - d¹ Suppression of idols and false prophets (13:2-6)
 - b³ Shepherd struck: people tested; purification and return to God (13:7-9)
 - c³ War and victory of Israel (14:1-15)
 - a¹ Judgement and salvation of all nations (14:16-21)

Under the siglum b the structure shows the presence of a figure variously identified as King, Shepherd and Pierced One. In biblical tradition the identification of king with shepherd was common enough.⁶⁸ Although the Pierced One is not identified specifically, chapter 12 deals with the royal House of David. Thus there is a certain unity among the figures. We will examine them in their individual contexts.

Zech. 9⁶⁹ consists of a hymn that joyfully proclaims a final victory of the forces of God. Zechariah depicts YHWH on a victory march, in the familiar imagery of a Holy War. Vv. 1-8 have been variously assigned to different historical settings,⁷⁰ but it is extremely difficult to identify any particular incident. Most probably these verses depict an apocalyptic image of the final victory of YHWH, with the victory march reaching its climax in the entry of Jerusalem, which YHWH guards from enemies. Then in vv. 9-10 the king of Jerusalem is acclaimed. This section is linked, both thematically and structurally, to the earlier section. The reference to a kingly figure evokes parallels with the Isaian passages which deal with a similar figure⁷¹ as well as with other prophetic references.⁷² This king has undergone an ordeal as the text indicates: 'he is upright and victorious'. 'Victorious', ṣōṣā⁷³, would tend to pre-suppose that he has been saved from something. Therefore he is 'humble', ʾānī⁷⁴, which has the overtone of a state of poverty or affliction.

The description of the kingly figure is followed by a promise of the implementation of peace. According to the MT, it is YHWH himself who will take this initiative.⁷⁵ The description makes use of typically prophetic imagery.⁷⁶ This King must be seen in the context of the ancient tradition of the Holy War. His victory march provides

the occasion for a theophany of YHWH:

And YHWH will appear to them (v. 14),

The theophany clearly recalls the primordial Sinai theophany in its language:

His arrow will go forth like lightning (bārāk)
YHWH Lord will sound the trumpet (sōpār)
And march forth in the storm winds of the south.

The hierophanic imagery of lightning was part of the Sinai experience as was the cultic usage of the sōpār. The 'storm winds of the south' also evoke Sinai, which was in the south, since other warrior marches of YHWH began from that point.⁷⁷

YHWH therefore acts through an intermediary figure, a king, who represents him. At the point of victory YHWH then manifests himself in a theophany to the people. The next occurrence of an intermediary is in the most difficult passage of Zech. 11:4-17.⁷⁸ It is almost impossible to anchor it historically, as the list of scholarly attempts testifies.⁷⁹ It can be divided logically thus:

- i) YHWH gives one last chance (vv.4-6)
- ii) The Good Shepherd is rejected (vv.7-14)
- iii) A Worthless Shepherd replaces him (vv.15-17).

In this text a prophet describes an allegorical vision, whose elements have been identified, at some period, with specific historical events. The prophet becomes a shepherd, a visible representative of YHWH, pasturing a flock that is doomed because of the blindness of its leaders. It is clear, from the onset, that his efforts with regard to the flock are in vain. YHWH's action has been mediated through him, but the action has been frustrated. The shepherd takes two

staffs. These staffs symbolize his leadership. The first was named nō^cam ('beauty', 'favour') which was a distinctive characteristic of YHWH.⁸¹ The second was named hōblīm ('union') which was the intended outcome of such gracious leadership. Thus, the Shepherd announces that he would not impede those forces which were bent on the destruction of the community. nō^cam is broken thus rupturing the binding relationship between YHWH and the people. The making of a covenant⁸² was a distinctively regal task. In this instance the shepherd-king broke the covenant-bond between YHWH and the 'people', who would seem⁸³ to be the various Jewish colonies.

Finally the prophet acted out the part of a wicked and incompetent shepherd, fulfilling all that was worst in the indictment of Ezekiel 34. In times which must have known despair and the seeming destruction of all Yahwistic structure the message of this prophetic piece would have announced that, in fact, this dissolution was the work of YHWH. He had brought about the suffering and was involved in it.

84

The context of the third figure is the final eschatological conflict. A final outpouring of the spirit upon the people characterizes the age. Moved by this new spirit they mourn for one who was pierced:

85

They shall look on me (?) whom they have pierced (dāqār)
and they will mourn for him as for an only son,
and weep for him as people weep for a first-born child.
On that day the mourning in Jerusalem will be as great
as the mourning for Hadad-rimmon⁸⁶ in the plain of Megiddo.

Three general lines of interpretation have been in vogue. The first identified the Pierced One with some historical individual, such as⁸⁷ Onias III or Simon Maccabeus. The second identified the Pierced One⁸⁸ with YHWH, in the person of his representative. The third simply

took the verse metaphorically.

The text speaks of a dramatic change in the attitude of the people. They begin to mourn the death of a Pierced One. The Pierced One was clearly identified, in the first instance, with YHWH, but obviously that reference cannot be literal. The identification of YHWH with the suffering and lowliness of another had already been broached in such texts as Hos. 11 and Is. 43:24. In the first, YHWH expresses the depths of the emotional bond between himself and the people, and it is this identification which brings him 'suffering' over their sinfulness. In Is. 43:24 YHWH complains that the people have burdened him with their sins and troubled him with their iniquities. The wording is of importance:

You have not bought me sweet cane with money,
or satisfied me with the fat of your sacrifices.
But you have burdened me with your sins
you have wearied me with your iniquities.

It is rather tenuous a basis for asserting that this is the beginning of the Suffering Servant syndrome in ancient Israel, but that could be possible. Although Zechariah does not identify the Pierced One, it would seem to be a figure similar to the Servant of Isaiah. The Pierced One is an essential part of a project of YHWH - the final forgiveness of the people.

The final instance⁹⁰ would seem to be a separate unit and should be judged apart from 11:1-17.

Awake, O sword, against my Shepherd (rō^c i[^])
against my near neighbour (geber^c amiti[^])
says YHWH sebā'ōt.

'My Shepherd' (rō^c i[^]) could also be 'my companion'. Perhaps the

play on words is intentional. The shepherd is also 'the man close to me', (geber ^{amiti}). The phrase is used elsewhere only in ⁹¹ Leviticus, where it denotes a 'near neighbour'. Thus the shepherd is identified as one who has a close relationship with YHWH, and one who, according to the mores of Israel, should expect just treatment from his neighbour, YHWH. Yet YHWH will engulf this shepherd-companion in suffering and death and then the people will be rendered shepherdless. But, a remnant of this shepherdless people will react contritely and call upon the name of YHWH. These will be saved and enter into a new covenant-relationship. The shepherd's own sufferings and death reflect the pangs of this new age.

Although we remain in a state of uncertainty concerning the figure who is variously described as the King, the Shepherd and the Pierced One, for our purposes there is no need to press for any particular historical identifications. It seems certain that, at some stage or at various points in time, certain personages were actually identified. Of more importance for us is the fact that a certain mediatorial role is clearly identified. The mediator is identified with YHWH; YHWH acts through him; YHWH suffers through him and thereby effects salvation.

In this instance, taking into account the eschatological outlook of Zechariah, we would postulate a group later in time than those responsible for the literature of Job and Deutero-Isaiah. This group has undergone not only the experience of suffering but also that of apostasy. They see themselves as an elect group, whose suffering will purify the apostates. So, they re-interpret the Exodus myth and insert their own identification into the figure and function of Moses.

The three soundings in Job, Deutero-Isaiah and Deutero-Zechariah are fair evidence that the mediatorial pattern was something that had its own impetus and which was not extinguished by the demise of the Israelite institutions, apart from priesthood, after the Exile. Instead it sought new structures and institutions in which it could be realized. While the Job figures depicted new identifications of the divine hypostatization, the figures in Deutero-Isaiah and Deutero-Zechariah illustrated possible new identifications of a human mediator.

In all, the soundings are consistent evidence that, in pre-Christian Judaism, there was a state of crisis. The prevailing religious paradigm was not universally accepted because there were groups within Israel who could not achieve satisfying contact with YHWH through that particular expressive model. Due to historical circumstances these groups saw themselves as discrete, maintaining core-values at variance to those of the priestly caste. As a result these groups caused the cultural heritage to undergo drastic change by evaluation. While the new form of their tradition was retained in a literary repository, there does not seem to be any evidence that, at this stage any one single model gained pre-dominance. It was simply a state of pre-paradigmatic crisis awaiting resolution.

3.1.3 Religious Social Groups in pre-Christian Judaism

The evidence found in these three soundings for a series of re-evaluation of the social heritage explains why, in the period prior to the Christian era, there was uncertainty and the need for change in the Jewish religious system. The change was, in the first place, marked by the new Rabbinic social group. The Rabbis can be isolated as a social group, quite distinct from the established priesthood. The

latter continued (as the Sadducee sect) to uphold the Priestly
 93
 paradigm.

The Rabbinic group changed the meaning of the Israelite symbols between the early period and the turn of the Christian era. The god
 94
 YHWH gave way to Hamakom, The Place, because he was viewed as the place of the universe although it was carefully stipulated that 'the universe is not his place'.

During this period several concepts vied for acceptance as the hypostatization of YHWH. They were memra, the word of YHWH, yekara,
 95
 the glory of YHWH, and shekinah. This latter was a designation of the divine presence, from the root škn, 'to pitch a tent'. There was a suggestion in this term of a relationship with the Tent of Meeting in the desert period of the Exodus. In its Aramaic forms, it is
 96
 frequently found in the Targumim, particularly Targum Onkelos. Thus, Numbers 14:42, in the Massoretic Text, reads:

Go not up! YHWH is not among you.

In Targum Onkelos, however, the text reads:

Go not up! The Shekinah of the Lord is not among you.

Other intermediary depictions of YHWH's presence which occur in the Hebrew are likewise designated by shekinah in the Aramaic Targum.

As shekinah, YHWH dwelt in the midst of men who study the Torah
 97
 of Judaism, and he shared the sorrows of man's condition. The symbols indicate an increase in intimacy and closeness between the extremes of the mediatorial structure. In effect, by the later period, the mediator, or Moses-function, is no longer an institution

but the Torah, seen as a tangible life-style both written and orally
 98
 communicated.

The notion of torah developed side by side with that of shekinah.
 Particularly after the Exile, the idea of torah, or instruction,
 dominated the life of the Jews. Oral tradition interpreted the
 written Torah of Moses and gradually the belief emerged that the
 written Torah had derived from Moses himself and that the oral law
 was continuous from Moses on. The Torah was seen not only as the
 criterion of proper behaviour but as the means to life. Thus, Hillel
 wrote:


99

Where there is much torah, there is much life.

The life of the Essene group at Qumran centred on the Torah. The
 development of the Rabbinic schools and the eventual redaction of the
 Talmud are evidence of the extreme concentration on torah. The link
 with shekinah was also clearly made:

If two sit together and the words of the torah (are spoken)
 between them, the shekinah rests between them.¹⁰⁰

Thus, the new expressive model within Robbinic Judaism was as follows:



From around 175 BC the pressures exerted by the Greeks upon the
 religious community of Israel brought about a revision of this model.
 101

It was felt that contact with YHWH was at a stand-still and this was expressed by the notion of YHWH communicating with his community only by the bat qôl, the 'daughter of a voice', a secondary and indirect means.¹⁰² The personalistic approach towards the Moses-function re-asserted itself in the form of the Messiah, the anointed one.¹⁰³ The Messiah was simply Moses (or David) redivivus. It was to be his role to fulfil all the expectations of the Torah, delivering Israel from her enemies and bringing This Age (hā C^ōlām hazzeh) to its final end. Then The Age-to-Come (hā C^ōlām habbah) would be introduced. Because David, as deliverer of Israel from foreign oppressors, had been seen more and more as a Moses-figure there is a concatenation of symbols in the description of the Messiah. However, overwhelmingly, the imagery pointed to Moses. This link between the Messiah and the Torah¹⁰⁴ brought about a fervid searching of the written text (and oral Torah traditions) for features of the Messiah which might identify the time, place and circumstances of his arrival.

Thus, immediate pre-Christian Judaism was characterized by a variety of sects, each vying to achieve predominance and widespread acceptance as the orthodox group.¹⁰⁵ While this phenomenon has been described, it has never been sufficiently explained. Stolidly, the Sadducees occupied the centre, while other sects were on the periphery. Gradually, the Pharisees, with a moderate Messianic model, became more and more popular. However, the Essenes, with their monastic settlement at Qumran, and the Zealots strove to displace the other groups. Each of these had variant expressive models, with the Sadducees being the least changed since the Priestly revolution. Associated with each group and its model was a way of viewing the world, self and the future. In other words, a specific religious knowledge devolved from the particular model by which contact with YHWH was achieved. From such

knowledge there was precipitated written sources and the late stages of Judaism consists of a variety of written material which requires cataloguing under specific group tendencies.

The proliferation of sects, and their attendant expressive models, within Judaism was dramatically halted by the Roman military intervention of 70 AD. The destruction of the Temple, of the monastery at Qumran and the dispersion of the Jewish forces meant that viability was possible only for the Pharisees as a social group. Accordingly, subduing their messianic tendencies, they returned to the earlier form of the expressive model in which the Torah occupied the mediatorial function, and YHWH was depicted as Hamakom.

There was a tendency however, for YHWH to become more and more distant, and the tendency continued within Judaism down to medieval days. In the Provençal-Spanish school of Isaac the Blind and Moses de Leon, YHWH was described as En Sof, 'He Who is Without End'. En Sof projected from him ten sefiroth, channels of light, by which the divine existence became perceptible and comprehensible.¹⁰⁶ The final sefir was the Shekinah, the indwelling of YHWH in individuals and communities. In some pristine state there had been a unity of YHWH and the world order in the harmony of En Sof. Evil had ruptured that harmony and consequently the Shekinah was in exile in isolated individuals and localities. All human endeavour should, therefore,¹⁰⁷ be directed towards the restoration of the En Sof. Thus, the structure was as follows:




Because of the distance between En Sof and the community, and thereby the difficulty experienced in contacting YHWH, there was always the possibility in medieval Judaism, sometimes actualized, for the collapse-
 108
 effect to take place.

3.2 The Primary Expressive Model of Christianity.

Christianity was essentially a revitalization movement which took its origin and basic experiential model from Judaism. ¹⁰⁹ Such a movement can be defined as

a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture. 110

The classic processes of culture change produce changes in cultures as systems; they depend on a chain-reaction that is gradual. In a revitalization movement the cultural elements form a new Gestalt abruptly and simultaneously. The experiential model of Judaism was not changed but the Christian primary expressive model was novel and so a drastic change was introduced. A specific social group, the early Christian community, spurred on by the need to identify with exactitude the Messiah, reformulated the prevailing Rabbinic model.



The historical event of Jesus thus concluded the period of paradigmatic confusion for at least this one group. The distinction between shekinah and torah would have been the earliest hint that humanity and divinity were combined in the single human event. The requirements and institutions of the Torah were replaced by the life-example of Jesus while the Presence, the shekinah, was validated by his presence and his works of power.


The earliest need of the Christian group, after the death of Jesus, was to ensure the perpetuation of the system that had replaced that of Judaism. This was met, in the first instance, by the early resurrection stories which clearly affirmed that death had only been a temporary stage and that the risen Jesus still remained present to the group.¹¹³ Thus the shekinah became a fixed element in the Christian experience. The emphasis upon Jesus as immanu-el ('God-with-us') and the finale of Matthew's gospel gives assurance of this:

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Behold I am with you even to the consummation of the world.

If Jesus, the shekinah, was assured by the resurrection stories, Jesus the torah was, at first, assured by the continuation of eye-witnesses who gave a guarantee to his instruction and its interpretation. The role of 'The Twelve' must be seen in this light. At some stage something more durable would have been required, particularly when the imminence of the parousia was delayed. This would have been supplied by the parakletos,¹¹⁵ whose role was associated primarily with truth and teaching. It was made clear that the earlier instructional institution, established by Jesus, would be perpetuated by means of the parakletos. It would be up to later authority to decide where the institutional locus of the parakletos could be found.

Thus, in an era which saw the definitive break between the Christian sect and Judaism, there was the assertion of a new model:



However, an expressive model, when it has once been accepted, will
 116
 require vindication and expansion. The categories in which it
 had first been expressed were the typical categories of apocalyptic
 Judaism. Resurrection, shekinah, torah, parakletos-pneuma only had
 meaning within that context. But, once the moorings with Judaism
 had been rent, there was the immediate need to re-express the categories
 in a new idiom. In fact, Christianity survived in a Greek culture
 117
 and therein apocalyptic thinking was uneasy.

The attempt to vindicate and expand any model itself requires a
 research model. At first, no new research model tends to be generated,
 but is borrowed. The prevailing culture supplies it. The early
 118
 Christians lived in a Greco-Roman cultural milieu. Since much of
 Greek and Roman literature and philosophy expressed the positions of
 pagan religion, there were immediate difficulties. Tertullian was
 the proponent of the extreme position which would deny Christians any
 119
 access to the methodology of the prevailing culture. Other Christian
 writers allowed Christians to study pagan literature and philosophy
 120
 because they were a useful preparation for the study of the faith.
 In short, the Greek methodology was used as a research tradition.

The first research tradition of the early Christians was that of
 121
 syncretic Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. Middle Platonism
 was made up of elements of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism.
 It flourished from the reign of Hadrian in 117 AD to the end of the
 reign of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus in 180 AD, and this was precisely
 the time in which the reflection upon the system was taking place.
 In content it had little enough to appeal to the Christian mentality.
 It was based upon the ideal of divinity necessarily causing the cosmos,
 either through emanations or through the work of a demiurge. However,
 it was the methodological principle inherent in its thought that was
 adopted by the Christian thinkers. Eventually Middle Platonism was
 incorporated into Neoplatonism.

At this point the specific ideas of Plato and Aristotle must be
 122
 contrasted. Plato tried to solve the dilemma caused by the oppo-
 sition of Heraclitus' doctrine of change and Parmenides' doctrine of
 permanence. In 387 he had encountered the Pythagoreans on a visit
 to Sicily and Italy. This contact with Pythagorean mathematics was
 to give rise to his notion of an ideal and perfect other-world. Thus,
 he reconciled the one and the many, being and becoming in human experi-
 ence by reference to the other-world. All objects of sense experience
 are simply approximations of other-worldly Forms or Ideas. Men can
 have knowledge because the actual, in some way, reflects the ideal.
 It is the ideal alone that is real.

Plato had developed his dialectic in opposition to the Sophists
 who relativized truth to particular, changeable circumstances, denied
 its attainment, or maintained that truth could be on opposing sides of

an argument. For his part, Plato stated that any being is determinate. Therefore truth about a question was determinate since the argument
123
would concern itself with a determinate being. Truth deals with what is eternal and real in contrast to the many and changing appearances.
124

Plato's method of rendering the truth determinable was approximation.
125 Sense knowledge was stabilized through postulated intelligible hypothesis. Empirical knowledge, by deduction from these hypotheses, could be given universality, necessity and rational connection that it does not have in itself. In order to justify the hypotheses
126 the highest stage in knowledge is required - dialectics. Dialectics is the search for those meanings of the terms which are the components of the hypotheses, which make their synthesis in the hypothesis
127 necessary.

The search for meanings is complex. When a man experiences a thing, its mode is signified by a term. Things so experienced can be similar and so a mode of difference must be affixed to a likeness, otherwise there is the danger of ambiguity. Definition, therefore, is by means of likeness and difference. Intelligibility is attained when a concept is able to embrace both the originally given term and its contrary in its own meaning. The difference, clearly presented in the concept, opposes its contrary so that an ambiguous discrimination can be made in experience. However, the process does not end there. The comprehensive term, consisting of the given term and its opposite, then seeks reconciliation with its own contrary in a yet higher term.

Thus dialectics, for Plato, seeks the organically intelligible whole which gives intelligibility to all things. Since the intelligible

is the real, the whole must give being to all things. In short, dialectics seeks the vision of The Good. It is unambiguous, since there is nothing with which it could be confused. The Good thus has an internal relational structure, which dialectics is able to explore.

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Aristotle's philosophy was more this-worldly than Plato's. He saw the central metaphysical problem as that of matter and form, replacing the other-worldly Forms of Plato. Matter is passive, purposeless. Form transforms matter, giving it purpose and direction. Parallel to his teaching on matter and form was his notion of act and potency. Form corresponds to act; matter corresponds to potency. As form realises the potency of matter and brings it into act, change can be understood.

This metaphysical theory is then elucidated by his ideas on causation. Every effect has four causes. There are the material and formal causes, which are understood as above. Then there is an efficient cause, of which an ordered series can be constituted, leading to an Uncaused Cause. In the fourth place, there is a final cause, the purpose or end for which the being has been constituted. Aristotle was confident that in describing the four causes he was giving an adequate account of entities.

Aristotle was a pioneer of the scientific method. He saw the need to pose a question about observable nature and then to measure by collecting pertinent data. Explanation was followed by hypothesis and this would be verified by experience. Assumption, rejection or modification of the hypothesis would then follow experimentation. This is the basic methodology of science, of history and of literary criticism.

Thus, Aristotle's view of reality was different from that of Plato. For him an intelligible is stabilized by being this particular way or mode. The human mind expresses, in concepts, different modes of being or categories. So, a man experiences reality and this experience is stabilized within a category by means of a specific difference, specific to one particular category and no other. The specific difference, and the generic trait that it specifies, has been bestowed on the thing by an efficient cause which acts towards a finis. Both the genus and the specific difference actualize the form, in relation to the matter of the thing. The mind searches for genus, specific difference and the causes for the thing being affected by them. In this way the entity can be defined.

Experience in definition will show that certain specific differences are connected with a particular category, and a direct intuition of a specific difference will be had. Further hypotheses are justified because the mind intuitively recognises that they state the causes of this particular thing.

When specific differences and the causes that bring them about in a composite are discovered, they can then be used as the middle term in a syllogism. A syllogism will then demonstrate the necessity of the thing. This form of reasoning is, in Aristotelian understanding of scientia, scientific but the reasoning is not scientific if contingent beings are being scrutinized or if the intrinsic causes of necessary beings are not known. However, even if these causes are not known, a sign of their connection can function as a middle term for probable knowledge of the juncture of subject and predicate. This sign does not cause the being of a thing but it can cause probable

knowledge of the thing. One of these signs is the logical order caused in the human mind as the man thinks about it. Dialectics is the technique of establishing probable truths through a sign. It is second level methodology with respect to scientia.

As the result of an accumulation of experiences the universal emerges in the mind by way of induction. The mind is able to produce the universal and then to predicate it of singulars, because within reality there is a basis for the universal, the form which organizes a thing, giving it direction and consistency. Form is individualized by matter, which acts as a passive limitation on it. The mode of predicating a universal of particular things is a logical order only. Man's ability to perform the operation is controlled by things and so predication is an intelligible sign of things. Dialectics requires this principle in order to establish truths universally.

Dialectics demands some knowledge of the possible kinds of problems that can occur when a universal predicate is attributed to a particular. There are four such problems based on a combination of convertibility with the subject and essentiality with the subject. A universal predicated covertibly and essentially of the subject raises the problem of definition. A universal predicated convertibly, but not essentially, constitutes the problem of property. A universal predicated essentially, but not convertibly, constitutes the problem of genus. A universal predicated, non-essentially and non-convertibly,
130
constitutes the problem of accident.

Dialectics only has a role with respect to the order created by the human mind itself. It does not deal with self-evident things since there is no part to be played by the order of the mind, nor does

it deal with things unacceptable to men since again there is no order formed. Aristotle first organized the acquisition of a stock of problems and propositions around four techniques: the securing of propositions, the distinction of meanings of particular expressions, the discovery of the differences of things, the investigation of the likenesses of things.¹³¹ After this has been done, it is possible to apply the rules that govern the four different modes of predication.

The world view supposed by Aristotle relied completely on reason rather than authority. The observable world was 'given', and within it God was a self-sufficient entity, although separate from the world process. He was not the self-effusive Good of Platonic philosophy.

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
Neoplatonism had transferred some Stoic ideas to the Platonic universe. In general, it conflates Greek philosophy of the early period. According to this line of thought, each level of the hierarchy of things contains the whole of possible reality, but under a different aspect. Thus, everything is contained in The One, The Nous, The Soul and The Sensible World (Nature and Matter). All things are potentially present in The One. All things are immediately compenetrated in The Nous, by an act of intuition. In The Soul all things are unfolded as in rational discourse, while all things are mutually exterior in The Sensible World. The Soul is at the centre of a descending scale of principles. The process of emanation is an overflow of The One, which emanation is not needed or desired. The Soul can only have knowledge in terms of the two worlds contiguous to it - The Nous and Nature. It knows the world of the Spirit through intelligible categories (being, identity, difference, motion, rest) and the world of Nature through sensory categories (space, time, quality, quantity, and so on). The One and Matter are beyond categories. In this context

of thought, Plotinus distinguished several stages of knowledge: perception (aisthesis), understanding (logismos) and reason (nous). Perception is sensory and anterior to knowledge. Understanding is indirect knowledge, achieved by differentiation, inference and reflection upon sense perception. But it is reason which achieves true knowledge, seeing the unity of what has been differentiated (ie. seeing the One in the many). This takes place without reflection; Nous is immediate knowledge. Beyond this immediate knowledge there is union with The One. Thus knowledge can lead to above-being, and the final goal can be union with The One.

The method of Neoplatonic philosophy called for a unitive mode of knowledge which would bring the individual to a coincidence with the Absolute, from which all levels of reality and modes of knowledge proceed. The monistic overtones of the prevailing philosophy were corrected in Christian thought by an emphasis on creationism, which was carried over from Judaism. In this way the sacramental concept of Neoplatonic thought, the movement from the literal and historical towards the spiritual could be maintained without destroying the essential distinction between divinity and humanity required by the Christian's expressive model.

The principal intellectual problem of early Christianity can, at this point, be formulated. Two cultural worlds were in confrontation within the one social group. This group was in possession of an expressive model, derived directly from Judaism, which was formulated in
133
a Semitic mode of thought. The social group, having been ostracized by Judaism, found itself forced to live and vindicate itself in a Greek world. In thus vindicating and rationalizing its new model, the group had to bridge the gap with contemporary prevailing consciousness.

Even within Judaism itself there had been a notable bifurcation of thought, one direction being opposed to Greek thought and the other seeking to harmonize Jewish thought with it. ¹³⁴ Within the Christian group this harmonization brought about a new form of the Semitic model:



The Christian community, as a distinct social group, can be recognised by its involvement in a drastic change in the secondary expressive model of late Rabbinic Judaism. This secondary expressive model displaced the primary expressive model and inevitably brought about a rupture with the social group of Judaism. But, from a very early period, a blurring of this revolutionary model occurred, due to the instinctive application of a Greek, research tradition, and there emerged the secondary expressive model as described above. This latter point requires expansion.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. See above pp. 146-151
2. Standard treatment of the so-called 'Documentary Hypothesis' can be found in R.H. Pfeiffer, Introduction to the Old Testament, sec. ed. (London, 1949); C.R. North, 'Pentateuchal Criticism' in H.H. Rowley (ed.), The Old Testament and Modern Study (London, 1951), pp. 48-83; H. Hahn, The Old Testament in Modern Research (London 1956); O. Eissfeldt, The Old Testament: An Introduction (Oxford, 1965); A. Weiser, Introduction to the Old Testament (London, 1961). For our purpose we will follow the line developed by moderate scholars such as A. Weiser, op. cit. Thus the Yahwist strand of the Pentateuch will be designated by the siglum J, and will denote the earliest complete description of the myth of ancient Israel, deriving from the period of David and Solomon and redacted by an editor who was clearly closely associated with the royal house of Judah and party to it. The Elohist account is designated by the siglum E. Its home is, by general agreement, the northern Kingdom of Israel. It shows a clear relationship to the prophetic circles and their way of thinking and is later than J. Both J and E shared the common basis of the ancient myth of Israel which probably circulated in oral form. After the fall of Samaria in 721 the Elohist account was assimilated into the southern kingdom and became part of the J strand. No doubt alterations and abridgement took place so that we no longer possess an original E source. Deuteronomy, designated as a source by D, had its origins in the period of the confederation of tribes, when it served as a liturgical text for the festival of the renewal of the covenant. It was presented in the form of a series of sermons delivered by Moses on the eve of entering the land of promise. These would have been preserved in the north in prophetic circles and also came to the southern kingdom after the fall of Samaria. The group who retained this original form of Deuteronomy used it as a reform program but received little encouragement until the time of Josiah (640-609), when the Urdeuteronomium was accepted as the basis of reform. Then began a period in Israelite history when the school of Deuteronomy dominated the thinking and interpretation of the ancient myth. Various additions that had derived from the time of Moses were redacted in the spirit of D's theology; at the same time some of the other material in the fused corpus of JE was revised. The final major influence on the growing Pentateuch was the Priestly writing, or P. This writing admitted, and assimilated, earlier material. It had its own independent narrative going back, in parts, to early priestly learnings, handed down orally. It became the foundation of the post-exilic religious community.
3. The following general works on the book of Exodus, as a literary work, and on Moses were consulted: E. Auerbach, Moses (Amsterdam, 1953); G. Anzou, De la Servitude au Service: Étude du livre de l'Exode (Paris, 1961); A. Bentzen, King and Messiah (London, 1955); M. Buber, Moses (New York, 1958); U. Cassuto, A Commentary on the book of Exodus (Jerusalem, 1967); H. Cazelles, Moïse, l'homme de l'Alliance (Paris, 1955); A. Clamer, L'Exode

3.

- Contd. (Paris, 1956); F.M. Cross, 'The Song of the Sea and Canaanite Myth' in R.W. Funk (ed.), God and Christ: Existence and Province (New York, 1968); G. Fohrer, 'Überlieferung und Geschichte des Exodus', BZAW, 91 (Berlin, 1964); E. Galbiati, La struttura letteraria dell'Esodo (Rome, 1956); H. Gressman, Mose und seine Zeit (Göttingen, 1913); J.P. Hyatt, 'Were there an Ancient Historical Credo in Israel and an Independent Sinai Tradition?' in H.T. Frank and W.L. Reed (eds.), Translating and Understanding the Old Testament (Nashville, 1970), pp. 152-170; id., Exodus (London, 1971); W.L. Moran, 'Moses und der Bundesschluss am Sinai', Stimmen der Zeit, 170 (1961/62), pp. 120-133; M. Noth, Exodus (London, 1962); H.H. Rowley, 'Moses and Monotheism', ZAW, NF 28 (1957), pp. 1-21; R. Smend, Das Mosebild von Heinrich Ewald bis Martin Noth (Tübingen, 1959); H.M. Teeple, The Mosaic Eschatological Prophet (Philadelphia, 1957); P. Volz, Mose und sein Werk (Tübingen, 1932); G. Widengren, 'What do we know about Moses?' in J.H. Durham and J.R. Porter (eds.), Proclamation and Presence (London, 1970) pp. 21-47; F.W. Winnett, The Mosaic Tradition (Toronto-London, 1949); E. Zenger, Die Sinaitheophanie. Untersuchungen zum jahwistischen und elohistischen Geschichtswerk (Würzburg, 1971).
- All translations in what follows have been made directly from the Hebrew text.

4. There are notable inconsistencies in Exodus 32. In two different ways Moses learnt of the apostasy (vv. 7-8/vv. 17-19); there are two accounts of Moses' intercession (vv. 11-13/vv. 30-33); different consequences of the apostasy are put forward (vv. 14, 20, 34 and 35). Who made the calf? In vv. 1-6 the people ask Aaron and he complies; in vv. 8 and 20 the people make 'gods' themselves; in v. 35 it is Aaron and the people and in v. 24 it is self-produced. Material on the formation of vv. 1-6 can be found in Beyerlin, op. cit., pp. 126-129; S. Lehming, 'Versuch zu Exodus 32', VT, 10 (1960), pp. 16-50; M. Buber, Moses, p. 175. The difficulties met in the actual calf-making are covered in M. Noth, 'Zur Anfertigung des goldenen Kalbes', VT, 9 (1959), pp. 419-427; J. Petuchowski, 'Nochmals "Zur Anfertigung des goldenen Kalbes"', VT, 10 (1960), p. 74; S.E. Loewenstamm, 'The Making and Destruction of the Golden Calf', Biblica, 48 (1967), pp. 481-490; id., 'The Hebrew Root haras in the Light of the Ugaritic Text', JSS, 10 (1959), pp. 63-65; L.G. Perdue, 'The Making and Destruction of the Golden Calf - A Reply', Biblica, 54 (1973), pp. 237-246.
5. Apart from general references in n. 3, see, on ch. 33 in particular, M. Gorg, Das Zelt der Begegnung: Untersuchung zur Gestalt der Sakralen Zelttraditionen Altisraels (Bonn, 1967); R.J. Clifford, 'Tent of 'El and the Israelite Tent of Meeting', CBQ, 33 (1971), pp. 221-227.
6. W. Beyerlin, The Origins and History of the Oldest Sinaitic Traditions (Oxford, 1961) pp. 93ff.
7. G. Widengren, Sakrales Königtum im Alten Testament und in Judentum (Stuttgart, 1955), esp. pp. 14-16; id., 'King and Covenant', JSS, 2 (1957), pp. 1-32; J.R. Porter, Moses and Monarchy (Oxford, 1963), esp. pp. 11-13; id., 'The Succession of Joshua' in J.I. Durham and J.R. Porter (eds.), Proclamation and Presence (London, 1970), pp. 102-132.

8. See below pp. 164-71.
9. Cf. S.E. Loewenstamm, 'The Making and Destruction of the Golden Calf', Biblica 48 (1967), pp. 481-499; Beyerlin, op.cit., pp. 128-129.
10. General introductions to the Israelite concepts of prophet and prophecy can be found in J. Pedersen, 'The Role Played by Inspired Persons among the Israelites and the Arabs' in Studies in Old Testament Prophecy (Edinburgh, 1950), pp. 127-142; H.H. Rowley, Religion in Ancient China and Israel (London, 1956) esp. pp. 1-26; J. Lindblom, Prophecy in Ancient Israel (Oxford, 1967).
11. On the role of Moses in Deuteronomy see C. Steuernagel, Das Deuteronomium sec. ed. (Göttingen, 1923), p. 121; E. Sellin, Mose und seine Bedeutung für die israelitische-jüdische Religionsgeschichte (Berlin, 1922); H.J. Kraus, Worship in Israel (Oxford, 1966), p. 108.
12. See J. Cody, A History of Israelite Priesthood (Rome, 1968).
13. General commentaries on Job consulted were: E. Dhorme, Le Livre de Job (Paris, 1926), ET. A Commentary on the Book of Job (London, 1967); N.H. Tur-Sinai, The Book of Job (Jerusalem, 1957); G. Fohrer, Das Buch Hiob (Gütersloh, 1963); R. Gordis, The Book of Job and Man (Chicago, 1965); M. Pope, Job (New York, 1965); J. Steinmann, Le Livre de Job (Paris, 1955); S. Terrien, Job, Poet of Existence (Indianapolis, 1957); id. Job (Neuchâtel, 1963); H. H. Rowley (ed.), Job (London, 1970); J.J. Weber, Le Livre de Job (Tournai, 1947); A. Weiser, Hiob sec. ed., (Göttingen, 1956); C. Larcher, Le Livre de Job (Paris, 1957); G. Fohrer, Studien zum Buche Hiob (Tübingen, 1963); J. Lindblom, La composition du livre de Job (Lund, 1945); C. Westermann, Der Aufbau des Buches Hiob (Tübingen, 1956); J. Lévêque, Job et son Dieu (Paris, 1970); F. Horst, Hiob (Neukirchen, 1968).
14. The more common division is that Job makes a speech in reply to successive speeches of Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar. A variation is offered by Snaith who divides each of the Job speeches into two. Job both introduces and answers each of his Friends. Cf. N. Snaith, The Book of Job (London, 1968), pp. 9-10. Snaith noted that in the earlier parts of the dialogue Job's speeches tended to be approximately twice as long as the speech of the Friend who had immediately preceded him. Thus he devised a pattern: i) speech by Job, speech by Eliphaz, speech by Job; ii) speech by Job, speech by Bildad, speech by Job, iii) speech by Job, speech by Zophar, speech by Job. Snaith remarks that the soundness of this conjecture can be neither proved nor disproved because of the independence and isolation of the speeches.
15. A. Alt, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des Buches Hiob', ZAW, 55 (1937), pp. 265-268.
16. Snaith, op. cit., pp. 6-8.
17. H.H. Rowley, 'The Book of Job and its Meaning', BJRL, 41 (1958-9), pp. 167-207:

17.

