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BROCH, MUSIL, CANETTI

Three Austrian Novelists
of the 1930's.

MOTIFS OF CRIME AND MADNESS IN DIE SCHLAFWANDLER, DER MANN OHNE EIGENSCHAFTEN AND DIE BLENDUNG.

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for the degree of
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CONTENTS

Acknowledgement	III
Statement	IV
Abstract	V
Note	X
Introduction	XI
CHAPTER ONE: The criminal motif in Broch's Die Schlafwandler.	
Pasenow: the uniform as judge	1
Esch: the obsession with justice	16
Huguenau: the criminal as value-free man	41
CHAPTER TWO: The function of the criminal in Musil's Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften.	
Moosbrugger: the criminal as a reflection of society	57
Clarisse: the criminal as savior	69
Ulrich: the moral question	75
Ulrich and Agathe: "Die Verbrecher"	85
CHAPTER THREE: Crime and the criminal in Canetti's Die Blendung.	
The private world	11o
The underworld	134
The forces of law	14o
The devaluation of life	153
CHAPTER FOUR: The criminal motif.	158
CHAPTER FIVE: The function of insanity in Broch's Die Schlafwandler.	
The psychology of values	172
The insanity of value-fragmentation	184
Pasenow: the romantic psychological cycle	188
Esch: anarchy and 'Erlösungswahn'	2o9
Huguenau: crisis and the hope for recovery	219

CHAPTER SIX: The role of insanity in Musil's Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften.
Moosbrugger: the ego and the world 236
"Rausch und Geisteskrankheit als verwandt" 246
"Eine geheimnisvolle Zeitkrankheit" 260
Clarisse: 'Erlösungswahn': 'Wahn' as 'Erlösung' 265
Ulrich and Agathe: "das Fragment eines anderen Lebens 277

CHAPTER SEVEN: Forms of madness in Canetti's Die Blendung.
Obsession as structural principle 292
Monomania: the private world 306
The paralysis of schizophrenia 313
Power and paranoia 324
"Ein Irrenhaus" 344

CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion: the motif of madness. 365

Footnotes 381
Bibliography 416

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S T A T E M E N T

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published by another person, except where reference is made in the text of this study.

Abstract

After a preliminary survey of critical opinion linking Elias Canetti with Hermann Broch and Robert Musil, this study examines the motifs of crime and insanity which play a significant role in their novels, Die Blendung, Die Schlafwandler and Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften respectively.

The first half of this examination, dealing with the criminal motif, begins with a discussion of Broch's Die Schlafwandler. In the first two sections of Broch's trilogy, references to crime demonstrate the relationship of the protagonists to the values of society, which are shown to be unrealistic and invalid.
Joachim von Pasenow condemns himself as a traitor and criminal because he is unable to live up to the rigid standards of his military code; Esch is obsessed with justice and order, attempting to free himself from the guilty society he is involved in, and to avenge both its wrongs and his own. The more extreme state of value loss in the third novel of the trilogy, Huguenau, is reflected in the protagonist's rejection of all moral standards: his act of murder represents complete freedom from the invalid codes of the past; but it is also shown to point forward to a potential reconstruction of values.

The criminal motif in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften is centred on the figure of the murderer Moosbrugger. Moosbrugger's

position within the novel is analysed, to reveal that he reflects the latent violence of his society. Clarisse's obsession with Moosbrugger is discussed as the expression of a general dissatisfaction with prevailing values. In a different form, this dissatisfaction provides the basis for Ulrich's search for more valid moral criteria. This search involves the rejection of existing moral laws, and culminates in crime: the third volume of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften is subtitled "Die Verbrecher", in reference to Ulrich and his sister Agathe. Agathe's crime of forging her father's will is presented as the starting point of an attempt to live according to inner convictions rather than external laws. Although their 'Utopia' does not succeed, their attempt stands as a positive foil to the negative portrayal of the existing society and its moral standards.

In Die Blendung references to crime - in the fears, suspicions and hopes of the characters, as well as in actual crimes - reveal that each individual lives according to a private moral code, which he sees as giving him the right to pursue his own goals ruthlessly and with impunity. At the same time, he feels justified in condemning others to death if they stand in the way of his goals. All sectors of society are shown to conform to this pattern, which results in the complete devaluation of human life. The destructiveness of these private legal systems is not, within the novel, evaluated from the point of view of more valid moral

standards: Canetti's condemnation of the violently egotistic values of his characters is simply revealed in their grotesque consequences in the incidents of the novel.

The summarizing chapter, "The criminal motif", sets the results of each individual study in the context of the others. In particular, the relationship of the criminal figures to the society depicted in each novel is examined: in each instance the criminal is seen to be representative of his society, rather than alien from it.
The utopian aspects of the criminal motif in Die Schlafwandler and Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften - in portraying the potential for new ethical values - form the basis for fundamental distinctions in the ultimate significance of the motif in each of the works discussed.

The motif of madness, examined in the latter section of this study, runs parallel to the criminal motif in many respects.

Broch's theoretical works provide the frame of reference for the discussion of Die Schlafwandler: Broch's theory of the cycle of values and the accompanying psychological states - in particular the concepts of value disintegration as neurosis, false closed systems as psychosis, and alienation from reality as insanity - are discussed in the opening section of the chapter. These concepts are linked with the incidents and images of the novel, to show how Broch, in many different

ways, depicts the breakdown of values through the psychological instability of his characters. The plots of Huguenau present the most extreme instances of these forms of madness, but also reveal the potential for the restoration of normality.

Moosbrugger is, again, the focal point for the image of madness in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. The major features of Moosbrugger's illness - the sense that the ego is threatened by external reality, and the opposite state of ecstatic communion with the world - recur in the incidents of intoxication depicted in the novel, which are equated with Moosbrugger's experiences through shared images. These incidents are presented as the result of the deficiencies of the age which is characterized as diffuse and aimless, and designated as insane. Clarisse's vision of redemption and her concept of delusion form one response to this general instability. Ulrich and Agathe represent another response in their attempt to establish a 'second reality' as an alternative form of life. Their experiences are shown to be closely linked with the delusions of Moosbrugger and Clarisse: the tension between these indications of insanity and the hope that their attempt nevertheless represents a valid way of life is seen as dominating the final section of the novel.

Madness, in the form of the obsessions of the characters portrayed, determines the action, characterization and narra-

tive mode of Die Blendung. The society of Die Blendung is composed of monomaniac individuals, whose extreme egotism alienates them radically from society and reality. Each character's physical surroundings, and the images used in his characterization, provide an image of schizophrenic isolation and paralysis. The aggressive delusions of these characters are linked with paranoia, as Canetti portrays it in Masse und Macht. The "Irrenhaus" chapter is analyzed to demonstrate that it presents the same negative characteristics as Canetti's depiction of normal society: the novel offers no alternative to the radical and destructive image of insanity.

The conclusion relates the motif of madness to the criminal motif, suggesting that insanity is used within all three novels to reveal the underlying causes for those characteristics delineated by the motif of crime. The central factors of both motifs - in most general terms, the absence of unifying values, and the subsequent alienation of the individual from society and reality - are common to all three novels, although in widely varying ways. The final conclusions drawn from the role of these motifs in each novel suggest basic differences in the philosophical assumptions underlying each novel.

NOTE

Source references for quotations from the works of Broch, Musil and Canetti are given within the text.
In Chapters 1,2,3 and 5,6,7, the numbers in brackets refer to page numbers of the respective text under discussion, in the edition given in the bibliography.
In the Broch chapters, other works by Broch are referred to according to the volume number of the Gesammelte Werke, followed by the page number e.g. (9:93).
Musil's Tagebücher, Aphorismen, Essays und Reden and Prosa, Dramen, Späte Briefe are designated by the initials T. and P. respectively.
In the Canetti chapters, M. refers to Masse und Macht, A. to Aufzeichnungen 1942-1948, and A.V. to Alle vergeudete Verehrung.
In the general chapters all references are given in the footnotes, to avoid confusion.

Introduction

The juxtaposition of the Austrian novelists Robert Musil and Hermann Broch has become a critical commonplace.[1] Comparisons have been based largely on such factors as contemporaneity; common cultural background; similar intellectual and scientific interests; and the shared designation of their novels Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften and Die Schlafwandler as 'Epochenromane' written within the context of the disintegrated Hapsburg Empire. With the rediscovery of Elias Canetti's Die Blendung, in 1964, Canetti has increasingly been assigned a significant role in the same constellation.

General discussions of the Austrian novel or the 2oth century German novel provide both broad comparisons and basic distinctions, linking Canetti with Musil and Broch or differentiating between them. In "Das schöpferische Mißtrauen", for example, Herbert Eisenreich divides Austrian literature into five generations, beginning with Grillparzer. Broch and Musil are placed in the third generation, born in the last decades of the 19th century, raising Austrian literature to new heights in the early 2oth century; while Canetti belongs to the fourth group, constituting the literary "Zwischenkriegsgeneration." Whereas the third generation is seen as united in the experience of the dying monarchy, the fourth is characterized as diffuse, "ohne die Charakteristika des

Österreichischen."[2] Eisenreich's distinction is valid in terms of the age gap between Musil (born 1880) and Broch (1886), and Canetti (1905): but it obscures the fact that their novels, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (1931-'33), Die Schlafwandler (1931-'32) and Die Blendung (1935), belong to the same post-War/pre-War decade.

Claudio Magris sets Canetti in the same generation as Musil, in discussing "Der habsburgische Mythos nach dem ersten Weltkrieg." Magris considers Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften a prime example of the creative depiction of the past monarchy. Despite "der vielfachen Verflechtungen mit den hier zu untersuchenden Motiven", Broch's Die Schlafwandler - set in Germany rather than Austria - remains outside the field of Magris' study. Die Blendung, on the other hand, is briefly discussed as one of a group of novels in which "dieser (habsburgische) Mythos in einer lebenspendenden, schöpferischen Metamorphose stirbt und zu neuen dauerhaften Werten führt": although the Hapsburg monarchy does not figure directly in the novel, the Austrian tradition is strong, as "der Wiener Dialekt für einen Augenblick zur Seelensprache der ganzen Welt wird." Magris also assesses Die Blendung as an important element in the development of "eine komplexe, ultramoderne Erzählkunst" in Austria between 1920-1940.[3] In the survey, "Aktuelle Perspektiven der mitteleuropäischen Literatur", Magris expands a little on this aspect. Here he links the novels of Broch, Musil and

Canetti as examples of innovations in the formal structure of narrative prose, although without determining the nature of these innovations. Musil and Canetti are singled out as exponents of this trend:

> mit Musil und Canetti vollzog sich eine Entlarvung der Welt, der Labyrinthe des Wirklichen und der Ungeheuer der Vernunft; als Reise in die Hölle, Mysterienspiel der modernen Hölle, Dies Irae unserer Werte. 4)

The formal categories of Roland Heger's Der österreichische Roman des 2o. Jahrhunderts distinguish Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften and Die Schlafwandler from Die Blendung. Discussing "Österreichs Beiträge zu neuen Formen des Romans", Heger classes Musil and Broch as founders of the "polyhistorische oder essayistische Roman." Heger refers to the "köstliche psychologische Studien" in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, and comments on the "tiefenpsychologische Mittel" used by Broch, but stresses the role of reflection and essayistic commentary within these novels. Die Blendung, on the other hand, is classified as a "psychologischer Roman". 5)

Werner Welzig's criteria in Der deutsche Roman im 2o. Jahrhundert also make a clear distinction between Musil and Broch on the one hand, and Canetti on the other. Die Schlafwandler and Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften are classed under the "Epochen und Generationsroman", dealing with "Die Kräfte der Zeit"; while Die Blendung is considered an "Entwicklungs-

roman", concerned with "Das Ich und die Welt". In view of the absence of a specifically designated historical setting in Canetti's novel, as opposed to those of Musil and Broch, Die Blendung cannot be seen as dealing directly with a particular age, as Die Schlafwandler and Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften do. Classification of Die Blendung as an 'Entwicklungsroman', however, distorts the position and nature of Kien's role within the novel: Kien is more closely linked with the society around him, in a general portrait, than this classification implies. The stress placed on 'Zeitkritik' in Canetti's aesthetic views also suggests possible comparisons from the perspective of the 'Zeitroman'.[6]

Michael Hamburger links Canetti with Musil and Broch in such a sense, while reviewing the novels of Doderer, in Between Prophecy and Exorcism.

> Yet Doderer's 'demonology' anticipated and included the issues of that war, as the psychology of Musil, Broch and Elias Canetti included them in novels written before the war.

Commenting on the "split ... between abstract knowledge and vital experience, between fantasy and reality in modern literature", Hamburger cites Broch's scepticism regarding the value of imaginative literature, and then continues:

> Mr. Elias Canetti, too, has presented an extreme and grotesque instance of the alienation in his novel 'Die Blendung'.... Like Broch and Doderer, Canetti has been led to psychological and philosophical studies by his experience of the dilemma, and Canetti's plays investigate various obsessions bound up with a loss of reality.

Hamburger's brief comments sum up several common issues. Concern with the problems of the age between the Wars is evident in the works of Broch and Musil, although they are set in the pre-War period; and Die Blendung has often been interpreted as a prophetic indication of the approaching war. The background of psychological and sociological interests is apparent, for example, in Musil's scientific studies, in Broch's "Werttheorie" and later "Massenpsychologie", and in Canetti's involvement in the questions of "Masse und Macht." Finally, the alienation of the individual imagination from the complex reality surrounding him is an important factor in the characters portrayed in all three novels.[7)]

This relationship between the individual and his world is discussed by Robert Mühlher as a basic theme of the "moderne psychologische Roman in Österreich". Mühlher sees Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften as

> die exemplarische literarische Spiegelung des von der neuen Psychologie so gründlich erforschten Typus des Neurotikers.

He continues with a parallel with Broch:

> Die Ambivalenz ist die neuropathologische Entsprechung, gleichsam das 'Symptom' der an Wertzerfall erkrankten Seele, eine Diagnose, die ganz ähnlich auch in einem anderen Gipfel des modernen österreichischen Romans, in den "Schlafwandlern" von Hermann Broch, ausgesprochen und dargestellt wird.

The two basic tendencies of general social portrait and individual psychological study - which Welzig has used as a differentiation - are combined by Mühlher to form the

basis of a link between Canetti and his contemporaries.

> Auch 'Die Blendung' weist dieselbe Grundstruktur auf, die hier aufgezeigt wird: vordergründig ein Gesellschaftsroman, hintergründig die "paranoischen Maskenzüge..." ... Im Zusammenhang mit der hier dargelegten Problematik fällt bei Canetti ... auf, daß er untersucht, wie weit die Sozialwelt eine manische, ja paranoische ist. 8)

General surveys of 2oth century Austrian literature thus provide some guidelines in setting Canetti in the context of his more established contemporaries. Most detailed comparisons, however, occur within studies devoted specifically to Canetti. Since the general outlines of critical investigation into Musil and Broch are relatively settled, research into Die Blendung has been able to proceed from initial groundwork towards a wider perspective of comparisons against this background. Canetti has been most frequently linked with Broch, in the first instance on the basis of their friendship. Canetti was also acquainted with Musil, but Broch played a particular role in Canetti's early career as a type of "geistigen Mentors".[9] Their mutual respect is evident in Broch's introduction to a public reading of Die Blendung, and in Canetti's tribute in the "Rede auf Hermann Broch. Zum 5o. Geburtstag." Research into mass-psychology provides the basis for a further personal connection: Kurt Loewenstein discusses Broch's Massenpsychologie and Canetti's Masse und Macht under the title of "Juden in der modernen Massenwelt".[1o]

Several analyses of Die Blendung contain references to similar themes in Broch's Schlafwandler. In his dissertation on Die Blendung, Manfred Moser compares the tripartite structure of Canetti's novel ("Kopf ohne Welt", "Kopflose Welt", "Welt im Kopf") with that of Broch's trilogy. Moser designates the action of Die Blendung as a "Zerfallsprozeß der Wirklichkeit", suggesting a parallel with Broch's "Zerfall der Werte". The three stages of Canetti's novel are then described in terms of the three sections of Die Schlafwandler: "Kopf ohne Welt" accordingly presents the "Perversion einer Erhebung vom Irdischen zum Absoluten", which is the essence of 'Romantik' as Broch depicts it in Pasenow; "Kopflose Welt" demonstrates the "fortschreitende Zersetzung der geistigen Autonomie" as Broch's Esch does; and the 'Sachlichkeit' of Huguenau has its parallel in the "Untergang des Individuums" and "Herrschaft der Objekte" of "Welt im Kopf". Moser's equation of the three sections of each novel thus establishes Canetti's depiction of the individual, Kien, as following the same course as Broch's presentation of the decline of a civilization. There is a fundamental distinction, however, Moser suggests, between the optimistic conclusion of Die Schlafwandler and Canetti's renunciation of "Lösungen und Erlösung".[11)]

Manfred Durzak, in "Versuch über Elias Canetti", draws a comparison between Die Blendung and Huguenau, the last novel of Die Schlafwandler. Durzak discusses the incident

of Fischerle's murder in Die Blendung as representing the "Logik der Wahnsysteme" of Canetti's characters; and recalls the same "unerbittlich abspülende Sachlogik eines Teilwertsystems" in Broch's Huguenau. Durzak sums up:

> Diese in Wirklichkeitszerstörung mündende Verabsolutierung der Teilwertsysteme ... erscheint bei Canetti, mit vielen grotesken Untertönen, ins Wahnhafte gesteigert.

Durzak also points out that there can be no question of influence in this thematic similarity: a draft of Canetti's novel was complete before Broch wrote Die Schlafwandler, although Die Blendung was only published four years after Broch's trilogy.[12)]

The characters of Die Blendung have also been compared with those portrayed by Musil in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. Mechthild Curtius, in "Das Groteske als Kritik", claims that some of Musil's characters, e.g. Leona and Lindner, have grotesque characteristics which make them comparable with Canetti's figures. The grotesque features of these characters, such as Leona's 'Freßsucht', show them to be on the verge of madness; Curtius considers that this is presented with great psychological accuracy.[13)] Dieter Dissinger's study Vereinzelung und Massenwahn concludes with a similar comparison of the predominance of madness in each of these novels. Dissinger sees only one character in each novel - Ulrich in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften and Georg in Die Blendung - as standing apart from the "wahnwitzigem Treiben" which is

presented throughout both novels.[14] On the basis of this "Schlüsselstellung" of insanity in Die Blendung, Fränzi Maierhöfer ("Wider die Waffe der Blindheit") links Canetti with Musil and Broch, as well as with, for example, Benn, Döblin and Céline. Maierhöfer sees their novels as standing in the tradition of Dostoïevsky's "Untergrundmann":

> Dieser verleugnete Kellerloch-Bewohner, den ... Broch das "apokalyptische Wahngeschöpf"... nennt, lebt ... in den eigenschaftslosen Geschöpfen Musils und in den geblendeten Massenwesen Canettis. [15]

Karl Markus Michel's discussion of Canetti's work, "Der Intellektuelle und die Masse", contains a more comprehensive comparison of the three writers. Michel stresses Kien's role as an intellectual in Die Blendung, linking him with Musil's Ulrich and Broch's Vergil: Michel postulates "einen gemeinsamen Erfahrungsgrund Österreich, die Scherben der Habsburger Monarchie", in which 'die Intelligenz abgedankt hatte' as the background for the treatment of this theme. At the opposite pole, Michel comments on the "Thema Irrenhaus" and the shared interest in the "Masse". Michel considers Musil's Moosbrugger the "Abbreviatur für ... das Phänomen der Masse", and suggests that Canetti's characters are "Exponenten einer kollektiven Regression zu archaischen und primitiven Verhaltensmustern". The dichotomy between the intellectual and the crowd, which Michel here establishes as a basic factor in the works of Broch, Musil and Canetti, recurs in Durzak's analysis of Canetti. Durzak, too, sees the themes of insanity and the

masses as linking Canetti with Musil and Broch in the "spezifischen geistesgeschichtlichen Topographie" based on "dem Hintergrund des Positivismus":

> Wie Broch in seiner Rationales und Irrationales verbindenden Gesamterkenntnis und Musils Synthese von ratoidem und nichtratoidem Verstehen auf die eine unaufgespaltene, einheitliche Wirklichkeit gerichtet sind, die es zu erkennen gilt, zielt auch Canetti auf die aus Geist und "Masse" gleichermaßen erwachsende universale Erkenntnis. 16)

Whereas Durzak judges the rational/irrational dichotomy in Die Blendung as resolved by a postulated balance, Michel considers the novel to demonstrate the conquest of the intellect by the forces of the irrational crowd. Michel speculates inconclusively on possible reasons for the shared themes - "Der Intellektuelle, der Irrsinn, die Masse, der Massenwahn" - in the works of these three writers:

> Setzt sich hier der Einfluß Freuds durch? Wirkt der Sozialcharakter, die politische Erfahrung, ein gemeinsamer Grundreiz? Das alles reicht zur Erklärung nicht aus.

Thematic similarities are balanced by formal differences:

> Mit Musil wie mit Broch verbinden Canetti freilich mehr noch motivische als stilistische Elemente. Von beiden unterscheidet ihn wiederum die unbekümmerte, ... äußerst artistische Technik, mit der ein gesellschaftlich und politisch stark belastetes Thema zur Fabel gebogen wird. Wenn jene bedeutend sind durch ihr Scheitern an der Kunstform Roman, das dieser neue Möglichkeiten erschließt, so Canetti durch ein Gelingen, das zweifellos einzig für sich selbst steht. 17)

In general, then, critical opinion ranks Canetti's Die Blendung with its contemporaries, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften and Die Schlafwandler: all three are seen as making formal

advances, although in different ways. Their common intellectual and social background becomes apparent in the psychological bias of their novels: all three are interpreted as examining the underlying causes for the state of society between the Wars. This basic theme is in turn seen as determining the presence or dominance in all three novels of pathological characters, although distinctions are drawn regarding the ultimate significance of these figures within each novel.

This study sets out to examine in detail the role of motifs of crime and insanity in Die Schlafwandler, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften and Die Blendung. This examination concentrates largely on independent studies of the motif in each novel, attempting to determine the position of the criminal or insane figures (e.g. Huguenau, Moosbrugger and Kien) in relation to the other characters and incidents of each work. In each instance the role of the motifs is shown to extend beyond the significance of individual characters or incidents to become closely interwoven with each writer's basic themes. The general summarizing sections attempt to evaluate the results of the separate studies in relationship to one another, in order to show where each writer's use of these motifs coincides with or diverges from the others. In this way, detailed examination of shared motifs provides insight both in the interpretation of each work individually, and in determining fundamental differences between them.

CHAPTER ONE

The criminal motif in Broch's Die Schlafwandler.

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Pasenow: the uniform as judge.

In all three sections of Broch's Schlafwandler trilogy, the 'Verbrecher' motif expresses in varying degrees the relationship of the title character to the values of his society.

In Pasenow images connected with crime and the criminal occur almost solely in the thinking of Joachim von Pasenow. In most instances this involves his response to his own actions or to the behaviour of his friend Bertrand: the criminal image expresses his moral judgements, revealing attitudes which he himself is not always fully aware of.

Joachim's life is determined by the ethos of the landed gentry, predominantly through their links with the army and with the church. The army in particular dominates him so completely that he can imagine no existence outside it: for him, the world is divided into two opposing factions consisting of the army and the ideals of the class it represents and upholds, and the rest of the world which is inimical to those ideals.[1)] Because of his view of the whole of life as virtual warfare, his moral judgements are based on the military virtue of loyalty. Anyone who breaks away from the strict code of the value system represented by the army is therefore in his eyes not merely immoral, but a traitor who has committed the worst crime, that of deserting his own cause and collaborating with the enemy.

The conviction that the rest of the world, outside the closed value system of the family circle, is necessarily hostile is predominant also in the thinking of the Baddensen family, the other representatives in the novel of the landed aristocracy[2].

This view produces in Elisabeth, the daughter of the family, the same kind of value judgement, in which leaving the family circle constitutes betryal. In her case, betrayal takes the form of a prospective marriage, which would force her to leave her parents and the life of the "eingefriedete Park" (74) they have set up around themselves as a barrier against the hostile world. To overcome her feelings of guilt that she will be untrue to her parents despite her protestations, she develops a concept of marriage as another way of taming the outside world by making an outsider part of the peaceful closely-knit family group.

> Würde man mit allen Menschen verwandt sein, so wäre die Welt wie ein gepflegter Park und einen neuen Verwandten bringen, hieße eine neue Rosensorte in den Garten setzen. Untreue und Verrat würden dann zum leichteren Verbrechen. (76)

The disloyalty of breaking the circle is still an injustice against her parents - "... in dem Meere des ihnen angetanen Unrechts" (ibid.) - but the idea of linking the world in a family relationship becomes a "kleine Insel des Verzeihens" (ibid.) and makes the crime less serious. Nevertheless, the attitude remains, that anything less than complete devotion to the prevailing value system is seen as criminal. Elisabeth's attitude demonstrates the dominance of the

value system, in that its code is considered absolutely binding, broken - as it inevitably will be - only at the cost of an exaggerated consciousness of guilt. By the same token, it also indicates the inner weakness of the value system, in that the most normal course of events - a daughter's marriage - seems to constitute a break away from its ideals, and that such a betryal threatens to shatter the validity of the closed system.

When Elisabeth later comes under the influence of Bertrand's philosophy[3], her concept of 'Verbrechen' changes. Bertrand does not believe in adherence to external codes, but rather to inner drives:

> Man soll bekanntlich immer das tun, wozu einen der Dämon treibt. (27)

He rejects all norms, and urges Elisabeth to do the same. In response to her question, "Was soll ich tun?", he advises:

> "Nichts, was nicht bis in die letzte Faser Ihres Erlebens von Ihnen bejaht werden kann. Nur wer sich frei und gelöst dem Befehl seines Gefühls und seines Wesens unterwirft, kann zur Erfüllung kommen". (1o3f)

Although Elisabeth is not strong enough to break away from her family, she does recognise that she is doing wrong in marrying Joachim despite her love for Bertrand:

> "Leb wohl, ich werde heiraten... vielleicht ist es zynisch, aber das darf dich nicht wundern... wir begehen vielleicht beide das schwerste Verbrechen an uns". (147)

For her, now, it is not a crime to 'betray' her parents, but to act according to their wishes, since this means acting

against personal convictions. Even though she is not free to follow her own inclinations as Bertrand does - largely because of Bertand's failure to support her attempt to put his theories into practice - the priority of social or family codes has given way in her mind to the priority of the individual in her value judgements.

Joachim von Pasenow's moral code undergoes this process in reverse. The only value judgement of Joachim's which stands outside the social code of his family occurs in his childhood reminiscences early in the novel. Joachim's preference for the family property rather than a military career, paralleled by his brother Helmuth's wish to become an officer rather than a land-owner, is overruled by the class convention which prescribes that the older son should inherit the family estate and the younger son enter the army. The enforced denial of personal inclination for the sake of a "lächerliche Einrichtung" (10) leads Joachim to condemn his family as traitors (12). But with his entry into the 'Kadettenanstalt' in Culm, and the necessity of finding security in a dependable value system to replace the lost childhood reliance on his family, Joachim represses individual freedom in favour of established authority, in the form of the military system. A family incident provides the turning-point initiating this switch from a personal value-system to unquestioning adherence, amounting to total identification, to a strict imposed code, separate from the family but still

part of its general ethos. Shortly before he is to leave home for the cadet school, Joachim disobeys his father's orders and rides his brother's pony, which as a result breaks its leg and must be destroyed. Joachim interprets the family's reaction as the condemnation of a criminal who deserves banishment:

> er vermochte sich nicht mehr zu entsinnen, wie sie heimgekommen waren, wußte bloß, daß er in der Küche stand... und daß alle ihn anschauten, als wäre er ein Verbrecher... Und nun stand er plötzlich im Arbeitszimmer des Vaters, und es war, als ob das Strafgericht, das die Mutter ihnen so oft... angedroht hatte, nunmehr aufgestapelt und angesammelt, über ihn hereinbrechen müßte...
> Endlich klemmte der Vater das Einglas ins Auge:
> "Es ist die höchste Zeit, daß du aus dem Hause kommst."
> (13)

Despite resentment of his banishment to the army, Joachim is never able to eradicate the consciousness of guilt resulting from this incident, even after he has made reparation to Helmuth for the lost horse:

> Natürlich gab es in jener Zeit noch allerhand, das er vergessen hatte, aber es war trotzdem ein beunruhigender Rest geblieben... Als er Premierleutnant geworden war, schenkte er Helmuth ein Pferd... Dennoch ließ ihn das Gefühl nicht los, als wäre er ihm etwas schuldig geblieben, ja als wäre Helmuth ein unbequemer Gläubiger.
> (14)

The experience of disgrace and punishment resulting from disobedience produces in him an exaggerated awareness of guilt which asserts itself strongly in any moment of crisis throughout his life, and dominates his judgements and actions.

As the ethos of the army becomes the absolute value system for Joachim, it assumes the position of sole judge of right and

wrong, the only authority for distinguishing good and evil. His convictions are explained by Bertrand:

> Einstens war es bloß die Kirche, die als Richterin über den Menschen thronte, und ein jeglicher wußte, daß er ein Sünder war. Jetzt muß der Sünder über den Sünder richten, auf daß nicht alle Werte der Anarchie verfallen, und statt mit ihm zu weinen, muß der Bruder dem Bruder sagen: "Du hast unrecht gehandelt"... so mußte, da die große Unduldsamkeit des Glaubens verloren ward, die irdische Amtstracht an die Stelle der himmlichen gesetzt werden, und die Gesellschaft mußte sich in irdische Hierarchien und Uniformen scheiden und diese an der Stelle des Glaubens ins Absolute erheben. (19)

Because he is dependant on the security provided by the value system, Joachim must consider any offence against the ethos of that value system a serious wrong; but more importantly, the absolute validity he ascribes to the value system is put to question by any action which does not acknowledge its absolute rule. Bertrand's actions in leaving the army to become a businessman therefore brand him in Joachim's eyes as a criminal of the worst kind, a 'Verräter'[4]

> der etwas, das ihrer aller gemeinsamer Besitz gewesen war, hinüber auf die andere Seite des Lebens getragen und es dort preisgegeben hatte. (21)

Bertrand's treachery is not an objective fact, but Joachim's subjective reaction to the feeling of insecurity induced in him by Bertrand's existence as a renegade officer: because he cannot admit his subconscious awareness that Bertrand's new life invalidates the absolute claims he himself makes for the military value system, he must condemn Bertrand's action as radically evil.

Joachim therefore suspects Bertrand of being capable of committing any crime, as is demonstrated by his fear that he will kidnap his mistress Ruzena. This unvoiced accusation against Bertrand is, again, a transference of his subjective guilt in transgressing the strict military code - or his exaggerated concept of it - through his liaison with Ruzena. He suspects that he is himself guilty of 'Raub' (5o) because he has taken Ruzena from the sphere of the taverns and tried to incorporate her into his life, and because he is forced to keep her hidden from his peers. By transferring this threat to Bertrand, he is able to justify continuing his relationship with Ruzena, as the fulfilment of his chivalric duty to protect her from the wickedness of Bertrand.

The same rationalisation provides him with an argument in his attempt to persuade himself that it is his duty to marry Elisabeth - despite his belief that marriage will mean the "Entweihung" (34) of the "Engel" (164) - to shield her from the evil which Bertrand embodies (51). Much of the threat which Bertrand represents for him is connected with a subconscious shift in his own attitude to the value-system of his family and social class. His affair with Ruzena, Helmuth's death and Bertrand's friendly reasonableness undermine his faith in the conventions he has lived by until now.[5] Joachim rejects Bertrand's arguments, and tries to suppress the "kleines Freiheitsgefühl" (3o) he experiences in connection with his love for Ruzena, but he can neither free him-

self completely from his obligations to the code of his class, nor adopt the new way of life he has moved towards.

The resultant conflict produces a feeling of guilt so strong that he regards himself as a criminal. When he visits Elisabeth, for example, his guilt at his relationship with Ruzena expresses itself in his involuntary choice of the term 'Komplice' to describe his connection with Bertrand, the witness of his intimacy with Ruzena. But his horror at this sudden recognition of the link between Bertrand and himself - "es ekelte ihn ein wenig, da ihm das Wort Komplice einfiel" (92) - does not lead to a recoil from the life which both fascinates and horrifies him, but to the decision that he belongs in that sphere, since he is in fact worse than Bertrand.

> Ja, dort gehörte er hin, dort wollte er sein, fühlte sich freiwillig verbannt aus der Gesellschaft und doch verstoßen, fühlte sich Elisabeths unwürdig. Bertrand war zwar sein Komplice, hatte aber reinere Hände. (98)

His attachment to the world of Bertrand and Ruzena almost approaches the strength of his allegiance to the uniform, but not in the positive sense of replacing it as a personal philosophy or moral order. Joachim simply feels an obligation to remain loyal to his associates in 'crime', to the extent that his decision to marry Elisabeth seems tantamount to "Untreue" und "Gegenverrat" (111) against them. His relationship with Bertrand thus results in a balance of guilt on both sides:

> Ein Komplice, der den Komplicen verrät, und vom Vater mit Recht beschuldigt, daß er mit Bertrand konspiriere! (ibid.)

As Joachim begins to accept his father's wish that he should marry Elisabeth, his thinking also becomes increasingly dominated by Pasenow's accusations of conspiracy and betrayal.

The climax of Joachim's self-condemnation comes with Pasenow's relapse into mental illness. He sees his father's doctor as an inquisitor, uncovering his hidden guilt, which now seems so great that he feels he can justifiably be called his father's murderer:

> Denn diese Fragen schienen Joachim eine zwar sanfte, aber deshalb nicht weniger eindringliche und scharfe Inquisition und er erwartete, daß plötzlich der Inquisitor mit strengem Blick durch die Augengläser und ausgestrecktem Finger auf ihn deuten werde, hörte bereits anklagend und verdammend das fürchterliche Wort: Mörder. (124)

The murder Joachim imagines he has committed points forward to Huguenau's murder of Esch. The imagined murder functions in the same way as the later actual murder, destroying the authority of the value system, incorporated in the father figure, for the sake of freedom. Joachim's sense of guilt, however, indicates how far he is away from the freedom which allows Huguenau actually to commit the murder without ever thinking about it, without ever becoming aware of what he has done and recognising it as a crime.

There is some cause for Joachim to feel uneasy at his father's illness, since the latter's breakdown has from the beginning

been mainly concerned with angry accusations of his son, and the second attack results directly from a letter of Joachim's. Joachim does not, however, see his responsibility for the breakdown in simple terms of cause and effect, but rather interprets it as a sign of his guilt, as punishment, and as a "Prüfung" (127) he must undergo to be absolved (126). The religious strain in Joachim's thinking, awakened by Helmuth's funeral, has since then gradually developed in connection with the concept of Elisabeth as angelic and saintly. With Pasenow's public denunciation of his son's conspiracy (126), this comes to the forefront. Joachim equates his father's attack with a 'Brandmal'[6], the visible sign of his guilt, and sees this revelation of his crime as the working of God -

> daß es Gottes Stimme selber ist, die durch den Mund des Vaters spricht und die Prüfung verkündet. (127)

The turn to religiosity - "man mußte die Gnade allein und im eigenem Leid erkämpfen" (ibid.) - is confirmed by the breakdown of his relationship with Ruzena. Ruzena's attack on Bertrand and subsequent disappearance on the one hand substantiate his conviction that misfortunes are not accidental but represent "Buße", "Gottes Prüfungen" (13o); on the other they so fill him with horror at the "Pfuhl" (136) of Ruzena's world that he is forced to turn to the "jungfräuliche Lichtgestalt" (135) of Elisabeth for rescue. The novel closes with his marriage to Elisabeth, representing his rejection of

the sinful world of Bertrand and Ruzena, and the beginning of a life of virtue and purity.

The motifs of crime and judgement express the state of crisis in the individual's relationship to his value system. The essentially legalist attitude of a world-view dominated by an absolute value is demonstrated by the merging of Joachim's identity with the order of the uniform.

> ... wenn einer seit seinem zehnten Lebensjahr daran gewöhnt ist, eine Uniform zu tragen, dem ist das Kleid schon wie ein Nessushemd eingewachsen, und keiner, am allerwenigsten Joachim v. Pasenow, vermag dann noch anzugeben, wo die Grenze zwischen seinem Ich und der Uniform liegt... sich bescheidend oder kaum mehr bemerkend, daß die Uniform ihm nur einen schmalen Streifen persönlicher und menschlicher Freiheit ließ. (23)

The concept of individual freedom disappears in an order where everything is regulated by a value which claims absolute validity not only in its own sphere, but is regarded as the supreme authority in the general world order. Ascribing infinite and absolute authority to a restricted and relative value is the essence of the Romanticism embodied by Joachim von Pasenow[7]. This absolutist attitude, backed up by the superior status and influence of the military élite and the class it stems from, determines Joachim's rejection of everything which stands outside his value system as evil, so that 'das Zivilistische' acquires overtones of a criminal underworld. His experiences with Bertrand and Ruzena provide clear evidence that this other world is not totally alien and hostile, but can provide a valid alternative way of life.

The logical extension of this awareness, the realization that his value system is not absolute and all-encompassing, has been reached by Bertrand in his rejection of a strictly de-limited and codified form of life. Joachim, however, does not draw the same conclusions: his involvement in the alien world does not, in the end, serve to make that world more acceptable, but by convincing him of his guilt forces him to retreat from it and ultimately to regard it as "nicht existent" (139).

By condemning his own actions outside the system as criminal, Joachim stifles awareness of the inadequacy of his value system, and proves not how far he has strayed from it, but how rigidly he is still bound by its authority. His retreat to the even stricter laws of his concept of the church and the Christian household - i.e. to a system which has already been demonstrated as superseded by Bertrand's arguments and his own admissions - thus epitomises the Romantic 'Erkenntnis-flucht' into the security of an established order and its judgements.

Joachim's reappearance in Huguenau, thirty years later, as an elderly reinstated army major in a time of war, shows him as the highest representative of the authority of that system. As 'Stadtkommandant' Major von Pasenow is directly responsible for maintaining the rule of the military system, whose authority in such a situation is in fact absolute.

His inability to successfully wield this authority stems largely from a state of personal value crisis closely parallel to that depicted in Pasenow oder die Romantik. Although he does not waver in his sense of duty towards the army, his faith in the system is shaken by the War, which is obviously no longer glorious and honourable. The uncertainty caused by this realization is magnified by doubts concerning his own position in his dealings with Huguenau and Esch, who in different ways draw him away from his allegiance to the military code. Esch and Huguenau closely parallel Ruzena and Bertrand in the roles they play in Joachim's thinking, as is clearly indicated by the recurrence of the terminology used to describe those relationships in the first novel. Esch offers an opportunity for relaxing military severity and reserve, while Huguenau is instinctively felt to threaten the value system as Bertrand had:

> Wieder fühlte Major v. Pasenow die Süßigkeit des Hinströmens, des Fortgetragenwerdens, als wollte eine Silberwolke ihn aufnehmen, schwebend über den Frühlingsflüssen. Geborgenheit des Vertrauens! Nein, dieser Mann, der da ernst vor ihm stand, war kein Abenteurer, kein Verräter, kein Unzuverlässiger, keiner der das Vertrauen auf die andere Seite des Lebens trägt, schamlos und nackt es dort auszustellen. (5o9) 8)

The concept of the 'Verräter' has even greater significance in this situation than it had thirty years earlier, as it now represents actual treason in time of war, by his standards necessarily the most serious of crimes, demanding as punishment the death penalty. Huguenau's accusations of treason against Esch force Joachim into the Ruzena-situation of close attachement conflicting with distrust and abhorrence.

The more substantiated charge of treachery against Huguenau, proven by his name on the deserters' list, causes more serious problems for Joachim, since it forces him into a situation where he must take decisive action[9]. His sense of his own guilt makes him powerless to deal with the problem. His instinctive denunciation of Huguenau as "Mörder" and "der Leibhaftige" (566) simply repeats accusations he made against himself during his father's illness and his own wedding. His own complicity in Huguenau's introduction to the town -

> Ein Verräter ist ein unehrenhafter Mensch, ein Verräter ist ein Mensch, der sein Vaterland verrät, ein Verräter ist ein Mesch, der das Vaterland und die Kameraden betrogen hat... ein Deserteur ist ein Verräter. Und während er solcherart seine Gedanken immer näher an den versteckten Gegenstand heranrückt, zerreißt plötzlich die Hülle, und er weiß mit einem Male alles: er selber ist der Verräter, er selber war es gewesen,... der einen Deserteur zu sich gerufen hat,... damit der Deserteur ihm den Weg ins Zivilistische bereite, zu Freunden, die keine Kameraden sind. (615)

- makes it impossible for him to take the necessary action against him. His guilt convinces him that he has again been "gebrandmarkt" (619), as he had been by his father; he decides on suicide as the only honourable solution. His collapse as he makes the final arrangements for this is described in the same terms as were used for his father's breakdown, and, like that breakdown, demonstrates through the collapse of the individual's authority - "kein Major mehr, sondern ein ganz alter Mann" (ibid.) - the final disintegration of the value system he stands for, later substantiated by the violence and chaos of the revolution. Joachim von Pasenow is dedicated to

the values of his profession and class, but the discrepancy between those ideals and his actual situation stamps him as a traitor and criminal in his own eyes and makes him incapable of maintaining the authority of those values.

The ultimate collapse of the system into the chaos depicted in the closing stages of the novel seems therefore to him the just outcome of his failure, not only for himself, but for the whole order:

> oh, die Dunkelheit stieg, es stieg das Chaos, aber aus dem Chaos im Pfuhle giftiger Gase grinste die Fratze Huguenaus, die Fratze des Verräters, Werkzeug der göttlichen Strafe. (616)

Joachim's legalistic and guilt-obsessed view of the hand of a warning or avenging God at work in every misfortune is evident in this statement. But it does at the same time parallel the narrator's views on the breakdown of a system, "die sich selbst gerichtet hat" (674).[10]

The complex of betrayal and guilt dominating Joachim's value judgements during the periods of crisis depicted in the novel reveals the weakness of his value system. The inability of the system to cope with reality becomes apparent subjectively, in that the individual is forced by his code to reject whole areas of experience and awareness both of himself and the outside world. Objectively, the individual's failure to assert the authority his system claims for itself demonstrates the consequences of this insufficiency and proves the inevitabi-

lity and necessity of its ultimate disintegration.

Esch: the obsession with justice.

In Esch oder die Anarchie motifs connected with crime dominate on many more different levels, reflecting the greater confusion in the values of the times.

As a bookkeeper, Esch maintains a value-system dependent on the bookkeeper's virtues of balance and order, so that justice, the instrument of such balance and order in the moral sphere, becomes his major concern. The element of a guilty conscience vis à vis the commands of his own ethos is strong, as it was for Joachim von Pasenow. But Esch's qualms do not concern so much his own transgressions of the moral code as his failure to avenge others' transgressions and thus further the ideal of justice: he allows his values to become questionable by not upholding them absolutely.

Esch's guilt complex begins with his dismissal from his bookkeeping job because he has discovered the fraudulent activity of his boss Nentwig. Since he needs a reference from him, he does not accuse Nentwig of his crime, and thus becomes guilty of betraying his "Bürgerpflicht" (178) for the sake of a job. Even after he has obtained his reference, fear of the possible consequences, such as being suspected of complicity, prevents him from laying charges and thus fulfilling his duty, "die Nemesis walten zu lassen" (179). His world order

is, however, so dependent on the achievement of justice that he expects it to come about automatically: when he sees a police-van full of prisoners, for example, he expects to find Nentwig amongst them, although there is no reason why the police should arrest or even suspect him; he is deeply upset when Nentwig is missing. Even his satisfaction over his new job cannot blot out the disorder caused by the injustice of a criminal going free because of his own failure to denounce him:

> Ja, Esch hatte einen guten Tausch gemacht, wenn auch die Gerechtigkeit dabei draufzahlte. Oft mußte er denken... ob sich nicht doch ein Weg finden ließe, um die pflichtgebotene Anzeige zu erstatten; dann erst wäre alles in Ordnung. (187)

Esch's sense of guilt becomes an obsession reaching an irrational but powerful climax during the performance of a knife-thrower at the 'Variété': he identifies with the knife-thrower's assistant to such an extent that he imagines himself transfixed by the knives "wie einen Käfer" (193). This identification is closely linked with his guilt complex, as he sees such a death as the due punishment for his crime:

> Es waren die Fanfaren des Gerichts. Der Schuldige wird wie ein Wurm zertreten; warum soll er nicht wie ein Käfer aufgespießt werden? warum soll der Tod nicht statt der Sense eine lange Stecknadel tragen, oder zumindest eine Lanze? immer wartet man, daß man zum Gericht geweckt wird, denn mag man auch einmal beinahe dem Freidenkerbund beigetreten sein, so hat man trotzdem sein Gewissen. (ibid.)

Esch's vision of an absolving death leads on to his obsession with the idea of sacrificing himself to restore order and re-

deem the world, expressed in the image of "das Aussehen einer Gekreuzigten" (192) to depict the same situation.

On another level, the problem of justice contributes to Esch's concept of the world as in need of redemption. Because justice is so important to him, Esch sees the law and the police as essential means of maintaining order, but his faith in these instruments of justice is severely shaken by the arrest and imprisonment of his friend Geyring. Geyring, a union official, is found guilty of the crime of "Aufwiegelung" (219), although, as Esch observes, he was actually trying to prevent the strike which led to his arrest. This failure of justice shatters Esch's whole world order and convinces him of the need for salvation through the restitution of just order:

> Esch sagte: "Wenn es gerecht zuginge, brauchte man Ihre albernen Vereine nicht für die Erlösung... keine Heilsarmee brauchte man, wenn die Polizei die Leute einsperren würde, die es verdienen... statt Unschuldige" (227)...
> "So lange man zusieht, daß Unrecht geschieht, gibt es keine Erlösung auf der Welt... warum hat Martin sich geopfert und sitzt?" (228)

The injustice of an innocent man's imprisonment throws more weight on his wrong in allowing the guilty to go free, and makes the restoring of justice a personal life-and-death struggle for Esch:

> "Ordnung muß gemacht werden. Der eine sitzt unschuldig und der andere läuft frei herum; umbringen müßte man ihn, oder sich selber müßte man umbringen." (ibid.)

The linking of these two forms of injustice makes Esch see

himself as responsible for the chaos of the world, since any minor disorder disrupts the order as a whole.

> Esch sagte: "Ich bin eine Sau." Ja, eine Sau war er, keine Spur besser als der Nentwig, der sich gleichfalls der Verantwortung entzog. Eine Unordnung, in der sich der Teufel auskennen mochte! Und ohne Ordnung in den Büchern gab es auch keine Ordnung in der Welt, und so lange keine Ordnung war, würde Ilona weiter den Messern ausgeliefert sein, würde Nentwig sich weiterhin frech und gleißnerisch der Sühne entziehen und Martin würde ewig im Kerker schmachten. (231)

The practical consequence of this is his decision to leave his job with Bertrand's firm, because he has recognised "daß er bei einer Gesellschaft, die Martin ins Gefängnis gebracht hatte, nicht länger leiben dürfte" (231). Nentwig is at this stage no longer just a dishonest boss, but the representative of the corruption of the business world and society in general:

> er bedauerte jetzt nichts mehr, sah bloß hinter jeder Türe einen Nentwig sitzen, lauter Nentwigs, sie alle verschworen und darauf bedacht, Martin im Gefängnis schmachten zu lassen. (232 f)

Esch's interests here coincide with those of the social class struggle as he crusades for the unjustly-treated working man - Geyring - against the combined forces of unscrupulous businessmen - represented by Nentwig - and the police who collaborate with them. However, a visit to the socialist-democratic newspaper 'Volkswacht' convinces him that he can expect no assistance from that quarter: his naive suggestion that revelation of the true facts will necessarily lead to Geyring's release is greeted with laughter, and the assertion that his suggestion would eventually bring about a severe industrial

crisis. The editor does, however, direct his attention to the figure which from now on dominates Esch's thinking when he reveals that it is Bertrand, whom Esch has always respected, who is responsible for Geyring's imprisonment. The discovery that Bertrand is a homosexual adds to Esch's abhorrence, so that Bertrand's faults become in his mind illogically but inextricably linked with Nentwig and Geyring as symptoms of the evil he must combat.

Esch sees himself as surrounded by criminals to the point of becoming personally involved in their questionable activities. Ilona is, despite his respect for her, "eine dreckige Hure" (255); Teltscher a "Hurentreiber und Meuchelmörder" (ibid.); Nentwig appears to him now as a "Mordbube" (ibid.). These characters all combine in Esch's obsession to form a pack of murderers - "Gesindel der kleinen Mörder" (255)- since the threat they pose to his world-order is so radical that they cannot be considered merely petty criminals: the term murderer is necessary to express the danger they represent. But behind these petty cut-throats, Esch's obsession fixes on the figure of Bertrand as the source of the evil:

> so erhob sich hoch über all dem dreckigen Gesindel der kleinen Mörder eine Gestalt, vornehm und überlebensgroß, die Gestalt eines hochanständigen Menschen, kaum Mensch mehr zu nennen, so wert und hoch war sie entrückt, und dennoch Gestalt des Übermörders, unvorstellbar und drohend erhob sich das Bild Bertrands, des schweinischen Präsidenten dieser Gesellschaft, des warmen Bruders, der Martin ins Gefängnis gebracht hatte. Und diese vergrößerte und eigentlich unvorstellbare Gestalt schien schien die der beiden kleineren Schächer in sich aufzu-

> nehmen, und manchmal war es, als müßte man bloß diesen Antichrist treffen, um auch alle geringeren Mörder der Welt zu vernichten. (ibid.)

The identification of the minor illegalities of the underworld Esch moves in, the injustice of the police and the large-scale dishonesty of the business-world thus consolidate into a compulsive idée fixe in Esch's thinking. The criminal motif thus becomes the driving force of the novel, as it motivates Esch's actions in his one-man crusade against the abstract force of evil, "losgelöst vom Täter" (258), but still personified by Bertrand.

Esch's crusade involves two possible courses of action, two separate strands of the plot, linked in various aspects but basically incorporating two quite different responses to the problem of anarchy represented by crime and injustice[11]. One of these strands, the impulse to emigrate to America, is actually an attempt to flee the chaos he fears, rather than to try to solve the problem. The other tendency involves the extension of the book-keeping moral code, in Esch's attempts to restore the lost balance. The latter strand thus indicates a strong sense of personal responsibility to a particular order, whereas the former demonstrates the longing to be free of order and responsibility. Esch's pre-occupation with the crimes of the people he lives amongst, and the injustice of the imprisonment of the innocent, builds up a concept of his world as a prison. Esch's obsessive concern with Geyring languishing in prison provides the concrete basis for

the 'Kerker' motif, reinforced by his visits to the prison to see Martin, but taking an increasingly abstract significance. In terms of this motif, 'Erlösung' becomes the state in which "keine Seele mehr im Kerker zu schmachten hätte" (293). The opposing forces in Esch's struggle are represented, during his trip to visit Bertrand, by the unreal visionary images of Geyring's prison and its counterpart, Bertrand's palace:

> Ein Coupé dritter Klasse ist wie eine Kerkerzelle und auf der Bühne links oben... hatte sich eine graue Kulisse vorgeschoben, eine Kulisse aus Pappe, hinter der nichts steckt als die grauen verstaubten Bühnenmauern. Aber auf der Kulisse war das Wort "Gefängnis" zu lesen und obwohl man wußte, daß nichts dahinter ist, wußte man doch, daß in dem Kerker einer steckt, den es gar nicht gibt und der dennoch die Hauptperson ist. Aber die Bühne, in die die Gefängniskulisse wie ein Zahn hineinragt, ist im Hintergrund von einem großen Prospekt abgeschlossen, auf dem ein herrlicher Park gemalt ist. (298) [12]

In the same way as the prison motif conveys Esch's sense of responsibility to the value system of just order and the imbalance he tries to redress, Bertrand's palace represents his freedom from any such ethos or responsibility, expressed in his philosophy that

> "Jeder muß seinen Traum erfüllen, böse und heilig zugleich. Sonst wird er der Freiheit nicht teilhaftig". (323)

For Esch, America becomes the land of freedom - symbolised by the statue of liberty - standing in contrast to the experience of confinement in the society he lives in. Leaving his job with Bertrand's firm is the first step towards free-

dom, breaking away from the "Gefangenschaft der trügerischen Ziffern und Kolonnen" (233) of the business world of criminals like Nentwig and Bertrand. Esch is convinced that there is no injustice in America:

> Viel Interesse brachte er den amerikanischen Polizei- und Gerichtseinrichtungen entgegen, die ... in den Dienst der demokratischen Freiheit gestellt waren, so daß es für jeden ... einsichtig wurde, daß man dort keine Krüppel auf Geheiß lasterhafter Reeder einzukerkern pflegte. (121)

The German "Schweinepolizei" (275) have to put up with wrongs, he argues - such as the barely legal activities of his wrestling troupe, or his failure to lay charges against Nentwig - because they themselves are dishonest; but the American police, "eine Polizei, die im Dienste der Freiheit wirkt und die von den Reedern kein Geld nimmt" (277) would enable him to live in freedom. The 'Kolonist' chapter reveals America not so much as a land where justice is achieved, but where law and justice are not necessary:

> Der Arm der Gerechtigkeit vermag ihnen nichts anzuhaben, denn sie brauchen weder Recht noch Gesetz. (326)

As the parallel with Bertrand indicates - expressed in the surrounding images associated with the isolation of his palace and the freedom of his travels - Esch's flight to America represents his unconscious wish for an extension of the lawlessness and irresponsibility, of anarchy, with the desire for freedom outweighing the desire for order.

Esch's vision of freedom envisages also the annihilation of the evil he is fleeing.

> Esch sah die Freiheitsstatue vor sich, deren Fackel all das verbrennt und erlöst, was herüben zurückgelassen wird, alles Gewesene und alles Tote dem Feuer überantwortet, - und wenn dies Mord ist, so ist es einer, über den die Polizei nicht mehr richten darf. Um der Erlösung willen. (278)

As the reference to 'Mord' indicates, the annihilation of evil refers in particular to his dream of killing Bertrand or sacrificing himself in the attempt, a plan which at this stage is still closely linked with his planned trip to America, as a duty which must be fulfilled before he can leave. Although minor wrongs have assumed such major proportions in Esch's thinking that he sees them as causing anarchy, he does not shrink from committing, in intentions at least, the much more serious crime of murder. This murder is, however, to his mind not a crime but a duty, belonging to a higher sphere than the jurisdiction of the police and their laws. Esch also feels his plan to be justified by the element of self-sacrifice implicit in the idea, since "bloß der Mord die Freiheit bringen kann" (316), of combat with a superior enemy, constantly recurring in the phrases: "Entweder er oder ich", (256, 309), "Er fühlte sich stark, fest und wohlbestellt, ein Kerl, den umzubringen sich schon verlohnte" (309). Huguenau's eventual act of murder takes to its logical conclusion the urge behind Esch's projected murder for the sake of freedom. The element of punishment and justice in Esch's plan to kill Bertrand is totally lacking from Huguenau's thinking as he commits murder, and in fact demonstrates that allegiance to a specific form of world order which makes it

impossible for Esch to attain Huguenau's state of freedom. The factor of justice is in fact linked with Huguenau's murder of Esch, through the narrator's concept of that act as the execution in the representative figure of Esch, of the old invalid and therefore evil value system.

Esch's dream confrontation with Bertrand introduces an entirely different concept of guilt and atonement. Bertrand rejects Esch's system of a just balance, denying any individual the right to judge and condemn another:

> "Keiner steht so hoch, daß er den andern richten darf, und so verworfen ist keiner, daß seine ewige Seele nicht Ehrfurcht gebietet". (323)

Order based on the redressing of wrongs through punishment is therefore out of the question:

> "Mord und Gegenmord ist diese Ordnung, Esch, - die Ordnung der Maschine". (324)

Bertrand's reversal of Esch's values, making justice a crime just as he had, in Pasenow, made obedience to a code a crime against the individual's right to self-fulfillment, reveals the relative value-freedom he has attained in comparison with Pasenow and Esch, and points forward to the autonomy reached by Huguenau, the autonomy Esch subconsciously seeks in America.

Bertrand's arguments direct Esch's hopes for a new life away from laws and atoning punishment to faith in an "erkennenden liebenden Erlöser" (324) and his sacrifice -

> "Und erst sein Opfertod erlöst die Welt zum Stand der neuen Unschuld". (ibid.)

Broch presents this hope as a profound dream, assuming mythological proportions, common to all mankind, expressing his need for some kind of transcendent hope

> Daß Einer komme, der den Opfertod auf sich nimmt und die Welt zum Stande neuer Unschuld erlöst: aufsteigt solch ewiger Wunsch des Menschen bis zum Morde, aufsteigt solch ewiger Traum bis zur Hellsichtigkeit. Zwischen geträumtem Wunsch und ahnendem Traum schwebt alles Wissen, schwebt das Wissen vom Opfer und vom Reich der Erlösung. (319)

Esch's new awareness does not, however, supersede his ideal of justice entirely. The suicide of Bertrand's transvestite friend Harry is interpreted in the terms of that system, as the achievement of a balanced ledger:

> hier hoben sich endlich Mord und Gegenmord, Post und Gegenpost kontomäßig auf, hier war einmal ein korrekt glattgestelltes Konto gefunden! (348)

But the central role in Esch's hopes has definitively shifted from Bertrand - whose suicide "interessierte ihn wenig" (ibid.) despite the significance his death had previously had in Esch's plan for justice - to an irrationally-religious belief in a Redeemer to be born from his marriage to Mutter Hentjen. Just as America represents the opposite pole of the 'Kerker' motif, Mutter Hentjen provides the fixed point in contrast to the general anarchy. As the fulfilment of his longing for a "magistrale Form der Liebe" (232), Mutter Hentjen represents authority for Esch because she is

> ein Mensch, der wußte, wo sein Rechts und sein Links, sein Gut und sein Böse zu finden ist. (268)

Although she thus embodies fixed values incompatible with his striving to free himself - in America - from the law, Esch

combines his dream of salvation with her with his hopes for a better future in America. The images of the 'Kolonist' chapter show the traveller setting out to find a new life of freedom, but finally relapsing into homesickness and the longing to return to the mother: this movement parallels Esch's goal of turning the anarchy of this society into personal autonomy in a new country, only to turn back, like the Romantic Pasenow, from potential freedom to the security of stable values. Mutter Hentjen's role as a stern but reliable mother figure is evident, for example, in Esch's feelings of guilt regarding his immoral activities - such as his relationship with Erna, or his suspect business activities - experienced only in connection with her disapproval. Her severity nevertheless attracts him because it is the one element in his life which is clearcut and well-defined, satisfying his love of orderliness.

The nature of their relationship reflects Esch's bookkeeping value system on another level. Mutter Hentjen's demand for unswerving faithfulness from him, and the corollary threat of murder as the punishment for unfaithfulness, impress Esch as quite appropriate and in order, even after he has betrayed her with Erna.

> Auch war es sehr wahrscheinlich, daß Mutter Hentjen ihn nun umbringen würde, denn sie wird ja doch nie begreifen, daß er ihr treu geblieben war; sie wird ihn umbringen wollen, und dies war gleichfalls voll guter und freier Zuversicht. (305)

Mutter Hentjen's words could of course be interpreted as an

idle threat, expressing the force of her feelings on the issue rather than stating a definite intention. Esch, however, takes the threat literally, and expects and hopes that it will be carried out. As well as expressing Esch's death wish,[13] this attitude also indicates the great significance attached to love in the novel. In connection with Esch's affair with Erna, the narrator explains that in his longing for sexual union each individual is unconsciously motivated by his fear of dying alone, which thus represents "die Sehnsucht der gefangenen Seele nach Erlösung aus ihrer Einsamkeit" (211). The violent reaction to the breakdown of love - such as in Esch's potential infidelity - therefore expresses not simply jealousy, but also the fear of loneliness and death. Although he could not explain it, Esch feels the crucial importance of such a relationship, and, typically for one obsessed with justice and balanced accounts, expresses this in his belief that death may be the due punishment for betraying it.

The 'Kerker' motif is significant in the depiction of Esch's relationship with Mutter Hentjen, particularly referring to Esch's attempts to escape the past. Mutter Hentjen's previous marriage and the remnants of her attachement to her dead husband are the major obstacles to Esch's happiness with her. Mutter Hentjen's aloof 'Sachlichkeit' is equated with death, for Esch, and Hentjen's restraining influence with murder:

> ... er erkennt, daß Mutter Hentjen schon tot ist, daß sie, die Tote, kein Kind von ihm haben durfte... Auch Mutter Hentjens Wangen sind aufgedunsen, die Zeit und das Sterben liegen in ihrem Gesicht, und die Liebe ihrer Nächte ist tot, ist tot wie der Musikautomat, der mechanisch abschnurrt, es braucht bloß einer hineinzugreifen.(337 f)
> ... er weiß, daß der Tod immer Mord ist. Nun war das Wort wieder da, ... rasselnd wie ein Trambahnwagen in der nächtlichen Straße war das Wort Mörder da und schrie. Der Tote gibt den Tod weiter. Keiner darf überleben. Als wäre der Tod ein Kind, hat Mutter Hentjen ihn von dem toten Schneidermeister empfangen... Mord und Gegenmord, Zug um Zug, stürzen Vergangenheit und Zukunft ineinander, stürzen hinein in den Augenblick des Todes, der die Gegenwart ist. (338 f)

The power of the past, which Hentjen incorporates, is felt to be not only deadening but positively murderous, because it threatens to destroy the possibility for new life. Esch sees this destructive hand at work in both Mutter Hentjen's lack of enthusiasm about America, and her inability to bear a child, an 'Erlöser'. Through these two factors - habit-bound conservatism unwilling to attempt a new way of life, and age, the permanently and irrevocably lost time - the past threatens Esch's search for freedom, and so becomes another form of prison.

Hentjen, the representative of the past - physically present only in his portrait in Mutter Hentjen's tavern - becomes identified with Bertrand, the symbol of crime and injustice as "Schweine, die man abzustechen hätte" (287); this merging is so complete that Esch feels, as he sets out to visit Bertrand,

> daß es auch seine Affäre mit Hentjen war, die er mit Bertrand abrechnen mußte. (292)

Upon his return after coming to terms with Bertrand, Esch therefore feels released from the prison of the past. On the one hand, settling matters with Bertrand (not by achieving justice through carrying out judgement, but by adopting a new awareness of a possible higher state of innocence[14]) frees him from the sense of guilt at his earlier betrayals of justice - as is indicated by his feeling of no longer being threatened by Geyring, who has until now played the role of a warning conscience; on the other hand, Esch now feels free to return to Köln. i.e. Mutter Hentjen, as the first step "in die Fremde und in die Freiheit" (331), also feeling that the deadening stubbornness of an unchanging past has been overcome and will no longer hinder this freedom -

> und wenn man morgen in Köln eintreffen wird, so wird man der Stadt und ihrem Bilde nicht mehr unterworfen sein, man wird sie fügsam und demütig finden, fügsam sich zu verändern. (ibid.)

Leaving the prison after visiting Geyring for the last time is thus equated with being released from the prison of the past:

> Esch marschierte mit langen ungelenken Schritten, als müßte er die Entfernung zwischen sich und dem Gefängnis, als müßte er die Entfernung zwischen sich und allem, was hinter ihm lag, möglichst rasch vergrößern... es galt sich loszulösen aus der Verstrickung des Vergangenen (ibid.);

and his last meal with Korn, Erna and Lohberg before returning to Köln is "ein Fest der Loslösung aus dieser irdischen Gemeinschaft" (332), which is, from the point of view of his new faith in a transcendent salvation, a "Gefängnis des Irdischen" (333). The final stage in freeing himself from

the past, the removal of Hentjen's portrait from the tavern, is a further application of Esch's scheme of balancing 'Mord und Gegenmord'. The removal of the portrait represents a symbolic murder of a man who is already dead, who is still felt to have power of life and death over others. Esch clearly feels himself to be a murderer: he imagines that Teltscher has descovered the secret of his trip to Badenweiler, and could make some accusation against him,

> als besäße Teltscher irgendeine Mitwisserschaft und könnte etwa "Mörder" zu ihm sagen (347) -

a sense of guilt specifically related to the portrait of Hentjen, which he is sure Tettscher must have in mind. This avenging of the wrongs of the past, redressing the balance, is followed by tangible changes in Mutter Hentjen indicating a conquest over death and a possibility for new life, with images of relaxed softness and flexibility replacing those of mechanical hardness.

> Und auch in Mutter Hentjens Verhalten gab es manches, was als Beginn eines neuen Lebens deutbar gewesen wäre. Sie widersprach nicht seinen Heiratsplänen, ... und ihre Seele war von einer Weichheit erfüllt, die bisher niemand an ihr gekannt hatte... Sogar ihre starre Frisur schien sich zu lockern; kein Zweifel, sie wandte nicht mehr die alte, adrette Sorgsamkeit an ihre äußere Erscheinung, und auch darin schied sich Vergangenes von Gegenwärtigem. (358)

At the same time, however, the 'Kerker' motif recurs in its strongest form, as Esch's hopes of freedom are dashed - again by a crime, that of Gernerth's embezzlement of the wrestling-troupe's funds, which were to finance Esch's journey to America.

> Die Käfigtür war zugefallen. Man war eingesperrt. Die Fackel der Freiheit war erloschen... Esch wiederholte: "Eingesperrt"... (356) Das neue Leben im Käfig? Als ob das so einfach wäre! Nein, mit kleinen Mittelchen, mit kleinen Veränderungen war das neue Leben, war der Stand der Unschuld im Kerker nicht zu erreichen. Dem Unveränderlichen, dem Gewesenen, dem Irdischen ist nicht so leicht beizukommen (358); Man hat eben revolutionäre Gedanken, führt revolutionäre Reden, wenn man in einen Kerker gerät (359); "Der Käfig wird eben immer nur dann ausgemalt, sooft ein neuer Vogel hineingesetzt wird!" (360)

The major associations of the 'Kerker' image are repeated here: the state of unchecked wrong and injustice, implied by its counter poles, the 'Fackel der Freiheit', i.e. the Statue of Liberty and America, and the 'Stand der Unschuld'; the prison of the past, directly referred to, and also designated by the reference to the redecoration of Mutter Hentjen's tavern for the first time since her marriage to Hentjen, the previous 'neuer Vogel'; the striving for anarchy and autonomy, accompanied by the complete destruction of the past, contained in the idea of revolution as the inevitable outcome of the sense of being trapped; the reference to Esch's belief in a supra-human 'Erlöser', as the 'Stand der Unschuld' is equated with a miraculous state of "neue Jungfrauschaft" in Mutter Hentjen (359). Of the possible means of release from this prison, only the semi-religious hope for a Redeemer remains open, as far as Esch is concerned. For the remaining few pages of the novel this faith, inspired by the Salvation Army -

> Auf einer Bank zu stehen - die Mädchen mit den Tamburins vor sich - und zu singen, ja, das war das Richtige, von der gefangenen Seele zu singen, die durch die Kraft der erlösenden Liebe befreit wird (362) -

and inseparably linked with Mutter Hentjen -

> Und die gefangene Seele wird erlöst sein, hallelujah, wird auf der Bank stehen, höher als der, der sonst so viel höher stand. Und in seinem Geiste nannte er die, die durch ihn zur Mutter werden sollte, zum ersten Male bei ihrem Vornamen: Gertrud. (ibid.) -

alternates with the realisation

> daß die vollkommene Liebe ... nichts als Lug und Trug war, daß er hier ... in diesem Käfig herumlief als einer, der an Flucht und weite Freiheit dachte und doch nur an den Gitterstäben rütteln konnte (ibid.),

to end eventually in resignation, the acceptance of earthly barriers to the fulfilment of such hopes.

When Esch is again depicted, in Huguenau, the whole complex of the criminal motif - crime, justice, guilt and imprisonment - recurs in a similar form, intensified and taken to the logical conclusion foreshadowed in the previous novel.

Esch is still designated as the bookkeeper who expects to find the affairs of the world conducted according to strictly observed prescriptions linked in a fixed and all-encompassing order. Esch's position has in fact become more radical, corresponding to the even more anarchic situation of a country at war. The chaos is worsened by the fact that Esch sees the betrayal of order as stemming from the authorities who, like the police in the earlier novel, are entrusted with the task of upholding it. The more radical conflict resulting from this central inconsistency is reflected in the designation of Esch as a "Rebell" (396), elaborated in

the analogy with Don Quixote, depicting

> wie durch die Unkorrektheit des unübersichtlich gewordenen Krieges eine Rebellion genährt wird, zu der ein akriber und korrekter Mensch sogar schon im Frieden manchen Anlaß gefunden hätte, die aber hier zum notwendigen und unausweichlichen Kampf zwischen der Behörde und der Gerechtigkeit werden muß... vergleichbar dem Kreuzweg Don Quichotens gegen eine Welt, die sich den Forderungen des ordnungsetzenden Geistes nicht fügen will. Immer wird der Buchhalter für das Gerechte streiten... und ohne eigentlich ein guter Mensch zu sein, wird er sich zum Anwalt des gebeugten Rechts aufschwingen, sobald er das Unrecht und die Gesetzwidrigkeit erkannt und registriert hat, unnachgiebig und zornig wird er auf seinem Platze stehen, ein hagerer Ritter, der mit seiner eingelegten Lanze Angriff um Angriff reiten muß zu Ehren der Rechnung, die in derWelt glatt aufgehen soll. (397)

The lance, previously occurring in connection with the 'Gekreuzigte' (192) and 'aufgespießte Käfer' (193) images expressing Esch's vivid consciousness of guilt[15], his willingness to sacrifice himself, his awareness of death and his longing for it, here becomes a weapon in his own hands rather than one threatening him: Esch now sees himself much more as the champion of justice than as defending it from a position undermined by his own guilt, as he had previously. The change in the motif thus indicates the state of crisis, which now demands aggression rather than defence, and at the same time the hardening of Esch's stand, now a conviction beyond doubts and indecision.

By the same token, Esch still sees himself as surrounded by criminals. Most strongly suspected is Huguenau, whom Esch immediately judges to be a "Spion" or a "Schwindler" (385,

386) deserving imprisonment (385). His instinctive and unreasoning distrust of Huguenau, although in the circumstances completely justified, does not, however, enable him to resist once again being drawn into complicity with the forces of lawlessness: he is pressured into accepting Huguenau as a partner, and even as a lodger in his own house - a position which Huguenau takes control of to the extent of considering himself Esch's adoptive son. Esch thus unwittingly provides refuge for the deserter and paves the way for his fraudulent dealings with the businessmen of the town, and ultimately for the rape of Frau Esch and his own murder. This failure to counteract the real threat of lawlessness represented by Huguenau, extending to the point of complicity, exposes the futility of Esch's rebellion against chaos in the name of law and order.

Ironically, it is Esch, not Huguenau, who comes under general suspicion. Because he is unwilling to compromise his bookkeeping correctness in such matters as the censorship of newspapers to prevent unfavorable reports on the progress of the war, Esch is considered a subversive element in the town - an opinion which Huguenau fosters. Huguenau's dealings with the local businessmen interested in buying Esch's newspaper thus give the impression of being

> eine Art Fehmgericht, das über den Rebellen Esch abgehalten wurde. (42o)

On the other hand, Huguenau's values coincide with theirs as "einer, der für sich und seine Tasche sorgte" (ibid.) and therefore "die Sprache redete, die die anderen verstanden" (ibid.); he is therefore "kein Rebell" (ibid.) and consequently soon becomes respected and prosperous. Society in this way proves to be blind to the threat of an unscrupulous and even violent criminal, while it suspects and rejects the individual who zealously tries to maintain its order. This inconsistency is based on the divergence of basic attitudes in the rebel and in the criminal; these are differentiated in an excursus specifically devoted to this question. Although generally considered antisocial, the criminal's values, according to Broch, are the same as those put into practice by society at large: in seeking only his own advantage regardless of law and the rights of others, the criminal conforms to the pattern of the private value systems constituting society. The rebel, however, is concerned only with a supra-personal value, like Esch's ideal of a just and stable world order, which he tries to make society conform to; as his ideal is essentially alien to the prevailing conduct of that society, his crusade leads inevitably to conflict.

> Der Rebell steht allein: treuester Sohn der Gemeinschaft, die ihm Ziel der Opposition und Auflehnung ist, ist dem Rebellen die bekämpfte Welt eine Fülle lebendiger Beziehungen, deren Fäden bloß durch teuflische Bosheit in Verwirrung gebracht worden sind, und die zu entwirren und nach eigenem besserem Plane zu ordnen seine Aufgabe wird. So protestierte Luther gegen den Papst, und Esch war mit Fug als Rebell zu bezeichnen. (444)

Esch's rebellion is not, however, despite the usual connotations of the term, an attempt to break down society and the established system in order to set up a new system or to remove all obstructions to the autonomy of the individual: even as a rebel, Esch is still a romantic, clinging to the absolute of a just order, despite the obvious incompatibility of that value with the reality of even his own actions. Even the most radical aspect of his ideal, the apocalyptic vision of complete destruction of the old to make way for the 'Erlöser' and the new life, is based on concepts of judgement and condemnation; the avenging of wrongs, and the subsequent new beginning is a return to 'Ordnung', to something like the system which has already been broken down and superseded.

All of the formulae which accompanied Esch's earlier crusade for justice recur throughout this novel too, reaching their culmination in the actual situation of his death. His obsession with murder is again revealed in his characterization of his foster-daughter Marguerite with the attribute he had previously applied to Mutter Hentjen: "die wäre imstande, einen umzubringen" (430). The same attitude to death, coupled with confidence and pride in his own power, recurs in his usual reaction to confrontation with the enemy, in this instance Gödicke, who rejects his vision of salvation:

> Er fühlte sich stark, fest und wohlbestellt, robust auf seinen Beinen, ein Kerl, den umzubringen sich schon verlohnte. Er streckte die Arme aus ... wie

ein Gekreuzigter... (565)[16]

Gödicke, as a man who has "returned from the dead", also takes over Hentjen's role, representing the power of the dead, of the past

> "Tot", schrie Esch, "die Toten glauben, daß sie mächtig sind... ja, mächtig sind sie, aber das Leben im dunklen Haus können sie nicht erwecken... Die Toten sind die Mörder! Mörder sind sie!" (ibid.)

The recurring phrases again reveal Esch's concept of his life as sacrificial struggle to the death against powerful and destructive opponents, designated as murderers. This struggle finally culminates in his murder, fulfilling his death wish, in a form - a bayonet stab in the back - that brings to its climax the complex of images of death and sacrifice begun with Teltscher's knife-throwing[17]. Esch's death is, however, completely unheroic and unredeeming. It contributes directly in fact to the safety and prosperity of the arch-criminal Huguenau, in that Esch's absence enables Huguenau to take over the role of Major von Pasenow's escort - which gives him safe conduct back home - and Frau Esch's widowhood provides Huguenau with yet another opportunity for profitable exploitation and fraud.

The 'Kerker' motif, too, returns, with intensified religious significance. The state of war is equated with imprisonment, when Esch calls his war rations "Gefängniskost" (479) and reveals his hope for eventual freedom:

> wenn die Welt wieder wahrhaft frei werden würde, dann brauchte sie keine Gefängniskost zu fressen. (ibid.)

The war becomes for him a "Galgenfrist" (530), when those who have been found guilty await the final destruction which will make way for the Redeemer, and the new freedom. Actual events become signs of this apocalypse, which Esch expects at any time - most strongly evident in the incident of the prison riot:

> "Es ist das Ende"... Doch das Ende brach nicht herein, kein Erdbeben kam und kein Engel, und das Tor ward nicht aufgetan... Wie eine Kulisse ragten die Gefängnismauern in den hellen Abendhimmel... Neben dem Tor hing eine Tafel, die man nicht mehr entziffern konnte; natürlich waren es die Besuchszeiten, die darauf verzeichnet standen, aber das waren bloße Worte. Denn selbst die Demagogen und die Mörder und die Mißgeburten, die man eingekerkert hatte, werden aus dem Gefängnis heraustreten zu neuer und lichterer Gemeinschaft in einem gelobten Lande. (581 f)

The incident thus becomes the objectification - although the expected outcome is not fulfilled on this occasion - of the Biblical passage Esch has adopted as a motto, the story of the jailer of Philippi.

> "Schnell aber war ein großes Erdbeben, also daß sich bewegten die Grundfesten des Gefängnisses. Und von Stund an wurden alle Türen aufgetan und alle Bande los/ Als aber der Kerkermeister aus dem Schlafe fuhr und sah die Türen des Gefängnisses aufgetan, zog er das Schwert und wollte sich selbst erwürgen, denn er meinte, die Gefangenen wären entflohen/ Paulus aber rief laut und sprach: Tu dir kein Leid! denn wir sind alle noch hier." (561)

The "wir sind alle noch hier" of this verse links back to another aspect of imprisonment as Esch experiences it, that of imprisonment within the self; the concept of being "In der Einsamkeit eingekerkert" (525); at the same time it points forward to the Epilogue which closes the novel with these same words, essentially a consolation expressing the hope that the

basis of a possible new human community is still present despite the disintegration of the previous unity into individual isolation and mutual hostility.

Esch's main concern is the collapse of the "Grundfesten des Gebäudes" (561), the culmination of the chaos surrounding him in its own annihilation: this he sees accomplished in the events of the November revolt, when the buildings representing social authority - the military barracks, the Town Hall and the prison - are destroyed, and all the prisoners set free. The only significant consequence of the release of the prisoners is the car accident which causes Pasenow's final mental collapse; the closing stages of the revolt, after Esch's death, show the prisoners helping to restore order in the town; presumably they return eventually to their imprisonment as the situation returns to normal, with the arrival of outside troops; in this way a parallel is established to the "wir sind alle noch hier" of the Epilogue. Esch's apocalyptic hopes, however, remain unfulfilled. For him the chaos produces only the breakdown of his friend and mentor Pasenow, the rape and defrauding of his wife, and his own death; the 'Erlöser' fails to appear, and is in a sense replaced by his murderer, who appears as the rescuer of authority in the assistance he gives to Pasenow. Esch's unnoticed death, and the triumph of his adversary are thus the result of Esch's hoped-for messianic apocalypse.

Huguenau: the criminal as value-free man.

In the sub-plots centred on the Kurtrier town which is the scene of Huguenau's activities, the criminal motif embodies the individuals' reactions to the war and the value states represented in it. The wounded soldier Jaretzki is convinced that life can never return to normal for the soldier who has killed[18].

> "... wenn man so richtig ein paar umgebracht hat... sehen Sie, dann braucht man wohl sein ganzes Leben lang kein Buch mehr in die Hand zu nehmen ... das ist so ein Gefühl von mir ... man hat schon alles erledigt... deshalb wird auch der Krieg nicht aufhören." (473)

He sees the reason for the continued killing not in devotion to the ideals at question in the war, or even self-defence, but in the individual's utter loneliness, for "jeder, der allein ist, muß einen andern töten" (539). A soldier kills, therefore, not out of duty to his fatherland, but in an irrational response to isolation and fear, and in Jaretzki's view this is unjustified, tantamount to murder. This judgement is made clear in his opinion that the loss of his right arm is the just punishment for his wartime crimes:

> "Manchmal denke ich mir, das Ihr mir das Ding höchst überflüssigerweise heruntergesäbelt habt ... sozusagen bloß aus Gerechtigkeitssinn habt Ihr es getan ... ich bin Ihnen ja dankbar für Ihren Gerechtigkeitssinn, und ausgezeichnet habt Ihr operiert ... fühle mich jetzt viel wohler auf der Welt." (474)

Jaretzki's values thus reverse the normal values of a country in wartime, according to which killing the enemy is the highest good; as his crime is accepted by all as a valuable service, he rejects society's concepts of right and wrong, claiming

that they have been replaced by a new ethos:

> "Keine Juristengerechtigkeit ... wir haben eine neue Gerechtigkeit bekommen, was sollen dem Menschen so viel Gliedmaßen, wenn er allein ist ... jeder ist seiner Einsamkeit verpflichtet." (549)

His new ethos is, however, no more humanitarian than the one it replaces, as it is basically the law of "an eye for an eye"; although it recognises the activities of a soldier at war as criminal, it does not see them as something which can be overcome by a new order, but as the inevitable universal and permanent condition of man: it can provide no alternative to the solipsism which makes restoration of the human community and shared values impossible.

Heinrich Wendling, too, sees the war as causing a radical change in human behaviour, although he hopes this will only be a passing phase:

> "Wenn der Krieg vorbei ist, wird alles wieder anders werden ... wir sind durch den Krieg irgendwie primitiver geworden ..." (569)

His suspicion that the post-war generation may completely reject the old values -

> "Möglich, daß eine Generation von Verbrechern heranwächst... " (569) -

is backed up by the image of the younger generation given in the portrayal of Esch's foster-daughter Marguerite: she is presented as completely detached from any ties to family or any other type of community or authority - she has no regard at all for Esch, despite his fondness for her, and her attachment to Huguenau is motivated by malice against Esch

and the hope of getting money from him. Esch's frequent designation of her with the formula, "... die wäre imstande, einen umzubringen" (430)[19] links her with Mutter Hentjen, to whom he had formerly applied this phrase and to Huguenau, to whom it applies in fact. Marguerite is thereby equated with those characters in the novel who are characterized as 'sachlich', behaving mechanically without any regard to laws or values. The potential rejection by Marguerite's generation of the society of their elders is apparent, too, in her exultation at the violence and destruction accompanying the revolt. Wendling finally rejects the idea of a complete revolution of values by this generation:

> "nichts bürgt dafür, daß es heute oder morgen bei uns nicht genau so losgeht wie in Rußland ... na, hoffentlich nicht, ... aber dagegen spricht bloß die ungeheure Haltbarkeit einer noch vorhandenen Ideologie." (569)

Wendling's optimism is undercut by the insecurity of the prevailing ideology - demonstrated by the entire action of the trilogy - but is at the same time substantiated by the romantic retention of invalid systems, evident in the stories of Joachim von Pasenow and Esch.

Hannah Wendling demonstrates the same phenomena, more strongly if less consciously, but her attitude is the reverse of her husband's. She feels that it is her husband, as the representative of a generation of soldiers, who must bear the guilt for the situation of the world; that his references to a coming generation of revolutionaries are an

evasion of the truth,

> als wenn ein Angeklagter sagen wollte:
> "Prachtvolles Wetter heute, Hoher Gerichtshof." (569)

Her obsessive expectation that a thief will break into her isolated villa becomes linked with the phrase "Einbruch von unten" (613), a reference to the Russian revolution which takes on metaphysical significance for her. Whereas her husband obviously fears this kind of upheaval, she subconsciously welcomes it as a means of breaking down the wall of isolation which has grown up around her:

> es war weit weniger Angst als eine Art Überreiztheit gegen die einsame Lage der Villa ... es war der leere Raum, der das Anwesen umgab, so leer, es war die abgestorbene und wie aus Stücken wieder aufgebaute Landschaft so abgestorben, daß es gleichsam ein Gürtel der Leere wurde, welcher sich immer enger um die Einsame zwängte, Gürtel, welcher bloß durch einen Gewaltstreich, durch ein Zerbrechen oder einen Durchbruch oder einen Einbruch wieder gesprengt werden konnte. (613)

When, after the revolt and the prison breakout, a prisoner approaches her home, Hannah becomes aware of his presence, and in fact frightens him away while trying to draw him towards her. The criminal here thus represents the irrational forces which dominate at the last stage the disintegration of values. The narrator specifically links these two factors when, in the Epilogue, he discusses the irrationality of Huguenau's actions as an "Einbruch von unten" (661) resulting from the collapse of all value systems. The function of the value system,

> all das Irrationale zu verdecken und zu bändigen, von dem das erdgebundene empirische Leben getragen wird (662),

enables the formation of

> Brücken des Vernünftigen, die sich spannen und überspannen, sie dienen einzig dem Zweck, das irdische Dasein aus seiner unentrinnbaren Irrationalität ... zu jenem eigentlich metaphysischen Wert zu führen, in dessen deduktiver Struktur es dem Menschen ermöglicht wird, der Welt und den Dingen und den eigenen Handlungen die gebührende Stelle anzuweisen. (ibid.)

When this metaphysical system has been destroyed, therefore, man is "nur noch vom Irrationalen her bestimmbar" (665): this process has been depicted from Pasenow's rejection of the irrational, through Esch's instinct-dominated way of life and deeply irrational religious visions, to Huguenau's totally instinctive and impulsive act of murder. Hannah Wendling dreads this threat, which she perceives subconsciously, but also seeks it as the only means for bringing about the complete collapse of the individual value-prison. The narrator's analysis of the relationship between the rational and the irrational and the role of each in the structure of a balanced value system and in the process of its disintegration reveals a close parallel between Hannah's instinctive attitude and Broch's logical conclusions: the criminal, as the representative of the uncontrolled irrational, forms a violent and destructive but nevertheless necessary role in the collapse and reconstruction of values generally.

The figure of Huguenau embodies and brings to its climax the the complex of ideas centred on the criminal motif. In the

narrator's analysis of his behaviour the ideas of crime and guilt are no longer restricted solely to reflections within the minds of the individual characters. Whereas until now the motif complex has given internal evidence of the characters and the values they represent, these issues are now also commented on by the author. The discussion widens to deal with questions of more general significance than the beliefs and obsessions of individuals. The author does not identify himself with Huguenau any more than he does with Pasenow and Esch, but the concepts Huguenau represents are so crucial in Broch's philosophy that he is necessarily more closely involved with the questions associated with Huguenaus's crime. What concerns Broch in Huguenau's story is not another stage of the disintegration of values, or the fate of an individual representative of one of the many possible value systems, but the basic problem of the nature of man and the existence of values.

Huguenau's actions depict, more radically than those of the complementary sub-plots, the last stage of value-disintegration: the value-free man is a criminal. However, the two cannot simply be equated, as Broch makes clear in his discussion of the rebel and the criminal. Despite the antagonism existing between the criminal and society, the criminal wants to belong to the society he exploits and seems to oppose:

> das Wesentliche eines Verbrechens liegt in seiner Wiederholbarkeit, in seiner Wiederholbarkeit ist es nichts anderes als ein bürgerlicher Beruf. Das Verbrechertum ist nur in sehr loser Form gegen die Ge-

> sellschaft gerichtet; der Dieb und der Wechselfälscher wüßten mit der Ausrufung des Kommunismus wenig anzufangen ... und sogar der Beruf eines Mörders ... ist nicht gegen die Gesamtheit gerichtet, sondern ist bloß ein persönliches Geschäft, das der Mörder mit seinem Opfer auszutragen hat. Nichts kehrt sich gegen das Bestehende. (445)

For a businessman like Huguenau, who is not averse to illegality for the sake of profit, being accepted by society is essential for the success of his ventures, and in this case involves association with the more conservative rather than the more revolutionary elements of society. But Broch establishes in the criminal a psychological need for belonging which goes beyond the pragmatic, the need

> daß das von ihnen bewohnte Land, dieses Land an der Grenze einer Welt voller guter Ordnungen, daß es einbezogen werde in jene größere, gute, fast geliebte Ordnung, die zu ändern nicht vonnöten ist ... lediglich von der Begierde erfüllt, Grenzstreitigkeiten zu vermeiden, ihrem Beruf in Ruhe nachzugehen und immer klagloser, lautloser, ja feinnerviger sich einzupassen in den Dienst, welcher der gesamten Ordnung und dem Bestehenden gilt. (ibid.)

The criminal in this sense - Huguenau in his dealings with Pasenow, characterized by the urge to be accepted as an equal and by great sensitivity towards real or imagined slights - accepts the concept of an orderly society regulated by a fixed system of laws, even if he does not obey them, and he is therefore not free from the sphere of values.

Huguenau is, however, not only a criminal but also a deserter, and it is this which allows him to become value-free. His first action in the novel is the decisive step which begins

his progress towards freedom: by deserting from the army he "(entlöste) sich erstmalig der menschlichen Verbundenheit" (376). This action stamps Huguenau as a criminal in the eyes of the army and condemns him to death if he is discovered. Thus he considers Major von Pasenow - the representative of military law - as his "Henker" (390), capable of destroying him at any time. Huguenau is guilty of the same crime of treason which Joachim had earlier accused himself of; and in fact when Pasenow does discover Huguenau's crime, his reaction is to condemn not Huguenau but himself, to the extent of attempting to commit suicide. The advancement of the value breakdown is clearly indicated in this confrontation. In the first novel, i.e. at the first stage of disintegration, Joachim had condemned himself to death by suicide (even though this sentence was not carried out) for his betrayal of the military code, but had, despite his moments of rebellion, returned to full adherence to the code. Huguenau on the other hand does not experience any sense of guilt at committing the worst possible crime against the army, desertion in the face of the enemy. The military code seems to dominate even more now than it did 30 years earlier, with the whole country in a state of war and under military control, but Huguenau is able to disobey it not only with impunity but also to his own advantage. The laws of the military system are more binding, to Pasenow's mind, than they were before, as the army performs its essential function, the

conduct of war. But despite this weight of authority behind his military value system, and the strength of his own allegiance to it - indicated by his second suicide attempt - Pasenow is quite incapable of enforcing it against the threat posed by Huguenau: his failure sets the seal on the bankruptcy of the system.

As a businessman, Huguenau is an exponent of the phase of 'Sachlichkeit', the attitude allowing the individual to pursue his own goals - in this case financial advantage - without regard to any outside laws, ethics or principles[20]. Huguenau's actions in defrauding Esch and the local businessmen in his purchase of Esch's newspaper, and in his "erpresserische" (667) resale of the paper to Frau Esch, are legally and morally reprehensible; but they conform to the business ethic and are presented as being typical of the activity of his generation, characterized by the same brutal logic in every sphere it enters. In this way Huguenau illustrates the further decline of the system of justice as Esch had accepted it. The petty cheating among businessmen which had aroused Esch to his crusade for order is now the accepted way of life:

> zur Logik des Wirtschaftsführers gehört es, die wirtschaftlichen Mittel mit äußerster Konsequenz und Absolutheit auszunützen und, unter Vernichtung aller Konkurrenz, dem eigenen Wirtschaftsobjekt, sei es nun ein Geschäft, eine Fabrik, ein Konzern, oder sonst irgendein ökonomischer Körper, zur alleinigen Domination zu verhelfen; ... zur Logik des bürgerlichen Faiseurs gehört es, mit absoluter Konsequenz und Radikalität den Leitspruch des Enrichissez-vous in Geltung zu setzen.(474 f)

Just as his desertion is linked with Joachim's 'Verrat', Huguenau's career as a swindler is a further stage of Esch's business deceptions with the wrestling troupe. Even Huguenau's rape of Frau Esch can be seen as an extension of Esch's own actions in forcing himself upon Mutter Hentjen: the two events are linked by the description of Mutter Hentjen's reaction with the same metaphor on both occasions - "Wie ein Delinquent, der dem Henker selber behilflich ist" (273, 645 f). What for Esch was a symptom of anarchy is an accepted element of the prevailing order for Huguenau.

Because he is primarily a businessman, Huguenaus's attitude to the November revolt is ambivalent. Although he supports the prisoner's outbreak, he is afraid of the "Verbrecherbande" (644) and the risk the "Schränker und Einbrecher" (639) pose to his property. To ensure the safety of his printing press, Huguenau abandons both his post as a citizen defending the town and his brief fight on the side of the rebels: in a time of crisis, Huguenau is neither a loyal citizen nor a revolutionary, but solely an individual whose only concern is his own wellbeing.

Those considerations are, however, only of secondary importance in the designation of Huguenau as the 'wertfreie Mensch'. The significant factor here is his murder of Esch, an action not even motivated by business principle, but based solely on personal instinct. Although his murder is not logically motivated, it is prepared for throughout the

course of the novel. Huguenau's first introduction in the novel shows him reminiscing about a picture of a condemned murderer, which he had seen as a child, and with which he identifies:

> Auf einem (Bild) war ein Mann zu sehen, der an eine Art Pritsche angekettet war und der, wie die Beschreibung sagte, einen Pastor im Sächsischen mit vielen Dolchstößen ermordet hatte und nun auf dieser Pritsche die Strafe des Räderns erwartete ... Der Mann hatte ein durchaus gutmütiges Aussehen, und es war ebenso unvorstellbar, daß dieser Mann einen Pastor erstochen hatte und zum Rädern bestimmt war, wie daß man selber hier im Leichengestank auf einer Pritsche ausharren sollte. (371)

The central elements, the 'Dolchstoß' and the 'Pastor' - Huguenau's private name for Esch - already prefigure his crime, at the moment when he takes his first step towards freedom by deserting. That this image remains in his mind is indicated by a later episode in which Huguenau, walking with Esch, sees a soldier being escorted to prison, and takes a guess at what his crime may have been:

> Huguenau ... murmelte etwas von Raubmord und Kinderschändung: "Oder er hat einen Pfarrer erstochen ... mit einem Küchenmesser" (455);

only then does he refer to the most likely case, and, in view of his own situation, the one which would most naturally occur to him, desertion. Shortly afterwards, the sight of Marguerite sitting on the printing press again recalls the picture to mind -

> Sonderbar deutlich stieg wieder das Bild jenes Mörders auf ... und das Bild beunruhigte ihn (471) -

and already he associates it, though unclearly, with Esch, whom he hates:

> "Alles zu seiner Zeit, die Zeit wird schon noch kommen ... hier stört er uns ohnehin nicht." Und während er darüber nachdachte, wofür die Zeit noch kommen werde, fiel ihm ein, daß dieser Esch mit seinem Pferdegebiß, daß dieser hagere unleidliche Lehrer ihm keine Ruhe ließ ... (ibid.)

The subconscious intention becomes more explicit in the 'Symposion' chapter, when Huguenau mentions Esch's murder as a hypothetical instance of the judgement of criminals according to criteria of sanity and responsibility:

> "... und wenn Sie mich umbringen, Herr Esch, so werden Sie wegen religiösen Wahnsinns freigesprochen, und wenn ich Sie umbringe, so werde ich um einen Kopf kürzer gemacht" (532).

The irrational reasoning behind Huguenaus's urge to kill Esch is established when Huguenau, feeling uneasy about his victory over Pasenow and Esch in the matter of the prison riot, associates Esch with the punishing figure of authority, the father and the executioner[21]:

> Huguenau schrickt zusammen, es ist des Vaters Schritt. Ach Gott, es ist bloß der Esch, der Herr Pastor. Schwein, der Esch, geschieht ihm recht, wenn er sich ärgert. Wie du mir, so ich dir. Küchenmesser sind scharf; und spitzig sind sie auch ... Hochstapelei sein Pastorenrock. Der Scharfrichter hat auch einen schwarzen Anzug... Man weiß nie, ob sie einen schon zur Exekution holen oder bloß das Essen bringen. (586)

Although he refuses to acknowledge any guilt, Huguenau continues to feel like a disobedient child in his relationship with Pasenow and Esch, expressed particularly in his warning of the coming unrest, prompted by a vague inexplicable "Schuldgefühl" (633). This warning is accompanied by the cliché metaphor which gains significance from subsequent events:

> "Ich stoße keinen von rückwärts nieder wie andere Leute!" (633)

The movement of the actual murder is simply an expansion of this metaphor in action:

> Huguenau trieb es vorwärts; er war jetzt etwa zwanzig Schritte hinter Esch ... Und da übermächtigt es ihn wie eine Erleuchtung, - er senkt das Gewehr, ist mit ein paar tangoartigen katzigen Sprüngen bei Esch und rennt ihm das Bajonett in den knochigen Rücken. Esch geht, zu des Mörders großer Verwunderung, noch ein paar Schritte ruhig weiter, dann stürzt er lautlos vornüber aufs Gesicht. ... es war alles gut! (650)

Huguenau's action follows a momentary impulse whose deeper motivation of resentment and uneasiness does not rise to consciousness. His attempt to excuse his action to Pasenow - unconscious after an accident - stresses his feeling that Pasenow and Esch have always treated him unfairly and without due respect, and that their designation of him as evil has made him so; but he denies, without being able to explain why, that he is a murderer:

> ich gebe auch zu ... daß Herr Major mich vielleicht heute einen Erpresser oder Mörder nennen werden, und trotzdem sieht es bloß so aus; in Wirklichkeit ist alles anders. (654)

His crime is accordingly forgotten, without Huguenau ever becoming aware of its significance, and without producing any consequences in Huguenau's life, apart from providing an opportunity to extort money from Frau Esch.

> Hat er einen Mord begangen? hat er einen revolutionären Akt vollführt? er brauchte darüber nicht nachzudenken und er tat es auch nicht. (661)

But although the murder only has marginal significance for Huguenau - exploited as a businessman, although not performed as such - its wider significance is analyzed by the narrator

in the Epilogue. Huguenau's crime represents the lowest stage in the dehumanization of man which accompanies the disintegration of values: the state of total isolation, in which no communication - "ein Geschlecht von solch absoluter Stummheit" (683) - is possible, apart from "das eiserne Rasseln des Mordes" (684). This murder substantiates Jarotzki's belief that each man must kill his fellow man because he is so radically and irrevocably alone[22].

But the epilogue also claims a positive significance for Huguenau's crime, as the first sign of a hope for the future. Huguenau's act of murder is explained as the revolt of the irrational against the hyperrational, dogmatic conventions of the established value-system (670 - 673)[23]. In Huguenau's case these newly released irrational forces are used only for evil, but there are other possibilities.

> Und es ergibt sich darauf die Frage nach dem Schicksal der im Wertzerfall freiwerdenden irrationalen Kräfte: ... sind sie tatsächlich nur noch Mittel der gegenseitigen Zerfleischung? sind sie tatsächlich nur noch Mord? ... kann ein Partialwertsystem ... eine genügend starke Bindungsfähigkeit besitzen, um auch ohne Unterstützung von Bajonetten und Polizeiknütteln die irrationalen Strebungen wieder zu einem Organon zu vereinigen und dem gleichfalls freigewordenen Wertwillen ein Ziel weisen? (670)

The value-free man is evil, but the system he symbolically destroys has also become evil[24], and its destruction is not only inevitable but also necessary:

> Und immer ist es so, daß der Mensch des kleineren Wertverbandes den Menschen des sich auflösenden größeren Verbandes vernichtet, immer übernimmt er, der Unglücklichste, die Rolle des Henkers im Prozeß des Wertzerfalls, und an dem Tage, an dem die Fanfaren des Gerichts ertönen, dann ist es der wertfreie Mensch, der

> zum Henker einer Welt wird, die sich selbst gerichtet hat. (674)

Murder is not excused by this reasoning -

> Denn Mord bleibt Mord, Bösheit bleibt Bösheit, und die Philistrosität eines auf das Individuum und seine irrationalen Triebe eingeschränkten Wertgebietes ... bleibt der Punkt der absoluten Verworfenheit. (683) -

but it is nevertheless interpreted as a token that "die Idee der Freiheit" (681) still exists, and may possibly be taken further than "zur Freiheit des Mordes, ... des Kerkers, ... des Deserteurs" (682). Huguenau's actions after the murder - his devotion to Pasenow, his return to his home and family and the family business - demonstrate his urge, no less romantic than Joachim's, to belong to a community, even if only the "Rausch einer Schein-Gemeinschaft" (678). He is after all:

> der Verbrecher, der nicht imstande ist, den Weg zur Wertwirklichkeit einer ersehnteren Gemeinschaft zu finden. (684)

This longing for a volte-face from solipsism, complete freedom from the pseudo-communities of the decaying order, to genuine community, is the basis of Broch's hope for the future. The epilogue ends with a further reference to the story of the jailer of Philippi, specifically to the words "Tu dir kein Leid! denn wir sind alle noch hier!" (687)[25], stressing again the hope of the narrator-persona in the final 'Ahasver' poem:[26]

> daß wir dereinst verklärt zu höheren Gestalten
> uns nähern werden auf der licht-erhöhten
> Stufe der Gnade, uns nähern werden, ohne uns zu töten.
> (661)

Despite the total pessimism of the action of the novel, climaxing as it does in the brutality of murder and the destruction of social order, it maintains faith that this inhumanity will be overcome and a human community will once again be formed. The criminal motif's dominance in the action of the novel is outweighed by the optimism on the level of reflection, which argues that although man without values is a brutal criminal, he is not essentially and irrevocably so, that although value systems inevitably collapse, man is not intended to live without values.

CHAPTER TWO

The function of the criminal in Musil's Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften

Moosbrugger: the criminal as a reflection of society[1].

The criminal motif in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften is most concretely presented in the figure of Christian Moosbrugger, the mentally-disturbed murderer of a prostitute. Musils panorama of Austrian society concentrates almost exclusively on the middle and upper classes, consisting of officials, businessmen and intellectuals. The few major exceptions are Rachel and Soliman - the servants of Diotima and Arnheim - and Moosbrugger. However, while Rachel and Soliman are presented almost entirely in connection with the 'Parallelaktion' and its members, Moosbrugger stands completely apart. He does not come into direct contact with any other characters, at least in the completed sections of the novel (Clarisse meets him in Bk. 2, Chapt. 92, published by Martha Musil from Musil's 'Nachlaß'). Moosbrugger is depicted in only 6 of the 161 chapters published during Musil's lifetime (and in 2 of the 40 chapters published by Martha Musil), and therefore seems a relatively minor figure. However, the fact that he stands alone outside the central group of characters, that he does not merge - as they tend to, despite their differences - into a general study of a particular class of people, focusses special attention on him as an individual, making his role more dominant than it would otherwise appear to be.

The controversy over Moosbrugger - whether he is to be judged insane, or condemned as a criminal - and the inability of doctors and lawyers to come to an agreement which would enable them to deal with him, reflects the general ineptitude of the governing sector of Kakanian society.

Officials like Stallburg, Leinsdorf and Tuzzi, and the 'Parallelaktion' as a whole, are presented as having firm convictions and high ideals, but are also shown to be indecisive in practice, usually to the point of allowing events to follow the opposite course to the one they intend. Similarly, the lawyers and doctors dealing with Moosbrugger's case have definite ideas on what constitutes crime, responsibility and insanity, but they are unable to decide which category Moosbrugger belongs to. Like the other officials, they operate according to standards which cannot cope with the reality they have to face.

> Moosbrugger war einer jener Grenzfälle, die aus der Jurisprudenz und Gerichtsmedizin auch den Laien als die Fälle der verminderten Zurechnungsfähigkeit bekannt sind... Die Natur hat eine merkwürdige Vorliebe dafür, solche Personen in Hülle und Fülle hervorzubringen; natura non fecit saltus, sie macht keinen Sprung, sie liebt die Übergänge..... Aber die Jurisprudenz nimmt nicht Notiz davon. Sie sagt: non datur tertium sive medium inter duo contradictoria, zu deutsch: der Mensch ist entweder imstande, rechtswidrig zu handeln, oder er ist es nicht, denn zwischen zwei Gegensätzen gibt es nichts Drittes und Mittleres. (242)

The reality which Moosbrugger represents defies the limitations of "zweitausendjährigen Rechtsbegriffen" (247). Musil

here demonstrates the dichotomy between modern man's insistence on the new in the fields of science and technology, and his disregard for the unchanging treatment of "Fragen der Schönheit, der Gerechtigkeit, der Liebe und des Glaubens, kurz alle Fragen der Humanität" (248). Many attempts are made to rationalise this aspect of the judicial system, but the result is an even greater confusion of mutually contradictory opinions. Musil indicates that a logical solution is impossible while such virtues as "männliche Strenge, Hochmut, moralische Gesundheit" (537) are considered inviolable. The progress of reason is hindered by the stubborn constancy of feelings, which in this case prove to be less humane than logic: this is indicated by Ulrich's father's theory that the insane should be punished more severely than other criminals (538). Like the 'Parallelaktion' in search of an aim, the judicial system in its search for justice can only manage to produce solutions which cannot be reconciled with one another, or with their own basic aim of justice[2]. Moosbrugger's case remains undecided, with the most likely result "daß der Staat schließlich Moosbrugger umbringen wird, weil das in einem solchen Zustand der Unfertigkeit einfach das Klarste, Billigste und Sicherste ist" (245). The Moosbrugger episode demonstrates the incompetence of the legal system[3]. But this is a minor aspect of Moosbrugger's function within the novel, serving merely to supplement the satirical portrait of Kakanian bureaucracy provided by the 'Parallelaktion' chapters.

Allied to this problem of the contradiction between the principles which inspire an action and the actual consequences of it, the gap between intention and achievement, is the discrepancy between appearance and reality, another symptom of the 'Zeitkrankheit' which Moosbrugger highlights. Moosbrugger's appearance - "Gutmütige Kraft und der Wille zum Rechten sprachen auch aus seinem Gesicht" (67) - belies the brutal murder he has committed. In this, Moosbrugger's situation parallels that of his age, which seems civilized, progressive and idealistic, but can also be judged by Ulrich to be an "Urwald" (27), "ebenso leicht der Menschenfresserei fähig wie der Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (361)[4].

More significantly, the public reaction to Moosbrugger serves to expose not only this discrepancy but also the reality itself which normally remains hidden beneath the appearance of normality and respectability.

Everyone is fascinated by Moosbrugger's case, considering it "endlich einmal was Interessantes" (69), to the degree that "man wurde von ihr innerlicher beschäftigt als vom eigenen Lebensberuf" (69). This preoccupation goes so far that even very proper men (Tuzzi and Fischel are hinted at) identify with Moosbrugger, even if only for a moment and in jest:

> Ja, es mochte sich ereignen, daß in diesen Tagen beim Zubettgehen ein korrekter Herr Sektionschef oder ein Bankprokurist zu seiner schläfrigen Gattin sagte: "Was würdest du jetzt anfangen, wenn ich ein Moosbrugger wäre..." (ibid.)

This fascination is interpreted by Musil as the usual interest in the sensational, aroused because the everyday life of

the average man is so uninteresting that he needs something exciting from outside to enliven it (69). Boredom is a symptom of deeper inadequacies, which Musil later explains as the internal cause of Kakania's collapse.