Contd.

The Elihu speeches could therefore be dropped from the book without being missed, and without affecting its structure. (p. 173)

N.H. Tur Sinai, The Book of Job, pp. xxxviii f., held that whereas most of the book was composed in Aramaic and translated into Hebrew, the Elihu speeches were composed in Hebrew by a disciple of Ezekiel. Writers who retain the Elihu speeches as part of the original book are : P. Szczygiel, Das Buch Job (Bonn, 1931); B.D. Eerdmans, Studies in Job (Leiden, 1939), pp. 16-17; A.M. Dubarle, Les Sages d'Israel (Paris, 1946), pp. 84ff; P. Humbert, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum III, (Rowley Festschrift, 1955), p. 150.

18. Thus, E. Dhorme, op.cit., p. lxxvi; N. Duesberg, Les Scribes inspirés (two vols., Paris, 1938), p. 156, who calls this chapter 'petit bloc erratique, situé probablement hors de sa place, mais qui donne le dernier mot du livre'; J. Chaine and A. Robert in A. Robert and A. Tricot (eds.), Initiation Biblique, third ed. (Paris, 1954), p. 181; R.H. Pfeiffer, Introduction to the Old Testament (New York, 1948) p. 671; A. Lods, Histoire de la littérature hébraïque et juive (Paris, 1950), p. 680.

19. That the four texts which we will deal with in detail are linked by a common context is maintained by W.A. Irwin, 'Job and Prometheus', Journal of Religion, 30 (1950), pp. 90-108; Pope, op.cit., p. 118, 219; Snaith, op.cit., p. 51.

20. The text reads:

לֹא יֵשׁ בֵּינֵינוּ מוֹכֵיחַ יֵשׁת יְהוָה עַל-שִׁנֵּינוּ

In thirteen MSS there is the reading lû for lô' and so the translation, instead of being a negative, could well be a wish:

'Would that there were an arbiter between us!'

It was read thus by the LXX and the Syriac. The LXX reads:

eithe ên ho mesitēs hēmōn kai elegchōn kal diakouōn
ana meson amphoterōn.

21. The action is clearly described in Ps. 139:5.

22. The text reads: נִסְעָתָה הִנֵּה בַשָּׁמַיִם עָרִי וְשִׁחִי בַמְרוֹמִים:
מְלִיצִי רַעִי אֶל-אֱלֹהֵי דָלָפָה עֵינִי:
וַיִּבַּח לְגֹבֶר עִם-אֱלֹהֵי וַיִּכְן-אֶתֶּם לְרַעְיוֹ:

V.20 contains a difficult reading:

MT: m^eliṣay rēcāy el'ēlōah dāl pā^e enī.

LXX: aphikoito mou he deēsis pros kurion,
enanti de autou stazoi mou ho ophthalmos.

Let my prayer go up to the Lord
while my tears flow before him.

Tur-Sinai, in his commentary on Job, proposes mlyṣw in place of m liṣay. He derived the term from mlṣ, the basic meaning of which would be 'to speak smoothly', and in this instance it would

imply an 'intermediary'. Cf. The Book of Job, p. 269. Pope offers an alternative reconstruction. He attaches 'el-'ēlōah to 20a in order to fill out the defective line. This leaves 20b short but, on the basis of LXX's enanti de autou, he conjectures that 'lyw was lost by haplography and should be restored. Pope's final reconstruction would read:

mēlîs rē^cāy 'el-'ēlōah
'elayw dāl pay^cēnî

Interpreter of my thoughts to God,
Toward whom my eye drips.

This allows the reading of a singular mēlîs, 'interpreter'. Cf. Pope, op.cit., p. 118.

23. Dhorme, op.cit., p. 239.
24. Some of those who hold that the witness is God himself are: J. Lévêque, Job et son Dieu, p.460-464; G. Fohrer, op.cit., p.291
25. J. L. McKenzie, Second Isaiah (New York, 1968), p. 59.
26. C. Westermann, op.cit., p. 133.
27. Mēlîs is also used in 1 QH 2:13,31; 4:7,9; 6:13 for the 'interpreter of knowledge'. Cf. T. Mansoor, The Thanksgiving Hymns (Leiden, 1961), p. 143; H.N. Richardson 'Some Notes on lys and its derivatives', VT, 5 (1955), p. 169.
28. S. Mowinckel, 'Hiobs go'el und Zeuge im Himmel' in K. Buddhé (ed.), K. Marti Festschrift (Giessen, 1925), pp. 207-212.
29. The text reads:

MT: ואני ידעתי נאלי חי ואחרון על-עפר יקום:

LXX: oida gar hoti aenaos estin ho ekluein me mellon epi ges.

The Vulgate has detached the colon of v. 25b from 25a and yākūm has been read as 'ākūm. It could be that the MT's words have been displaced.

30. Pope, op. cit. p. 135.
31. As it stands the MT is syntactically incoherent so certain emendations have to be made.

ואחר עורי נקמו זאת ומבשרי אחזה אלוה:

The LXX did not read we'ahar at the beginning. Instead ōdî was regarded as the object of yākūm, which was read as the hiph'il yākîm. In place of MT, nigq pû-zōt the LXX read nōqēp-zōt. LXX^A translated ōdî by mou to soma. Other Greek MSS read sperma. Sutcliffe's reconstruction of v.26 is:

w^{ec}ōdî nigqepû mibb^esadi
w'ahar zot 'ehēzeh 'ēlōah.

Cf. E. F. Sutcliffe, 'Further Notes on Job', Biblica, 21(1950), pp. 377-378.

32. H.N. Richardson, loc.cit., p. 169; C. Schedl, 'T^esubah und Melis: Über die wahre Busse und den Fürsprechen', Biblica, 43 (1962), pp. 169-170; W.A. Irwin, 'Job's Redeemer', JBL, 81 (1962), p. 218; G. Johnston, The Spirit-Paraclete in the Gospel of John (Cambridge, 1970).
33. General surveys on the literature can be found in H.H. Rowley, 'The Servant of the Lord in the Light of Three Decades of Criticism' and 'The Suffering Servant and the Davidic Messiah' in The Servant of the Lord and Other Essays (London, 1952), pp. 1-60 and 61-94; C.R. North, The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah, sec. ed. (Oxford, 1948); H. Hagg, 'Ebed-Jahwe-Forschung 1948-1958', BZ, 3 (1959), pp. 174-204; J. Coppens, 'Le messianisme israelite. La relève prophétique', Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 48 (1972), pp. 21-26.
34. Is. 42: 1-9.
35. W.A.M. Beuken, 'Mispat. The First Servant Song and its Context', VT, 22 (1972), pp. 1-30; J. Jeremias, 'Mispat im ersten Gottesknechtslied', ibid. pp. 31-42.
36. This is based on Beuken, loc.cit., p. 3.
37. Beuken, loc.cit., p. 7.
38. For parallels, see Ex.21:1; 15:25; Jos.24:25; 1 Sm. 30:25.
39. N.H. Snaith, 'Isaiah 40-66. A Study of the Teaching of Second Isaiah and its Consequences' in Studies on the second Part of the Book of Isaiah (Leiden, 1967), p. 180. Jacob and Israel are in parallel in Is. 40:27; 41:14; 43:1; 49:5. They refer in such contexts to the exiles.
40. Is. 49: 1-6.
41. 'Israel' is missing from a single MS, number 96 in Kennicott's list, which cannot in any case be adduced as real evidence for a sound tradition. The insertion of y^sr'l is now further verified by its presence in 1 Q Is. Cf. J.A. Bewer, 'The Text-Critical Value of Hebrew MS Kennicott 96 for Isaiah 49:3' in Jewish Studies in Memory of G.A. Kohut (New York, 1935). pp. 86-88; id., 'Textkritische Bemerkungen' in Festschrift Alfred Bertholet, pp. 67-68.
42. Is. 50: 4-11.
43. Is. 52:13 - 53:12.
44. Recent general commentaries on the Fourth Song are: D. Winton Thomas, 'A Consideration of Isaiah LIII in the Light of Recent Textual and Philological Study', Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 44 (1968), pp.79-86; G.R. Driver, 'Isaiah. 52:13-5. The Servant of the Lord' in M. Black and G. Fohrer (eds.), In Memoriam Paul Kahle (Berlin, 1963).
45. This basic master-servant motif and its terminology is discussed in G.E. Wright, 'The Terminology of Old Testament Religion and its Significance', JNES, 1 (1942), pp.404-411.
46. ANET, p. 144.

47. S. Smith, The Statue of Idrimi (London, 1949), p. 14.
48. The only non-Israelite upon whom the title was bestowed was Nebuchadnezzar in three texts of Jeremiah. Jeremiah, in these contexts, depicted Nebuchadnezzar as YHWH's rod of punishment against both Judah and the other nations. However, it is possible that the ^Cabdi in the three texts is secondary. Cf. W.E. Lemke, 'Nebuchadnezzar, My Servant', CBQ, 28 (1966), pp. 45-50.
49. Thus the primary meaning of ^Cbd is not 'to work'. While ^Cobēd 'ādāmāh is known (Gn.4:2; Zech. 13:5 etc.), ^Cebēd 'ādāmāh is never attested. A failure to distinguish between the substantive ^Cebēd and the verbal forms of ^Cbd vitiates many of the conclusions of C. Lindhagen, The Servant Motif in the Old Testament (Uppsala, 1950).
50. The Gibeonites described themselves as ^Cabdekem in Jos. 9:11. Likewise Ahaz described himself to Tiglath-pileser: ^Cab^{ka} ubinkā'ānī.
51. Cf. 2 Kgs. 8:13; 2 Sam. 9:8. The pious man, in religious humility, stood before YHWH in deference and thus became ^Cebēd. A similar religious stance was also found in Babylonia:
- 'Quicken thy servant, who wishes to exalt thy power and praise thy greatness among all men'.
- W. Schrenk, Babylonische Sühnriten (Leipzig, 1908), p. 56. And on a votive pillar:
- 'To our Lord Melkart, the Lord of Tyre, from your devotees your servant Abdosir and my brother Osirshamar, son of Osirshamar, son of Abdosir, for he has heard their voice. May he bless them'.
- Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum, pars. I, l. No. 122.
52. Dt. 34:5; Jos. 1:1, 13, 15: 8:31, 33; 11:12; 12:6 (bis); 13:8; 14:7; 18:7; 22:4, 5; 2 Kgs. 18:12; 2 Chr. 1:13; 24:6.
53. 1 Chr. 6:49; 2 Chr. 24:9; Dn. 9:11; Neh. 10:29. This title is also used in Gn. 50:17 to describe Joseph's brothers. In Aramaic texts, Daniel, the Three Friends and the Jews under Ezra are so designated (Dn. 6:21; 3:26; Ezr. 5:11).
54. Jos. 24:29; Jgs. 2:8.
55. Both instances are found in the superscriptions to Pss. 18 and 36.
56. Is. 42:19.
57. The previous analysis would seem to indicate that, in general, the Songs in Second Isaiah are part of the general context of the prophecy. This is also the growing consensus among scholars moving away from the earlier position outlined by Duhm in 1892 who isolated the Songs from their general context. C.R. North, The Second Isaiah (London, 1964), p. 8; G.A.F. Knight, Deutero-

Isaiah (New York, 1965), p. 12; J. Smart, History and Theology in Second Isaiah (Philadelphia, 1965), p. 26; H.M. Orlinsky, Studies on the Second Part of the Book of Isaiah (Leiden, 1967), p. 16; N. H. Smith, Isaiah 40-66 (London, 1944), pp. 169-170; J. Lindblom, The Servant Songs in Deutero-Isaiah (Lund, 1951), p. 10.

58. Thus, he calls on the people to flee out of Babylon, in 48:20-21:

צֵאוּ מִבָּבֶל בְּרַחֲוֵי מִכְשָׁדִים בְּקוֹל רֶחַב הַיָּדוֹ
הַשְׁמִיעוּ זֶאת הוֹצִיאוּהָ עַד-קֶצֶה הָאָרֶץ אָמְרוּ נָא לַיהוָה
עֲבָדוּ יַעֲקֹב: וְלֹא צָמְאוּ בְּחֶרְבוֹת הוֹלִיכֶם מִיָּם מִצֹּר
הַיָּל לָמוּ וַיִּבְקַע-צֹר וַיִּזְבּוּ מִיָּם:

In 52:11-12 there is a similar context and a similar command:

סוּרוּ סוּרוּ
צֵאוּ מִשָּׁם מִמָּא אֶל-תַּנְעוּ צֵאוּ מִתּוֹכָהּ הִבְדּוּ נִשְׂאֵי כְלֵי
יְהוָה: כִּי לֹא בַחֲפֹזֹן תֵּצְאוּ וּבִמְנוּסָה לֹא תֵלַכּוּן כִּי-הִלָּךְ
לִפְנֵיכֶם יְהוָה וּמִאֲסָפְכֶם אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:

The Exodus allusions in both passages are overt. In the first passage the use of g'l and the reference to the cleaving of the rock are typical Exodus images. In the second there is the obvious reference to the guidance of YHWH before and after the returning column.

59. 43:16; 51:10. Cf. Ex. 14:5-31.
60. 48:4. Cf. Ex. 32:9.
61. 43:20; 48:21. Cf. Ex. 17:1-7.
62. 40:5; 52:8. Cf. Ex. 24:16; 33:20. The indirect vision of Ex. 33:20 is contrasted with the direct vision in Is. 52:8.
63. Jer. 21:11; 22:3; 23:5; Ps. 72:1,2.
64. Jgs. 4:5.
65. 1 Sm. 8:3. For other regal features (some far-fetched) see O. Kaiser, Der königliche Knecht (Göttingen, 1959), pp. 18-31.
66. This is the general position taken in most modern commentaries. The following have been consulted: J.C. Baldwin, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi (London, 1972); B. Otzen, Studien über Deuteriosacharja (Copenhagen, 1964); M. Sæbo, Sacharja 9-14 (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1969); P. Lamarche, Zacharie IX-XIV, Structure littéraire et messianisme (Paris, 1961); A. Gelin, Aggée, Zacharie, Malachie (Paris, 1960); D.R. Jones, Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi (London, 1962). The block of material in Zechariah 9-14 differs noticeably from that in 1-8. Whereas Zechariah 1-8 centered its interests on the rebuilding of the temple and the messianic hope that was generated by Jerusalem and the House of David, Zechariah 9-14 presupposed the rebuilt Temple and its messianism bypassed the Davidic House. The styles are considerably different. Zechariah 9-14 is set in an apocalyptic context. It must be read against the background of the end-message of history. Yahweh and his people are engaged in a final conflict with the nations and victory will ensue only

after the sufferings of the end-time. In these sufferings Jerusalem is embroiled and, after a period of purification, she will be brought to a covenant-renewal.

67. Lamarche, op.cit., pp. 112-113.
68. Jer. 23:1-8 sets shepherds and the Davidic king side by side. A similar parallel is found in Ez. 34:23-24.
69. See commentaries under n.66.
70. H. Tadmor, 'Azyiyau of Yaudi' in Studies in the Bible (Scripta Hierosolymitana VIII) (Jerusalem, 1961), pp. 269-270. Tadmor dates vv. 1-6, 10 to the time of Uzziah, about 739 BC. E. Lipinski, 'Recherches sur le livre de Zacharie', VT, 20 (1970). pp. 46-50 places vv. 1-2 in the reign of Uzziah.
71. Is. 9:6-7; 11:1-5; 32:1-8.
72. Hos. 3:4-5; Am. 9:11,12; Mic. 5:2-4.
73. Zech. 7:10; 11:7,11.
74. Is. 51:21; 54:11.
75. The LXX continues in the third person, but the MT is to be preferred.
76. In the description of David there are echoes of Mic.5:10 and the description of his kingdom is a direct quotation from Ps. 72:8.
77. Cf. Jgs. 5:4-5 and Hab. 3:3. See also Enuma elish IV, 39-60, ANET, p. 66, which specifically mentions the storm winds with which Marduk marches against Tiamat.
78. See commentaries under n.66.
79. See the various interpretations of the three shepherds in H.C. Mitchell, 'Haggai and Zechariah' in International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh, 1912), p. 306; Baldwin, op.cit., pp. 181-183.
80. Baldwin, op.cit., p. 179.
81. Cf. Pss. 27:4; 90:17.
82. Certain texts show the same pattern of the king making the covenant with the people: Dt. 17:14-20; 2 Sm. 5:3; 2 Kgs. 11:17.
83. Cf. 1 Kgs. 22:28; Jl. 2:6.
84. Zech. 12:10-13:1.
85. daqār has had a tortured textual transmission. LXX gives katōrchēsanto while the Targum has 'spurned'. Further, some early Hebrew copyists felt that the text must have been in error in attributing death to YHWH. Thus the pronoun was changed from the first person to an unidentified third person.

86. Pedersen, in Israel (4 vols. in 2, Oxford, 1940), vol. 11, p. 475 sees this term as another name for the Babylonian Tammuz (or a fertility deity similar to Tammuz) with annual rites of weeping such as were denounced by Ez. 8:14. Hadad, the father of Aleyin, bewailed the murder of his son by Mot. The murder was avenged but eventually both Aleyin and Mot were raised to life. It is possible that some such wailing custom survived into the post-Exilic times and indeed it could have been combined with some historical event which had acquired significance for Israel. 2 Chron. 35:25 shows that a lamentation for king Josiah was still an annual event after the Exile, with a set ritual. The reference to Megiddo in v.11 could justify such a reconstruction since it was in Megiddo that Josiah died.
87. Ita, W.O.E. Oesterley, A History of Israel (2 vols, Oxford, 1932), vol. 11, p.269.
88. A.F. Kirkpatrick, The Doctrine of the Prophets (London, 1906) p. 472.
89. J. Calvin, Commentary on the Gospel according to John (London, 1847), Vol. 11, p. 242.
90. Zech. 13:7-9.
91. Eg. Lv. 6:2; 18:20.
92. On Rabbis and Rabbinism see in particular G.F. Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era (3 vols., Cambridge Mass., 1927-30); W.O.E. Osterley, The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period (London, 1941).
93. T.W. Manson, 'Sadducee and Pharisee', BJRL, 22 (1938), pp. 3ff; P. Gaechter, 'The Hatred of the House of Annas', TS, 8 (1947), pp. 3-34.
94. Hamakom has the meaning of omnipresence as can be seen from its usage. Cf. Avodah Zarah 40b; Niddah 49b; Berakhot 16b. A tradition runs:

R. Huna in the name of R. Ammi said: 'Why do we use a circumlocution for the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, and call him Makom? Because he is the place of this world, but this world is not his (only) place'.

Genesis Rabbah 68:49.
95. Information on the concept of shekinah can be found passim in S. Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology (London, 1909); A. Marmorstein, Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God (London, 1927); J. Abelson, Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature (London, 1912); W.J. Pythian-Adams, The People and the Presence (New York, 1942).
96. The complete text of Targum Onkelos is in H. Barnstein, The Targum Onkelos to Genesis (London, 1896).
97. See A. Cohen, Everyman's Talmud (London, 1949), pp. 8, 42-43.

98. A very substantial bibliography on the torah, particularly as it relates to Christianity can be found in R. Banks, Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition (Cambridge, 1975).
99. Pirge Aboth 11:7.
100. Ibid., 3:2.
101. Cf. on Greek oppression of the Jews, W.O.E. Osterley, The Jews and Judea during the Greek Period (London, 1941); N.H. Snaith, The Jews from Cyrus to Herod (Wallington, 1949); V.T. Cherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia, 1959).
102. There is mention of the bath qol in Yoma 9b. It is described as an external voice that can be heard only by the recipient of the message.
103. On Messianism in Israel generally, M.J. Lagrange, Le Messianisme chez les Juifs (Paris, 1909); ID., Le Judaïsme avant Jésus-Christ (Paris, 1931); L. Cerfaux and others, L'Attente du Messie (Paris, 1954); E. Mascaux and others, La Venue du Messie (Paris, 1962); S. Mowinckel, He That Cometh (Nashville, 1956).
104. At Qumran the Messiah was expected to give the final interpretation to the Torah. See A.R.C. Leane, The Rule of Qumran and Its Meaning (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 102-103.
105. M. Simon, Les sectes juives au temps de Jésus (Paris, 1966).
106. Zohar vol. 3, p. 288.
107. Ibid., vol. 2 p. 216.
108. See above, pp. 72-73,
109. For general background to the anthropological use of the term see A. Wallace, 'Revitalization Movements', American Anthropologist, 58 (1956), pp. 264-281. The bibliography at the end of the article gives further resources.
110. Wallace, art.cit., p. 265.
111. There are certain texts which are commonly agreed to refer to the shekinah. Matthew 18:20, (cf. Aboth 3:2); John 1:14; Colossians 2:9; Luke 1:35 where the verb episkiasei is the translation of the action of the shekinah in Ex. 40:35.
112. See Banks, op. cit., bibliography.
113. Docetism and Gnosticism were deviant explanations of the death of Jesus, rejected by the orthodox Christians. On the resurrection there is a voluminous bibliography.
114. Matthew 28:20.

115. The word is used in Jewish writings, eg. Pirke Aboth 4:11. Cf. O. Betz, Der Paraclet (Leiden, 1963); R. Brown, 'The Paraclete in the Fourth Gospel', New Testament Studies, 13 (1967), pp. 113-132. Further bibliography can be found in Brown's article.
116. This is known as 'paradigmatic core development'.
117. See J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford, 1961), especially ch. 2.
118. H. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (New York, 1956); M. L. Laistner, Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire (Ithaca, 1951); W.W. Jaeger, Early Christian and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, Mass., 1961).
119. De praescriptione hereticorum, ch. 7.
120. L. H. Millar, Christian Education in the First Four Centuries (London, 1946); G. L. Ellspermann, The Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers toward Pagan Literature and Learning (Washington, 1949). Examples of this latter attitude can be found in Basil the Great (c.330-379) particularly in his work, To Young Men, On how they might derive profit from Pagan Literature. Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 330-390) wrote two invectives against Julian because of his rescript, given in 362, banning Christians from the pagan schools.
121. F.W. Bussell, The School of Plato: Its Origin, Development and Revival under the Roman Empire (London, 1896); R.E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, 1937); P. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism sec. ed. (The Hague, 1960).
122. Extensive bibliographies on Plato can be found in A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work, sixth ed. (London, 1949); C.J. de Vogel (ed.), Greek Philosophy, (3 vols., Leiden, 1950-59.)
123. Rep. 478A-480. Plato is cited simply by book and Stephanus number.
124. Rep. 514A-518.
125. Rep. 509E-514.
126. Rep. 511.
127. Rep. 338C.
128. An earlier bibliographic work on Aristotle is M.D. Philippe, Aristoteles (Bern, 1948). On the points raised here see W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development sec. ed. (New York, 1948); I. Düring and G. Owen (eds.), Aristotle and Plato in The Mid-Fourth Century (Göteborg, 1960); J.H. Randell, Aristotle (New York, 1960); J. Ferguson, Aristotle (London, 1972).

129. Topica, 100a 25; 101a 18. Aristotle is cited by book and Bekker number.
130. Topica 101b 18-25; 101b 38-102b 26; 103b 2-20.
131. Topica 105a 20-33.
132. Plotinus is regarded as the founder of Neoplatonism. On Neoplatonism in general see T. Whittaker, The Neo-Platonists: A Study in the History of Hellenism sec. ed. (Cambridge, 1928); C.J. de Vogel, 'On the Neoplatonic Character of Platonism and the Platonic Character of Neoplatonism', Mind, 62 (1953), pp. 43-64; P. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, sec. ed. (The Hague, 1953); L. Robin, Les Rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon (Paris, 1957). Plotinus' works are collected in P. Henry and H. R. Schwyzer, Plotini Opera (2 vols., Paris, 1951-9). On Plotinus see W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus (2 vols., London and New York, 1929); A.H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge, 1940); E. Brehier, The Philosophy of Plotinus (Chicago, 1958); K. Jaspers, The Great Philosophers (2 vols., New York, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 38-92.
133. See the bibliography in J. Barr, op.cit., pp. 299-303.
134. See P.D. Hanson, The Dawn of Apocalyptic (Philadelphia, 1975), esp. ch. 3.

4.

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL

EDUCATION

4.1 Early Evidence for research traditions in Christianity.

The first attempts to apply Greek research traditions, in adapted and Christianized form, to the primary expressive model which had been derived from earlier generations, gave rise to two schools of thought, at Antioch and Alexandria. They became the first recognizable theological schools.

4.1.1 The Schools of Alexandria and Antioch.


The school of Alexandria was founded by Origen who had been entrusted with the task of founding a grammar school by Demetrius, the¹ bishop of Alexandria around 202 AD. Eventually, he turned his attention to the Christian formation of the groups who had undergone basic catechesis. In so doing, he saw the need to answer objections of learned pagans to the developing ideas of the Christian primary expressive model. It was this didascalion, with its particular methodology, that would become the school of Alexandria.

In considering the research tradition established by Origen it is necessary to examine the thought of his predecessors - both Christian² and Jewish. Of vital importance in this regard was Philo Judaeus. Philo combined ideas from two worlds of thought: the Judaeo-biblical concept of memra (Aramaic, 'word') and the Greek-philosophical theme of logos, (Greek, 'word'). He took the text of Gen. 1:26, which spoke of man being made in the 'image' of God, and saw in this a reference to Plato's concept of eikon (image). Indeed, Plato had described the entirety of the visible and sensible world as an eikon of the³ intelligible Idea world. Philo therefore spoke of man as the⁴ eikon eikonos ('the image of the Image'). To this he wedded the

idea of logos, taken from Heraclitus and the Stoics, in order to describe the deity. While there was Hebrew precedent for applying the idea of 'word' to God, the Greek usage had a twofold application. The Logos was, at the same time, the eikon⁵ of God, and also the paradeigma (model) of the sensible world. Thus Philo could write:

The world discerned only by the intellect is nothing else than the logos⁶ of God, when he was already engaged in the act of creation.

Justin⁷ had been the first to take up these ideas, derived either directly or indirectly from Philo, and to use them as a research tradition in order to formulate a new secondary expressive model. The concept of logos, with its double field of reference, seemed ideal for explaining the ambivalent relationship between the human Jesus and the divine presence. The earlier Jewish concept of shekinah had, by this time, lost its relevance and soon fell from Christian usage. Thus, the new secondary expressive model made use of the logos endiathetos (the immanent presence of the logos) and the logos prophorikos⁸ (the logos in its involvement with the sensible order). The following structure could be proposed as representing Justin's thought:



The original proposers of this system did not recognise the inherent problem, namely that the distinction between the divine and

the human was compromised. Further, the extension of presence of the Logos to the human Jesus would tend to suggest a change in the divinity. Origen was schooled in this Logos model.

The insistence on the model meant that there was a stress on the intelligible over the sensible at Alexandria. In effect, the Logos model allowed movement in one of two directions and Origen opted for movement towards the spiritual. Thus, in hermeneutics he used the literal sense as the basis for a spiritual interpretation, sometimes even maintaining that a 'corporeal' meaning was not present in the sacred writings of Christianity. He set out his approach on hermeneutics in the fourth book of De principiis in which he applied Plato's threefold distinction of body, soul and spirit to the meanings of scripture. The body was paralleled to the corporeal or historical sense; the soul was paralleled to a psychic or moral sense while the spirit was paralleled to a spiritual sense, involving all other meanings apart from those previously named. For Origen, this spiritual sense was the goal of all hermeneutics, there being little value in the literal sense. Only Christians, however, could perceive this spiritual interpretation; Jews were confined to the 'carnal' letter of the law.

The differentiation between Jew and Christian in method of interpretation is of extreme importance. The school of Alexandria was stating explicitly that the research model for producing the secondary expressive model was in their hands, and the validity of this process was established by authority. The Jews' inability to accept the revolutionary paradigm of Christianity was therefore satisfactorily explained. Even among Christians simple men were, like the Jews, restricted to the 'carnal' sense of the Scriptures. The more advanced could perceive the 'psychic' sense. Only the most advanced had access

to the 'spiritual' sense. Thus, a select group, identified by their religious prowess, were in control of the process of tradition and its actuality.


The basis of Origen's exegetical method, and his insistence on the spiritual sense, can only be properly understood by relating it to Philo. At Alexandria, Philo had promoted the meditative life, the effort of man to return to God by observance of the Law and conformity to the values symbolically contained within it. Following Plato, Philo proposed a movement from the corporeal to the incorporeal. Philo also maintained that human education, steeping itself in the human structures of politics and society, could be an indispensable means of rising to a vision of truth if properly employed.

The perfect take their point of departure in the body, in sensation, in the different parts of their organism without which it is not possible to live (for these parts are useful to education applied to the life that accompanies the body), and they come to their end at the side of the wisdom of God ... Beginning with what is mortal, improvements are produced in the direction of what is incorruptible.¹³

The allegorical trend that was part of Philo's approach was taken up by Origen and the Alexandrians into their own exegetical method. It led eventually to an insistence on the divine aspect of Jesus but with doubts as to the quality of his humanity. Eventually, Eutyches and the Monophysites, deriving from this school, would deny true
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humanity in Jesus.

Platonic thought led Origen to see two planes of reality, the sensible and the intelligible. Thus he was able to say that the

'gospel in time' was identical with the 'eternal gospel' only differing by reason of epinoia or the imperfect manner in which it was possessed and understood. This led to the distinction between faith and knowledge (gnosis). Faith was seen as a vague illumination which had to be developed by the further understanding of the human sciences, towards true human knowledge. Already the distinction between the primary expressive model and the secondary expressive model was being elucidated.



It is obvious that the Logos model, which Origen had derived from Justin, did not satisfy his distinction between the human and divine sides of the structure. Accordingly it is in the writings of Origen that the Son-model is introduced. Logos could thereafter only be applied to the divine reality. The distinction between Jesus as Logos and Jesus as Son was established and the problem that previously arose, from possible collapse of the system, gave way to the problem of distinguishing the two aspects in Jesus. The Alexandrians never solved it.

Basically Alexandria produced a research model, owing much to Philo, forged by Origen, but then perpetuated by others. This basic research model was, in the first place, the heremeneutics applied to lectio divina. Already Christian authority had been situated in the actual corpus of sacred writings and there was need for some ordered, systematic approach to them in order to validate and generate the secondary expressive model. Alexandria provided it and thus formed a coherent school which could be described as

the current of Christian thought represented by a group of scholars and propagandists with similar intellectual interests,¹⁵ and a more or less uniform procedure in exegesis of the Scriptures.


At Antioch there was likewise a school characterized by common tendencies in exegetical method and theological direction. Lucian¹⁶ of Antioch had conducted a local didascalion from about 270 AD. The exegetical method of this school was based on the literal and historical meaning of the text. Restraint marked any recognition of typology in the sacred writings. Generally, a typical meaning was acknowledged only when it could be shown to be well founded on the literal and historical meaning. Thus, Theodore of Mopsuestia¹⁷ would admit only a few types in the Old Testament and the same attitude marked his Christology. As he stressed the literal sense of Scripture, so too he stressed the humanity of Jesus. He rejected the formula 'logos and flesh' and used in its place 'logos and assumed man'. He described the unity of the two as being a sunapheia, a conjunction. It was the term that, later, Nestorius would develop, from within the same school, to the point that each nature continued to subsist in its own person (prosopon),¹⁸ although there was a separate 'prosopon of union'.

Antioch and Alexandria thus represented two research models striving for dominance. Antioch was marked by the stress on the literal and the human, both in exegesis and in Christology. Alexandria was marked by the stress on the intelligible, the allegorical and the divine. Historical events were to weigh in favour of Alexandria and the extreme view of Nestorius would do harm to the Antiochean cause. The more Jewish view of Antioch, close to the Messiah-model of earlier times, then gave way to the Logos-model of Alexandria.

At this point ecclesiastical authority stepped in. Flavian, the Patriarch of Constantinople, appealed to the bishop of Rome for a solution to the question, after Eutyches' denial that the two natures continued to be separate after the incarnation of Jesus. Leo I summarized the orthodox position in the Tome of Leo, which was later accepted at Chalcedon in 451 AD. Two natures(physis) were united in one person (prosopon). The text reads:

Therefore, following the holy Fathers, we all with one accord teach men to acknowledge one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man, consisting also of a reasonable soul and body; of one substance with the Father as regards his Godhead, and at the same time of one substance with us as regards his manhood; like us in all respects, apart from sin; as regards his Godhead, begotten of the Father before the ages, but yet as regards his manhood begotten, for us men and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin, the God-bearer one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ; even as the prophets from earliest times spoke of him, and our Lord Jesus Christ himself¹⁹ taught us, and the creed of the Fathers has handed down to us.

The model that obtained at this stage was the following:



Chalcedon's decision marked the end of any typically Jewish formulations of the primary expressive model. Henceforward, all secondary

expressive models had to conform to the Greek model established there. In effect, what was taking place was the displacement of competing secondary models by Chalcedon's model which now, in turn, displaced the primary expressive model. The process of tradition would demonstrate that this new expressive model was in possession from the very beginning. Canonical sacred writings were henceforward interpreted in its light.

With the primary expressive model firmly entrenched it was possible to consider new problems. Argument and dialogue over the model were tending to render it more and more static. At first the model had retained something of the dynamism that was the inherent quality of the experiential model and the primary expressive model. But, by the end of the second century, interest was turning to the actual structure of the divinity. Tertullian had written:


We define that there are two, the Father and the Son, and three with the Holy Spirit, and this number is made by the pattern of salvation... which brings about unity in trinity (trinitas) interrelating the three, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. They are three, not in dignity, but in degree, not in substance but in form, not in power but in kind. They are of one substance and power, because there is one God from whom these degrees, forms and kinds devolve in the name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.²⁰

While most of this scholarly attention was drawn towards the relationship of Father and Son, the question of the derivation of the Spirit also caused reflection. In 598 AD the Synod of Toledo declared:

We believe that the Spirit is the Counsellor, who is not the Father himself, nor the Son, but proceeds from the Father, proceeding from the Father and the Son. Therefore the Father is unbegotten, the Son is begotten, the Counsellor is not begotten but proceeds from the Father and the Son.²¹

This would be essentially accepted within the Latin Church and received an affirmative approbation at the Council of Florence (1438-9).²²

The focus of attention had now passed from the economic trinity²³ to the immanent trinity. Consequently the model had gradually taken on a more complex form which was to be stabilized under Augustine.