> ... es stürzen Zeitalter und Reiche nicht anders zusammen wie Geschäfte, wenn ihnen der Kredit verlorengeht... Kakanien war das erste Land im gegenwärtigen Entwicklungsabschnitt, dem Gott den Kredit, die Lebenslust, den Glauben an sich selbst und die Fähigkeit aller Kulturstaaten entzog, die nützliche Einbildung zu verbreiten, daß sie eine Aufgabe hätten. (528)

Musil links this with the purposelessness of the life of the individual, which prompts him to seek satisfaction in vicarious 'adventures' - such as the exploits of a murderer.

> Es war ein kluges Land und beherbergte kultivierte Menschen; wie alle kultivierten Menschen an allen Orten der Erde liefen diese zwischen einer ungeheuren Aufregung von Geräusch, Geschwindigkeit, Neuerung, Streitfall und allem, was sonst noch zur optisch-akustischen Landschaft unseres Lebens gehört, in einer unentschiedenen Gemütslage umher;... wie alle anderen fühlten sie sich von Mord, Totschlag, Leidenschaft, Opfermut, Größe umgeben, die sich irgendwie in dem Knäuel ereigneten, der um sie gebildet war, aber sie konnten zu diesem Abenteuer nicht hingelangen, weil sie in einem Büro oder einer anderen Berufsanstalt gefangen saßen.... (ibid)

The dominant elements of the public response to Moosbrugger, i.e. indecisiveness, sensationalism, and vicarious excitement as the most absorbing occupation, have their roots in the lack of unifying purpose which makes Kakania's downfall inevitable. Ulrich finds the general preoccupation with Moosbrugger more sinister than simple curiosity. Moosbrugger fascinates everyone, not because he is completely alien, but because he reflects, in a distorted fashion, "bloß ein ver-

zerrter Zusammenhang unserer eignen Elemente des Seins" (76). It is this relationship which is indicated by the respectable man's identification with Moosbrugger: he is shocked at Moosbrugger's crime, and would be even more shocked at the suggestion that he himself could be capable of committing the same atrocity, but he can momentarily imagine himself to be the insane sex murderer. In fact, Ulrich goes so far as to equate the average man in his sexual relationships with the murderer:

> An nichts entzündet sich die bürgerliche Liebe so sehr wie an der schmeichelhaften Erfahrung, daß man die Kraft besitzt, einen Menschen in ein Entzücken zu jagen, worin er sich so toll benimmt, daß man geradezu zum Mörder werden müßte, wenn man auf zweite Weise die Ursache solcher Veränderungen werden wollte. - Und wahrhaftig, daß es solche Veränderungen zivilisierter Menschen gibt, daß solche Wirkung von uns ausgeht!: liegt nicht diese Frage und Verwunderung in den kühnen und verglasten Augen all derer, die an der einsamen Insel der Wollust anlegen, wo sie Mörder, Schicksal und Gott sind und auf äußerst bequeme Weise den höchsten ihnen erreichbaren Grad von Irrationalität und Abenteuerlichkeit erleben? (284 f)

The most extreme example of this in the novel is provided by the sexually-disturbed man whom Walter, Clarisse and Ulrich observe lurking in the bushes to shock female passers-by. His attitude towards his potential victim is that of the killer:

> Es erfüllte ihn eine so grausame Rücksichtslosigkeit gegen sie wie einen Mörder, und ihre Todesangst sollte ihm nichts ausgemacht haben. (787)

As in Moosbrugger's situation, the image of man is here distorted by mental illness. But Ulrich himself is involved in an episode which equates the sexual encounter with the act of murder. When Ulrich seduces Gerda Fischel, his dominant

emotion is "die Gewaltsamkeit des Verführers" (618), and his motivation is

> nicht die Ergriffenheit der Liebe, wohl aber eine halb verrückte, an ein Gemetzel, einen Lustmord oder wenn es das geben kann, einen Lustselbstmord erinnernde Ergriffenheit von den Dämonen der Leere, die hinter allen Bildern des Lebens zuhause sind (622).

The use of the image 'Lustmord' in particular links Ulrich at this point with Moosbrugger, indicating that the irrational brutality of Moosbrugger's crime can also be found in man's more or less normal activities.

The theory that Moosbrugger represents the realization of man's secret dreams - "wenn die Menschheit als Ganzes träumen könnte, müßte Moosbrugger entstehen" (76) - is taken up by Ulrich when he reflects on the possibility that Moosbrugger is

> die Verkörperung unterdrückter Triebe, an denen alle teilhaben, die Fleischwerdung ihrer Gedankenmorde und Phantasieschändungen (653).

At this level, Moosbrugger embodies the violence which is still present in civilized man, though it is so sharply suppressed that it seems to have disappeared.

> Dicht neben den Straßen, wo alle dreihundert Schritte ein Schutzmann den geringsten Verstoß gegen die Ordnung ahndet, liegen andere, die die gleiche Kraft und Gesinnung fordern wie ein Urwald (27).

Some of these 'Urwald' qualities are expressed in the image of the hunter. Moosbrugger's ruthless savagery is stressed when Ulrich designates him "der Prostituiertenjäger und -vertilger" (652). But the judges who condemn him are also identified with him by the use of the same image. Bonadea's

husband, a judge involved in Moosbrugger's case, is also a hunter, and these two factors are deliberately linked:

> ... da er nicht nur Richter, sondern auch Jäger war, antwortete er..., daß es einzig das Richtige sei, das Raubzeug allerorten ohne viel Sentimentalität auszurotten (262);
> Ein Jagdpächter klagte Bonadeas gerechtem Gatten das Überhandnehmen der Füchse, wodurch in diesem hohen Funktionär die Stimmung zugunsten der Unbeugsamkeit von Rechtsgrundsätzen verstärkt wurde. (533)

In the 'Nachlaß' chapters describing Clarisse's visit to Moosbrugger in the mental asylum Clarisse feels that his doctors and guards are "Jäger" (14oo). Dr. Pfeiffer, one of the doctors who declared Moosbrugger sane, is described as a hunter by the psychiatrist Friedenthal:

> Man kann es auch merken, wenn er von den "Opfern" erzählt, zu deren gesetzlicher Ermordung, oder wie Sie es nennen wollen, er selbst beigetragen hat. Ein guter Beobachter gewährt da vielleicht etwas wie eine Rivalität, Gehirntriumph, Geschlechtslust... Alles natürlich gänzlich innerhalb der Grenzen des Erlaubten und wissenschaftlich Zulässigen. Aber man kann wohl sagen, daß die Beschäftigung mit der Gefahr gefährlich macht -"
> "Er jagt sie?" fragte Clarisse gepreßt.
> "Ja, man kann fast sagen, er ist ein Jäger, der sein Wild liebt". (14o1 f)

The pleasure in killing expressed in the hunter image equates Moosbrugger's judges with the murderer and his "Blutrausch" (243), although their violence finds expression in legal and socially accepted ways, lacking the desperation which makes Moosbrugger's actions insane and criminal.

Apart from the legal authorities who are in a position to participate in killing through a socially honourable profession,

Musil designates scientists as being, like hunters, warriors and "listige und gewalttätige Naturen" (303). Ruthlessness and aggressiveness appear as society's dominant virtues:

> Im Kampf ums Leben gibt es keine denkerischen Sentimentalitäten, sondern nur den Wunsch, den Gegner auf dem kürzesten Wege..umzubringen... Sieht man andererseits zu, welche Eigenschaften es sind, die zu Entdeckungen führen, so gewahrt man Freiheit von übernommener Rücksicht und Hemmung, Mut, ebensoviel Unternehmungs- wie Zerstörungslust, Ausschluß moralischer Überlegungen...; mit anderen Worten, man erblickt nichts als eben die alten Jäger-, Soldaten- und Händlerlaster, die hier bloß ins Geistige übertragen und in Tugenden umgedeutet worden sind (ibid).

Several incidents in the novel demonstrate the release of this generally disguised aggressiveness. In the first of these incidents, Ulrich is attacked by three man. He is robbed, but feels that the motive for the attack was not robbery, but general anger and hostility, which is normally suppressed. His attackers are perhaps

> Bürger wie er, bloß etwas angetrunken und von Hemmungen befreit, die an seiner vorübergleitenden Erscheinung hängengeblieben waren und einen Haß auf ihn entluden, der für ihn und für jeden fremden Menschen stets vorbereitet ist wie das Gewitter in der Atmosphäre...Ungemein viele Menschen fühlen sich heute in bedauerlichen Gegensatz stehen zu ungemein viel anderen Menschen. Es ist ein Grundzug der Kultur, daß der Mensch dem außerhalb seines eigenen Kreises lebenden Menschen aufs tiefste mißtraut, also nicht nur ein Germane einen Juden, sondern auch ein Fußballspieler einen Klavierspieler für ein unbegreifliches und minderwertiges Wesen hält. Schließlich besteht ja das Ding nur durch seine Grenzen und damit durch einen gewissermaßen feindseligen Akt gegen seine Umgebung; ... darum ist es nicht von der Hand zu weisen, daß die tiefste Anlehnung des Menschen an seinen Mitmenschen in dessen Ablehnung besteht (26).

This concept of civilization as a ruthless struggle is also the basis of the political principle "daß man rauben, morden

und betrügen dürfe, so daraus Macht, Zivilisation und Glanz entstehe" (74o f). Even the very correct Sektionschef Tuzzi admits the amorality of the politician:

> "Wer sich heute zumutet, grundlegende politische Ideen zu verwirklichen, muß ein Stück Bankrotteur und Verbrecher in sich haben!" (8o8)

Civilization is based on the struggle of the individual against his surroundings, and the disguised violence of this struggle is exposed in such incidents as the attack on Ulrich.

A similar incident involving a belligerent drunk reveals "eine bis dahin völlige Abneigung gegen das Mitgeschöpf" (137): the drunk becomes involved in an argument with two passers-by over the 'Parallelaktion', and becomes violent when approached by a policeman. The drunk is expressly equated with Moosbrugger by the fact that his emotions are described in the same terms as Moosbrugger's moods during the murder and in prison[6]. Most significantly, it is suggested that a major factor in Moosbrugger's motivation to commit murder was "eine geheime Abneigung gegen das sich seiner selbst freuende Mitgeschöpf" (71).

Thus the instances of unprovoked violence, revealing deep repressed hostility, present a paler reflection of Moosbrugger's brutality. Ulrich is convinced that the capacity to murder, an extension of this aggressiveness, is present in everyone:

> In Wahrheit können sie einander ebenso kaltblütig morden wie herzlich miteinander auskommen (9oo).

This opinion sums up the "Gedankenmorde" (653) which recur frequently in the novel. Ulrich's childhood friends Clarisse and Walter distrust Ulrich, despite their continued friendship, and this reaches its climax in Clarisse's suggestion - more a taunt than an earnest proposal, but nevertheless justified by arguments - that Walter should kill him. Clarisse reports the conversation to Ulrich:

> "Ich habe zu ihm gesagt, daß er dich töten soll... Umbringen, habe ich gesagt. Wenn an dir nicht so viel daran sein sollte, wie du dir einbildest, oder wenn er besser wäre als du und nur dadurch zur Ruhe kommen könnte, wäre das doch ganz richtig gedacht... Wenn man etwas denken kann, dann soll man es auch tun können." (355)

In a later incident, Clarisse's challenge is repeated - "So töte ihn doch!" (613) - and Walter admits that his dearest wish has often been "Ulrich tot zu sehen". His dream - prompted by a demonstration against the 'Parallelaktion' - is ambivalent. He imagines

> daß Ulrich etwa an einer Laterne hing, von stürmenden Füßen zertrampelt wurde, ein andermal dagegen von Walter beschützt und zitternd gerettet wurde. (616)

Both aspects of the dream have the same motivation: the desire for victory over Ulrich, whose superiority he fears. Clarisse herself threatens Ulrich, "Ich werde dich ermorden, wenn du nicht nachgibst!" in connection with her vision of him as the father of her "Erlöser" (660).

Even Ulrich is guilty of an imaginary murder. His antipathy towards Arnheim finds its strongest expression in the momentary impulse to kill him.

> Es schien ihm in diesem Augenblick nichts leichter zu sein, als an ihm ein Verbrechen zu begehen, denn mit seinem Bedürfnis nach Bildhaftigkeit lockte dieser Mann auch diese alten Texte auf die Szene! "Nimm einen Dolch und erfülle sein Schicksal!"... unwillkürlich richtete er es so ein, daß er mit dem halben Körper hinter Arnheim zu stehen kam... Namentlich der Hals reizte ihn. Seine Hand suchte in den Taschen der rechten Körperseite nach dem Federmesser. (6,5)

Ulrich immediately dismisses this impulse as "Gedankenspielerei" (ibid). But when his sister Agathe contemplates killing her husband - "Ich möchte Hagauer umbringen" (742) - she means it seriously, and is only satisfied when she symbolically destroys him by cutting him out of her father's will.

Moosbrugger commits the murder which for others is a passing impulse, soon dismissed as absurd. These instances of the concealed tendency to crime and brutality in the ordinary man indicate that Moosbrugger is simply a more extreme form of the basic qualities of even the most civilized society. This theory is put forward in one of Ulrich's conversations with Agathe about morality.

> Wir haben festgestellt, daß sich die honetten Menschen gar zu gern, wenn auch natürlich nur in der Phantasie, auf Verbrechen einlassen... Also könnte man geradezu definieren: Verbrechen sind die in den Herrn Sündern Vereinigung alles dessen, was die andern Menschen in kleinen Unregelmäßigkeiten abströmen lassen. Das heißt in der Phantasie und in tausend alltäglichen Bosheiten und Lumpereien der Gesinnung. (959 f)

Musil also saw these tendencies as being revealed by the War. In the 1922 essay <u>Das hilflose Europa</u> he wrote:

> wir waren früher betriebsame Bürger, sind dann Mörder, Totschläger, Diebe, Brandstifter und ähnliches geworden: und haben doch eigentlich nichts erlebt. (622)

The people who took part enthusiastically in the brutality of

the War are the same as those who led peaceful and respectable lives: they were able to adapt so easily to the new role because they always had these basic qualities, although they were normally repressed in accordance with the demands of civilized society. Musil draws this parallel between crime and war in a 1936 study to the ending of the novel.

> Umfassendes Problem: Krieg... Entsteht (wie Verbrechen) aus all dem was die Menschen sonst in kleinen Unregelmäßigkeiten abströmen lassen. (1575)

Clarisse: the criminal as saviour.

Musil's comments on the "Zusammenbruch der Kultur" (1577) of 1914, in the 1936 Studie zum Schlußteil, indicate that the problem is more complex than a question of the repression of dangerous drives: aggressiveness can be interpreted not only as a failure of repression, but also as a sign of strength.

> Im gewissen Sinn ist auch das ganze real-moralische Problem das der Triebe . Ihres ergebnislosen Trieblaufs, ihres Unfugstiftens; sie müssen beherrscht werden, damit es nicht Mord, Wucher und so weiter gebe. Aber die Gegenproblematik der Beherrschtheit ist die Triebschwäche, das Verblassen des Lebens und daß sich die Kompensation dazu nicht deutlich vorstellen läßt. (ibid.)

Elements of this way of thinking can be found in Ulrich's philosophy. But the major representative of the revolt against "das Verblassen des Lebens" is Clarisse, and in her this conviction takes on a form distorted by madness.

Clarisse's revolt is inseparable from the figure of Moosbrugger, who becomes the centre of her obsession.

> "Drängt das gute Miteinanderauskommen zum Haß?" fragte sie sich. "Will das anständige Leben die Roheit? Bedarf das Friedliche der Grausamkeit? Verlangt die Ordnung nach Zerrissenwerden?" Das war es, und war es nicht, was Moosbrugger erregte. (144 f)

Clarisse judges Moosbrugger in the same terms as Musil's image of him as a representative of the destructive drives of mankind - 'Roheit' and 'Grausamkeit' are the main qualities - but in her view they have the positive function of the power capable of destroying an unsatisfactory order. Clarisse's dissatisfaction with her life - she feels that she and Walter are destined for greatness, but they have failed to achieve it - expresses itself obsessively in a search for 'Erlösung', which focusses on Moosbrugger. She sees in Moosbrugger not a savage killer, but the epitome of goodness. In her dream of freeing him, his release is equated with the emanation of "Kraft, Mut, Tugend, Schönheit, Reichtum" (146): "Er ist unsre Unschuldsgestalt" (147). For her, Moosbrugger is, like her idol Nietzsche, a victim of a society which cannot understand his greatness, expressed in the feeling of all such martyrs of "Verachtung für ihre Zeit" (1185). Clarisse equates the normal life of society with "Gemeinheit" (356), and sees 'Genie' of the Nietzschean type as the antidote for this. 'Genie' is represented, for her, by the insane like Moosbrugger, who stand outside the normal life she despises. According to these convictions, the imprisonment of the insane is unjust, and the decision to condemn Moosbrugger to death is murder (14o4). She considers it her duty to avoid this crime at all costs "wenn die Welt wieder recht werden soll" (14o4). The crime of freeing

Moosbrugger means reversing the process of law, overthrowing the social order by declaring its laws invalid and putting into practice what she feels to be a more just order. In Clarisse's mind, Moosbrugger becomes a Christ-figure, whose crime and suffering are representative for all. She demands

> der Befreiung des Frauenmörders und vielleicht seiner öffentlichen Ausstellung, zur Erinnerung an die Passionswege derer, die die verstreuten Sünden aller auf sich vereinigen müssen.(442)

Because she interprets Moosbrugger's act of murder symbolically, as the act of taking upon himself the guilt of the world,[7] Clarisse can ignore the savage aspects of Moosbrugger's nature, and see him as completely innocent. She reverses the judgements of society and condemns Moosbrugger's judges - and society in general, which does not prevent them from committing murder - as criminals. She is convinced that

> die wirklich großen Verbrechen nicht dadurch entstehen, daß man sie tut, sondern daraus, daß man sie gewähren läßt.(912)

"Gewährenlassen ist Mord" (919): allowing the present situation of society, exemplified in the injustice to Moosbrugger, to continue is the worst of crimes. Clarisse justifies her demands that the dangerous murderer be freed by calling him "musikalisch" (353), a term which she is unable to explain. But her theory of the way music should be produced -

> "Hast du noch nie beobachtet, daß jeder Mensch im Mittelpunkt einer Himmelskugel steht? Wenn er von seinem Platz weggeht, geht sie mit. So muß man Musik machen; ohne Gewissen, einfach wie die Himmelskugel, unter der man steht!..." .(353)

indicates the quality she admires in Moosbrugger: he acts

solely in accordance with the demands of his private world ("Himmelskugel"), without considering any external factors such as the demands of morality ("ohne Gewissen"). In connection with Moosbrugger, then, music represents the destruction of the present order to make way for a rebirth:

> Wenn sich aber Musik mit dem Gesicht verbindet, dann schwanken die Mauern und aus dem Grab der Gegenwart steht das Leben der Kommenden auf. (712)

The same logic determines her identification with him in her redemptive mission. By freeing Moosbrugger, she wants to set her own strength of purpose against the indecision and lack of conviction of society, against the failure to act to shape events rather than simply allowing them to occur, against the "Niedergedrücktheit, Flauheit und der Unentschiedenheit des gemeinen Lebens" (923). She contrasts this with the compulsion of the "Wahn" which inspires her and would make her liberation of Moosbrugger "ein mächtiges Gesteuertwerden vom Leben, ein Ergriffensein von sich selbst, ein Dahinschießen im Glück" (910). As Clarisse's 'Erlösungswahn' becomes progressively more insane, Moosbrugger remains as the goal of her mission, but she herself assumes the role of the 'Saviour', by virtue of her decision to intervene in the course of events - i.e. the events involving Moosbrugger - and take upon herself the martyrdom of acting against society's dictates.

The affirmation of crime in Clarisse's redemptive vision surprisingly finds a sympathiser in General Stumm von Bordwehr,

as is indicated by his comment:

> "Gnädigste wissen, daß ich Ihnen ein ziemliches Verständnis für den Wert einer Auflockerung des bürgerlichen Geistes durch Mord und Krankheit verdanke." (1191)

But it is obvious that his affirmation is only theoretical, and he is shocked at Clarisse's suggestion (after her visit to the 'Mörderhaus' of the asylum) that one should become closely involved with the criminal insane in an attempt to understand them. Stumm acknowledges the rigidity of society's values, but "gewisse Schranken müssen eingehalten werden" (ibid.).

Clarisse's urge for decisive action expressing fervent conviction is shared by the 'Parallelaktion' - with its search for a 'große Idee', and its final 'Tatparole' - and by the philosopher Meingast. Like Clarisse, Meingast believes that

> sie (die Welt) bei nichts weiß, ob sie es lieben oder hassen soll, und weil alles zweiwertig ist, darum sind auch alle Menschen Neurastheniker und Schwächlinge... daß nur Taten erlösen können, das heißt Erlebnisse, die den ganzen Menschen mit Haut und Haaren einbeziehen... daß Erlösung... durch die Entschlossenheit des Willens, ja, wenn nötig, sogar durch Gewalt herbeigeführt werden müsse. (834)

In Clarisse's case these convictions lead to the obsession with freeing a murderer; in the case of the 'Parallelaktion' and of Meingast, it leads to the affirmation of war[8]. Both instances express a drive to overthrow an existing invalid order to regain vitality and purpose.

Clarisse's vision of Moosbrugger embodies Nietzsche's 'Verbrecher' figure:

> Der Verbrecher-Typus, das ist der Typus des starken Menschen unter ungünstigen Bedingungen, ein krankge-

> machter starker Mensch. Ihm fehlt die Wildnis, eine gewisse freiere und gefährlichere Natur und Daseinsform, in der alles, was Waffe und Wehr im Instinkt des starken Menschen ist, zu Recht besteht. Seine Tugenden sind von der Gesellschaft in Bann getan; seine lebhaftesten Triebe, die er mitgebracht hat, verwachsen alsbald mit den niederdrückenden Affekten, mit dem Verdacht, der Furcht, der Unehre. Aber dies ist beinahe das Rezept zur physiologischen Entartung... Die Gesellschaft ist es, unsre zahme, mittelmäßige, verschnittene Gesellschaft, in der ein natürwüchsiger Mensch, der vom Gebirge her oder aus den Abenteuern des Meeres kommt, notwendig zum Verbrecher entartet. (Götzendämmerung § 45) 9)

Clarisse does not discuss Moosbrugger expressly in these Nietzschean terms, although she sees herself as Nietzsche's disciple, particularly in her plan to free Moosbrugger. But it is clear from her attitude to society, from her affirmation of those who do not conform to society, and from her expectations of renewal of society through Moosbrugger's release, that the criminal has the same meaning for her as Nietzsche expresses here. As her madness deepens, she increasingly sees herself in this role of the powerful individual following inner compulsion in opposition to the repressive laws of a decadent society. This is emphasised in one of the early drafts of the final section of the novel by the designation "Clarisse als geknickter Prometheus" (1558) i.e. as the defeated rebel.

Clarisse's views of society, and for the need of some kind of 'salvation' are paralleled by most characters within the novel, including Ulrich, and by the basic tendency of the novel to satire and utopia[10], but the inextricable

link between her mission and her insanity inevitably negates the validity of her vision of a new life.

Ulrich: the moral question.

In Ulrich's reflections, which highlight the central issues of the novel, the motif of the criminal plays a dominant role. References to crime or the criminal recur throughout the novel in Ulrich's discussians on morality, usually expressing his sceptical attitude towards accepted standards[11].

The initial premise in Ulrich's attitude is his dissociation of the crime from the criminal. This is implicit in his suggestion that society is more to blame for crime than the criminal himself.

> Es ist etwa sehr leicht möglich, daß ihm ein Verbrechen, bei dem ein anderer zu Schaden kommt, bloß als eine soziale Fehlleistung erscheint, an der nicht der Verbrecher die Schuld trägt, sondern die Einrichtung der Gesellschaft. (17)

This accusation of society is based on the belief that psychiatrists have the ability to prevent people committing crime, but that the state does not provide the financial resources necessary for such a project (263):

> Man ist bereits so nahe daran, durch bestimmte Einflüsse allerhand entartete Zustände verbauen zu können wie einen Wildbach, daß es beinahe nur noch auf eine soziale Fahrlässigkeit hinausläuft oder auf einen Rest von Ungeschicklichkeit, wenn man aus Verbrechern nicht rechtzeitig Erzengel macht. (252)

Accordingly, Ulrich concludes that the state is "das dümmste und boshafteste Menschenwesen, das es gibt" (263), whereas the individual cannot be considered as essentially evil:

> "Der Mensch ist nicht gut, sondern er ist immer gut; ... man sollte ... die Folgerung ableiten, daß der Mensch überhaupt nichts Böses tun kann; er kann nur bös wirken. Mit dieser Erkenntnis wären wir am rechten Ausgangspunkt einer sozialen Moral". (262)

By separating the destructive effects of man's actions - which he considers society should be able to prevent - from the nature of the individual himself, Ulrich is able to see even a murderer as innocent e.g. when he feels, while imagining Moosbrugger in court, "Man hat eine zweite Heimat, in der alles, was man tut, unschuldig ist" (119). This 'zweite Heimat' is related to the mystical 'anderer Zustand', which becomes the central element of the later part of the novel, but is already foreshadowed in Ulrich's earlier experiences. Ulrich links his feelings about Moosbrugger with the beliefs of the medieval mystics:

> Niemals ist unser Urteil über eine Tat ein Urteil über jene Seite der Tat, die Gott lohnt oder straft; das hat, sonderbar genug, Luther gesagt. Wahrscheinlich unter dem Einfluß eines der Mystiker...
> Sie waren,im bürgerlichen Sinn, alle Immoralisten. Sie unterschieden zwischen den Sünden und der Seele, die trotz der Sünden unbefleckt bleiben kann. (121)

But Ulrich's attitude at this stage remains equivocal: although he responds to the mystics' concept of purity of the soul with "ein unmittelbares Verständnis, eher noch eine Vertrautheit" (122), he is unable to wholly affirm it. The statement that man is always good is moderated by its context in Ulrich's explanation of his refusal to assist Moosbrugger and is further relativized by his admission that he has been talking nonsense throughout the conversation (264). The important factors about Ulrich's attitude, however, re-

main: the discrimination between the criminal deed and the innocent criminal, and the distinction between goodness and obedience to the law or conventional moral standards.

'Möglichkeitssinn', one of Musil's major concerns in the novel, provides the basis for Ulrich's relationship to moral law. For the 'Möglichkeitsmensch', as Musil explains in Chapter 4, the existing reality is only one of many possible realities, and therefore the existing standard of right and wrong is only one of the possible standards: norms which are basic assumptions for others, are not binding laws but points of view which could be replaced by other alternatives.

> Man sieht, daß die Folgen solcher schöpferischen Anlage bemerkenswert sein können, und bedauerlicherweise lassen sie nicht selten das, was die Menschen bewundern, falsch erscheinen und das, was sie verbieten, als erlaubt oder wohl auch beides als gleichgültig. (16)

Although, not sharing the conventional presuppositions, Ulrich is theoretically capable of leading a life which would bring him into conflict with society, his actual behaviour is generally conventional:

> Trotz dieses Willens überläßt er aber seine moralische Führung, mit gewissen Ausnahmen, die er sich gestattet, einfach jenem ritterlichen Anstand, der in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft so ziemlich alle Männer leitet, ... und führt auf diese Weise mit dem Hochmut, der Rücksichtslosigkeit und Nachlässigkeit eines Menschen, der zu seiner Tat berufen ist, das Leben eines anderen Menschen, der von seinen Neigungen und Fähigkeiten einen mehr oder weniger gewöhnlichen, nützlichen und sozialen Gebrauch macht. (151)

Ulrich's affirmation of crime exists only as potential.

In the flashback chapters summarizing Ulrich's first three attempted careers, Musil uses the image of the criminal to

express Ulrich's expectations from each of these vocations. In joining the cavalry, Ulrich had dreams of emulating Napoleon,

> teils geschah es wegen der natürlichen Bewunderung der Jugend für das Verbrecherische, teils weil die Lehrpersonen ausdrücklich auf diesen Tyrannen, der Europa auf den Kopf zu stellen versuchte, als den gewaltigsten Übeltäter der Geschichte hinwiesen. (35)

Ulrich's admiration of ruthless force was not simply a longing for power for its own sake, but for the power to revitalise the world:

> es schien ihm, da der Soldatenberuf ein scharfes und glühendes Instrument ist, müsse man mit diesem Instrument die Welt zu ihren Heil auch brennen und schneiden. (36)

In effect, Ulrich's ambition equates the criminal and the 'saviour', although in an ironically distanced form: the young lieutenant had been forced to realize the incongruity of his hopes and his actual position, leading him to look to technology to realize his hopes.

The image of the murderer is used to describe the extreme reaction of the engineer to Ulrich's expectation that the drastic changes in technology should be parallelled by similar changes in the nature of man:

> den Vorschlag, die Kühnheit ihrer Gedanken statt auf ihre Maschinen auf sich selbst anzuwenden, würden sie ähnlich empfunden haben wie die Zumutung, von einem Hammer den widernatürlichen Gebrauch eines Mörders zu machen. (38)

i.e. whereas change in technological matters is interpreted as progress, the same radicalism in humanitarian matters is

equated with the most violent crime. The same attitude, illustrated by the same image, is established in Ulrich's third sphere of activity, science.[12]

> Wenn man statt wissenschaftlicher Anschauungen Lebensanschauung setzen würde, statt Hypothese Versuch und statt Wahrheit Tat, so gäbe es kein Lebenswerk eines ansehnlichen Naturforschers oder Mathematikers, das an Mut und Umsturzkraft nicht die größten Taten der Geschichte weit übertreffen würde. Der Mann war noch nicht auf der Welt, der zu seinen Gläubigen hätte sagen können: Stehlt, mordet, treibt Unzucht - unsere Lehre ist so stark, daß sie aus der Jauche eurer Sünden schäumend helle Bergwässer macht; aber in der Wissenschaft kommt es alle paar Jahre vor, daß etwas, das bis dahin als Fehler galt, plötzlich alle Anschauungen umkehrt oder daß ein unscheinbarer und verachteter Gedanke zum Herrscher über ein neues Gedankenreich wird, und solche Vorkommnisse sind dort nicht bloß Umstürze, sondern führen wie eine Himmelsleiter in die Höhe. (4o f)

The aim of achieving a heightening of moral life by applying the revolutions of scientific thinking to the moral sphere is again equated with crime. The major factors motivating Ulrich's fascination with "der Kraft des Geistes" (45), are the awareness of the 'Möglichkeitsmensch' of the creative potential - "man konnte alles mit ihr machen und nichts, ein Erlöser der Welt werden oder ein Verbrecher" (ibid.) - and the corresponding revolutionary attitude of youth,

> ihre Auflehnung gegen das Bestehende, die Bereitschaft der Jugend zu allem, was heroisch ist, zu Selbstaufopferung und Verbrechen, ihr feuriger Ernst und ihre Unbeständigkeit. (131)

The account of Ulrich's scientific training provides the necessary justification for his openness towards crime, expressing the flexibility of his moral principles. The discrepancy between society's progress in thinking, reflected

in scientific progress, and the changelessness of the individual's feelings, reflected in the unchanged moral law, leads to the suggestion of a "Generalsekretariat der Genauigkeit und Seele" (583). This suggestion summarizes one of the major elements of Ulrich's "die Welt anders Denkens" (1592). In an early plan for the novel, Musil explained the basis for Ulrich's attitude:

> Die Vätergeneration war: Intellektualität, aber ungenügend im Moralischen. Die Negation ist seine ursprüngliche Stellung: Auch im Moralischen ausreichende Intelektualität. (ibid.)

Ulrich's aim of merging precise thought with deep emotion, summed up as "die Utopie der Exaktheit" (247), necessitates an amoral attitude, but should produce a more intense and meaningful form of goodness.

> Die festen Verhältnisse des Inneren, welche durch eine Moral gewährleistet werden, haben für einen Mann wenig Wert, dessen Phantasie auf Veränderung gerichtet ist; und vollends wenn die Forderung genauester und größter Erfüllung vom intellektuellen Gebiet auf das der Leidenschaften übertragen wird, zeigt sich... das verwunderliche Ergebnis, daß die Leidenschaften verschwinden und an ihrer Stelle etwas Urfeuerähnliches von Güte zum Vorschein kommt. (ibid.)

This goal is determined by Musil's basic concept of life as experiment, of the "Utopie des Essayismus" (247). Ulrich's sympathy with and theoretical capacity for crime are the logical outcome of his rejection of fixed standards of behaviour in favour of complete flexibility[13], finding a more essential basis for each action in each situation. The 'Utopie des Essayismus' chapter (Chapter 62) presents this link explicitly. Here Musil explains 'Essayismus' in terms of the ultimate re-

lativity of man's beliefs and values:

> Sie (die Menschheit) widerruft auf die Dauer alles, was sie getan hat, und setzt anderes an seine Stelle, auch ihr verwandeln sich im Lauf der Zeit Verbrechen in Tugenden und umgekehrt, sie baut große geistige Zusammenhänge aller Geschehnisse auf und läßt sie nach einigen Menschenaltern wieder einstürzen; nur geschieht das nacheinander, statt in einem einheitlichen Lebensgefühl, und die Kette ihrer Versuche läßt keine Steigerung erkennen, während ein bewußter menschlicher Essayismus ungefähr die Aufgabe vorfände, diesen fahrlässigen Bewußtseinszustand der Welt in einen Willen zu verwandeln. (251)

Accepted standards of virtue and crime are meaningless for the person who affirms 'Essayismus' as a way of life on this basis.

This is stressed by the fact that Ulrich has no a priori objection to killing, but sees the potential capability in himself to commit what is traditionally considered the worst of crimes. As in the case of the relativity of beliefs, a generally acknowledged fact becomes a motivating principle, when Ulrich incorporates into his philosophy the insight that the value of an action depends on its circumstances,

> von dem bald so, bald anders beschaffenen Ganzen, dem sie angehörten. Das ist übrigens nur die einfache Beschreibung der Tatsache, daß uns ein Mord als ein Verbrechen oder als eine heroische Tat erscheinen kann... Aber Ulrich verallgemeinerte sie. Dann fanden alle moralische Ereignisse in einem Kraftfeld statt, dessen Konstellation sie mit Sinn belud, und sie enthielten das Gute und das Böse wie ein Atom chemische Verbindungsmöglichkeiten enthält. Sie waren gewissermaßen das, was sie wurden. (250) (14)

Theoretically, then, Ulrich could be justified in committing murder, and it is suggested twice in this chapter that he would be capable of doing so:

> er ist imstande zu töten, ohne sicher zu sein, daß er es tun muß. (ibid.)

and

> Er könnte glücklich sein, weil er nicht tötet, oder glücklich sein weil er tötet, aber er könnte niemals der gleichgültige Eintreiber einer an ihn gestellten Forderung sein. (255)

The criteria for such an action depend not on commands or impulses, thoughts or emotions, but on a condition in which he could act "mit ganzer Seele" (ibid):

> es war ein "ganz Begreifen" und doch auch wieder nur so, wie wenn der Wind eine Botschaft fern herüberträgt, und sie kam ihm weder wahr noch falsch, weder vernünftig noch widervernünftig vor, sondern ergriff ihn. (ibid)

In the first half of the novel (i.e. before Ulrich's reunion with his sister Agathe), Ulrich's preoccupation with a new kind of morality remains theoretical: despite his rejection of the accepted values, his life proceeds outwardly in accordance with them. The incident involving Ulrich's impulse to kill Arnheim demonstrates the capacity to commit murder which Musil has established, but it also indicates the importance of the criteria governing such actions. The impulse, and even the motivation of antipathy, are present, but Ulrich's ironic awareness of the theatricality of his impulse - following the dramatic cliché "Nimm einen Dolch und erfülle sein Schicksal" (645) - completely excludes the possibility of the necessary state of 'Ergriffenheit'. The 'crime' is only a momentary fantasy, and the only result it has is the feeling of embarassment it leaves behind in Ulrich.

On a more serious level, a direct link with crime is possible in Ulrich's relationship to Moosbrugger. Ulrich is, like the

rest of Kakania, fascinated by Moosbrugger, to the extent that "Moosbrugger ging ihm durch etwas Unbekanntes näher als sein eigenes Leben" (121). But despite his sympathy, even empathy, with Moosbrugger, Ulrich does nothing to help him, apart from interceding with Graf Stallburg on his behalf. Despite his judgement that Moosbrugger has been unjustly condemned, he resists the suggestions made by Clarisse, and later by Bonadea, that he should save Moosbrugger, either by freeing him from prison - according to Clarisse's plan - or by using his influence. Ulrich rejects the romantic attitude which Bonadea represents - ignoring the brutal crime, and feeling sympathy for the murderer as the victim of the judicial system, rather than for the innocent victim of the crime - and recognizes the difficulty of finding a solution to the problem of how to deal with a criminal of this type. However, the impulse to set Moosbrugger free remains strong:

> Unbegreiflicherweise schoß ihm im selben Augenblick der Beschluß durch den Kopf, ein Verbrechen zu begehen, oder vielleicht war es auch nur ein gestaltloser Einfall, denn er verband keine Vorstellung damit. Möglich, daß es mit Moosbrugger zusammenhing, denn er würde gerne diesem Narren geholfen haben. (632)

Moosbrugger is, however, only the more or less accidental object of an action motivated rather by the urge to break out of an order which has long been rejected in theory: freeing Moosbrugger represents self-liberation, in the sense that his "aktiver Passivismus", "Das Warten eines Gefangenen auf die Gelegenheit des Ausbruchs" (356) can thereby become action. (15)

> Aber eigentlich fand er in diesem "Verbrechen" nur das Bedürfnis, sich auszuschließen oder das Leben, das man verträglich zwischen den anderen führt, zu verlassen. Was man staats- oder menschenfeindliche Gesinnung nennt ... war einfach da, und Ulrich erinnerte sich, daß es ihm durch sein ganzes Leben begleitet hatte, aber selten in solcher Stärke. Man darf wohl sagen, daß bisher bei allen Umwälzungen auf der Erde immer der geistige Mensch zu Schaden gekommen ist; sie beginnen mit dem Versprechen, eine neue Kultur herbeizuführen, räumen mit dem, was die Seele bis dahin erreicht hat, auf wie mit feindlichem Besitz und werden von der nächsten Umwälzung überholt, ehe sie die alte Höhe überschreiten konnten... und der Gedanke, sich außer diese Reihe zu stellen, war für Ulrich nichts Neues! (632 f)

The impulse to commit crime is thus given a rational motivation, as the extreme expression of Ulrich's theories of going beyond present morality to find a more meaningful mode of employing man's faculties. Whereas the impulse to aid Moosbrugger is irrational, reminiscent of the fascination everyone feels for the uncanny, the 'crime' itself is based on applying the concept of scientific progress through constant revolutions in ways of thinking to the moral sphere. These earlier theories also involved the recognition that acting accordingly would mean breaking legal or moral codes. The Moosbrugger incident is differentiated from these earlier instances by the urge to take direct action:

> das Gefühl, nun werde nicht wieder etwas Allgemeines und Theoretisches folgen, wie er dessen schon müde war, sondern er müsse etwas Persönliches und Tätiges unternehmen, woran er mit Blut, Armen und Beinen teilhabe, füllte ihn für einige Augenblicke ganz aus. Er wußte, daß er in dem Augenblick dieses sonderbaren "Verbrechens" ... der Welt nicht mehr die Stirn bieten könnte, aber Gott weiß, warum das eine leidenschaftlich zärtliche Empfindung war. (633)

Ulrich's feeling is immediately put in an ironic light by

Leindorf's interruption, to send Ulrich to Diotima with a message: the expected decisive crime is replaced by an insignificant action under the orders of an organisation which means nothing to him; and the 'Verbrechen an Arnheim' incident, which follows immediately, again exposes the impulse to crime to ridicule. Nevertheless, the rejected idea of freeing Moosbrugger retains its symbolic significance as

> das Bild eines Handelns, worin das Zugreifen, wie es aus höchster Erregung folgt, und das Ergriffenwerden in einem unbeschreiblichen gemeinsamen Zustande eins werden, der Lust von Zwang, Sinn von Notwendigkeit, höchste Tätigkeit von seligem Empfangen nicht unterscheiden ließ. (652 f)

The first volume of the novel ends with this state of indecision, resolved from outside by the death of Ulrich's father. On the one hand, Ulrich has frequently expressed the ideal of fulfilment through an intense mode of action; on the other, he has consistently allowed himself to be drawn into the activities of a society in which he feels no personal involvement, so that his way of life completely fails to approach his ideal.

Ulrich und Agathe: "Die Verbrecher".

The two titles of the second volume - "Ins Tausendjährige Reich" (Die Verbrecher) - stand in a paradoxical relationship to one another: the positive utopianism of the 'Millenium' and the negative judgement of the criminal coincide. The two concepts relativize one another: the conjunction of

utopia and lawlessness suggests that the attempt to achieve utopia ends in the failure of crime; or, in view of the basically positive link that has been made between Ulrich's 'Frage des rechten Lebens' and the rejection of accepted morality, that lawlessness is necessary if utopia is to be approached[16].

The conversations between Ulrich and Agathe, which dominate the action of this section of the novel, develop further the questions of morality and crime which have occupied Ulrich's thoughts. These issues are discussed in general terms, but more often with specific reference to Ulrich's and Agathe's own situation[17]. The theoretical question becomes a personal issue, as it culminates in action with Agathe's forging of her father's will, and also with the relationship which develops between the brother and sister.

The first incident involving Ulrich and Agathe acting together foreshadows Agathe's crime. In the chapter entitled "Sie tun Unrecht", they deliberately disregard their dying father's last wishes, conventionally considered inviolable. The action itself is trivial - involving simply the timing of the replacement of the father's decorations with the duplicates he wants to be buried in - but it signifies the rejection of the whole order he represented. Ulrich justifies their action with the argument that the conventions of the past are meaningless:

> "Nicht nur der Vater ist tot, auch die Zeremonien die ihn umgeben, sind ja tot. Sein Testament ist tot. Die Leute, die hier erscheinen, sind tot. Ich will damit nichts Böses sagen; weiß Gott, wie dankbar man vielleicht den Wesen sein muß, die zur Festigkeit der Erde beitragen: aber all das gehört zum Kalk des Lebens, nicht zum Meer! ... Die Tugenden der Gesellschaft sind Laster für den Heiligen." (696)

Agathe's response is the extension of Ulrich's rejection of convention to an express affirmation of law-breaking under specific conditions:

> "Du würdest also einen, der aus Gewohnheit ehrlich ist, kaum gut nennen? Aber einen Dieb, der zum erstenmal stiehlt, während ihm fast das Herz aus der Brust springt, nennst du gut?!" (ibid.)

Agathe's later transformation of her brother's theories into an illegitimate action is prefigured in this statement, which astonishes Ulrich, again typical of his later reaction. Ulrich's situation is a repetition of his dilemma in the earlier section of the novel, of being unable to find a way of regulating his life according to this theoretical principle

> "Ich selbst mache mir unter Umständen nicht viel daraus, ob etwas für recht oder unrecht gilt, aber ich kann dir keine Regel angeben, nach der man sich dabei zu richten vermöchte." (ibid.)

Simple negation of existing standards does not provide a guide for action unless accompanied by new criteria for judging the value of actions. The search for such criteria is one of the major issues of the discussions which dominate this stage of the novel.

Agathe's complete confidence in committing the wrong (even going further in playful disrespect for her father by putting

a garter in his pocket) contrasts with Ulrich's hesitance, and implicitly suggests a possible guiding principle for future conduct. Although Ulrich disapproves of Agathe's action, he is unable to condemn her for it: he admits their plan is "Unrecht" (705) - although he had proposed it - and feels that he should prevent it:

> Dann wäre er beinahe hinzugesprungen und hätte es verändert: einfach weil es so ganz gegen alle Ordnung war. (707)

The action itself, and Agathe's attitude as she carries it out, is so convincing that his objections are invalid:

> Agathe hatte eine Art, Unrecht zu tun, die den Gedanken an Unrecht nicht aufkommen ließ ... Er fühlte sich an den Dieb erinnert, dem das Herz aus der Brust springt. (705, 706)

and

> Dann aber fing er in den Augen seiner Schwester einen Blitz vor reiner Taufrische des frühen Morgens auf, in die noch keine Trübe des Tagwerks gefallen ist, und das hielt ihn zurück. (707)

These descriptions of Agathe's bearing suggest the strength and intensity of feeling which, according to Ulrich's reflections, are lacking in the sphere of conventional morality. The major elements of this episode - the rejection of convention, Agathe's decisive and confident action, and Ulrich's inability to disapprove of her conduct and the affirmation of intensity - form the nucleus of the later action of the novel.

From this point on Agathe becomes the dominant protagonist of the novel as far as action is concerned, although Ulrich

remains the focus of the development of ideas. Agathe's rebelliousness and decisiveness in action stand in contrast to the details given of her former life: she has until now lived only in obedience to authority, in the form of her school, her father, social conventions, and her husband. This reversal in her behaviour is presented as a reaction against the life she has led, under the influence of Ulrich's ideas. Ulrich's theories are, however, not alien to her: they strike her as expressions of her own unformulated feelings. Agathe's past parallels Ulrich's, in its outward conformity but inner dissociation from the demands of society - her obedience motivated by apathy and the feeling that everything demanded of her was remote and irrelevant (727). Ulrich's 'Eigenschaftslosigkeit' is paralleled by Agathe's conviction that she is "ein träger und wertloser Charakter ... auch nicht überzeugt, daß es besser sei, ein tätiger und guter Charakter zu sein" (727). Her apathy reflects the same passivity as Ulrich's drifting into the 'Parallelaktion', typical of the split between thought and action,

> da er zu oft sein Leben hatte gehen lassen, wie es wollte, und seinen Geist anders. (683)

Ulrich's questions about her marriage to Hagauer lead her to the realization "daß ich schrecklich im Unrecht gelebt habe" (685), i.e. that her acceptance of everything that happens to her rather than actively controlling her own life, is wrong. The qualities she shares with Ulrich are basically those qualities which make him a 'Möglichkeitsmensch'. They com-

bine with this new realization to form the background for her acceptance of Ulrich's attitude to ethics, and for her expression of it in her crime.

Agathe's rejection of conformity and dependence on authority coincides with Ulrich's longing

> in Geschehnisse verwickelt zu sein wie in einen Ringkampf, und seien es sinnlose oder verbrechereische, nur gültig sollten sie sein. (738)

- expressing his frustration at the passivity and inconsequence of his 'Urlaub vom Leben'. These emotions are reinforced by the principles evolved in the long discussions between Ulrich and Agathe on ethics. Ulrich's ideas on the worthlessness of conventional goodness echo Agathe's opinion of her husband, "einer jener Menschen, die immer gut handeln; in ihnen selbst ist keine Güte" (729), and her feeling that "nur Menschen, die nicht viel Gutes tun, imstande sind, sich ihre ganze Güte zu bewahren" (ibid.). Although she condemns those statements as nonsense, "solche Sätze erklärten ihr ganzes Leben"(73o). The corollary to this negation of accepted standards of goodness is the affirmation of the criminal. In one of their conversations the characters in the novels of Dostoievsky and Stendhal act as a starting point for the theory that even a murderer can be considered good:

> "... diese Mörder würdest du doch gut finden?!"
> "Natürlich! ... Das heißt - nein, warte doch: vielleicht sind das nur Menschen von guter Anlage, wertvolle Menschen. Das bleibt ihnen auch später als Verbrecher. Aber gut bleiben sie nicht!"
> "Aber warum liebst du sie dann noch nach ihrer Untat?! Doch gewiß nicht nur wegen ihrer früheren guten An-

> lage, sondern deshalb, weil sie dir noch immer gefallen!"
> "So ist es ja immer", sagte Ulrich. "Der Mensch gibt der Tat den Charakter, und nicht umgekehrt geschieht es!" (733 f)

The dichotomy between the good individual and the evil action is resolved in the "Moral des nächsten Schrittes" (733), an ethical principle which satisfies Ulrich's demand for a morality without fixed regulations of conduct:[18]

> "Nie ist das, was man tut, entscheidend, sondern immer erst das, was man danach tut!" (735)

Accordingly, even the worst crime can lead to goodness, because

> "... wenn du etwas bereust, so kannst du doch gerade darin die Kraft finden, etwas so Gutes zu tun, wie du es sonst nie zustandebrächtest." (ibid.)

Ulrich even postulates positive results which could possibly justify a murderer:

> "Und wenn du jemand einmal getötet hast, was kannst du danach tun?!" Ulrich zuckte die Achseln. Er hatte Lust, rein aus Folgerichtigkeit zu antworten: "Ich könnte ja dadurch vielleicht befähigt werden, ein Gedicht zu schreiben, das Tausenden das innere Leben gibt, oder auch eine große Erfindung zu machen!" Aber er hielt an sich. "Nie würde das geschehn!" fiel ihm ein. "Nur ein Geisteskranker könnte es sich einbilden. Oder ein achtzehnjähriger Ästhet. Das sind, weiß Gott warum, Gedanken, die den Gesetzen der Natur widersprechen. Übrigens -," verbesserte er sich "beim Urmenschen ist es doch so gewesen; er hat getötet, weil das Menschenopfer ein großes religiöses Gedicht war!" (735)

Ulrich's attitude here is equivocal: he rejects a possible answer, although he regards it as the logical consequence of his principle; he rejects it, not because it is wrong, but because he feels such a situation could never arise; and he

finally recalls a situation where it did arise, where murder was considered not only justifiable but positively valuable. A morality which could encompass such situations would be the ultimate expression of the principle of living according to possibilities rather than reality.

> "Aber worauf kommt es nach dem nächsten Schritt an? Doch offenbar auf den dann folgenden? Und nach dem nten auf den n plus ersten Schritt?! Ein solcher Mensch müßte ohne Ende und Entscheidung, ja geradezu ohne Wirklichkeit leben." (735)

The objection "daß wir keine Methode besitzen, mit dieser ruhelosen Reihe richtig umzugehen" (736) leads back to Ulrich's earlier principle of the "Erdensekretariat der Genauigkeit und Seele" (597), which would provide a working basis for the morality of the next step, using scientific thinking as a model[19].

> "Als wissenschaftlich erzogener Mensch habe ich in jeder Lage das Gefühl, daß meine Kenntnisse unfertig und bloß ein Wegweiser sind, und daß ich vielleicht schon morgen eine neue Erfahrung besitzen werde, die mich anders denken läßt als heute; anderseits wird auch ein ganz von seinem Gefühl ergriffener Mensch, 'ein Mensch im Aufstieg', wie du ihn dir ausgemalt hast, jede seiner Handlungen als eine Stufe empfinden, über die er zur nächsten emporgehoben wird." (74o)

This moral system is the extension of Ulrich's 'Utopie der Exaktheit', which was expressed in the same image:

> Es würde an der Heiligkeit des Augenblickszustandes zweifeln, aber nicht aus Skepsis, sondern in der Gesinnung des Steigens, wo der Fuß, der fest steht, jederzeit auch der tiefere ist. (3o4)

Just as the utopia "Gesetz und Gültiges beiseite schiebt im Namen einer anspruchsvollen Liebe zu ihrer nächsten Gestalt"

(ibid.), the 'Moral des nächsten Schrittes' affirms questionable actions, as the starting point for future goodness:

> "Manchmal kann ich mir denken, daß ein Mensch sogar durch ein Verbrechen glücklich wird, weil es ihm einen gewissen Ballast gibt, und dadurch vielleicht eine stetigere Fahrt." (742)

Ulrich's theory is challenged as soon as it has been brought to this climax, by Agathe's statement, "Ich möchte Hagauer umbringen!" (742). Ulrich's response seems to belie his principles: he refuses to treat it as a serious intention, even when Agathe suggests a plan which would enable them to carry out such an aim without being suspected. Agathe's appeals to the ideas he has put forward in their conversations -

> "Aber du sagst doch auch: die Tugenden der Gesellschaft sind Laster für den Heiligen!" (744)

- draw only equivocation:

> "Nur habe ich nicht gesagt, daß die Laster der Gesellschaft für den Heiligen Tugenden sind!" (ibid.)

Despite Ulrich's ideas on goodness coexisting with wrong actions, his rejection of a specific wrong is immediate and total, so that Agathe can accuse him, "Du nimmst eben immer alles wieder zurück" (ibid.).

This incident does not, however, negate the insights developed in their discussions. The criterion by which Ulrich condemns Agathe's proposal is not legalistic or moralistic, but is based on the principles of the 'Moral des nächsten Schrittes',

with its emphasis on the consequences of an action, rather than the action itself:

> "Stell dir bloß vor, du tätest es wirklich: es wäre gar nicht das, was du gemeint hast, und du würdest zumindest furchtbar enttäuscht sein." (743)

Agathe's impulse is the extreme expression of her realization that her apathy in allowing her life to be controlled by meaningless external values is wrong. The dominant motive for her wish to kill Hagauer is the desire to completely reshape her life: "Ich könnte vielleicht plötzlich ein anderer Mensch sein" (743). She feels that her crime would enable her to break away from the kind of life she has previously led, to put herself irrevocably outside the system whose values she does not share, to "Ganz und gar alles gewesene vernichten!" (ibid.). Although the form of her rebellion is rejected as unreasonable, the decision to find a more valid way of life stands.