4.1.2 The Research Model of Augustine of Hippo

Augustine had inherited the research model of Greek philosophy. His principal difficulty, from the beginning, had been to identify the source of certitude in human thinking. Early in his adult life he had tried to follow the philosophy of Manichaeism as a more rational presentation of truth than that of Christianity. Manichaeism did solve the dilemma over the problem of evil since its expressive model explicitly included an evil principle opposed to a good principle. However, Augustine's contact with Neoplatonism²⁴ turned his mind towards the Unchanging amid the changing. The balance between reason and faith turned towards faith. This was the essence of his conversion²⁵ experience.

Augustine accepted, with modification, the basic thought-pattern of Neoplatonism. He thereby saw all of reality in a hierarchy, and so he formulated the hierarchical Trinitarian processions in the divinity. Further, he saw man as hierarchically composed of spirit,

soul and body. Placing a strict line of demarcation between the sensible and the spiritual he was able to categorize all being, from God to the angels to man and thence to matter. Even more explicitly than the Alexandrians he distinguished faith and gnosis (knowledge):


I understand, you say, in order that I may believe; believe, I say, that you may understand. The prophet tells us: Unless you believe you will not understand. (Isa. 7:9)²⁶

Prior to understanding there was need for faith since faith and reason fused to produce understanding.²⁷ There was also a role for dialectics but only for the deeper appreciation of revelation and in order to refute heresy.²⁸

It was in Neoplatonism, with adaptation, that Augustine found his research tradition. Man was unique in the noetic process. The senses drew the attention of the individual to what was happening outside himself. While their reports might be judged by the intellect, any true knowledge could only be obtained under the influence of divine illumination. Things outside are essentially what they are because they participate in rationes aeternae, the true objects of knowledge. Therefore, the human intellect may find these rationes aeternae in all things. This illumination theory now became the one and only theory of knowledge for Christian thinkers up to the thirteenth century. No autonomous philosophy could be envisaged apart from the rationes aeternae.

The exaggeration between faith and reason also led to an opposition between grace and nature. There never was, in Augustine's view a homo naturalis. Man has necessarily a finis supernaturalis. Religious knowledge was thus the only true knowledge. The entrenched model now

appeared in this form:



The trinity-model was by this time separated from the main structure,
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 unconnected with Christology or revelation. This would affect
 the study of theology in the Christian tradition up to this century.

Augustine had therefore laid the foundation for theological education. The adapted Neoplatonic research tradition would function as an enculturation matrix. In fact, it would be variously modified in the succeeding centuries but would continue as the 'scholastic method'.³⁰

4.2 Early Christian Social Groups Associated with a Research Model.

Apart from the schools of Alexandria and Antioch there is little or no evidence of training schools, specifically designed for practitioners within Christianity.
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 It was considered that the liturgy was sufficient instruction for those who would primarily be leaders
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 of the liturgy. This would have been in keeping with accepted practice in religious groups. However, at Tagaste, Augustine founded a monastic community to provide suitable intellectual training for prospective priests of the Christian Church.

The saint left behind him a seedbed of sanctity and what was really the first seminary for priests. It was an imperfect thing, but its essential features were to be repeated through the ages.³³

From this time onwards three types of clerical educational communities can be distinguished: monastic schools, cathedral (and episcopal) schools, and universities. The first two types are contained within the model set up by Augustine. The last is a specifically late Medieval development.

4.2.1 Monastic Schools

The role of monasteries and religious orders during the medieval period is of some relevance. Monasticism in the early Church had only tenuous links with the mainstream of Christian orthodoxy.³⁴ The early desert monks of Egypt, for example, were either individualists³⁵ or formed separate sects. In particular, they specifically isolated themselves from the common sacramental structure of the established Christian church.³⁶ This meant, in effect, that the primary expressive model, as portrayed in ritual, was bypassed and other models were being proposed.

Where discrete social groups of monks did manage to emerge, with their own particular evaluation of the cultural heritage, they formed sects with a Rule. For such monastic societies, the Rule was the analogue of written tradition in the established Church and each Rule purported to be a true explication of the primary expressive model.

While the existence of such monastic sects was well authenticated in the earlier Christian centuries, the Middle Ages saw the reassertion of episcopal control over them. They became ecclesiolae, sects within the Church. Sects outside the Church were then categorized as deviant,³⁷ and authority moved towards their extirpation.

It has been argued that such religious virtuosi act out a role

of 'revolution by tradition':

Virtuosi take as their central point of reference a period in the early history of their religion which can be seen as particularly authentic. They then compare this pristine model with their perception of the contemporary reality, and are impressed with the extent to which this comparison indicates a decline. Their response is to practise a style of religious observance which aims at reinstating the valued tradition.³⁸

The religious virtuoso stands within the tradition of his day but activates elements of the past heritage. It would be expected that the education of such virtuosi would stress such elements. In the Latin West the most durable of the monastic communities were those established by Benedict of Subiaco. The monastery included a 'school of the Lord's service', in which boys were accepted into the monastery with the intention of educating them to become monks. Written into the Rule of Benedict were established periods for study, which became one of the chief pursuits of the monks.³⁹ The Venerable Bede described his life in such an institution:

I was born on the lands of this monastery and on reaching seven years of age, my family entrusted me first to the most reverend Abbot Benedict, and later to Abbot Ceolfrid for my education. I have spent all the remainder of my life in this monastery, and devoted myself entirely to the study of the Scriptures. And while I have observed the regular discipline and sung the choir offices daily in church, my chief delight has always been in study, teaching and writing.⁴⁰

Monastic education thus centered on the Scriptures, the lectio divina, together with preliminary studies required for such study.

4.2.2 Cathedral and Episcopal Schools

Side by side with the monastic schools were the cathedral and episcopal schools.⁴¹ Cathedral schools were intended for those being prepared for a sacerdotal ministry and were open to both the laity and those already in the clerical state. Episcopal schools were essentially schools in the house of a bishop and chiefly for clerics. When, after Justinian's suppression of the pagan schools in the Roman Empire in 529, there could no longer be any presumption that those presenting themselves for ordination as priests might be schooled to an elementary level, the cathedral schools assumed the task of complete formation from literacy and numeracy through to theology. The regular secular courses known in the Roman Empire, the trivium and the quadrivium, were used as an introduction to the study of philosophy and theology. The trivium enabled the student to read and write Latin, acquiring an acquaintance with both classical authors and early Christian writers, and some skill in rhetoric. The quadrivium gave the student basic arithmetic (which would be necessary for complicated ecclesiastical computations) and music.

At first the episcopal schools were conducted by the bishop himself but this arrangement could not be retained. Groups of teachers were required. Between 742-746 Chrodegang, the bishop of Metz, introduced the striking innovation of establishing communities for group living in his dioceses.⁴² The community life was based on a rule (or canon) and the 'canons' educated the prospective priests. Gradually this was established as the general practice in most European dioceses. However, if the general structure of these schools took on a common form, there was little uniformity in either the curriculum or the method used. The episcopal and cathedral schools were pastorally

oriented, being intended for the practical purpose of training a functional clergy. On the other hand the monastic schools were more intent on training men for the contemplative life.⁴³

During the eighth and ninth centuries there was a considerable change in the Frankish kingdom that would be the cause of later innovation. Due to both Papal and Anglo-Saxon influences new dioceses (for example Lassau, Freising, Wurzburg, Erfurt) were supported by monasteries which had been established by Anglo-Saxon missionaries. They carried out their missionary mandate but also set up educational centres for priests.⁴⁴

This reform movement intensified under Charlemagne (768-814), and Louis I, the Pious. Charlemagne had been influenced by the ideal of Augustine to create an ordered, harmonious society in which all men could find salvation. The causes of disorder and injustice in his kingdom were to be extirpated at their roots by a series of capitularies. The principal document that affected clerical education was the Epistola de litteris colendis⁴⁵ written to Baugulf, abbot of Fulda, between 794 and 796.

The organization and systematization of this new educational programme was entrusted by Charlemagne to Alcuin of York (c.735-804).⁴⁶ He was responsible for textbooks for the education of clerics and a palace school developed around him. He was not innovative and he set out basically to perpetuate the culture of the past. His achievement was to organize, and in fact his role in Frankish politics generally is only now being recognised. For our purposes, the important fact is that from the time of the Carolingian reform, clerical

education took the form of studying collections of authoritative statements.

The schools, whether monastic or cathedral-episcopal, were in reality functioning as discrete social groups, separate from the main thrust of the Church. In the sociological terms used earlier they were similar to sects, but without explicit dissociation from church. Their immediate purpose became more and more the generation of secondary expressive models by means of a distinctive research tradition which was always capable of becoming a research model. In general, the research tradition took the form of a mode of analysis of the authoritative statements in which the primary expressive model was clothed - the biblical writings and the writings of great thinkers of the past.

Authority had been vested in these written sources. This change in the locus of authority took place because of the continued non-presence of the human Jesus. In various religions, a written corpus⁴⁷ functions as a mediatorial element. In the case of the Christian Church, the development of a personal locus of authority, necessary for interpretation of the Scriptures, led eventually to the complete displacement of the written corpus, although it would always remain possible that a reversion could take place. Within Western Christianity the assertion of personal authority led to the emergence of⁴⁸ the Papacy. Certainly by the ninth century the Papacy was in control of the secondary expressive model and there was a need to assert the⁴⁹ validity of such an integral item of tradition in the model itself.

4.3 Towards Drastic Change in the Research Tradition.

4.3.1 Anselm of Canterbury and Anselm of Laon.

The Carolingian reform, with its stress on authoritative sources, ensured that Augustinianism would be handed on by the process of tradition. Clerical education tended to be based on collections of authorities in Scripture and outstanding Doctors of the Church systematically arranged. This was simply an extension of Augustine's insistence on the authority of faith. The first notable change came with Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033-1109) who set out to use reason alongside the authority of faith and to prove the truths, known already by faith, by reason.⁵⁰ He wished to induce reason into the process of faith so that there was a progression from faith alone to reason's insight into faith. As a methodological measure he disregarded authority, although he would have upheld it in fact. Thus, applying dialectic reasoning to dogmas of faith, he wanted to penetrate them, develop them and discern their applications. He sought the 'necessary reasons' within faith for the truths that are believed.

His Monologion is, therefore, quite professedly based on reason and not on the array of authorities that would have been common in textbooks up to that time.⁵¹ Anselm himself described the Monologion as

an example of meditation on the meaning of faith from the point of view of one seeking⁵², through silent reasoning within himself, things he knows not.

Through reason Anselm attempted to understand what he already believed. He began with his reasoned proof for the existence of God, the Ontological Argument. Anselm showed clearly that there is an experience of God prior to any dialectical reasoning, but, at the same time, there is a distance experienced between man and God.⁵³ Because of the need for more explicit expression of personal faith Anselm turned to the

question of proving from reason the existence of God.

Reflecting that this (Monologion) was made up of a connected chain of arguments I began to wonder if perhaps it might be possible to find one single argument that for its proof required no other save itself, and that by itself would suffice to prove that God really exists, that he is the supreme good needing no other and it is he whom all things have need of for their being and well-being, and also to prove whatever we believe about the divine being.⁵⁴

Anselm was thus convinced of the possibility of generating a rational proof for the existence of God. It took the form: God is he greater than whom cannot be thought; but if such a being exists only in the mind and not in reality a yet greater being can be thought, namely one existing both in the mind and in reality; therefore God must exist both in the mind and in reality.⁵⁵ The secret of Anselm's proof is that it must be seen within the total framework of the Christian paradigm. Anselm made no strict distinction between the process of natural understanding and the process of religious understanding,⁵⁶ between a secular research tradition and a religious research tradition. They were one and the same process. However, he showed that the research tradition could itself produce proof for the basic existence of the primary expressive model, already known by faith.

In the Proslogion he wrote:

I do not try, O Lord, to penetrate your heights, because in no way do I compare my intellect to it, but I desire to understand a little of your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For I hold to this because unless I should have believed, I would not understand.⁵⁷

This was the first successful synthesis of dialectics and Christian faith. It was the basis of the new research model.

The dialectic method which Anselm of Canterbury fostered among his pupils at Bec led to the formation of orderly, systematic collections (summae) of reconciled Patristic texts. Terms were defined, aspects were distinguished and reasoning was based on sound principles. A literary genre had been established.

The most influential of Anselm of Canterbury's students was Anselm of Laon (d. 1117). His Sententiae are the first attempt at systematization of theological thought. The plan, which follows the De divisione naturae of John Scotus Erigena, was: Creation, the Fall of the angels and of men, the necessity of Redemption, Redemption and the Sacraments. In effect this systematization was simply a more explicit outline of the primary expressive model:




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The method and plan of Anselm of Laon gave rise to many imitators. The Sic et Non of Peter Abelard was an encyclopaedic collection of 158 theological problems with traditional material for and against the specific points of doctrine under debate. In a prologue Abelard set forth the dialectical principles for reconciling the opposing texts that could be found in the past: analysing words, authenticating texts, noting changes in the authors' opinions. Such imitation ensured the proliferation of the research model of Anselm.

4.3.2 Peter Lombard

However, it was the Sententiae of Peter Lombard which was to have⁶⁰ the most lasting effect on the genre. His scriptural commentaries took their rise from the need to clarify the obscurity and brevity of the glosses of Anselm of Laon and, for this purpose, he also made use of the glosses of Gilbert de la Porrée. His Sententiae are based on teachings found in Scripture, the opinions of the Fathers, particularly Augustine, and later teachers together with some speculation. The genius of Lombard was to organize his material in such a way that it related to questions posed in his own day. The order was as follows: God in his unity and trinity, Creation, (including man and original sin), the Incarnation and the Sacraments. Lombard's popular acceptance was officially ratified by the approbation of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. Thereafter the Sententiae became the official textbook for⁶¹ students who were candidates for the degree of Master of Theology. We know that in c.1222 Alexander of Hales introduced it as the manual for his course at the University of Paris. Thereafter it was part of the University of Paris' curriculum and passed on to other schools.

While Lombard followed the path of Anselm of Canterbury in acknowledging the possibility of using reason on the cultural heritage, he was still in the tradition of Augustinianism. Augustinianism had survived since the time of Augustine. Its influence had been activated in the twelfth century by the School of St. Victor, founded by⁶² William of Champeaux in 1108. Peter Lombard had belonged to this school and his Sententiae therefore showed the influence of Augustine. The line of descent was:



In order to appreciate the relationship between Lombard and the research methodology we need to review the medieval system of studying theology. The typical student's learning experience centred on the lectio, in which he became aware of theological problems. He was introduced to the theological teaching of Lombard through the manual, the Sententiae. He could take up whatever position he thought best, but he would be assessed for his Licentiate on the value of his personal position. The Sententiae thus provided a framework for theological teaching without imposing answers. The student could still propose new arguments, advance new positions. Potentially at least, the student's own thinking was directed towards the production of a personal commentary on the problems posed by the Sententiae and according to the framework of the Sententiae.

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The principal limitation, inherent in this method, was that the framework of Lombard's Sententiae was invariably imposed. That framework was Augustinian. More radical forms of Summae developed which were no longer dependent on the order of Lombard. Sometimes these encompassed the whole of theology, sometimes only part of it.

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4.3.3 The Universitas and the Introduction of Aristotle.

By the eleventh and twelfth centuries the monastic schools were waning in influence. Cathedral schools, such as those of Paris,

Chartres, Orleans, Laon, Liège, Utrecht and Toledo, were more prestigious.

A natural process brought about the formation of the universitas from the cathedral schools. The university was an academic guild of teachers and students, formed for the pursuit of higher learning.⁶⁵ The University of Paris originated from the collection of masters and students in the three great Parisian centres of learning: the cathedral school taught by William of Champeaux, the school attached to the collegiate church of Ste. Genevieve and the school conducted by the canons of Saint-Victor.⁶⁶ Students had been attracted to Paris in order to study near Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard and John of Salisbury at the various schools. This concentration of professors and students gave rise to the university of Paris and other universities because of the fact that since the towns in which such teachers taught were autonomous, foreign students risked being outside the protection of a system of law by living and studying in such an environment.⁶⁷ Further, there tended to be ecclesiastical encroachment over all areas of education. Hence it was natural that there would be the tendency towards forming independent, collective bodies of masters and students in order to give both protection and freedom to the institution.⁶⁸

Universities, as studia generalia, were indeed possible because there was the common bond of Christianity in Europe, common allegiance to the bishop of Rome, and Latin was the lingua franca of the universities. By the thirteenth century the university could customarily receive recognition through a Papal Bull, conferring on the masters the licentia docendi which was transferable to other universities. From this time the influence of monastic schools declined even further.

The result was that, in one social group, the university, there was differentiation of fields of learning - law, medicine and theology. However, all these fields shared a common basis of intellectual culture.⁶⁹ This was philosophy. The philosophical method determined the actual program of events. A lectio would take place in the morning, while a disputatio on some significant point would be held in the afternoon. A quaestio disputata would be posed by the magister and a bachelor would respond to closely argued objections proposed by students. Finally, the magister would summarise the status quaestionis, present his determinatio or solution and resolve the major objections. Disputationes quodlibetales were conducted only by outstanding magistri and could be on any problem. These special sessions were held during⁷⁰ the seasons of Advent and Lent.

The order of the quaestiones followed, in any particular discipline,⁷¹ the order in the auctoritas. However, since there was no evident logical order in the Bible, the Creed was adopted for orderly study of Theology. The research tradition was actually built into the structure of the scholar's day. The auctoritas, expatiated in the lectio, was the presentation of the primary expressive model. The disputatio was the application of the process of reason to certain problems that remained after the lectio.

At first the university of Paris was firmly set in the Augustinian tradition of the twelfth century. But Aristotelianism was beginning to make itself felt. While some of Aristotle's logic was known previously, the early Middle Ages only had indirect contact.⁷² Through the Muslim invasion of Europe⁷³ the remainder of his works came into the hands of Western Scholars.

The introduction of Aristotle into the West caused problems. A world view that was based entirely on reason seemed clearly to be at odds with Christian faith. There was widespread distrust of the Greek philosopher.⁷⁴ In order to understand the implications of his thought, given that the translations circulating were crude and literal, there was a tendency to turn to the Arab commentators, Avicenna and later, Averroes. In this way Christian scholars imbibed new approaches to a research model.

Avicenna (Ibn Sina, Abu Ali Al-Husayn, 980-1037) belonged to a school of Muslim philosophers in the Hellenistic tradition.⁷⁵ Basically, he had stated that universals, or Forms, existed, prior to any particular objects, in the mind of God. They next existed in particular objects in nature and, in human experience, they existed after particular objects. Hence, these universals could be studied in themselves and this was the work of metaphysics. They could be studied in particular things and this was the work of science or they could be studied in the human mind and this was the work of logic. The human mind attains intellectual knowledge by illumination received from a single separated Intellectus Agens, the summation of separated intellects.

The world view of Avicenna arranged all reality in tiers of eight (or ten) heavenly spheres, in successive triads of separate intellects, Souls and Heavenly Bodies. The final triad consisted of the Intellectus Agens of the sublunary world, the multiplicity of individuated human souls and the "world of generation and corruption".

Averroes (Ibn Rushd 1126-1198) wrote commentaries on Aristotle

and developed his ideas within the logic of the Aristotelian system. He held that both the Intellectus Agens and the possible Intellect were separated substances and were one for all men.⁷⁷ An individual's imagination, memory and cogitative power would supply sensory data for the use of the separated Intellect and men then shared in the knowledge. The separated Intellectus Agens would activate the intelligible species potentially present in man's phantasms and thus enable the separated possible Intellect to become that subject in which knowledge exists.⁷⁸

Aristotle, as seen through the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes, offered to the social group in the university the possibility of a viable research tradition which was independent of the faith process. The new research tradition would allow the individual scholars to generate knowledge without recourse to the primary expressive model.

During the thirteenth century, in the University of Paris, a movement took its rise based on Averroes' commentary. This was Latin Averroism.⁷⁹ It maintained that history was cyclical and that the world and all species are eternal. God and all other heavenly causes act out of necessity. Only in the world are there contingent and indeterminate things. All men share in one possible Intellect, which uses the sense faculties of individual men, and they come to understanding in so far as their powers co-operate in the act of knowing. Since the individual does not possess a personal intellectual soul there can be no proof of personal immortality by human reason.

The Latin Averroists still claimed to be orthodox Christians despite such beliefs as the eternity and necessity of the world, the unity of the intellect and the denial of immortality. They maintained

that the Christian faith was true because it was based on the supernatural light of revelation. The conclusions of reason were less certain, being known only by the inferior light of the human mind. Thus, a proposition could be probable or necessary in philosophy while contradicting a revealed truth. In short, the Latin Averroists were proposing two absolutely separate ways of knowing in man and these ways of knowing could come into conflict. This was the principal danger seen in Latin Averroism - it set reason in conflict with faith. Confidence could not be vested in the research model accepted to that point.

Latin Averroism challenged the entire paradigmatic system of knowledge that had been developing within Christianity. The research tradition, whose mechanism it described, could not guarantee certitude. Yet man had no other resource. There was no ability for the Christian to generate any secondary expressive model, as a result. The primary expressive model, given through revelation, could be in conflict with any output of the research tradition.

The new social group, the universitas, was a discrete theological community comparable to the monastic schools and the episcopal/cathedral schools. It differed from its predecessors in that its research model, philosophia, was common to both sacred and non-sacred disciplines and it thus gained an autonomy that had been previously unknown in the other social groups. The problem that now arose was whether the new research model, of its own momentum, could genuinely establish a secondary expressive model.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. The philosophical background of Origen seems to have been Neoplatonic. He followed courses in philosophy given by Ammonius Saccas, the father of Neoplatonism. Cf. Eusebius, citing Porphyry's *Contra Christianos*. Further on Origen, R.P. Hanson, *Origen's Doctrine of Tradition* (London, 1954); J. Daniélou, *Origen* (New York, 1955); H.T. Kerr, *The First Systematic Theologian: Origen of Alexandria* (Princeton, 1958); H. de Lubac, *Exégèse Médiévale* (two vols., Paris, 1959-64), vol. 1; H. Crouzel, *Origène et la philosophie* (Paris, 1962). The text of Origen is in PG vols. 11-17.
2. The text of Philo is found in L. Cohn and others (eds.), *Philonis Alexandrini Opera quae Supersunt* (7 vols, in 8, Berlin, 1962). On Philo's philosophy see E. Brehier, *Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie* sec. ed. (Paris, 1925); H.A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (two vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1947); R.P. Hanson, *Origen's Doctrine of Tradition*; J. Daniélou, *Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1958); E.R. Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus* sec. rev. ed. (New York, 1963).
3. Plato, *Timaeus* 9c.
4. Philo, *De Opificio mundi* 25.
5. *De confusione linguarum* 172.
6. *De Opificio mundi* 15.
7. On Justin see E.F. Osborn, *Justin Martyr* (Tübingen, 1973).
8. *Dial.* 61 in PG 6: 614-615.
9. On this term see E.F. Osborn, 'Greek Answers to Christian Questions', *Colloquium*, 6 (1974), pp. 11-12.
10. W. Gruber, *Die pneumatische Exegese bei den Alexandrinern* (Graz, 1957); H. de Lubac, ' "Typologie" et "allegorisme"', *RSR*, 34 (1947), pp. 180-226; N. de Lange, *Origen and the Jews* (Cambridge, 1976).
11. Origen extracted this method of interpretation from the LXX translation of Prov. 22:20:

And do thou portray them triply
in counsel and knowledge (gnosis).
Cf. Origen, *In Lev. Hom.* V.
12. *Principia* IV, ii, 1.
13. *Quis rerum divinarum heres* in L. Cohn et al (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp. 315-316.
14. Cyril of Alexandria maintained that while Jesus possessed a human

nature, he was not human in his hypostasis. The ontologically subsisting element was the Logos, so that Jesus possessed impersonal humanity (anhypostasia). Cf. J. Knox, The Humanity and Divinity of Christ. (Cambridge, 1967), p. 17.

15. A von Roey, New Catholic Encyclopaedia (Washington, 1967). The school of Alexandria lived through two distinct phases. While Origen (and Clement of Alexandria prior to him), tried to present the Christian religion to the educated people of their era as a reputable gnosis, the scholars of the fourth and fifth centuries (Athanasius and Cyril for example) were bent on a purely apologetical and defensive course, defending the normative teaching on the Trinity and the divinity of Christ against heretics. Cf. R. Nelz, Die theologischen Schulen der morgenländischen Kirchen (Bonn, 1916).
16. On the school of Antioch see G. Bordy, Recherches sur S. Lucien d'Antioche et son école (Paris, 1936); R.V. Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies (London, 1940); J. Guillet, 'Les exégètes d'Alexandrie et d'Antioche', RSR, 34 (1947), pp. 257-302.
17. R. Devresse, 'La methode exégétique de Theodore de Mopsueste', Revue Biblique, 53 (1946), pp. 207-241; F.A. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Rome, 1956); P. Galtier, 'Theodore de Mopsueste: Sa vraie pensée sur l'Incarnation', RSR, 45 (1957), pp. 161-186, 338-360; J.L. McKenzie, 'Annotations on the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia', TS, 19 (1958), pp. 345-373; R.A. Green, Theodore of Mopsuestia (London, 1961).
18. Galtier, art. cit., put forward the thesis that this prosoyon was the divine Logos. This would seem to be in error since the prosoyon is something new, brought about by the union. A newly found fragment of his Contra Eunomium (see Museon, 71 (1958), pp. 99-100) explicitly declares that the prosoyon of Jesus is not a hypostasis.
19. Text is in Denz.Schön., p. 108.
20. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, 12. On the Trinity, cf. J. Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité (two cols., Paris, 1927-8).
21. Text is in Denz.Schön., p. 160.
22. Ibid., p. 330.
23. For a discussion on these concepts see J. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London, 1966), ch. IX; E. Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity (Edinburgh and London, 1976).
24. Confessions, book VII. Neoplatonic teachings came to him principally through the Latin translation of Marius Victorinus.
25. Confessions, book XII.
26. Sermo, XLIII, 106,7 (PL 38, 257).
27. Contra Academicos, 3,20,43.

28. De Ordine, 2,3; De Civitate Dei, 8, 10.
29. De Trinitate, V-VIII, Cf. K. Rahner, "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise 'De Trinitate'" in Theological Investigations (Baltimore, 1966), vol. IV, pp. 77-102.
30. However, Neoplatonism did not die out in its unadapted form. Through Pseudo Dionysius it was to influence, in a different way, the Franciscan scholastic thought, found in such men as Bonaventure and Grosseteste, in the thirteenth century. Cf. Y. Congar, L'Eglise. De saint Augustin à l'époque moderne (Paris, 1970).
31. See A. Kerrigan, St. Cyril of Alexandria, Interpreter of the Old Testament (Rome, 1952), pp. 7-11; J. Quasten, Patrology (London, 1960), vol. III, pp. 44-45.
32. J. Jungmann, The Assisi Papers (Collegeville, 1957), p. 25
33. E. van der Meer, Augustine the Bishop (London, 1961), p. 234.
34. M. Hill, The Religious Order (London, 1973), p. 22.
35. See above pp. 120-129.
36. Hill, op.cit., pp. 22-23. For examples cf. J.O. Hannay, The Spirit and Origin of Christian Monasticism (London, 1903), ch. 4.
37. E. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Church (London, 1931), p. 241.
38. Hill, op.cit., p. 3.
39. J. McCann (ed.), Rule of St Benedict (New York, 1921), pp.304, 311.
40. L. Sherley-Price (ed.), Bede: A History of the English Church and People (Middlesex,1955), p. 330.
41. H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages rev. ed. (3 vols, Oxford, 1936), see Vol. I; N. Schachner, The Medieval Universities (New York, 1938); H. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (New York, 1956); P. Riche, Education et culture dans l'Occident barbare, VIe-VIIe siècles (Paris, 1962).
42. In his Regula Canoniorum, Chrodegang cited the earlier decree of the Fourth Council of Toledo (633) which made it obligatory for candidates for the priesthood to lead a community life in the cathedral.
43. C. Davis, 'Theology in the Seminary Context', Downside Review, 81 (1964), pp. 307-316.
44. E.S. Duckett, Carolingian Portraits (Ann Arbor, 1962); D.T. Rice (ed.), The Dawn of European Civilization (New York, 1965), pp. 197-218, 269-326.
45. L. Wallach, 'Charlemagne's De Litteris colendis and Alcuin', Speculum, 26 (1951), pp. 288-305. The primary aim of the Carolingian reform was the re-establishment of Latin language and

culture in the Western church.

46. F.S. Scheibe, 'Alcuin und die Admonitio Generalis', Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, 14 (1958), pp. 221-229.
47. An example is the religion of Islam where the Qur'an serves as the mediator. It corresponds to the divine Qur'an, written on heavenly tablets. However, the Qur'an required authoritative interpretation, from the time of Muhammad, and history has shown the possibility for interpreters or interpretative institutions to displace the mediatorial role of the Qur'an.
48. On the rise of the Papacy see for example M. Maccarone, Vicarius Christi (Rome, 1952); P. Brezzi, The Papacy: Its Origins and Historical Evolution (Westminster, Md., 1958); P. Paschini and V. Monachino (eds.), I Papi nella Storia (2 vols., Rome, 1961).
49. Nicholas I (858-867) asserted the supremacy of the Papacy especially in the letter Preposueramus quidem. Cf. J. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Lyons, 1899-1927), vol. 15, pp. 196-197.
50. R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm and his Biographers (New York, 1963).
51. Anselm saw the dangers inherent in his innovative method and personally counselled prudence. Epist. 1.74, PL 158:1144.
52. Proslogion, Proem.
53. Proslogion, chs. 25-26 has many examples of this.
54. Proslogion, Proem.
55. The argument is contained in Proslogion, chs. 2-4.
56. Cf. K. Jaspers, The Great Philosophers (2 vols., New York, 1966) vol. 2, pp. 102-105.
57. The text of the latter part reads:

Neque enim quaero intelligere, ut credam; sed credo,
ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo quia nisi credidero,
non intelligam. Proslogion. ch. 2.
58. Peter Abelard's Introductio ad theologiam (1125) and Sic et Non mark the beginning of the genre. Peter Lombard's four books of Sententiae were, however, to become normative for the genre. Following Abelard came the Sententiae Florianenses and the Sententiae Parisienses of Master Omnibonus, De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei of Hugh of Saint-Victor, the Summa Sententiarum and the Sententiae Divinitatis of unknown authorship. In historical succession the genre was later exemplified by Robert of Melun (1152-1160) Candolph of Bologna; Roland Bandinelli; Alan of Lille (c.1160); Peter of Poitiers (c.1167-1170); Peter Comestor (c.1170).

59. Cf. PL 178:1344D. Abelard's treatment of dialectics included a theory of knowledge in which the unity of knower and known was broken:

Intellectus is an action of the soul, by which it is said to be intelligens. The form toward which intellectus is directed is some imaginary and made-up (ficta) thing which the soul manufactures for itself as it wishes and of what sort it wishes, such as are those imaginary cities we see in sleep.

Cf. Logica Ingredientibus in B. Geyer. Peter Abelards Philosophische Schriften (Münster, 1919-27) vol. 20, pp. 25-26.

60. On Lombard, cf. P. Delhaye, Pierre Lombard: sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa morale (Paris, 1961).
61. B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (New York, 1952), p. 64. The medievals called Anselm's work the Glossa ordinaria, Gilbert's the Glossatura media and Peter Lombard's the Magna Glossatura.
62. On the perpetuation of the Augustinian tradition see F. Cayre, 'The Great Augustinism', TD, 2 (1954), pp. 169-173; F. van Steenberghe, The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1955); H.I. Marrou, St. Augustine and His Influence through the Ages (New York, 1958); G.A. Leff, Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham (Chicago, 1960); É. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine (New York, 1960). On its relationship to Aristotelian - based theologies see F. Ehrle, 'L'Agostinismo e L'Aristotelismo nella scholastica del sec. XIII', Xenia Thomistica, 3 (1925), pp. 517-588; F.J. Thonnard, 'Augustinisme et Aristotelisme au XIIIe siècle', L'Année Théologique Augustinienne, 5 (1944), pp. 442-466; A. Forest and others, Le Mouvement doctrinal du XIe au XIV siècle (Paris, 1951), pp. 174-305; L. de Simone, 'S. Agostino e L'agostinianismo medievale', Sapientia, 8 (1955), pp. 5-17; D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology in the Fourteenth Century', Augustiniana, 6 (1956), pp. 146-274; A. Zunkeller, 'Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters', Analecta Augustiniana, 27 (1964), pp. 167-262.
63. R. Stegmüller has listed 1407 titles, in manuscript form, which would be but a fraction of the total output. Many of the private efforts would never have taken stable written form.
64. For example Robert of Courçon dealt only with moral questions; Guy de l'Aumône dealt only with law and the commandments; Guy d'Orchelles dealt only with the sacraments.
65. G. Paré and others, La Renaissance du XIIe siècle: Les Écoles et l'enseignement (Paris, 1933); H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (3 vols., Oxford, 1936); E. Lesne, Les Écoles de la fin du VIIe siècle à la fin du XIIe (Lille, 1940).
66. S. D'Insay, Histoire des universités françaises et étrangères des origines à nos jours (two vols., Paris, 1933-35); M. de Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie médiévale sixth ed. (3 vols., Louvain, 1947), see vol. 2.

67. Rashdall, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 1-24, 43-73.
68. F.M. Powicke, 'Bologna, Paris, Oxford: Three Studia Generalia' in Ways of Medieval Life and Thought (London, 1950), pp. 149-179.
69. J. le Goff, Les intellectuels au moyen âge (Paris, 1957), pp. 97-100, 108-133.
70. M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte des scholastischen Methode (two vols., Friburg, 1909-1911); A. Landgraf, 'Zum Begriff der Scholastik', Collectanea Franciscana, 11 (1941), pp. 487-490.
71. Cicero was the auctoritas for Rhetoric; Priscian and Donatus for Grammar and Aristotle for Logic.
72. The Middle Ages received its Aristotelian form of logic from Boethius (475-525). Boethius had planned to translate the entire corpus of Plato and Aristotle into Latin and show that they were able to be harmonized. He did not complete the assignment but he did manage to translate the major logical works of Aristotle and commented on several of them. He also produced logical treatises himself.
73. Justinian, in the sixth century, closed the pagan schools and Aristotle became a closed book to the Western world. Only in the monasteries of the East were his writings preserved and they first penetrated the West through Arab scholars. After the Fourth Crusade of 1204, with the conquest of Constantinople, there was access to the Greek text. The Posterior Analytics was translated by James of Venice in the twelfth century. The Physics, De Anima, Metaphysics 1-4 and the Parva Naturalia came to the Latins also through his agency. His translations, although revised by William of Moerbeke in the following century remained the textus receptus until the Renaissance.
74. In 1210 the Synod at Paris forbade the use of Aristotle's works on natural philosophy or even commentaries on them. This was extended by the University of Paris in 1215 to his Metaphysics and natural philosophy, summae on them, books on the doctrine of David of Dinant, Amalric of Bene or Maurice of Spain. Although the strictures were renewed by Gregory IX in 1231, private study of Aristotle continued. By 1255 the new statutes for the Faculty of Arts in Paris officially included all known works of Aristotle for public lectures. Cf. H. Denifle and E. Chartelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris, 1889-97) vol 1., p. 277.
75. B.H. Zedler, 'Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei' ', Traditio, 6 (1948), pp. 105-159; M. Cruz Hernandez, La metafisica de Avicenna (Granada, 1949); L. Gardet, La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn Sina) (Paris, 1951); A.M. Goichon, La philosophie d'Avicenne et son influence en Europe medieval sec. ed. (Paris, 1951); Y. Mahdavi, Bibliographie d'Ibn Sina (Tehran, 1954).
76. Averroes wrote three types of commentary on Aristotle. The great commentary reproduced each paragraph of Aristotle's work and explained it in detail. The middle commentary cited Aristotle's first words and provided an exposition. There was also a paraphrase but this followed the order of Averroes himself. His

76.

Contd. works were translated between 1220 and 1235. He is first cited by theologians such as William of Auvergne, Philip the Chancellor and Albertus Magnus between 1230 and 1250. For text see F.S. Crawford (ed.), Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); Commentarium in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros in Aristotle, Opera cum Averrois commentariis (nine vols. in eleven and three suppl., Venice, 1562-74, repr. Frankfurt, 1962); E.I.J. Rosenthal (ed. and tr.), Commentary on Plato's Republic (Cambridge, 1956); G.F. Hourani (tr.), On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London, 1961); S. Van den Bergh (tr.), Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) (two vols., London, 1954); B.H. Zedler (ed.), Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin Version of Calo Calonymos (Milwaukee, 1961).

77. On the specific teachings of Averroes see L. Gauthier, Ibn Rochd (Averroes) (Paris, 1948); E. Renan, Oeuvres philosophiques: Averroes et l'averroïsme in vol. 3 of Oeuvres complètes (Paris, 1949); E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers sec. ed. (Toronto, 1952).

78. Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros 3.4, 383-385; 3.5, 388-389; 3.18, 439-440; 3.19, 441; 3.33, 476.

79. On Latin Averroism see E. Renan, op. cit.; M. Grabmann, Der lateinische Averroismus des 13. Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung (Munich, 1931); R. de Vaux, 'La première entrée d'Averroes chez les Latins', Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 22 (1933), pp. 193-245; A. Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft sec. ed. (Rome, 1952). Criticism of Latin Averroism was quick to develop showing the entrenched position of its supporters. In 1256 Albertus Magnus wrote De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroem. Thomas Aquinas refuted the doctrine of the oneness of the intellect in Summa Contra Gentiles (2.73-76) and he directed De unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas, written in 1270, against the Parisian Averroists, particularly Siger of Brabant. In 1267 Bonaventure attacked Parisian scholars who followed the Averroist line and in 1270 the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, officially condemned them, naming thirteen reprehensible propositions. Later, in 1277, he condemned, in a rather disorderly conglomerate, 219 propositions. Cf. Denifle and Chartelain, op. cit., vol 1, pp. 486-487, 543-555.

5.

THE PARADIGMATIC SYSTEM OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES.

5.1 The Research Model of Thomas Aquinas.

Latin Averroism was not the only response to the introduction of Aristotle. Another line was developed by Albertus Magnus and his disciple Thomas Aquinas. The spheres of faith and reason were seen by them as separate, but not in conflict. Albert wrote:

In matters of faith and morals Augustine is to be believed rather than the philosophers if they are not in agreement. But if one speaks of medicine, I should rather believe Galen or Hippocrates; or if of the nature of things, I believe Aristotle or some other who is expert in the nature of things.¹

2

Albertus Magnus thus laid the foundations for Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas set out to demonstrate that Latin Averroism was a perversion of Aristotelian thought and that the latter could be reconciled with Christian theology.³ For Aquinas the Aristotelian analysis corresponded to his own intellectual experience. He introduced it into his personal system, displacing the Augustinian research tradition in which he had been formed.⁴ Making use of the text of Aristotle he set out to compare natural knowledge with sacred knowledge, explaining how sacred knowledge presupposes, uses and perfects natural knowledge.⁵

The university, as was mentioned above, was responsible for bringing about the separation of philosophia as a distinct discipline. Aquinas now made a formal, and quite explicit, distinction between theology and philosophy. Philosophy relied solely on the natural light of reason while theology accepted principles on authority, that is, theology acts on the primary expressive model as a given, making use of philosophy to generate, with confidence, the secondary expressive model. In this way Aquinas assumed a middle ground between the extremes of his day. Faith and reason were distinct, but complementary

rather than antithetical.

Basically Aquinas expressed Augustinianism, as it reached him through the process of tradition, in terms of Aristotelian philosophy. Contrary to Augustine's basic thought, he distinguished two ends, fines, for man. One finis was supernatural; the other was natural. This was basic to the assumption of the real distinction between faith and reason. It was also essential in order to clarify the distinction between a secular and religious system of knowledge.

Whereas Plato and Augustine had insisted that intelligibles were participated from God, Aquinas followed Aristotle in positing that what is participated is the lumen that renders things intelligible. He rejected the view of Averroes that there is one possible intellect and one Intellectus Agens for all men as contrary to faith, since man would be deprived of a soul and personal immortality.⁶ The problem seen by the Averroists was that if the intellect was a power of the soul and the soul the substantial form of the body, then it would be immersed in matter and incapable of intellectual knowledge. Aquinas responded to this in showing a misunderstanding of the relationship between the soul and the matter it informs. The soul is not a material form existing with only the being of the composite. Instead, it has its own being, and, through that being, the composite exists. Since this form is a substance connecting its being to matter, nothing prevents it from having an immaterial operation or power.⁷

Aquinas' innovation was, first, to distinguish faith and reason and then, making use of the Aristotelian research tradition, to accept an Aristotelian world-view. The Platonic and Augustinian view had

presented a unified universe which was the arena of man's response to the divine, salvific activity. Aquinas, and Albert before him, replaced this with two distinct, although compatible, orders of things. The first was the natural order, which would include all relationships between creature and creature or creature and Creator that did not transcend the capacities of created being. The other order is the supernatural which includes all relationships between creature and creature or creature and Creator that transcend the capacities of created being. Faith is the mode of knowledge proper to this latter, while reason is the mode of knowledge proper to the former. The two are complementary but faith is the final arbiter in case of apparent conflict.

The natural order could be defined in terms of act and potency. In every finite being, essence is in potency to its existence and hence no finite being exists necessarily. The same order could be defined in terms of matter and form.

Aristotle's metaphysics were Christianized by Aquinas. His metaphysics, built on the twin concepts of act/potency and matter/form as the principles of being, were able to cover all being from God to prime matter. The basic problem with Aristotle's moderate realism was the manner in which the same form could exist in two orders of reality: extramental being as actuality and being in the mind as universality. Aquinas had amended Aristotle by clearly distinguishing between essence and existence. Since essence is not identically its own existence, the same form can exist in different individuals. With this correction, such a metaphysics could explain the entire world order without, in Aquinas' opinion, contradicting faith.

On the assumption that grace followed the pattern of nature Aquinas then applied hylomorphism, act/potency and the four causes to the supernatural order - God, the Incarnation, the sacramental economy. A significant new research tradition was at the disposal of the Christian scholar seeking to elucidate the primary expressive model.


There was little, if any, direct academic continuity between Aquinas and those who, immediately after his death, defended his position.⁸ His new system found adversaries particularly among those in the Augustinian tradition represented by Franciscans, Dominicans who had been formed in the older tradition and secular clergy. During the same period the Augustinian tradition was itself being transformed, in particular by Avicbron.

Avicbron (c.1021-1058)⁹ was a Jewish philosopher whose work, under the title of Fons Vitae,¹⁰ was translated into Latin by Dominic Gundisalvi and John of Spain about 1150. His world-view was essentially Neoplatonic. At its highest point there was God, the Actus Purus. The Will of God (similar to the Logos of Philo) confers being on all creatures in the descending order of spiritual essences, celestial bodies and the corporeal sublunary world. The Will of God is the only thing not composed of matter and form, with matter extending even into the realm of the simple substances. Franciscans of the Augustinian tradition in Paris, such as Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure, maintained such a position.¹¹

As a result of contact with this world-view the Augustinian tradition held to an identification between matter and potency and between form and act, thus positing a forma universalis and a materia

universalis in all creatures. All being, both spiritual and corporeal, were hylomorphically composed. There was a certain degree of actus even in materia prima. It would further be possible for one and the same individual to have a plurality of substantial forms. Contrary to this approach, Aquinas held that matter and form are principles only of corporeal things and that materia prima is without actus. In a single composite there can be only one substantial form conferring all perfections proper to it.

It was the innovation of denying universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms that aroused immediate suspicions against Aquinas' teaching. Universal hylomorphism had been used in the Augustinian tradition in order to assert the distinction between creatures and Creator. The plurality of forms led, in the Augustinian view, to a denial of the numerical identity of Jesus before and after his death. This would put in jeopardy the basis of the Christian structure.



In 1277 Latin Averroism was condemned and, of the sixteen propositions generally considered to be Thomistic, the only serious issue was the denial of universal hylomorphism and its ramifications. This was mentioned four times. The question of plurality of forms was not mentioned, but Robert Kilwardby, the Dominican Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned thirty theses in the same year in a special convocation¹² of the masters in Oxford. Five of the propositions regarded the

unicity of substantial form and six others were related to it.

The fact that Aquinas had been attacked by a member of his own Order stirred up immediate controversy. In 1278 the General Chapter of the Dominicans appointed two visitors to investigate the English Dominicans

who have brought scandal to the Order by¹³ disparaging the writings of the venerated Friar Thomas Aquinas.

Such veneration for Aquinas was further instilled by the General Chapter of May 1279. At the same time Dominicans and Franciscans were dividing over the issue. In 1279 William de la Mare, who held the Franciscan chair at Paris, completed a Correctorium Fratris Thomae in which a total of 117 passages from the writings of Aquinas were corrected by reference to Sacred Scripture, Augustine and Bonaventure. This Correctorium¹⁴ was officially adopted by the Franciscan General Chapter in 1282. Thenceforth only notably intelligent scholars within the Franciscan Order were permitted to read Aquinas and only with the assistance of the Correctorium. In this way the Augustinian tradition was protected.

5.2 Differentiation of Research Models in Discrete Disciplines.

5.2.1 The Research Tradition in Biblical Exegesis.

The development of theology and its disjunction from the lectio divina¹⁵ meant that medieval biblical exegesis began to live its own life. As part of the total theological science, exegesis had been¹⁶ evolving since the time of Origen and the Alexandrians. The Alexandrians had distinguished three levels of meaning - the somatic, the psychic and the pneumatic - and these were transmitted to the medieval

world through the Latin Fathers. Thus, Eucherius of Lyons (d.499) shows how the influence of Origen had spread into the West:

The body of Sacred Scripture, as it is handed down, is in the letter; its soul is in the moral sense, which is called tropicus; 17 its spirit is in the higher understanding which is called anagogic.

Gregory the Great (d.604) explained the functional character of the meanings of Scripture:

The words of Holy Scriptures are square stones, for they can stand on all sides, because on no side are there rough spots. For in every past event that they narrate, in every future event that they foretell, in every moral saying that they speak, and in every spiritual sense they stand, as it were, on a different side because they have no roughness. 18

In general, the medievals preferred to speak of a fourfold meaning in Scripture, rather than a threefold. Augustine of Dacia (d. 1282) expressed the hermeneutical basis of exegesis in the distich:

Littera gesta docet, quid credis allegoria;
Quid agis moralis, quo tendis anagogia. 19

The fourfold division of the meaning of the Scriptures harmonized with the Neoplatonic world view. The visible, in this case the literal sense, both concealed and revealed a deeper, invisible reality which was of greater importance. 20

As it developed in a monastic setting, between 650 and 1200, the purpose of exegesis was meditation and contemplation. Writers sought to edify their readers and the tendency was to produce, above all, the spiritual or allegorical sense. Indeed, little scientific exegesis

was possible because of a deficiency in philological knowledge,²¹
 the only basis for study being the corrupt Vulgate text of Jerome.²²
 For further philological problems reference was made to Jerome's
Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim and there was a similar rather
 servile adherence to other authorities, in the form of florilegia,
 biblical catenae or sententiae. Only gradually was there any
 development in the skill of criticism of the biblical text. Certain
 collections of quaestiones, for example Wicbod's Liber quaestionum,²³
 collections of sententiae,²⁴ biblical homilies²⁵ or a sustained
 commentary on a biblical text²⁶ would be examples.

However, the eventual change can be seen, in embryo, in the exeget-
 ical school of Laon. Anselm of Laon had developed a scientific method,
 systematizing both biblical and theological studies. This, as was seen
 above, led to the Liber Sententiarum of Peter Lombard on the theological
 side. On the biblical side, it can be seen in the Glossa ordinaria,
 basically the work of Anselm himself, a marginal and interlinear gloss
 on the entire biblical text. In time this became the text book for
 the lectio as the lectio separated from the totality of sacred science.²⁷
 Anselm's work gave rise to a particular genre which was represented in
 the twelfth century by the Major Glossatura of Peter Lombard and the
Historia Scholastica of Peter Comestor.²⁸

The twelfth century also saw the rise of the school of Saint-Victor,
 where Hugh of Saint-Victor set out a programme of biblical studies on
 the basis of Augustine's De doctrina Christiana. He endeavoured to
 establish the foundation of doctrine, insisting on the primacy of the
 literal sense. The purpose of biblical studies, in his view, was
 knowledge, history and doctrine, but knowledge that could be directed
 towards practice, namely morality and contemplation. This Victorine

tradition was further developed, in a somewhat new direction by Peter Comestor (d.1179), Peter Cantor (d.1187) and Stephen Langton (d.1228). They also studied biblical science, but with the same tendency towards the practical - tropology and homiletics.

It was this ferment in the field of biblical studies, which had been developing since the time of the school of Laon, which eventually led to the definitive separation of biblical exegesis and theology as two separate disciplines, each of which then developed its own methodology and presuppositions. More systematic study of biblical exegesis became the prerogative of the Universities, after the separation of the disciplines.²⁹ Sometimes the contents of the biblical text were reduced to categories: materia, modus, utilitas and intentio auctoris. Sometimes they were reduced to causes: materialis, formalis, finalis and efficiens. More and more, however, the emphasis was placed on the literal sense. The Expositio continua of Aquinas was in this mould, following the earlier style of the Glossa ordinaria of Anselm.

The trend in exegesis continued to the late Middle Ages, with the postilla as the dominant literary form. These were complete, coherent and detailed commentaries on the text. Philology was gaining a more recognised role and becoming the instrument of exegesis,³⁰ comparable to the role of dialectic in theology. The need for establishing the basic text from oriental languages was soon recognised, the Vulgate being so deficient. Thus, by 1311, the Council of Vienne had ordered that Hebrew should be cultivated for the purpose of exegetical study. It endowed chairs in Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Aramaic in the Universities of Rome, Paris, Oxford, Bologna and Salamanca.³¹

Such encouragement in the study of the original texts gave rise to the outstanding figure of Nicholas of Lyra, a Franciscan (d. 1340).

He was an original scholar, skilled in the biblical languages.³²

Refusing to be bound by the tradition of the early Fathers he wrote:

The writings of the Fathers are not of such great authority that no one is allowed to think in a contrary sense in those matters which have not been determined by Sacred Scripture itself.³³

By the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation the scientific techniques for the study of literature were to the fore and criticism, philology and history became the new areas of study. The trends in a distinctive style of medieval exegesis came to an end.

In general, what occurred during the Middle Ages was the distinction of biblical exegesis, as a separate discipline related to theology proper but not identical with it. It developed its own research tradition, based on philology and literary criticism, which could yield a literal sense. In effect, it was possible for the theologian and the biblical exegete to produce variant expressions of the primary expressive model.

5.2.2 The Research Tradition in Christian Ethics.

The first clearly formulated Christian statement on Ethics, understood as the study of the norms behind the pattern of behaviour in a community, was found in the writings of Augustine.³⁴ It was Augustine who produced a Platonic-Stoic concept of ius naturale.³⁵ Plato had held that from what is beautiful, man could rise to the Idea of the Beautiful, which the Stoa then described as the divine Logos, permeating the universe. In a special way man shared in this Logos.

Both Plato and the Stoics differed from Aristotle in that they denied
 any dichotomy between nature and reason.³⁶ To act in accord with
 the dictates of reason meant the same as acting according to nature.
 Law and nature, therefore, would be one and the same if law is the
 product of reason.³⁷ This was the basis of ius naturale.

Within this perspective the Logos was the efficient cause of the
ius naturale which is, in the first instance, the cosmic order of the
 universe, and secondly, that same order realised in individual men.
 The synthesis of this entire cosmic order was disrupted by the Roman
 jurist Ulpian in the third century. He distinguished the ius naturale
 and the ius gentium, the former being applicable only to non-humans.
 These two in conjunction formed the entire cosmic order, the lex
³⁸
aeterna.

Augustine took up this Greco-Roman idea of ius naturale and found
 that the biblical concept of Logos, which had already undergone eval-
 uation by the process of tradition, could be readily applied to it.
 Augustine, was then able to put forward the Decalogue as a succinct
³⁹
 summary of the ius naturale, and use it as the foundation of his
 ethical teaching. Those who followed in Augustine's wake tended to
 take a rigorous line in ethical demands. Man's response to God was
 pre-determined and it was the effects of the Fall which caused
⁴⁰
 ignorance and unwillingness to fulfil Christian demands.

The Augustinian line of ethical thought was taken up by Aquinas
⁴¹
 who saw the lex aeterna as being the supreme form of all law,
 identical with the very being of God. It directed immaterial things,
 by means of their nature, to a specific purpose. Man, by the use of
 his reason, could participate in the lex aeterna and this partici-

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pation was the ius naturale. Hence, for Aquinas, ius naturale was the sharing by a rational creature in the lex aeterna. As to the content of the ius naturale, Aquinas would maintain that all men could see that good must be done and evil avoided. However, still following Ulpian, he wanted to flesh out the 'good-to-be-done'. It would be in the Decalogue that derived conclusions would be found.

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However, Aquinas had introduced new elements into the understanding of ius naturale. No longer was the world view specifically Stoic. Instead it was Aristotelian. In opposition to the Stoics he had bridged nature and reason by means of his idea of 'naturaliter cognitum', that the primary conclusions of the ius naturale were naturally known by all men.

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Up until the twelfth century, however, few specifically moralistic works appeared. The only important development was the diffusion of the Libri Poenitentiales. These originated in the Celtic church and were established in Ireland by the sixth century. When the monastic practice of private confession of sins replaced public confession they were required as sources for appropriate penances. Such penances were assigned on the basis of any indications in the Scriptures, canonical and monastic practice and finally the personal judgement of monastic superiors. The Carolingian reform movement criticised them for their lack of canonical authority, the discrepancies they showed from one to another and for abuses which occurred when the giving of alms could substitute for more personal penance.

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From the twelfth century, however, the Latin moralists were once more read and eventually the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle reappeared. Gradually, Christian Ethics was becoming a discipline in its own right.

The interest shown by Lateran IV (1215) in the subject of Penance, and the editing of summae for the use of confessors was definitively to bring this about.

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The Bull, Omnis Utriusque Sexus of Innocent III, commanding all Christians to confess their sins every year, ensured that Christian Ethics, or Moral Theology, would live its own life apart from Theology generally. Immediately there developed a literary genre, the Summae de casibus conscientiae which provided assistance to priest-confessors.⁴⁹ Raymond of Penafort, a Dominican, was one of several in the thirteenth century who composed such a summa. Within five years of the Bull he had completed a draft of his Summa de Casibus Poenitentiae to help members of his own order in their confessional duties. After 1234 he added a section on matrimony. William of Rennes added a gloss to it in 1245 and it became known as the Raymundina. Its four books cover the major categories of sin and present them in the form of casus conscientiae; sins against God, sins against the neighbour, problems concerning Holy Order and Penance, matrimony. William of Rennes expanded some of its discussions, offered additional examples, and proposed several different solutions to cases. With the Raymundina the genre was established.

Changes to the genre were heralded, first of all, by Monaldus di Capo d'Istria, whose work is known as the Monaldina. He introduced an alphabetical order into the material, replacing the categories of Raymund. This alphabetical listing became accepted practice. John of Freiburg incorporated, around the same time, opinions of theologians, especially Aquinas, concerning moral issues. From being a catalogue the genre became more reflective and creative.

The Summae assimilated the variant intellectual approaches of
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 the time and reflected the debates in the universities. However,
 they retained their practical purpose, intended exclusively for con-
 fessors who used the information they contained to interrogate their
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 penitents 'distinctly and methodically'. Such interrogation
 followed certain guidelines; investigation of common sins (the ten
 commandments, the seven deadly sins, the abuses of the five senses);
 only such commonly known sins should be investigated; details should
 52
 not be demanded particularly in sexual matters. They had the set
 purpose of forming an intellectual élite among the clergy, aware of the
 gravity of their status as ecclesiastical judges.

The core ideas underlying the construction of the Summae con-
fessorum were law, guilt and absolution. They established a research
 tradition by which human authority was able to define moral behaviour,
 which all men were subsequently responsible for knowing and practising.
 Those who did not were guilty and were therefore accountable. While
 the manifest function of the Summae was the care of souls, it must be
 said that a latent function is discernible. The ideas, and the
 institutions established on the basis of the ideas, served as means of
 social control and centralization. The hierarchical status of the
 clergy, and ultimately of the bishop of Rome, was assured from the time
 of Omnis Utriusque Sexus.

This fact must be seen in conjunction with the growing importance
 of the hierarchical structure. The bull Unam Sanctam of 1302 can be
 53
 regarded as the high point of papal power. The document contends
 that peace and justice in the world, by a hierarchy of being, derives
 from the Christian sacraments and from the exercise of the jurisdiction

of the church, both of which resides in the person of the Pope.

In yet another aspect of Christian thinking a research model was developing. It was based on the authority of the ius naturale. It attempted to propose a model whereby any casus conscientiae could be solved as to licitness or illicitness by reference to the ius naturale. However, such exercise of judgement only pertained to a select social group - the confessors. They were, in turn, given social coherence because of the primacy of the bishop of Rome.


5.3 Rival Research Models.

The research model of Aquinas could have functioned as the matrix of scholarly investigation. That it did not was due to several causes. In fact, there eventuated separate research models, rivalling Thomism.

Christianity, up to the end of the Middle Ages, must be seen within Western culture and society. Thus, the research model that we have been describing, while being borrowed from an alien culture, was developed within Western culture and became part of it. The process of tradition made it unique to that society and culture. Hence there was only a single system of knowledge which was common to religious knowledge and everyday knowledge, the latter being subsumed under the former just as everyday culture was subsumed under religious culture.

However, within the society of Western Europe, there was a disruption of this homogeneous development. Everyday life and religious life were to be seen as distinct. It would even be possible to speak of two sub-cultures, the everyday and the religious. In such circumstances there would also be two systems of knowledge which might not

coincide. Everyday knowledge took on this separate structure.



The beginnings of this rift are to be seen in the clear distinction between philosophy and theology. Thus, the paradigmatic system of knowledge, set out by Aquinas and the Scholastics, did not spread beyond his death.

There was a reaction to the Greco-Arabian necessitarianism, which took the form of an attack on the use of reason and its ability to know God. Whereas the scientific theology of the thirteenth century was confident that it could establish common ground for dialogue between Christian and non-Christian, there was now a more self-reflective theological system. This is called Nominalism, which consists of several phases.

5.3.1 The Research Model of Scotism.

The Franciscans had no doctrinal synthesis that could come to terms with the new Aristotelianism. John Duns Scotus attempted to provide them with one. He wanted to examine anew the limits of reason as against faith, the problem of knowledge and the doctrine of being. He tried to close the gap between Platonic teaching and the insistence upon the ultimate reality of the singular. With Plato, he held that the form or Idea had extramental status but he still took account of the irreducibility of the singular to the universal. Thus, he contended that the form of man must receive the additional form of haecceitas (individuality), which seals reality and gives existent meaning to this particular, singular reality. He conceived of being

in an univocal sense. God and creatures are simply two modes, the infinite and the finite, of the one being. He interpreted the Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form in an Augustinian sense, denying the absolute potentiality of materia prima and the real distinction between essence and existence.

Scotism is really the Aristotelian form of Augustinianism which was handed on through the Franciscan order. Although Scotus died at a young age, he left behind a strong following. By this stage it is clear that dialectics, the research tradition of theology, had lost any moorings in biblical and patristics studies. Unlike Peter Lombard or Aquinas, Scotus wrote no preliminary biblical commentaries.

5.3.2 The Research Model of Ockhamism.

Soon after, another research tradition developed with William of Ockham. Ockham rejected the doctrine of formal distinction proposed by Scotus whereby common natures could be distinguished in individual things. For Ockham, all distinctions within a singular can only be real distinctions, and all components distinguished can only be as individual as the thing itself. Universals, therefore, are names only.

Ockham's ontological nominalism was connected with his teaching concerning a free, omnipotent divinity. The affirmation of a real distinction in things simply implied that God could create one component of reality without another. The actual order of nature and grace was necessary only to the extent that God de facto directed his power (potentia ordinata) in this particular way and not in another. Arguments from human experience, therefore, had only probability when they referred to the order of grace. God's inner life was

beyond human reason.

In general Nominalism weakened the link between realities and words, or between empirical entities and the systems of thought describing them. In our terms, Nominalism weakened the link between the experiential model and any expressive model. The certainty that Aquinas had engendered was thereby destroyed. Any claims made by the intellect had to be separately verified by tests of experience. The link between the experiential model and the expressive model would not be taken for granted. The primary affirmation of the Nominalists would be, then, that the expressive models do not relate ontologically to the experiential model but have covenantal status. The connections are not necessary, based on nature, but willed agreements which could
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be otherwise.

The universal concepts required to formulate secondary expressive models were only 'in anima et verbo', for Ockham, verbal connections
64
formed by the mind in response to its perception of individual things. Aquinas and Scotus would have said that the human mind, in delineating the secondary expressive model, relied upon the assumption that the universal really existed in the particular. Through the universals, the mind mediately knew the particulars. Ockham, on the contrary, maintained that the human mind knows particular things intuitively and then forms universals simply as tools. There was therefore no need for intelligible species as the immediate and certain basis of human knowledge. This was an assertion of human spontaneity that would be
65
fully verified by the Renaissance. The passive mind of Aristotelian epistemology was replaced by an active human mind, capable of direct, immediate intuition of particulars.

Nominalism also protected the freedom of God with its assertion of the covenantal nature of man's relationship to him. Ockham distinguished between the potentia Dei absoluta and the potentia Dei ordinata. This was a retreat from secondary expressive models of any kind. The Aristotelian system had tended towards a mechanistic deity, realized in Latin Averroism. Ockham intended, by his distinction, not to describe the divine essence itself but its mode of acting in the created order. God committed himself to act in a certain way; he could still act beyond that mode since the will of God was not
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to be constricted to a unique design.

From this concept of 'covenant' there followed the general traits which united the Nominalists. There was a non-necessary character
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about Ethics, a freedom about the action of God towards men. God was thought to have positively decreed all moral laws, a denial of ius naturale.

Nominalism had the potential to open up an avenue to revolution. Between God and man the relationship had been historically realised but it no longer could be maintained that this was the unique mode whereby God and man could be linked. Loss of certainty in the prevailing structure could always bring about the 'collapse effect' and mystics
68
such as Meister Eckhart and John Tauler took the opportunity.

Thus, the empirical method came to the surface in ecclesiastical studies. The authority-based deductive method was replaced. Metaphysics was rejected in favour of physics; Scripture and the prior decrees of God were emphasised within the realm of theology. The relationship between God and the world and God and the Church were

seen accordingly as non-necessary, covenantal.

It was also to be expected that the Nominalist movement would challenge Papal authority. Papal authority was part of the secondary expressive model, not the primary. Ockham looked to a General Council to replace a heretical Pope and the role of the Pope in the Christian structure was, in the nominalist view, reformable. Statements on the idea of Papal infallibility included the addendum that Papal authority was not an absolute, and the infallible character of that authority could be transferred to another locus.

Ockhamism, consequently, spawned the leaders of the Conciliar⁶⁹ movement in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries - Peter of Ailly and Jean Gerson. Ockham himself had suggested the establishment of a General Council to counterbalance the papal power. This shows the reaction to the general trend within Ockhamism against hierarchy. Instead of hierarchy there is partnership and instead of subordination there is co-ordination. However, this trend developed a significantly new form of the secondary expressive model of Christianity. Between the Papal and the Conciliar models there was to be bitter and protracted opposition.

Ockham's stress on the covenantal nature of man's relationship with God can be seen as a re-activation of the biblical concept of YHWH, in contradistinction to the concept of divinity that had been⁷⁰ introduced particularly through the Prime Mover of Aristotle. The mechanistic deity of Latin Averroism had shown where Aristotelian doctrine could lead.

With this established, the potentia ordinata gives a mandate

to men to reform the established church. For an Ockhamist, the church has its unique mediatorial role as a result of a covenant and not because of its position within a supposed metaphysical hierarchy. There is no ontological necessity about the structures of the church. There was similarly an open mandate to reform any prevailing system of knowledge.

5.4 Theological Education in the later Middle Ages.

By the later Middle Ages there were four competing theological schools: Thomists, Scotists, Nominalists and Augustinians (who followed in the tradition of Bonaventure). Apart from the Dominicans, the Jesuits generally followed Aquinas. Franciscans generally followed Scotus. These two schools focussed on the original writings of their mentors, producing vast commentaries as time went on. In Germany, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Summa Theologiae of Aquinas was used as a textbook, replacing the Sententiae of Peter Lombard. The practice spread to Paris, Spain and Italy. A tradition developed among the Dominicans of lecturing on the Summa of Aquinas, seeking a positive rather than an apologetical understanding of his text. Likewise after the invention of printing, Scotus' Opus Oxoniense and Quodlibeta appeared in a number of editions and these were used in Franciscan houses of study as basic texts, where they likewise replaced the Sententiae of Lombard.

Scotus' writings proliferated and gave rise eventually to manuals for the instruction of clergy such as the Parvus Scotus of Le Bret (c. 1527), the Monotesseron Formulorum of John Dovetus (c. 1579)

and the Flores Theologiae of Joseph Angles (d.1587). In 1593 Scotus was declared the official Doctor of the Franciscan order and his popularity increased.⁷¹ The situation, by the early part of the seventeenth century, has been described in this way:

The Angelic Doctor has his own private professors and disciples; so too has the Subtle Doctor. From one chair the teachings of St Thomas are expounded, and from another those of Scotus. I went to three of the most notable universities in Spain, Coimbra, Salamanca and Alcala and at each I saw a chair appointed for the masters who taught the views of Scotus; also at the academy in Paris, Padua and even Rome itself, the very capital of the world, Scotus acquired a chair. Furthermore in the University of Salamanca, no professor could expound any doctrine other than that of Scotus, and in doing so, he was supposed to explain his text and clarify his ideas at great length, and not merely summarize or mention them by way of conclusion.⁷²

In 1633 the Franciscans held a General Chapter at Toledo, at which a directive was given for a manual of Scotist philosophy to be composed. Thereafter, courses in Scotistic philosophy were organized in various parts of Europe and a new edition of his works was commissioned.⁷³ With this stimulus many manuals of philosophy and theology ad mentem Scoti are to be found during the seventeenth century.⁷⁴

In the same period Thomistic commentaries proliferated including those of Tommaso de Vio Cajetan⁷⁵ and Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, a Dominican General who commentated on the Summa Contra Gentiles. Another commentary on the Pars Prima of the Summa was completed by G.C. Javelli who added Quaestio de Dei Praedestinatione et Reprobatione in which he departed from Thomistic doctrine in an effort to pacify the Lutherans. Javelli wrote also one of the first manuals ad mentem S. Thomae in three volumes which was later entitled: Totius Rationalis, divinae ac moralis philosophiae compendium. Perhaps the most extensive of all the commentaries was that of Francis Suarez.⁷⁶ The use of original

texts and, in particular, the use of commentaries ensured that the separate research traditions would be handed on.

By the sixteenth century there was no single research tradition which enjoyed a monopoly in the universities, seen as discrete social groups. The four competing research traditions, while elaborating the same primary expressive model, were making use of quite different pre-suppositions and methodologies. The end result was variety in the secondary expressive models produced.

The later Middle Ages therefore witnessed considerable diversity in theological education. The variant research traditions, acting as enculturation matrices, continued to form discrete social groups through education - Thomists, Scotists, Nominalists and Augustinians. At the same time other social groups, within these broader groups, were being formed - biblical exegetes and ethicists.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. In 2 Sent. 13, 2.
2. There is a definite element of Neoplatonism in Albertus Magnus which was to be exploited by the German Dominican school which included such notables as Theodoric of Freiburg, Ulric of Strassburg and Meister Eckhart.
3. De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas, ch. 1.
4. ST, 1a, art. 1, q. 88, ad 1.
5. Ad secundum dicendum quod haec scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quasi ex necessitate eis indigent, sed ad maiorem manifestationem eorum quae in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit ab aliis scientiis tamquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tamquam inferioribus et ancillis; sicut architectonicae utuntur subministrantibus ut civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis non est propter defectum vel insufficientiam ejus, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui ex eis quae per naturalem rationem ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae cognoscuntur, facilius manducitur in ea quae sunt supra rationem quae in hac scientia traduntur. ST 1a, art. 1, q.8, ad 2.
6. De Unitate Intellectus, Proemium.
7. Ibid., 1,3.
8. The earliest Thomists who could have had any personal contact with him such as William of Macclesfeld, Giles of Lessines, Bernard of Trille and Rambert dei Primadizzi were never actually enrolled in his courses.
9. G. Vajda, Introduction a la pens e juive du moyen age (Paris, 1947) pp. 75-83; I. Huisik, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy sec. ed. (New York, 1959), pp. 59-79. Avicenna was known to the medievals as an Arabian philosopher and not identified as a Jewish poet until 1846.
10. A.B. Jacobs (tr.), Fountain of Life (Philadelphia, 1954).
11. J. Goheen, The Problem of Matter and Form in the 'De Ente et Essentia' of Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge, Mass., 1940).
12. H. Denifle and E. Chartelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, vol 1., pp. 558-559.
13. B. Reichert, Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica (Rome-Stuttgart - Paris, 1896-), vol. 3, p. 199.
14. Early supporters of Aquinas then replied with Correctoria to William de la Mare.
15. M.D. Chenu, La Theologie comme science au XIIIe siecle (Paris 1957).