Ulrich responds in much the same way to Agathe's second proposal, to symbolically destroy all links with the past by altering her father's will to exclude Hagauer[20]. This plan is more reasonable, but still illegitimate, and Ulrich still considers it a "gefährliche Irrtum" - "Man sollte wirklich so etwas auch nicht denken!" (794) His reaction substantiates Agathe's conviction:

> Einen unerlaubten oder geheimen Weg zu gehn: darin fühlte sie sich Ulrich überlegen. Sie hörte, wie er immer wieder vorsichtig alles zurücknahm, wozu er sich hinreißen ließ. (771)

With her decision to commit this crime Agathe takes over the dominant role in their relationship: in his doubt and indecision Ulrich acts and thinks simply in response to and in reaction against Agathe's arguments. Ulrich's reaction on this occasion is much less decisively negative. He puts forward no real objection to her plan: the reply

> "Sogar Nietzsche schreibt den "freien Geistern" vor, um der Freiheit des Inneren willen gewisse äußere Regeln zu achten!" (794 f),

seems invalid even to him. Ulrich's doubts are based not on straight-forward moral grounds - e.g. that it would be unjust to deprive an innocent man of property rightly due to him - but on the uncertainty of Agathe's motivation. Agathe's situation is desribed by the analogy of a completely unmotivated theft, since she has no compelling reason to steal Hagauer's share of their inheritance:[21]

> "Nimm an, ich möchte" sagte er "auf der Reise einem Fremden die goldene Zigarettendose stehlen: ich frage dich, ob das nicht einfach undenkbar ist?! Also will ich jetzt auch nicht erst darüber reden, ob eine Entscheidung, wie sie dir vorschwebt, mit höherer Geistesfreiheit zu rechtfertigen sei oder nicht ... Aber stell dir vor, ich im Hotel sei weder in Not, noch ein Berufsdieb, noch ein geistig Minderwertiger ..., noch sei ich von irgendetwas anderem verwirrt oder stigmatisiert, stähle aber trotzdem: ich wiederhole dir, daß es diesen Fall auf der ganzen Welt nicht gibt! Er kommt einfach nicht vor!" (796)

But Ulrich has no reply for Agathe's simple rebuttal, "Aber Ulo! Was ist dann, wenn man es trotzdem tut?!" (ibid.) A later discussion makes it clear that Ulrich could approve of her action if it were motivated by a conviction -

> "Wenn man so etwas tut, so muß man wenigstens eine Überzeugung damit verbinden! ... Man tut nichts

> "einfach"; entweder ist es von außen begründet oder von innen ... wenn man etwas ganz Unbegründetes für recht hält oder wenn gar ein Entschluß wie aus dem Nichts entsteht, dann verdächtigt man sich einer krankhaften oder schadhaften Anlage." (956 f)

or if it were justified by unjust behaviour on Hagauer's part -

> "Ja, du würdest sogar, wenn Hagauer ein Lump wäre, glühend gerecht sein; es ist geradezu ein Unglück, daß schon er anständig ist!" (959) -

or if it could be performed openly -

> "Bloß es heimlich tun müssen, das mag ich nicht. Ich liebe die Räuber der Moral und nicht die Diebe. Ich möchte also einen moralischen Räuber aus dir machen", scherzte er "und gestatte dir nicht, aus Schwäche zu fehlen!" (958)

None of these conditions apply to Agathe's situation and Ulrich is unable to justify her action. But he is equally unable to condemn it, or to find her criminal.

> ... in dem schönen Anblick, den Agathe während ihres Vergehens bot, war ... weder von Habsucht noch von Rache oder einer anderen inneren Häßlichkeit eine Spur zu entdecken ... seiner Schwester wildsanfte Entschlossenheit, worin sich Reinheit und Verbrechen unterschiedslos mischten, (machte ihn) in diesem Augenblick völlig fassungslos. Er vermochte nicht, dem Gedanken Raum zu geben, daß dieser Mensch, der ganz offen begriffen war, eine schlechte Handlung zu begehn, ein schlechter Mensch sein könne ... Ihre Entschlossenheit machte den Eindruck, aus einer anderen Welt auf die Ebene gewöhnlicher Entscheidungen herabgestiegen zu sein. (797)

It is impossible for Ulrich to condemn his sister's action, because he recognizes it as the putting into practice of his ideas, formulated in the "Heiliges Gespräch" (Chapter 11, 12)[22].

> Er hatte doch gesagt, daß es im höchsten Zustand eines Menschen kein Gut und Böse gebe, sondern nur Glaube

> oder Zweifel: daß feste Regeln dem innersten Wesen der Moral widersprächen und der Glaube höchstens eine Stunde alt werden dürfe; daß man im Glauben nichts Niedriges tun könne...; daß Ahnung ein leidenschaftlicherer Zustand sei als Wahrheit. Und Agathe war jetzt im Begriff, das Gebiet der moralischen Umfriedung zu verlassen und sich auf jene grenzenlose Tiefe hinauszuwagen, wo es keine andere Entscheidung gibt als die, ob man steigen wird oder fällt ... in diesem Augenblick liebte er sie unerachtet ihrer Gewissenlosigkeit mit dem merkwürdigen Gefühl, daß es seine eigenen Gedanken seien, die von ihm zu ihr gegangen wären und nun von ihr wieder zu ihm zurückkehrten, ärmer an Überlegung geworden, aber wie ein Wildwesen balsamisch nach Freiheit duftend. (797 f)

Agathe sees her action in the same light: "Eigentlich machte sie Ulrich ein Verbrechen zum Geschenk" (798). Agathe's forging of her father's will is the culmination of the moral considerations which have occupied Ulrich's thinking throughout the novel.

The same dichotomy between thought and action which had e.g. caused Ulrich to become secretary of the 'Parallelaktion' although he in no way took its aims seriously, expresses itself here in Ulrich's inability to act according to his own convictions, presumably because he does not feel he has found the right method of applying his principles to given situations with the necessary certainty. But he does not, on the other hand, act contrary to his theories: he does not prevent Agathe from carrying out her plans; he does not feel guilty about his part in them - he has unwittingly become her accomplice by lying to Hagauer about Agathe's attitude and intentions, and about his father's will (738, 802); and, after leaving Agathe and returning to Vienna, he cannot bring

himself to write the moralising letter he feels is due, advising her to give up the deception before it is too late. He decides instead to leave things as they are and await developments. This is virtually a decision to live according to the morality of the next step, in that he sees the consequences of Agathe's crime as being more important than the fact that it is a crime:

> Der Handstreich seiner Schwester hatte viel an sich, das ihm gefiel ... Er wollte auch diesem Geschehen nicht ausweichen, indem er es schnell und in gewöhnlicher Weise gutmache: Aber dann gab es keine Regel, und man mußte das Geschehnis sich entwickeln lassen. (802)

The crime becomes something he must come to terms with as a factor determining his own conduct. Thus Musil presents in Ulrich a gradual process of bringing his actions into line with his theories, more or less against his will.

> Die in ihrer (Agathes) Natur liegende Bereitwilligkeit, sich einer ... gut-bösen Ausdrucksform zu bedienen, was sich in dem Eingriff in das väterliche Testament gewichtig verkörpert hatte, verletzte die in seiner eigenen Natur liegende gleiche Bereitwilligkeit, die bloß eine gedankenmäßige Gestalt ... angenommen hatte, während er als Person nicht nur schlecht und recht zu leben vermochte, sondern wie er sah, darin auch nicht gern gestört sein wollte. (824)

Ulrich's gradual acquiescence in the realization of his ideas virtually makes Agathe's forgery the "endgültige" event he had earlier hoped for (738). Musil suggests this through the narrator's pre-figurative comment immediately following the expression of this wish - and long before Agathe's suggestion about the will -

> Das Merkwürdigste war aber wohl, daß Ulrich bei dieser Gelegenheit an nichts so wenig dachte wie daran, daß zu dieser Zeit doch schon etwas geschehen war, da er seinem ahnungslosen Schwager in Agathens Auftrag und im Wunsche, ihn abzuschütteln, die Lüge aufgebunden hatte, es wäre ein verschlossenes Testament vorhanden, das erst in einigen Tagen geöffnet werden dürfe, und ihm ebenso wider besseres Wissen versichert hatte, Agathe werde seine Ansprüche wahren, was Hagauer später Vorschubleistung nannte. (738)

Without realizing it, Ulrich has become involved in an action which is not merely "vorläufig" (ibid.), but will have consequences for his conduct. Ulrich's gradual involvement in Agathe's crime is therefore really a process of recognizing his demands in action, after they have already been realized. Ulrich's indecisiveness in dealing with Agathe's plan develops from mere procrastination to a serious resolution to attempt a way of life in keeping with the concepts formulated in the 'Heilige Gespräche'. He is forced to abandon his moralizing tone by the realization

> daß er sich bisher noch allemal, wenn er sich "moralisch" verhielt, in einer schlechteren geistigen Lage befunden habe, als bei Handlungen oder Gedanken, die man üblicherweise "unmoralisch" nennen durfte. (821 f)

The strength of Agathe's conduct throws into sharp relief the moral passivity of his going along with existing circumstances despite his criticism of them. Moral condemnation gives way to admiration of intensely felt action, with the principle,

> daß der Unterschied zwischen Gut und Böse alle Bedeutung verliert gegenüber dem Wohlgefallen an einer reinen, tiefen und ursprünglichen Handlungsweise, das wie ein Funke ebensowohl aus erlaubten

> wie aus unerlaubten Geschehnissen hervorschlagen kann. (823)

- Ulrich sees in his sister's crime "leidenschaftlichen, bejahenden, zum Handeln drängenden Güte" (824). Ulrich's life has been devoted to the search for the

> Gesetz des rechten Lebens ..., das ehern und natürlich ist, das keine Ausnahme zuläßt und keinen Einwand ausläßt, das lösend ist wie ein Rausch und nüchtern wie die Wahrheit. (825)

Agathe's crime provides the key to a life under this kind of a law, in that it paves the way for their attempt to achieve together the 'anderer Zustand',[23]

> worin alles ein Ja ist ... worin man keiner anderen geistigen Bewegung fähig ist als der moralischen, also auch den einzigen, worin es eine Moral ohne Unterbrechung gibt ... Und Agathe tat doch nichts, als das sie die Hand danach ausstreckte ... und an die Stelle von Ulrichs Überlegungen traten Körper und Gebilde der wirklichen Welt. Alles, was er gedacht hatte, erschien ihm jetzt bloß als Verzögerung und Übergang. Er wollte "es darauf ankommen lassen", was aus Agathes Einfall entstünde, und es war ihm in diesem Augenblick ganz gleichgültig, daß die geheimnisvolle Verheißung mit einer nach gemeinen Begriffen schimpflichen Handlung begonnen hatte. (827)

The quest for such a 'zweite Heimat' has been a central issue in Ulrich's thought since his first reflections about Moosbrugger, and the mystics who would be capable of finding him innocent. This state has always been linked with Ulrich's amoral attitude, while at the same time conveying an intensely moral experience e.g.

> Die Dinge scheinen nicht aus Holz und Stein, sondern aus einer grandiosen und unendlich zarten Immoralität zu bestehen, die in dem Augenblick, wo sie sich mit ihm berührte, zu tiefer moralischer Erschütterung wurde. (156)

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The climax of this theme is approached in the 'Heiligen Gespräche', which revolve around their contemplation of the writings of the mystics, in the hope of finding a way of life which can combine the insights of the mystics with their own situation. The result is a concept of morality which represents the ultimate union of 'Genauigkeit und Seele':

> "... ich werde mich einzig und allein nach dem Zeichen richten, ob mich seine Nähe steigen oder sinken macht. Ob ich davon zum Leben geweckt werde oder nicht. Ob bloß meine Zunge davon redet und mein Gehirn oder der strahlende Schauder in meiner Fingerspitze ... Aber ich glaube vielleicht, daß die Menschen in einiger Zeit einesteils sehr intelligent, anderenteils Mystiker sein werden. Vielleicht geschieht es, daß sich unsere Moral schon heute in diese zwei Bestandteile zerlegt. Ich könnte auch sagen: in Mathematik und Mystik. In praktische Melioration und unbekanntes Abenteuer!" (770)

Agathe finds these criteria fulfilled in her situation, as she, alone after Ulrich's return to Vienna, carries out the legal organisation necessary to exclude Hagauer from her father's will. The fact that she is doing wrong is forgotten, because in this action she is so much at one with herself that it never occurs to her to question it. Her reflections about her future - whether to follow the prescribed path of marriage and motherhood, or whether to attempt, with Ulrich, a completely new way of life - culminate in a mystic experience summarized as "Einheit des Gewissens mit den Sinnen" (860). Her conclusion is the resolve to realize what Ulrich half jokingly called the "Tausendjährige Reich" (861), where the momentary mystic dream state is to become a permanent reality.

At the same time Ulrich comes to the same conclusion that Agathe's conduct must lead inevitably to a new life for both of them:

> Nach seinen Gesetzen ... konnte Agathes Fehler nicht bereut, sondern nur durch Geschehnisse, die ihm folgten, gut-gemacht werden. Er war nicht einen Augenblick im Zweifel, daß dies sein und seiner Schwester ganzes Leben sein sollte ... Aber da fühlte Ulrich nun doch wieder, daß man sich nicht an die gewöhnlichen Bedingungen der Güte halten dürfe, wenn man sich in den Bereich der unbedingten Güte vorwagen wolle. Die ihm auferlegte Aufgabe, den Schritt in das Neue hinein zu tun, schien keinen Abstrich zu dulden. (87o f)

The basis of their new life is the resolve, "nichts mehr der Seele Gleichgültiges tun wollen" (875), the complete reversal ot their former life of involvement in affairs which meant nothing to them, of obedience to an alien order. The forging of the will thus develops into an actual break away from an order from which they have until now only intellectually distanced themselves: it is the realization of their private rebellion. 'Bereuen' and 'Gutmachen' in this sense do not mean a return to the moral laws they have transgressed, but the search for the basis of a new mode of ethics, in the 'anderer Zustand' of 'Moral ohne Unterbrechung'.

The dominance of a further immoral, perhaps even criminal, element in their whole life - the question of their incestuous relationship - reinforces these basic factors of self-realization and protest.[24] The basis of their spiritual intimacy lies in the fact that each finds in the other the essential complement to his own nature, the true mirror

image of himself, and thus the only possibility of self-fulfilment: Ulrich calls Agathe "meine Eigenliebe" (899), and Agathe finds in Ulrich for the first time true inner contact with another individual - "Was bedeutet es, daß es gerade mein Bruder ist, an den sich das anschloß, was ich in mir habe?" (863)

Their dissatisfaction with their former selves makes what others would call a "widernatürliches Empfinden" (941) the natural course for them.

> "Was jeder von uns empfindet, ist die schattenhafte Verdopplung seiner selbst in der entgegengesetzten Natur. Ich bin Mann, du bist Frau; man sagt, daß der Mensch zu jeder Eigenschaft auch die schattenhaft angelegte oder unterdrückte Gegeneigenschaft in sich trägt: jedenfalls besitzt er die Sehnsucht nach ihr, wenn er nicht heillos mit sich selbst zufrieden ist. Dann ist also mein ans Licht gekommener Gegenmensch in dich geschlüpft, und der deine in mich, und sie fühlen sich großartig in den vertauschten Körpern, einfach weil sie vor ihrer früheren Umgebung und dem Ausblick aus ihr hinaus nicht allzuviel Achtung haben!" (941 f)

This rejection of their own former lives is parallelled by their withdrawal from society -

> zweifellos war in dieser Geschwisterlichkeit nicht mehr Liebe für einander enthalten als Abstoßung von der übrigen Welt. (876)

Their forbidden relationship is, like the forgery, the expression of their until now subdued "Proteststellung zum Leben" (944).

The precise nature of their relationship is not determined at the stage when they decide to live together. But it is clear that it is of the deepest significance for them -""Gewiß gibt es Wichtigeres als Liebeserlebnisse!" Aber sie glaubte es

nicht (862)" - and that the fact that such a relationship is taboo means nothing:

> Man hätte in diesem Augenblick ebensowenig sagen können, daß sie es ablehne, zu ihrem Bruder in unerlaubte Beziehungen zu treten, wie daß sie es wünsche. Das mochte von der Zukunft abhängen (ibid.).

Apart from the early draft chapter, "Die Reise ins Paradies", the fulfilment of their emotions in an incestuous union is not depicted. But their responses to one another after Agathe has rejoined Ulrich make it seem inevitable that their relationship will develop in this direction[25]. Musil brings them to the verge of breaking the taboo, and provides no counter-argument to suggest that they should refrain. Rather, Ulrich argues that there is no intrinsic law against their love -

> Ein inneres Verbot, eine Blutsverwandte nicht mit männlicher Liebe anzusehn, gibt es ja nicht, das ist nur Sitte oder auf Umwegen der Moral und Hygiene begründbar (897) -

and since their new life is not to be bounded by extrinsic laws, only such an inner command would determine their conduct. Ulrich still believes that his attitude to his sister cannot be the same as to any other woman, but his reaction to her presence belies this:

> Aber dann hörte er, wo früher Stille war, minutenlang ihre Stimme, und wie war ihre Stimme? Wellen von Duft begleiteten die Bewegung ihrer Kleider, und wie war dieser Geruch? ... Das einzige, was man davon sagen konnte, war: es sei da. Es war da, wo zuvor nichts gewesen war. (897)

Agathe, who follows the inclinations of her emotions rather than reflecting on them as Ulrich does, is deeply disappointed each time their moments of deep intimacy break off with their hesitancy to fulfil their inclinations, and feels

> daß es das richtigste gewesen wäre, einfach der Liebe nachzugeben und auf der schwindlichten Himmelsleiter, die sie hinanstiegen, der überforderten Natur eine Ruhestufe einzuräumen. (1o63) 26)

- the action itself is not as important as the fact that resisting it may be an obstacle to their achievement of the mystic union of the 'andere Zustand'. The close link between their relationship and their quest for the mystic state is suggested in the 'Heilige Gespräche', where Ulrich describes the 'anderer Zustand' in terms which closely parallel their situation as 'Siamesische Zwillinge'. He speaks of the "Hermaphroditismus der Urphantasie" (754); and describes the whole of reality, in this state, as being "geschwisterlich untereinander verbunden" (762). This paradoxical self-realization through union with the whole of reality - "Man verliert sich und kommt mit einemmal zu sich" (761) - parallels the self-fulfilment they can find only in their union with one another.[27] They momentarily achieve this state of ecstasy on one occasion (1o82), and it seems that their actual physical union will inevitably follow in an attempt to recapture and extend this moment of 'Entrückung'. Despite the fact that they stop short of this action, this episode is decisive, as it establishes that "jedes Verbot ihnen nun gleichgültig wäre" (1o83). This moment is "das Fragment eines anderen Lebens" (1o87), providing a model for their aspirations. At this point their relationship becomes what Musil terms "ein Versuch des Anarchismus in der Liebe" (1578): just as they have rejected all laws in their discussions on morality, culminating in Agathe's

crime, they now feel themselves no longer bound by any existing taboos in personal relationships. This further offence against society's code puts them outside their society and reinforces their 'autistic' withdrawal.

Their anti-social behaviour is to some extent balanced by the possibility Ulrich envisages of their new mode of existence becoming universal, when he conjectures that the union he and Agathe have experienced could unite all mankind:[28)]

> "Vielleicht ist der Inhalt des Tausendjährigen Reiches nichts als das Anschwellen dieser Kraft, die sich anfänglich nur zu zweien zeigt, bis zu einer brausenden Gemeinschaft aller?" (878 f)

Although this idea is rejected as slightly ridiculous, and quite out of keeping with the admitted asocial element in their relationship, they do experience moments of union with their fellow man.

> Das Geheime und Unbestimmte, das sie selbst verband ... sonderte sie von den anderen Menschen ab; aber die gleiche Leidenschaft, die sie dauernd fühlten, weil sie sich nicht sowohl an einem Verbot gebrochen hatte als vielmehr an einer Verheißung, hatte sie auch in einem Zustand zurückgelassen, der Ähnlichkeit mit den schwülen Unterbrechungen einer körperlichen Vereinigung besaß. Die Lust ohne Ausweg sank wieder in den Körper zurück und erfüllte ihn mit einer Zärtlichkeit, die so unbestimmt war wie ein später Herbsttag oder ein früher Frühlingstag. Und wenn sie auch gewiß nicht für jeden Menschen und alle Welt ebenso empfanden wie für einander, so spürten sie doch den schönen Schatten des "Wie es wäre" davon auf ihr Herz fallen.(1o96)

i.e. the forbidden relationship which cuts them off from society at the same time provides the possibility of reunion with it. They experience moments when this 'Gemeinschaft' seems near, moments when everything they see is "von etwas

übergossen, daß mit Liebe Verwandtschaft hatte" (1125), but Ulrich remains sceptical.

> Aber zu glauben, nun sei wirklich das Reich der Liebe da, ... das wäre doch wohl ebenso schwer wie sich einzubilden, daß in solchem Augenblick kein Hund beißen und kein Mensch Böses tun könne! (ibid.) 29)

Nevertheless, they are convinced that their feeling is not an illusion, even though the "Menschenbrüderschaft" of the "Reich der Liebe" (1127) is achieved only fleetingly and "schattenhaft" (ibid.). In the end, it is the impossibility of extending this personally valid experience in time and space which dooms their utopia to failure - stressed by the approach of war in the world they have cut themselves off from. Their new truth remains "eine geheime für Liebende" (1127), and only for these two specific lovers. The forbidden relationship which culminates their withdrawal from society loses its justification if it cannot be related back to that society: their private utopia cannot be brought to bear on the destructive forces which dominate the world around them, but can exist only in isolation.

The negation of society's values which is embodied in the criminal motif is not intended as an end in itself, but must lead to the possibility of 'Utopia' if it is to fulfil its function. Ulrich and Agathe's 'crimes' take them a long way towards this goal, but ultimately end in failure. However, this does not necessarily mean that their behaviour must be seen negatively: it does lead them to the most real and va-

lid experiences depicted in the novel: they do achieve their aims of "Nichts der Seele Gleichgültiges tun wollen", of a life of 'Steigen', in contrast to the purposeless activity leading to catastrophe which characterizes society as it is presented in the novel.

That the 'Testamentsfälschung' has fulfilled a useful function in allowing Ulrich and Agathe to achieve glimpses of a new life is indicated by Ulrich's reaction to Hagauer's threatening persistence in the question of the will. His letters make it seem inevitable that they will have to confess the forgery and retract their crime, but Ulrich is not worried by this:

> Es ließ sich im Feuer der Güte leben auch ohne Brandstiftung, und der verbrecherische Kunstgriff, den sie am Vermächtnis ihres Vaters vorgenommen hatte, war längst überflüssig geworden. (1362)

The crime was a necessary preliminary step of separation from superficial acquiescence in the laws of 'Seinesgleichen geschieht'. Ulrich's reasoning as he tries to determine the motive for Agathe's insistence on forging the will firmly establishes the connection between it and the satirical intent of the novel:

> "Das Gute ist beinahe schon seiner Natur nach Gemeinplatz, das Böse bleibt Kritik! Das Unmoralische gewinnt sein himmlisches Recht als eine drastische Kritik des Moralischen! Es zeigt uns, daß das Leben auch anders geht. Es straft Lügen ... Es beweist, daß an der Bewertung unseres Tuns etwas nicht stimmt." (959)

Ulrich's judgement is underlined by Agathe's reaction to the 'Parallelaktion' when she first encounters it after joining Ulrich:

"Ich finde, es spricht sehr für mich, daß ich nicht hierher gehöre, sondern ins Zuchthaus" (1o22)

In the account of this meeting of the 'Parallelaktion' there are many indications that the society it represents is about to plunge into war,[3o] and this adds weight to Agathe's lighthearted remark. This episode concludes with Ulrich's definitive break with the 'Parallelaktion', and the novel continues with Ulrich and Agathe's "Reise an den Rand des Möglichen" (761): as the society they thus exclude themselves from is depicted in a completely negative light, their breakaway must be seen as a positive step. Ulrich's misgivings that they are "moralisch schwachsinnig" (961) and antisocial are outweighed by Musil's satire in these chapters of a society which is completely lacking in moral purpose. By rejecting such a society, Ulrich and Agathe reject its moral weakness, and are, although legally criminals, the only genuine moralists of that society.

CHAPTER THREE

Crime and the criminal in Canetti's Die Blendung.

The private world.

In Die Blendung references to crime or criminals occur frequently, largely within the minds of the individual characters, in the form of their private plans, or their judgements on others. The position of references to crime in the thoughts or conversations of the characters functions as a symptom of the philosophy and values of those characters, and through them of the society they represent.
The latter half of the novel is set in the underworld of petty criminals, and here crime naturally dominates, on the level of action as well as on the secondary level of more abstract references[1]. But even in the first section of the novel, set in Kien's household largely shut off from the outside world, crime in various forms is prominent in the thoughts of the two protagonists, Kien and Therese, although restricted to fears, suspicion, accusations and guilt.

The relationship between Kien and his housekeeper/wife is one based on contracts and rights, petty punishments and revenge, with frequent threats of recourse to law. At its extreme, this mutual suspicion leads each to imagine the other as a murderer. In an early episode Therese's rigid standards of respectability equate infringements of her behaviour code - such as the fact that Kien does not go to

bed before midnight, or that he does not work during the period from 6:15 to 7 which he spends locked in his library each morning - with criminal leanings. The unexplained 3/4 hour in Kien's daily routine suggests to Therese that he must be a murderer, or at least a drug peddlar:

> Sie vermutete ein Laster; was für eins blieb unentschieden. Erst schwebte ihr eine Frauenleiche im Koffer vor. Da unter den Teppichen zu wenig Platz für sie war, gab sie die gräßlich Verstümmelte auf. Kein Schrank half aus, wie hätt' sie sich welche gewünscht: an jeder Wand einen. So steckte das Verbrechen sicher hinter einem Buch.(24)
> Es gibt Opium, es gibt Morphium, es gibt Kokain, wer kann sich das alles merken? ... Hinter den Büchern steckt es..Den Mörder zieht es an die Mordstelle. (28)

Even after observation satisfies Therese that Kien's activities are not criminal but insane, the suspicion remains latent, to come to the surface again later. Kien entertains similar suspicions about Therese. When he imagines that she has been murdered by a burglar, for example, he justifies his delight with the excuse that she had intended the same fate for him anyway:

> Sie hätte ihn in ihren Rock verwickelt und erstickt... Sie hat so etwas mit ihm vorgehabt, sicher, sie wollte ihn ermorden. Jede Frau will ihren Mann ermorden. Sie hat auf das Testament gewartet. Hätte er eins gemacht, er läge statt ihrer tot da. (132 f)

Such suspicions serve as an indicator, not of the nature of the character under suspicion, but of the one who makes the accusation, and of the relationship that exists between them. The situation is the same as that between two nations at the outbreak of war, as Canetti analysed it in Masse und Macht.

> Man beschließt, daß man mit physischer Vernichtung bedroht ist, und verkündet diese Bedrohung öffentlich vor aller Welt. "Ich kann getötet werden", erklärt man, und leise denkt man dazu: "weil ich den oder jenen töten will." Der Ton müßte in Wahrheit auf dem Nachsatz liegen: "Ich will den oder jenen töten, darum kann ich selber getötet werden." ... Ob man in Wirklichkeit selber der Angreifer ist oder nicht, immer wird man die Fiktion zu schaffen suchen, daß man bedroht wird. (M. 78)

The individual feels threatened, therefore, because he imputes his aggressive impulses to others and expects them to act accordingly. Human relationships within the novel are thus, through the example of the underlying feelings in what should be the closest personal links, reduced to a state of permanent mutual aggression and self-defence.

Kien's obsession with his work as "der wohl größte Sinologe seiner Zeit" (237) gives rise to complementary obsessive fears, such as his fear of fire, and of the possibility that his library may be broken into and his books stolen. The obsession with 'Einbrecher'[2] comes to the fore whenever anything at all untoward happens: when Kien and Therese return home after their wedding, he immediately suspects burglars when he hears a key turning in the lock of the front door, only to find the door being opened by his wife, who of course has her own key - and whose later actions justify such a designation of her anyway. A random street incident is interpreted in the same way: Kien sees a girl throw a key from a window to a man waiting below, and he immediately thinks of a burglary conspiracy -

> "Was macht er mit dem Schlüssel, ein Einbrecher, das Dienstmädchen wirft ihm den Schlüssel zu, seine Geliebte" (1o6 f)

This motif reaches its absurd climax in a train of thought - and subsequent events - unleashed by him finding someone in his bed when he comes home one night and prepares for bed without switching on the light. Instead of assuming that the person must be his wife, Kien imagines it to be a burglar, and weaves an elaborate fantasy about the burglar having murdered Therese - before Therese awakens, and makes it very clear who the imagined thief and murderer is.

> Da spürte Kien etwas ungewohnt Weiches, dachte "Ein Einbrecher!" ... Den Vorschlag, sich zu wehren, der in einer entlegenen Mördergrube seines Herzens gemacht wurde, lehnte er ab. Sollte die Einbrecherin ... wirklich schlafen, so wird er sich nach einer längeren Probezeit heimlich davonschleichen ... Er wird den (Hausbesorger) nicht gleich herausholen; er wird lange, lange warten ... Inzwischen hat seine Einbrecherin Therese ermordet. Sie muß sie ermorden, weil Therese sich wehren wird. Therese läßt sich nicht berauben, ohne sich zu wehren. Sie <u>ist</u> schon ermordet ... (132)

The train of illogical and absurd conclusions, leading from the first interpretation of "etwas ... Weiches" in terms of his strongest fear, through the rationalization of his cowardice - in his decision that the urge to defend himself is murderous ('Mördergrube seines Herzens') - to the conviction that his greatest wish, Therese's death, has been fulfilled, reveals Kien's perception of events as determined by his fears and hopes[3]. And these fixed ideas reveal his relationship with the world as the constant expectation of criminal attack, welcomed in as far as it concerns Therese, abhorred when it involves - as it does only in his imagination -

the only thing in his life which has meaning for him, his library.

This same suspicion, of threat to his books, pervades his relationship with Therese too. At first he alternates between trust and fear. When he is made aware of Therese's interest in books, he lends her a tattered and unimportant novel, but almost immediately regrets his generous impulse:

> Oder spielte sie ihm nur eine Komödie vor? Vielleicht schmeichelte sie sich ein, um ihn in Sicherheit zu wiegen ... Vielleicht bereitete sie einen großen Diebstahl vor. Man müßte wissen, was sie treibt, wenn sie mit dem Buch allein ist. (37)

When he discovers her treating the book with even more care than he has ever lavished on his library, he decides that she would be the perfect guardian for his books, and marries her for this reason: his marriage is thus based on the fear of fire or thieves, and the impression that his housekeeper will provide protection against these threats. The old suspicions soon re-emerge, however, especially when Therese insists on taking over all the rooms of their apartment, except for his study -

> Er beschloß, einmal im Monat den Bestand der Bücher in ihren Räumen zu kontrollieren. Vor Bücherdiebstählen war niemand geschützt.(61)

And as Therese becomes progressively more demanding his relationship becomes more hostile. His reference, in a speech to his books, to Therese as "den Einbruch einer fremden Macht" (77) indicates that his unwitting designation of her as an 'Einbrecher' was in fact correct, according to his new fears.

Kien sees Therese as an enemy waiting for an opportunity for attack, and links her with his nightmare visions of the destruction of masses of books, inspired by reports of the great library burnings ordered by the Emperor of China in 213 B.C. For Kien who personifies books (as well as other things in his library such as his desk and the ladder) and addresses them as living beings, the destruction of books is tantamount to murder, and has more significance in his philosophy than the destruction of human life. He describes the annihilation of China's books as "ein Verbrechen von mythischer Größe" (78) and relates with delight the terrible fate which later befell the instigator of the crime.

> Jedesmal wenn ich bei einem chinesischen Historiker die Geschichte der Bücherverbrennung lese, versäume ich nicht, in sämtlichen vorhandenen Quellen auch das erbauliche Ende des Massenmörders Li-Si nachzuschlagen ... Bevor er nicht zehnmal vor meinen Augen entzweigesägt wurde, konnte ich noch nie Ruhe und Schlaf finden. (79)

The crime of 'Büchermord' weighs so heavily on Kien's mind that no revenge, even the annihilation of Li-Si's whole family, is considered great enough to balance it: the distortion of his value judgements is made clear by the precedence he gives books over even innocent human life. He equates this 'mass murder' with the attacks he fears Therese plans on his library through theft, and declares a state of war between his army of books and their "räuberischen .... Feind" (82).

From this point on, Kien's hatred of Therese grows to become the conviction that she deserves death[4]. Even during the brief period of harmony caused by Kien's misunderstanding of Therese's demand for a will - each believes that the other intends to give him a fortune - Kien can still only judge his marriage to be "ein Verbrechen wider die Natur der Wissenschaft" (1o8), but he does condescend not to charge Therese with this crime. When bitterness at the loss of the new library he had hoped to buy with Therese's fortune is added to the renewed hostilities, Kien's hatred is so intense that he feels completely justified in wanting to kill Therese, as his fantasy about the 'Einbrecherin' who has murdered Therese reveals. His pleasure at the thought that she has been killed yields to dismay that he has been cheated of carrying it out himself:

> Wenn sie lebt, so schlägt er sie zu Brei. Das ist sein gutes Recht. Sie hat ihn um die neue Bibliothek gebracht. Er hätte sich an ihr gerächt. Da kommt jemand und ermordet sie. Der erste Stein hätte ihm gebührt. Den hat man ihm geraubt. Er wirft den letzten Stein auf sie. Er muß sie schlagen. (133)

The imagined murder of Therese is no crime per se in Kien's mind, but becomes one when he feels robbed of his right to revenge by committing the crime himself. His urge to annihilate her even after her death - "Unter seinem Namen wird sie nicht begraben" (ibid.) - stems from his feeling that he must cover up the guilt incurred against learning by his marriage:

> Diese Ehe könnte seinem Rufe schaden. Ein echter Gelehrter leistet sich keinen solchen Fehltritt.(ibid.)

In Kien's scale of values, his ability to continue his work and maintain his respected position outranks any other consideration, so that the crime of betraying 'Wissenschaft' outweights murder. He is, however, not totally unscrupulous: when he decides, according to his own twisted logic combined with his sexual repressions, that he has committed 'Leichenschändung' (134), he is so conscious of his guilt that he allows Therese to punish him with a merciless beating. Kien does not reject law and morality, but simply subordinates them to his goals: he can contemplate murder only because his thinking is so controlled by his scientific concerns that he cannot envisage anything taking priority over his private world of books and research and his need to defend it against outside attack with any available means.

The same frame of mind governs Kien's reaction when he is told by one of Fischerle's accomplices that his wife is dead. He immediately assumes that she has died of starvation after being imprisoned in the apartment by his departure, and assumes some of the blame for her death because of his imagined role in cutting off her access to food. However, there is no trace of remorse in his confession of complicity, but an impassioned defence of his actions instead. He claims that his treatment of his wife was justified because her illiteracy negates any rights she may have as a human being:

> "Sie war eine Analphabetin" ... Kien behauptete lächelnd, daß dieses Schicksal allen Analphabeten drohte, sie verdienten es auch alle, keine hätte es sosehr verdient

> wie seine Frau".(231)
> "Sie hat diesen Tod verdient. Ich weiß noch heute nicht bestimmt, ob sie geläufig lesen und schreiben konnte." (233)

Kien is so convinced of Therese's death that he prepares a defence speech for his murder trial, based on the importance of his work and on the culpability of his victim:

> Er war an Theresens Tod mitschuldig. Sie trug die Hauptschuld, aber er hatte sie eingesperrt. ... Er hatte sie zum Tod verurteilt, der Hunger und ihre Gier hatten dieses Urteil an ihr vollstreckt. Er nahm kein Jota von seiner Tat zurück. Er war bereit, vor Gericht für sie einzustehen. Sein Prozeß mußte mit einem überwältigenden Freispruch enden. (236)

Kien thus reverses the - imagined - situation to make Therese the criminal and himself simply her judge, the representative of justice, rather than a murderer. Therese's culpability in his eyes consists in her inferiority in the field of learning and her hindrance of his work, which combine to make her death not only insignificant, but a public duty.

> Auf keinen Fall ging es an, daß der wohl größte Sinologe der Zeit wegen eines inferioren Weibes bestraft wurde, eines Weibes, von dem sich nicht einmal mit Sicherheit aussagen ließ, ob sie fließend lesen und schreiben konnte. Die Wissenschaft erforderte ihren Tod. Sie erforderte auch seine völlige Freisprache und Rehabilitierung. Gelehrte seinesgleichen lassen sich an den Fingern abzählen. Frauen gibt es leider zu Millionen. (237)

Through his sense of his personal superiority and his corresponding assumption that his interests must prevail, even to the point of causing the death of another, Kien usurps for himself the power, normally reserved for the representatives of the law or the governement, to control the life and death of others according to his own private needs.

Significantly, Kien feels no need to repay society for the loss of one of its members[5], but does consider it will be necessary to make recompense for the time spent in defending himself against the expected murder charge.

> Allerdings bedauerte er unendlich, so viel philologische Akribie auf einen bloßen Mord verwenden zu müssen. Er handelte unter höherem Zwang und versprach der Welt reichlichen Ersatz in den Leistungen seiner nächsten Zukunft. An seiner Arbeit habe ihn eben jene verhindert, deren Fall hier zur Diskussion stehe. (237 f)

In his suddenly acquired feeling of confidence in his dealings with the outside world, paradoxically gained precisely at the moment which he feels his position to be more open to question than at any other time, Kien conforms to Canetti's image of the survivor in the aggressive sense in which he uses this term[6]. The death of his enemy increases the strength of the survivor proportionately more than the level of benefit gained by removing the enemy's hindrance. As Canetti explains it in Masse und Macht:

> Die niedrigste Form des Überlebens ist die des Tötens. So wie man das Tier getötet hat, von dem man sich nährt ... so will man auch den Menschen töten, der einem im Wege ist, der sich einem entgegengestellt... Man will ihn fällen, um zu fühlen, daß man noch da ist und er nicht mehr ... Nun kann man mit ihm tun, was man will, und er kann einem gar nichts mehr anhaben ... Dieser Augenblick der Konfrontation mit dem Getöteten erfüllt den Überlebenden mit einer ganz eigentümlichen Art von Kraft, die keiner anderen Art von Kraft zu vergleichen ist. (M. 259)

Accordingly, Kien turns his confrontation with his victim - in thought - into his moment of triumph before the whole world:

> Aus Kiens Verteidigungsrede wurde eine lückenlose Anklage gegen Therese. Nachträglich vernichtete er sie zum zweitenmal. (237)

He feels himself raised to a new height of self-assurance, power and influence -

> "Die Welt wird aufhorchen! Ich gedenke schonungslos zu enthüllen, was ich weiß. Noch hat ein Gelehrter was zu sagen!" Seit dem Tod seiner Frau war Kiens Sprache kühner geworden und selbst die Schwierigkeiten, die ihm bevorstanden, reizten seine Kampflust nur zu neuen Taten. (238)

The ultra-civilized man of learning thus reveals himself to be ruled by the same impulses as the primitive hunter or warrior.

From this point the novel is dominated by Kien's obsession with his fantasy of his wife's death, and - after his arrest, arraignment and eventual release - with his feeling of unjust persecution by the police. The obsession develops into the mania which finally drives him to destroy himself and his library by fire. Kien's psychiatrist-brother's attempts to discover the roots of Kien's madness call forth lengthy recitals of historical instances of famous women who have committed wrongs against their husbands and have thus proved that all women are worthless and evil. Although he admits his imagined crime-"...vielleicht bin ich ein Verbrecher. Nach strenger Moral bin ich es" (389) - he again insists that he has only rid himself of something worthless, quite justifiably:

> "Der Tod trennt Ehen. Soll mir weniger erlaubt sein als dem Tod?" (ibid.)

Again he proves his point by quoting historic murder cases.

> Er bewies eine erstaunliche Kenntnis historischer Mordprozesse. Mit Feuer verteidigte er das Recht des Mannes auf Beseitigung seiner Frau. Seine Rede ging in die eines Verteidigers über, der vor Gericht erklärt, warum sein Klient die dämonische Frau ermorden mußte ... Dann plädierte er für die Mörder weniger begabter Frauen. (4oo)

Georg, however, reacts only with contempt at the banality of Kien's obsession, and by underestimating its depth, abandons Kien to his self-destruction, unwittingly forecasting his brother's fate as he accuses him of not taking his own obsession seriously enough.

> Der kühnste Gedanke, zu dem ein Philologe sich aufschwingt, ist der eines Mordes an seiner Frau... Wenn er den Mord noch ausführte, wenn er die Hand gegen sie erhöbe und nicht im letzten Augenblick zurückzuckte, wenn er an seinem Verbrechen zugrunde ginge; Konjekturen, Manuskripte und Bibliothek, alles, was in sein mageres Herz hineingeht seiner Rache opferte - dann Ehre seinem Andenken! (4o1)

Georg's mistake here results from the telegram for help which he believes was sent by his brother, and from his failure to realize - since he has seen Therese alive - that as far as Kien is concerned he has murdered her. His error condemns Kien to the "honorable" death he considers him incapable of.

In the chain of obsessive associations which lead directly to Kien's suicide, the thought of the murder he imagines he has committed plays an essential role[7]. At this stage he feels persecuted on all sides: an old newspaper seems to tell the story of his murder -

> so las er die Zeitung bei Sternenlicht aus. Als erstes nahm er aus: ein großes M. Von Mord war also die Rede. Gleich dahinter kam wirklich ein O. Diese Überschrift, fett und schwarz, füllte ein Sechstel des Blattes aus. So bauschte man seine Tat auf! (409) -

and to demand the consequence of fire -

> Die zweite Überschrift begann mit einem Brand gleich danach kam ein R: Brand. Mord und Brand verheert die Blätter, das Land und die Köpfe ... folgt auf den Mord kein Brand, so fehlt ihnen was am Behagen, am liebsten würden sie ihn selber legen, zum Morden fehlt ihnen der Mut. (410)

Remembering the warnings of Fischerle at the Theresianum, he imagines the police coming in force to arrest him and to defend himself against them, tries to burn the red stripes from the carpet because "Die Polizei hält sie für Blut" (412). The colour red recurs constantly in his thoughts at this time, representing all the obsessions which drive him to suicide: the blood of murder and death; the threat of his persecutor Pfaff (the 'rote Kater'); and fire, the arch-enemy of his books and the means of punishment for crime, but now an aid to covering up the 'evidence' which might cause detection and conviction. The combined force of all these manias culminates in the fire which causes his death.

Kien's judgements of right and wrong, with the priority of his work as the only absolute to be maintained at any cost, reveal the complete solipsism of the individual in a world governed only by the laws he himself chooses to acknowledge; surrounded by similar worlds which also obey only their own laws; and helpless once outside forces have penetrated his de-

fences, because the obsessions which rule his private domain make no allowances for the demands of a reality which refuses to conform and thus makes their rules invalid.[8)]

The same situation applies to all other characters in the novel, though the goals determining their value-judgements differ widely from each other.

Therese's all-consuming interest is in material possessions. Like Kien, she is prepared to consider committing any crime, even murder, to further her goals. A young salesman, envisaging an opportunity to become rich by marrying a wealthy widow, hints, to Therese, at the possibility of poisoning her husband - "Wie leicht ist ein Mensch vergiftet" (86). Therese rejects the suggestion instantly, but only because it would probably result in her imprisonment and that would not be respectable:

> Manchmal kommt es doch heraus und dann wird man eingesperrt. Einsperren gehört sich nicht für eine anständige Frau. (87)

Like Kien, she is indignant that anyone should consider such an act worthy of imprisonment, and resents the intrusion of the police as unwarranted:

> Es wär Vieles schöner, wenn man nicht gleich eingesperrt würde. Man darf sich nicht rühren. Kaum kommt was heraus, schon ist die Polizei da und sperrt einen ein ... Die müssen in alles ihre Nasen hereinstecken. Was geht die das an, wie eine Frau mit ihrem Mann lebt? (ibid.)

Her evaluation of her husband reciprocates Kien's judgement of her, again indicating complete disregard of the humanity

of the other:

> Das ist ja kein Mann. Um so einen Mann ist es nicht schad'. (ibid.)

Moral outrage at the thought of committing murder for money is out of the question, and although Therese considers it not quite respectable, she would be happy for someone else to commit the crime for her:

> Am besten wär's noch, der Geliebte nähm eine Hacke und gäb' ihm damit eine über den Kopf wenn er schläft... Sie tut das nicht. Sie ist eine anständige Frau. (ibid.)

The prospective lover/murderer naturally retreats immediately and the plot comes to naught, but the idea remains in Therese's thoughts. Like Kien in similar circumstances, she is so dominated by the thought of killing him that when on one occasion she finds Kien unconscious in his library, she immediately assumes that he is dead and prepares her defence against police accusation.

> Sie wollte sagen, der interessante Mensch hat mir zugeredet, aber ich hab' mich gewehrt. Auf einmal hat man Scherereien mit der Polizei. Da fiel ihr ein, daß der Hausbesorger selbst zur Polizei gehörte. Der weiß alles. Gleich wird er sagen: Vergiften darf nicht sein. Warum haben Sie das getan? ... Sie ist auf nichts eingegangen, auch aufs Vergiften nicht... Kann sie denn was dafür, daß der Mann tot ist? (92)

The feeling that others must be aware of her guilty secret wishes indicates her continued pre-occupation with the idea of killing Kien, though she has rejected it on practical grounds. When she tries to persuade Kien to make a will in her favour the same preoccupation and its accompanying feeling that her guilt has been discovered is revealed again in her comment, "Wer denkt ans Vergiften?" (1o4)

Her value system, which puts her own wealth above any other consideration, allows her to see murder as justifiable, but Kien's withholding of a will as criminal. She accuses Kien of theft when he - according to her interpretation of their negotiations - insists on retaining a million Schilling of the legacy she expects to get from him. When the situation is clarified and it is obvious that she cannot expect any money from him, she equates him with Judas:

> "Verführer gehören aufgehängt. Erst verspricht man man die Ehe, dann macht man kein Testament... Hab' ich vielleicht was verbrochen? Der Judas ist ein Verbrecher". (13o)

Her conviction that his money, in the form of his bankbook, is her rightful property, and that he is completely unscrupulous, culminates in her suspicion that he is planning "das Schlimmste, selbst Diebstahl an ihrem Bankbuch" (144); she therefore throws him out of his own house with the accusation "Säufer - Verbrecher - Dieb!" (146) and the accompanying threat:

> "Ich mach' die Anzeige! Diebe werden eingesperrt! Die Polizei wird es finden! Diebe werden eingesperrt!" (ibid.)

From this point on Therese refers to her husband only as 'der Dieb', even before discovering that he has taken his bankbook with him, and although his departure has left her in possession of his only assets, the apartment and his books: the loss of the non-existent but hoped-for legacy outweighs everything in her mind, to the extent that she condemns Kien as criminal for not giving her something he has never possessed

anyway. Death is the only punishment she regards appropriate for such a crime, as she reveals in her dream of her ideal world:

> Diebe brachten gestohlenes Gut zurück und hängten sich auf, dann ließen sie sich begraben. (247)

Therese does recognise the validity of society's laws against theft, even to the extent of feeling guilty when Kien discovers her pawning his books. As with the idea of killing Kien, only the thought of punishment and its concomitant loss of respectability and property can arouse any qualms of conscience. But her recognition of the law does not extend as far as allowing her to judge correctly her own actual guilt (in stealing Kien's books) in comparison with the crime she imagines Kien has committed, by withdrawing his own money from this own bank account. In her charge against Kien, when she accuses him of theft in their Theresianum confrontation, the private value system becomes identified with the public legal system. Because Kien is a thief in Therese's opinion, she expects the police to act accordingly, although throughout the long farcical interrogation scene she does not even state what Kien has allegedly stolen, let alone bring forward evidence for her charge. Here the law has become merely a function of the individual's value system, ignored when it would hinder the advancement of the individual's goals, invoked when it seems that it may help towards those goals.[9)]

The grotesque scenes involving Therese's absurd greed-

motivated activities - particularly in the furniture-shop scenes and the Theresianum episode - ridicule the distortion of values which allows her to consider possessions the highest good. Canetti attacks the same passion for property in Aufzeichnungen 1942 - 1948, where he proposes a scheme to eradicate it:

> Man müßte die Menschen durch ein jährliches Fest erziehen, das Bestohlenwerden zu ertragen. Es dürfte nichts geben, auf das die Mysten dieses Festes nicht Hand legen könnten, keine Kostbarkeiten, keinen Gegenstand der allerheiligsten Erinnerung ... Menschen allein, die jüngsten wie die ältesten, wären vor dem Los des Gestohlenwerdens auszunehmen. Vielleicht bekämen sie so etwas von dem Wert zurück, den die Dinge ihnen genommen haben. .. Der Besitz würde viel von seiner Gottähnlichkeit und Ewigkeit verlieren. (A. 13)

The whole system of laws and moral judgements based on the absolute value of possession is here called into question: Canetti's scheme reverses social laws, making theft permissible and fear of theft, if not a crime, at least a moral failing. The object of this hypothetical scheme is not the complete invalidation of laws regarding property - the freedom to steal is only imagined as a yearly ritual, not a permanent state - but a change in values through the demonstration that the right to personal possessions is not absolute and inviolable. Whereas Therese's distorted standards place a higher value on wealth than on human life, Canetti's proposed reversal of normal judgements is intended to work in the opposite direction. The goals Therese, and Kien too, place above all others - wealth, knowledge - are highly valued by society at large: their obsessions are society's values, taken to an ex-

treme where they come into conflict with other values and become anti-social in the sense that they outweigh any other objectively more important social standards, particularly those concerning the worth of human life.

In the first book of the novel Canetti thus establishes the characteristics of a "Kopf ohne Welt": the individual so shut off from the outside world that he virtually constructs for himself an entirely separate reality[10]. The dimensions of this private world are determined by its highest value, and anything which cannot be integrated into that value system is ignored as irrelevant. Accordingly the question of the moral judgements and conduct of the individual is reduced to subservience to the private value system. The individual determines for himself - without reference to society's standards unless they coincide with his demands - what actions are criminal and what punishments they deserve. In the event of a clash between the individual moral system and public standards and laws, the individual assumes that his values are more important and that society must make its judgements conform to his higher considerations[11].

There is no general discussion within the novel of the validity of society's traditional moral judgements. On the other hand, however, the novel satirizes the individual moral systems of Kien and Therese by depicting the grotesque results of these systems. Authorial comment or reflection is

not necessary since the characters condemn themselves through their own thoughts, statements and actions. There is no external - i.e. outside the thinking of the characters themselves - point of reference within the novel by which the morality of the actions can be judged: the possibility of other moral systems is not raised, let alone different moral stands analysed and evaluated. The value systems of the characters in the novel are simply exposed in a completely negative light, not from the point of view of a conventional morality, but solely through the destructiveness implicit in the ruthless solipsism of the individual's moral system.

This impression of Canetti's ethical position as presented in the novel is substantiated by a statement in the Aufzeichnungen 1942 - 1948 of the individual's right to establish his own moral code, but always under the supremacy of human life and rights:

> Man muß sich seine Moral aus einem gefährdeten Leben zusammensuchen ... Man mag zu einem Schluß und Entschluß kommen, der in der üblichen Sprache der anderen furchtbar klingt und doch der einzig richtige ist. Es ist sinnlos, nach dem Leben und der Erfahrung anderer zu leben, die man nicht gekannt hat, die zu einer anderen Zeit, unter anderen Umständen, in andersgearteten Beziehungen gelebt haben. Man muß ein reiches und empfängliches Bewußtsein haben, um zu einer eigenen Moral zu gelangen ... Man muß glauben, daß man die Menschen sehr liebt und immer lieben wird, sonst richtet sich diese Privatmoral gegen die anderen und ist nicht mehr als ein Vorwand für den nackten eigenen Vorteil. (A. 112 f)

Precisely those elements which Canetti here postulates as essential to differentiate a private morality from the ruthless pursuit of personal advantage are the elements most

decisively negated by the value systems which dominate in the novel.

Kien does in fact lay some claim to have the welfare of mankind at heart in his profession and even in his supposed murder of Therese. In his defence speech at the police interrogation, he sets himself up as the hero who has dared to defy the law for the sake of a higher good:

> sie waren unheilbar, einer so feig wie der andere, keiner hätte Therese ermordet, jeder sich von ihr zu Tode quälen lassen.(278)

and

> Ihr Hingang ist nichts Alltägliches ... Er ist die endgültige Erlösung der furchtbar verfolgten Menschheit. (248)

The absurdity of Kien's heroic pretensions is made patent by the situation in which his claims are made. The foe he claims to have destroyed is still alive, and it has not occured to anyone to accuse him of the non-existent crime he is so passionately defending; the incident around which he has invented a fantastic train of events to provide a cause for Therese's falsely-reported death shows him as a coward and weakling being thrown out of his own home, rather than the image he portrays of himself as the merciless captor of evil. The disparity between the salvation he expects to result from his imagined action and its actual consequences is clear: overcoming the threat Therese poses to his work can result at best in a greater number of treatises in Chinese philology, ignored by the great majority of mankind. Even if

Therese could be interpreted symbolically as the incarnation of 'Dummheit', "der Stein am Geiste der Menschheit" (151) (although Kien's pronouncements on the stupidity of his fellowman have already been discredited by the 'Mutstraße' incident),[12] her death would still have value only within the narrow sphere for which the pursuit of knowledge is the only good, i.e. in Kien's private world.

Kien's insistence that the grisly death he has invented for Therese is the just punishment for her lack of intelligence and education highlights the link Canetti sees between the devaluation of the individual's qualities or accomplishments and the conviction that his life is worthless, that he has in fact no right to live. The whole system of judging oneself superior and others inferior, no matter in what kind of field and regardless of how restricted it may be, is analysed in Masse und Macht as intrinsically aggressive and destructive.

> Die Freude am negativen Urteil ist immer unverkennbar. Es ist eine harte und grausame Freude, die sich durch nichts beirren läßt..... Worin besteht diese Lust? Man schiebt etwas von sich weg, in eine Gruppe des Geringeren, wobei vorausgesetzt ist, daß man selbst zu einer Gruppe des Besseren gehört. Man erhöht sich, indem man das andere erniedrigt.... Was immer das Gute ist, es ist da, damit es sich vom Schlechten abhebt. Man selber bestimmt, was zum einen und was zum anderen gehört. Es ist die Macht des Richters, die man sich auf diese Weise zubilligt. (M. 341)

Therese's references to Kien are almost exclusively negative judgements, like the analogy to Judas, the progression "Säufer - Verbrecher - Dieb" (146) and the total devaluation

of "Er ist kein Mann".[13] The most marked instance of the pleasure of condemning others is the virtual competition in derogatory epithets against Kien, between the bull-like Pfaff and the slightly more restrained Therese, who is upset to find herself cheated of the best terms:

> "Aber ich bitt' Sie, das war kein Mann!"
> sagte sie.
> "Eine Hur war das!" brüllte der Geschädigte.
> "Ein Verbrecher! Ein Abgefeimter! Ein Raubmörder!"
> Therese wollte Bettler einwerfen, da war er schon beim Verbrecher. Und als sie ihren Dieb hervorholte, machte sein Raubmörder jede weitere Steigerung unmöglich. Er fluchte überraschend kurz. (25o)

Therese's condemnations often carry the corollary that the types of people designated "gehören aufgehängt" (e.g. 13o); in Kien's defence speeches the link between the verdict of inferiority and the denial of the right to live is even closer. Canetti defines this link as an essential element in every negative judgement.

> Der Mensch hat ein tiefes Bedürfnis danach, alle Leute, die er sich vorstellen kann immer wieder umzugruppieren... Es ist die Neigung zur feindlichen Meutenbildung, die diesem Prozeß zugrunde liegt. Sie muß letzten Endes zur Kriegsmeute führen ... Aber auch wenn sie sich friedlich abspielt, auch wenn sie in ein oder zwei Urteilswerten abgetan erscheint, die Neigung, sie weiterzutreiben, zur aktiven und blutigen Feindschaft zweier Meuten, ist immer im Keime vorhanden... Aus scheinbar friedlichen Urteilen werden dann Todesurteile gegen den Feind. (M. 341 f)

This analysis presents theoretically the situation which dominates the novel. The idea of opposing armies is most clearly present in Kien's mobilisation of his books into an army to defend itself against Therese. But the enmity on the personal

level - always expressed in terms of the law (in the constantly recurring references to others as criminals) and its rights and punishments, or in the name of abstract concepts like 'Wissenschaft' or 'Anständigkeit' - follows the same pattern, to the same conclusion of the death sentence.

Devaluation and negative judgement, therefore, as a form of death sentence express the hostility and hatred of the characters towards one another, as a sublimation of the wish to kill, betrayed also by the other more explicit incidents. Transforming this illegitimate wish via judgement into execution reflects, again, a basic human attitude, according to Masse und Macht, where Canetti explains public participation in executions - even through the medium of newspaper reports - as springing from the desire to kill.

> Der freigegebene Mord springt für alle Morde ein, die man sich versagen muß, für deren Ausführen man schwere Strafen zu befürchten hätte. Ein gefahrloser, erlaubter, empfohlener und mit vielen anderen geteilter Mord ist für den weitaus größten Teil der Menschen unwiderstehlich. Man muß dazu sagen, daß die Todesdrohung, unter der alle Menschen selber stehen und die in mancherlei Verkleidungen immer wirksam ist, ... eine Ablenkung des Todes auf andere zum Bedürfnis macht. (M. 51)

This mechanism is seen at work most graphically in the behaviour of the pack which gathers outside the Theresianum during the row between Therese and Kien. The assumption that the disturbance means a murder has been committed is automatically followed by the assumption that 'der Krüppel', Fischerle, is responsible; this soon develops into the judgement,

> Die Todesstrafe müßte wieder her. Krüppel gehören ausgerottet. Alle Verbrecher seien Krüppel. Nein, alle Krüppel Verbrecher. (292)

This judgement is immediately executed when the pack catches sight of 'die Fischerin', who has come to see if Fischerle is all right -

> Plötzlich schreit jemand dicht neben ihr: "Der Krüppel" und haut sie auf den Buckel... Die Menge fällt über sie her... Die Fischerin stürzt zu Boden... Sie wird furchtbar zugerichtet. Man meint den Buckel und trifft sie überall... An der Echtheit des Buckels ist nicht zu zweifeln. Über ihn entlädt sich die Masse. (294)

Thus negative judgement, usually unfounded, forms the justification for a death sentence and subsequent attack, without scruples or qualms of conscience. It is this process which dominates all relationships in the novel, explaining the apparent illogic of the individual not considering murder wrong, but reacting with extreme hostility and aggression if his personal value-code is transgressed.

The underworld.

In the section of the novel set in the world outside Kien's library, the disregard for laws or traditional moral values is more open, and the inversion of values more obvious: in the petty underworld and its fringe society the crimes are actual, as well as feared or dreamed of.

Kien's values remain the same in his new surroundings. The crime he fears most is still the theft of his books, even

though these are now only imaginary, the library he has stored in his head. His relationship with his new companion, Fischerle, is determined by this fear. In this world he has been thrust into by his expulsion, he feels surrounded by violence: he calls the pub 'Zum idealen Himmel' a 'Mördergrube' (160) and considers himself lucky that Fischerle does not murder him (155); the threatening atmosphere persuades him to accept the ways of his new society so completely that his impulse to resent Fischerle's attentions "erschien ihm als gigantisches Verbrechen" (ibid.). Kien is fascinated by the world he has stumbled on, and although the masses disgust him as much as he had always imagined they would, he does not try to escape their world, but forms a friendship with Fischerle, the epitome of its petty criminal mindlessness.

The bizarre situation of Kien feeling sympathy, a degree of respect and even trust for such a grotesque figure is made possible by Kien's habit of interpreting other people's behaviour according to his own values[15]. In particular he imputes to Fischerle his own evaluation of books and learning as more important than money. Although he notices, when he offers Fischerle a note from his bundle of money, that Fischerle behaves "wie der gierigste Räuber" (166), he explains this away with a train of excuses. Similarly, when the other 'Himmel' customers forcibly demand money from him, after his donation to Fischerle, he thinks only of saving his library, and it does not occur to him that they are more interested in

money than books. This type of misinterpretation enables Kien to come to a form of understanding with his fellow man, one which satisfies him although it diverges widely from the real situation. He thus grows to trust Fischerle - although he makes sure that he is always literally within reach while carrying his books, because even

> Die charaktervollsten Gefährten seien um Bücher willen schon zu Verbrechern geworden. (185)

Fischerle's treatment of Kien's 'books', which do not interest him at all, is so careful as to be above suspicion, while his schemes to rob Kien go unnoticed because of Kien's complete indifference to his money: Kien therefore has no grounds for feeling threatened by his new companion.

Fischerle misunderstands Kien in exactly the same way, expecting him to be dominated by the craving for wealth as much as he is himself. Fischerle is Therese's exact counterpart in the "kopflose Welt", possessed by the same greed and directing all efforts towards obtaining Kien's money. He aims at achieving fame and power - which Therese imagines as resulting from her beauty - through his ability at chess. The close parallel between these two characters leads to the only instance of genuine understanding between two individuals in the novel, although they never really meet: Kien's reports of her greed and stupidity and her wish to kill him evoke from Fischerle the opinion that she is "eine tüchtige Frau" (233) -

> An ihre Verrücktheit glaubte er nicht, alle Einzelheiten, die Kien von ihr erzählte, waren total in Ordnung. (ibid.)

Like Therese, Fischerle sees the whole relationship between himself and Kien as a struggle over the possession of Kien's money. Kien remains unaware of this struggle because he could never imagine the possibility of such a greed-dominated way of thinking. But Fischerle, the alert and practical thief who lives by his wits, is just as blind to the reality of others as Kien, the ivory-tower intellectual. Fischerle's consistent misjudgement of Kiens actions stamps his criminal way of life as an absolute and unquestioningly accepted value-system which in his world is the norm rather than the illegal exception. Accordingly, his first impression of Kien's first attempt to redeem books destined for the pawn-broker is that Kien is stealing them - "Die Kühnheit eines Raubs auf offener Treppe imponierte ihm" (19o). Fischerle's inversion of society's laws is evident in his reaction when he discovers that Kien has paid for the books:

> "Ein Verbrechen ist das! Schämen Sie sich, so ein großer Mensch" (ibid.)

- he approves of Kien's action as robbery, but considers it reprehensible as a legal transaction. Judged according to this system, Kein's book-saving mission becomes a confidence trick disguised with a pretence of insanity by "der kühnste Schwindler der Welt" (217), "ein Weltmeister der Hochstapelei" (ibid.). This is the only explanation which makes sense in Fischerle's logic, dependent as it is on the absolute value

of wealth. His suspicion that Kien is out-witting him to retrieve his reward money makes Fischerle's own fraudulent scheme, to his mind, justifiable self-defence.

> Während des organisierten Betrugs an der Buchbranche war sich Fischerle jeden Augenblick dessen bewußt, daß es gegen einen Feind ging, der ihn noch gestern um alles zu prellen versucht hatte. Natürlich wehrt sich ein Mensch seiner Haut. Gegen einen Mörder wird man selbst zum Mörder. Gegen einen Gauner erniedrigt man sich auch zum Gauner. (210)

Any possible means of achieving his goal is justified, since judged by his own standards everyone else, sharing the same goals, must necessarily be a dangerous rival, an enemy.

Fischerle's assumptions, though false in this instance, are justified by the society he lives in. Each character in this section of the novel subscribes to a limited value system in which money is a major factor - as the means towards the goal - and petty crime the method of obtaining it. The values of the 'Himmel' customers are demonstrated in the brief scene following Kien's gift to Fischerle: every customer becomes involved in a vicious brawl in the attempt to rob Kien of his money and prevent his companions from getting it. The struggle of each individual against all others which dominates "Kopf ohne Welt", but is never acknowledged, is quite overt in the milieu of "Kopflose Welt". Fischerle's plea to Kien for patronage is prompted by this struggle:

> "Mit dem Idealen Himmel ist es aus. Glauben Sie, ich kann da wieder rein? Die finden das viele Geld bei mir und schlagen mich tot. Weil, wo hat Fischerle das Geld her? ... Sag' ich, von der Buchbranche, no da schlagen sie mich kaputt und stehlen dem kaputten Fischerle das

> Geld aus der Tasch'n. Sag' ich nichts, danehmen sie es dem Fischerle weg, derweil er noch lebt. Sie verstehn mich, bleibt Fischerle am Leben, so hat er nix mehr zum Leben, und ist er tot, so ist er eh tot." (168 f)

This argument is a useful excuse to help him extort more money from Kien, but the fears expressed are confirmed by the depiction of his colleagues. Honesty and legality, as represented by the 'Kanalräumer', are the exception rather than the rule in Fischerle's world. His wife is a prostitute, highly respected because she has a regular customer; his 'employees' include a beggar who feigns blindness to ensure sympathetic giving, but bitterly resents the same kind of swindle practised on him by people who give him buttons instead of money; and a salesman who earns his living legally but participates in Fischerle's fraudulent scheme because he is sure it involves drug-smuggling which will help him solve his great problem, insomnia. More serious crime is represented by the clientele of 'Zum Pavian', where Fischerle gets his forged passport for his trip to America.

> Hier war jeder vorbestraft ... Wer kam schon her? Paßfälscher, Obdachlose, Abgeschobene, Steckbriefliche, schlechtere Juden und außerdem gefährliches Gesindel. In den Himmel kam manchmal auch Polizei, hierher getrauten sie sich nicht. Zur Verhaftung eines Raubmörders, der sich bei der Pavianwirtin sicher fühlte, wurden genau acht Detektive aufgeboten. So ging es da zu. Ein gewöhnlicher Zuhälter war seines Lebens nicht sicher. Nur Schwerverbrechern brachte man Respekt entgegen (301).

Their values are basically the same as Fischerle's friends, i.e. possessions:

> Alle Männer sangen ... jeder sang, was er sich für sein Leben gern wünschte. "Haupttreffer", brummte einer und der andere stöhnte "Schatz". "Einen Goldklumpen groß wie

ein Kindskopf", das wollte der dritte und der vierte eine endlose Türkenpfeife. (3o7)

The 'Paßkoch', however, deviates from this pattern to form a close parallel to Kien, occupying the same kind of position in the underworld as Kien does in the field of learning. His main concern is not wealth but pride in his accomplishment as the best forger in the world and the position he therefore claims as a great artist. His devotion to the abstract ideal of his art and its far-reaching importance, and the spread of his reputation throughout the world, outweigh financial considerations to the extent that he, like Kien, works without accepting payment. His value system functions in the same way as Kien's, although the dominant value is different. The equation of the high-minded man of learning with the equally dedicated forger reduces Kien's professional pride to the same level as that of a common criminal; and provides another parallel between the underworld and conventional society, which operates in the same way but preserves an appearance of legality and respectability.

The forces of law.

Therese and Kien do not come into open conflict with the law or its enforcers apart from the Theresianum interrogation. This incident is so completely dominated by mutual misunderstanding that the charges (of theft, against Kien) and the prisoner's defence (of his murder of Therese) are not

only unrelated, but both concern non-existent crimes; while the one real crime - Therese's and Pfaff's theft of Kien's books - is ignored.

For Fischerle, however, life consists largely of a battle gainst the police. Police intervention and the fear of being imprisoned are the only factors which deter Fischerle from his criminal activities, although they do not go any further than making him hesitant and extremely cautious as he continues to carry out his profession. Like Kien and Therese, he considers his actions justified by their necessity for the achievement of his dream to become world chess champion. The particular crime of defrauding Kien seems even more justified because he believes that the money "gehört doch sowieso alles ihm" (173) because he has rescued it from the mob im 'Himmel'. He is therefore doubly bitter at potential police interference:

> Die Polizei ist überflüssig. Er verzichtet auf ihre Einmischung. (ibid.)

The police represent for Fischerle a constant source of persecution, the only obstacle to his life of crime:

> Er hat schon eine Weile nichts mehr gestohlen, weil es in seiner Umgebung nichts zu stehlen gibt. Auf weitere Ausflüge läßt er sich nicht ein, weil die Polizei ein scharfes Aug' auf ihn hat. Er ist so leicht zu identifizieren. Da kennt der polizeiliche Feuereifer keine Grenzen. (173)

> Auf offener Straße pflegte man ihn auch ohne Verbrechen anzuhalten. (262)

His persecution complex derives largely from this awareness of himself as an outsider, because he is a cripple, and be-

cause he is a Jew -

> Er glaubte an nichts, nur daran, daß "Jud" zu den Verbrechen gehört, die sich von selbst bestrafen. (218)

For him, then, there is no way of life apart from crime, for "Alles verstößt gegen das Gesetz" (214).

The major cause of Fischerle's resentment of the police results, again, from his judging them, too, by his own standards. He therefore finds them guilty of theft, for example, because they confiscate money found on criminals when they are arrested:

> Noch dazu nehmen sie einem alles ab. Nie wieder bekommt man was davon zu sehen. Das ist kein Stehlen! (173 f)

He doubly resents police interference in his scheme to defraud Kien because he considers it a legal business transaction to recover his own money.

> Die Polizei hat überhaupt keinen Zweck. Sie stört das Geschäftsleben.... er schwitzt und plagt sich... da kommt die Polizei im falschen Moment. ...
> Was tut die Polizei? Sie behält das Geld für sich... Die Polizei stiehlt und ein Mensch soll anständig bleiben! ...
> Er beschloß, sich an der Polizei ... wegen des Eigentumdeliktes, das sie an ihm begangen hatte, zu rächen.... Er war davon überzeugt, daß sie das gestohlene Geld untereinander aufteilten ... Keiner sagte: "Nein! Ich nehme das Geld nicht, weil es gestohlen ist!", wie es bei der Polizei sein müßte. (298)

Fischerle thus reverses the roles of the criminal and the law enforcer, designating himself as a law-abiding businessman forced to punish the police for their illegal activities: Fischerle's underworld inverts the laws of normal society. The same values are retained, in particular the inviolabili-

ty of private property, but the working of the system dependant on those values has been reversed by Fischerle's private logic and legal system to make himself innocent and his opponents criminal - just as in Kien's and Therese's private systems.

Fischerle cannot seriously claim to act in protest against corrupt authorities or in rebellion against the injustice of the existing laws. His dream of his future as world chess champion in America indicates that he is not opposed to the police or the law in principle, but simply to their antagonism towards him. In the position of wealth and power he envisages for himself in his new life,[16] he imagines himself also as being able to exercise control over the police -

> Die Polizei mischt sich ein, natürlich. Sie wollen ihn wieder einsperren. Nein, nein meine Herren, jetzt geht das nicht mehr so einfach, jetzt schmeißt er mit dem Geld um sich und die Polizei beehrt sich, ihn freizulassen. (175)

He also dreams of being able to make or manipulate laws in his own favour -

> Er zahlt an sämtliche Kaffeehäuser der Welt ein Stipendium. Dafür müssen die Besitzer sich eidlich verpflichten, alle Partien, die der Weltmeister gespielt hat, als Plakate an die Wände zu schlagen. Das Beschädigen von Plakaten ist polizeilich verboten. (177)

and

> "Beehre mich höfl. vorzustellen, der neue Schachweltmeister Siegfried Fischer" ... wer es nicht glaubt, kommt wegen Ehrabschneiderei vor Gericht. (299)

Fischerle's ideal is thus not the abolition of law, but a situation in which the law conforms to his needs and is under

his authority, i.e. a world constructed according to his private values, like Therese's utopia.

Kien's attitude to the law is the same.[17] He argues for an independent legal system for academics, enabling them to deal with crimes against learning internally, while at the same time making them exempt from outside laws:

> Die rechtliche Unabhängigkeit der Priesterkaste im Mittelalter habe viel für sich. Wenn es den Gelehrten heute so gut ginge! Wegen irgendeines kleinen, vielleicht eines notwendigen Vergehens werde ein Gelehrter, dessen Arbeit unschätzbar sei, von Laien verurteilt. (406)

Despite his rejection of the validity of the existing legal system in its application against him, he is quite willing to proclaim - in the last stages of his decline into madness - absolute and universal laws to force the world to conform to his obsessions:

> Ein Dekret betreffs Abschaffung des weiblichen Geschlechts wird vorbereitet. Für morgen ist der öffentliche Anschlag geplant. Der Hausbesorger ruft aus. Seine Stimme hört die ganze Stadt, das Land, alle Länder, soweit die irdische Atmosphäre reicht... auf Ausreden steht Todesstrafe, Unkenntnis der Gesetze schützt vor nichts. (340)

The absurdity of this insane scheme is, however, only an extension of the prevailing standards of the supposedly moral society depicted throughout the novel.

The image of the police given from Fischerle's perspective naturally demonstrates his values rather than those of the police. In a novel dominated by criminal actions and attitudes, either on the part of the underworld or of the appa-

rantly respectable members of society who are equated with criminals, the legal authorities could be expected to function as a norm, pointing up the distorted values by acting as a foil, representing valid standards. The presence of the police in the scenes involving Kien's arrest and interrogation suggests no such standards, as the farcical scenes show the police to be completely incompetent: their investigations into an alleged theft do not even establish what has supposedly been stolen; Kien is arrested simply because an accusation has been made, without any evidence being considered; and in the end he is released simply because Pfaff denies the allegations, again without any evidence being brought forward.

But the inadequacy of legal procedures is not the point at issue here. What emerges more clearly from these incidents is the fact that the law-enforcers are just as indifferent to the law as all other characters of the novel. The policemen, too, are characterized by a limited personal value system which dominates their behaviour. One, known as the "Gedächtniskünstler" (263) memorises the major points of the prisoner's testimony and dreams of the promotion which should reward these services; another is described as "der stolze Vater" (274) because he has a son who writes brilliant essays at school - and his own thinking is therefore conducted in the form of such essay topics.

The Kommandant's major concern is with elegance. He is ob-

sessed by the awareness that his nose is very small and therefore spoils his appearance, and has to demonstrate his superiority over others to make this failing appear insignificant; he is also very proud of his taste in cravats, and throughout the interrogation revels in an imaginary pile of the finest silk ties. His self-respect is closely bound up with the cushion on his chair, with 'Privateigentum' embroidered on it as a guarantee that only he can use it, that his position is secure; he boasts of his intelligence - "er hatte beinah' Matura" - which allows him to see through Kien's eloquence; and his only interest in the actual interrogation of his suspect is that it should run smoothly, with the correctness of his findings only a secondary consideration. His disregard of police procedure -

> An die Bestimmungen hält er sich einmal nicht. Bestimmungen sind für Verbrecher da. (28o)
> Zuhören soll er bei jedem Verhör. Er tut das aus Prinzip nicht, weil er eh schon alles weiß (284) -

betrays the same sense of invincible superiority cancelling out all other considerations which characterizes Kien's opinion of his role as a man of learning.[18] The devaluation process culminating in the negation of the inferior individual's right to life operates in his case, too, in reference to his ideal of elegance, obviously offended by Kien's appearance:

> Ja,..solche Individuen sind abzuschaffen. Sie erregen öffentliches Ärgernis ... Für solche Fälle mußte es die Folter geben. Im Mittelalter war das Leben der Polizei schöner. Wenn einer so ausschaut, ist Selbstmord das beste. Die Statistik verträgt's, der fällt nicht ins Gewicht. Statt sich umzubringen, spielt er

> den Scheintoten. Keine Scham kennt so ein Geschöpf. (367)

For him, elegance is the absolute, and lack of this one attribute inevitably signifies lack of all other human virtues, like "Tüchtigkeit..., Verstand, Intelligenz und Politik" (ibid.), so that such an indivudual forfeits all right to live.

Pfaff, the caretaker of the apartment block in which Kien lives, functions more strongly than the police as a representative of authority. He exploits his position to wield power over the tenants of the building and over anyone who approaches it.[19] He sees his main task as ensuring that his tenants are not bothered by beggars; since he defines as a beggar anyone whose trousers he does not recognize, he has many opportunities to demonstrate his talent in beating up his victims brutally and systematically. But over and above his dictatorship by brute force, his authority is increased by the fact that he is a retired policeman. Therese, e.g. fears him just as much as the police when she finds Kien apparently dead soon after she has considered poisoning him. Immediately she feels suspect, convinced that Pfaff, because he has been a policeman, knows her thoughts. Fischerle's reaction is even stronger, and Pfaff's reputation is enough to prevent him from stealing Kien's valuables from his home:

> Auf so einen Einbruch pfeift er. Mit Polizei läßt er sich jetzt nicht ein ... mit pensionierter erst recht nicht, die Pensionierten, die sind am ärgsten. Die gehen vor Faulheit auf Unschuldige los. Weil sie nicht mehr verhaften dürfen, werden sie bei jeder Gelegenheit rabiat und schlagen harmlose Krüppel zu Krüppeln. (236)

Pfaff's power reaches its climax when he successfully resolves the matter of Kien's arrest by taking control of a situation even the police in charge cannot understand, simply by forcefully claiming jurisdiction he is not entitled to:

> Er ist nämlich von der Polizei, Hausbesorger im Nebenberuf und pensioniert..Der Herr Professor ist unschuldig... Er nimmt ihn auf sich. Ein Organ kann sich das leisten. Bei sich im Kabinett hat er eine Wachstub' eingerichtet ... Auch im Kommandanten erwachte ein Rest von Interesse. Er gab jetzt zu, daß der Rote von der Polizei herstamme. So laut und unverschämt trat ein gewöhnlicher Mensch hier nicht auf. (287)

Without representing any force of law or government, and without reference to any legal system of assessment and judgement, Pfaff exercises the only effective authority in the world of the novel.[2o] Each individual usurps supreme authority in his field for himself. But only Pfaff's control extends further than the private inner world, because it is precisely this factor - power backed up by force - which constitutes his obsession.

Pfaff certainly considers himself still empowered to enforce law and order. When Therese reports that Kien is dead, e.g., his first reaction is joy at "ein so schönes Verbrechen" (9o), and he instantly conjures up a vision of his major role in Therese's murder trial.

> Die Mörderin ist niedergeschlagen und gibt kein Lebenszeichen von sich. In voller Uniform tritt er vor die Richter und erklärt, wie man so was machen müsse. Er ist der Kronzeuge des sensationellen Prozesses. Der Staatsanwalt lebt nur von ihm. (91)

The feeling of power he derives from this dream is so essential to him that he regrets the fact that Kien proves to be still alive, again indicating the primacy of the individual's dream fulfilment over his regard for the lives of others. His obsession with power is even more evident in the organisation of his household. His wife and daughter are treated in the same way as criminal 'Subjekte' (73): the only time he approaches either of them is in exercising his "Züchtigungsrecht" (326); anything he is dissatisfied with in the household is classed a a crime e.g. "Ein schlechtes Stück Fleisch ist dasselbe wie ein Verbrechen" (327); he teaches Anna his trade to prevent the 'crime' of her becoming a burden on the state (331); if he judges her negligent in her duties,

> so wurde die genaue Strafe für ihre Nachlässigkeit festgesetzt und sofort exekutiert. Ohne die Prügelstrafe bringt es der Mensch zu nichts; (332)

when she locks herself in her room he breaks the door down "Im Namen des Gesetzes" (334); the most affectionate and honourable name he can imagine for his daugther is Poli, derived from 'Polizei', and on other occasions he refers to her as "die Arrestantin" (329).

His claim to authority through her is so absolute that her eventual rebellion signifies the dissolution of the world into anarchy for him:

> Sie bedrohte ihn mit einer Anzeige... Sie gehörte aufs Schafott ... (334) Von Jahr zu Jahr wird die Menschheit schlechter. Bald wird man die Polizei abschaffen und die Verbrecher haben die Macht. Der Staat sagt: Ich zahl' die Pensionen nicht und die Welt geht unter!

> Der Mensch hat eine Natur. Der Verbrecher greift um sich und der Herrgott wird schauen!
> Bis zum Herrgott verstieg er sich selten. Er hatte Respekt vor der allerhöchsten Stelle, die ihm zukam. Der Herrgott war mehr als ein Polizeipräsident. Um so mehr ergriff ihn die Gefahr, in der heute Gott selbst schwebte. (335)

Thus the individual value system becomes so completely identified with the world order that any threat to its absolute authority is seen as the disintegration of even metaphysical values and order. The paranoiac exaggeration of his drive for power makes it clear that Pfaff cannot function as an alternative order to the chaos of values presented by the other characters. His passion for justice - in the form of brutal and extreme punishment - cannot act as a normative foil for the criminal tendencies of the others, for it reveals a destructive, exclusive quality that runs parallel to the egocentric judgements of his counterparts.

Pfaff's power obsession drives him to the gradual murders of his wife and daughter by systematic brutal treatment. In his treatment of beggars Pfaff respects the law and stops just short of murder -

> Das sind die besten Menschen! Sie fangen die Leut' ab, wo sie können, machen sie halb hin, weil ganz hin ist verboten. (332)

He deals with his wife and daughter on the same level - "Ich kenn' die Weiber. Alle sind Verbrecher" (96) - but his authority over his family is even more total, and recognises no limitations:

> ... ich kann mit sie (Anna) machen, was ich will, weil ich bin der Vater. Jetzt ist sie auch tot. (99)

Pfaff ignores the causal relationship between these two factors, and refuses to acknowledge that his expression of his own authority through force results in murder. The same situation applies in the case of his wife's death.

> Sie starb unter seinen Händen. Doch wäre sie in den nächsten Tagen bestimmt und von selbst eingegangen. Ein Mörder war er nicht. (327)

Pfaff's constant protestations of innocence, whenever he feels uneasy in the presence of people in authority, reveal his subconscious guilt. His fear of punishment forces him to continully justify his actions, with the result that he is incapable of recognising the violent destructiveness of his obsession with power and force. Because of his strength he is able to commit the murders the other characters dream of; and he justifies his actual murders in the same way as they excuse their imagined crimes.

The one instance of authority outranking Pfaff's is Georg Kien's even more dubious claim, in summarily dealing with his brother's exploiters.To gain control over Pfaff, Georg pretends to be the Paris police-commissioner, and the authority this gives him in Pfaff's eyes is backed up by Pfaff's fear of his unacknowledged guilt - "Die Tochter sei krank gewesen, sie wäre von selbst auch gestorben" (404) - which Georg unwittingly induces when he claims to

be able to read Pfaff's conscience. But despite his attempts to penetrate the deception and confusion, Georg too fails to uncover the hidden crimes. Apart from discovering Therese's theft of Kien's books and forcing her to restore hem, he is unable to untangle the strands of suspected and imaginary crimes, such as the murder both Kien and Therese believe Kien has committed. Georg's value judgements prove to be as equivocal as all others in regard to actual legal or moral standards. They are equally determined by the self-appointed laws of his own value-world: his reaction on hearing - from Therese - that Kien is a murderer is amazement, followed by concern that the scandal may ruin his reputation and position; later awareness of the truth brings him to condemn Kien's cowardice, in allowing Therese to throw him out of his home, as a 'Verbrechen' (39o), regretting bitterly Kien's failure to carry his obsession to its logical extreme of murder - "Wenn er den Mord ausführte ... - dann Ehre seinem Andenken!" (4o1) In Georg's code madness is the greatest virtue and his profession of curing lunatics "ein Verbrechen an der Menschheit" (359); Kien's projected murder of Therese would accordingly, if carried out, be valued as a manifestation of the greatness of madness, rather than as crime.[21]

Georg's implication in the criminal attitudes he shares with all characters of the novel is given a further dimension by the fact that his position as a wealthy, successful and influencial asylum director is founded on murder, although he

is unaware of it: Georg's wife provides the actual parallel to Therese's contemplated murder of Kien, in that she has committed the 'Giftmord' of her first husband, the former director of the asylum, to enable Georg to obtain the position and marry her. The only glimpse the novel gives of a society outside the world of Kien's home and surroundings proves that society to be essentially identical with it.

The devaluation of life.

The most violent incident of the novel, Fischerle's murder, provide the clearest example of the link between a private value system and the inhumanity of crime. The 'blind' beggar, who has an obsessional hatred of buttons, stabs Fischerle and hacks off his hunch-back in revenge for Fischerle's farewell joke of substituting a button for a Groschen in making his final payment to his 'employees'.
The action of the entire novel has revealed in all characters the overriding tendency for individual obsessions to outweigh the value of human life.[22] This mechanism becomes most obvious in Fischerle's murder, where human life is devalued to such an extent that it has less significance than a button.

Fischerle's murder takes place in the violent world of petty criminals, but it has close parallels on every level of the society depicted in the novel. The entire society is presented as split into individual private worlds, each ruled

by its own laws deduced from its ruling absolute value; with this value, the fulfilment of the individual's dream, in each case taking precedence over the life of any other individual who stands in the way of that dream. The devaluation of life in the subsequent hostilities is parallel to the situation of war, where the life of perhaps millions is subordinated to other considerations. Canetti sees this, however, as simply an intensification of an attitude prevalent in society generally: the society of Die Blendung extends ad absurdum the acceptance of death which Canetti observes as determining much of man's normal social behaviour.

> Ich halte den Einfluß des hingenommenen, des akzeptierten Todes auf unsere Gesellschaft für einen geradezu verheerenden. Ich glaube, daß wir uns so sehr daran gewöhnt haben, den Tod für etwas Selbstverständliches zu halten, daß wir eine Unmenge von Dingen in unserem täglichen Leben dulden, die wir eigentlich ablehnen müßten... Die gefährlichsten Politiker, insbesondere die faschistischen Politiker unserer Zeit, sind Menschen, die einen massenhaften Tod geradezu wünschen und postulieren... Aber es gibt viele andere Manifestationen davon. Es ist doch so, daß wir es gar nicht für so sonderbar halten, daß wir den Tod anderer in Rechnung stellen, daß Leute andere Menschen für ihre Zwecke einsetzen und benutzen, wobei sie es für natürlich halten, daß sich diese Menschen Gefahren aussetzen, umkommen und sterben. Wir sind alle daran gewöhnt, daß wir darauf warten, Dinge zu erben, niemand findet es als unanständig, daß er den Tod anderer erwartet, wenn es darum geht, sie zu beerben... Das sind nur sehr auffällige Erscheinungen ein und derselben Sache.[23)]

The accepted and expected deaths of actual society become the wished-for deaths and murders of the fictional society.

Since this situation is created by the absolute isolation

of each individual, Georg Kien's vision of a unified 'Masse' encompassing the whole of humanity could perhaps be seen as a possible foil to the society depicted in the novel.[24] His concept does postulate the kind of community which would reverse the "Zersplitterung der Menschheit" symbolized by the life of the modern city:[25]

> Sie (die Masse) brodelt, ein ungeheures, wildes, saft-trotzendes und heißes Tier in uns allen ... Sie ist... das wesentliche Geschöpf der Erde, ihr Ziel und ihre Zukunft. Wir wissen von ihr nichts; noch leben wir als vermeintliche Individuen. Manchmal kommt die Masse über uns, ein brüllendes Gewitter, ein einziger tosender Ozean, in dem jeder Tropfen lebt und dasselbe will. Noch pflegt sie bald zu zerfallen und wir sind dann wieder wir, arme, einsame Teufel ... Einmal wird sie nicht zerfallen, vielleicht in einem Land erst, und von diesem aus um sich fressen, bis niemand an ihr zweifeln kann, weil es kein Ich, Du, Er mehr gibt, sondern nur noch sie, die Masse. (365)

Canetti's sympathy with this view has been pointed out by Ernst Fischer, who knew Canetti at the time Die Blendung was written:

> Ich weiß nicht, ob Canetti sich nach wie vor mit diesem düsteren Mythos einer Ur-Masse, die dem Reich der Mutter voranging, identifiziert... In den Gesprächen von einst erwartete Canetti, das totale Aufgehen des Individuums in die Masse werde der Sieg über den Tod sein.[26]

But the novel as a whole does not postulate the 'Tiergattung ... Masse' as a positive counterpoint to the ruthless solipsism which dominates its action. The 'Masse' is an integral part of the negative violent world of the novel. The animal-like crowd Georg postulates would provide the ultimate intensification of the animal imagery used in the satiric portraits of e.g. Kien as 'Hund', Therese as 'Katze' or

'Tiger' and Pfaff as 'der rote Kater'.[27] As the crowd symbols of Therese's imagined millions, Fischerle's pile of money and crowds of admirers and Kien's army of books, the 'Masse' is a major element in the obsessions which determine the murderous attitudes of society and their final outcome in Kien's auto-da-fé.[28] The actual crowds which appear in the novel present extreme instances of the brutality and destructiveness which characterize the individuals, rather than indicating positive advantages gained by transforming isolated individuals into a united mass.[29] The prime function of the crowd is the release from the isolation of the individual - largely self-imposed, but enforced by fear - in a union of undifferentiated equals. This is exemplified by the crowd in the Theresianum during the dispute between Kien and Therese, as all become united in attacking Kien:

> Ein gewaltiger Rhythmus hat die Menschen gepackt... Alle Geschöpfe, von denen es (das Theresianum) bevölkert ist, holen zusammen tief Atem und atmen begeistert aus. (262)

The removal of this object of attack restores their individuality and hostility:

> Es kostet große Überwindung, die freien Hände nicht gegeneinander zu verwenden. Einer betrachtet den anderen, beim Anblick des fremden Anzugs schlüpft man in die eigene Kleidung zurück. (ibid.)

The breakdown of the barriers of individuality in the crowd is only temporary, and the individual soon reverts to his solipsistic violence. In the instances depicted in the novel, the union of the crowd does not end the hostility and aggression caused by ruthless egotism. It rather allows them to be

multiplied, concentrated, intensified in the violence of a closely-knit mob - as singleminded as the monomaniac individual - against outsiders who can justifiably be attacked simply because they are alien.

The kind of 'Masse' Georg envisages, however, is not short-lived, and would ultimately leave no individual outside it to be the object of hostility. But his vision is belied by his own actions: he conforms to the pattern presented by the people around him, rather than standing apart as a positive foil to the negative society portrayed through the other characters.[3o] Although he sees himself as the selfless servant of the masses, he is revealed as egotistic and paranoiac, dreaming of a republic of madmen formed into an army under his leadership, perpetuating division and hostility.

The novel therefore offers no solution to the problems of the society it depicts: nothing is capable of overcoming the violent drive to value private obsessions more highly than the lives of others. Since Canetti's philosophy is based on his opposition to death, such a devaluation of life represents the extinction of all values in the conduct of life, as he maintains in a comment on the war:

> Man hat kein Maß mehr, für nichts, seit das Menschenleben nicht mehr das Maß ist. (A. 2o)

CHAPTER FOUR

The criminal motif.

The pervasive presence of the criminal or the theme of crime in Die Blendung, Die Schlafwandler and Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften links these novels with one another, as well as with contemporaneous European novels in the tradition of Dostoievsky, Stendhal and Nietzsche.[1] The predominance of the criminal type in the 20th century novel has been recognised as expressing, in most general terms, the dissonance between man and his society.[2]

Georg Lukács' Theorie des Romans (1916) anticipated much of this tendency with a wider concept: in defining the essence of the novel as a genre, since Cervantes, as "ein Ausdruck der transzendentalen Heimatlosigkeit" he also designated the novel's hero as a "Suchender" whose course may well lead to crime or madness -

> Denn Verbrechen und Wahnsinn sind Objektivikation der transzendentalen Heimatlosigkeit; der Heimatlosigkeit einer Tat in der menschlichen Ordnung der gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhänge und der Heimatlosigkeit einer Seele in der seinsollenden Ordnung des überpersönlichen Wertsystems.3)

The criminal motif in reference to the themes of the disintegration of values or social structures and of the "Frage des rechten Lebens" sets Die Schlafwandler, Die Blendung and Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften within this traditon. Within this general category, however, the variations in the place and

significance of the criminal motif illuminate not only the interpretation of the motif itself, but also the fundamental differences between the respective authors.

The crucial factor in the function of the criminal in the novel is his relationship to the society depicted in it. The conventional image fostered e.g. by the 'Krimi' or even by the 'Verbrecherroman'[4] establishes the criminal, particularly the murderer, as completely alien from society: he is linked with it only in that his criminal act disturbs the social order and sets the process of law and judgement in action against him. An alternative concept of the criminal as the product of society's failings - but still quite separate from that society - is seen in the literary traditions of the 'edle Räuber' or the rebel against unjust authority, against false or hypocritical values.[5] In the novels under discussion, however, the relationship of the criminal to his society is closer and more complex.

In Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften the criminal motif is centred upon the figure of the murderer Moosbrugger. The depiction of the figure per se establishes him as completely alienated from any human community, and it is suggested that his early background - primarily the lack of social contact - determines his criminality. Society does not understand him or know what to do for or with him; and he sees himself as the persecuted opponent of the social order he cannot understand or

find a place in. But the major significance of the criminal in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften does not lie in these factors. Moosbrugger is also depicted on many levels as reflecting society in its suppressed violence, hatred and aggression[6] - in those elements which culminate in the War, but are already prefigured, e.g. in the 'Jäger' motif, the actual physical attacks or the "Gedankenmorde".[7]

Clarisse's interpretation of Moosbrugger as a Redeemer-figure sets the strength and conviction of his actions against the weakness she sees in contemporary society. For her, then, the criminal is not a vicious outcast, or a representative of society. He instead represents that which is lacking in society, that which is necessary for its rejuvenation. Through Clarisse's deepening madness Musil obviously distances himself from her concept of Moosbrugger. But the conviction underlying the concept - the belief that the world needs 'Erlösung', through decisive action and if necessary through force - is not peculiar to Clarisse. The 'Parallelaktion' in general and other characters like Meingast and Hans Sepp share this conviction, though without linking it with Moosbrugger. In the Clarisse-plot Moosbrugger thus represents one possible form of the 'erlösende Idee' society is seeking. In this role too he reflects again, although less directly, the potential in normal society which finds expression in the violent action of war. On these two levels the criminal functions within the satiric exposé of Kakania, representing

those elements which play a major role in the ultimate breakdown of that society.

On a third level the emphasis shifts from Moosbrugger to Ulrich and Agathe, in connection with the utopian theme of the novel, embodied in Ulrich's search for 'das rechte Leben'. Moosbrugger is for a time involved in Ulrich's reflections on the moral code and his determination to find a more meaningful ethos, but his influence disappears with Ulrich's reunion with Agathe. From this point on the criminal motif becomes involved primarily with their relationships: in their discussions and in their attitudes and actions the equation of crime with moral wrong is negated, to allow for the possibility of a new ethos emerging from illegal or traditionally unacceptable behaviour. In this sense the criminal is not an element in the negative portrayal of a society without purpose and direction, but instead carries the complementary positive element of the novel's basic concern: the author's search, portrayed - not without distancing, irony, criticism - through the protagonist's search, for a possible counter-world to the society satirised by the novel. Musil's concept of literature demands an utopian aspect:

> Die Dichtung hat nicht die Aufgabe, das zu schildern, was ist, sondern das, was sein soll; oder das, was sein könnte, als eine Teillösung dessen, was sein soll.[8)]

Regardless of their success or failure, of the ultimate validity of their attempt, 'die Verbrecher' present 'was sein

könnte' and thus the novel's 'Teillösung'. The image of the criminal as an outcast is reflected in Ulrich's and Agathe's self-imposed isolation and their rejection of society's norms, but this implies a negative judgement on society rather than on them. In as far as they convey the hope for a utopia - until their apparent failure presumably places them once more in the society they cannot affirm - Ulrich and Agathe do not represent society, but the attempt to find a solution to the problems of society. Their situation as outsiders does not mark a return to the traditional concept of the criminal as essentially evil and alien, but deepens into the serious discussion of a possibly valid alternative. This alternative is possible because Ulrich's and Agathe's involvement in crime is more intellectual than actual: the openness to crime signifies a new way of looking at moral issues, the search for new and more reliable criteria for judging the worth of actions, rather than a readiness to commit acts of violence against society. Musil's 'Verbrecher' thus become a third alternative in the concept of the criminal in literature, fitting into neither of the opposing poles of alien from or representative of society.

In Die Schlafwandler the criminal motif is introduced in a completely different manner. In Pasenow and Esch there is no concrete criminal figure to act as the focus for the motif. The criminal is here not so much an objective reality within the world of the novel, but a subjective thought -

complex in the mind of each main protagonist. The major factor in this internal criminal motif is the discrepancy between the individual's value system - which is also his moral code and 'Gerichtsinstanz' - and the society he lives in. Both Pasenow and Esch experience the world as anarchy because their ideals of order and justice are not realized in it. Their sense of being surrounded by chaos is heightened by the fact that they are themselves involved in this anarchy: here the criminal-complex expresses the individual's awareness of his own guilt vis à vis the values he believes to be absolute. The question of the relationship between the criminal and the society of the novel therefore arises only on a secondary level in these sections of the trilogy. The title character of each novel is obviously representative of his age - 1888/1903 - and the appropriate value-stage - 'Romantik'/'Anarchie'. In these sections the criminal motif conveys the breakdown of value systems which have lost their power to order the world, but not their hold over the conscience of the romantic individual or the society he reflects, which continues to believe in norms it can no longer adequately live by.

The image of the criminal is therefore not presented objectively here in the sense of being focussed on a particular criminal or crime: Bertrand, e.g., is a criminal type only in the mind of Pasenow and then of Esch, not in the action of the novel as such. The actual injustices which

occur in Esch's world approach a depiction of a lawless society, but they do not constitute as convincing an image of criminal anarchy as Esch's obsession makes it seem. With the introduction of Huguenau, however, the criminal becomes an objective figure whose crimes - desertion, fraud, rape and murder - are tangibly real occurrences (although for the most part undetected by those very characters who have previously been so sensitive to the lawlessness around them).

Huguenau represents his age - 1918 - and its philosophy of 'Sachlichkeit' in the same way as Pasenow and Esch do theirs. In his fraudulent business dealings Huguenau matches the ethics of the society he exploits, and he is fully accepted by that society. On this level the criminal represents the practical ruthlessness which pervades each of the solipsistic spheres of human activity at this final stage in the disintegration of values. The criminal practises his profession just as every other citizen does, and as such he does not differentiate himself from a society which has taken the anarchy of Esch's world to the extreme where Huguenau's violence and the inhumanity of war have become the norm.

As a deserter and as a murderer Huguenau frees himself from social order and from all values. In this role Huguenau represents not the actual society of his time, but the potential next stage of its development, absolute freedom. Huguenau's action in committing murder is not equated with

the War, although both represent the ultimate in violence and devaluation of human life. The War is conducted for specific purposes and dominated by conflicting value systems, pursued by each individual with the ruthless 'Sachlichkeit' of Huguenau's business activities. Huguenau's action is instead closely linked with the November riots which, like his murder of Esch, arise spontaneously and irrationally: in the destruction of all forces of authority the riots parallel the total lack of external considerations which could have restrained Huguenau's unreflected act; and just as Huguenau surrenders his freedom in his return to the business ethic, the rebels abandon their revolt in the attempt to save the 'Rathaus', the symbol of the authority they had set out to destroy. The image of Marguerite, too, suggests that the new generation may progress from 'realism' to freedom. Despite these echoes, Huguenau as value-free man does not so much reflect existing society as convey indirectly Broch's hopes for the future.

The situation in Die Blendung is less complex. The use of the criminal motif, although not centred on a single representative figure, amounts to the direct equation of criminal and society. The society of Die Blendung covers a broad spectrum from the professions of scholar and psychiatrist through the police froce and the business world to servants, pimps, beggars and petty criminals. The depiction of this society takes to its extreme Broch's world of 'Sachlichkeit'[9]

The ruthless logic of private value systems is here personified in a series of individuals singlemindedly devoted to a particular cause which outweighs even the value of human life.

The ultimate devaluation of all values is depicted by Canetti, as by Broch in the world of 1918, in the murderous violence[10] of totally solipsistic personal pursuits in a fragmented society. Moosbrugger reflects the concealed aggression and brutality of society, too, but the question of values is not a dominant issue in the discussion of his actions. The human traits Moosbrugger symbolizes demonstrate the shallowness of civilization in much the same way as the ruthless logic of the War (in Die Schlafwandler) and the passion for 'survival' (in Die Blendung) demonstrate the weakness of civilization's ideals. The same sense of a disintegrated society is implicit in Musil's evocation of the prevailing atmosphere, with its mutual lack of contact and understanding between individuals, and its direct antipathy, which the acts of aggression and 'Gedankenmorde' reveal. This sense of fragmentation is also strongly present in the presages of the approaching collapse of Kakania because it lacks a unifying purpose, as the 'Parallelaktion' makes clear. But Kakania's fragmentation does not lead to the relentless activity of isolated and absolute value segments, but rather to the indecisiveness of 'Fortwursteln', 'das Prinzip des unzureichenden Grundes' and 'Gewährenlassen'; and the unifying element Kakania is ultimately to discover in the enthusiasm

for War substantiates the aggressiveness and general hostility rather than working against it. Broch, however, stresses the role of values in this context in the theoretical discussions of the "Zerfall der Werte" essay, and Canetti's characters betray their systems of priorities and values in terms which make their disregard of human values explicit. This specific link between the society the criminal symbolizes and fragmented value systems is not present in Musil. The aggression which becomes brutality and murder is not postulated as the expression of a particular stage in man's ethical development, but is simply established as present even in a highly civilized society - serving in fact as a driving force in that civilization through the adventurous competitive spirit which produces scientific progress.

Comparably, Canetti neither presents the fragmented society as the disintegration of a previously existing community, nor suggests that such a community will develop at some future time, to eradicate the obvious evils of society as it stands. The theories of Masse und Macht[11] - based on evidence ranging from the animal world to primitive peoples and ancient civilizations and to modern Europe - substantiate this view of the basic drives which motivate Kien and his associates as universal in time and space. With no hope of an alternative offered, the world of Canetti's criminals is thus unmitigatedly negative.

The general similarities in the various uses of the criminal to expose the latent inhumanity of civilization as a whole or of a particular society give way to radical differences in the wider significance of the criminal motif for each author's basic concerns. The exposé of a city composed of individuals pursuing absolute personal goals with the mentality of vicious murderers is in Die Blendung an end in itself; the positive utopian aspects of Die Schlafwandler and Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften have no place here. The essence of the philosophy which prompts Canetti to view society in this light is his belief that death is the absolute evil. The inevitability of death and the basic instinct in man which makes the death of others a personal triumph for the survivor, allow little scope for a more optimistic portrayal on Canetti's part.[12] The only possibility of a more positive interpretation of Die Blendung is the generally acknowledged insight that the satirist's portrayal of a distorted world implies its reverse as the ideal: the satirical exposé is thus an "Utopie ex negativo".[13]

Broch's philosophy, too, is based on death as the negative absolute; his theory of values is based on his view of the establishment of value systems as "Todesüberwindung".[14] Unlike Canetti, Broch introduces his theories directly into the novel in the form of the "Zerfall der Werte" essay, as well as in other scattered sections of comment by the narrator within the action itself. In this discussion the criminal

- Huguenau - paradoxically plays a positive role. In that his act of murder represents the release of the forces of the irrational within the individual, Huguenau represents the potential nucleus of value-renewal. The value-systems of Pasenow and Esch - and even of Huguenau as the ruthlessly logical pragmatist - represent the 'Überrationalität' of a set of convictions which has ceased to incorporate the unknown and irrational aspects of the reality which lies outside it, and can therefore no longer claim to encompass total reality. Huguenau's action symbolizes his freedom from all such convictions, therefore although the action itself is evil, it represents those irrational forces which can give rise to the equally irrational act of 'Wertsetzung'.[15] Huguenau is therfore not the inaugurator of a future society, nor even a model for any such development.[16] He is completely unaware of the whole sphere of values - taking for granted his life-style of exploiting any situation for his own advantage - and of the autonomy he has attained: he cannot realize the potential present in that autonomy. Huguenau does not in any way serve the rebirth of a unifying value-organon, but simply marks the point in the process of disintegration from which that rebirth can develop. The optimism of Broch's vision of a utopia beyond the chaos he portrays is thus, on the level of the characters and action of the novel, extremely restrained: although he points out the potential development, he presents it also as distanced as possible from real achievement - despite the affirmative

rhetoric in the final paragraphs of the novel.

The reflections on morality centred on Ulrich and Agathe as 'Verbrecher' provide a more tangible approach to utopia. In contrast to Huguenau, Ulrich is aware of the failings in the 'Moral' of his society, and he has dedicated himself to finding a solution to this problem. Ulrich and Agathe do share with Huguenau the image of crime functioning as the ultimate rejection of traditional moral precepts which are no longer valid. Huguenau unconsciously demolishes a particular ethical system based on the beliefs and ideals unified under medieval Christendom, and he points forward to the potential establishment of a new system, similar in structure if not necessarily in content. The moral system from which Ulrich distances himself is much the same one, presented in similar terms of 'Erstarrung' and 'Zerfall'. Ulrich, however, does not envisage a new system of hierarchically arranged values under one ruling authority, like that implied by Broch's view of the cyclical development, disintegration and reconstruction of universal value-systems. Ulrich instead seeks the criteria for evolving a state of 'Moral ohne Unterbrechung', a dynamic morality which allows the individual free play in each action and in the assessment of each situation, but without degenerating into arbitrary personal whim. The concept of a fixed system is completely alien to this kind of outlook: Broch postulates an all-embracing set of values, which must by its very nature eventually cease to expand,

a process followed by inevitable collapse and replacement. Musil, on the other hand, imagines a guiding principle which is completely flexible, not determined or limited by any given situation.[17] And whereas Broch's new value-structure is presented as potentially attainable, Musil's remains 'eine Richtung' rather than a specific goal: the failure of Ulrich's and Agathe's 'andere Zustand' experiment does not therefore cancel out Musil's 'Utopie'.

CHAPTER FIVE

The function of insanity in Broch's Die Schlafwandler.

The psychology of values.

The dominance of questions concerning the psychological state of mankind in Broch's works from 1939 onwards - most evident in the various writings on Massenpsychologie - is clearly linked with his experience of the rise of fascism and the approach of War.[1] This background provides the starting point and the general underlying question of Broch's 1942 outline of his projected research into mass hysteria:

> A psychopathic has made this Time what it is... Whatever happens in this age of ours is but a function of the "spirit of the age" ... Its very exponent is a psychopathic. But its actual carrier is mankind. Has mankind then entered a psychopathic stage? ... Or, even worse, has mankind any basic psychopathic disposition? (7:257)

But although the dominant consideration in this research is Hitler's Germany, the general question is integral to Broch's earlier works before the appearance of these phenomena.