16. See M.L.W. Laistner, 'Antiochene Exegesis in Western Europe during the Middle Ages', HTR, 40 (1947), pp. 19-31; H. de Lubac, Exégèse Médiévale (two vols. in 4, Paris, 1959-64); R.E. McNally, 'Medieval Exegesis', TS, 22 (1961), pp. 445-454; id., The Bible in the Early Middle Ages (Westminster, Md., 1959); B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages sec. ed. (New York, 1952).
17. Formulae spiritalis intelligentiae in PL vol. 50, p. 727
18. Homilia IX in Ezechielem in PL vol. 76, p.1047
19. The medieval development of meaning in Scripture is dealt with in H. de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale, passim.
20. The fourfold pattern was to be found in many aspects of medieval religious life such as preaching and education.
21. B. Altaner, 'Zur Kenntnis des Hebräischen im Mittelalter,' BZ, 21 (1933), pp. 288-308; C. Spicq, Esquisse d'une histoire de l'Exégèse latine au moyen âge (Paris, 1944), see especially p.16.
22. The Vulgata latina had been revised during the Carolingian renaissance by Alcuin but remained in an imperfect state. The Greek text of the New Testament was rarely consulted and the Septuagint was virtually an unknown entity. By 700 Greek had almost disappeared as a known language in the West and Hebrew had never taken a footing in Christian scholarly society.
23. PL, 96:1105-68.
24. For example, Smaragdus' Expositio comitis, PL, 102:15=552.
25. For example, Remigius of Auxerre's Homiliae duodecim, PL, 131: 865-932.
26. For example Bede's In Marci Evangelium expositio in Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina (Turnhout, 1953-), vol. 120, pp. 431-648.
27. The wide diffusion of Anselm's Glossa has been verified by C. Spicq, op.cit., p. 113.
28. A. Landgraf, 'Zur Methode der biblischen Textkritik im 12. Jahrhundert', Biblica, 19 (1929), pp. 445-474.
29. P. Mandonnet, 'L'enseignement de la Bible selon l'usage de Paris', Revue Thomiste, NS 12 (1929), pp. 489-519; A. Kleinmans, 'De studio Sacrae Scripturae in ordine Fratrum Minorum saeculo XIII', Antonianum, 7 (1932), pp. 413-440.
30. Roger Bacon's Compendium Studii developed the fundamental relationship between philology and exegesis: 'Notitia linguarum est prima porta sapientiae'.
31. EB, 41-43.

32. The later influence of Nicholas of Lyra can be gauged by the dictum: Si Lyra non lyrasset, Lutherus non saltasset.
33. The principal work of Nicholas of Lyra was Postillae Perpetuae sive Brevia Commentaria in Universa Biblia. It stressed the literal sense. It was published in Rome, 1471-72.
34. Examples of moral casuistry in Augustine would be De agone christiano, De mendacio, De continentia, De bono conjugali, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, De bono viduitatis, De virginitate. On Augustine as a moralist see T. Deman, Aux origines de la theologie morale (Paris, 1951); F.X. Murphy, 'The Background to a History of Patristic Moral Thought', Studia Moralia, 1 (Rome, 1963) pp. 49-85.
35. J. Stelzenberger, Die Beziehungen der frühchristlichen Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa (Munich, 1957), pp. 100-101; J. Arntz, 'Natural Law and Its History', Concilium, 5 (1965), pp. 23-32.
36. Aristotle distinguished between what was phusei dikaion ('just by nature') and nomooi dikaion ('just by force of law') cf. Ethica Nicomacheia. 1134b. 18-21.
37. Stelzenberger, op.cit., p. 104.
38. J.M. Aubert, Le droit romain dans l'oeuvre de Saint Thomas (Paris, 1955), p. 93.
39. A. Schubert, Augustins Lex Aeterna - Lehre nach Inhalt und Quellen (Munster, 1924); O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIe et XIIIe siecles (six vols., Louvain, 1942-60), vol. 2., esp. pp. 75-87.
40. This can be seen particularly in the writings of Gregory the Great (590-604) who set the moral standard with his works until the twelfth century. Liber regulae pastoralis, Moralis in Job, Dialogi de vita et miraculis patrum italicorum. Cf. L. Weber, Hauptfragen der Moral theologie Gregors des Grossen (Freiburg, 1947).
41. Aquinas defined law as 'an ordinance of reason, tending towards the common good, promulgated by him who is in charge of the community'. ST Ia IIae, q.90, art. 4. The lex aeterna was identified with the being of God. ST Ia IIae, q. 91, art. 2, ad 1.
42. Aquinas wrote:

'The light of natural reason which enables us to distinguish between good and evil - which belongs to the ius naturale - is nothing but an imprint of the divine light in us.'

ST Ia IIae, q. 91, art. 2, ad 1.
43. ST Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2.

44. ST Ia IIae, q. 100, art. 3, ad 1.
45. Cf. De Veritate, 10, 6, ad 6; II, 1, ad 5. Cf. P.M. van Oberbeke, 'Loi naturel et droit naturel selon S. Thomas', Revue Thomiste, 57 (1957), p. 75.
46. T.P. Oakley, 'Celtic Penance; Its Sources, Affiliation and Influence', Irish Ecclesiastical Review, 52 (1938), pp. 147-164 581-601; J.T. McNeil and H.M. Gamer, Medieval Handbooks of Penance (New York, 1938); C. Vogel, La discipline penitentielle en Gaule des origines a la fin du VIIe siecle (Paris, 1952); L. Bieler (ed.), The Irish Penitentials (Dublin, 1963); B. Poschmann, Penance and the Anointing of the Sick (New York, 1964).
47. William of Conches (d.1146) adapted Cicero's De Officiis in his Moralium dogma philosophorum. Aelred (d.1166) was inspired by the De amicitia while John of Salisbury (d.1180) wrote an anthology on the texts of Seneca. See O. Lottin, op. cit.
48. For text see Denz. Schon. pp. 264-5.
49. Lists of such Summae de casibus conscientiae are contained in Johannes Dietterle, 'Die Summae confessorum (sive de casibus conscientiae)-von ihren Anfängen and bis zu Silvester Prierias', Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, 24 (1903), pp. 353-363; Pierre Michaud-Quantin, 'Sommes de casuistique et manuels de confession au moyen age (XII-XVI siècles)', in Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia, 13 (1962), pp. 34-42, 103-106. The principal Summae in chronological order are:
Raymundina (1220, 1234). (Raymond of Penafort, Summa de poenitentia et matrimonio cum glossis Ioannis de Friburgo (Rome, 1603). Monaldina (before 1274). (Joannes Monaldus di Capo d'Istria, Summa in utroque iure). Joannina (c. 1290). (Johannes von Freiburg, Summa confessorum.) Summa Johannis, deutsch (c. 1300). (Berthold von Freiburg, Summa Johannis.) Astesana (c. 1317). (Astesanus de Asti, Summa de casibus conscientiae.) Pisanella (c. 1338). (Bartholomaeus de Sancto Concordio, Summa casuum.) Supplementum (c. 1444). (Nicolaus de Ausimo, Supplementum summae pisanellae.) Rosella (and Baptistina) (1480-90). (Baptista Trovamala de Salis, Rosella casuum (and Summa Baptistina), Angelica (1480-90). (Angelus Carletus de Clavasio, Summa Angelica de casibus conscientiae.) Sylvestrina (1516). (Silvester Prierias Mazzolini, Summa summarum or Summa Sylvestrina.)
50. Raymund of Penafort, for example, based his moral theory on a contritionist theory in which the forgiveness of sins actually precedes the act of confession. Cf. Raymundina III, 34. Bartholomaeus of Pisa (responsible for the Pisanella) followed the opinion of Aquinas on this, namely that the act of sacramental absolution was instrumental, disposing the penitent to justification but not directly causing it. He seems to emphasize sacramental efficacy ex opere operato by his assertion that both Penance and Baptism are effective purifiers of man. However, he is at one with the contritionist theory in using the comparison of the gospel narrative where Jesus heals a leper and then orders that he go and show himself to a priest. Nicolaus de Ausimo (author of the Supplementum) agreed that the power of sacramental

absolution had only instrumental causality but he added that those who were not perfectly contrite could obtain grace through sacramental absolution. Thus, he went against the contritionist theory. Cf. Supplementum, 'Absolutio', 61; 'Clavis', 6-7; 'Contritio', 11.

51. Raymundina III, 34, 30.
52. Artesanum V, 16.
53. Text is in Denz. Schon. pp. 279-281.
54. See above pp. 133-134.
55. Thomism was principally confined to the Dominican Order where its diffusion was fostered by legislative action. On Thomism as distinct from the actual work of Aquinas himself see: M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben (3 vols., Munich, 1925-56); A.G. Sertillanges, Les Grandes Thèses de la philosophie Thomiste (Paris, 1928); G.M. Manser, Das Wesen des Thomismus third ed. (Freiburg 1949); P. Wyser, Der Thomismus (Bern, 1951); F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuquem 1964); É. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956); id., The Spirit of Thomism (New York, 1964). The legislative action which fostered Thomism is dealt with in M. Burbach, 'Early Dominican and Franciscan Legislation regarding St. Thomas', Medieval Studies, 4 (1942), pp. 139-158.
56. Cf. É. Gilson, The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 402-420, 498-499. Examples of the dialogue genre would have been Roger Bacon's Opus Majus, Aquinas' Contra Gentiles, Raymund Martin's Pugio Fidei.
57. Late scholasticism can be divided into at least three movements. See H.A. Oberman, 'Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with attention to its relation to the Renaissance', HTR, 53 (1960), pp. 47-76; id., The Harvest of Medieval Theology, (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). The first group would be the conservative Augustinian branch of late medieval thought, sometimes called 'right wing nominalists'. See D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century', Augustiniana, 6 (1956), pp. 146-274 where it is dubbed the 'historico-critical group', including Thomas Bradwardine, Gregory of Rimini and Hugolino Malbranche of Orvieto. The second group would be the moderates or the less radical branch of the 'logico-critical group'. This second group would have embraced William of Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly and Gabriel Biel. Finally there was a third group, the radical nominalists, or 'left wing nominalists' including Robert Holcot, Adam Wadham, Nicholas of Autrecourt and John of Nirecourt.
58. Whereas the point of departure for Aquinas, in formulating a new synthesis, had been Aristotle's works, the point of departure for Scotus was Avicenna. See above pp. 230f. On Scotus see A. Bertoni, Le Bienheureux Jean Duns Scot: sa vie, sa doctrine, ses disciples (Levanto, 1917); H.J. Storff, 'De schola et doctrina Franciscana B. Joannis Duns Scoti', Acta Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, 51 (1932), pp. 36-42; É. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 454-471.

59. D. de Caylus, 'Merveilleux épanouissement de l'école au XVII^e siècle', Études Franciscanes, 24 (1910), pp. 5-21, 493-502; 25 (1911), pp. 35-47, 306-317, 627-645; 26 (1912), pp. 276-288. C. Piana, 'Gli inizi e lo sviluppo dello Scotismo a Bologna', Archivum Franciscanum Praedicatorum, 40 (1947), pp. 49-80.
60. In fact there is a dearth of biblical commentaries from the fourteenth century.
61. The difficulty of characterising the movements at this time simply as 'Nominalism' is dealt with in W.J. Courtenay, 'Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion' in C. Trinkaus and H.A. Oberman (eds.), The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion (Leiden, 1974).
62. At first Ockham considered concepts to be objective products of thought (ficta), but he later identified them simply with the subjective acts of thinking. P. Boehner, 'The Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham', Traditio, 4 (1946), pp. 307-335.
63. W.J. Courtenay, 'Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly', Speculum, 46 (1971), pp. 94-119.
64. Cf. Boehner, art. cit.
65. Cf. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, passim.
66. F. Oakley, 'Medieval Theories of Natural Law: William of Ockham and the Significance of the Voluntarist Tradition', Natural Law Forum, 6 (1961), pp. 65-83.
67. Cf. Courtenay, art. cit.
68. M. Greschat, 'Der Bundesgedanke in der Theologie des Späten Mittelalters', Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, 94 (1970), pp. 49-63.
69. The first proponent of Papal Infallibility is often claimed to be Petrus Olivi. However, referring to the book of Revelation, Olivi asserted that in the last days Rome would be another Babylon and the succession of Christ would be handed on to the Franciscans. See B. Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility (1150-1350) (Leiden, 1972). In 1440 Lorenzo Valla uncovered the fraudulent basis of the so-called Donation of Constantine. This gave emphasis to the Conciliarists. De falso credito et ementita Constantini donatione declamatio in Omnia Opera (Basel, 1540; reprinted Turin, 1962), vol. 1, p. 795.
70. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 402-410, 498-499.
71. See D. de Caylus, art. cit.
72. L. Wadding, Annales Minorum (Quaracchi, 1931), vol. 6, pp. 143-144.

73. A. Chiappini, Annales Minorum continuati (Quaracchi, 1941). The Opera Omnia of Scotus was published at Lyons in twelve volumes in 1639. Appended were commentaries of seven outstanding scholars.

74. Thus, for example, John Ponce, Integrum Philosophiae cursum ad mentem Scoti; William van Sichein (d. 1691) produced a Cursus Philosophicus to harmonize Scotus, Aquinas and Bonaventure. Claude Fransen wrote Scotus Academicus in four volumes, published in Paris 1672-77.

75. Cajetan lectured on the Summa at the University of Pavia from 1497 to 1499. Between 1507 and 1520 he published a commentary which revived Thomistic studies in Italy and influenced the future interpretation of Thomistic teaching. A. Cossio, Il Cardinale Gaetano e la riforma (Cividale, 1902); D.A. Mortier, Histoire des maîtres généraux de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs (8 vols., Paris, 1903-1920) see vol. 5; J.F. Groner, Kardinal Cajetan (Freiburg, 1951). Cajetan's Thomism was not a re-statement but, in the spirit of Aquinas, a Thomistic approach to the more relevant questions of his day.


76. R. de Scorraillie, Francois Suarez de la Compagnie de Jésus (two vols., Paris, 1912-13); P. Descoqs, 'Questions de métaphysique: Le suarezisme', Archives de philosophie, 2 (1924), pp. 187-218; 'Thomisme et Suarezisme', ibid., 4 (1926), pp. 434-544; K.E. Schweiler, 'Die Philosophie der spanischen spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des XVIII. Jahrhunderts', Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, 1 (1928), pp. 297-311; C.C. Riedl, 'Suarez and the Organization of Learning' in G. Smith (ed.), Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance (Milwaukee, 1939); H. Guthrie, 'The Metaphysics of Francis Suarez', Thought, 16 (1941), pp. 297-311. On the deviation between Suarez and Aquinas see M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben (Munich, 1926); N. del Prado, De Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae (Fribourg, 1911), pp. 165-209; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality, A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought (St. Louis, 1950), pp. 37-57.

6.

THE EMERGENCE OF A SPECIFICALLY ROMAN CATHOLIC PARADIGMATIC

SYSTEM OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

The Reformation disrupted the Western Christian Church to its roots. It is not our purpose to examine it apart from its effects upon the Roman Catholic Church's thinking and education. It is sufficient to note that, in line with the model proposed for Christianity, the Reformers, in general, replaced the hierarchical mediatorial element, subsumed under the bishop of Rome, by the written corpus of inspired Scriptures. This was a re-evaluation of the cultural heritage, indeed a re-vitalization movement. Hence, the comparison of models would reveal the following contrast:



The separate models reveal specifically different forms of religious knowledge. It would be possible to chart the major intellectual arguments of the Reformation period by recourse to such models. This would be, however, impossible within the scope of our thesis. The Roman Catholic Church soon recognised the challenge inherent in the Reformation¹ and the issues involved. Its response took the tangible form of the Council of Trent, bent on internal reform and clarification. This Council would have a profound effect on theological education.

6.1 Innovations Resulting from the Council of Trent.

Prior to the Council of Trent, clerical discipline was low. Adrian VI's attitude towards abuses can be seen in a letter to Francesco Chierigati, bishop of Teramo in November 1522:

We frankly acknowledge that God permits this persecution of His Church on account of the sins of men, and especially of prelates and clergy ... Holy Scripture declares aloud that the sins of the people are the outcome of the sins of the priesthood... We know well that for many years things deserving of abhorrence have gathered round the Holy See; sacred things have been misused, ordinances transgressed, so that in everything there has been a change for the worse ...

We all, prelates and clergy, have gone astray from the right way, and for long there is none that has done good; no, not one. To God, therefore, we must give all the glory and humble ourselves before Him; each one of us must consider how he has fallen and be more ready² to judge himself than to be judged by God in the day of His wrath.

The Roman Church was now bent on reform in response to the Protestant Reformation, and that reform centered on the clergy and clerical education.

6.1.1 The Establishment of a New Theological Social Group - the Seminary.

Paul III appointed a commission for church reform in July 1536 consisting of nine members. They submitted a report on March 9, 1537: Consilium delectorum cardinalium et aliorum prelatorum de emendenda ecclesia.³ It declared that the basis of all ecclesiastical evils was the exaggeration of papal authority, that every priest should be under the jurisdiction of a particular bishop so that vagi could be eliminated, and that bishops should engage a teacher for the education of clerics. This education issue was to bring about the establishment of a new structure for clerical education - the Seminarium or Seminary.

The Council's concept of a seminary was arrived at only gradually. In 1563 some documents were presented to it, highlighting clerical abuses and offering some remedies. Amongst these was a submission by Louis Beccadelli, the archbishop of Ragusa, suggesting a seminarium clericorum for the education of those who aspired to the priesthood.

Another suggestion was the establishment of special schools for clerics attached to the cathedrals, a revitalization of the idea of cathedral schools. The Emperor Ferdinand urged the erection of ⁴
collegia for clergy in the vicinity of the universities.

One of the influences in the new development was to be Ignatius ⁵
Loyola and his Jesuit followers. Between 1543 and 1552 Loyola wrote the Constitutiones for his Order. They contained, in their fourth part, an elaborate programme of studies, with appended pedagogical methods. He wrote :

In Theology the Old and New Testaments and the scholastic doctrine of ⁶St Thomas are to be read, and in philosophy Aristotle.

It was further specified that the Summa Theologiae of Aquinas was to be covered by two professors over eight years.

The Jesuit concern was not confined to its own members. In the Spring of 1546 Claude Le Jay, a Jesuit who represented Cardinal Otto Truchsess von Waldburg of Augsburg, spoke at Trent of the need to establish colleges for the training of priests. On June 17, 1546 a decree on the obligation of teaching and preaching the Scriptures, calling for the establishment of lectureships in connection with cathedrals and principal churches of large cities, was passed. However, it differed little from the legislation of Lateran IV in 1215. Some-
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thing more adequate was required.

Giovanni Morone, a leading figure at Trent, responded to Le Jay's initiative by conceiving the idea of a college in Rome to educate candi-

dates for the priesthood from German lands. It should be given, he thought, to the Jesuits. In February 1551, therefore, the Jesuits opened the Collegium Romanum with, at first, only liberal arts being taught. In October 1553 philosophy and theology were taught to twenty theological students, Jesuits and others resident at the German College, which had been opened in 1552.⁸ Loyola wrote a set of regulations for the College which became a model for later seminaries,⁹ particularly in Rome.

Cardinal Reginald Pole had been one of the members of the Papal reform commission of 1536. In 1553 he was named the Papal Legate to England and in 1555 he summoned a national Council which met until February 1556. Loyola had corresponded with him on the Roman and German Colleges.¹⁰ The eleventh decree of the national Council read:

That in cathedrals there be educated a certain number of beginners, from which, as from a seedbed (seminarium), priests may be chosen who can worthily be placed in charge of the churches.¹¹

Further details then listed the entrance requirements, the programme of studies which allowed for differing ages and intellectual abilities, the professors' qualifications, and financial sources. Pole drew on Cranmer's experience of improving English cathedral schools in the Reformatio legum ecclesiasticarum of 1553.¹²

At Trent almost a decade went by without any legislation on clerical education. On July 15, 1563 decrees on seminaries received approval in the twenty-third session of that Council.¹³ The first draft of May 1563 was almost verbatim that of Pole's National Council

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and shows his influence. This was amended during discussion. Its provisions were that every cathedral and metropolitan church should have a seminary, although smaller and impoverished dioceses might pool resources for a provincial or interdiocesan seminary. Candidates should have at least reached the age of twelve, be competent in writing and reading, and be of good character. Preference in the selection of candidates should be given to the sons of the poor. This same provision had been cited earlier by Claude Le Jay when, convinced of the impossibility of restoring the study of theology in the Universities, he had conceived of individual bishops gathering the sons of the poor to study theology in colleges. The course of studies was to include letters, the humanities, chant, 'ecclesiastical computation', together with Sacred Scripture, Dogmatic, Moral and Pastoral Theology and Rubrics. There were specific pronouncements on the wearing of a distinctive clerical garb, the reception of the tonsure, the obligation of daily assistance at the Mass, the confession of sins once a month and the reception of Holy Communion on the advice of a spiritual director. Professorships were to be entrusted only to those with doctorates, masters or licentiates in the respective disciplines.

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The seminary was a return to the concept of the cathedral school, as against the University, but with obvious modifications. The first one was established in Milan by Charles Borromeo in 1564. The initial faculty included fourteen Jesuits, thirty-four internal students and one hundred external students. In order to guide the seminary, Borromeo wrote Institutiones ad universum seminarii regimen pertinentes. In the following year Pius IV erected another seminary for the diocese of Rome, while in France seminaries for both younger boys and more mature students were opened. In 1611 Pierre de Bérulle established the

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French Oratory in order to re-establish what he saw as the pristine format of Christian priesthood. Other Oratorian seminaries were subsequently opened.¹⁹

The Tridentine instructions on seminaries for young boys were particularly difficult to comply with. Vincent de Paul opened the College des Bons-Enfants in Paris but eventually admitted the futility of the endeavour and separated the boys from the more mature students.²⁰

The seminary therefore was intended to institutionalize the major pastoral concerns of Trent, tightening the bonds between bishops and their secular clergy and deepening the personal piety of the priests. But differentiation was found in the format of the Tridentine seminary. The French tradition, which was also to be found in Italy and Spain, emphasised a long spiritual formation with severe discipline and a closed atmosphere separating the students from the outside world.²¹ Academic training and spiritual formation went on side by side. Another tradition was found principally in Germany. Students did their academic training in a university and then spent some time in a seminary, where they learnt the practical performance of ritual and studied ascetic and spiritual theology. A third type could be called the Roman where seminarians lived in ecclesiastical colleges in which they were subject to ecclesiastical discipline. They then attended ecclesiastical universities which operated separately from the colleges of residence.

The essential point, however, is that the seminary marks the establishment of a new, closely-controlled social group in which 'graduates' could be enculturated in a consistent manner on a universal scale. The university, as a social group, had given rise to diverse research traditions which had led, through variant secondary expressive

models, to the drastic revolution of the Protestant Reformation.

In order to maintain and protect the entire paradigmatic system of religious knowledge perpetuated by the Roman Church it was necessary to envisage a more disciplined social group for graduates in which the research tradition in particular could be more exclusively enforced by authority.

6.1.2 Legislative Enforcement of the Thomistic Research Model.

The establishment of seminaries as a new social group coincided with the enforcement of the Thomistic research model by Roman Catholic ecclesiastical law. Pius V, to whom the implementation of the decrees of Trent on seminaries fell, sponsored the complete edition of the works of Aquinas.²² He had declared him a Doctor of the Church in 1567.

The Jesuits also insisted on the research tradition of Aquinas. In ch. 13 of Loyola's Constitutiones a separate treatise was called for on particular curricula and pupil exercises in Jesuit educational institutions.²³ In 1584 Claudio Aquaviva appointed a six man delegation to produce a draft of the Ratio Studiorum which then appeared in 1586. This was revised in 1591 and the material, previously in essay form, was organized into rules with theoretical discussion eliminated.²⁴ A final version was formally promulgated in 1599.

The Ratio Studiorum is similar in content to other Renaissance school plans. During Loyola's own lifetime the sequence of studies and the procedures used at the University of Paris were adopted. The Ratio provided for three faculties in a full Jesuit educational establishment. In the Faculty of Letters there were five sections - three

grammar classes, humanities and rhetoric. The Arts Faculty provided a three year course in philosophy together with some science and mathematics. The Theology Faculty covered four years and was normally provided for candidates for the ministry. In Theology, Aquinas was²⁵ the prescribed author as he had been in the Constitutiones.

There had been some Jesuit departure from Aquinas preceding²⁶ this period. Claudio Aquaviva had allowed some liberty particularly where Aquinas differed from current views. A more radical departure was made by Luis de Molina in his book Concordia liberii arbitrii cum gratiae donis²⁷ and Gabriel Vasquez and Francesco Suarez continued the line of freedom. However, in 1593, while the final form of the Ratio Studiorum was being drafted, Jesuits were ordered to,²⁸ return to the teaching of Aquinas.

After Trent, new religious orders generally claimed Aquinas as their official teacher while the older orders, following the reform spirit of Trent, made serious attempts to teach Thomistic doctrine. Diocesan seminaries, fulfilling the mandates of Trent and Pius V, introduced manuals of philosophy and theology ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis.

Thomism, in the new phase after Trent, was marked by the multiplication of manuals. Textbooks of Thomistic philosophy were written for use in seminaries, largely being summaries of Aristotle or adaptations of Aquinas' Summa Theologiae. The ancient texts themselves were thus largely abandoned. A new form of disputatio emerged in these manuals. It began with a thesis to be defended, followed by an explanation of terms, a list of contrary opinions, a proof of the thesis and finally answers to the opponents. This disputatio form

reflected the spirit of the Counter Reformation with its need to restore established doctrines and to defend them from further attack.

In a period in which the Roman Catholic Church saw the need to resist the inroads of the Reformation in doctrine and the need to form a clergy intellectually and spiritually able to cope with the problems of a divided Western Christianity, the seminary became the focal point of ecclesiastical policy. However, unlike the university, it was separated from all non-ecclesiastical influence and, unlike the earlier cathedral and monastic schools, it took its rise in an age in which the religious model of knowledge was no longer a monopoly. The specific character of this form of religious community would profoundly affect the Roman Catholic paradigmatic system of knowledge. We will now review the principal influences on that model.

6.2 Non-Ecclesiastical Influence on the Research Tradition.

6.2.1 The Influence of René Descartes.

Despite the insistence on the teaching and method of Aquinas, seen at Trent as an essential reform measure and enforced by the legislature of the Jesuits and other Religious Orders, the estimation of Aquinas declined in Roman Catholic scholarly circles in the next century.
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This was largely due to the influence of René Descartes.

Descartes began in the Platonic tradition, holding to a dualism
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between intellectual knowledge and sensory knowledge. His earliest personal contribution to a theory on ideas had maintained their physical origin - ideas were identified as physical patterns in the brain, and

they were essential for any knowledge of the world. He distinguished at this time between knowledge of the physical systems of nature and knowledge of the mental systems. The former involved these physical ideas but knowledge of mental things did not. These latter were known by an innate light (he used the term ingenitum), and without the help³¹ of any physical image. He thus challenged the moderate realism of Aristotle, which had been espoused by Aquinas, proceeding from the ego to the world rather than vice-versa. Aristotle had insisted that man's knowledge of self came from this knowledge of the world, and Thomism had concurred in this. Instead, Descartes followed the Platonic tradition of a dual universe in which eternal necessary truths exist apart from the world of human experience but are still accessible to human reason. For neither Plato nor Descartes could sense experience be the source of genuine knowledge. However, he was sure that the human mind, in its natural state, functioning in accordance with its nature, could not fail to think truly. The method of Descartes was discovered by reflection upon the human mind, a study of its procedure and rules of operation.

His method was actually based on the procedure of mathematics. Mathematical demonstration starts from self-evident data and every step in the process is self-evident. These two conditions, assuring the certainty of demonstration, correspond to two functions of the human mind: intuitus, the ability to apprehend the self-evident data and deductio the power of moving, by uninterrupted sequence of self-evident steps, from the data to their consequents. These are the primary conditions for all knowledge according to Cartesian theory.

Intuitus is a conception of a 'pure and attentive mind', such that no doubt could remain as to what one conceives. Objects so conceived

by the mind would be 'simple natures', that is single ideas or two elements of an idea in immediate and necessary connection. The objects must be conceived clearly and distinctly and at once, not successively. In this context 'clearly' means having the thing concerned present to the mind that is attending to it. 'Distinctly' means having before the mind precisely the relevant content, neither more nor less. Deductio is the process by which intuition then extends itself to comprehend within itself a complex of intuitions.

For a sound metaphysics, therefore, a clear and distinct apprehension is required, which can be known with certainty. This is, in the very first instance, the assertion: Cogito, ergo sum. ³² Even were the individual to be deceived in all else there would still remain the certainty that there is an 'ego' who is deceived and therefore exists. Descartes meant 'cogito' to cover the entire gamut of mental operations - willing, feeling, perceiving and so forth.

The Discours of Descartes exercised considerable influence on scholastic thinkers who came to require the recognition of first principles and the deduction of necessary conclusions both in theology and philosophy. Descartes himself hoped to have Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), which was recast into scholastic form as Principles of Philosophy (1644), adopted as a textbook by the Jesuits. He was looked upon as the creator of a new, scientific research tradition. By the end of the seventeenth century Cartesianism was synonymous with science itself. ³³ It came to permeate the text-books of theology. In 1691 a French Jesuit, Gabriel Daniel, could write:

Judging by the medical and philosophical books reaching us from England, Holland, and Germany, Cartesianism has made great strides in these quarters. Philosophy courses based on the scholastic method are hardly printed any more, and nearly all the works of

this kind which come out of France these days are treatises on physics based on the principles of the new philosophy. People no longer talk about Thomists, Scotists, and Nominalists, except in the schools; or at least people no longer distinguish between them; they put them all in the same category and on the same side, calling it ancient philosophy; to this they oppose the philosophy of Descartes, or the new philosophy.³⁴

The research model of Cartesianism was self-sufficient, fulfilling the direction taken from the time of the establishment of the universitas as a distinct social group. It was able to generate a secondary expressive model that did not require the givenness of the primary expressive model and therefore could stand besides the theoretical world-view of the scientist.

After 1650 there were a multiplicity of schools and attempts to combine the tradition of the past with the new modern developments heralded by Descartes in philosophy and Galileo Galilei in the field of science. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, after 1680, the commentaries on the Summa were being replaced by manuals that followed the deductive, geometric reasoning made popular by Descartes with the ordo inventionis distinct and preliminary to the doctrinal presentation. The influence of Melchior Cano (d. 1560) was, in this matter, paramount. In his Loci Theologici he had laid the basis for the new order of presentation - proof from the Scriptures, proof from the Church's Tradition and proof from theological reasoning. Cano had still emphasised, however, that vital aspect of tradition, the ultimate foundation of faith being in the testimony of God revealing himself.³⁵ This was further restricted by John of St Thomas who considered the foundations of faith to be a personal awareness of the divine testimony.³⁶ Thus, in outline, the method for dealing with any question followed this model: statement of thesis, status quaestionis (definitions, explications), positive proof from authority (Scripture, Tradition, Church documents),

proof from theological reasoning, answers to objections, corollaries (particularly where there was something of relevance to the life of the Christian).

The introduction of Descartes' method into theological education meant that Theology tended to become a positive science. The element of investigation, of evaluation of the religious cultural heritage, was minimised. The approach aimed at determining the biblical and Patristic foundations of dogmas, which were assumed as revealed. Philosophy served as the ancilla for this task and philosophical manuals summarized what was useful for this purpose, assimilating what was acceptable in the new sciences.

6.2.2 Christian Wolff and his Scholastic Imitators.

Between 1750 and 1830 there was further development along the same lines. This was the adoption of Wolffian manuals. During the seventeenth century scientists such as Galileo, Kepler and Newton had set out to describe the universe rigorously by means of mathematics. Philosophers subsequently tried to introduce the same rigour into all fields of knowledge. Thus, Leibniz wished to use the mathematical model to construct a rationalistic system that could embrace the mind, God and matter. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was much influenced by Leibniz.³⁷ At the Protestant University of Halle, and later at Marburg, he began to outline a philosophy according to such a method. Using Euclid and his geometric method he aimed to present the whole of philosophy systematically by reducing it to its principles. He first proposed a new division, based on experience and reason. Each form of empirical knowledge was supplemented by a corresponding rational form which raised the former to the status of genuine knowledge by

deducing it from principles of ontology and cosmology. Philosophy, as the speculative science of Metaphysics, could be divided into General Metaphysics or Ontology and Special Metaphysics, which subsequently divided into Cosmology, Psychology and Theodicy. Metaphysics became a geometry of being, with deduction being all important. From clear and distinct concepts he derived a chain of definitions, which he saw as irrefutable.

Wolff, in fact, combined three traditions. There was first that of Descartes and Leibniz with the stress on clear ideas and reason. Secondly, there was Newtonian science with its foundation in experience. Finally, there was the Aristotelian-scholastic school with its emphasis on metaphysics. The Wolffian synthesis was, in fact, based on the application of the mathematico-deductive method to all the sciences, tempered by an inductive appeal to the facts of experience. He organized each science into a strict, deductive pattern and placed them all into an hierarchical order built on the same principles.

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There were many scholastic imitators of Wolff who maintained a static tension between experience and reason, with a rationalistic attitude towards reality. The speculative power of the human mind was segregated and exalted to the depreciation of other human powers. Such imitators began soon after 1750 and their philosophical compendia were regarded as an embodiment of the scholastic tradition. The main borrowings from Wolff were the division of the sciences and the principle of sufficient reason. This latter stated that the component elements (essentialia) of a possible must be mutually compatible and this consistency is regulated and judged by the principle of contradiction. But, to be possible is not to be in actu. An explanation must be

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provided, demonstrating why the particular objects or events of the given world are in actu in preference to other possibles.

Theology manuals followed Wolff's method, beginning with definitions of theological realities and then seeking a greater insight by relating concepts or by analyzing definitions to discover their full, logical implications. In particular, the Jesuits, although other Catholics were involved also, became the channel by which this particular form of German rationalism permeated much of Roman Catholic intellectual thought into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The reaction against the Aristotelian innovation had now run its course. A new consciousness had been born in the fifteenth century, of which Ockham was the forerunner. It was evident, in the stress which the Renaissance placed on human spontaneity and its anthropocentric view of the universe, that Man as an individual, unique being was counterposed to universal Man and a hierarchical way of life. The reflexive, philosophical expression of this new consciousness was Descartes' epistemological method, with its confidence in human reason. The most powerful abstract expression was the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff. By the time this trend had culminated in Kant's Critique of Pure and Practical Reason and Hegel's attempt to overcome all duality in the developing Spirit, however, there had been a contrary reaction within the Roman Catholic Church.

6.3 The New Research Model of Neo-Thomism.

The result of the influence of Descartes and Wolff on the study of Theology in the Roman Catholic Church was that Thomism, as a paradigmatic research model, survived virtually only in Dominican houses of

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study by the eighteenth century. At this point there was paradigmatic confusion in Roman Catholic theological education and a need was seen for normalization. In 1777 Salvatore Roselli, a professor at the Dominican College of St Thomas in Rome (Minerva) published a Summa Philosophica in six volumes which was intended to revive Thomism. It⁴¹ did have some influence on leaders in Italy, France and Spain.

In Italy, for example, Roselli's Summa influenced Vincenzo Buzzetti (1777-1824), a seminary professor in Piacenza, who had been introduced to scholastic thinking by two Jesuit exiles in Piacenza, Jose Antonio Masdeu and Baltasar Masdeu. They had shared, before the suppression of the Jesuits in Spain, in a cultural development which had included a fresh appreciation of scholastic thought and its method. The centre of this development was the Jesuits' Collegio de Cordellas⁴² in Barcelona.

In the Piacenza seminary, Buzzetti influenced two brothers - Domenico and Serafino Sordi. Upon the restoration of the Jesuits in 1814 they entered the order and became themselves instigators of⁴³ the neo-scholastic revival. Buzzetti wrote Institutiones sanae philosophiae iuxta divae Thomae atque Aristotelis inconcussa dogmata. It was basically Thomistic but it showed that Christian Wolff's method was still a force. The book aroused both interest and opposition.

Other symptoms of revival of interest in Aquinas was the birth of the journal Civiltà Cattolica, which was founded in Naples in 1850 by Carlo Mario Curci and Luigi Raparelli d'Azeglio in order to promote the Catholic cause and to restore Thomism, and the fact that eminent⁴⁴ theologians once more produced Thomistic manuals. These textbooks

were Wolffian in their division of sciences: Logic, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology, Theodicy and sometimes Ethics. Their method was deductive, a syllogistic defence of theses, but they purported to follow Aquinas. This development would have its effect on the seminaries.

In Spain seminaries followed the Summa of Aquinas from 1824 onwards. Theological education was based on it and influential philosophers followed suit.⁴⁵ In France,⁴⁶ the restoration of the monarchy had brought a general reaction against prevailing rationalism. In French seminaries an eclectic Cartesianism continued, for example in the Philosophia Lugdenensis written by Joseph Valla, but after 1850 the Dominicans were re-established in France by J.B.H. Lacordaire and interest in Thomism spread from them. Pierre Roux-Lavergne (1802-74) wrote two philosophical textbooks for seminaries (Paris, 1850-9; 1856)⁴⁷ but the general progress of Thomism was impeded by both traditionalism⁴⁸ and ontologism, which philosophies saw no distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders of truth. In Germany the outstanding Thomist was Josef Kleutgen (1811-1883), a professor of Theology in Rome for forty years. He opposed the prevailing tendencies of his time, including the pseudo-Thomistic traditionalism of Ventura. He first published his Theologie der Vorzeit (first ed. 1853-60) and then, in 1860, Philosophie der Vorzeit, an attempt to give an accurate account of Thomistic philosophy for his own day.

The period from 1850 onwards was one of rapid change in the realm of European thought generally. The idea of development had been given impetus by Darwin's Origin of the Species in 1859 and new thinking on historical method. The inductive and empirical approach was pitted against the more deductive methodology of the scholastic tradition.

The Bishop of Perugia, Gioacchino Pecci, was interested in the revival of Thomism in Italy. He was elected Pope as Leo XIII in 1878. Thereafter no doubt could be harboured as to the future direction of Catholic thought. He wished to establish a sound Christian philosophy and the groundwork of such a philosophy was set out in Aeterni Patris of August 4, 1879. It is thought that Kleutgen was the author of the encyclical. It exhorted Catholic scholars

to restore the golden wisdom of Thomas and to spread it far and wide for the defence and the beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society and for the advantage of all the sciences.

In so doing, Leo XIII was bringing to a head the renaissance of Thomism which had been developing since the turn of the century. He saw it as the restoration of the research model of Thomas Aquinas. In fact, it was something quite new, with various accretions since the time of Aquinas.

To implement this new model Leo XIII founded, first of all, the Roman Academy of St Thomas in 1879 and then directed the editing of the critical text of Aquinas. Further, he established at Louvain, in 1880, an Institut Supérieur de Philosophie as a centre of studies specifically designed to promulgate the doctrine of Aquinas. Finally he made Aquinas the patron of all Catholic universities, academies, colleges and schools throughout the world in 1890.

The first man to occupy the chair of Thomistic philosophy at Louvain was Désiré Mercier, under whom the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie was established. He saw philosophy as a purely rational discipline, distinct from theology, and free from all apologetical

preoccupation. Philosophy had to follow its own tradition but yet stay in contact with the empirical sciences of the day. He attempted to create a philosophia perennis. To his way of thinking the scholastic method consisted primarily in a synthetic and deductive explanation of all things. Philosophy had for its object not the discovery of new objects, of knowledge by analysis whether direct or indirect, but the synthetic explanation of the results already known by analysis. Thus he hoped to integrate all modern sciences and mathematics by means of
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the philosophia perennis.

Mercier encouraged Désiré Nys (1859-1927) to unite cosmology, seen from his viewpoint, with physics and chemistry as they presently stood and S. Deploige (1868-1927) to link Ethics with the social sciences. A textbook, Cours de Philosophie, prepared by Mercier, Nys and Maurice de Wulf was accepted widely.

From this time there was an optimistic hope that the philosophia perennis, based on Aquinas, would be adapted to the needs of the time and that a new scholastic synthesis of all philosophy could be constructed
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that was consistent with the progress of the new developments in science. The groundswell can be measured by the number of journals specifically
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devoted to this Neo-Thomism. It was felt that the co-operation of all Catholic intellectuals would be required to ensure the success of the enterprise.

The philosophia perennis was, therefore, an attempt to re-found a single research model which would serve both the religious and the non-religious systems of knowledge. Louvain's project clearly demonstrated this aim. It was presumed that the research model was that of Aquinas and so it was also necessary to establish the continuity between

it and that of Aquinas.

The traditional link between the past and this new development
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 was supplied by Maurice de Wulf. His historical studies showed
 that there had been significant differences between the scholastics
 of the thirteenth century. However, he dismissed these discrepancies
 in order to establish a substratum of philosophia perennis. He con-
 cluded that 'scholasticism' was a single body of doctrine and could
 be limited and defined. This view was later to be discredited by
 56 57
 Mandonnet and Étienne Gilson who saw not superficial but profound
 differences in the views of the scholastic philosophers of the thirteenth
 century. However, up to the 1960s there was still a broad presumption,
 in Roman Catholic circles, that Aquinas was revived in the philosophia
perennis.

The terminology covering this new philosophia perennis differed.
 De Wulf felt that 'Neo-Thomism' was too narrow and preferred 'Neo-
 Scholasticism', which he took to be the common teaching of the scholastics,
 shorn of false and useless notions such as celestial movers, incompatibility
 of celestial bodies, their influence on terrestrial events, the diffusion
 of sensible 'species' throughout a medium and their introduction into the
 organs of sense.

The nineteenth century was notable for the burgeoning and pro-
 liferation of new research traditions in the secular sciences, both
 physical and social. Development impinged on both Science and History,
 and the Roman Catholic theologian was placed under considerable pressure.
 As an antidote to possible confusion, there being no entrenched research
 model in the Catholic Church, this Neo-Thomist research tradition was
 proposed. It claimed, as would be expected, antiquity and thereby

gained credence and acceptance. Quickly it was installed as the research model which would give the true secondary expressive model. When during the time of Leo XIII, it was enforced by authority, at first suggestive and later clearly directive, its perpetuation was ensured. In this instance authority acted analogously to social exchange in maintaining the research tradition within the sciences.

Neo-Thomism was a re-evaluation of Aristotelianism, to an extent that was unprecedented. As was shown above, Aquinas was as Neoplatonic as he was Aristotelian, although less dependent on Pseudo-Dionysius than other medievals. Aristotelianism is concerned with the analysis of reality seen as an empirical entity. Being is analysed by its causes, and its inner structure is described by material and formal elements. When this is applied in the field of theology, such a research model allows the theologian to stand back from the elements of the expressive model and analyse them as objective entities. For example, the community is taken as a visible and definable thing, its juridical elements emphasised. The character of the Christian community can be isolated by the 'notes of the Church'. Likewise the other elements can be submitted to such scrutiny by the research model. The research model is acting in a purely deductive way in order to elucidate the expressive
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model. Neo-Thomism reactivated this research tradition.

The mechanism by which such analysis can take place is also of interest. The first cognitional act, according to the Neo-Thomist teaching, is cognition. Through sensible stimuli the question arises in the human mind as to the nature of a particular external thing. Recognition is effected when there emerges in the mind a concept which corresponds to the particular, sense-perceived instance. The interior

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concept is generated by the intellectus agens which has the power to illuminate, immaterialize and transform sensibly impressed images into universals which can then be applied to successive, individual instances. The intellectus agens, however, not only generates universals but has the further ability to combine these concepts into propositions. These propositions can be aligned into premises leading to universal, and incontrovertible, conclusions by a process of reasoning.

The intellectus agens, now referred to as ratio or reason, compares the separate units of meaning and automatically divides them into subjects and predicates, thus forming logical propositions, which are subsequently arranged into syllogisms leading to a conclusion. For this purpose the intellectus agens has, at its disposal, four figures and nineteen syllogistic moods. Each of these can bring about legitimate conclusions. However, the entire process is protected by certain ultimate principles. Operating in the light of these ultimate principles, the intellectus agens guides the human mind through the premises to the conclusion. The three ultimate principles are contradiction, identity and excluded middle.
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The Neo-Thomist research tradition gave new confidence to the Catholic scholars that not only could they give valid expression to the primary expressive model and vindicate the secondary expressive model by reason, but their research tradition could be just as truly applied to secular knowledge and the conclusions of one system of knowledge would be equally as valid as those of the other system.

6.4 Further Development of the Research Models in discrete Ecclesiastical Disciplines.

While the main thrust of ecclesiastical science and therefore of

theological education, necessarily centered on Neo-Thomism and therefore on the combined disciplines of Philosophy and Theology, there were also significant developments in Biblical Exegesis and Christian Ethics. Each of these was in the process of acquiring its own research tradition.

6.4.1 The Further Development of the Research Model of Biblical Exegesis.

The study of Scripture as exegesis was revived by the Council of Trent, which decreed that cathedral schools and colleges should set up schools of biblical exegesis (lectorales) and that Scripture be taught⁶¹ in seminaries. Trent had also passed a momentous decree on the⁶² relationship between Scripture and Tradition. It was said that the 'truth of the gospel' was handed down both in written Scriptures⁶³ and non-written Tradition. From this time, it was authoritatively⁶⁴ held that Scripture and Tradition were the sources of Revelation. 'Tradition', in this sense, included the constant teaching of the Roman Church, in various modes, which was not contained clearly in the written corpus of the Bible. It comprised, to a large extent, the conglomeration of variant secondary expressive models. Trent's decree shows the tendency, which can be seen in other religious groups as well, to replace the primary expressive model by the more elaborated secondary expressive model.

As a consequence of this view there was little change in the research tradition as it concerned the study of Sacred Scripture up to the late nineteenth century. Using philology the text was simply explained and its application to problems in the field of Theology indicated. In the late 1800s several new text books were produced which exemplified this approach. Vigouroux and Bacuez published

their Manuel Biblique in 1878 in four volumes. It became the most commonly used textbook in the Catholic seminaries of France. It was still simplistically assumed that the secondary expressive model was literally contained in the written corpus.

However, there were challenges to the reigning methodology on the horizon. Jean Astruc (1684-1766) was a medical practitioner and eventually professor at the College of France.⁶⁵ He wrote on medical topics but also published anonymously his Conjectures sur les memoires originaux dont il parait que Moïse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genèse (Brussels, 1753). Within the biblical narrative of the book of Genesis he was able to disengage two separate sources, on the basis of differing usage of the divine name. He postulated two major sources and two less important ones. He maintained that Moses had originally placed them side by side but that later copyists had integrated them.

Astruc's Conjectures met with hostility and derision, challenging as it did the most basic tenets of biblical science.⁶⁶ However, within the Protestant school which leaned towards Rationalism, S. Semler and J.G. Eichhorn successfully developed the critical method into biblical research.⁶⁷ Although Astruc was a Catholic, the method matured in Protestant circles and during the nineteenth century Catholics found themselves faced with the 'Biblical Question' which was the application of literary criticism to the Bible.⁶⁸ Literary criticism was a particular variation of textual study. The focussing of attention on the Bible by the Reformers had led to such critical questioning. Beginning with Astruc, literary problems came to the fore which led to the supposition that documents had been used as sources for the biblical writings.

It was also a time when the study of history, and its accompanying appreciation of sources, was undergoing review. Classical philology had made considerable progress and Greek and Roman antiquity came to be understood much better. Social, economic, artistic and literary characteristics of ancient societies were understood and appreciated. Leopold von Ranke summed up the new approach in his endeavour to uncover
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'wie es eigentlich gewesen'. At once the same ideal was appropriated by the liberal school of exegesis. In 1832 H.A.W. Meyer founded, at the University of Göttingen, the Kritischexegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament. The method was grammatical, stylistic and historical.
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Other commentaries then replicated the method.

The issues that developed in the literary criticism of the Bible concerned the authenticity of the writings of the Old Testament, the value of the historical writings, the authenticity of the Christian gospels and the question of the actual origins of Christianity.

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J. Wellhausen led literary criticism in a new direction. Earlier, the emphasis had been on the discovery of pre-existing documentary sources and the means of identifying such sources. From his time, interest turned to the Sitz im Leben, the life situation which had prompted the writing. This was known as Higher Criticism or Historical Criticism. The method spawned confusion, and from the confusion there was born the more regulated method of Formgeschichte. It concentrated on the primary categories of form rather than on documents as such. It combined this emphasis with a recognition of the Sitz im Leben and the original function of the form. Formgeschichte went behind the problem of documenting sources to an earlier stage in the whole process of forming the written Bible. A novel idea that
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surfaced was the influence of oral transmission on the writings.

Traditionsgeschichte presupposed the analytical work of both literary and form criticism.⁷³ In general, it recognised that the entire community participated in shaping the tradition and handing it on from generation to generation. Varying degrees of emphasis on oral and written means of transmission marked the variant schools of thought in this area.⁷⁴ A later refinement was Redaktionsgeschichte, which dealt with the final stage of editing, which ensured that the corpus of written material, in its final form, carried out the task demanded by the social group. In short, Traditionsgeschichte is interested in all the stages between Formgeschichte and Redaktionsgeschichte.

The biblico-exegetical method with its use of Formgeschichte, Traditionsgeschichte and Redaktionsgeschichte led to a realization of the process of tradition in the formation of the expressive models. This exacerbated the problem of seeing a relationship between an historical event and its theological expression, for example the relationship between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith. However, the method did allow for creative reformulation from the matrix of the basic myth.

In particular the method threw into doubt the entrenched secondary expressive model of Roman Catholicism. Thus, Strauss' Leben Jesu in 1835 and Renan's Vie de Jesus both presented what were considered to be significantly deviant views of that secondary expressive model.⁷⁵ The secondary expressive model had been considered to be a literalist restatement of the primary expressive model, even though certain interests had been inserted into the process of restatement. This demanded that Scripture contain the primary expressive model and, implicitly, the secondary expressive model.

The authoritative, ecclesiastical attitude in this period of turmoil was the Encyclical Letter of Leo XIII Providentissimus Deus written in 1893.⁷⁶ The Encyclical presented a curious mélange. It extolled the advantages of linguistic and exegetical studies on the Bible. However the same Encyclical showed a fear towards the new developments in biblical science:

'There has arisen, to the great detriment of religion, an inept method, dignified by the name of the 'higher criticism', which pretends to judge of the origin, the integrity and authority of each book from internal indications alone ... It will not throw on the Scripture the light which is sought, or prove of any advantage to doctrine seeing that most of them (the biblical critics) are tainted with false philosophy and rationalism, it must lead to the elimination from the sacred writings of all prophecy and miracles, and of everything else that is outside the natural order.'

Leo XIII decreed a solemn stricture on the new methods:

'For although the studies of non-Catholics, used with prudence, may sometimes be of use to the Catholic student, he should, nevertheless, bear in mind - as the Fathers also teach in numerous passages - that the sense of Holy Scripture can nowhere be found incorrupt outside the Church, and cannot be expected to be found in writers who, being without the true faith, only gnaw the bark of the sacred Scripture and never attain its pith.'

In the face of these new developments Roman Catholic biblical scholars divided into three rather uneven groups. There were the conservatives who repudiated any critical exegesis, seeing it as necessarily opposed to the supernatural element in the Bible and as denying the truth of the Bible in the fields of science and history. In a second category were informed progressives, aware of the timely nature of these new findings, but yet hesitant to give full acceptance to them. There was, thirdly, a group of ultra-progressives who indicated that the findings were of such a nature that they heralded, in fact, the demise of Christian faith.

The second and third groups contributed towards the so-called
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heresy of Modernism. Its biblical phase was represented by Alfred
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Loisy (1857-1940), whose personal life characterised these times.
In 1890 Loisy had presented a thesis on the history of the Old Testament
Canon in which it was obvious that he had felt the impact on his thinking
of liberal Protestant biblical criticism. During the following years
Loisy faced the growing attacks on the Church as an institution. There
were many voices being raised which saw the Christian response as some-
thing essentially interior and personal and the existence of an insti-
tutional Church was regarded as quite superfluous. Loisy's reaction
was to present the Church as indeed the mediator between God and man
but he then denied that the Church, as it had developed historically,
was founded by Christ. He allowed that it had developed according to
the designs of God but this evolution had in no way been foreseen by
Christ. Taking his findings into a broader area Loisy maintained that
the Jesus of History, the Jesus who lived and walked and spoke, was to
be dissociated from the Christ of Faith, the Lord proclaimed by the
early apostolic community. In fact, Loisy contended, the early
Christian community is an impenetrable barrier between the believer and
the actual event of Christ. This line of thinking was expressed in
and substantiated by his treatment of the gospels. Thus, he denied
that the secondary expressive model could be an historically verifiable
replica of the primary expressive model.

Several enterprises were undertaken in order to protect the Church
from the consequences of the 'Biblical Question'. These were the
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editing of the Corpus Sacrae Scripturae and the founding of specific
institutions for the study of the Scriptures in a Catholic environment,
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namely the École Biblique, the Benedictine Studium Biblicum at
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Montserrat, and the Franciscan Studium Biblicum in Jerusalem. In

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1902 Leo XII established the Pontificia Commissio de Re Biblica.
 The role of this deliberating body was to moderate the questions being discussed by Catholic scholars so that Rome could be informed as to what questions should be further discussed and what discussion should be terminated within Catholic circles. Between 1905 and 1915 a series of decrees was issued which gave rise to what was to be for a long time the typical face of Roman Catholic biblical scholarship - the ultimate in conservatism, maintained by rigid authority. Decrees passed during this time by the Biblical Commission included, first of all, an assertion on the authorship of the Pentateuch. The Commission decreed that Moses was substantially the author of the Pentateuch and that the literal and historical character of Genesis 1-3 was to be
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 firmly maintained. On the subject of the prophecy of Isaiah the Commission maintained there was insufficient evidence to warrant the
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 opinion that the present prophecy was the result of several authors. The Davidic authorship of certain Psalms was upheld together with the rejection of the opinion that any Psalms could have been composed after
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 the time of Ezra and Nehemiah. In New Testament studies the primacy of Matthew's gospel was dictated. It had been written in Hebrew or
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 Aramaic and then translated into Greek in an identical version. John the Apostle was specifically identified as the author of the
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 fourth gospel.

By 1915 Modernism had been checked. By this stage a position had been reached whereby the Tridentine decree on Scripture and Tradition as the sources of revelation was a cornerstone of Roman Catholic belief and methodology. The work of the theologian was to mine the information contained in the sources and, in order to do this, as we have seen, the research model of Neo-Thomism was used. Necessarily the historico-critical research tradition was repressed and the Scriptures

were seen as a facsimile of the expressive models. Seminary manuals from this time onwards were marked by a sameness and a very conservative bent, allowing no leeway for critical analysis. Thus, in an Encyclical Letter of Benedict XV, written in 1920 we read:

If Jerome were living now, he would sharpen his keenest controversial weapons against people who set aside what is the mind and judgement of the Church and take too ready a refuge in such notions as 'implicit quotations' or 'pseudo-historical narratives' or in 'kinds of literature' (genera quaedam litterarum) in the Bible such as cannot be reconciled with the entire and perfect truth of God's word, or who suggest such origins of the Bible as must inevitably weaken - if not destroy - its authority.

This situation was to remain virtually unchanged until the 1940s. Authority had suspended any development of a research tradition in the field of Biblical exegesis.

6.4.2 The Further Development of the Research Model of Christian Ethics.


At the end of the sixteenth century a new literary genre in the field of Christian Ethics or Moral Theology appeared - the Institutiones Morales. Trent had called for a more profound study of Moral Theology and assigned two years to it in the seminary course, as the study of casus conscientiae. Manuals were therefore designed for this need. One plan for such a manual already appeared in the Jesuits' Ratio Studiorum: actus humani, conscience, sin, law, and a study of cases involving the Ten Commandments, the Commandments of the Church, the Sacraments and Church censures.

In 1600 Juan Azor (1536-1603) published his Institutiones Morales which was the forerunner of the genre. He had served on the committee

that had drafted the Ratio Studiorum since 1584. He intended his work, which basically followed the Commandments, with casus conscientiae, to supplant the Summae Confessorum now considered to be outmoded. Azor was used into the next century and his most important successor was Hermann Busenbaum (d. 1668) the author of Medulla Theologiae Moralis. This went to forty editions in the author's lifetime and from 1670-1770 there were 150 editions throughout Europe. It became the model for seminary studies in Moral Theology, and, in its turn, inspired commentaries.⁹³ His method was strictly casuistic and analytical. He saw the primary need for the course on Moral Theology as being the instruction of priests for the practical work of the confessional.

The characteristic of this genre is that human experience, for the purposes of the confessor, is broken down into certain, definable casus conscientiae. These could be regulated by law - the Decalogue and ecclesiastical law - and reason. However, it was still necessary to establish, on firm principles, a research tradition which would render ready solutions to such casus conscientiae when required.

It has become clear that the Institutiones Morales, as a literary form, had broken its moorings with the primary expressive model and lived its own life.



The Institutiones Morales established conscience as the focal point

of the research tradition of Moral Theology. The penitent is judged according to his conscience above all else, but he is primarily responsible for the formation of that conscience. Systems of morality developed, therefore, which gave general theory for the formation and interpretation of a conscience. The system of probabilism became part of the tradition of the Institutiones Morales after 1577 when it was introduced by Bartholomew Medina, a Dominican. He was commenting on the Prima Secundae of Aquinas and admitted the strength of the Thomistic position, namely that an individual should in conscience follow a safer opinion. However, he maintained that it will still be licit to follow any probable opinion even though the opposite opinion might be more probable.

It seems to be that if there is a probable opinion it is⁹⁴ lawful to follow it, even though the opposite is more probable.

Spanish and Portuguese Dominicans followed this system until 1656, when it was explicitly forbidden by their General Chapter in Rome. From that time they supported probabiliorism, the system which demanded that a conscience could be legitimately formed only on the basis of an⁹⁵ opinion which is demonstrably more safe than its opponent.

Gabriel Vasquez, following Medina, introduced probabilism to the Jesuits. The system allowed the appearance, if not the reality, of a certain laxity in Christian living and Alexander VII (1665-1666) and Innocent XI (1679) condemned more than one hundred laxist propositions.⁹⁶

By this stage Moral Theology, in the sense of casuistry, had developed its own research tradition. There were many variants.

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
Alphonsus Ligouri (1696-1787) sought a solution to the debate. His Theologia Moralis began as a simple annotated commentary on Busenbaum in its first edition in 1748. A second edition (1753-55) was more personal, although still following the outline of Busenbaum. However, by a third edition (1757) the Theologia Moralis had taken on
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its own format.

In a later work, Dell'uso moderato dell' opinione probabile published in 1765 Ligouri established a competing system of equiprobabilism.
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He rejected probabilism as a universally valid and mechanically applicable solution to casus conscientiae. A personal decision was necessary and there was an obligation to follow the more probable opinion in favour of the law. Moralists progressively adopted this stance and manuals of Moral Theology used in seminaries were realigned according to its position.

There was a progression therefore within the Institutiones Morales. The casuistic method depended upon the concept of the ius naturale written into the universe, from which there was no possible exception. There could be no possible conflict of moral values. Moral values and disvalues consisted in the conformity or difformity of the agent's conscience with the perfectly ordered demands of this natural law. There was a need therefore to bring the will into conformity with the moral law. The methodology described three mechanisms for ensuring this. If there were doubts about the demands of the moral law, which doubts did not reflect on the moral law but on the insufficiency of the human intellect, then one of the moral systems - probabilism, probabiliorism, equiprobabilism - came into effect. If there appeared to be a collisio officiorum, then the doctrine of ignorantia invicibilis applied. Finally, if there were intrinsically evil consequences following from

some action then the principle of the two-fold effect applied. Thus, the research tradition for Moral Theology was complete and adequate. There could be no exceptions and the researcher need only examine casus conscientiae and show the application of principles in order to round off the normal science of morality.

Hence we can chart the succession of literary genres relating to Moral Theology in this way:



During the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries students in the seminaries were formed in the research model that had emerged under the influence of Ligouri. Differences of opinion circulated as to the acceptance or rejection of probabilism, but the main outline of the research tradition remained intact. There was little connection between this research tradition and that of Theology in general, apart from a basis within the research tradition of Neo-Thomism. Conclusions, provided by that model, which were universal and necessary, could become

principles of conduct, moral laws, from which moral decisions could be formed and human behaviour regulated.

6.5 Challenges to the Neo-Thomist Research Model.

The hoped-for co-operation of Catholic intellectuals, accepting Neo-Thomism, was not forthcoming. There was a sizeable body of scholars who considered that the wealth of contemporary thought could not be expressed through the categories of Neo-Thomism. They saw the theological manuals as stressing the argument from authority at a time when reason and critical reflection provided the primary methodology in science and literature.

The static approach towards the Church, viewing it as an absolute hierarchical structure, found in the manuals, was at variance with the intellectual trend which owed much to Schliermacher and his theory of experience, maintaining that the feeling of dependence was at the heart of religion.¹⁰⁰ During the course of the nineteenth century Schliermacher's disciples tended to eliminate more and more the element of intelligence from religion. In Catholic circles, as a consequence, men like John Henry Newman were caught up with the need to work out a theory of experience as against notional knowledge.¹⁰¹ Revelation, for Newman, was a lived and experienced reality, an Idea. It came to fuller understanding through its confrontation with changing, historical circumstances. Thus, knowledge was never relegated to the level of logic. It had psychological and sociological dimensions. Newman then made some extremely important distinctions, from one point of view. He distinguished between implicit, non-reflective reasoning and explicit, reflective reasoning and coined the term 'illative sense'¹⁰² to identify a particular sense of judgement, based on an intimate contact with the

experience of the reality of faith, which would lead to the true expression of logical knowledge. Having perceived the disproportion between the primary expressive model and subsequent, successive models, he saw the need to protect the work of the research tradition by his 'illative sense'.

Along similar lines in 1893 Maurice Blondel presented a new metaphysics of action in which man's totality was in response to God and the development of dogma was the Church's growth in self-awareness, an awareness which could never exhaust the reality.¹⁰³ Both Newman and Blondel indicate re-assertions of Platonic research traditions.

Thus towards the end of the nineteenth century there was a definite thrust towards the idea of growth and development in religion, both within the Roman Catholic Church and in other Christian denominations. Neo-Hegelians, reactivating the Platonic tradition, supported this approach and, rather paradoxically, they found a confederate in William James.¹⁰⁴ A theory was put forward of a radical evolution of dogma and a pragmatic norm for discovering religious truth, namely its fruitful life-value and permanence. Neo-Kantianism was still influential and eventually joined this composite theory in questioning the stability and the reality of dogma. All of this threatened the philosophia perennis as a research tradition.

Side by side with this emphasis on development there was the emergence of an historical method. It caused the philosophia perennis to undergo scrutiny. In particular it was to bring about a drastic change in the research tradition associated with Biblical exegesis, which will be dealt with later.

The reaction against Neo-Thomism in favour of the new movements of development and evolution were grouped together as was said above, as the heresy of Modernism.¹⁰⁵ The basic issue at stake in the entire Modernist controversy was the relationship of revelation to dogma. In other terms it was the relationship of the primary expressive model to elaborations of other models.¹⁰⁶ Thus, George Tyrrell saw that the experience of the apostolic Church was, in the first place, normative for a Christian believer. It was the primary expressive model. Revelation thence forward took place as self-manifestation of the divine in the personal life of the believer, who elaborated his own secondary expressive model.

Such emphasis on personal activity in the believer raised the issue of immanence¹⁰⁷ as a mode of knowledge. Immanence bypasses extrinsic causality and any external referent for knowledge. If it does not completely exclude transcendence then it emphasises the inner dynamism and self-perfecting character of being or the awareness of self in the knowing act. In the field of epistemology, the immanent activity, involved in the act of knowing, is stressed so as to exclude everything extrinsic to the knowing subject. When it is absolutely maintained, the theory demands that anything beyond thought should be eliminated. The human mind can only know that which is already contained within it.¹⁰⁸ This was basically the position of Eduard Le Roy, who maintained it is impossible to know anything at all outside one's self. When Le Roy applied his theory to dogma he stated that the function of dogma was, negatively, to safeguard against error and, positively, to prescribe a rule of practical conduct. Thus, the dogma of the paternity of God does not require any intellectual assent but a filial attitude towards God.

The relative principle of immanence maintains that the human mind cannot know anything unless it has some kind of inward preparation or need, either intellectual or moral, to assimilate the knowledge. Man has therefore to prepare himself to enter into dialogue with the truth since he can assimilate nothing which is radically foreign to his thought. There could be no reconciliation between immanence and the Neo-Thomist research model.

During the reign of Leo XIII and into the reign of Pius X the struggle with Modernism continued. Its acceptance would have meant a drastic change in the paradigmatic system of knowledge, replacing the research tradition of the philosophia perennis with the personal, individualistic noetic activity of immanence. Then, under Pius X, the Roman Catholic Church's authority repudiated all forms of Modernism. Authority acted as social control to protect the system.

First of all, the decree Lamentabili of July 3, 1907 condemned 65 errors of Modernism, many of them connected in some way with
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repudiation of the teachings of Neo-Thomism. Pius X, in Pascendi, then noted that the Modernists

deride and heedlessly despise scholastic philosophy and
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theology.

There had, in fact, been no widespread acceptance of Aeterni Patris and some Catholic institutions had only very broadly accepted its directives. Accordingly Pascendi spelt out the requirements of intellectual endeavour. The study of scholastic philosophy, especially Aquinas, had to form the basis for any kind of theological instruction. Professors at seminaries and universities had to be vetted as to their scholastic principles. Bishops had to inhibit and confiscate any Modernistic writings, and they had regularly to report to Rome on the success of the measures
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taken.

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In the encyclical Doctoris Angelici of June 29, 1914, Pius X insisted that 'scholasticism' meant the 'principal teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas'. The doctrine of any other Church teacher was commended

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to the extent that it agreed with the principles of Aquinas or was in no way opposed to them.

The Summa was also to be used as a textbook in all institutions granting pontifical degrees. Discussion raged over the interpretation of 'principal teaching' of Thomistic philosophy. On July 24, 1914 the Congregation of Studies published a list of 'principia et
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pronunciata maiora' of Aquinas. In this way Neo-Thomism took on a static form. There was little possibility that it could function as a true research model. The research tradition had itself become part of the secondary expressive model that needed to be accepted without question as a 'given'.

From the time of its revitalization, Neo-Thomism had been transformed from a research tradition to a preparation for the study of
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Theology. It had less and less ability to generate new expressive models. Competing research traditions were inevitable but they were authoritatively excluded. In 1950, the Encyclical Humani Generis stated:

How deplorable it is then that his (Aquinas') philosophy, received and honoured by the Church, is scorned by some who shamelessly call it outmoded in form and rationalistic, as they say, in its method of thought.
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With repression of the ability to generate and evaluate it was inevitable that a static secondary expressive model should appear less and less fruitful at least to the community of graduates.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. The response is sometimes called the Counter-Reformation. In fact, it can be demonstrated that a reform movement had been taking place from the previous century, especially in Spain. For a select bibliography see A.G. Dickens, The Counter-Reformation (London, 1968), pp. 203-206.
2. Cited from L. Pastor, The History of the Popes (St Louis, 1910), vol. IX, pp. 134-135.
3. The text of the Report is found in J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et amplissima Collectio (Lyons, 1899-1927), vol. 35, pp. 347-355.
4. For documentation on Trent, see Denz. Schön., pp. 363-427.
5. The role of the Jesuits in this period is described in A.G. Dickens, op.cit., pp. 27-28.
6. Constitutions. Ch. 5, par. 14. See G.E. Ganss, The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus (St. Louis, 1970).
7. H. Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent (two vols., London 1957), Vol. II, p. 356.
8. By Bulls of Julius III in 1552 and Paul IV in 1556 doctorates in philosophy and theology could be bestowed by the College and it enjoyed all the privileges of the universities of Paris, Louvain, Salamanca and Alcalá. Gregory XIII erected a much larger building for it in 1567 and it became known thenceforward as the Gregorianum. In 1928 the Pontificium Institutum Biblicum and Pontificium Orientale Institutum were affiliated to it. E. Rinaldi, La fondazione del Collegio Romano: Memorie storiche (Arezzo, 1914); R. Garcia-Villoslada, Storia del Collegio Romano (Rome, 1954).
9. The text is in F. Schroeder, Monumenta quae spectant Primordia Collegii Germanici et Hungarici collecta et illustrata (Rome, 1896), pp. 60-74.
10. J. H. Crehan, 'Saint Ignatius and Cardinal Pole', Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu, 25 (1956), p. 84.
11. The full text is in the appendix to F. C. Bourne, Ecclesiastical Education (New York, 1926), pp. 74-77.
12. Pole's decree is commented upon in J.A. O'Donohoe, Tridentine Seminary Legislation. Its Sources and its Formation (Louvain, 1957), pp. 89-120.
13. Text is in H. Jedin (ed.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta (Bologna and Freiburg, 1962), pp. 726-729; See J.A. O'Donohoe, 'Trent and the Doicesan Seminary' Clergy Review, 49 (1969), pp. 616-625.
14. J.G. Dwyer, New Catholic Encyclopaedia, vol. 11, p. 488.