Early unpublished works like "Skizze einer erkenntnistheoretischen Werttheorie", "Canto 1913" and "Das historische Problem"[2] already indicate a concern with similar questions, based on the shock of the First World War, or on a more general concept of the 'Zeitgeist' as 'Kulturkrise'. The "Skizze" - probably written before the War - begins with the question,

> Hat dieses verzerrte Leben noch Wirklichkeit? hat diese hypertropische Wirklichkeit noch Leben? 3)

which later in the "Zerfall der Werte" essay (1930) leads directly to the discussion of the insanity of war. The major theme of "Cantos 1913" is the combination of 'Dummheit' and 'Dämonie', designated as preludes to war, contradicting by their apathy and inhumanity - again, major issues in the opening section of "Zerfall" (400 - 403) - the progress of humanity since the Middle Ages. And "Das historische Problem" prefigures the formulations of "Zerfall":

> Wir, die wir diese Zeit erleben, sind nicht wahnsinnig geworden - wenn wir auch diese Zeit, platt genug, eine irrsinnige genannt haben -: begreifen wir sie deswegen? 4)

In Broch's early thinking, then, the First World War provides the culmination of the "Spannung und Zerrissenheit" (9:38) of the age; and demands diagnosis of its cause in the intellectual, spiritual and psychological state of humanity at such a time. Accordingly, the later years of the War see the beginning of Broch's theoretical studies on the philosophy of history and on values.[5)]

"Die Straße", an open letter to Franz Blei, published in Die Rettung Dez. 20, 1918, provides a close link between Broch's concerns at this time - the crisis of values - and the later studies in the psychology of the masses. Here Broch refers to the actions of the masses during the November uprisings a "Massenpsychose" (10:257). This negative judgement is based on the conviction that the unity of the masses at this time was not founded on a unity of purpose or be-

lief, but on "jener billigen Ekstase des gemeinsamen Rhythmus" (ibid.). Such a "falsche Gemeinschaft" (ibid.) is condemned by being measured against the criteria of Broch's theory of values. The theory is not discussed explicitly in this short article, but is implicitly present in the evaluation of this event (the November uprisings) as a "Werterlebnis" (ibid.) of an inferior order because it lacks the essential qualities of "das gemeinsame metaphysische Wahrheitsgefühl und die Verankerung der letzten Einsicht in einem Glauben" (1o:258). The concept of the disintegration of values clearly underlies the idea that such development is inevitable in an age destined "alle Werte suksessive erstarren und hypertrophieren zu lassen" (1o:26o). The basic factors of the 'Massenpsychologie' are thus already established in an elementary form: the interpretation of political events as the consequence of the pathological psychological state of the masses; the concept of the psychological welfare of the masses as dependent on the alternating conditions of 'Ekstase' - the sense of common goals realized - and 'Panik' - the result of the breakdown of the unifying value system; the collapse of the value system as the inevitable consequence of its own growth, of its innate tendency to become dogmatic to the point of estrangement from reality.[6]

The Massenpsychologie fragments clearly depend on Broch's 'Werttheorie'. The determining factor in the formation of values, as defined e.g. in "Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst" (1933) is the negative absolute, death: "Alles was wert ge-

nannt ... zu werden verdient, zielt auf Aufhebung und Überwindung des Todes" (6:317). Because of this centrality of death, the construction and preservation of values becomes a psychological problem, as well as a metaphysical one:

> Denn nichts geschieht auf dieser Welt, das nicht der Bekämpfung der Angst diente: es ist jene einzige und wahre metaphysische Angst ... die den Menschen mit dem gleichen Augenblick befällt, in dem sein Bewußtsein zum ersten Male ... die Einsamkeit seines Todes vor sich sieht ... die Angst ist nebenbei ein psychologisches Problem. Denn jene metaphysische Angst konkretisiert sich in vielerlei irdischen Ängsten, und bloß diese sind direkt beobachtbar ... Innerhalb des Konkreten ist der Tod vor allem ein psychisches Phänomen, und die Individuation der großen metaphysischen Todesangst in die Vielfalt von Ängsten, die das menschliche Leben durchsetzen und bewegen ...,all diese psychische Realität wird zum Objekt der Psychologie. (6:231 f)

The value system enables the individual to come to terms with and gain control over the reality beyond his own ego, the unknown which is equated with death and feared as such. This function is defined (in "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm") in the opposing concepts of panic and ecstasy, the mental states which express the value standing of the individual at any given time - providing a clear link between Broch's theory of values and his psychological theories:

> der reale Träger des Wertgeschehens ist ... die menschliche Psyche, in der das Werterlebnis sich realisiert... Es ist zu vertreten ..., daß jeder Wertzuwachs ... als Ich-Erweiterung, hingegen jeder Wertverlust als Ich-Verengung empfunden wird; die positive Richtung dieses Wertgeschehens wirkt aber "ekstasierend", während die negative "panikisierend" wirkt, so daß damit zwei recht eindeutige Symptome gegeben sind, denn sowohl "Ekstase" wie "Panik" sind weitgehend wohldefinierte psychische Zustände. In gewissem Sinne, zumindest so weit, als Ekstase und Panik die menschlichen Verhaltungen und Haltungsweisen bestimmen, kann man also hier von der

> Verifikation des Wertmodells im Bereiche der Moralpsychologie, also einer allgemeinen psychologischen Ethik sprechen. (9:43)

The problematic types of behaviour investigated in Massenpsychologie -

> Wie ist es möglich, daß offenkundige Wahnsinnshaltungen und Anomalitäten für lange Perioden als "normal" gelten konnten und wahrscheinlich immer wieder dies tun werden? (9:77)

- are not proved to be psychologically abnormal, but assumed to be so, considered obvious on the basis of consensus acceptance of standards of truth and sanity. The investigation is therefore not concerned with the 'Wahnsinnshaltungen' as such, but with their cause, and, developing out of that, methods of overcoming and preventing them.

The Massenpsychologie writings establish as the underlying cause of mass aberrations, the state of panic at the breakdown of values:

> es sind vor allem "wertgefährdete" Menschen, welche am widerstandslosesten und raschesten von einem Massenwahn ergriffen werden, Menschen, die entweder infolge ihrer eignen Unfähigkeit oder infolge der Mängel des Wertsystems ihrer Lebensumgebung ... ihren Platz im System, sei es nicht finden konnten, sei es verloren haben, und die hiedurch sowohl ökonomisch wie sozial wie seelisch in schwerste Unsicherheit gestürzt sind... hoffnungsloser Wertverlust bedeutet immer Panik ... und aus solcher Panik führt eigentlich kein anderer Weg als der zu einer "Ersatzgemeinschaft". (9:82)

The "Zerfall der Werte" theory thus explains the 'psychopathic stage' by describing the progressive collapse of the medieval 'Wert-Organon' to this point of panic. Deprived of the security of a strong value system, the individual is vul-

nerable to any kind of doctrine which promises the "Ekstase" of a formula for coping with reality: in Massenpsychologie the value-system used as example is the surrender of the masses to a demagogic leader who - on the basis of erroneous theories - promises conquest of the world; in Die Schlafwandler, the various systems are all similarly, if far less radically, false in their acceptance of a partial and often totally inadequate value as true and absolute.

The corollary question - "Has mankind any basic psychopathic disposition?" (7:257) - is also anwered on the basis of the theory of values, here developed in psychological terms into the "Gesetz psychischer Zyklen".

1. Herrschaft eines zentralen Wertes, unter dessen Leitung der Kulturaufbau erfolgt.
2. Zerfall des Wertsystems, und zwar sobald die Theologie des Systems bis zu ihren Unendlichkeitsgrenzen gelangt ist (Epoche des Hypertrophiewahns),
3. Wiederetablierung der Realität, und zwar sowohl der inneren wie der äußeren,
4. Übergang in Wertzersplitterung (begleitet von Zerrissenheitswahn) und neue Suche nach einem zentralen Wert. (9:94)

According to this law the history of man, expressed in terms of the value systems he creates, passes inevitably from periods of normality - phases 1 and 3 - to periods of abnormality: either the 'Hypertrophiewahn' of a value complex at the heigt of its strength, unity and completeness; or at the opposite pole, the 'Zerrissenheitswahn' of the disintegrated value systems. In Massenpsychologie and Die Schlafwandler the present age is established as the end-

result of one revolution of this cycle: it begins with the all-embracing value-complex of medieval Christianity; reaches its peak in the closed theology which does not develop new axioms to account for inexplicable aspects of reality, and thus gives rise to aberrations like the 'Kerker-theorie' (9:87) and 'Hexenwahn' (9:88); followed by the rise to dominance of the denied reality, in this case through the Renaissance and the Reformation, and ultimately the 'Aufklärung'; leading in turn to the trauma of conflicting sectional systems dominating the 19th and 20th centuries, culminating in the Wars. Man as discussed in all of Broch's works is thus undergoing the fourth phase, 'Zerrissenheitswahn', searching for a universal and absolute value to replace his lost security. The substitute system upon which the findings of the Massenpsychologie are based is that of Hitler's fascism; in Die Schlafwandler there are many different substitute systems, either clinging to ideals of the past, or establishing the individual's profession, or simply his personal advancement, as the absolute good.

Each of these solutions is structurally the same, in that it is a form of closed system, as opposed to the open system of phase 1. Those concepts are central in Broch's judgements of the validity of any value system. The designation of a particular system as closed or open depends on the nature of the ultimate goal of the system:

> Ein System, welches unter der Herrschaft einer Wertdogmatik steht, darf als "geschlossenes System" bezeichnet werden. "Offene Systeme" hingegen zeichnen sich dadurch aus, daß sie nicht versuchen, in einem bestimmten materialen Wertdogmengebäude sämtliche Wertphenomäne unterzubringen, sondern sich bemühen, die erwünschte absolute Geltung durch ständige Fortentwicklung des Systems zu erreichen. Das offene System ist sich der Unendlichkeit der Welt bewußt, und es weiß daher auch, daß die Absolutgeltung bloß ein unendlich ferner Zielpunkt, nicht jedoch ein konkret erreichbares Endstadium sein kann. (7:29o)

In the corresponding terms "ethisch" and "ästhetisch", employed in "Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst", a value system is ethical as long as it works towards an infinite goal, by incorporating reality with a corresponding extension of its basic concepts. The system becomes aesthetic when it accepts a concrete end-product, or a particualr situation which has already been achieved, as absolute; and refuses to depart from or change this situation to deal with those areas of reality which have not already been taken into the system.

In the terms of the "Gesetz" these concepts apply to phases 1 and 2, the valid 'Wert-Organon' and its hypertrophic form, reached when it has ceased to strive towards an infinite goal and has become closed, dogmatic and aesthetic. Hypertrophy does not refer to the extension of an open system, which expands its bases in order to expand its sphere of influence, but to the attempt of the closed system to grow by subsuming all of reality under an unchanging set of principles which therefore soon lose any correspondence with the wider reality. Although 'Hypertophiewahn' represents the opposite pole to

'Zerrissenheitswahn', the two states can accompany one another. Each of the partial value systems created by the disintegration of the larger system is subject to the cyclical law. But because the value-basis of the minor system is very narrow, it passes very quickly from valid expansion to hypertrophy; and it retains this position because of the increasing reluctance of the insecure individual to acknowledge the reality which would cause the collapse of his system.

In the psychological terms of Massenpsychologie, the state of value-disintegration and its accompanying 'Zerrissenheitswahn' is defined as neurosis, and the 'Hypertrophie' of the closed system as psychosis. Both states of mental illness are, in Broch's theory, essentially "Realitätsinsuffizienz" (9:84) caused by the inadequacy of the relevant value system. The disintegrated value systems compete for the loyalty of the individual in his day-to-day activities, causing uncertainty: the individual can no longer confidently follow a fixed system of priorities or a predetermined course of action in coping with a world divided between conflicting and irreconcilable values. The major characteristic of neurosis, in Broch's psychology, is therefore 'Entscheidungslähmung' (9:92) and conflict with reality:

> der Konflikt des Neurotikers besteht in einem richtigen Kampf, den er unausgesetzt mit der innern und äußeren Realität zu führen hat, um diese im Sinne seiner Realitätsinsuffizienz zurechtzubiegen, und wenn er ... in diesem Kampf ... eine Niederlage erleidet, so wird er zum panikisierten Flüchtling, zum Flüchtling in eine andere d.h. rationalärmere und niedrigere Wertreali-

tät und unter Umständen sogar in völlige Apathie. (9:84)

This is the basic psychological state of the individual in the age of the disintegration of values, and thus of the characters of Die Schlafwandler.

The opposite pole in Broch's psychology is covered by the term 'psychosis', which accordingly corresponds to the period of hypertrophy, and to the closed systems which share this this hypertrophic tendency even in a time of general fragmentation. In Broch's terms, psychosis is basically alienation from reality - "Realitätsfremdheit, das wesentliche Merkmal der Psychosen" (9:89) - caused by following unquestioningly a logical system which operates according to its own laws rather than to awareness of the outside world.[7)]

> Eine autonom gewordene Theologie, also insbesondere eine solche, welche infolge Abschließung des Systems nicht über ihren ursprünglichen Axiomenkreis hinausschreitet und sich weigert, diesen zu erweitern, verfolgt eine einzige Aufgabe, nämlich sich deduktiv auszugestalten und sich logisch unangreifbar haltbar zu machen; es ist eine logische "Hypertrophie" in diesem Vorgang, denn er ist rein deduktiv, und die autonom gewordene Deduktion ist ... gegen jegliche Realitätskontrolle gefeit. (9:87)

If this unrealistic logic is insisted upon, the system becomes a form of delusion:

> Die eigentliche Wahnhaftigkeit tritt erst ein, wenn die Hypertrophie, ungeachtet ihrer Realitätsentfremdung, jedoch kraft der ihr nach wie vor zukommenden logischen Suprematie im System, diesem die praktischen Wertnormungen zur Bewältigung der (von ihr ignorierten) Realität vorschreibt: solange das System und seine Autonomie besteht, hat die systemtragende soziale Gruppe keine andere Wahl, als jene realitätsentfremdeten Normen zu akzeptieren, und in der Realitätsblindheit dieser Akzeptierung liegt das eigentlich Wahnhafte

des Vorganges. (ibid.)

On the level of the individual, therefore, "Geschlossenheit" is equated with "abnormes ... Verhalten" (9:78), with insanity.

> Der "Irre" ist demnach derjenige, welcher mit seinen ganzen Denken und Gehaben ohne Rücksicht auf die Umweltsrealität sich in seinem streng subjektiven, in sich abgeschlossenen Wertsystem bewegt. (ibid.)

Whereas the neurotic is dominated by fear and anxiety in dealing with daily life - with the fear of death, 'Panik', constantly in the background - the psychotic moves within a value system, which, although false or hypertrophic, overcomes this fear and provides an undisputed basis for every action.

> der Psychotiker hingegen weiß nichts von seiner Realitätsinsuffizienz, er weiß nichts von Realitätsunsicherheiten und Realitätsanpassungen, vielmehr fühlt er sich in seinem eigenen (eben psychotisch geschlossenen) Wertsystem vollkommen sicher, und sein Konflikt mit der Realität ist daher nicht ein "Kampf" ... sondern ist ein unaufhaltsames Weiterschreiten im eigenen Wertsystem, das unbekümmert um jegliche Realität weiter und weiter wuchert, unbekümmert um Sieg oder Niederlage. (9:84 f)

Despite this polarity, neurosis and psychosis are closely linked, with the cycle of history moving inevitably from one to the other. In fact, the two states determine one another: neurotic insecurity and indecisiveness is caused by hypertrophic value systems in conflict; and in turn this insecurity produces the need to construct a value system which must of necessity also tend increasingly strongly to become closed and psychotic (9:96). This cycle proves, for Broch,

a "durchgängige Wahnveranlagung des Menschengeschlechts" (9:84), based on the conclusion:

> wie unentrinnbar die psychotische Veranlagung der Menschheit ist, wie unentrinnbar die beiden Massenwahnformen, zwischen denen sie hin- und herpendelt, und daß sie solcherart, da das "Anormale" als "normal" angesprochen werden muß, niemals imstande sein wird, ihre Geschäfte unter der Leitung der Vernunft zu besorgen. (9:92)

Abnormality is therefore the normal state of man, occupying most periods of history, between brief periods of stability and sanity: but this abnormal normality is capable of intensification to further abnormality in "psychopathische Eruptionen" (7:203) such as fascism.

These concepts of "normale Abnormalität" (ibid.), of the laws of psychic states, occur only in the later works of Broch, but the foundation for them is already laid in the earliest value theories, which refer to the same states in terms of values rather than in psychological terminology. Broch's concept of the "erkenntnistheoretische Roman",[8] which goes beyond psychological categories to those of cognition theory, indicates the metaphysical significance of psychological states depicted within the novel: thus in Die Schlafwandler the psychological well-being or disturbance of the individual is specifically presented as a symptom of the precise state of the value system he represents;[9] and the psychological terminology of Broch's Massenpsychologie can therefore be helpfully applied to elucidate, in detail, shifts in the value standing of the individual or the age.

The insanity of value-fragmentation.

In the opening questions of the "Zerfall der Werte" essay in Die Schlafwandler, the psychological state of the age is discussed in its most indicative form, the First World War. The recurring question, "sind wir wahnsinnig, weil wir nicht wahnsinnig geworden sind?" (4o1) expresses the author's reaction against the War, and against the response of his fellow Europeans towards it.

The narrator refers to the reality of the War as "verzerrt", "hypertrophisch", "unwirklich", "unlogisch", "anti-logisch" and "phantastisch": the "Ideologie des Sterbens" (ibid.), which must be accepted before war can be accepted, is not compatible with normal logic, and can only be affirmed if this logic, in the thinking of the individual, has become perverted. The emphatic rejection of any possible logical justification for such affirmation of death is the natural outcome of Broch's concept of death as the "absolute Unwert", which man's entire ethical being strives to overcome: accepting mass death, even for oneself, is therefore in Broch's view a complete negation of man's basic drives. It can therefore only be interpreted as illogical. Illogic represents for Broch more than a technical fault in the thought process, because of the primacy of "Logos" in the ethical activity of man, "denn alles Wertschaffen ist dem Logos untertan" (7:53).[1o] In the "Erkenntnistheoretischer Exkurs" Broch describes how

this link between the "Logos" and values operates:

> Denn das effektive ... Wertsubjekt kann bloß in der Einsamkeit seines Ichs imaginiert werden ... deren Stolz es ist, ausschließlich von den Vorschriften des Logischen abhängig zu sein ...; dies aber bedeutet ... auch die Vorschrift, alle Konsequenzen aus der autonomen Gesetzlichkeit des Ichs zu ziehen, auf daß das Werk, unbeeinflußt von jeglicher Dogmatik in reiner Originalität dieses Ichs und dieses Gesetzes geschaffen werde... Aber so sehr diese Eigengesetzlichkeit in der Zeit wirkt, also zeit- und stilbedingt ist, es kann solche Stilbedingtheit immer wieder nur Abschattung des übergeordneten Logos sein, jenes Logos, der heute wirkt und der das Denken ist. (595 f)

The denial of 'Logos' which illogicality represents is thus not simply an error, but ethically wrong - one of Broch's early essays, "Kant", condemns the individual who denies the "autonome Eigengesetzlichkeit" of his ego as morally and psychologically abnormal:

> Wer das Gesetz seines Denkens verletzt, ist unmoralisch, er wird zum Wahnsinnigen und zum Verbrecher. 11)

This equation of logical error and insanity recurs in the "Logischer Exkurs", where Broch names as "die Urfrage alles Ethischen" (452):

> Wie kann Gott den Irrtum zulassen, wie darf in der Welt Gottes der Wahnsinnige leben? (ibid.)

The illogicality of the War and of the age which produced it can thus be equated with 'Wahnsinn', although Broch reserves this term for the life of an individual rather than any conglomerate of events such as a period of war. However, although the age is often referred to as 'wahnsinnig' by its members, the individual who composes that age, Broch argues, consider his own actions logical and normal.

> Wir empfinden das Gesamtgeschehen als wahnsinnig, aber für unser Einzelschicksal können wir mit Leichtigkeit einen logischen Motivenbericht liefern. (4o1)

The discrepancy between the normality of the individual and the abnormality of the composite activity of all such individuals indicates, not that the composite must after all be normal, but that there is an even deeper disturbance suggested by the question, "Sind wir wahnsinnig weil wir nicht wahnsinnig geworden sind?" i.e. the mind which accepts illogicality without thereby itself becoming insane, must be operating according to different - abnormal - laws. In accepting the logic of war, the individual accepts a value system which must stand in conflict with his basic values and the logic dependent on them.

> Diese Zeit hatte irgendwo ein reines Erkenntnisstreben, ... hatte ein immerhin präzises Sozialgefühl; wie kann der Mensch, all dieser Werte Schöpfer und ihrer teilhaftig, wie kann er die Ideologie des Krieges "begreifen" ... ohne wahnsinnig zu werden? Wie ist solche Wandelbarkeit möglich? (4o2)

This inconsistency is then defined as the consequence of a profound disturbance in the prevailing value systems, enabling contradictory values to exist not only in opposing factions but also within the individual - a situation possible only in the psychological state of "Zerspaltung" (4o3). The normality of the individual's logical behaviour in an overall abnormal and illogical situation is therefore deceptive, concealing a more basic abnormality, the 'Zerspaltung' which can be equated with the 'Zerrissenheitswahn' of the "Gesetz psychischer Zyklen". The formulation of this

state in Die Schlafwandler -

> Aufgelöst jedwede Form, ein Dämmerlicht stumpfer Unsicherheit über die gespenstische Welt, tastet der Mensch, einem irren Kinde gleich, am Faden irgendeiner kleinkurzatmigen Logik durch eine Traumlandschaft, die er Wirklichkeit nennt und die ihm doch nur Alpdruck ist -

contains all the elements which are later systematized in the "Gesetz" to constitute Broch's concept of 'normale Abnormalität': "aufgelöst jedwede Form" corresponds to the fragmentation of all larger value structures; this leaves the individual exposed to a reality he has no established way of coping with - "gespenstische Welt" - resulting in the radical insecurity, "einem irren Kinde gleich", of near-panic; "kurzatmige Logik" - i.e. one without an infinite goal, and therefore of limited validity - describes the closed value system which results from fragementation and provides the only escape from potential panic; this closed, psychotic, system gives rise in turn to alienation from reality - "Traumlandschaft" - which is ultimately the "Alpdruck" of panic. The War shich provides the starting-point for Broch's "Zerfall der Werte" thus represents the culmination of the cycle of value-breakdown. The pathological state of neurosis is present in the alien and irreconcilable 'Wirklichkeitssphäre'; and psychosis results when these contradictory spheres are illogically united - in the individual who affirms the War - to form a false system, accepted "mit absoluter Selbstverständlichkeit".

The action of Die Schlafwandler is set in the final stage of the collapse of the still theoretically dominant value structure established by medieval Christendom. The characters of the novel therefore experience the phase of the neurotic 'Realitätsinsuffizienz', accompanied by the psychosis of substitute systems intended to overcome the threat of panic which accompanies neurosis.[12] In each character these two tendencies are evident in varying degrees, varying also within the life of the individual as the value crisis becomes increasingly evident.

Pasenow: the romantic psychological cycle.

Joachim von Pasenow progresses through the entire cycle of the establishment and breakdown of values, on a scale reduced to the level of the individual, but nevertheless exhibiting all the characteristics of the much larger process presented in Broch's theory of the disintegration of a formerly universal system.

Joachim is by birth part of a broad value-structure, with the major components the land, the military and the Church. The ideology of this class appears to be securely established as the dominant force in society. The basis of this pre-eminence is the "ruhig-gesichertes Vermögen" (9) of the feudal landholder, bringing with it both privileges and duties, and a strict code of behaviour. Links with the ruling sector of society are suggested by several references to royalty:

Pasenow is compared with Kaiser Wilhelm, whose reign ends with his death in 1888 - the year in which the novel is set - indicating the waning influence of the society he represents; Joachim's mother is designated as "Königin Louise inmitten ihrer Kinderschar" (1o), a comparison shown to be inappropriate, thereby calling attention to the latent weakness of the family; this allusion is later repeated, when a picture in the household's "Jägerzimmer" - "eine hohe Frau in antiker Kleidung" (85)-is compared with Königin Louise, in terms which point to the ideal of devotion to the fatherland as an ideal of the past. The references to royalty thus suggest a position of authority, while at the same time indicating that this authority may be only apparent. The family's sense of superiority - Pasenow's "herrische Aggression" (7), the family's pride in its military achievements, Helmuth's sense of honour, Joachim's conviction that any other way of life represents a fall - presents self-conscious awareness of themselves as the value-carrying sector of the community.

This sense of position is evident, too, in the unyielding instance on observation of the accepted code, which at the same time reveals the weakness of the value basis of that position. The regulation which forces Joachim to undertake a military career is an example of the maintainence of the system taking precedence over adaptation to actual situations. This rigid adherence to an unchanging code - which recurs in Helmuth's duel, in Joachim's relationships with

women, in the family's formal deference to the Church, in Joachim's return to the land after his brother's death, the complete rejection of the world of business - is the major factor in the inner instability of the value-system: it represents the 'Realitätsinsuffizienz' of the hypertrophic system which

> ungeachtet ihrer Realitätsentfremdung ... die praktischen Wertnormungen zur Bewältigung der (von ihr ignorierten) Realität vorschreibt. (9:87)

In Joachim's case the illogicality of the system destroys the security of his position within the family's value structure, with the result that he takes refuge in the even more closely defined and regulated system of the army.

In the wider situation of the whole value group represented by the family, the failings of the basic ideology becomes increasingly apparent in the neurotic trend towards final collapse. The incipient collapse is prefigured e.g. in the opening analysis of Pasenow's appearance and gait as lacking "Würde", as ultimately "auf das Nichts gerichtet" (9).[13] Helmuth's death makes the latent instability obvious, revealing the emptiness of the family's code: it not only causes the duel in which Helmuth dies, but also leads to Pasenow's collapse. In Helmuth's case, the code requires him to risk his life for the ideal of honour; and at the same time it fails to provide him with a sense of meaning and direction in life, so that he is "fast gleichgültig" (41) about dying. The discrepancy between the inviolable autho-

rity of the code and its lack of actual significance for the individual exposes the definitive loss of validity of the system. Bertrand's analysis of the concept of the duel as incompatible with the spirit of the age uncovers the root of the problem in the tendency towards "Trägheit des Gefühls" (54), the unwillingness to make the effort to change attitudes in accordance with changing reality - the basic fault of the closed system. Broch's view on the acquiescence in the death of others - as in capital punishment, or in war - as a negation of the ideals of humanity, is echoed by Bertrand's comparison of this 'atavism' with a similar retardation of humane feeling in the acceptance of such inhumane punishments as 'Rädern', even by e.g. Lessing and Voltaire. Allowing, even forcing, two honourable men to attempt to kill one another is, he claims, as abhorrent as torture, but is made acceptable by romantic attachment to the attributes and rules of the past. The failure to develop in matters of feeling thus becomes an ethical failing, inevitable in an aesthetic, self-perpetuating system. Inertia and apathy thus conceal the loss of validity of the value system, through the conformity of despair, which sees conventional attitudes as a refuge from the alternative threat of panic.

These characteristics are typical of the whole family, indicating that Helmuth's dissatisfaction is not simply a personal matter, but pervades the whole system. Joachim's mother displays little emotion in response to Helmuth's death, and

this is specifically presented not as fortitude, but as indicative of the family's general lack of response; Pasenow's recurring, "Na, ist ja egal" (16, 18 ...) expresses the apathy of a way of life in which there is nothing which is ultimately of any importance; and Joachim is frequently characterized by a 'Trägheit des Gefühls' which prevents him from taking decisive action in any crisis. All thus display the same 'Müdigkeit' and 'Gleichgültigkeit' which sum up Helmuth's attitude to life, and finally play a major role in his acceptance of death.[14] This inability, or refusal, to come to grips with the problems of reality reveals the unacknowledged - except in Helmuth's final letter - absence of guiding principles capable of giving significance to daily events and providing the individual with a sense of the importance of his actions. By its very nature, inertia fills this vacuum - or rather allows it to be filled - with the prevailing rules of conduct, even though they are no longer founded on a solid value reality. The apathy of the Pasenow family thus foreshadows that 'Gleichgültigkeit' which is discussed as the main symptom of the insanity of the War, in "Zerfall der Werte".

With Helmuth's death, the experience of the loss of values is transferred from the son to his father, as he finds the traditional ways of coming to terms with death unsatisfactory. Since the function of a value-system consists in overcoming

the fear of death by integrating it meaningfully into the beliefs of the system, Paswnow's fear demonstrates the inadequacy of his values. This failure is first made apparent, paradoxically, in the persistent affirmation of the value which has been found wanting: Pasenow's constant repetition of the words "Er starb für die Ehre" (42, 43) represent the attempt to give Helmuth's death a significance which will make it comprehensible and acceptable; the frequent reiteration of this attempt clearly indicates not strength of conviction, but continual doubt, coupled with the fear of facing the consequences of this doubt.

Pasenow's story from this point onwards consists of reports on his progressive mental collapse. The symptoms of his illness begun with his obsession with Helmuth's death, caused by his failure to find a solution to the problem of death per se. The major consequences in Pasenow's emotional life are the sense of being surrounded by a void,[15] and a feeling of loneliness, quite disproportionate to the degree of attachment he had previously felt for his son. These factors indicate a loss of values, rather than a personal loss, and fear of the loneliness of death, rather than grief at the death of an individual whose companionship is missed.

Pasenow's fear takes the form of an obsession with a "Bote" which he seeks, to provide some kind of reassuring view of death. The irrationality of his expectations is patent: he searches the mail for a letter from his dead son, and is furious when he doesn't receive letters from Joachim, who

is actually present on the farm. The frustration of his desire for some kind of message from "Jenseits" takes on the force of a delusion when he explains the absence of this message as part of a conspiracy by the pastor and everyone around him to keep the truth from him. His delusion of persecution makes Joachim and Bertrand conspirators in a plot to rob him of friendship and reassurance. The sense of being surrounded by hostile forces explains his inactivity:

> "Aber wenn man vor die Türe tritt, verstellen sie einem oft den Weg, so voll ist die Luft von ihnen, so voll, daß kein Laut durch sie hindurchdringt." (126)

Fear and frustration at such conspiracies give rise to violent rages, which alternate with periods of childish humour, providing constant movement from extreme depression to frenzied 'Heiterkeit' - an intensification of his latent hysteric disposition, indicated already in the opening of the novel (9)

Pasenow's obsessions distort his awareness of what is happening around him, so that his attempts to interpret reality reinforce his delusions rather than disprove them. A conversation with the pastor is transformed into a childhood game, from which he only with difficulty "fand sich in die Gegenwart zurück" (69); he refuses to acknowledge Joachim's presence, because he wants to receive a letter from him (80); the thought of dying alone submerges his awareness of his surroundings, until he is able to force himself "in die Realität zurück" (ibid.); he continues to expect a letter

from Helmuth, although he is at the same time aware that his son is dead; and obsessed with his delusion of Joachim's conspiracy against him, he assumes that a consulting nerve specialist is a notary who has come to help him disinherit Joachim: his perception of reality is so completely dominated by his delusions that any alternative interpretation of events is excluded. Finally, as he sinks into "völlige Apathie" (125), Pasenow's alienation from reality becomes permanent, constituting incurable insanity:

> Er erkannte niemand mehr: vegetierte dahin (136) er dämmerte dahin, nahm die Umwelt nicht mehr zur Kenntnis. (160).

Pasenow's illness, beginning with the panic caused by the realization of the inevitability of death, ends with the extreme intensification of the 'Realitätsinsuffizienz' which results from the loss of values. His collapse into the insanity of total incapacity to cope with life runs parallel to to the collapse of the value structure he represents. This analogy consists not only in the general sense of a parallel and complementary disintegration, but also in the exact course of this process: the attempt to retain convictions which no longer correspond to new situations; the inevitable eventual breakthrough of this reality which is not accounted for by the value system; and the subsequent breakdown of the ability to function in reality in any way.

The general value structure which the Pasenow family represents is also depicted in the presentation of the Baddensen

family, which follows a completely different course. As with the Pasenows, the basis of the value system is the property and the family. But while the Pasenows are committed to other ideals, such as the army, the fatherland and honour, for the Baddensens the family itself and its home form the entire focus of interest and activity.[16] Their outwardly untroubled life, however - not disturbed by any of the problems which strike the Pasenows, and culminating in the desired goal of a good marriage for the daughter - conceals a psychological disturbance as profound as Pasenow's. The Baddensens are characterized as collectors, whose main interest is in beautifying their home with architectural renovations and objets d'art, and with transforming further areas of their land into park. The urge "ihrer aller Leben zu einem immer größeren eingefriedeten Park ... zu machen" (74), is analogous to the urge of every value system to expand by incorporating the alien areas outside it into its own rational scheme. But despite the appearance of growth, the park and the value system it represents remain static: all new elements conform to the same ideal of untroubled beauty serving to decorate the surface of a way of life which resists any change which is more than superficial. Since their marriage, the Baddensens have aimed at a "Verewigung des Brautstandes" (73), expressed e.g. in Baddensen's references to his daughter Elisabeth as his wife, in effect making her a duplicate 'Braut' rather than accepting her as a child, i.e. a new and different element. The accumulation of new adornments for the home necessitates

alteration and is only possible for someone who, like Baddensen, "keinen übermäßigen Respekt vor dem Bestehenden an den Tag legte" (ibid.). But the aim of this activity is the perpetuation of a particular state, that of beauty, which in turn involves questions of youth and age, of the passing of time, and of death as its consequence. Elisabeth's reaction to the sensation of time -

> zusammengeballt und zusammengepreßt wie eine Uhrspirale,... die nun aufzuspringen drohte, sich zwischen den Fingern herauswand, länger wurde, ein beängstigend langes dünnes weißes Band, das zu kriechen begann und von ihnen Besitz zu ergreifen suchte wie eine böse Schlange, so daß man dick, alt und häßlich wurde - (75)

equates the passing of time with ugliness. The 'Sucht' to surround oneself with beauty is therefore equated with the urge to halt the progress of time and the approach of death. This process of 'Todesüberwindung' through 'Zeitüberwindung' is the function of every value system. Broch differentiates between two methods of obtaining this goal, one producing a valid system, and the other a pseudo-system. In Massenpsychologie Broch defines these two methods:

> einerseits der einer geistig-erkenntnismäßigen Einverleibung der Welt, andererseits aber der eines gewaltsam materialen Eingriffes in die Realität; ... beide (tendieren) zu Identifikationen mit dem Gesamtsein, der erste zu einem "Ich bin die Welt", der zweite zu einem "Ich habe die Welt" (9:106)

The 'Sammelleidenschaft' of the Baddensens places them in the second category, of the attempt to possess the world rather than to identify with it through a process of cognition. This second kind of ego-expansion is designated by Broch as a form of mental illness:

> Denn keiner kann, trotz Hitler, die ganze Welt "haben", auf daß er sich sodann mit ihr identifizieren kann ... Und wer darauf besteht, mit materiellen Stücken, die er sich aus der Welt zueignet, sein Ich, sein "Ist" aufzubauen, wird zum Geisteskranken oder wenigstens zum Neurotiker, zum Geizhals, zum Sammler, zum Wüstling, zum Lustmörder. (7:235)

The severity of this condemnation by association is explained by Broch's definition of the closed aesthetic value system as "das Böse" (6:34o). The aesthetic system, in Broch's terms, is one in which something finite - such as the timeless beauty sought by the Baddensen family circle - is set up as an absolute, as in the Baddensen collection:

> zwar wußte Elisabeth nicht, daß jeder Sammler mit der nie erreichten, nie erreichbaren und doch unentwegt erstrebten lückenlosen Absolutheit seiner Sammlung hinauslangt über die gesammelten Dinge, in die Unendlichkeit hineinlangt, und daß er, aufgehend in seiner Sammlung, auch die Erreichung seiner eigenen Absolutheit erhofft und die Aufhebung seines Todes. (74)

The identity of these two activities - 'collecting' and establishing an aesthetic value system - is clarified in "Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst", where Broch uses the image of the collector to express the nature of the aesthete:

> seine Tätigkeit ist die des Sammlers toter Gegenstände, denn das Gewesene und Geformte ist ihm nicht mehr Symbol des unendlichen Zieles, sondern es wird von ihm kurzerhand mit diesem identifiziert. (6:34o)

Because a finite goal has been accepted as infinite, the dependent system must necessarily be closed, incapable of real development of consciousness despite the material growth which may occur. The closed Baddensen family circle - "ihr Kreis ewiglich geschlossen" (74) - admits only, and then

with hesitation, 'Verwandte' such as husbands, i.e. only those strangers who by their close links with the family can be identified with it and are thus not considered alien. The function of the art objects collected by the family - "die Bilder (waren) an die Wände gehängt ..., als sollten sie die Mauern verstärken" (ibid.) - also stresses the impulse to shut in the family and the beauty it regards as timeless by building a barrier strong enough to keep out the alien elements of change and time. These factors make the value system of this family a model of the closed system, which virtually sets itself, i.e. the state of security it has previously achieved, as its absolute goal; and therefore develops only in material extent and not in awareness. In Broch's psychological terms, it represents a system at the stage of 'Hypertrophiewahn', the psychosis of insisting on norms which give only the illusion of encompassing reality, and are therefore on the verge of collapsing in confrontation with that reality.

The precariousness of the closed circle is demonstrated by the incident of Bertrand's visit. Bertrand's doctrine of love as possible only in "Fremdheit" (1o5) disturbes Elisabeth's concept, inherent in her family's values, of the familiar as the ideal. This is Bertrand's intention:

> "Muß man Sie da nicht aufrütteln, damit Sie nicht aus Müdigkeit, aus Konvention, aus Dunkelheit Ihr Schicksal verrinnen lassen oder verstauben oder vertropfen oder so ähnlich ..." (1o3)

He succeeds at least temporarily, in Elisabeth's feeling

> eine Art Widerstreben gegen die Gemeinsamkeit des Mittagstisches ..., ja, daß die Heimkehr in den schönen friedlichen Park ... ihr eine große Beklemmung auferlegte. (1o6)

The parallel with the closed value system which cannot stand up to reality is made explicit in Elisabeth's attitude:

> Sicherlich war es nicht ganz deutlich, aber es war eine Grenzscheide gezogen, und was einstens einheitlich gewesen, diese Welt des Geschlossenen, zerfiel, und die Eltern standen jenseits der Grenze. Dahinter war die Angst, jene Angst, vor der die Eltern sie schützen wollten, als würde ihrer aller Beisammensein davon abhängen: das Gefürchtete, es war jetzt hereingebrochen, sonderbar erschütternd und spannend und doch keineswegs fürchterlich. (1o8)

The closed circle is broken by Elisabeth's realization that the reality outside it is not necessarily alien and destructive: this awareness per se threatens the closed system, by proving that it is not absolute, as it claims to be. Elisabeth does not act according to these insights, and her marriage to Joachim represents at least a partial retreat to the family principle of 'Vertrautheit'. But this first breaking of the circle by Bertrand's arguments indicates the fallacy of its ideals based on "toten Dingen" (74) and underlines its illusoriness.

The disintegration of the aristocratic value structure concretely represented in the mental collapse of Pasenow, the epitome of the dominant values of his society, is not yet apparent in the Baddensen family. But the depiction of the apparently secure closed value system of the collector as a delusional system reveals its adherents to be no less psy-

chologically unbalanced, and no less threatened by imminent collapse, than its obviously insane counterpart.

Through his childhood experiences, Joachim von Pasenow is the first to be made aware of the weakness of his family's values. His total absorption in the particular value system forced upon him, the army, indicates his reaction against the fear of loss of values, produced by the breakdown of his childhood trust in the family. The need for security is stressed by his affirmation of the "Abgerücktheit" (13) offered by the 'Kadettenanstalt'. Seclusion from the alien outside world becomes the major factor in Joachim's adherence to the military code, a closed value system symbolized by the uniform.[17] The images used in connection with the uniform, in discussing Joachim's attitude to it, stress the aspect of 'Geschlossenheit':

> denn eine richtige Uniform gibt ihrem Träger eine deutliche Abgrenzung seiner Person gegenüber der Umwelt; sie ist wie ein hartes Futteral, an dem Welt und Person scharf und deutlich aneinanderstoßen und voneinander sich unterscheiden ... So wird dem Mann, der des Morgens seine Uniform bis zum letzten Knopf geschlossen hat, tatsächlich eine zweite und dichtere Haut gegeben ... Abgeschlossen in seinem härterem Futteral, verschlossen mit Riemen und Klammern, beginnt er seines eigenen Untergewandes zu vergessen und die Unsicherheit des Lebens rückt fern ab. (19, 2o)

The essential feature of the closed system, the finite goal which is considered infinite and absolute, is represented by the position of the uniform as the dominant value in society, as a replacement for religious belief:

> so mußte, da die große Unduldsamkeit des Glaubens verloren ward, die irdische Amtstracht an die Stelle der himmlischen gesetzt werden, und die Gesellschaft mußte sich in irdische Hierarchien und Uniformen scheiden und diese an der Stelle des Glaubens ins Absolute erheben. 19)

This absolute value has the function of determining the social order and providing the individual with a means of 'Realitätsbewältigung' -

> ist es ja der Uniform wahre Aufgabe, die Ordnung in der Welt zu zeigen und zu statuieren und das Verschwimmende und Verfließende des Lebens aufzuheben. (2o)

But because it is a finite system which sets up barriers against the reality outside its own sphere - as shown by the images of encapsulation - the sense of control over reality through the order of the military system is illusory. This is especially significant since society in general accepts its claims to be the dominant force in the world, and the officer can believe himself to be fulfilling "die eigentliche Lebensform seiner Zeit" (19). These pretensions to supreme authority reveal the essential instability of the system: in the terms of Massenpsychologie, it is psychotic because, although a closed system, alienated from reality, it insists on submission to its principles of ordering reality.

In Broch's 'psychic cycle' the period of hypertrophy is followed by the re-establishment of reality, providing an opportunity for the return of normality.[18] In the action of the novel, reality from outside the closed system of the

uniform enters Joachim's life through his relationships with Bertrand and Ruzena, who succeed in breaking down the barrier formed by the uniform. Bertrand attacks the system of the uniform on the rational plane, exposing the faults in the logic of the code, not only by his arguments against the church, the code of honour etc. but also simply by his existence as a former officer who has found the value of a business career superior to that of the army, thereby putting the whole system in question. At the same time, Joachim's affair with Ruzena calls into question his moral code which denies the existence of this sphere which it fears as 'das Anarchische'. When he takes off his uniform in his first evening with Ruzena, Joachim demonstrates the breaking down of rigid barriers in favour of "Gelöstheit", "Weichheit", "Verströmtheit" (210).

The frequently recurring sensation of 'Gleiten' Joachim experiences throughout the rest of the novel is the physical manifestation of his awareness that his new allegiances are forcing him away from the military code.[19] This feeling is "unheimlich" (25), expressing the insecurity caused by his deviation from the prescribed path and the consequent doubt as to his position in the system which has until now encompassed his whole life. An alternative view of this phenomenon is provided when the same term is ascribed to Bertrand, to describe a cheerful mood, linked with success in business:

> Es war ein freundliches Gleiten, beinahe so, als müßte er sich nicht zu den Dingen hinbewegen, sondern als kämen sie entgegengeschwebt. (26)

'Gleiten' is here specifically contrasted with the way of life demanded by the army:

> Vielleicht war auch dies einer der Gründe gewesen, um derentwillen er das Regiment verlassen hatte: so viele Dinge gab es, die ringsum sich anboten und von denen man damals ausgeschlossen war. (ibid.),

i.e. it represents for Bertrand the possibility of access to spheres from which he was formerly excluded. In general terms, then, it represents openness to the world, contrasted with the encapsulation of the value system of the uniform. In Bertrand's case, since he is free of the restricted view of the army as the only honourable way of life, the mobility and indefiniteness implied by 'Gleiten' are a positive advantage granting opportunities for variety of experience, and for unlimited change and growth, symbolized by his travels and the expansion of his business. For Joachim the same openness means being exposed to and becoming involved in evil - expressed most convincingly in his growing conviction that he is a criminal, a murderer - because it represents the breakdown of a system which regards everything outside its sphere as not only valueless but also hostile.[2o] For the romantic, 'Gleiten' is a symptom of psychological insecurity, of the neurosis of value-breakdown. On the other hand it has a positive aspect as it opens up a closed system to the world of normal reality. New awareness of reality - in Joachim's case of alternative ways of living and thinking, and of

sexuality as something to be experienced and enjoyed, rather than rigidly suppressed as evil - does not result in increased ability to deal with reality, but to the reverse: the discrepancy between new awareness and old, unchanged, concepts leads to greater insecurity.

Joachim's insecurity becomes apparent, e.g., in his uncertainty and confusion about the identity of people around him. The "kastenmäßige Abgeschlossenheit" (34) of Joachim's life has enabled him to ignore the rest of humanity, just as it has cut him off from all other sheres of activity. That such a barrier is necessary, from the point of view of the system, has been demonstrated by the susceptibility of Joachim's convictions to the influence of the outsiders he has become involved with. His awareness of others, since the barrier has been penetrated, leads only to confusion, since he still judges them in terms of 'das Zivilistische' which is untrustworthy and beyond his control. The illogicality of his conclusions in identifying a young foreigner as Ruzena (35) and a passer-by as Bertrand's agent (48) and ultimately even as Bertrand himself (49), indicates that fears and irrational associations have taken the place of normal thought processes; and he feels that the blame for his confusion rests with the nature of the people he finds confusing, rather than with any distortion of his own perceptions and judgements.

> Das Gewühl der Menschen um ihn herum ... schien eine verschwimmende, gleitende, weiche Masse zu sein, deren man nicht habhaft werden konnte. (50)

Seeing human faces transformed into landscape is a closely related symptom of Joachim's neurotic insecurity.[21] Joachim had experienced this sensation already during his childhood crisis, in connection with the Schaffer Jan; and in his present crisis it recurs with threatening frequency and intensity (4o, 112, 12o, 123, 149, 163). These hallucinatory visions, confusions and fears - which he acknowledges as "Die Hirngespinste" (21), but nevertheless cannot bring under control - merge to form a reality he is quite unable to cope with,

> bis er eschrocken gewahr wurde, daß er der verschwimmenden und verfließenden Masse des Lebens nicht mehr habhaft zu werden vermochte. (121).

All of these elements of 'Realitätsunsicherheit' are combined in a virtual persecution complex, expressed in the image of the 'Netz'. The network of threatening influences disturbing the order of his world takes on the appearance of a plot against him when he places the blame for them on Bertrand, the representative of "Das Böse" (14o): Joachim's mind is at this stage dominated by 'Zwangsvorstellungen' which designate reality as evil, and thus make his retreat into a closed world inevitable. Bertrand's lawyer sets the seal on Joachim's rejection of aspects of reality he finds disturbing, when he advises Joachim to end his affair with Ruzena by making a large payment, enabling him "eine gewesene Beziehung als nicht-existent anzusehen" (139). It is this attitude which forms the basis of any closed system: any factors which threaten its claims to absolute validity must be considered non-existent if the system is to maintain the illusion of

total 'Realitätsbewältigung'.

With the revival of his religious beliefs Joachim completes the value cycle. His new ideal of a "christliche Hausstand" with the 'Heilige' Elisabeth provides a substitute for the military code which has failed him,

> sie (Joachim and Elisabeth) schützend, damit sie nicht unbelehrt, hilflos und sinnlos auf Erden wandeln und in Nichts eingehen müßten. (168)

The circumstances surrounding the adoption of this new value system, however, make it clear that it is not capable of fulfilling this function successfully or for any length of time. By designating Elisabeth as "das Ziel im Himmlischen" (ibid.) Joachim declares as infinite something equally restricted and temporal as the uniform. The illusoriness of his security in this new value system is suggested already at its initiation, the wedding night. The hostile world which the new system is to shut out cannot be excluded: Joachim thinks longing of his nights with Ruzena, and Elisabeth's words echo Bertrand's arguments closely.[22]

Joachim's religious value system is romantic not only in its restrictedness, but also in its return to the ideals of the past, the value structure of the family, whose inadequacy has already been proved. Pasenow's illness plays a significant part in Joachim's decision to abandon his rebellion against the family code. Joachim interprets his father's madness as a visitation by God and accepts his accusations as pronouncements of divine judgement: he is convinced

> daß es Gottes Stimme selber ist, die durch den Mund des Vaters spricht und die Prüfung verkündet: oh, deshalb war der Vater nun umnachtet, denn niemand ist ungestraft Gottes Sprachrohr. (127)

With his subsequent obedience to his father's demands Joachim expects to find salvation from the confusion and fears of his brief apostasy, but by adopting his father's values he exposes himself to the same threat of dissolution of belief and consequent mental collapse as his father had experienced.

In the final crisis of this value structure, in the War thirty years later, Joachim is depicted as an elderly soldier. His behaviour at this point combines the major traits of both his earlier military career and his father's breakdown. As a soldier, he reverts to his earlier ideals of duty and honour, deepened by added religious fervor. The concept of the uniform still stresses that it must be "geschlossen" (615) to ensure a "geborgene Leben" (616); and at the same time it is threatened by similar forces of 'das Zivilistische' in Huguenau and Esch. At the same time, he has acquired characteristics of his father, e.g. he now carries a walking-stick, a symbol of a sense of weakness and the need for support; and he has adopted the phrase "ist ja egal", using it to dismiss as insignificant anything which is felt to be a real threat. As military commander, Joachim represents the supreme authority of his class, as his father had in the earlier novel. In his dealings with Huguenau, Joachim virtually repeats his father's denunciations against himself as a

conspirator and traitor, with the same gesture of banishment, "Packen Sie sich ... " (619). But although Huguenau is the accused on this occasion, Joachim also feels himself condemned, in exactly the same way as he had been by his father's judgements:

> Es war das Ende, das unritterliche Ende! gebrandmarkt, für immer gebrandmarkt! (ibid.)

Thus the earlier judgement scenes recur in a similar form but with Joachim taking both roles as accuser and as condemned. His collapse as he prepares to commit suicide - as punishment for his guilt - reiterates in detail the scene of his father's breakdown.[23] The accident during the uprising completes this mental disintegration: he is last depicted clinging in childish trust to his arch-enemy, totally unaware of the world around him. In his helpless senility - "kein Major mehr, sondern ein ganz alter Mann" (619) - Joachim von Pasenow embodies the total loss of control by the authority he represents. His insanity is the ultimate 'Realitätsinsuffizienz' of a deluded value system disintegrating under the pressure of reality. Whereas his father's identical breakdown was an exceptional case in an apparently secure social order, Joachim's collapse, surrounded by the chaos of war and revolt, is presented as the final and irrevocable destruction of the whole value structure.

Esch: anarchy and 'Erlösungswahn'.

The anarchic stage of value disintegration presented in Esch

is reflected in the psychological make-up of the main character. Esch acknowledges no restrictions like those imposed by Joachim's military code; he accepts the uncontrolled irrational as central in man's activities. The designation "ein Mensch von impetuosen Haltungen" (571) contrasts Esch's temperament with Joachim's 'Trägheit des Gefühls'; whereas Joachim's life within the system is regulated by codified responses and reaction, Esch's is dominated by emotions and subconscious drives. Lacking the stability of a predetermined path of behaviour Esch's actions are from the start governed by whims and by idea-associations rather than by logical reasoning.

The world Esch inhabits lacks the ordering principle established by the hierarchy of the aristocracy. Esch himself lacks any semblance of social prestige; and while unemployed he is robbed of any sense of having a specific position in an ordered system. Instances of conflict between the businessman and the worker - such as his dismissal in the opening incident of the novel - suggest general social unrest even in those spheres where the businessman provides some form of control. This lack of social order and accompanying absence of general standards of behaviour make up the anarchy of valuelessness expressed in the more flexible behaviour of the central character.

Although he does not live within a strictly controlled social code, Esch does however subscribe to a particular concept of moral order.[24] Esch's book-keeping concept of justice postu-

lates a specific regulating principle as absolute: any breakdown in the system of atonements balanced against wrongs is equated with the destruction of the whole world order. Like the uniform, the book-keeper's ledger divides the world into good and evil. But Esch does not deny the existence of what has been designated evil as Joachim does - the ledger can cope with evil as long as it can be fitted into the balance. When this balance cannot be achieved, however, Esch's system is as susceptible to alien reality as the uniform system was. Although apparently a looser and more comprehensive system, Esch's concept of a just order is still determined by a fixed set of rules, and is unable to cope with anything which does not conform to those rules. The image of the closed system is particularly clear in the later portrayal of Esch in Huguenau.

> Denn ein Buchhalter ... ist ein Mensch der innerhalb eigener und außerordentlich präziser Ordnungen lebt ... Gestützt und gefestigt durch solche Ordnungen ist er gewohnt, in einer machtvollen und dennoch demütigen Welt zu leben, in der jedes Ding seinen Platz hat, in der er selber sich stets wiederfindet und sein Blick unbeirrbar und unverloren bleibt. (394)

As long as this system remains intact, "wie ein sicherer Fels in der Welt des Unbestimmten" (396), Esch can retain his sense of belonging to a secure and meaningful order, in a world under control. If anything disturbs his "festgefügte Welt" (ibid.), he is forced into conflict -

> sein Leben (wird) zum aufreibenden Kampf gegen eine Wirklichkeit, die für ihn Unwirklichkeit ist. (ibid.)