15. O'Donohoe, op.cit., pp. 139-140.
16. Letter of Le Jay to Alfonso Salmeron S.J. in January 1545 in C. Sommervogel and others, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jesus (11 vols., Brussels and Paris, 1890-1932).
17. Documentation and a bibliography on seminaries are contained in Seminaria Ecclesiae Catholicae (Rome, 1963). On the origin and history of seminaries see M. Barbera, 'L'origine dei seminari a norma del Concilio di Trento', Civiltà Cattolica, 91 (1940), pp. 215-221; G. Culkin, 'The English Seminaries', Clergy Review, 35 (1951), pp. 73-88; H. Jedin, 'Domschule und Kolleg', Trier Theologische Zeitschrift, 67 (1958), pp. 210-223; idem, 'L'importanza del decreto tridentino sui seminari nella vita della chiesa', Seminarium, 15 (1963), pp. 396-412.
18. On Borromeo and this text see R. Mols, 'Saint Charles Borromée, pionnier de la pastorale modern', NRT, 79 (1957), pp. 600 ff.
19. On the French experience, see J.T. Ellis, Essays in Seminary Education (New York, 1967), pp. 41-111.
20. M.A. Roche, Saint Vincent de Paul and the Formation of Clerics (Fribourg, 1963). His reaction to the development of the seminary as an institution can be traced in P. Coste (ed.), Saint Vincent de Paul: Correspondence, Entretiens, Documents (Paris, 1924). See especially letter of May 13, 1644 in op. cit., vol. 2, p. 459
21. Ellis, op.cit.
22. Pius V, a Dominican, sponsored the edition in seventeen volumes.
23. B. Duhr, Die Studienordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu (Freiburg, 1896); E.A. Fitzpatrick (ed.), St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studiorum (New York, 1933); A.P. Farrell, The Jesuit Code of Liberal Education (Milwaukee, 1938); W.V. Bangert, A History of the Society of Jesus (St. Louis, 1972).
24. Both the 1586 and 1599 texts are in G.M. Pachtler (ed.), Ratio Studiorum et Institutiones Scholasticae Societatis Jesu in Monumenta Germaniae Pedagogica (Berlin, 1887-94), vols. 2, 5, 9, 16.
25. After Aquaviva the Ratio Studiorum was regarded as authoritative and, as part of the cultural heritage of the Jesuit community, it was preserved against indiscriminate change. Cf. Bangert, op.cit., p. 54.
26. V. Beltran de Heredia, 'L'ensenanza de Santo Tomas en la Campania de Jesus durante el primer siglo de su existencia', Ciencia Thomista, On this point see especially pp. 392-393.
27. This was published in Lisbon in 1588. It was condemned by the Spanish Inquisition and attacked by Banez in particular. The key issue was Molina's description of a scientia media by which God sees all possible reactions of individuals in various circumstances. Knowing how men will react, he gives grace to them accordingly. If man accepts grace then God concurs, by concursus simultaneus, with man in his meritorious action. Banez and the Dominicans insisted on the primacy of God's universal causality, teaching that free will could not choose grace unless it is

physically premoved (praemotio physica) by God. God foreknows whom he will eventually save because he gives intrinsically efficacious grace to whom he wills. The altercation became known in Rome between 1594 and 1597. On February 22, 1599 a long series of Conferences, the so called Congregatio de auxiliis, began. In 1607 Paul V forbade both sides to call each other heretical over this point of debate.

28. A Jesuit decree of 1593 stated: Nullus ad docendum theologiam assumatur, qui non sit vere S. Thomae doctrinae studiosus. Cf. Beltran de Heredia, art.cit.
29. Some works that are relevant to the aspect of Descartes discussed here are: É. Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris, 1930); J. de Finance, Cogito cartésien et réflexion thomiste (Paris, 1946); E. Alquie, De découverte métaphysique de l'homme chez Descartes (Paris, 1950); id., Descartes: L'homme et l'oeuvre (Paris, 1956); L.J. Beck, The Method of Descartes (Oxford, 1952); N.K. Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (London, 1952); H.H. Joachim, Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind (London, 1957); H. G. Gonhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris, 1962); L.J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes (Oxford, 1965).
30. See Olympica vol. 10, pp. 217-219 in C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes (12 vols. and suppl., Paris, 1897-1913).
31. Rules XII in ibid., vol. 10, p. 419.
32. Discourse IV, in ibid., vol. 6, p. 32.
33. Cf. P. Mouy, Le développement de la physique cartésienne 1646-1712 (Paris, 1934).
34. Voyage du monde de M. Descartes (Paris, 1691) quoted in Mouy, op.cit., p. 168.
35. De locis 2.8.
36. Cursus theologicus (Paris, 1931), vol. 1, p. 316.
37. M. Campo, Cristiano Wolff e il razionalismo precritico (2 vols., Milan, 1939); J. Gurr, The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems. 1750-1900 (Milwaukee, 1959); R. Blackwell (tr.), Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General (New York, 1963).
38. Amongst the Jesuits there was J. Radlhamer (1713-61); B. Hauser (1713-62); B. Stattler (1728-97) who was responsible for Philosophia methodo scientiis propria explanata (Augsburg, 1769-72); Institutiones Logicae (Vienna, 1769) and Institutiones Metaphysicae (Vienna, 1772). The most notable Franciscan was H. Osterrieder who wrote Metaphysica vetus et nova (Augsburg, 1761) which was a manual adapted to the specific needs of Franciscan students.
39. J. Gurr, op.cit., pp.48-53.

40. In 1757 the Master General of the Dominicans, J.T. Boxadors, renewed the legislation from the past which insisted that the members of the Order return immediately to the solid teaching of Aquinas. His letter was included in the Acta of the General Chapter held in Rome in 1777. Cf. B. Reichert (ed.), Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica (Rome - Stuttgart - Paris, 1896 -), vol. 14, pp. 344-350.
41. J. L. Perrier, The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1909); R. Villeneuve, 'Le Thomisme avant et après l'encyclique Aeterni Patris', Revue Dominicaine, 26 (1929), pp. 272-282, 339-354, 479-496; M. Grabmann, 'Der Anteil des Dominikanerordens und der Entstehung und Entwicklung der Neuscholastik im 19. Jahrhundert', Neue Ordnung, 1 (1948), pp. 98-112.
42. Cf. E. E. Hales, Pio Nono (London, 1954), pp. 150-151; R. Aubert, Le Pontificat de Pie IX (Paris, 1952), p. 286.
43. Serafino Sordi (1793-1865), having entered the Jesuit order, attempted to stir up interest in Thomism. As a result, when he was proposed for the position of Professor of Logic at the Collegium Romanum he was set aside. It was explained: 'So strong are the prejudices against Fr. Sordi because he is a Thomist'. Letter of the Jesuit Provincial, October 2, 1827 cited in P. Dezza, Alle Origini de neotomismo (Milan, 1940), p. 33.
44. Thus Vincenzo Gatti (1811-82) wrote Institutiones apologeticae (1866); Francisco Xarrie (d.1866) and Narcisio Puig (d.1865) jointly wrote Institutiones Theologicae ad mentem D. Thomae (1861-3); Xarrie also wrote Theologia Thomistica. Tommaso Zigliara wrote the influential Summa philosophica, which ran eventually to seventeen editions.
45. J.L. Balmes followed the Thomistic line in his Filosofia fundamental, written in 1846, and Curso de filosofia elemental in 1847.
46. L. Foucher, La Philosophie catholique en France au XIXe siècle avant la renaissance thomiste et dans son rapport avec elle, 1800-1880 (Paris, 1955).
47. Cf. H. Medine, Esquisse d'un traditionalisme Catholique (Paris, 1956). The principal exponent was P.G. Ventura. Ventura's works are contained in Opere Complete (31 vols., Milan and Venice, 1852-63). On his connection with Traditionalism see A. Christofoli, Il pensiero religioso del P.G. Ventura (Milan, 1927).
48. Cf. J. Henry, Le Traditionalisme et l'ontologisme a l'université de Louvain (Louvain, 1922).
49. Leo XIII's first encyclical issued in 1878, Quod Apostolici Muneris, concerned socialism and the general need for a Christian philosophy. On the influence of Leo XIII, see R. Aubert, 'Aspects divers du neo-Thomisme sous le pontificat de Leon XIII' in G. Rossini (ed.), Aspetti della cultura cattolica nell'età di Leone XIII (Rome, 1961), pp. 133-227.

50. Encyclopaedia Cattolica (Rome, 1949-54), vol. 7, p. 716.
51. ASS, 11 (1879), p. 114.
52. D. Mercier, Ontologie (Louvain, 1903). Similarly M. de Wulf wrote that philosophy 'becomes the science par excellence because it seeks a synthetic and deductive explanation of things'. Scholasticism Old and New (Dublin, 1965), p. 82
53. This was most clearly expressed in M. de Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie médiévale sixth ed. (Louvain, 1947).
54. Civiltà Cattolica (1850-); Divus Thomas (1880-); Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Speculative Theologie (1887 -); St. Thomasblätter (1888-); Philosophisches Jahrbuch (1888-); Revue Thomiste (1893 -); Revue Neoscholastique de philosophie (1894 -); Rivista italiana di filosofia neoscholastica (1909-); La Ciencia Thomista (1910 -).
55. Especially in Histoire de la philosophie médiévale.
56. P. Mandonnet expressed himself in Des Écrits Authentiques de Saint Thomas d'Aquin sec. ed. (Fribourg, 1910). He also founded the Revue Thomiste in 1893 and frequently contributed to it.
57. Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
58. Examples of manuals written in this way would be J. Perrone, Praelectiones Theologicae (Paris, 1889), see especially pp. 8-53; R. Schultes, De Ecclesia Catholica (Paris, 1925), in which the Church is explained adequately by the four causes; G. Paris, De Vera Christi Ecclesia (Malta, 1949); C. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate (2 vols., New York, 1955). Journet has arranged the four marks of the Church within the framework of the Aristotelian causes. He writes:

In this perspective the four marks, the four notes of the Church, naturally fall into place as corollaries of each of the four causes respectively. They are seen as rooted in and growing out of the very essence of the Church, an exteriorization, a normal manifestation of her mystery. (Ibid. vol. 1, p. xxvi.)

However, Journet's work did have a hybrid character in so far as it included large amounts of biblical material which were well presented.

59. On the intellectus agens see R. E. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology (New York, 1952); J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (New York, 1959).
60. A full treatment can be found in F.H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic (two vols., London, 1922).
61. Text is in EB, pp. 65-72.
62. Text is in Denz. Schön., pp. 364-365.

63. The original draft of April 8, 1546, stated that revelation was contained 'partly in written books, partly in unwritten traditions (partim...partim)'. This was changed to:
- 'The Council is aware that this truth and teaching are contained in written books and in the unwritten traditions'.
(Denz.Schön., p. 364)
- There is no consensus among theologians as to the interpretation of this decree.
64. Cf. J.R. Geiselman, Die Heilige Schrift und die Tradition (Freiburg, 1962).
65. Astruc's work had been anticipated by H. Witter, Jura Israelitarum (1711). See A. Lods, 'Astruc', RHPR, 4 (1924), pp. 109-201. On Astruc see A. Lods and P. Alphandery, Jean Astruc et la critique biblique au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1924); E. O'Doherty, 'The Conjectures of Jean Astruc, 1753', CBQ, 15 (1953), pp. 300-304; J. de Savignac, 'L'Oeuvre de la personnalité de Jean Astruc' La Nouvelle Cleo, 5 (1953), pp. 138-147.
66. Astruc expected such a reaction. He published his Conjectures anonymously, gave a false publisher's name and a false place of publication.
67. J.G. Eichhorn, Allgemeine Bibliothek der biblischen Literatur (ten vols., Leipzig, 1787-1801; Einleitung in das Alte Testament (three vols., Leipzig, 1780-1783); Einleitung in das Neue Testament (Leipzig, 1804-1812). J.S. Semler (1725-1791) is credited with 171 literary works.
68. On the method of literary criticism, in general, see J. Coppens, Histoire critique des livres de l'Ancien Testament (Tournai, 1942); H. J. Kraus, Geschichte der historisch - kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments (Neukirchen, 1956); H. Hahn, The Old Testament in Modern Research (Philadelphia, 1966).
69. 'Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker', in Werke (Leipzig, 1874), vols. 33-34, p. vii.
70. See J. Levie, The Bible, Word of God in Words of Men (London, 1961),
71. Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels (Berlin, 1883; sixth ed. 1905); Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte third ed. (Berlin, 1897).
72. Much of the influential work in this area was established by H. Gunkel and S. Mowinckel. Both concentrated on the book of Psalms and developed then methodology from this study. Cf. H. Gunkel, Die Psalmen fourth ed. (Göttingen, 1926); S. Mowinckel, Psalmen - Studien (4 vols., Oslo, 1921-24).
73. The foremost scholars in the field have been M. Noth, Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Studien sec. ed. (Darmstadt, 1957); id., Gesammelte Studien zur Alten Testament (Munich, 1957); I. Engel, Gamla Testamentet: en traditionschistorisk inledning (Uppsala, 1945),
74. Redaktionsgeschichte has been more recently exemplified in the works of G. Bornkamm, Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew

- in Matthew (London, 1963); H. Conzelmann, The Theology of St. Luke (New York, 1960).
75. Published in 1834, Das Leben Jesu gave a mythical interpretation of Jesus, historical fact embellished by faith. E. Renan's work in 1863 eliminated the supernatural from Jesus' life.
 76. EB, pp. 34-62.
 77. EB, p. 54.
 78. EB, pp. 50-51.
 79. On Modernism see A.R. Vidler, The Modernist Movement in the Roman Catholic Church (Cambridge, 1934); G. Martini, Cattolicismo e storicismo (Naples, 1951); L.V. Coutinho, Tradition et histoire dans la controverse moderniste (Rome, 1954); E. Poulet, Histoire, dogme et critique dans la crise moderniste (Paris, 1962); M. Ranchetti, The Catholic Modernists (Oxford, 1969); A.R. Vidler, A Variety of Catholic Modernists (Cambridge, 1970).
 80. Loisy's chief works were L'évangile et l'église (Paris, 1902) and Les évangiles synoptiques (2 vols., Paris, 1907-8). Loisy left much information on Modernism in Memoires pour servir a l'histoire religieuse de notre temps, 1860-1931 (3 vols., Paris, 1930-31). Cf. F. Heiler, Der Vater des katholischen Modernismus, Alfred Loisy (Munich, 1947).
 81. In 1884 Rudolf Cornely conceived a programme for biblical research which would culminate in a comprehensive biblical commentary. He obtained the collaboration of F. von Hummelauer and J. Knaberbauer in the project. He himself wrote the introductory volumes: Historica et critica Introductio in utriusque Testamenti libros sacros (three vols., Paris, 1885-1887). Over the next two decades a succession of biblical commentaries emanated from the group to form the Cursus Sacrae Scripturae. It was seen as a bulwark against the new developments in biblical science. Cf. A. Merk in L. Pirot and others (eds.), Dictionnaire de la Bible. Supplement (Paris, 1928-), vol.2, pp. 153-155.
 82. The École Biblique was founded in 1890 by M.J. Lagrange (1855-1938) as an institution for the practical study of Scripture. See. F.M. Braun, The Work of Père Lagrange (Milwaukee, 1963). Its programme was outlined in the first issue of its Revue Biblique.
 83. Later, in 1909, the Pontifical Biblical Institute was founded in Rome, with the express mandate 'to refute by scientific means' the critical trend in exegesis.
 84. The Apostolic Letter of Leo XIII establishing the Pontifical Biblical Commission, Vigilantiae, is found in EB, pp. 64-68. Of especial interest in the statement:

The main point to be attained is that Catholics should not admit the malignant principle of granting more than is due to the opinion of heterodox writers, and of thinking that the true understanding of the Scriptures should be sought first of all in the researches which the erudition of unbelievers has arrived at.

85. Authenticity - Whether the argument amassed by critics to impunge the Mosaic authenticity of the sacred books designated by the name Pentateuch are of sufficient weight, notwithstanding the very many evidences to the contrary contained in both Testaments, taken collectively, the persistent agreement of the Jewish people, the constant tradition of the Church, and internal arguments derived from the text itself, to justify the statement that these books have not Moses for their author but have been compiled from sources for the most part posterior to the time of Moses.

Answer: In the negative.

Writer - Whether the Mosaic authenticity of the Pentateuch necessarily postulates such a redaction of the whole work as to render it absolutely imperative to maintain that Moses wrote with his own hand or dictated to amanuenses all and everything contained in it; or whether it is possible to admit the hypothesis of those who think that he entrusted the composition of the work itself, conceived by himself under the influence of divine inspiration, to some other person or persons, but in such a manner that they render faithfully his own thoughts, wrote nothing contrary to his will, and omitted nothing; and that the work thus produced, approved by Moses as the principal and inspired author, was made public under his name.

Answer: In the negative to the first part, in the affirmative to the second part.

EB, p. 78.

86. Unity of Authorship - Whether the philological argument, one derived from the language and the style, and employed to impugn the identity of the author of the book of Isaias, is to be considered weighty enough to compel a man of judgement, versed in the principles of criticism and well acquainted with Hebrew, to acknowledge in the same book a plurality of authors.

Answer: In the negative.

EB, pp. 100-101.

87. Davidic Authorship: Whether, considering the not infrequent testimonies in the Bible to David's natural skill, a skill further illumined by the special gift of the Holy Spirit, for the composition of religious odes; whether, considering too, the arrangement drawn up by him for the liturgical chanting of the psalms; the attributions also, both in the Old Testament and the New, of psalms to him, as also in the actual inscriptions anciently affixed to the psalms; whether, considering moreover, the common opinion of the Jews, and of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, it can be prudently denied that David was the principal author of the odes contained in the Psalter. Whether, on the other hand, it can be maintained that only a few of these odes are to be attributed to the Royal Psalmist.

Answer: In the negative to both questions.

EB, p. 111.

88. Order of Composition and Language - Whether the opinion must be considered as sufficiently supported by the testimony of tradition, which holds that Matthew wrote before the other Evangelists and that he wrote the first Gospel in the native dialect then in use by the Jews of Palestine, for whom this work was intended.

Answer: In the affirmative to both parts.

EB, pp. 121-122.

89. External Evidence for Authenticity - Whether from the constant, universal, and solemn tradition of the Church coming down from the second century, as it is gathered chiefly:
- (a) from the testimonies and allusions of the holy Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, nay even those of heretics, which since they must have been derived from the disciples or first successors of the Apostles, are joined by a necessary connection to the very origin of the book;
 - (b) from the fact that the name of the author of the Fourth Gospel was received always and everywhere in the canons and catalogues of the sacred books;
 - (c) from the most ancient manuscripts, codices and their versions in various languages of the same books;
 - (d) from the public liturgical use obtaining throughout the whole world from the very beginnings of the Church; leaving aside the theological argument, it is proved by such a solid historical argument that the Apostle John and no other must be acknowledged as the author of the Fourth Gospel, that the reasons to the contrary, brought forward by the critics, in no wise weaken this tradition.

Answer: In the affirmative.

EB, pp. 81-82.

90. Examples would be E. Ruffini, Introductio in S. Scripturam (2 vols., Rome, 1925); H. Höpfl and B. Gut, Introductio specialis in Vetus Testamentum (Rome, 1936); id., Introductio specialis in Novum Testamentum (Rome, 1938); H. Simon and G. Dorado, Praelectiones Biblicae ad Usum Scholarum (5 vols., Torino, 1947).
91. Text is in EB, p. 152.
92. The Ratio Studiorum outlined a theoretical section covering the headings in Aquinas, ST Ia IIae, human acts, conscience, sin and law. It described a practical section for the solution of casus conscientiae, following the order of the commandments of God and of the Church, the Sacraments and censures.
93. Examples would be C. Lacroix, Theologia Moralis (Cologne, 1707-14); Alphonsus Ligouri, Theologica Moralis (Padua, 1737), of which more will be said below; A. Ballerini, Opus theologicum morale in Busenbaum medullam (7 vols., Prato, 1889-93). This latter work was revised by D. Palmieri.
94. In ST Ia IIae, q. 19 arts. 5-6.

95. J. Aertnys and C. Damen, Theologia moralis sixteenth ed., (2 vols., Turin, 1950), vol. 1., p. 101; M. Zalba, Theologiae moralis compendium (2 vols., Madrid, 1958), vol. 1., pp. 679-703.
96. Text is in Denz.Schön., pp. 450-455, 457-466.
97. The Complete Works of Ligouri have been edited by E. Grimm in twenty-two volumes (New York, 1886-97). A second edition of volumes 1-5, 12 was produced in Brooklyn, 1926-8. For his commentary see L. Gaude (ed.), Theologia Moralis (4 vols., Rome 1905-12). His life is recorded in R. Telleria, S. Alfonso Maria de Ligorio (2 vols., Madrid, 1950-1).
98. Ligouri also published two other books on the same lines, Practica del confessione per ben esercitare il suo ministero and Instruzione e practica per un confessore (1757) which was translated into Latin as Homo Apostolicus and intended for use in the field of Moral Theology.
99. Aertnys and Damen, Theologia Moralis, vol. 1, pp. 102-119.
100. Schliermacher's works are collected in Sämtliche Werke (30 vols., Berlin, 1835-64). On this aspect of his thought see W.A. Johnson, On Religion: A Study of Theological Method in Schliermacher and Nygren (Leiden, 1964).
101. Newman's writings are to be found in Collected Works (25 vols., New York, 1890-1927). The idea of development in Newman is well covered in O. Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, The Idea of Doctrinal Development (Cambridge, 1957); A.J. Boekraad and H. Tristram, The Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God according to J.H. Newman (Louvain, 1961); G. Biemer, Überlieferung und Offenbarung. Die Lehre von der Tradition nach J. H. Newman (Freiburg, 1961).
102. The 'illative sense' covers the process of subconscious reasoning. Newman distinguished the spontaneous act of the mind and the mind's subsequent reflection on its own spontaneous act. See his Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London, 1870).
103. See H. Bouillard, Blondel et le Christianisme (Paris, 1961); C. Tresmontant, Introduction à la métaphysique de Maurice Blondel (Paris, 1963).
104. M. C. Otto and others, William James, the Man and the Thinker (Madison, 1942); H.V. Knox, The Philosophy of William James (New York, 1914).
105. See above pp. 297-298
106. H. Egerton, Father Tyrell's Modernism (London, 1909); M.D. Petre, Von Hugel and Tyrrell (New York, 1938); D. Grasso, 'La conversione e l'apostasia di George Tyrrell', Gregorianum, 38 (1957), pp. 446-480, 593-629.
107. J. de Tonquedec, Immanence, third ed. (Paris, 1933); J.B. Lotz, Immanenz und Transzendenz, Scholastik, 13 (1938), pp. 1-21, 161-132.

108. On Le Roy see A. G. Sertillanges, Le Christianisme et les philosophies (2 vols., Paris, 1939-41), vol. 2, pp. 402-419.
109. Text is in Denz.Schön. pp. 669-674.
110. AAS, 40 (1907), p. 636.
111. The text of Pascendi is in Denz.Schön., pp. 675-683. The measures set out to defend the Church's teaching against an amalgam of agnosticism, immanence and emancipation of biblical exegesis from doctrinal teaching.
112. AAS, 6 (1914), pp. 336-341.
113. Ibid., p. 338.
114. AAS, 6 (1914), pp. 383-386. Of the twenty-four theses all but one went counter to the teachings of Suarez and this caused problems for the Jesuits who followed him. A letter to Jesuits, approved by Benedict XV on March 19, 1917, emphasized the traditional place of Aquinas in the society of Jesus but allowed that the prescriptions of Pius X would be satisfied if not all the theses were maintained, so long as they were proposed as safe, directive norms.
115. See Aubert, art.cit., pp.164-171.
116. Text is in Denz.Schön., pp. 772-780. The Encyclical rejected such new approaches as evolutionism, phenomenology and the scientific methodology of P. Teilhard de Chardin.

ROMAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

7.1 Stabilization of the Research Model.

In 1917 the Code of Canon Law¹ legislated anew for seminaries in the Roman Catholic Church. The result was re-enforced implementation of the Neo-Thomistic research model. The minor seminary was to provide training in religion, Latin, the vernacular and other subjects required by the prevailing culture. The major seminary was to provide two years of philosophical training and four years in the disciplines of Dogmatic Theology, Moral Theology, Canon Law, Scripture and Church History. In all studies, however, the 'method, doctrine and principles' of Aquinas, had to be maintained.

Trent had created a close-knit community in its concept of the seminary. It aimed at sheltering the seminarian from the external ambient. Its educational programme was always viewed as a closed system, which had the practical aim of forming ministers at the service of the Catholic Church. During this present century the particular method and content of Neo-Thomism was integrated into the structure of the Tridentine seminary.

The Seminary, as a theological community, must be seen as a total institution, a place of residence and work where a large number of like-interested individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time,² together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.

Following the characteristic features of all total institutions, the Tridentine seminary endeavoured to form a new man after an initial radical change. This was effected by disculturation, physical isolation, regimented life and weakening of autonomy. The new man was then restructured by indoctrination, the use of symbolic activity and uniformity in dress.

The educational process in a seminary therefore played a major part in the complete restructuring of the candidate's values, attitudes and action patterns. All influences of the secular milieu were withdrawn and a process of mental indoctrination begun in philosophy and theology. This was accompanied by the normative socialization programme of a prescribed ordering of activities, the practice of celibacy and ritual centering on progressive rites de passage.

Even the use of Latin as the lingua franca of the seminary was part of the process. This was justified on the grounds of its being the mother-tongue of the ecclesiastical society. In the times of Aquinas for example it had allowed easy transition from university to university. Aquinas taught at Paris in Latin even though his French was not fluent. In fact, however, the latent function of Latin was isolation. Increasingly it had become more and more difficult for ecclesiastically trained scholars to enter meaningful dialogue with scholars not formed in the Latin tongue. Other disciplines also ceased to speak to the Roman Catholic theologian. In this way the paradigmatic system of knowledge was protected,³ and this continued up to the 1960s.

The use of Neo-Thomist manuals tended to formalize discussion, to inhibit curiosity and to discredit evaluation. They relied on authority rather than on a vibrant research tradition. Theological propositions were detached from the problems which had given rise to the propositions.

4

The seminary had become an enculturation matrix. Knowledge was transmitted through the entire gamut of influences - the curriculum, the time-tabling, the selection of staff and more. Cultural meanings

surrounded the candidate and he was confronted quite decisively with a group cultural system and with no other competitors. Authority, both on the local level and on the wider, ecclesiastical level, ensured that the individual cultural system, adopted by the candidate, was within the degrees of variation allowed by the group cultural system. Deviants were carefully disengaged from the group.

In 1931 Pius XI in Deus Scientiarum Dominus further elucidated the educational aims which were to establish uniformity of purpose and method in all seminary faculties and universities of the Catholic world, providing a broad, solid base for primary theological training. In the field of theology, the study of positive theology and the scholastic method should be followed according to the principles and doctrines of Aquinas. In philosophy a study of the methods and principles of Aquinas should precede the examination and appreciation of any other philosophical system.

That little had changed until the 1960s can be seen from the dialogue that occurred at Vatican II, prior to the formulation of a decree on clerical formation. The early draft of the document went beyond the Code of Canon Law and especially enjoined theologians and philosophers to deal with speculative questions according to the
6
'system, teaching and principles' of Aquinas. An intervention by Archbishop Staffa wished the Decree to make specific reference to Aquinas, in recognition of his research programme, particularly the
7
relationship between faith and reason. However, this preference was seen in a different light by Cardinal Jaeger, who specifically rejected any reference to Aquinas:

not because the works of St. Thomas should be spurned, but because immoderate exclusivism should be completely avoided.⁸ Woe to the man of one book! Woe to the Church of one Doctor!

The original text of the Decree had stated that students of philosophy should base themselves on the 'perennis philosophiae principia'. This⁹ was changed to 'innixi patrimonio philosophico perenniter valido'.

When the method of Dogmatic Theology was dealt with, Aquinas was¹⁰ also recommended as The Teacher, 'S. Thoma magistro'.¹¹ 116 Council Fathers, however, submitted a modus that sought to replace these words with

The Catholic Church proposes St. Thomas as a teacher and exemplar for all those who work in the field of the theological sciences.¹¹

The reason given for the modus was:

The system or doctrine of St. Thomas is not imposed, but rather St. Thomas, in his scientific and spiritual mode of procedure, is proposed as an outstanding exemplar of investigation and creation in the field of theology. He made use of the science of his own time for the purpose of the Gospel.¹²

Despite this intervention the original formula was retained in the text.

Earlier in 1964 Paul VI had spoken on the content of Aquinas:

Those on whom the duty of teaching is laid... should reverently listen to the voice of the Church's Doctors among whom blessed Aquinas holds the chief place. So great was the Angelic Doctor's power of mind, so sincere his love of truth, so wise was he in investigating the most profound truths, illustrating them and summarizing them into a unity that his doctrine is not only an instrument for safely establishing the foundations of the Faith but also for usefully and securely attaining the fruits of a healthy deepening of that Faith.¹³

The essential witness of Aquinas, however, seems to be more in the method than in the actual content. In an important address to the

Sixth International Congress of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas

Aquinas, on September 10, 1965, Paul VI could say:

Your work ought to be based on the indispensable value of natural reason, solemnly affirmed by the First Vatican Council, in conformity with the constant teaching of the Church, of which St. Thomas Aquinas is the most acclaimed and the most eminent witness.¹⁴

This, in turn, is further explained:

In declaring him the Common Doctor and in making his doctrine the base of ecclesiastical teaching, the Church's Magisterium has not intended to make him an exclusive Teacher, nor to impose each of his theses, nor to exclude the legitimate diversity of schools and systems, and still less to proscribe the right freedom of research. The preference accorded to Aquinas - preference and not exclusivity - is due to the fact that he has become an exemplar of philosophical and theological wisdom, and due to the harmonious relationship he has established between reason and faith.¹⁵

There is a subtle progression in these discourses and even in the final text of the Vatican Council II. It could no longer be maintained that Aquinas, in the form of Neo-Thomism, was the exclusive research model for the study of the ecclesiastical sciences. Authority was leaving the way open for others. In fact there was another research tradition that had been developing within the Catholic Church.

7.2 The New Research Model in Roman Catholic Biblical Exegesis.

In 1941 the Pontifical Biblical Commission, which had been virtually silent for two decades, issued an unusual decree. It was the condemnation of an anonymous brochure circulating in Italy and it was condemned because of excessive conservatism.¹⁶ Its author is now known to have been an

obscure Italian priest, Dolindo Ruotolo. He fiercely assailed scientific biblical study and gave an exaggerated importance to the Latin Vulgate version of the Bible. For him the study of oriental languages was of minimal value for an understanding of the Bible, as were textual criticism and other auxiliary sciences. Ruotolo promoted the value of a certain spiritual sense, which God revealed to the believer, over the literal sense of Scripture.

The condemnation of Ruotolo indicated two principles which were, in a short time, to become the basis of a new Roman Catholic approach: the need for historical and literary criticism and the primacy of the literal sense.

17

In 1943 Pius XII published the Encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu. It proposed a new research model for Roman Catholic Biblical scholars - the historico-critical method. It was held to be acceptable because Rationalism was by this time deemed conquered and moderation had been practised by those involved in the use of this methodology. Henceforward, the education of students, both undergraduate and post-graduate, in the field of Biblical Studies, took a decided turn.

The principal statement of the Encyclical was that the time of fear was now at an end:

We also, by this Encyclical Letter, desire to insure that the work (of Catholic biblical scholarship) may not only proceed without interruption, but may also daily become more perfect and fruitful; and to that end we are specially intent on pointing out to all what yet remains to be done, with what spirit the Catholic exegete should undertake, at the present day, so great and noble a work, and to give new incentive and fresh courage to the labourers who toil so strenuously in the vineyard of the Lord. ¹⁸

The Catholic exegete, the Pope demanded, should be skilled in the use of all scientific tools. Where Providentissimus Deus had permitted Catholic scholars to pay attention to the original texts, beside the Latin Vulgate, Divino Afflante Spiritu ordered them to interpret the original texts. In stressing that the principal concern of the exegete must be the delineating of the literal sense the chief novelty of the Encyclical became apparent.

What is the literal sense of a passage is not always as obvious in the speeches and writings of the ancient authors of the East as it is in the works of our own time. For what they wished to express is not to be determined by the rules of grammar and philology alone, nor solely by the context; the interpreter must, as it were, go back wholly in spirit to those remote centuries of the East, and with the aid of history, archaeology, ethnology and other sciences, accurately determine what modes of writing (litteraria genera), so to speak, the authors of that ancient period would be likely to use, and in fact did use.¹⁹

Thus, in 1943, the Roman Catholic Church finally espoused the historico-critical method. The books of Sacred Scripture were no longer to be naively regarded as historical writings. Pius XII gave a most resolute declaration of academic freedom for biblical scholars involved in the use of the new method:

Let all the other sons of the Church bear in mind that the efforts of these resolute laborers in the vineyard of the Lord should be judged not only with equity and justice, but also with the greatest charity; all moreover should abhor that intemperate zeal which imagines that whatever is new should for that very reason be opposed or suspected.²⁰

After Divino Afflante Spiritu Roman Catholic biblical scholarship changed course dramatically. In 1948 Cardinal Suhard of Paris proposed a test case to the Pontifical Biblical Commission. It concerned the early chapters of Genesis and the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch.²¹ In its official Letter in reply the Commission noted the vast changes

that had taken place in the preceding forty years. It further acknowledged the changed state of Pentateuchal studies. It was clear, the Commission said, that simple Mosaic authorship could not be predicated of the Pentateuch, that it was dependent on written sources and oral traditions and that account had to be taken of progressive development of the laws which were called Mosaic laws. Speaking specifically of the first eleven chapters of Genesis the Commission again reported a vastly changed situation. The literary forms of Genesis 1-11 corresponded, the Commission said, to no classical categories and could not indeed be classified as history, in the modern sense of the term. These narratives related in simple and figurative language the fundamental truths presupposed for the economy of salvation as well as giving a popular description of the origin of the human race and the chosen people. The interpreter of the biblical text must collate material from paleontology, history, epigraphy to discover better how the ancient Oriental peoples thought and expressed their ideas.

However, when the conclusions being drawn from the use of the new research tradition in Biblical exegesis were applied to the field of Dogmatic Theology, friction developed. In 1950 the same Pius XII issued another Encyclical, Humani Generis, which specifically denounced various deviations that were being put forward. One concerned the belief, based on a new interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis, in polygenism:

It is in no way apparent how such an opinion can be reconciled with that which the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Teaching Authority of the Church propose with regard to original sin. ²²

Further, on the literary form of the first chapters of Genesis, the Encyclical reads:

Therefore whatever of the popular narrations have been inserted into the Sacred Scripture must in no way be considered on a par with myths or other such things, which are more the product of an extravagant imagination than of that striving for truth and simplicity which in the Sacred Books, also of the Old Testament, is so apparent that our ancient sacred writers must be admitted to be clearly superior to the ancient profane writers.²³

Despite setbacks, freedom for Biblical scholars was to be a characteristic of the reign of Pius XII. In 1955, in a review of the new collection of documentation pertaining to biblical studies, the then Secretary of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, Athanasius Miller O.S.B. wrote:

However, as long as these decrees (i.e. of the Commission especially between 1905-15) propose views which are neither immediately nor mediately connected with truths of faith and morals, it goes without saying that the scholar may pursue his research with complete freedom provided always that he defers to the supreme teaching authority of the Church.²⁴

In a conciliatory way, Miller explained the earlier decrees of the Commission:

Today we can hardly picture to ourselves the position of Catholic scholars at the turn of the century, or the dangers that threatened Catholic teaching on Scripture and its inspiration on the part of liberal and rationalistic criticism, which like a torrent tried to sweep away the sacred barriers of tradition. At present the battle is considerably less fierce; not a few controversies have been peacefully settled and many problems emerge in an entirely new light, so that it is easy enough for us to smile at the narrowness and constraint which prevailed fifty years ago.²⁵

However, the friction that had been sporadically noted between those in the field of Biblical Exegesis and those in other ecclesiastical sciences was about to develop into a more heated confrontation. We

can trace the moment of conflagration to an article written by a Spanish Jesuit, Luis Alonso Schökel, which explained, in a popular fashion, the principal changes in biblical methods that had occurred since the earlier Encyclical of Pius XII.²⁶ This was countered by an article written by Antonio Romeo. It was significantly entitled: L'Encyclica 'Divino Afflante Spiritu' e le 'opiniones novae'.²⁷

Romeo simply denied that there ever had been any change in the thinking of the Church and that certainly the Encyclical of 1943 had not allowed any new direction to be taken. Romeo dubbed Catholic biblical scholars as 'a whole swarm of termites working away incessantly in the shadows'.²⁸

Rome thereafter was to know a litany of rumours and denunciations.²⁹ Two leading professors, exponents of the new methodology, from the Biblical Institute - Maximilian Zerwick and Stanislaus Lyonnet - were removed from their teaching positions. Further, in 1961 the Holy Office issued a warning directed against those who were calling into question the genuine historical and objective truth of Sacred Scripture.³⁰

Catholic biblical scholars awaited with pessimism the first draft of the document on the Sources of Revelation to be submitted to the Second Vatican Council.³¹ The Council had been convened to meet late in 1962. When the draft did appear it confirmed their worst fears. It was a retrogression, a presentation of Scripture and Tradition as the literal, historical sources of Revelation, that took no cognisance of the change of direction that had taken place. In November 1962 debate began in the Council sessions on this draft and soon the struggle between the sides became evident. On November 20 the question was posed to the assembly: 'Must discussion of this scheme end now?' An affir-

mative vote would mean that the schema as such was considered to be unsuitable as a basis for further deliberation, but an affirmative vote was two-thirds majority. The voting figures in fact were 1368 yes, 822 no, 19 null. It was not the two-thirds required, but next day John XXIII intervened and removed the schema from discussion, appointing a special commission to rewrite it. Not until September 1965 would there be a schema which could be finally accepted by a majority.

In 1964 the Biblical Commission issued its most positive document ever, an Instruction on the Historical Truth of the Gospels.³² Significantly, it began with praise of biblical scholars and a repetition of Pius XII's admonition that they be treated with charity by other members of the Church. The Instruction outlined, for the biblical interpreter, the methodology for a study of the gospels. Attention had to be paid to the three stages by which the doctrine and life of Jesus had come down to believers: the stages of the life of Jesus, the apostolic group and the sacred authors. The sacred authors, the evangelists, from many things handed down to them concerning Jesus had

selected some things, reduced others to a synthesis, and still others they explicated, keeping in mind the situation of the churches.³³

This was a reassertion of the historico-critical method.

In the following year Vatican II promulgated the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, no longer called the Sources of Revelation. It left unsolved the controversy over the sources of revelation, that is whether revelation derives from two separate sources (Scripture and Tradition) or whether it derives from a single

source (Scripture as interpreted by Tradition). The compromise was voiced thus:

Hence there exists a close connection and communication between sacred tradition and sacred Scripture. For both of them, flowing from the same divine well-spring, in a certain way merge into a unity and tend toward the same end.³⁴

We will bring our study of the development of the new historico-critical method in the Roman Catholic Church to a halt at this point.³⁵ By the 1960s it was being used by a considerable body of scholars. Consequently, the methodology was gradually being introduced into the seminaries. Such a sudden replacement was possible because of the fact that authority had, in the first place, installed it and authority was part of the secondary expressive model.

However, there is another issue that must be considered. The research tradition of historico-critical Biblical methodology had, as its basis, a Platonic philosophy, counterposed to an Aristotelian way of thinking. It saw reality, in this case the biblical events, as growing, changing, capable of many different expressions.

The confrontation that took place in the late 1950s was inevitable, therefore, given this disparate use of research traditions. There was no common ground. Each group was working with a different research model. But, there was to be a more significant factor at work. This can be called the migration syndrome.

7.3 The Migration Syndrome and the subsequent Theological Revolution.

It was seen above, in the discussion on the natural sciences, that when the mechanism of intellectual control is dismantled, migration

can occur in several possible ways with the consequent possibility of revolutionary science. Models were proposed as to the modes of migration. It will now be proposed that an analogous phenomenon occurred in Roman Catholicism during the 1960s. A migration syndrome, arising from the matrix of Biblical scholarship within the Roman Catholic Church, brought about a revolution.

The Encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu gave authoritative consent to a new research tradition which, in turn brought about questioning of the authority which, up to that point, had efficiently controlled the entire paradigmatic system of knowledge. The process was not simple but took the form of a differential dismantling, beginning with scholars in the field of Biblical Studies and spreading, by means of the migration syndrome, to other ecclesiastical disciplines.

We need to chart this migration syndrome. The new historico-critical methodology with its Platonic basis, was introduced first into scholarly circles and then, eventually, into the seminaries. Within a short time there was a community formed, familiar with this methodology, which was pitted against the research tradition being used in other ecclesiastical disciplines. It was obvious that there was discrepancy between the conclusions being drawn by biblical scholars and those being proposed by those in the fields of Dogmatic Theology and Moral Theology.

Biblical scholars formed a close-knit community due to the circumstances of their education. Because Biblical Studies had been so rigidly controlled by authority since the beginning of the century, there was a centralization of the degree-conferring faculty. Only

the Pontifical Biblical Institute and the Pontifical Biblical Commission were empowered to grant ecclesiastical degrees in the field.³⁷ Of these the Pontifical Biblical Institute was the sole teaching institution, the Pontifical Biblical Commission acting only as an examining body following a set syllabus.³⁸ The inroads of the historico-critical method were obvious at the Institute following the permission implied in Divino Afflante Spiritu.³⁹ Hence, from the time of Divino Afflante Spiritu there was being formed a community of scholars who were imbibing the new methodology and intended specifically to teach in seminaries.⁴⁰

The influence of this group who, either through their education in Rome or through their personal formation, had accepted the historico-critical approach can be accurately gauged by a survey of the periodical literature that thereafter issued in Catholic circles.⁴¹ In the first instance it can be demonstrated that the gross number of articles on biblical topics, in specifically Roman Catholic periodicals, aimed at a general theological reading public (in the main, priests) increased dramatically.⁴² The successive volumes of the Catholic Periodical Index give the following result:

July 1950-June 1952:	109
June 1952-May 1954:	111
June 1954-May 1956:	204
June 1956-December 1958:	259
January 1959-December 1960:	276
January 1961-December 1962:	347
January 1963-December 1964:	362
January 1965-December 1966:	225
January 1967-December 1968:	234
January 1969-December 1970:	81

The statistics show that as the 1950s progressed there was a vastly increased number of articles in the periodical literature, covering all aspects of a Biblical renaissance. The same trend can be verified if individual theological periodicals are examined. For example the American Ecclesiastical Review and the Clergy Review, the more popular theological journals with widest circulations in the United States and Great Britain respectively, and Theology Digest which culls articles representatively from periodicals on a world-wide basis, give the following statistics on the number of articles specifically on Biblical topics.⁴³

<u>Year</u>	<u>American Ecclesiastical Review</u>	<u>Clergy Review</u>	<u>Theology Digest</u>
1950	4	0	
1951	2	1	
1952	3	4	
1953	1	4	14 (18%)
1954	0	1	6 (8%)
1955	2	3	6 (8%)
1956	6	2	7 (8%)
1957	4	1	12 (22%)
1958	5	2	11 (39%)
1959	10	5	4 (14%)
1960	8	5	9 (29%)
1961	7	5	7 (25%)
1962	6	10	8 (26%)
1963	2	8	7 (22%)
1964	3	1	15 (41%)
1965	4	15	13 (36%)
1966	2	14	9 (24%)
1967	1	6	9 (25%)
1968	2	1	12 (34%)
1969	1	1	11 (32%)

It is not to our purpose to attribute any exactitude to the use of such statistics, and it would be presumptuous to make use of them

in any more refined way than as indicators of the arrival of a community that was interested in a new presentation of ecclesiastical science. When the actual content of the material presented by such scholars is examined there is a stress on novelty and change and this with increased frequency. A new genre was established dealing with this aspect of novelty.

Examples of the 'novelty' genre during, for example, January 1959-
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December 1960 would be the following:

'New Trends in Sacred Scripture'; 'Quandary about the Bible: Iconoclastic exegetes'; 'A Survey of Modern Biblical Scholarship';
'Le renouveau biblique contemporain et sa signification'; 'The Modern Approach to Sacred Scripture'; 'Conientes biblicas catolicas recientes'.

Comparing statistics, we find that this genre is represented with the following frequency:

January 1959-December 1960	6
January 1961-December 1962	12
January 1963-December 1964	8
January 1965-December 1966	3
January 1967-December 1968	3

Once again the statistics defy any strict mathematical usage, they simply indicate an awareness of novelty in scholarly circles and, towards the end of the 1960s, an attenuation of such an awareness.

The material found in the periodical literature, when considered with the historical indicators dealt with in the previous section, are considered to be sufficient evidence for the beginning of the migration

syndrome. Scholars, formed in the new biblical methodology, manifested a presence in general theological literature on an unprecedented scale. Such a presence peaked during the 1960s.

The migration of those formed in the historico-critical research tradition into Dogmatic Theology brought about some immediate changes. In the first place there was the emergence of new forms of Theology which were more in accord with the new methodology. They were 'Kerygmatic Theology' and 'Biblical Theology'.

The basis of Kerygmatic Theology was the Heilsgeschichte, the notion, uncovered by the historico-critical methodology, that das Heil, the salvific purpose of God, was realised progressively in history and continued to be so realised.⁴⁶ Consequently there was a need, it was maintained, for ministers within Christianity to be formed in this mentality so that they could make the Christian people aware of the progressive and continuing divine action. Thus, the aim of Kerygmatic Theology was primarily pedagogical. The material is systematically presented but the synthesis is based on historical situation rather than on the scientific and speculative organization that has been characteristic of the manuals.

Thus a Theology evolved that was independent of the Neo-Thomist Theology still being presented in the Roman Catholic Church.⁴⁷ The community formed by this latter research tradition saw the new contender as imprecise, inherently ambiguous and limited in its intellectual scope. A compromise was effected by some in which the kerygmatic approach was seen only as a complement to the Neo-Thomistic foundation.

Biblical Theology was also based on the historico-critical approach. It had been known in Protestant circles since the past century. Both the Old and the New Testaments were seen, in this methodology, as a living process and Biblical Theology, accordingly was conceived as an interplay between historical survey and theological synthesis.⁴⁸ However, Biblical Theology could tend to devolve into an investigation of concepts which had no overall synthetic character. Given the idea of YHWH's redemptive acts throughout the Old Testament period, culminating in the final and definitive redemptive act of Christ, the Biblical theologian was confident that he could retell the narrative of YHWH's activity, a sacred history, in a theological framework.

In short, the historico-critical approach had been substituted, as a research tradition, for the research model of Neo-Thomism. The new research tradition would attempt to echo directly the immediate content of the biblical text and so to provide a more living secondary expressive model. By the 1950s and into the 1960s Biblical Theology was becoming more and more prominent in both the periodical literature and in book form.⁴⁹ It was clear that there would be a collision⁵⁰ course between it and the established form of theology.

The collision can be seen in a comparison of the different elements of the secondary expressive model that were emerging. This variety had been well documented. In particular, there were variant images of the community of believers. From the time of the Counter Reformation a juridico-societal model had been in possession, one that was perpetuated⁵¹ by the research model of Neo-Thomism. It had been supplemented during the decade from 1940-1950 by a 'Mystical Body' model which attempted to

take the same juridico-societal model and invigorate it, virtually
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 giving soul to the body. However, from the advent of Biblical
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 Theology rival models competed.

The God element also changed. The God of the scholastic approach had been a self-sufficient absolute. The re-introduction of the YHWH concept, of a God who acts in the historical process, replaced the former idea with that of a self-effusive Good, continually making contact with man, explicable only by historical examination. Likewise the ritual of the Christian Church, the sacraments, which had received a definitive status through Aquinas' depiction of them as supernatural media of divine contact, was replaced by a concept of historically conditioned manifestations of divine contact, which were not absolutely exclusive.

It could be said that, in time, all elements of the secondary expressive model were under review. The historico-critical approach was inductive, more in line with the Platonic way of thinking; it was necessarily pitted against the deductive approach of Neo-Thomism. The proximate cause for the change can be explained by the migration of biblical scholars from their own particular field of exegesis to the more synthetic field of Theology in general. Kerygmatic and Biblical Theology were simply manifestations of the migration.

Of equal importance was the migration of the same style of scholar
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 to the field of Moral Theology. The drastic revolution that has taken place in Roman Catholic Moral Theology has received many explanations, principally focussing on disillusionment about institutions
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 and ethical systems that have become irrelevant. However, such explanations, while true, are inadequate. We would contend that the

principal reason was, again, the migration syndrome. Just as those formed in the biblical exegetical approach tended to migrate to the field of Dogmatic Theology and to bring about a new synthesis, so, too, others migrated to the field of Moral Theology. They saw the basis of all moral theology not in terms of a ius naturale that needed to be codified and of casus conscientiae that required resolution⁵⁶ but in terms of a response to a living and developing covenant to God. The new approach could be thus described:

It is possible to outline some of the characteristics that should be salient in a Christian moral theology ...

- (1) Most basic of all is the charity-centeredness of the scriptural teaching. Christian moral life is a loving response to the prevenient love of God revealed in Christ and his saving deeds. This response of love, in its turn, is to be affirmed and validated in our worship and our day-to-day fidelity to the law of Christ.
- (2) Since the agape which we must thus strive to express and embody is our common sharing in the grace-life of Christ, a morality centered in it will be at once Christocentric and ecclesial.
- (3) In the same way, it will be what has been called a 'paschal morality': not a morality that consists in the static fulfilment of moral norms but one that is dynamic and progressive, 'which, in hope, keeps us in tension from good to better, from death to resurrection, from the present life to the future life'.
- (4) To point up the other side of the coin, there will be in such an ethic no legalism, no minimalism, no individualism. These are surely characteristics, positive and negative, to be gleaned from the biblical sources. The Catholic moral theology of recent centuries has been frequently reproached with a failure to reflect these features. It is clear that on every level of moral teaching - in the classroom situation, in the confessional, in the pulpit (and therefore in the seminary above all) - there is need⁵⁷ for a revitalization of our presentation of moral doctrine.

When such scholars sought for a unifying concept that would be the equivalent of ius naturale in the former theology they lighted

spontaneously on the concept of love, agape in their biblical terminology. At once new depictions of Moral Theology were presented, based on agape. It was seen as dynamic and progressive, excluding the legalism, the
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minimalism and individualism of the established Moral Theology.

Such were the elements that made up the revolution that occurred during the 1960s in Roman Catholic theological education. It began with the community of scholars who were involved in the post-graduate study of Biblical Studies. From there, by migration, it spread to the fields of Dogmatic Theology and Moral Theology. Through this new community and its resources, such as books and periodical literature, it then spread to the seminaries. Soon, there was confrontation and challenge.

In terms of the thesis, a paradigmatic system of religious knowledge had been constructed from the time of the Counter Reformation but more particularly from the nineteenth century. Its vital element was the implementation of a new research tradition which was presumed to be that of medieval Thomism. This research tradition was accepted as universal and perennial, applicable to all systems of knowledge. It gave rise to an accepted secondary expressive model which quickly became entrenched and thereafter static. The research tradition lost its raison d'être and ossified. A new research tradition was generated within the community of biblical scholars. Its value was first experienced within their discipline and the possibility of further application seen. This community migrated, with their new tradition, into other ecclesiastical disciplines and soon variants of the secondary expressive model, noticeably different to that which had been in possession, became apparent. Confrontation and the exercise of authority to restore the status quo failed to stop the development.

Eventually a revolution took place with the installation, in certain Roman Catholic social groups, of the new research model. The end result was the paradigmatic confusion, or state of revolution, that marked the 1960s and the consequent influence that this had on Roman Catholic seminary education.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7.

1. Codex Iuris Canonici (Rome, 1918), cc. 1352-1371.
2. E. Goffman, Asylum (New York, 1961), p. xiii.
3. Legislation, which endeavoured to enforce the usage of Latin as an ecclesiastical language in the 1960s, is principally found in the Encyclical Veterum Sapientia, AAS, 54 (1962), pp. 129-135. This was reinforced by Sacrum Latinae Linguae, AAS, 54 (1962), pp. 339-368 and the address of John XXIII at the opening of Vatican II, AAS, 54 (1962), pp. 791-792, which had the significant addendum that there was a 'need to clothe the teaching of the Church in forms which are accessible and attractive to the way men think today'.
4. This point is developed in J.J. Smolicz, 'Fragmentation in science and education. An analysis of the community structure of science' in S. Murray-Smith (ed.), Melbourne Studies in Education 1974 (Melbourne, 1974).
5. AAS, 23 (1931). pp. 241-284; A. Bea, 'The Apostolic Constitution Deus Scientiarum Dominus. Its Origin and Spirit', TS, 4 (1943), p. 42; J. de Ghellinck, 'La nouvelle Constitution sur les études', NRT, 55 (1931), pp. 769-785.
6. M. J. Hurley, Declaration on Christian Education of Vatican Council II (New Jersey, 1966), p. 90.
7. Text is in J. Neuner, 'Decree on Priestly Formation' in H. Vorgrimler (ed.), Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II (New York, 1967), p. 395 n. 33.
8. Neuner, op.cit., p. 395, n. 34.
9. Ibid., p. 396, n.36
10. The text is taken from the document Optatam Totius, par. 16 in Enchiridion Vaticanum. Documenti del Concilio Vaticano II seventh ed. (Bologna, 1968), p. 442.
11. Neuner, op.cit., p. 398.
12. Ibid.
13. Allocutio in Gregoriana Pontificia Studiorum Universita habita, 12 March, 1964. See AAS, 56 (1964), p. 365.
14. AAS, 57 (1965), p. 789.
15. Ibid., p. 791.
16. EB, pp. 192-202.
17. EB, pp. 205-232.

18. EB, p. 213.
19. EB, p. 222.
20. EB, p. 226.
21. EB, pp. 237-241.
22. EB, pp. 258-259.
23. EB, p. 259.
24. A. Miller, 'Das Neue Biblische Handbuch', Benedictinische Monatschrift, (1955), pp. 49ff.
25. Ibid.
26. L. Alonso Schökel, 'Dove va l' esegesi cattolica?' Civiltà Cattolica, 111 (1960), p. 449-460.
27. Divinitas, 4 (1960), pp. 385-456.
28. Art.cit., p. 454.
29. J. Fitzmyer, 'A Recent Roman Scriptural Controversy', TS, 22 (1961), pp. 426-444; 'The Close of a Controversy', CBQ, 23 (1961), p. 269.
30. The Monitum warned against any attacks on the 'genuine (germana) historical and objective truth of Sacred Scripture'. AAS, 53 (1961), p. 507.
31. A convenient history of the text's formation can be found in: G.H. Tavard, The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation of Vatican Council 11 (London, 1966). See also A. Dulles 'The Constitution on Divine Revelation in Ecumenical Perspective', American Ecclesiastical Review, 154 (1966), pp. 217-231; M. Zerwick 'De Sacra Scriptura in Constitutione dogmatica Dei Verbum', VD, 44 (1966), pp. 17-42; G. Baum 'Vatican 11's Constitution on Revelation: History and Interpretation', TS, 28 (1967), pp. 51-75; T. Worden 'Revelation and Vatican 11', Scripture, 19 (1967) pp. 54-61; E. Maly and others, 'The Constitution on Divine Revelation', Bible Today, (1968) pp. 2418-2460.
32. AAS, 56 (1964), pp. 712-718. There is a commentary by J.A. Fitzmyer in TS, 25 (1964), pp. 386-408.
33. Ibid.
34. Text is in Enchiridion Vaticanum, p. 505.
35. A description of the formation of a separate community of scholars, in the Protestant churches, has definite parallels with what is being said here:

The community of reference and accountability became, not the liberal church, but the guild of biblical scholars. The guild, however, is not a community but a collective. It is simply a peer group on the model of any other professional guild, subject to the same virtues (preservation of high standards, rewards in terms of prestige to those deemed most worthy, centralization and dissemination of information etc.) and vices (development of an "expert" ethos, invention of a technical esoteric language, repression of innovation, conformity to peer-group values) which characterize all other professional groups.

W. Wink, The Bible in Human Transformation (Philadelphia, 1973, p. 10.

36. See above pp. 104-5.
37. The Pontifical Biblical Institute was given its mandate by the letter Vinea electa of May 7, 1909. The text is in EB, pp. 102-108. At first, only those holding the ecclesiastical degree of Doctor in Theology could take its courses, but by 1928 it could grant all degrees in the field of Biblical Studies in its own right. See Quod maxime erat in votis, AAS, 20 (1928), pp. 314-325. On the Biblical Institute see S. Schmiat, 'Cinquanti anni del Pontificio Istituto Biblico', Civiltà Cattolica, 111 (1960), pp. 615-623.
38. The Pontifical Biblical Commission was enabled to grant degrees by Scripturae Sanctae of Pius X, February 23, 1904. At various times new syllabi were set for examinations. Texts are in ASS, 37 (1904-1905), pp. 126-129, AAS, 3 (1911), pp. 47-50, 296-300. Other institutions such as the École Biblique in Jerusalem, and the Studium Franciscanum in Jerusalem were able to conduct courses but not to grant degrees.
39. For evidence of this see A. Romeo, art.cit.
40. It was intended that, in the main, those trained for higher ecclesiastical degrees, particularly in the field of Biblical Studies, would be intended for the seminaries. This was not so true of other disciplines, such as Canon Law, Theology or Sacred Music.
41. The following figures are based on the Catholic Periodical Index (Haverford, Pennsylvania, 1930-1966), which was succeeded by the Catholic Periodical and Literature Index (1967-).
42. For the purposes of examining the migration trend all articles in periodicals specifically dedicated to Sacred Scripture have been discounted (e.g. articles in Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Scripture, Biblica, Verbum Domini, Revue Biblique, Biblical Archaeologist, Scripture Bulletin). Likewise all official statements of the Vatican have been discounted, and those articles of a very popular nature which could be deemed non-academic in the strict sense.

43. American Ecclesiastical Review (Washington 1889-); Clergy Review (London, 1931 -); Theology Digest (Kansas City, 1953 -). The latter specifically stated, in its first issue, that it intended to present articles from 'a few main currents of present-day theological thought'.
44. Theology Digest only began in 1953. Because of the fact that the number of articles varied considerably from year to year (whereas the number of articles in the two other examples was relatively constant) the number of articles pertaining to Biblical Studies has been expressed as a percentage as well as a gross total.
45. These examples are taken from the Catholic Periodical Index.
46. See A. de Villamonte, La teologia kerigmatica (Barcelona, 1962).
47. Examples of systematic kerygmatic presentations within Roman Catholicism would be J.A. Jungmann, Handing on the Faith (New York, 1959); id., The Good News Yesterday and Today (New York, 1962); J. Hofinger, The Art of Teaching Christian Doctrine sec. ed. (Notre Dame, 1962).
48. General discussion among Catholic authors can be found in C. Spicq, 'L'avenement de la theologie biblique', Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, 35 (1951), pp. 561-574; id., 'Nouvelles reflexions sur la theologie biblique', ibid., 42 (1958), pp. 209-219; F.M. Braun, 'La Theologie Biblique', Revue Thomiste, 53 (1953), pp. 221-253; S. Lyonnet, 'De notione et momento Theologiae Biblicae', VD 34 (1958), pp. 142-153; R.A.F. MacKenzie, 'The Concept of Biblical Theology', Catholic Theological Society, 10 (1955), pp. 48-73.
49. See the bibliography in G.S. Glanzman and J.A. Fitzmyer, An Introductory Bibliography for the Study of Scripture (Westminster, 1961), pp. 79-86. R. Schnackenburg, New Testament Theology Today (New York, 1963) also has a copious bibliography.
50. See H. Vorgrimler (ed.), Dogmatic vs. Biblical Theology (Baltimore, 1965).
51. This has been described in the following fashion:

Coetus hominum viatorum eiusdem fidei christianae professione, et eorundem sacramentorum participatione adunatus, sub regimine legitimorum pastorum ac praecipue Romani Pontificis.

This was basically the definition of Robert Bellarmine in his De Controversiis (Igolstadt, 1586-93). It established the model followed by others after the Counter-Reformation.
52. Pius XII defined this model as follows:

Fideles, Christo adjuncti, cum Ipso efformant aliquod corpus, non solum moraliter, sicut fit de quacumque societate, sed realiter; non tamen materialiter, sed mystice. Corpus siquidem efformant, cuius singuli sunt membra, eadem vita spirituali viventes qua Christus vivit, quam Christus nobis suo sanguine acquisivit.

The text of Pius XII's Encyclical, Mystici Corporis is found in AAS, 35 (1943), pp. 200-243.

53. On the proliferation of models see A. Dulles, Models of the Church (New York, 1974). He explicitly names such competing models as the Body of Christ, the Servant Church, the People of God.
54. New developments in Moral Theology became obvious during the late 1950s, causing disquiet and reflection. J.C. Ford and G. Kelly, Contemporary Moral Theology (2 vols. Westminster, 1958-63), expressed the hesitant sentiments of many around the 1960s.
55. See, for an example of these inadequate explanations, S.E. Ahlstrom, 'The Radical Turn in Theology and Ethics. Why it Occurred in the 1960s' in New Theology, 8 (1971), pp. 19-39.
56. N. Crotty, 'Biblical Perspectives in Moral Theology', TS, 26 (1965), pp. 574-595.
57. Crotty, art.cit., pp. 593-594. The Roman Catholic scholar, most influential in introducing this new approach was B. Haring, The Law of Christ (two vols., Cork, 1963).
58. Cf. C. Spicq, Agape: Prolegomenes à une étude de theologie néo-testamentaire (Louvain, 1955); R. Carpentier, 'Vers une morale de la charité', Gregorianum, 34 (1953), pp. 32-55; id., 'Le primat de la charité en morale surnaturelle', ibid., 83 (1961) pp. 3-24; id., 'Le primat de l'Amour-Charité comme méthode de theologie morale', ibid., pp. 492-509.
59. The movement against legalism caused serious problems for the Roman Catholic Church. This tendency gave rise to the broad spectrum of 'situational morality'. It was condemned by Pius XII in his Allocution of April 18, 1952, AAS, 44 (1952), pp. 413-419. Various attitudes had been taken by Catholic moralists. K. Rahner, 'Situationsethik und Sundenmystik', Stimmen der Zeit, 145 (1949-50), pp. 330-342; J. Vialatoux, 'Reflexions sur les idées de casuistique et de loi morale' in Faculté Catholique de Theologie (eds.), Memorial J. Chaine (Lyon, 1950); M. Reding, 'Situationsethik, Kasuistik und Ethos der Nachfolge', Gloria Dei, 6 (1951), pp. 290-292; D. von Hildebrand, and A. Jourdain, True Morality and its Counterfeits (New York, 1955); E. Hamel, 'Valeur et limites de la casuistique', Sciences ecclesiastiques, 11 (1950), pp. 147-173.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has been an endeavour to investigate the system of knowledge peculiar to religious culture and to apply such findings to Christianity so as, in particular, to elucidate the process of theological education that has de facto eventuated in the Roman Catholic Church and which has included an evident drastic change in the 1960s. In order to achieve this broad aim it has been necessary to make use of scholarly techniques from many disciplines and to introduce data from many sources. It is contended that in no other way could the topic have been adequately treated.

In the development of the enquiry certain substantially new ground has been broken. The thesis first established the experiential models of religious knowledge. This theoretical description, using original terminology, was an innovation and, in our estimation, it explains the religious phenomenon more precisely and accurately than any previous attempts. It was, further, necessary to generate a new vocabulary in order to expatiate on the entire system of religious knowledge, with its experiential models of religious knowledge, its primary and secondary models and its research tradition. This theoretical construct was vindicated by recourse to empirical data on religion.

Particular application was then made to Christianity, which necessarily implied that Judaism be seen in considerable depth. It became evident that both Judaism and Christianity shared an experiential model of religious knowledge that normally took a mediatorial form. Such a model described the posture of the religious adherent who made contact with Ultimacy, in the form of the High God, on a stable basis. The religious community was formed and shaped by its

mode of contact. Within Judaism there emerged a distinctive primary expressive model which verbalized and validated the stance of the religious group. This primary expressive model was encapsulated in the myth of the community. Through the written corpus of ancient Israel it was possible to reconstruct the myth and the primary expressive model.

This work done on the written sources of Judaism has been original since no extant studies adequately served the needs of the thesis. The recourse to the Hebrew text and the use of modern scholarly methods of exegesis and literary dissection were vindicated because of this need. The result introduced a substantially novel approach to the religion of Judaism which would be patient of further application. For the purposes of the thesis only limited use was made of the approach.

It has been further established that any study of systems of religious knowledge cannot be divorced from the social groups that produced them. This has necessarily involved the sociological perspective and, in this field, novel application has been made particularly in the use made of the theory of tradition. While it has been used by other scholars in various intellectual fields of research the application to religious culture in the way described in the thesis has been untested. It is tradition, as explained in the thesis, which is responsible for the perpetuation of the primary expressive model and its transmission into a secondary expressive model. Tradition evaluates as it transmits, but with constant appearance of continuity with the past. Eventually tradition will aggregate to itself a research methodology.

At this point the transition was made to the field of education, and specifically religious education. The synthesis of tradition, in the sociological sense, and research methodology has cast significantly new light on education. A research tradition will generate variants of the primary expressive model with fuller elaboration of those aspects considered to be currently important. It will also endeavour to demonstrate, for the sake of establishing continuity with the past, that the secondary expressive model is in all respects a genuine replica of the primary expressive model. The demonstration of this aspect of the thesis, as it applied to Christianity and Christian theological education, has entailed a selective review of the history of Christianity, using historical methodology and with recourse to primary sources.

The thesis has finally confronted the problem that has been recognised in many fields of religious scholarship, the drastic change that is verified in religious mythology, religious thinking and education. It is maintained that the theoretical foundation that has been constructed would allow a satisfying solution to this problem. At a certain point in the life of a religious social group the entire process from the experiential model, in symbiosis with the primary expressive model, via an established research model to a secondary expressive model becomes fixed and established. It is then a paradigmatic system of knowledge, which indicates that a stable and fruitful mode of contact between the religious social group and Ultimacy has been constructed. Such a paradigmatic system of knowledge is maintained by the social control of religious authority which is first vested in the 'givenness' of the experiential model but which inevitably tends to be extradited to the expressive models. However, it is possible for an anomalous situation to occur when contact ceases to be fully realised. The thesis, by

making use of parallel studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, has endeavoured to show the ways in which change, and particularly drastic change, could and can take place. This has led to an original theory on the drastic change in religious thinking in the Roman Catholic Church in the 1960s and the concomitant drastic change that took place in Roman Catholic theological education in the same period. It is contended that this theoretical description explains the acknowledged situation more adequately than previous attempts.

Since the thesis has broken considerable new ground at various points and necessarily had to establish an overall view, it was not possible to develop all the potential along the way. Further application would be possible, from the theoretical basis of the thesis, to many different fields but such was not feasible within the confines of the thesis. In many ways the thesis must stand as a prolegomenon.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Sources

AAS	<u>Acta Apostolicae Sedis</u> (Rome, 1909-)
ASS	<u>Acta Sanctae Sedis</u> (Rome, 1865-1908).
ANEP	J.B. Pritchard (ed.), <u>Ancient Near East in Pictures</u> (Princeton, 1955).
ANET	J.B. Pritchard (ed.), <u>Ancient Near Eastern Text</u> rev. ed. (Princeton, 1955)
Denz.Schön	H. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer (eds.), <u>Enchiridion Symbolorum</u> thirty-second ed., Freiburg, 1963.
EB	<u>Enchiridion Biblicum</u> fourth ed. (Naples and Rome, 1961)
PG	J.P. Migne (ed.), <u>Patrologia Graeca</u> . 161 vols., Paris, 1857-66.
PL	J.P. Migne (ed.), <u>Patrologia Latina</u> 217 vols., Paris 1878-90.
ST	Thomas Aquinas, <u>Summa Theologiae</u> .

Abbreviations of Periodicals

AHR	<u>American Historical Review</u>
BA	<u>Biblical Archaeologist</u>
BJRL	<u>Bulletin of the John Rylands Library</u> .
BZ	<u>Biblische Zeitschrift</u>
BZAW	<u>Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft</u>
CBQ	<u>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</u>
EvT	<u>Evangelische Theologie</u>
HTR	<u>Harvard Theological Review</u>
HUCA	<u>Hebrew Union College Annual</u>
JAOS	<u>Journal of the American Oriental Society</u>
JBL	<u>Journal of Biblical Literature</u>
JEA	<u>Journal of Egyptian Archaeology</u>

Abbreviations of Periodicals contd.

JNES	<u>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</u>
JSS	<u>Journal of Semitic Studies</u>
JTS	<u>Journal of Theological Studies</u>
NRT	<u>Nouvelle Revue Theologique</u>
OTS	<u>Oudtestamentische Studien</u>
RA	<u>Revue d'Assyriologie</u>
RB	<u>Revue Biblique</u>
RHPR	<u>Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses</u>
RHR	<u>Revue de l'histoire des religions</u>
RSR	<u>Revue des sciences religieuses</u>
TD	<u>Theology Digest</u>
ThLZ	<u>Theologische Literaturzeitung</u>
TS	<u>Theological Studies</u>
TZ	<u>Theologische Zeitschrift</u>
VT	<u>Vetus Testamentum</u>
ZA	<u>Zeitschrift für Assyriologie</u>
ZAW	<u>Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft</u>

Miscellaneous Abbreviations

LXX	Greek Septuagint
MT	Massoretic Text
Vg	Vulgate

Abbreviations of the Books of the Hebrew Scriptures

Gn	Genesis	Dt	Deuteronomy
Ex	Exodus	Jos	Joshua
Lv	Leviticus	Jgs	Judges
Nm	Numbers	1 Sm	1 Samuel

Abbreviations of the Books of the Hebrew Scriptures

2 Sm	2 Samuel	Is	Isaiah
1 Kgs	1 Kings	Jer	Jeremiah
2 Kgs	2 Kings	Ez	Ezekiel
1 Chr	1 Chronicles	Hos	Hosea
2 Chr	2 Chronicles	Am	Amos
Ezr	Ezra	Mi	Micah
Neh	Nehemiah	Na	Nahum
Est	Esther	Hab	Habakkuk
Jb	Job	Zeph	Zephaniah
Ps(s)	Psalms	Zech	Zechariah
Prv	Proverbs		

1Q, 2Q, 3Q etc. Numbered caves of Qumran, yielding written material,
followed by abbreviation of biblical book.

Transliteration of Hebrew

' = נ	z = ז	m = מ	q = ק
b = ב	h = ח	n = נ	r = ר
g = ג	t = ט	s = ס	ś = שׁ
d = ד	y = י	c = צ	š = שׂ
h = ה	k = כ	p = פ	t = ת
w = ו	l' = ל	s = שׂ	

Note: The presence or absence of dages lene in the begadkepat letters is not shown. Consonants with dages forte are written double.

With matres lectionis

bâ	=	בַּ
bô	=	בּוֹ
bû	=	בּוּ
bê	=	בֵּי
bî	=	בִּי

Without matres lectionis

bā	=	בָּ	ba	=	בֶּ
bō	=	בֹּ	bo	=	בֻּ
bū	=	בֻּ	bu	=	בֵּ
bē	=	בֵּ	be	=	בִּ
bî	=	בִּ	bi	=	בִּ

With vocal sewa

bă	=	בְּ
bō	=	בּוֹ
bě	=	בֵּי
b ^e	=	בִּי

Transliteration of Greek

ē	=	η	h	=	ῥ	ph	=	φ
ou	=	ου	th	=	θ	ch	=	χ
ō	=	ω	y	=	υ	ps	=	ψ

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