The 'Rebell' does not try to adapt his system to reality,

to "das Bestehende unterjochen" (446) and "nach eigenem besseren Plane ... ordnen" (444). The comparison with Don Quixote stresses this (397). Don Quixote stands as the epitome of the romantic individual who sees the world solely in terms of his ideals, and tries to make it act accordingly.

With the unatoned injustice of his dismissal, Esch's order is profoundly disturbed, and the novel follows his subsequent attempts to restore the required balances. The failure of his value system gives rise to the insecurity caused by a discrepancy between absolute ideals and reality. Esch's problem is intensified, however, by the fact that the anarchy he opposes is also present within himself. Esch's basic tenet places the just order of society in service of his own advancement:

> Ich will hinaufkommen. Ordnung muß sein wenn man hinaufkommen will. (176)

The principle breaks down into two conflicting interests, personal 'Hinaufkommen' and general 'Ordnung', at the outset of the novel: Esch fails to have Nentwig brought to justice because he needs a reference from him to get a good job. Such a conflict of conscience is discussed in Massenpsychologie as an inevitable consequence of value-fragmenttation.

> so ist es... das menschliche Individuum als solches... das sich nach einer Maximalzahl der verschiedensten und kontradiktorischsten Wertnormungen zu richten hätte: die Normungen des Staates, der Nationalität, der Religionsgemeinschaft, des Berufes, sie stehen alle in Widerstreit innerhalb der Seele des Individuums, und wenn sich dieses nach der einen Normung "normal" verhält, so wird es für die andere "anormal"... Neben den konkreten Schädigungen, die sich für die Gesellschaft aus jedem Wertkonflikt ergeben... so das schon von hier aus das Individuum seine Realitäts-

> insuffizienz und Realitätsunsicherheit erfährt, wird ihm diese nun auch noch, und zwar offenbar auch noch intensiver und daher eigentlich ausschlaggebend, durch die Gewissensqual zugemittelt, die sich notwendigerweise immer einstellt, wenn in Ermangelung zureichender objektiver Entscheidungsgründe zwischen zwei oder mehreren kontradiktorischen Wertnormungen gewählt und entschieden werden muß. (9:9o f)

In accordance with this, Esch's guilt obsession is the dominant feature of his neurotic inability to come to terms with reality Through his visions of himself as 'der Gekreuzigte' and his concept of 'Opfer', Esch's actions are motivated largely by his guilty conscience, assuming pathological proportions in his desire to kill Bertrand or die in the attempt.

From the point of view of the order he idealises, the world appears chaotic to Esch. As in Joachim's confrontation with 'das Zivilistische', his sense of insecurity is expressed in the phenomenon of 'Verfließen'. As in Joachim's case, this sensation indicates the neurotic's inability to see reality in terms of definite divisions and contours, since the delineation provided by a fixed system has been invalidated. Perception of his surroundings gives way to visions in which abstract ideas take on tangible form e.g. at his first encounter with the Salvation Army the word 'Erlösung' assumes definite shape in his mind:

> da verändert sich das Bild in höchst merkwürdiger und schreckhafter Weise, und es war, als schwebte das Wort der Erlösung befreit über dem Tische, gehalten und doch losgeslöst von einer unsichtbar kreisenden Mechanik, losgelöst auch von dem Munde, der es ausgesprochen hat. (2o8)

Similarly, Esch envisages Bertrand as the embodiment of corruption and injustice:

> Doch kam er dann bei den langgestreckten Magazinen der Mittelrheinischen vorbei, sah er dann die verhaßte Firmenaufschrift, so erhob sich hoch über all dem dreckigen Gesindel der kleinen Mörder eine Gestalt, vornehm und überlebensgroß..., Gestalt des Übermörders, unvorstellbar und drohend erhob sich das Bild Bertrands. (255)

The lack of clarity in Esch's differentiation between individuals corresponds to the anarchy he sees in the tendency for evil to usurp the position of the good and force the good to suffer for the wrongs of others: reality as he perceives it has become "seltsam unfaßbar und konturlos" (261) because his system of social order no longer comprehends the actual working of society.

However, the disturbing visions of reality beyond his control are increasingly balanced by a positive evaluation of these visions as elements in his new task of 'Erlösung'. The merging of identities - particularly in the case of Bertrand and Nentwig - gives rise to a more abstract view of social wrongs, and the corollary conviction of that he can counter them. Accordingly, the vision of 'Erlösung' (208) culminates in the belief:

> Und obwohl die Verachtung für den Idioten um keinen Deut geringer wurde, schien das Reich der Erlösung zu bestehen, konnte bestehen, mußte bestehen. (ibid.)

In the same way, the image of Bertrand produces the hope

> als müßte man bloß diesen Antichrist treffen, um auch alle geringeren Mörder der Welt zu vernichten. (255)

Confusion of identities gives way to deliberate equation of two individuals under one abstract designation, e.g. Esch's identification of Bertrand with Hentjen:

> Nichts ist eindeutig! ... Und da Esch solcherart mit großem Haß der Welt umher gedachte und der Schweine, die man abzustechen hätte..., haßte er immer deutlicher den Präsidenten Bertrand ... Er versuchte, sich ihn vorzustellen ... und wenn das vornehme Bild schließlich wie aus Tabaknebel hervortauchte, so glich es dem eines geckenhaften Schneidermeisters, sehr ähnlich dem Porträt des Herrn Hentjen. (287)

Here Esch virtually conjures up a vision, to conform to his predetermined image. This tendency transforms the 'Realitäts-insuffizienz' of neurotic confusion and indecisiveness into that of psychotic conviction. This is particularly evident in the dream sequence of Esch's visit to Bertrand: this is not a case of reality distorted by uncontrollable confusion, but of a self-induced alternative reality of wish-fulfilment. The deliberate ambiguity of this section of the novel stresses the significance of Esch's subjective experience rather than actual events: through this indecisiveness the reader is made to share Esch's reality, instead of being presented with a distorted view specifically designated as such. At this point, reality is irrelevant for Esch, as for the psychotic, because his dream has become an independent reality.

Esch's delusion of himself as the Saviour of the world runs parallel to this movement into a dream world. His relationship with Mutter Hentjen is a major factor in this 'Erlösung' complex. Like his view of himself as atoning for injustice, this relationship and its growing significance arise directly from Esch's original insecurity. The most disturbing aspect

of the 'Verfließen' of images and identities is Esch's resulting confusion about his own identity:[25]

> Keiner ist, was er zu sein glaubt: man glaubt, daß man ein Kerl ist, der fest auf seinen zwei Beinen steht...; und in Wirklichkeit steht man einmal auf diesem Platz und einmal auf jenem, und selbst wenn man sich opfert, ist man es nicht selber gewesen. Eine unbändige Sucht überkam ihn, den Beweis zu erbringen, daß es nicht so sei, nicht so sein dürfe, und wenn er es schon niemanden anderen beweisen konnte, so mußte er wenigstens der Frau da drinnen zeigen, daß sie ihn weder mit Herrn Lohberg noch mit Herrn Hentjen zu verwechseln habe. (259)

Esch subsequently decides that marriage to Mutter Hentjen will prove the solution to his value insecurity, by providing a fixed point upon which a definite order can be based. These hopes are called into question by the attitudes of the homosexual musician Alfons:

> Er wußte, daß man das Absolute noch lange nicht erreicht, indem man sich für eine Frau entscheidet ... er hatte ... erkannt, daß diese Gehetzten, die das Unvergängliche und Absolute im Irdischen suchen, immer nur Sinnbild und Ersatz finden ...; denn sie sehen den Tod des andern ohne Bedauern..., so sehr sind sie von dem eigenen besessen; sie jagen nach dem Besitz, um von ihm besessen zu werden, weil sie in ihm das Feste und Unwandelbare erhoffen, das sie besitzen und behüten soll. (349 f)

Alfons' terms designate Esch's marriage as a closed value system, which he equates with the destructiveness of madness:

> Er hatte die Erfahrung gemacht, daß alle diese Männer Unheil stiften. Sie schienen ihm wie Amokläufer, die durch die Welt rasen und bei deren Nahen man nichts anderes tun konnte als sich dücken. (ibid.)

Alfons' position within the novel as a representative of Bertrand gives his commentary the same validity as Bertrand's

comments on the uniform in Pasenow; and his views are substantiated also by Ilona's claim "Alle taten nur Unheil, als ob sie sich strafen müßten, wenn sie Lust aneinander suchten" (352). The illusoriness of Esch's ideal is also evident in Mutter Hantjen's total incomprehension of his hopes, and complete lack of response.

Esch, however, gives his relationship with Mutter Hentjen even greater significance, when he makes it the source of 'Erlösung' for the whole world. His vision of rebirth through a son to be born to himself and Mutter Hentjen is obviously a delusion, mitigated only by moments of awareness and doubt.

Esch's thinking remains dominated by this vision in Huguenau, but in a modified form. The irrational belief in a Redeemer-child is gradually transformed into a form of Protestant faith, retaining the belief in a son to be born and rule the world, but in a more abstract, less personal sense. Esch looks forward to "Die Herrschaft des Erlösers über alle Menschen" (480), but now considers it blasphemy when Huguenau interprets his hope in "der Sohn" (479) als referring to Esch's own son. Esch does, however, interpret the War as a prelude to the coming of the Saviour, and the 1918 revolt is for him the climax of this period of preparation:

It is Huguenau who provides the commentary to Esch's beliefs. He refers to those beliefs as "religiöse Wahnsinn" (532). This reaction is hardly unexpected from someone who rejects any supra-personal values and is completely unaware of metaphysical values. But Huguenau's actions go beyond his words in showing Esch's belief to be a delusion, by providing a parody of his expectations. Huguenau assumes the position of a son in the Esch household, but turns the hope of 'Erlösung' through the uprising into the senseless violence of the rape and murder of his symbolic parents. Esch's last recorded thought, the reference to the approach of the Redeemer (648), contrasts ironically with the real situation, as he is being followed by his murderer, on the verge of attack.

In the chapter of aphoristic character summaries in Huguenau, Broch links Esch's religious beliefs with his irrationality, and his desire for a fixed order.

> Esch war ein Mensch impetuoser Haltungen. Deshalb war jede Lappalie imstande, ihn zur Selbstaufopferung zu bringen. Sein Wunsch geht nach Eindeutigkeit: er möchte eine Welt formen, deren Eindeutigkeit so stark ist, daß seine eigene Einsamkeit dran festgebunden wäre wie an einem eisernen Pfahl. (571)

This designation equates Esch's new religiosity - and to a lesser extent Joachim's equally emotional, unreasoning and illusory religious ideals - with "neurotische "Flucht" in ein anderes und niedrigeres System" (9:91). Esch's 'Erlösungswahn' is less rational than his logically regulated ideal of the balanced book-keeping ledger: his belief that

Mutter Hentjen will bear him a Redeemer-son, e.g. is maintained despite the obvious impossibility of child-bearing in her situation. The awareness of the absolute which Esch's vision of redemption implies does not progress beyond the initial irrational impulse, and can in no way serve as the model for a new religious value system: it remains a deluded escape from the panic realization of value-insecurity.[26)]

Huguenau: crisis and the hope for recovery.

a. Apathy and alienation.

In the first section of "Zerfall der Werte", the madness of war is equated with 'Gleichgültigkeit' and 'Zerspaltung'. By affirming war, man proves himself to be "Gleichgültig gegen fremdes Leid" (402), and equally indifferent to the destruction of his own life.

On the narrative level, the awareness of the illogicality of this situation is expressed by individuals closely involved in this process: the patients and staff of a military hospital. The inconsistency of life proceeding normally while millions are killed leads Dr. Flurschütz to the conclusion: "... nein, jetzt müßte man von Rechts wegen wahnsinnig werden" (424). Man's indifference to mass-death is equivalent to insanity in Flurschütz' thinking - as it is for the narrator of "Zerfall" - although this insanity does not become apparent in the lives of the civilians who remain untouched by the war. Jaretzki's belief that

> "der Krieg nicht aufhören kann, weil der Mensch draußen allein geworden ist ... und jeder, der allein ist, muß einen andern töten" (539)

explains the cause of this indifference: the fragmentation of the value-community has broken down all links between each individual and his fellow man.[27] Jaretzki's belief that the war can never end expresses the depth of his awareness that war denotes an abnormal state of mind, which can never be restored to normality. Jaretzki's life bears out the claim that this situation must lead to madness. By recognizing the insanity of war, Jaretzki has distanced himself from the mass of mankind which continues to act normally because it is unaware of its profound abnormality. His behaviour becomes progressively more irrational, as he becomes more convinced that there can be no solution to the problem of loneliness. Jaretzki's continual drunkenness represents a form of escape from panic into the 'Ekstase' of an irrational sense of community:

> "erst wenn der Mensch besoffen ist, versteht einer den anderen ... geben Sie mir irgendeine andere, irgendeine neue Besoffenheit, meinetwegen Morphium oder Patriotismus oder Kommunismus oder sonstwas, das den Menschen ganz besessen macht ... geben Sie mir etwas, damit wir wieder alle zusammengehören, und ich lasse das Saufen sein." (599)

He thus interprets the reason for the madness of war as the radical breakdown of humanity into isolated individuals who can only be reconciled by the ecstasy of a common goal, but is unable to find such a goal. Jaretzki's worsening mental illness is, pradoxically, almost a positive factor, since it indicates an awareness of insanity which is generally

lacking: the narrator's suggestion that man is profoundly mad because he has not been driven mad be the War makes Jaretzki's surface madness less serious than surface normality. Dr. Kühlenbeck unwittingly provides the correct diagnosis of Jaretzki's illness, when he claims:

> "der Mensch ist ein Schlächter und überall bleibt er ein Schlächter, was anderes versteht er nicht ...wer sich mit dieser Tatsache nicht abfindet, der könnte wirklich wahnsinnig werden" (586 f).

Jaretzki becomes unbalanced because he cannot come to terms with man's murderous isolation; and Broch's hope in the rebirth of a value system capable of restoring human community proves his belief that man is capable of overcoming this isolation if he refuses to accept it.

On another level, Hannah Wendling's life depicts the ultimmate isolation caused by the disintegration: "die Entropie des Menschen ist seine absolute Vereinsamung" (429). Here, the novel traces the psychological consequences of this entropy in the daily life of the individual.
The dominant factor is, again, the disturbed relationship with reality which for Broch constitutes the essence of psychological imbalance. The breakdown of the binding social value structure is reflected in Hanna's altered relationship to her immediate surroundings within the home. "Die geheime Harmonie und die Kontrapunktik der Möbel- und Bilderanordnungen" (427) of the household normally represents for the individual

> ein Abbild ... das er sich von dem sozialen Gefüge geschaffen hat und schaffen mußte, solange er noch dessen Teil gewesen ist. (429)

Now, however, the formerly satisfactory household order gives the impression of "der Fluch des Zufälligen und Zusammengewehten" (428), of "eine gewisse Verwirrung" (ibid.) rather than of a meaningful organisation. This "Unsicherheit des Architektonischen" (ibid.) represents the alienation from reality caused by the insecurity of an order dependent on an invalid value system.

Hanna's 'Realitätsinsuffizienz' is expressed in the extent to which her life is dominated by dreams rather than by real events. Any contact with reality occurs in conflict, designated as "Guerillakrieg",

> den das Ich in jedem kürzesten Augenblick gegen jene winzigsten Partien des Empirischen zu führen hat, mit denen seine Oberfläche in Berührung gerät. (404)

This superficial irritation is a reflection of the much deeper opposition to the reality of the War, which finally alienates Hanna from reality:

> Und vielleicht ... ist die Lähmung, welcher Hanna Wendling mit dem fortschreitenden und zunehmenden Krieg verfiel nichts anderes als der Ausdruck eines höchst ethischen Entsetzens über das Grauen, dem die Menschheit sich anheimgegeben sah. (405)

Paralysis, in Broch's psychology, is the result of the neurotic's inability to cope with reality: the guiding principles of an established value system can no longer provide a reliable basis for decision and action, so the individual tends to withdraw from situations in which he should act decisively.

In Hanna's case this withdrawal takes the extreme form - foreshadowed by Esch's dream meeting with Bertrand[28] - of accepting the dream as an alternative reality. Since she is now "nur durch sehr schwache und ... kaum vorhandene Fäden mit dem verbunden ..., was man ... das Leben nennt" (389), Hanna tends to spend more time in dreams than in action:

> man konnte mit Fug sagen, daß die Träume Hanna Wendlings plastischer und bluterfüllter waren als ihre Wachheit. (403)

The same "Entfremdung" (414) characterizes her relationship with others, threatening even the security of her own ego:

> Wenn sie in der Nacht aufwachte, kostete es Mühe, sich vorzustellen, daß der Junge im Nebenzimmer schlief und daß dies ihr Kind sein sollte. Und wenn sie ein paar Töne am Klavier anschlug, so war es nicht mehr ihre Hand, die es tat, sondern es waren fremde unbewegliche Finger geworden. (ibid.)

This process of alienation virtually creates a private closed world, symbolised by the isolated position of Hanna's home, deliberately shielded from human contact:

> es war der leere Raum, der das Anwesen umgab, so leer, es war die abestorbene und wie aus Stücken wieder aufgebaute Landschaft so abgestorben, daß es gleichsam ein Gürtel der Leere wurde, welcher sich immer enger um die Einsame zwängte. (613)

Hanna's "Abgeschlossenheit" (570) is so extreme that even the return of her husband cannot break it down. They are unable to form even a community of two, remaining "beide verschlossen wie ihre Augen, ein jeder in seiner Einsamkeit" (499). In this sense Hanna's private reality resembles the psychotically closed value-system. But Hanna's problem is more intense, since in her case even the last remaining value of

personal well-being is lacking. Her alienation represents "die Haltlosigkeit und die Insignifikanz eines bürgerlichen Menschen, dem die Wertinstinkte fehlen" (414): for her, values no longer exist. Hanna's "Teilnahmslosigkeit" (427) reflects the apathy and indifference which are the basis of the acceptance of the War, substantiating Jaretzki's view that absolute isolation is its underlying cause.

> Je einsamer er aber wird, desto mehr zerfallen und isolieren sich ihm auch die Dinge, desto gleichgültiger müssen ihm die Beziehungen zwischen den Dingen werden, und schließlich vermag er sie kaum mehr zu sehen. (429)

The charge of 'Gleichgültigkeit' is, however, mitigated by the fact that Hanna - to a large extent unconsciously - wants her private alienated world of meaninglessness and passivity to be opened out. Her longing for an "Einbruch von unten" (613) expresses the awareness that her life of seclusion and apathy is wrong, and must be corrected, even if by force. Her action in pursuing the 'Einbrecher' during the uprising symbolizes her subconscious search for a way out of the insanity of total 'Realitätsfremdheit'.[29]

b. The return to normality: a model of rebirth.

Gödicke's gradual recovery from war death depicts by analogy the process of fragmentation and reconstruction of values.[30] More significant than his physical injuries is the state of disintegration of the ego, "der Schmerz einer in Atome zerrissenen und zerstäubten Seele" (378).

The first stage of reconstruction of a unified personality consists in the total exclusion of reality, limiting the world to the dimensions of the essential elements of the self. Gödicke guards his closed world rigorously against incursions by external forces, considering even his wife an "Eindringling" (466). At this point Gödicke's world order is that of the isolated ego, deliberately alienated from reality by the barriers of a closed system.

> Am besten wäre es, die Augen würden einem wieder zuwachsen und die Ohren würden wieder verstopft werden; der Mann Gödicke dürfte nichts sehen, nichts hören, nichts essen durfte er. ..
> Hätte er jetzt nicht so arge Schmerzen, er würde in den Garten gehen und sich eine Handvoll Erde holen, die Löcher zu verstopfen. (467)

But Broch's usual negative judgement of the closed value system as psychotic is suspended in this instance. Gödicke's exclusion of reality is depicted as a preliminary stage in the re-establishment of a valid system. The fragmented ego needs a period of total autonomy from outside influences, in order to establish clearly its own essence.[31] Gödicke's rejection of elements of his past life is thus based on the recognition

> daß jeder Einbruch in irgendeinen Teil der Seele alle anderen Teile in Mitleidenschaft zog, ja, daß sie alle dadurch verändert wurden. (466)

When the unity of the self has been restored, Gödicke allows his private world to be opened out, extended,

> denn das Leben, das sich jetzt um ihn sammelte, brauchte er nicht mehr zu fürchten, selbst wenn es ganz nahe an ihn heranrückte: er hatte den Tod bereits hinter sich, und alles, was kam, diente lediglich dazu, das Gerüst immer höher zu bauen. (517)

Gödicke's progress thus represents the value system which is strong enough to counter the fear of death, and is therefore able to remain open to a world it can deal with confidently. Prompted by Samwald's claim "daß das Elend dieses Krieges schließlich zu einem lichteren Heil der Seele führen müsse" (518), Gödicke sees himself as playing an active part in a general process of reconstruction, although without defining how this will proceed:

> es war von ferneher wie eine Bestätigung wiedergefundenen Lebens und es war wie eine Auffforderung, in diesem Leben einen gebührenden, gewissermaßen einen jenseitigen Platz einzunehmen. (ibid.)

The fragmentation of Gödicke's ego is equated with the final stage in the disintegration of values. His subsequent rebirth is accompanied by the development of a sense of security in dealing with the world - by implication ("jenseitig") based on the certainty of an infinite value-goal - and a sense of duty towards mankind. In this Gödicke embodies Broch's hopes for the rebirth of a valid value-system, developed by the autonomous individual who has freed himself from the dead values of the past; who is at the same time open to the metaphysical sphere of the 'Logos', the source of absolute values (595). Just as Gödicke, regarded as a harmless lunatic, reconstructs his ego, mankind can build up a new value-community, out of the insanity of value-dissolution expressed by the War.

c. Huguenau: The private world.

As the epitome of the practical realist, Huguenau seems to be impossible to fit into a scheme of psychological instability based on two alternative modes of 'Realitätsinsuffizienz'[32]. There are, however, clear indications of a pathological state in the deepening obsession of his Oedipus complex, culminating in rape and murder.[33]

Huguenau's thinking is dominated by the ruthlessly practical logic of commercial advancement, representing the hyperrationality of positivist value systems. But at the same time his actions are increasingly dominated by the irrational. His desertion, e.g., is not logically thought out, but follows an impulse, prompted by a memory subconsciously equated with freedom. His initial approach to Major von Pasenow is not planned as a means of financing his purchase of Esch's newspaper: he simply feels drawn to the Major, and invents the scheme as he introduces himself to him:

> die Handlungen Huguenaus erfolgten unter Aufhebung jeglicher Entfernung, gewissermaßen irrational wie unter Kurzschluß und ohne Überlegungszeit. (391)

The "traumwandlerische Sicherheit" (42o) of his activities is produced by a series of such "luziden Eingebungen" (583): Huguenau's success is based as much on irrational impulses as on the 'Zweckmäßigkeit' of his logic.

The irrational element in Huguenau's behaviour is presented to a large extent through the images depicting him as a child.

This analogy is established from the beginning of the novel, in Huguenaus's designation of army service as a kind of "Schulzeit" (369), cut off from the problems of normal life: "Es war bloß so angenehm, an nichts anderes mehr denken zu müssen" (ibid.). With his desertion, Huguenau does not return to normality, but simply adopts a more pleasant form of childhood life, "Ferien" (379). He regards his business activities in Kurtrier not as a return to his former business responsibilities, but as a means of extending his holidays. The newspaper he buys is therefore a "Spielzeug" (469) - he enjoys the novelty, but "fühlte sich von der Realität des Zeitungsgetriebes gestört" (ibid.); his appreciation of the newspaper's printing-press is compared with a young boy's fascination with locomotives (470). The strongest element in the image of Huguenau as a child is his identification of Esch and Mutter Esch with his own parents. Memories of his parent's home merge with his impressions of events in Esch's household, culminating in a sense of unjust treatment, in which longing for the affection of the mother and fear and hatred of the father are combined (586). These impulses reach their climax in his rape of Mutter Esch, and murder of the father image.[34] These actions, too, are completely irrational, prompted by an "Erleuchtung" (680). The images of childhood, particularly in this realization of the Oedipus complex, designate Huguenau as the "'wertfreien' sachlichen Menschen ..., der seine Kindheitsträume in der Wirklichkeit einfach naiv zu Ende lebt" (8:18).

This realization of a dream world establishes an alternative reality for Huguenau, more radically than in Esch's case: Huguenau actually achieves his goals, forces his dream into reality. His violent subjectivity is that of the closed personal value system. Although he is not alienated from an incomprehensible reality like Pasenow or Hanna Wendling, Huguenau is surrounded by barriers which separate him from the world. This seclusion is expressed in the image of the "Käseglocke" (372):

> er schritt wie unter eine Glocke voll Unbekümmertheit, abgegrenzt von der Welt und doch in ihr, und er machte sich keine Gedanken. (374)

The image of the dancer has a similar function:

> Es ist der Tänzer dieser Welt entrückt. Eingeschmiegt in die Musik, hat er sein freies Handeln aufgegeben und handelt dennoch in höherer und luziderer Freiheit. In der Strenge des Rhythmus, der ihn führt, ist er geborgen und eine große Gelöstheit kommt über ihn aus der Geborgenheit. (544)

As a 'Verbrecher', too, Huguenau is described as inhabiting a private world, with the aim

> seine eigene kleine Welt und Wirklichkeit am Rande der großeren Ordnung zu errichten und in sie einzupassen; (446)

not with the intention of conforming to the values of the larger order, but of maintaining "das Land seines Gesetzes" (ibid.) through his activity in that world. This is the main motive in his decision to stay in Kurtrier after his desertion has been discovered: abandoning his schemes is equated with "ein Gefühl allseitiger Unabgeschlossenheit" (622), and he feels compelled to counter this by continuing

"seine Wirklichkeit gegenüber der der anderen zu behaupten" (ibid.).

The various images of a private world, hermetically sealed against reality, represent the closed value system: Huguenau's progress is that of the psychotic:

> ein unaufhaltsames Weiterschreiten im eigenen Wertsystem, das unbekümmert um jegliche Realität weiter und weiter wuchert. (9:85)

His practical success does not indicate openness to reality and the corollary ability to deal with life realistically. The irrational security of acting accoring to impulse is discussed in "Das System als Weltbewältigung" as a factor of the closed system.

> Der sogenannte "praktische Mensch", also derjenige, der "ohne viel Worte zu machen" ... mit dämmernd richtigem Instinkt die Welt bewältigt, ist der geborene Improvisator, und mag er auch mitunter ein äußerst genialer Improvisator sein, seine Schlußketten bleiben trotzdem verkürzt und nirgends wird er das ihm vorgezeichnete und von ihm akzeptierte System durchbrechen. (7:127)

Huguenau's violent actions during the riots reflect the destructiveness of the most narrow value system, produced by the final stage of general value fragmentation. The finite goal of the closed system is here limited to the absolute minimum, of a value which does not go beyond the individual - "die Philistrosität eines auf das Individuum und seine irrationalen Triebe eingeschränkten Wertgebietes" (683). Such a restriction is inevitably evil, as Broch explains it in the 'Epilog':

> je kleiner das System wird, desto geringer wird seine ethische Ausdehnungsfähigkeit, desto geringer wird sein

> ethischer Wille, desto stumpfer und gleichgültiger wird es gegen die Bösheit. (664)

The "radikalste Wertentblößung" (683) is therefore equated with "dieser an Wahnsinn grenzenden Gleichgültigkeit gegen fremdes Leid" (ibid.) expressed in the War, and in Huguenau's actions. Because he lacks the 'ethischer Wille' indicated by Jaretzki, Hanna Wendling and Gödicke, Huguenau is unable to progress from his momentary freedom, but remains the

> Wahnsinnige(n), der sich aus dem Gewirr seines Irrationalen und Überrationalen nicht befreien kann. (684)

d. Bertrand Müller: the personal commentary.

As the fictional writer of the "Zerfall der Werte", the first-person narrator of the "Geschichte des Heilsarmee-Mädchens in Berlin" is highly conscious of the value crisis of his age. His reflections and his actions in the "Geschichte" therefore provide a more personal, less theoretical commentary on the problems he has discussed in the essay.

The split between the hyperrational and the irrational - seen e.g. in Huguenau's combination of 'sleepwalking' and 'Sachlichkeit' - is discussed in the 'Epilog' as the final consequence of a disintegrated value system. For the philosopher Bertrand Müller, this problem touches the basis of his personal existence. As a philosopher in an age where philosophy has become abstract and divorced from every-day activity, he finds it impossible to fulfil his conviction "daß bloß im Aktiven der Sinn und das Ethos meines Lebens zu suchen ist" (590): "Denken" and "Sein" (609) prove to be irreconcilable.

The same problem is treated on another level through the relationship between the Jew Nuchem and the Salvation Army girl Marie, whose story Müller relates. In the "Zerfall" discussion on religion, orthodox Jewish belief and sects of the 'Heilsarmee' type are postulated as opposite poles of the fragmentation of religious belief. The Jew is seen as the epitome of the 'Sachlichkeit' of the age:

> er ist es, der sich mit absoluter Radikalität dem einmal gewählten Wert- und Berufsgebiet hingibt, er ist es, der den "Beruf", ... in den er zufällig geraten ist, zu einer bisher ungekannten Absolutheit steigert, er ist es, der, ohne Bindung an ein anderes Wertgebiet und in unbedingter Strenge hingegeben an sein Tun, zur höchsten geistigen Leistung sich verklärt, zur viehischsten Verworfenheit im Materiellen sich erniedrigt. (557)

The 'Heilsarmee', on the other hand, exhibits the opposite "Tendenz zur Wertzentralisation, zur Sammlung aller Wertgebiete" (559), attempting to recreate the sense of community through "ekstatischen Hilfen" (ibid.). Müller identifies the 'Heilsarmee' as an irrational phenomenon, "außerhalb einer sich völlig rational dünkenden Welt" (398). Although he rejects the Army's teachings as "primitiv" (399), he is drawn to it as an attempt to compensate for the "Verfehlungen" (ibid.) of the rationalist age. His attempt to bring Nuchem and Marie together represents the wish to re-unite the rational - symbolized by the 'Gesetz' of Jewish orthodoxy - and the irrational, in the form of love. In this attempt, the poles of thinking and being are not only to be combined on this symbolical level: Müller also sees it as a way of transforming his awareness into action in reality.

Müller is at the same time deeply involved in the isolation and alienation which have been depicted as constituting the insanity of the age, as summed up by Pasenow and Esch in the 'Symposion':

> Major: Der Wahnsinnige ist wie der Träumer; er hat die falsche Wahrheit...
> Esch: Er hat die falsche Wirklichkeit ... wir haben alle noch die falsche Wirklichkeit ... von Rechts wegen müßten wir alle wahnsinnig sein! wahnsinnig in unserer Einsamkeit. (532)

The attempt to unite Nuchem and Marie is thus also an attempt to overcome loneliness, and become involved in reality. The failure of this attempt shows the impossibility of breaking down the abstract systems, whose individual laws form barriers against one another - "Denn die Wirklichkeit ist bei denen, die das Gesetz gegeben haben" (591). This failure confirms Müller's alienation:

> es blieb die Welt ein fremder Feind, weniger noch als ein Feind, ein Fremdes, dessen Oberfläche ich wohl abtasten konnte, in das einzudringen mir doch niemals gelang, ein Fremdes, in das ich niemals eindringen werde, fremd in stets zunehmender Fremdheit, blind in stets zunehmender Blindheit, vergehend und zerfallend im Erinnern an die Nacht der Heimat, und schließlich nur mehr ein zerfallender Hauch des Einstigen. (592)

The individual fails to penetrate the barriers against reality and against other indivuduals, because he cannot free himself from his own private system:

> Ich selbst kann bloß mein eigenes Gesetz erfüllen, mein eigenes, mir vorgeschriebenes Geschäft versehen, ich bin nicht imstande, darüber hinauszudringen. (591).

The hopelessness of this situation is, however later balanced by a sense of certainty that it can be overcome.

> Es war eine Art Schwebezustand zwischen Nochnicht-Wissen und Schon-Wissen ... ein Schlafwandeln, das ins Helle führte, Angst, die sich aufhob und sich doch wieder aus sich selbst erneuerte, es war wie ein Schweben über dem Meer des Todes, ... es war eine beinahe körperliche Erkenntnis, mit der ich die höhere platonische Wirklichkeit der Welt aufnahm, und alles in mir war voller Sicherheit, daß ich bloß einen geringen Schritt zu tun brauchte, um solch körperliche Erkenntnis in eine rationale zu verwandeln. In dieser schwebenden Wirklichkeit strömten die Dinge auf mich zu, sie strömten in mich ein, und ich mußte mich nicht um sie bemühen. Was früher wie Passivität ausgesehen hatte, hat jetzt seinen Sinn erhalten. (609)

What Müller here prefiguratively experiences is the possibility for a reconstruction of the ideal value system: his 'Schlafwandeln' combines the elements of cognition of the platonic reality which is the source of the absolute; the ability to come to terms with the fear of death; the ecstasy of being able to absorb without difficulty all spheres of reality; the merging of the irrational and the rational; and the security of a life with genuine meaning.[36]

Müller does not approach realization of this ideal. At the end of the novel he remains "ein Kranker" (659) - he is considered slightly mad by the Jews he lives amongst, and is tempted to agree with them; and he remains correpondingly isolated:

> nichts zwingt ihn, sich dem Lebenskampf zu stellen ... Er ist nicht gezwungen, aus den Ereignissen, die der Tag ihm zuträgt, induktive Schlüsse zu ziehen, um danach sein Verhalten einzurichten, er darf in sein eigenes Denken eingesponnen bleiben. (ibid.)

He thus comforms to the pattern of the general tendency to insanity: but continued glimpses of "das Unendliche" (660) suggest Broch's hopes for renewal.

CHAPTER SIX

The role of insanity in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften.

Moosbrugger: the ego and the world.

Moosbrugger's insanity is the object of much controversy within the novel, involving almost every character. At the most serious level, Moosbrugger's illness is the central issue in the jurists' conflicting attempts to define the borders between legal responsibility and innocence based on insanity.[1] The main point of contention concerns the admissibility of a concept of diminished responsibility, combined with a vigorous dispute over the degree of insanity in Moosbrugger's behaviour. Musil does not at any time provide a clear external standpoint on the issue - Ulrich's attitude to the question is ambivalent - and the satirical treatment of the controversy exposes all parties to equal ridicule.
Despite the indecision on this theoretical level, the novel presents in Moosbrugger a clear case of insanity: regardless of clinical definitions, Moosbrugger's thinking projects an image of madness (e.g. 235-242; 393-398).[2]

Moosbrugger's position within the novel - belonging to none of the groups the other characters constitute - emphasises his isolation from any kind of social group. Before his arrest he had no permanent home or job, family or friends; and even as a prisoner he does not fit completely into the category of either criminal or madman. Moosbrugger's insanity is equated with exclusion from human society, both as cause

and effect. His early life - narrated as a report of Ulrich's findings, but told from Moosbrugger's perspective - demonstrates his isolation as a dominating factor in his growing mental disturbance. The poverty and rootlessness of his travels as an apprentice carpenter cut him off from contact with women.[3] The impossibility of a normal relationship under those circumstances - particularly the fear of continual rejection - fosters a feeling of persecution. Women appear to him to be incomprehensible and threatening:

> Es geht vorüber, die Röcke schwanken um seine Waden... Man blickt ihm in die Augen, und sie werden undurchsichtig. Man hört es lachen, dreht sich rasch um und sieht ein Gesicht, das so reglos rund wie ein Erdloch ist, in das eben eine Maus schlüpfte. (69)

Similarly, the position of being dependent on the good will of others for lodging during his travels alienates him from friendly contact with the communities through which he passes. Feeling constantly exposed to possible insult, he does not ask farmers' permission to sleep in their barns, "denn was soll man erst lang fragen und sich doch nur beleidigen lassen" (7o); he is therefore always in the wrong, because he takes liberties rather than asking for what he needs; this leads to disputes and arrests "wegen Gewalttätigkeit, Vagabundage und Bettelei" (ibid.); this in turn further alienates him from the authorities and the society who seem to be punishing him unjustly.

His relationship with employers, too, is always hostile, because he believes he is being unjustly treated:

> Er hatte schon als Bursche einem Brotherrn die Finger gebrochen, als dieser ihn züchtigen wollte. Einem andern verschwand er mit Geld; aus notwendiger Gerechtigkeit, wie er sagte. (71)

The only possible companionship, that with his workmates, is destroyed by the casual intimacy of closer aquaintance, which he again considers damaging to his dignity:

> solang er in seiner wortkarg mit freundlicher Ruhe und riesigen Schultern arbeitenden Art, wie es anfangs immer geschah, die Leute in Scheu hielt, blieb er; sobald sie vertraulich und respektlos mit ihm umzugehen begannen, als hätten sie ihn nun erkannt, packte er sich fort. (ibid.)

All approaches to others are thus based on a sense of inferiority, of being constantly at a disadvantage. Isolation, suspicion and hostility, resulting from this feeling, combine to form a persecution complex:

> denn die Welt hielt überall gegen ihn zusammen; kein Zauberwort kam gegen diese Verschwörung auf und keine Güte. (72)

An incidence of threatened physical attack by workmates[4] seems to substantiate his suspicions (71); and the subsequent punishment for his violent self-defence convinces him that he is being dealt with unjustly - "Daß er dafür bestraft wurde, hatte sein Gemüt erschüttert, wie er sagte" (ibid.).

The main persecution, however, comes from the women he encounters fleetingly. They seem to him to be all connected in "ganze Prozessionen von Frauen" (70), as though they have combined forces against him. This feeling develops into a delusion that he is being constantly followed by creatures intent on disturbing him.

> Man könnte also verstehen, daß Moosbrugger schon nach dem ersten Mädchenmord sich damit verantwortete, daß er stets von Geistern verfolgt werde, die ihn bei Tag und Nacht riefen. Sie warfen ihn aus dem Bett, wenn er schlief, und störten ihn bei der Arbeit; dann hörte er sie tags und nachts untereinander sprechen und streiten. (69 f)

The murder for which he is now being tried follows directly from his delusions. Women appear as an hostile army - he refers to a lone woman he encounters as a "Vorpatrouille" (73) - seeking to destroy him in many ways: a woman is

> ein wandelndes Gift ..., eine Betrügerin, die den Mann heimlich auslacht, während sie ihn schwächt und ihm ihr Theater vormacht, wenn sie nicht viel Schlimmeres ihm in ihrer Gewissenslosigkeit antut! (73)

Hedwig, the prostitute he murders, represents such a threat to him:

> Da wurde es zunächst Moosbrugger gewiß, daß ein Beschützer des Mädchens in der Nähe sein müßte; denn woher hätte sie sonst den Mut nehmen können, ihn trotz seines Unwillens zu folgen? Er griff nach dem Steckmesser in die Hosentasche, denn man wollte ihn zum besten haben; vielleicht wieder über ihn herfallen; immer steckt ja unter den Weibern der andere Mann, der einen verhöhnt. (ibid.)

In Moosbrugger's eyes, his act of murder was self-defence, caused by the "verdächtige Benehmen" (75) of the victim: "Ich stellte sie mir doch grausamer vor, als ich derlei Weiber sonst einschätze" (128). Moosbrugger's brutal action on this occasion thus repeats in a more radical way his normal pattern of contact with others: a profound sense of threat, violent self-defence and the conviction that his subsequent punishment is yet another instance of persecution.

Every contact with employees or legal authorities is always a conflict, resulting in accusations and punishments for Moosbrugger, although, subjectively, his actions are never wrong. The world therefore seems to combine against him in a conspiracy of injustice:

> sein Leben war ein Kampf um sein Recht gewesen. In der Einzelzelle dachte Moosbrugger darüber nach, was sein Recht sei. Das konnte er nicht sagen. Aber es war das, was man ihm sein Leben lang vorenthalten hatte. (236)
> So hatte man sein Jus verhöhnt und geschlagen, und er begann wieder zu wandern. Findet man das Jus auf der Straße?! Alle Weiber waren schon das Jus von irgendwem, und alle Äpfel und Schlafstätten; und die Gendarmen und Bezirksrichter waren schlimmer als die Hunde. (237)

Since he is unable to comprehend his imprisonments and committals -

> Aber was das eigentlich war, woran ihn die Leute immer zu packen bekamen und weshalb sie ihn in die Gefängnisse und Irrenanstalten warfen, das konnte Moosbrugger niemals recht herauskriegen. (ibid.)

- each successive instance strengthens his conviction that mysterious forces are at work against him.

Behind Moosbrugger's increasingly pathological sensitivity to real or imagined wrongs is his struggle to maintain his ego. The inferior status of his early life is the source of his compulsion for recognition of his personal worth. This is evident in each of his conflicts with others, where his fear of denigration is a constant source of hostility: the story of his early life contains frequent references to 'Beleidigung'. Throughout the trial he insists on main-

taining his dignity, to the detriment of his own interests, as he refuses to admit his illness. Even the most severe symptoms of his madness, his hallucinations, are not, in his view of himself, signs of mental disintegration, but a capacity which raises him above the normal masses. His attempts to make his crime appear political have the same motivation:

> er erklärte sich höhnisch als "theoretischen Anarchisten", der sich von den Sozialdemokraten jederzeit retten lassen könnte, wenn er von diesen ärgsten jüdischen Ausbeutern des arbeitenden, unwissenden Volks etwas geschenkt nehmen wollte. Da hatte auch er eine "Wissenschaft", ein Gebiet, auf das ihm die gelehrte Anmaßung seiner Richter nicht folgen konnte. (72)

By claiming to be an anarchist, Moosbrugger makes himself a rebel rather than an outcast, and his crimes become "die Unglückfälle einer großen Lebensauffassung" (72). His isolation, too, becomes a sign of superiority:

> Er war ersichtlich krank; aber wenn auch offenbar seine krankhafte Natur den Grund für sein Verhalten abgab, die ihn von den anderen Menschen absonderte, ihm kam das wie ein stärkeres und höheres Gefühl von seinem Ich vor. Sein ganzes Leben war ein zum Lachen und Entsetzen unbeholfener Kampf, um Geltung dafür zu erzwingen. (71)

The stronger consciousness of self which Moosbrugger claims is in fact so precarious that it can be broken down by the disregard of others. The violence of his reaction to insults, actual or imagined, reflects not only his pride, but also his urgent need to defend his ego against the threat of disrespect:

> denn ein unheimliches Gefühl ergriff ihn dann, so als wäre er nicht fest in seiner Haut. (71)

Whenever he feels insecure, then, the boundaries of his personality seem to dissolve, and his identity becomes formless capable of expansion in any direction:

> während alle anderen Leben hundertfach bestehen - in der gleichen Weise gesehen von denen, die sie führen, wie von allen anderen, die sie bestätigen - war sein wahres Leben nur für ihn vorhanden. Es war ein Hauch, der sich immerfort deformiert und die Gestalt wechselt. (75 f)

This flexibility enables Moosbrugger to see the motivation for his crimes as imposed from outside, and therefore not his responsibility.

> Dieser Richter faßte alles in eins zusammen,... und gab es als Schuld Moosbrugger; für den aber bestand es aus lauter einzelnen Vorfällen, die nichts miteinander zu tun hatten und jeder eine andere Ursache besaßen, die außerhalb Moosbruggers und irgendwo im Ganzen der Welt lag. In den Augen des Richters gingen seine Taten von ihm aus, in den seinen waren sie auf ihn zugekommen wie Vögel, die herbeifliegen. (75)

In the same way, Moosbrugger rapidly becomes alienated from his own actions, eventually knowing no more about them than about those of a stranger (241).

At the opposite pole, Moosbrugger's indefinite identity is apparent in the tendency to merge with other people or objects. When he feels uncertain, Moosbrugger senses a deformation of his surroundings, and of his own body.

> Mit einemmal war ein kalter Hauch da. Oder in der Luft tauchte ganz nah vor ihm eine große Kugel auf und flog in seine Brust. Und im gleichen Augenblick fühlte er etwas an sich, in seinen Augen, auf den Lippen oder in den Gesichtsmuskeln; in die ganze Umgebung kam ein Schwinden, ein Schwärzen, und während sich die Häuser auf die Bäume legten, huschten aus dem Gebüsch vielleicht ein paar rasch davonspringende Katzen hervor. (238)

and

> Es war ihm wirr zumut: ... und wenn er daran dachte, so ging der Boden unter den Füßen fort oder sein Kopf fing an, anders am Hals zu sitzen, als er es gewohnt war. (237)

Hedwig, the prostitute he murders, merges with him to become "wiederum er" (74), a "verfluchte zweite Ich" (ibid.). In stabbing her, he is therefore cutting out a part of himself - it reminds him of an occasion when he had cut a large wooden splinter out of his leg (ibid.): "er ... stach so lange auf sie ein, bis er sie ganz von sich losgetrennt hatte" (ibid.). The extension of personality encompasses elements which are not only alien, but also hostile: just as Hedwig is part of himself, his own body is part of the conspiracy against him (396). Moosbrugger sees his hallucinations as both external realities and a part of himself:

> die Gesichte kamen von außen, aber ein Schimmer von Beobachtung sagte ihm zugleich, daß sie trotzdem von ihm selbst kämen. Das Wichtige war, daß es gar nichts Wichtiges bedeutet, ob etwas draußen ist oder innen; in seinem Zustand war das wie helles Wasser zu beiden Seiten einer durchsichtigen Glaswand. (239)

The feeling that internal and external realities are interchangeable reveals the lack of established limits of the personality, as though nothing physical stands in the way of the flow of inward and outward elements.

> Sein Zustand kam ihm unfest vor. Sein mächtiger Körper hielt nicht ganz zu. Der Himmel schaute zuweilen in den Schädel hinein ... Und niemals, wenn sie jetzt auch zuweilen geradezu unangenehm war, verließ ihn eine gewisse wichtige Gehobenheit, die ihm durch die Kerkermauern aus der ganzen Welt zuströmte. (534)

As indicated by the juxtaposition of 'unangenehm' and 'Gehobenheit', Moosbrugger experiences the mobility of his awareness of himself both positively and negatively. On the one hand, it expresses his profound insecurity and confusion, and forms part of the 'conspiracy' which has involved him in brutality and imprisonment.

Positively, on the other hand, it represents the climax of a unique state of unity with the world. He feels that this condition brings superior awareness: "Er dachte besser als andere, denn er dachte außen und innen" (24o). In this state, Moosbrugger feels himself to be quite interchangeable with his surroundings:

> Wenn Moosbrugger einen großen Säbel gehabt hätte, würde er ihn jetzt genommen und dem Stuhl den Kopf abgeschlagen haben. Er würde dem Tisch den Kopf abgeschlagen haben und dem Fenster, dem Kübel und der Türe. Er würde dann allem, dem er den Kopf abschlug, seinen eigenen aufgesetzt haben, denn es gab in dieser Zelle nur seinen eigenen Kopf, und das war schön. Er konnte sich ihn vorstellen, wie er auf den Dingen saß, mit dem breiten Schädel, dem Haar, das sich wie ein Fell vom Scheitel in die Stirn zog. Er hatte die Dinge dann gern. (394)

Ultimately, no barriers or distinctions exist:

> Der Tisch war Moosbrugger.
> Der Stuhl war Moosbrugger.
> Das vergitterte Fenster und die verschlossene Tür war er selbst. (395)

The pleasure this state conveys consists in its reversal of his normal standing in the world. He is no longer inferior, at the mercy of people and objects, but in control:

> Er beherrschte jetzt alles und herrschte es an. Er brachte alles in Ordnung, ehe man ihn tötete.

> Er konnte denken, woran er wollte, augenblicklich war es so fügsam wie ein gut erzogener Hund ... Er hatte ... ein ungeheures Gefühl der Macht ... Alles in der Zelle war pünktlich streng und unverrückbar ... In einer merkwürdigen Umkehrung hatte er den Eindruck, diese Ordnung gehe von ihm aus, obwohl er wußte, daß sie ihm auferlegt war. (ibid.)

Only at such a time does Moosbrugger feel free of persecutions: everyone obeys him, rather than threatening his sense of his own worth by asserting their superiority over him.

> Dann waren sie nicht gegen ihn verschworen, bildete keine Mauer, und es zeigte sich, daß es nur die Anstrengung war ihn übertrumpfen zu wollen, was das Gesicht von Menschen und Dingen wie eine Last verzerrte. (397)

This type of sensation is the high-point of Moosbrugger's experience of the world, as the only situation in which he feels free from frustration and uncertainty. It is at the same time the climax of his insanity, the most extreme distortion of normal perception, emotion, and thinking. This state - "den leichten Tagen und Wochen, wo Moosbrugger fast aus seiner Haut schlüpfen konnte" (397) - is only temporary. In the intervening periods of "Einkerkerung" (ibid.) he is so powerless that he is forced to submit to inanimate objects, his cell and his fittings.

> Diese Dinge, vom Menschen gemacht, Diener, Sklaven,... werden frech. Sie gebieten Halt. Wenn Moosbrugger bemerkte, wie die Dinge mit ihm herumbefahlen, hatte er nicht übel Lust, sie auseinanderzureißen, und mußte sich mühevoll überzeugen, daß ein Kampf mit diesen Dienern der Justiz seiner nicht würdig sei. (531)

Apart from the brief intervals of confidence and power, Moosbrugger's life consists of the struggle to cope with an incomprehensible world.

> Das Leben bildet eine Oberfläche, die so tut, als ob sie so sein müßte, wie sie ist, aber unter ihrer Haut treiben und drängen die Dinge. Moosbrugger stand immer mit den Beinen auf zwei Schollen und hielt sie zusammen, vernünftig bemüht, alles zu vermeiden, was ihn verwirren konnte.(241)
> Gewöhnlich wendete er eben seine ganze Riesenkraft an, um die Welt zusammenzuhalten. (ibid.)

"Rausch und Geisteskrankheit als verwandt"

The essential features of Moosbrugger's madness are extreme isolation, conflict with his surroundings, and the incomprehensibility of the forces controlling his life, leading to an awareness of the world as unstable, and to a struggle to preserve his personality. These factors combine to form two extreme delusional states. On the one hand, the fears and hallucinations of persecution lead to moments of complete loss of control in an "unheimlichen Blutrausch(es)" (243). At the opposite pole, he experiences equally hallucinatory states of expansion of the ego culminating in the merging of his identity with the objects he sees. The insane murderer represents an extreme of human behaviour. As was also shown in the discussion of his criminality, however, the basic elements of his insanity are part of the experience of the world for many other characters in the novel.[6] And, just as in Moosbrugger's case, these experiences often reach a climax in moments of 'Rausch'.

A particularly clear instance of this is presented by the anonymous drunk who involves Ulrich in a dispute with the police. The images depicting the drunk's sensations portray

his experience and his reactions as very closely parallel to Moosbrugger's. The contradicting sensations of self-importance and of the indeterminate state of the self are the same in both cases:

> Das erregte Aufsehen schmeichelte den Betrunkenen. ... Ein leidenschaftlicher Kampf um Geltung begann. Ein höheres Gefühl von seinem Ich setzte sich mit einem Gefühl auseinander, als wäre er nicht fest in seiner Haut ... Ich bin berufen, bei ihnen Ordnung zu machen. (157)

In reference to Moosbrugger:

> Er konnte an vielem bemerken, daß er hier eine wichtige Person sei, und das schmeichelte ihm ... ein stärkeres und höheres Gefühl von seinem Ich ... Sein ganzes Leben war ein ... Kampf, um Geltung dafür zu erzwingen (71) ... ein unheimliches Gefühl, als wäre er nicht fest in seiner Haut (ibid.).
> Er brachte alles in Ordnung. (395)

The drunk also feels reality to be shifting, becoming distorted and losing its defining contours:

> Auch die Welt war nicht fest; sie war ein unsicherer Hauch, der sich immerzu deformierte und die Gestalt wechselte. Häuser standen schief aus dem Raum gebrochen; lächerliche, wimmelnde Tröpfe waren dazwischen die Menschen ... Der ganze Schauplatz war von etwas Flimmerndem ausgefüllt, irgendein Stück Weg des Geschehens kam klar auf ihn zu, aber dann drehten sich wieder die Wände ... Außen und Innen stürzten ineinander. (157)

Moosbrugger sees his surroundings deformed in the same way:

> Es war ein Hauch, der sich immerfort deformiert und die Gestalt wechselt (76) ... während sich die Häuser auf die Bäume legten. (238). (Seine Taten) waren auf ihn zugekommen (75). Die Straßenwände wanken (73). Er war bloß innen und außen. (395)

The instability of reality apparent in these common images has its basis in the individual's disturbed relationship

with reality in both instances. Moosbrugger's view of the world as a network of alien and incomprehensible forces combined against him is reproduced here in a less intense form. The background to this scene shows the drunk's actions as motivated by a similar feeling of frustration. His opposition to the 'Große Idee' (156) of the 'Parallelaktion' as a political manouvre by the Establishmentinduces the feeling that his whole life is ordered by the ghostly machine of the state authorities.

> Er (der Schutzmann) wohnte ihm beobachtend bei wie ein hervorstehender Ausläufer des eisernen Hebelwerks Staat, der in Knöpfen und andren Metallteilen endet. Nun hat der ständige Lebensaufenthalt in einem wohlgeordneten Staat aber durchaus etwas Gespenstisches; man kann weder auf die Straße treten, noch ein Glas Wasser trinken oder die Elektrische besteigen ohne die ausgewogenen Hebel eines riesigen Apparats von Gesetzen und Beziehungen zu berühren, sie in Bewegung zu setzen oder sich von ihnen in der Ruhe seines Daseins erhalten zu lassen, die tief ins Innere greifen, während sie auf der anderen Seite sich in ein Netzwerk verlieren, dessen ganze Zusammensetzung überhaupt noch kein Mensch entwirrt hat. (ibid.)

The drunk's reaction could serve as a summary of Moosbrugger's desperate response to the conspiracy against him:

> es kann den Menschen zuweilen eine Panik erfassen wie im willenlosen Traum, ein Bewegungssturm tollen Umsichschlagens wie ein Tier, das in den unverständlichen Mechanismus eines Netzes geraten ist. (157)

The combination of intoxication and the sense of being trapped and under attack forms a parallel state of mind to Moosbrugger's insanity, expressed in a similar, though milder, form of aggression and violence.

Ulrich's involvement in this incident gives it added validity as an expression of a more general experience. Ulrich, too, is drawn into the machinery of inextricable authority, operating without reference to the individual involved - "eine Maschine, die ihn in unpersönliche, allgemeine Bestandteile zergliederte" (159) - and finds its influence determining his future life by involving him in the 'Parallelaktion'. This train of events substantiates the ideas he is reflecting on immediately before the incident. These ideas and feelings, too, are linked through the use of parallel imagery with both the drunk and Moosbrugger. The sensation of the intoxicated or the insane that "die Welt war nicht fest" is the basis of Ulrich's philosophy: "Er hält kein Ding für fest" (154).[7] The emotional correlative of this is expressed in the same sense of the displacement of his surroundings - "Häuser, wie aus dem Raum gebrochen" (152). Ulrich also experiences the positive extreme of this flexibility of reality, like Moosbrugger, in merging with objects, feeling "Baum und Stein wie eine empfindsame Fortsetzung seines eigenen Leibes" (156).

The theatrical image expressing Moosbrugger's uncertainty on the night of the murder - "Die Straßenwände wanken wie Kulissen, hinter denen etwas auf das Stichwort wartet um herauszutreten" (73) - recurs to portray Ulrich's feeling that his life is purposeless:

"Da habe ich also einmal eine Rolle spielen wollen.

> zwischen solchen Kulissen wie diesen ... Man hat mir Stichworte gegeben, und ich habe gefühlt, sie gehen mich nichts an". (155)

The unreality of his attempts to express his personality in his activity is shared with the drunk.

> Wie flimmernden Lampenfieber war damals alles mit meinen eigenen Vorsätzen und Erwartungen ausgefüllt gewesen. Unmerklich hat sich aber inzwischen der Boden gedreht, ich bin ein Stück meines Weges voran gekommen und stehe vielleicht schon beim Ausgang. (ibid.);

> Der ganze Schauplatz war von etwas Flimmerndem ausgefüllt, irgendein Stück Weg des Geschehens kam klar auf ihn zu, aber dann drehten sich die Wände. (157)

Both Moosbrugger and the drunk react against this awareness of alienation from their own actions with violence. Ulrich observes his own situation more dispassionately, but the impulse to find a solution by force is also present in his feeling of frustration:

> Aber während der eine mit diesen Gedanken lächelnd durch den schwebenden Abend ging, hielt der andere die Fäuste geballt, in Schmerz und Zorn; er war der wenig sichtbare, und woran er dachte, war, eine Beschwörungsformel zu finden, einen Griff, den man vielleicht packen könnte, den eigentlichen Geist des Geistes, das fehlende, vielleicht nur kleine Stück, das den zerbrochenen Kreis schließt. (155)

Whereas the others simply suffer the experience of alienation from incomprehensible and threatening reality, and react against it with senseless violence, Ulrich analyses the situation. He concludes that this state is caused by the proliferation of ideas, facts, activities and social structures, which lack "der Strahlpunkt, wo sie sich vereinen" (154); and reacts with the resolve to find this missing focus.

The reference to the theatre recurs later in connection with Ulrich, indicating his growing awareness that his mission has failed. Ulrich's initial enjoyment of the dramatic effect of a lone walk through dark streets reflects the feeling of involvement and importance conveyed by his work with the 'Parallelaktion' and, in the immediately preceding incident, by Arnheim's offer of a position in his company; and his sudden disillusionment foreshadows his recognition that all this activity has not brought him any closer to a solution of the 'Frage des rechten Lebens'. The atmosphere of the incident recalls many components of the scene in which Moosbrugger murders Hedwig:

> Man konnte das Gefühl von Geschehen haben in dieser Nacht wie einem Theater. Man fühlte, daß man eine Erscheinung in dieser Welt war; etwas, das großer wirkt, als es ist; das hallt und, wenn es an beleuchteten Flächen vorbeikommt, seinen Schatten zur Begleitung hat wie einen mächtig zuckenden Narren, der sich aufrichtet und im nächsten Augenblick wieder demütig an die Fersen kriecht... Dunkelheit sprang aus den Ecken, Überfall und Totschlag fackelten in dem halberleuchteten Durchlaß: heftiges, altertümlich und blutig feierliches Glück faßte die Seele an... Ulrich stellte sich plötzlich vor, mit wieviel Selbstgenuß und innerer "Regie" Arnheim jetzt an seiner Stelle hier gehen würde. Er hatte keine Freude mehr an seinem Schatten und Hall... er kam sich jetzt nur noch wie ein durch die Galerie des Lebens irrendes Gespenst vor, das voll Bestürzung den Rahmen nicht finden kann, in den es hineinschlüpfen soll. (647 f)

The analogy with Moosbrugger is made explicit when Ulrich meets a prostitute during his walk. This meeting reminds him of "der krankhafte Komödiant" (652), Moosbrugger, and he projects himself completely into Moosbrugger's state of mind on the night of the murder.

> Als die kulissenhafte Unsicherheit der Straßenwände einen Augenblick stillhielt, war er auf das unbekannte Wesen gestoßen, das ihn in der Nordnacht bei der Brücke erwartete. Welch wunderbares Erkennen mußte das gewesen sein, vom Kopf bis zu den Sohlen; Ulrich glaubte einen Augenblick es sich vorstellen zu können! Er fühlte, daß ihn etwas hochhob, wie das eine Welle tut. Er verlor das Gleichgewicht, aber er brachte es nicht, dahingetragen in der Bewegung. Sein Herz zog sich zusammen, aber das Vorstellen verwirrte sich dabei in einer unbegrenzten Erweiterung und hörte alsbald in einer Art fast entmachtender Wollust auf. (ibid.)

The depth of feeling governing Moosbrugger's actions on this night, as Ulrich imagines it, stands in stark contrast to Ulrich's recognition that his own actions have been determined by his surroundings and have not really involved his inner self. He considers his alienation from his way of life typical of his age, again expressing this opinion in terms of the theatre:

> "Höchstens so, wie ein Schauspieler das Bewußtsein für Kulisse und Schminke verliert und zu handeln meint, darf der Mensch heute den unsicheren Hintergrund von Lehre vergessen, von dem alle seine Tätigkeiten abhängen!" (650)

This abstraction of living according to external principles or influences is completely absent from the intensity of Moosbrugger's emotions and actions -

> das Bild eines Handelns, worin das Zugreifen, wie es aus höchster Erregung folgt, und das Ergriffenwerden in einen unbeschreiblichen Zustande eins wurden, der Lust von Zwang, Sinn von Notwendigkeit, höchste Tätigkeit von seligen Empfangen nicht unterscheiden ließ. (682)

Moosbrugger's surrender to his "Zwangsvorstellungen" (ibid.) thus represents the "Glauben an seine Rolle" (ibid.) which is lacking from Ulrich's life, without the unity and pur-

pose of conviction.[8]

A similar sense of lack provides the background for another type of intoxication in the novel's system of parallels: the intoxication Walter and Clarisse induce by playing the piano together.[9] For them, particularly for Walter, music is a "betäubenden Getränk" (52), a "Narkose" (67). The height of their "Rausch" (6o) is described in terms which recur in the 'Betrunkener' incident:

> Es war der Augenblick, wo die Spieler ihr Blut anhalten, um es in gleichem Rhythmus loslassen zu können, und die Augenachsen ihnen wie vier gleichgerichtete lange Stiele aus dem Kopf stehn, während sie mit der Sitzfläche gespannt das Stühlchen festhalten. (142) Obgleich dieser Vorgang ganz und gar wirklich war, verschwanden die Mauern des Zimmers, und es erhob sich an ihrer Stelle das goldene Gewände der Musik, dieser geheimnisvolle Raum, in dem Ich und Welt, Wahrnehmung und Gefühl, Innen und Außen auf das Unbestimmteste ineinanderstürzen; (144)
>
> Die Augenachsen standen wie Stiele aus dem Kopf, während die Fußsohlen die Erde festhielten. ... Außen und Innen stürzten ineinander. (157)

Music represents for Walter and Clarisse moments of communion - "Einswerden" (143) - in a series of strong passions - "Heiterkeit, Trauer, Zorn und Angst, Lieben und Hassen, Begehren und Überdruß" (ibid.). But these emotions are, like the drunk's "bis zum Rasen erregte leibliche Gehäuse des Zorns" (157),

> keine vollen Gefühle, sondern nicht viel mehr als das zum Rasen erregte körperliche Gehäuse davon. Sie saßen steif und entrückt auf ihren Sesselchen, waren auf nichts und in nichts und über nichts oder jeder auf, in und über etwas anderes zornig, verliebt und traurig, dachten Verschiedenes und meinten jeder das Seine. (143)

The "Einswerden" (ibid.) of the periods of 'Rausch' is an illusion, and the passions are a substitute for authentic emotion and experience. In seeking to escape from the emptiness and indecisiveness of their lives, they turn to artificially induced feelings which come no closer to expressing or touching the essence of the individual, or breaking down the barriers around them. Their illusory ecstacy justifies Ulrich's condemnation of music as "Ohnmacht des Willens und Zerrüttung des Geistes" (48).

Walter experiences the same kind of excitement and false union with a demonstrating mob. This, too, is designated as "Rausch" (627), "etwas unvernünftig Überströmendes und über die Vernunft Wegströmendes" (626). The members of the diffuse mass have confused and mutually contradictory ideas of their intention, but nevertheless merge into "einer allen gemeinsamen lebendigen Kraft" (627). Their excitement is presented as a substitute for a more intense and meaningful state, which is felt to be lacking in their normal behaviour.

> es schien wahrhaftig schon gleichgültig zu sein, was dort geschah, wohin es alle zog, und zu genügen, daß es etwas Ungewöhnliches sei, um sie außer sich zu bringen; und obwohl dieses "Außer sich geraten" nur in jenem abgeschwächten Wortsinn zu verstehen war, der eine sehr gewöhnliche leichte Erregung bedeutet, spürte man doch darin eine feine Verwandtschaft mit vergessenen Zuständen der Verzückung und Verklärung, gleichsam eine wachsende unbewußte Bereitschaft, aus Kleidern und Haut zu fahren. (626)

In this case, too, intoxication represents an approach to some

kind of deep involvement strong enough to break down the barriers around the individual ego. The mass hysteria of this mob is seen as "leer", "besinnungslos" (627) and potentially destructive. This negative outcome is explained as reflecting the lack of purpose and order characterizing the age,

> denn wäre der Sinn des Lebens in Ordnung, würde es auch seine Sinnlosigkeit sein, und müßte nicht die Begleiterscheinungen des Schwachsinns haben. (ibid.)

The kind of intense commitment offered by the excitement of the crowd - or the other forms of intoxication - is not established as inherently negative: the forms it assumes in these instances, however, do not provide an authentic experience, because the basis for such commitment is lacking.

Moosbrugger's insanity is closely linked with frustrated sexuality, which dominates his acts of aggression: "Der stärkste Trieb wendet von Zeit zu Zeit sein Wesen grausam nach außen" (71). This connection recurs in Ulrich's description of "die Bewußtseinsveränderung durch den Geschlechtsrausch" (259) as "eine Wolke des Irrsinns" (115). Bonadea's nymphomania makes her a particularly clear exponent of this. The image of the stage is again used in the context of intoxication, to describe her attitude to the violent change:

> Und man selbst fühlt sich dabei ganz deutlich wie eine von künstlichem Licht angestrahlte Kulisse; es sind Bühnenaugen, ein Bühnenschnurrbart, sich öffnende Kostümknöpfe, was man vor sich hat, und die Augenblicke vom Betreten des Zimmers bis zur entsetzlichen ersten wieder nüchternen Bewegung spielen sich in einem Bewußtsein ab, das aus dem Kopf hinaus getreten ist und die Zimmer-

wände mit einer Tapete des Wahns überzieht. (259)

Ulrich sees his relationship with Bonadea in similar terms, stressing the sharp change of mental state, nevertheless accompanied by the realization that this occurs without any real personal involvement:

> jetzt, nachdem es geschehen war, fühlte er wieder, wie wenig es ihn anging. Das unglaublich Schnelle solcher Veränderungen, die einen gesunden Menschen in einen schäumenden Narren verwandeln, wurde überaus deutlich daran. Es kam ihm aber vor, daß diese Liebesverwandlung des Bewußtseins nur ein besonderer Fall von etwas weit Allgemeinerem sei; denn auch ein Theaterabend, ein Konzert, ein Gottesdienst, alle Äußerungen des Inneren sind heute solche rasch wieder aufgelöste Inseln eines zweiten Bewußtseinszustandes, der in den gewöhnlichen zeitweilig eingeschoben wird. (115)

Man's capacity for sudden transformations between extreme poles of behaviour is also the dominant impression left in Ulrich by another instance of abnormal sexuality: the scene involving the 'Kranker' he observes from Clarisse's window. Ulrich is absorbed in the nature of this change:

> Die Veränderung, dachte er, müsse wohl in dem Augenblick, wo dieser über das Gitter steige, so vollständig sein, daß sie sich im einzelnen nicht beschreiben lasse. Und so natürlich, als wäre das ein passender Vergleich, fühlte er sich alsbald an einen Sänger erinnert, der soeben noch gegessen und getrunken hat, dann aber ans Klavier tritt, die Hände über den Bauch faltet und, den Mund zum Liede öffnend, teils ein anderer ist, teils nicht... Die völlige Vollständigkeit dieser Verwandlung, die sich innen vollzieht, aber außen durch das Entgegenkommen der Welt ihre Bestätigung findet, hatte es ihm angetan. (787)

The exhibitionist intends only to shock his victim, but the suppressed violence of his attack equates him with Moosbrugger:

> sobald eine einzelne Frau vorbeikam ... waren das keine Menschen mehr für ihn, sondern Puppen, die sich sein Bewußtsein unsinnig zurechtschnitt. Es erfüllte ihn

> eine so grausame Rücksichtslosigkeit gegen sie wie einen Mörder. (ibid.)

Although these instances present abnormal sexuality, Ulrich sees the same forces at work in normal sexual relationships.

> An nichts entzündet sich die bürgerliche Liebe so sehr wie an der schmeichelhaften Erfahrung, daß man die Kraft besitzt, einen Menschen in ein Entzücken zu jagen, worin er sich so toll benimmt, daß man geradezu zum Mörder werden müßte, wenn man auf zweite Weise die Ursache solcher Veränderungen werden wollte.- Und wahrhaftig, daß es solche Veränderungen zivilisierter Menschen gibt, daß solche Wirkung von uns ausgeht!: liegt nicht diese Frage und Verwunderung in den kühnen und verglasten Augen all derer, die an der einsamen Insel der Wollust anlegen, wo sie Mörder, Schicksal und Gott sind und auf äußerst bequeme Weise den höchsten ihnen erreichbaren Grad von Irrationalität und Abenteuerlichkeit erleben? (285) [10]

Ulrich's interpretations establish 'Rausch' as a general outlet for the passions suppressed by civilization. The associations with Moosbrugger emphasize the strength of these drives. Moosbrugger's uncontrolled violence is thus presented as a more extreme case of a common phenomenon: normal society reveals the same irrational fears and drives, when its inhibitions are removed by intoxication.

More significant is the background against which the transformation from normality to insanity occurs. The factors which form the background to Moosbrugger's illness also play a large part in the states of intoxication depicted. Basically, these states are a reaction against a sense of alienation epitomised in Moosbrugger's extreme isolation. The 'Betrunkener' and Ulrich, e.g., find themselves enmeshed in the impersonal and threatening machinery of bureaucracy, in

the same way as Moosbrugger feels himself to be trapped by the incomprehensible forces of an alien reality. The fact that such forces dominate the life of the individual, although they have no meaning for him, is also recognised by Ulrich. His awareness that most of his life is spent in "närrische Tätigkeit" (256) without personal involvement is reflected also in the pseudo-ecstasy of Walter and Clarisse, or of the angry crowd: their flight into intoxication proves to be a reaction against the shallowness and emptiness of a life without unifying purpose. In this search for unity and conviction they can be equated with the 'Parallelaktion' in its search for a 'Große Idee'; and it foreshadows the enthusiasm for the War, which later seemed to provide this unifying purpose.[11] The individual is alienated from the activity of his society, and finds a substitute involvement in the intensity of various forms of intoxication: he responds to this maladjustment almost as desperately as Moosbrugger does.

This process becomes more conscious in the case of Arnheim. Although he represents the epitome of the well-balanced, reasonable and cultured gentleman, Arnheim, too, is occasionally troubled by "Anwandlungen" (383) which profoundly disturb his equlibrium. His relationship with Diotima arouses passions which normally have no place in his restrained and ordered world. These emotions are equated with intoxication:

> Nun weiß man ja wohl, daß am verantwortungslosen Rand der bewußten Person, von wo die Märchen und Gedichte

> kommen, auch allerhand kindische Erinnerungen zu Hause sind und sichtbar werden, wenn ausnahmsweise der leichte Rausch einer Ermüdung, das fessellose Spiel des Alkohols oder irgendeine Erschütterung diese Bezirke durchhellen; und leibhaftiger als solche Schemen waren auch Arnheims Anwandlungen nicht. (383)

Despite the ephemeral nature of these experiences, they do make Arnheim realize that there is something missing from his outwardly completely fulfilling way of life:

> Das Allgemeingültige, das er immer seinen Handlungen zu geben bestrebt war, als ein vor ganz Europa lebender Mensch, zeigte sich ihm mit einemmal als etwas Unheimliches ... Seit er das Feuer wieder kennengelernt hatte, das ihm die Zunge verdorrte, überwältigte ihn das Gefühl, er habe einen Weg, den er ursprünglich gegangen, vergessen, und die gesamte Ideologie eines großen Mannes, die ihn erfüllte, sei nur der Notersatz für etwas, das ihm verlorengegangen war. (383 f)

An earlier anecdote gives an indication of the element missing from Arnheim's life. His most prized possession is a collection of statues of saints in "verzückten Stellungen" (187) - "die Seele rang die Körper wie ein Stück Wäsche, aus dem man das Wasser preßt" (ibid.). The impression created by these sculptures is that of "einer Katatonikerversammlung in einem Irrenhaus" (ibid.), but Arnheim is profoundly impressed by the intensity their attitudes express:

> ein schreckenartiges Staunen war in ihm wie vor einer halb irrsinnigen Welt. Er fühlte, wie in der Moral ursprünglich ein unsägliches Feuer geglüht hat ... die Ahnung also eines Frühzustands der Seele, der nicht ganz geheuerlich und doch den Göttern liebenswert gewesen sein mußte, bildete dann einen seltsamen Rand von Unruhe um sein sonst so selbstgefällig ausgebreitetes Denken. (ibid.)

The strength of conviction apparent in the actions of the martyred saints is felt to be related to insanity, but at

the same time it is considered an ideal state, unapproachable in normal behaviour. This impression is substantiated by the accompanying incident, involving Arnheim's reaction to the discovery that his gardener has been stealing from him. The gardener is obsessed with gaining enough money to become independent. Arnheim castigates him "wegen der Irrwege seines leidenschaftlichen Erwerbtriebs" (188), but nevertheless envies the thief, without knowing why. Again, the major factor is the strength of purpose and the depth of personal commitment evident in the other's actions, and felt to be absent from his own. In both instances Arnheim senses something positive in states which by general standards approach the pathological -"denn dauernd vermögen bloß Narren, Geistesgestörte und Menschen mit fixen Ideen, im Feuer der Beseeltheit auszuharren"(186) - as either criminal or insane. The corollary to this realization is presented in his awareness that his life is dominated by invalid standards: "daß sein Seelenleben voll von verblaßten Moralpräparaten sei" (383). Arnheim's problem is thus basically the same as that behind the 'Parallelaktion' efforts:

> "Es ist das Kennzeichen einer Zeit, welche die innere Sicherheit gesunder Zeiten verloren hat", bemerkte Arnheim darauf "daß sich in ihr nur schwer etwas als das Wichtigste und Größte herausbildet". (196 f)

'Eine geheimnisvolle Zeitkrankheit'

Ulrich defines the 'Zeitkrankheit' in terms of a loss of something essential but indefinable - "Etwas Unwägbares. Ein

Vorzeichen. Eine Illusion" (57) - which has resulted in disintegration:

> Wie wenn ein Magnet die Eisenspäne losläßt und sie wieder durcheinandergeraten. Wie wenn Fäden aus einem Knäuel herausfallen. Wie wenn ein Zug sich gelockert hat. (57 f)

Throughout the novel this lack, which has also become evident in the background to the various kinds of 'Rausch', is expressed in terms of mental instability or abnormality.

Ulrich sees the basis of the disturbance of the age as "ganz gewöhnliche Dummheit" (58), a "(geistige) Unordnung" (490) in which each individual acts "gehirnlos"(ibid.) -

> einer rennt dahin, der andere dorthin, jeder mit einem Gedanken im Schnabel, den er für den einzigen auf der Welt hält: ... jeder von ihnen ist dumm ... aber das Ganze ist wie eine Experimentalgemeinschaft. (ibid.)

The positive element in Ulrich's view of the potential productiveness of experiment is lacking in Arnheim's diagnosis of his age as suffering the consequences of "die Entthronung ... des Gehirns" (408), "geistige Zerrissenheit" (588).[12] This diffusion is demonstrated, e.g., by the confused mass of proposals called forth by the 'Parallelaktion's' search for a meaningful project. Ulrich has to deal with a series of highly improbable suggestions and theories for the betterment of mankind: each is so obsessed with his private system that Ulrich suspects "den Eindruck eines Geistekranken" (349), and is surprised to find normality. General Stumm's attempts to comprehend civilian civilization, too, end in

an equation of diffuseness with insanity: the library, for him the epitome of civilized society, is a "Tollhaus" (462) because its vast size makes it impossible to order or comprehend each separate entity.

Arnheim's way of life, the fusion of many widely differing interests, represents an attempt to counter this fragmentation by merging many different spheres in the concerns of one unified personality. His activities therefore attempt to encompass the various elements of the 'Zerrissenheit' of the age, but in a way which is intended to re-unite them: on the contrary it actually perpetuates the divisions. His ability to combine apparently conflicting interests is based on the fact that

> eine doppelte geistige Persönlichkeit zu besitzen, schon längst nicht mehr ein Kunststück ist, das nur Narren fertigbringen, sondern daß im Tempo der Gegenwart die Möglichkeit politischer Einsicht, die Fähigkeit, einen Zeitungsartikel zu schreiben, die Kraft, an neue Richtungen in Kunst und Literatur zu glauben, und unzähliges andere ganz und gar auf der Begabung gegründet ist, für bestimmte Stunden gegen seine Überzeugung überzeugt zu sein, von dem vollen Bewußtseinsinhalt einen Teil abzuspalten und diesen zu einem neuen Vollüberzeugtsein auszubreiten.(391)

The capacity on which Arnheim's way of life is based, then, is the ability to extend without limitation in any direction, "ein Tun ohne Ränder und Lauf" (392). In this he simply follows the tendency "das in der gegenwärtigen Zeit alles ins Uferlose gehe" (ibid.). The possibility for "Umgrenzung in der Einheit seiner Person" (ibid.) is cancelled out by the fact that his personality is not really involved, to the extent

that none of his ideas or actions express genuine personal convictions:

> Es bedeutete auf diese Weise noch einen Vorzug, daß Arnheim ganz ehrlich niemals von dem überzeugt war, was er sagte. (391 f)

Arnheim is thus a model for the spirit of his age, split into individual factions, without any coordinating superstructure.

Musil's analysis of this situation culminates in an analogy with insanity. Fragmentation into individual systems results from the individual's need to come to terms with reality by reducing it to a sphere he can cope with; but he also needs to see his own system as part of an all-encompassing whole.

> Aber wenn man näher hinsieht, ist es doch ein äußerst künstlicher Bewußtseinszustand, der dem Menschen den aufrechten Gang zwischen kreisenden Gestirnen verleiht und ihm erlaubt, inmitten der fast unendlichen Unbekanntheit der Welt würdevoll die Hand zwischen den zweiten und dritten Rockknopf zu stecken. Und um das zuwege zu bringen, gebraucht nicht nur jeder Mensch seine Kunstgriffe, der Idiot ebensogut wie der Weise, sondern diese persönlichen Systeme von Kunstgriffen sind auch noch kunstvoll eingebaut in die moralischen und intellektuellen Gleichgewichtsvorkehrungen der Gesellschaft und Gesamtheit, die im Größeren dem gleichen Zweck dienen. (527)

The general moral and intellectual stabilizing forces do not, however, remain permanently valid; the inevitable "Abnutzung des Zusammenhalts" (ibid.) is described in terms of insanity:

> Aber von Zeit zu Zeit, nach solchen Zufriedenheitszuständen, die man in gewissem Sinn auch Zwangszustände des Fühlens und Wollens nennen könnte, scheint das Gegenteil über uns zu kommen oder, um es gleichfalls in Begriffen eines Narrenhauses auszudrücken, es setzt dann plötzlich auf der Erde eine gewaltige

> Ideenflucht ein, nach deren Ablauf das ganze Menschenleben um neue Mittelpunkte und Achsen gelagert ist. (ibid.) 13)

The 'Irrenhaus' analogy is expanded in the chapter "Ein Gleichnis", interposed between the "Ein großes Ereignis ist im Entstehen..." chapters depicting the final meeting of the 'Parallelaktion'. These chapters follow immediately upon the depiction of the visit to the asylum to see Moosbrugger; and they point forward to the War which is now 'im Entstehen'. The comparison begins with a description of the mentality of the idiot, as

> ein Geisteszustand, der durch keine weitspannenden Begriffe zusammengehalten, durch keine Scheidungen und Abstraktionen geläutert wird, ein Geisteszustand der niedersten Zusammenfügung. (1o15)

The generally established lack of a unifying intellectual basis for the activity of the age is set directly parallel to the idiot's mental state:

> und es darf behauptet werden, daß sich auch die Welt, unerachtet alles in ihr erhaltenen Geistes, in einem solchen der Imbezillität verwandten Zustand befindet, ja es läßt sich das gar nicht vermeiden, wenn man die Geschehnisse, die sich in ihr abspielen, aus dem Ganzen verstehen will. (ibid.)

The diverse and contradictory opinions expressed by the assembled members of the 'Parallelaktion', who purport to be working towards a common goal, exemplify this situation. Graf Leinsdorf, disappointed that the 'Große Idee' fails to materialize, draws the same conclusion. Despite the "Klugheit im einzelnen " (1o17) - the committee has invited the intellectual elite to work with them - the dominant state is

still one of "der Unzurechnungsfähigkeit im ganzen" (ibid.):

> Wenn man das millionenfach verkleinern könnte und sozusagen auf die Ausmaße eines Einzelkopfes bringen, so gäbe es darum genau das Bild der Unberechenbarkeit, Vergeßlichkeit, Unwissenheit und eines närrischen Herumhopsens, das sich Graf Leinsdorf immer von einem Verrückten gemacht hatte. (ibid.)

Clarisse: 'Erlösungswahn': 'Wahn' as 'Erlösung'

The depiction of Clarisse's decline into insanity begins with the state of intoxication induced by playing the piano with Walter. Whereas music represents for Walter a chance to escape from the failure of his hopes, for Clarisse it is the beginning of a much more significant state which culminates in a sense of mission.[14]

Music has always been closely associated with her relationship with Walter, particularly in her conviction that she is destined to achieve greatness with him:

> Eines Tags ... war sie aus dem Schlaf der Kindheit erwacht, und da war auch schon die Überzeugung fertig gewesen, daß sie berufen sei, etwas auszurichten, eine besondere Rolle zu spielen, vielleicht sogar zu etwas Großem ausersehen sei... Dann kam Walter, das war der Tag... Sie wußte nun, daß sie etwas Titanenhaftes tun werde; was es sein würde, vermochte sie noch nicht zu sagen, aber einstweilen empfand sie es am heftigsten bei Musik und hoffte dann, daß Walter ein noch größeres Genie sein werde als Nietzsche. (145 f)

With the failure of these ambitions, music becomes not resignation but an opening into another world: a world in which, e.g., she sees herself as Moosbrugger's rescuer, restoring a state of "Kraft, Mut, Tugend, Güte, Schönheit,

Reichtum" (146). She recognizes the emptiness of the intoxication of the music itself,

> alle diese Melancholien, Freudensprünge, Zornausbrüche, die man dabei durchrast, ohne daß es doch ganz wirkliche Leidenschaften wären. (444)

Clarisse sees a deeper significance behind the passions aroused by the music. This awareness is expressed in terms which recall Moosbrugger's hallucinations

> In flatternden Nebeln sprangen Bilder auf, verschmolzen, überzogen einander, verschwanden, das war Clarissens Denken; ... dann konnte man die Gedanken wie Dämonen hinter der Bühne stehen fühlen, und das zeitliche Nacheinander der Erlebnisse, das anderen Menschen eine richtige Stütze abgibt, wurde in Clarisse zu einem Schleier, der seine Falten bald dicht übereinander warf, bald in einen kaum noch sichtbaren Hauch auflöste. (144)

The stage-image has particular significance for Clarisse, since she believes in the role she is destined to play. The image recurs when, after an argument with Walter, she takes the first steps towards fulfilling her own mission.

> Sie wußte irgendetwas von Schnürböden in Theatern; dort oben, von wo die Seile laufen, saß sie also, während Walter seinen Abgang über die Treppe hatte. Sie malte sich aus, daß die Schauspielerinnen in ihren Spielpausen .... in Tücher geschlagen in dem Gebälk über der Bühne sitzen und zusehen; sie war jetzt auch eine solche Schauspielerin und hatte alle Vorgänge unter sich zu Füßen. Darin kam wieder ihr alter Lieblingsgedanke hervor, daß das Leben eine schauspielerische Aufgabe sei... Aber man muß den richtigen Instinkt für das Leben haben, wie ein Sturmvogel! ... In dieser Vorstellung fand sie einen Ersatz dafür, daß sie nicht mehr an Walters Zukunft glaubte ... das ungeheure Drama der einzelnen hatte begonnen. (655 f)

The drama Clarisse has in mind here is the struggle with Ulrich, to convince him that she "von ihm ... den Erlöser der Welt empfangen werde" (660). The conviction that this

is the role she is intended to play develops out of her belief in the strength of her will, in the strange powers she has shown in her early experiences with her father (294 f and 436 f), with Georg Gröschl (438) and with Meingast (439 - 441).

Her sense of mission is associated with the "Rausch" (442) of her youthful love for Walter, which she now sees as

> eine Inkarnation ... von etwas Unfleischlichem, einem Sinn, einer Aufgabe, einem Schicksal, wie sie für Auserwählte zwischen den Sternen vorbereitet werden. (442)

The precise form this task assumes is determined by an hallucination, which she afterwards links with the condition beyond intoxication.

> Ihr schmaler Körper wurde nach innen tief, empfindlich, lebendig, fremd, eins nach dem andern; ein Kind lag licht und lächelnd in ihrem Arm. Von ihren Schultern strahlte das Goldkleid der Gottesmutter zu Boden und die Gemeinde sang. Es war außer ihr, der Herr war der Welt geboren! (436)

This vision gradually assumes the position of the hidden 'Sinn' which has been prefigured by the experience of 'Rausch'. Like Ulrich, Clarisse sees "Rausch" as leading to a "zweite Bewußtseinszustand" (115) which is equated with "Äußerung des Inneren" (ibid.). Just as in Moosbrugger's moments of 'Entrückung', she feels that the limits of the personality have been dissolved, and that she is able to merge with her surroundings. She explains this state to Ulrich:

> "Hast du nicht selbst einmal gesagt, daß der Zustand, in dem wir leben, Risse hat, aus denen sozusagen ein unmöglicher Zustand hervorschaut ... Ich mache Musik oder male; das ist so, wie wenn ich eine spanische Wand vor ein Loch in der Mauer stellen würde ... Nun, das Weitere ist einfach: durch dieses Loch muß man hinaus! Und ich kann das! Ich habe Tage, wo ich aus mir hinausschlüpfen kann. Dann steht man ... wie geschält zwischen den Dingen, von denen auch die schmutzige Rinde abgezogen ist. Oder man ist mit allem, was dasteht, durch die Luft wie ein zusammengewachsener Zwilling verbunden. (659)

This state is decribed in terms which link it with Walter's fear for her sanity:

> sie ist dann außer sich, sie kann nicht angeben wo; aber keineswegs ist sie abwesend, im Gegenteil, man könnte eher sagen, sie sei inwesend, in einem tieferen Raum, der in einer den gewöhnlichen Vorstellungen unfaßbaren Weise in dem Raum steckt, den ihr Körper in der Welt einnimmt. (443)

It is this concept of a hidden space within, which Walter considers threatening:

> Namentlich wenn sie gemeinsam musizierten, fühlte er das. Clarissens Spiel war hart und farblos, einem ihm fremden Gesetz der Erregung gehorchend; wenn die Körper bis zum Durchschimmern der Seele glühten, kam es erschreckend zu ihm herüber. Etwas Unbestimmbares riss sich dann los in ihr und drohte mit ihrem Geist davonzufliegen. Es kam aus einem geheimen Hohlraum in ihrem Wesen, den man ängstlich verschlossen halten mußte. (62)
> Er (Ulrich) verschlimmerte ruchlos in ihr ... die Kaverne des Unheils, ... den geheimen leeren Raum, wo es an Ketten riß, die eines Tages ganz nachlassen konnten. (63)

When Clarisse's vision of herself as the mother of the Redeemer merges with the state of being both "außer sich" and "inwesend", the hidden region which Walter fears becomes the dominant force in her life. Clarisse accepts her hallucination "als ob ihr Schicksal plötzlich in den Sternen geschrieben stünde"(444), and from this point on, her sense of mission

becomes an incurable delusion. The basis of her mission is the resolve "daß man alles zu tun weigern misse, was nicht mit ganzer Seele geschieht" (ibid.):

> Vielleicht war es der Sinn aller der Augenblicke, wo sie aus sich hinaustrat, daß sie Gottesmutter werden sollte... "Vielleicht kann jede Mutter Gottesmutter werden ... wenn sie nicht gewähren läßt, nicht lügt noch wirkt, sondern das, was zutiefst in ihr ist, als Kind außer sich bringt!" (ibid.)

With Ulrich's refusal to cooperate in her scheme to become the mother of an 'Erlöser', Clarisse's 'Erlösungswahn' becomes primarily concentrated on her own active role in overcoming the sickness of the age. This aspect begins with her interest in Moosbrugger, whom she links with her idol Nietzsche, and finally culminates in her delusional equation of herself with Christ. Her suggestion that the 'Parallelaktion' should organize a 'Nietzsche-Jahr' and at the same time arrange for Moosbrugger's release links the two in a way which Ulrich considers "irrsinnig" (352). But the context in which her idea is expressed, as one of the many impractical and unreasonable proposals made to the 'Parallelaktion', establishes her growing madness as a reflection of a general trend.[14]

Clarisse's obsession with 'Erlösung' is a more extreme instance of a common desire to overcome the 'Zeitkrankheit' with a specific personal scheme. In each case the conviction that a minor change in man's behaviour or organisation will cause a universal betterment of mankind gives

this scheme a delusional quality.

> Denn nicht nur ein Mann wie er (Leinsdorf) sah das Wahre, das uns not tut, sondern auch unzählige andere Menschen wähnen sich in seinem Besitz ... viele von den Menschen, in denen dann ein Vorrat von ungültig unbefriedigten Träumen zurückbleibt, schaffen sich da einen Punkt an, auf den sie heimlich starren, als ob dort eine Welt beginnen müßte, die man ihnen schuldig geblieben sei ... Dieser eigensinnige Mensch im Menschen geht morgens mit ins Büro und vermag überhaupt in keiner wirksamen Weise gegen den Wettlauf zu protestieren, aber er wendet statt dessen zeit seines Lebens die Augen nicht mehr von einem unheimlichen Punkt ab, den kein andrer bemerken will, obgleich dort offenbar das ganze Unglück der Welt anhebt, die ihren Erlöser nicht erkennt. (14o)

The general state of dissatisfaction gives rise to the hope for a "Messias" (519) to solve the problems of each particular sphere of activity, and to the "unzerfaserte Verlangen nach einem Messias der starken Hand für das Ganze" (52o). General Stumm accordingly interprets the "Beliebtheit der Wortgruppe Erlösung" (519) as a symptom of the 'Zeitkrankheit', the loss of a "feste Weltanschauung" (52o). The 'Parallelaktion' as a whole aims to reverse this situation:

> Wenn sich also die Frage aufdränge, ob die gegenwärtige Zeit und die heutigen Völker überhaupt noch ganz großer gemeinsamer Ideen fähig sei, so müsse und dürfe man hinzufügen: der erlösenden Kraft! Denn um eine Erlösung handle es sich. Um einen erlösenden Aufschwung. (179)

The confusion and contradictoriness of its proposals, however, reveal it to be the epitome of the illness of fragmentation, rather than its cure. The result of its efforts is the resigned conclusion:

> Die gegenwärtige Zeit sei erwartungsvoll, ungeduldig, ungebärdig und unglückselig; der Messias, auf den sie hoffe und warte, sei aber noch nicht in Sicht. (4o3)

In summing up the frustration of the general desire for a convincing solution, Ulrich unwittingly sums up the future course of the 'Parallelaktion', and points forward to its eventual climax in the War:

> Man ist gewalttätig, weil die Eindeutigkeit der Gewalt nach langem ergebnislosen Reden wie eine Erlösung wirkt. Man vereinigt sich zu Gruppen, weil Gehorsam alles das zu tun erlaubt, was man aus eigener Überzeugung längst nicht mehr vermöchte, und die Feindseligkeit dieser Gruppen schenkt den Menschen die nimmer ruhende Gegenseitigkeit der Blutrache, während die Liebe sehr bald zum Einschlafen käme. (594)

In the last "Ein großes Ereignis" chapter, portraying the final meeting of the 'Parallelaktion', the War is more clearly established as the response of the nation as a whole to its inability to create a sense of unity and conviction. The 'Produktionskredit' analogy (528) defines the consequences for the individual of Kakania's loss of faith in its mission: "sie konnten nichts von ganzem Herzen tun oder lassen, weil es kein Gesetz ihrer Einheit gab" (ibid.). Ulrich sees as the consequence of this need the acceptance of an illusory commitment, which is basically another form of empty intoxication.

> Ein Wesen ist der Mensch, das nicht ohne Begeisterung auskommen kann. Und Begeisterung ist der Zustand, worin alle seine Gefühle und Gedanken den gleichen Geist haben... Dauer gewinnen die Gefühle und Gedanken nur an einander, in ihrem Ganzen, sie müssen irgendwie gleichgerichtet sein und sich gegenseitig mitreißen. Und mit allen Mitteln, mit Rauschmitteln, Einbildungen, Suggestion, Glauben, Überzeugung, oft auch nur mit der vereinfachenden Wirkung der Dummheit, trachtet ja der Mensch, einen Zustand zu schaffen, der dem ähnlich ist. Er glaubt an Ideen, nicht weil sie manchmal wahr sind, sondern weil er glauben muß ... Weil er durch Täuschung das Loch zwischen seinen Lebenswänden verstopfen muß, durch das seine Gefühle sonst in alle vier Winde gingen. (1037)

The inevitable result is "der Tausendjährige Glaubenskrieg" (1038): "Das Kriegsministerium darf also beruhigt dem nächsten Massenunglück entgegensehen" (ibid.) The search for 'Erlösung' ends in the violent solution of war, in the deluded hope that this will overcome confusion and frustration. The insanity of this solution, suggested here by the elements of illusion and intoxication, is substantiated by its clear parallel in Clarisse's madness.

This parallel consists not only in Clarisse's 'Erlösungswahn' itself, but also in her concept of 'Wahn' as the only way to achieve 'Erlösung'. The first factor, Clarisse's delusion of herself as 'Erlöser', comes to a climax in her vision of her greatness surpassing that of Christ. Her identification with Christ is foreshadowed from the beginning of her delusion by her repeated assumption of a pose resembling a cross, e.g., "Die Arme bildeten mit dem Stamm des Leibes zwei Kreuzbalken" (218); "Man muß seine Arme ... ausspannen wie Flügel ... Sie ... breitete die Arme aus und hielt sie in dieser Lage erhoben" (656); "ein Arm links, ein Arm rechts: plötzlich fühle ich hartes Holz, bin ans Kreuz genagelt" (712). Her redemptive mission is still centred on Moosbrugger: freeing him represents the decisive action - as opposed to "Gewährenlassen" (919) - which for her means salvation:

> "Wenn wir nicht die Kraft haben, ihn zu retten, werden wir auch nicht die Kraft haben, uns zu retten!" (913)

Her belief in her own destiny is so strong that she sets her strength higher than that of her Redeemer models: "Nietzsche und Christus sind an ihrer Halbheit zugrunde gegangen" (614, 915). As a "Doppelwesen" (922), she is confident of greater success, although she is not sure of the exact nature of her task. In her visits to the 'Irrenhaus', however, she sees herself as approaching fulfilment - expresed in terms of sacrifice and crucifixion.

> Sie stand ... wie die Muttergottes auf der von der Sünde ... umschlungenen Erde ... Eine eigentümliche Opferstimmung beherrschte sie ... Wiederholt hatte sie geglaubt, jetzt begänne es mit ihr: etwas Großes mit ganzer Seele zu tun! Aber sie wußte nicht was. Sie fühlte nur, es stand ihr etwas nahe bevor ... In der Leere des Morgens schwebte es wie ein Kreuz über ihren Schultern. Aber eigentlich war es doch mehr ein tätiges Leid. Eine große Tat. (1185)

Clarisse's delusion is accompanied by other closely linked symptoms of insanity, such as "Sündenwahn" (917), and 'Beziehungswahn', relating everything in her surroundings to her delusion, as a 'Zeichen' expressing some aspect of her obsession.

More important than her madness itself, however, is her recognition of her state as 'Wahn', and her idealisation of this state. The influence of Meingast is central to this development. Meingast concurs with the general diagnosis of the age - "den seelischen Zustand der 'Man kann so, aber auch anders'" (832) - but his solution is more drastic:

> die Welt ist zur Zeit so wahnfrei, daß sie bei nichts weiß, ob sie es lieben oder hassen soll, und weil alles

> zweiwertig ist, darum sind auch alle Menschen Neurastheniker und Schwächlinge ... Also ist nichts der Welt heute mehr zu wünschen als ein guter kräftiger Wahn ... nur Taten (können) erlösen ..., das heißt Erlebnisse, die den ganzen Menschen mit Haut und Haaren einbeziehn ... Denn die Erlösung der Welt durch Gewalt war augenblicklich der Mittelpunkt seiner Gedanken. (834)

Meingast thus proclaims as necessary and positve those factors of delusion, enthusiasm and violent action towards which the 'Parallelaktion' unconsciously strives.

Since her only criteria for judging experience have always been "Fühlen" (62) and "flammenden Willen" (ibid.), Clarisse is naturally predisposed to see madness, the unquestioning intensification of these states, as a higher form of behaviour:

> sie verstand unter "verrückt" etwa so viel wie einem Wetterleuchten ähnlich zu sein oder sich in einem solchen hohen Zustand von Gesundheit zu befinden, daß es andere erschreckt und es war eine Eigenschaft, die sich in ihrer Ehe entwickelt hatte, Schritt um Schritt, so wie ihre Überlegenheit und beherrschende Stellung wuchs. (656)

With Meingast's theory that delusion provides the antidote to the "Niedergedrücktheit, Flauheit und der Unentschiedenheit des gemeinen Lebens" (923), her earlier feeling becomes the system upon which her life is based.

> Clarisse war seither überzeugt, daß man sich einem Wahn überlassen müsse, wenn man der Gnade teilhaftig geworden sei, ihn zu fühlen ... Wer wußte denn damals noch, ob er rechts oder links gehen solle, wenn er aus dem Hause trat... Das ist in einem Wahn anders! Da ist das Leben so praktisch eingerichtet wie eine moderne Küche: man sitzt in der Mitte, braucht sich kaum zu rühren und kann von seinem Platz aus alle Einrichtungen in Gang setzen. (910)

Society in general - in Clarisse's view - suffers from the

indecisiveness of living according to disparate and conflicting standards, without any authoritative criteria for deciding between them. She overcomes this by setting up her own standards, unquestioningly affirming her impulses as valid directives. The fact that these impulses and intentions differ widely from accepted standards of behaviour is for her a positive factor, since those standards are an integral part of the weaknesses she observes in society. Her concept of 'Wahn' gives her the right and the duty to act completely independently of others, follwing solely her own will:

> Und überdies verstand sie unter Wahn nichts anderes als was man Wille nennt, nur besonders gesteigert. Clarisse hatte sich bisher davon eingeschüchtert gefühlt, daß sie sich nur weniges von dem, was in der Welt vorgehe, richtig zu erklären vermöge, aber seit der Wiederbegegnung mit Meingast sah sie sich gerade dadurch begünstigt, nach eigenem Ermessen zu lieben, zu hassen und zu handeln. (ibid.)

The image of 'Wahn' as making her the focus of all activity stresses the supreme importance of the self which here receives final justification. Clarisse's concept of a "besondere Rolle" (145) has given her earlier efforts at self-fulfilment the same sense of being the centre of the world. In the first instance, this image is connected with her ambitions for Walter:

> mit einemmal war die Welt keine wüste, regellose zerbrochene Fläche mehr, sondern ein schimmernder Kreis, Walter ein Mittelpunkt, sie ein Mittelpunkt, zwei in einen zusammenfallende Mittelpunkte waren sie. Erde, Häuser, abgefallene und nicht weggefegte Blätter, schmerzende Luftlinien ...; aus solchen Dingen

> hatte früher das Dasein bestanden und war nun mit einemmal ihr zu eigen geworden, wie Fleisch von ihrem Fleische. (145)

Clarisse's image of herself as 'Mittelpunkt' reveals that she is able to see the world as meaningful, ordered and unified only if she can at the same time establish her own central role within that order. The need for each individual's "persönlichen Systeme" (527) to be "eingebaut in die moralischen und intellektuellen Gleichgewichtsvorkehrungen der ... Gesamtheit" (ibid.) has been established by Musil as central in the individual's ability to order his existence (ibid.): the absence of the universal 'Gleichgewichtsvorkehrungen' is therefore the essence of the 'Zeitkrankheit'.[16] In Clarisse's case, however, her personal system is to be not only a part of the larger system, but the focal point of that system: her incipient 'Erlösungswahn' sees the general order as dependent on her, rather than she on it. This situation is comparable with Moosbrugger's vision of himself as the source of the order within his cell, although this order is obviously imposed upon him by prison authorities. His sensation, "die Welt dreht sich dann wie ein mechanisches Spielwerk um solche Leute" (395) is the equivalent of Clarisse's view of her delusion as a modern kitchen in which she simply has to stretch out her hand to set all the machinery in operation. Moosbrugger's sense of power is an exceptional state which develops out of hallucinatory perceptions over which he has no control: it represents an interlude between his usual states of extreme inferiority, oppression and persecution.

For Clarisse, however, the awareness of her dominant role is the driving force behind her way of life. The significance of music in her life is closely related to this concept:

> "Hast du noch nie beobachtet, daß jeder Mensch im Mittelpunkt einer Himmelkugel steht? Wenn er von seinem Platz weggeht, geht sie mit. So muß man Musik machen: ohne Gewissen, einfach wie die Himmelskugel, unter der man steht!..." (353)

Her idea of playing the piano forever (145) therefore represents her ideal of a life of continuous self-fulfilment, which at the same time means not only the establishment of a meaningful order for herself, but also a form of universal 'Erlösung'.

Ulrich and Agathe: 'das Fragment eines anderen Lebens'

The insanity of Clarisse's "Erlösungswahn" presents an extreme response to the mental illness of the age - a response which is itself the ultimate symptom of that illness. Walter interprets her illness in this sense:

> Überall stoße man, wenn ihre Einfälle auch unzusammenhängend wirkten, dahinter auf einen Krankheitsstoff, der wirklich in der Zeit gäre... Sie sei wie eine Rute, die verborgenes Vorkommen anzeige. In diesem Fall die Notwendigkeit, daß man an die Stelle des passiven, bloß intellektuellen und sensiblen Verhaltens des Gegenwartsmenschen wieder "Werte" setzen müsse; die Intelligenz der Zeit habe nirgends mehr einen festen Punkt übrig gelassen, und da könne also nur noch der Wille, ja, wenn es nicht anders ginge, sogar nur die Gewalt, eine neue Rangordnung der Werte schaffen, in der der Mensch Anfang und Ende für sein Inneres finde... (837)

This Meingast-inspired interpretation ascribes false validity to Clarisse's solution: her delusion does indicate the

course which eventually becomes apparent in the War, but it is precisely this outcome which reveals how wrong that course is.

Walter's definition of the underlying problem, however, is more correct. The search for criteria "in der der Mensch Anfang und Ende für sein Inneres finde" (837) is in essence the task which Ulrich and Agathe set themselves in the 'Frage des rechten Lebens' (255).
Clarisse's concept of 'Wille' envisages the solution to this problem as

> ein mächtiges Gesteuertwerden vom Leben, ein Ergriffensein von sich selbst, ein Dahinschießen im Glück. (91o)

and as a state

> wo nichts zufällig ist, worin kein Raum ist zu schwanken, wo Glück und Zwang zusammenfallen. Andere Leute haben das "wesentlich leben" genannt. (923)

These formulations recall the state in which Ulrich imagines Moosbrugger's action to take place, a state

> worin das Zugreifen, wie es aus höchster Erregung folgt, und das Ergriffenwerden in einem unbeschreiblichen gemeinsamen Zustande eins werden, der Lust von Zwang, Sinn von Notwendigkeit, höchste Tätigkeit von seligem Empfangen nicht unterscheiden ließ. (653)

The parallel between Ulrich's ideal and Clarisse's delusion is specifically referred to in the scene in which she tries to persuade him to become the father of her Redeemer-child.[17] She has decided on Ulrich because she feels "verwandt" (444)

with him, precisely because he is a "Mann ohne Eigenschaften":

> das erinnerte sie zum Beispiel an Klavierspielen, das heißt an alle diese Melancholien, Freudensprünge, Zornausbrüche, die man dabei durchrast, ohne daß es doch ganz wirklich Eigenschaften wären ... Von da ging es ganz ohne Umwege zu der Behauptung, daß man sich alles zu tun wagen müsse, was nicht mit ganzer Seele geschieht. (443 f) 18)

Her own sense of waiting for her fate to be revealed is thus equated with Ulrich's basic attitude of inner distance from the life he leads:

> Ein Mann ohne Eigenschaften sagt nicht Nein zum Leben, er sagt Noch nicht! und spart sich auf. (444)

She therefore attempts to make him follow the same progress from waiting to committed action as she has undergone with her vision of herself as "Gottesmutter" (ibid.).

Ulrich's 'Utopie des Essayismus' describes his ideal 'des rechten Lebens' in the same terms as Clarisse's goal. His belief that the prevailing 'Moral' has lost its 'ethischer Kraft' (251) and is therefore no longer a valid guiding principle demands a search for more meaningful criteria.[19] He rejects any "Gesetz nach oben oder innen" (255), but senses another possibility:

> Ulrich fühlte, daß ein Mann, der etwas mit ganzer Seele tun möchte, auf diese Weise wieder weiß ob er es tun, noch ob er es unterlassen soll. Und ihm ahnte doch, daß man es aus dem ganzen Wesen heraus tun oder lassen könnte ... er fühlte, daß in einer anderen Weise seine Entscheidung übereinfallen könnte mit seinem Glück... Das, was er in diesem Augenblick empfand war kein Gebot, es war ein Gebiet, das er betreten hatte... es war ein "ganz Begreifen und doch auch wieder nur so, wie wenn der Wind eine Botschaft fern herüberträgt, und sie kam ihm weder wahr noch falsch, weder vernünftig noch widervernünftig

> vor, sondern ergriff ihn, als wäre ihm eine leise selige Übertreibung in die Brust gefallen. (ibid.)

This "Gebiet" is closely linked with the "unmöglicher Zustand" (659) which Clarisse describes during her visit, and which recalls the mystic "Zustand" (125) of his youthful love for the "Frau Major".[2o] In the state Clarisse describes, she is "mit allem, was dasteht, durch die Luft wie ein zusammengewachsener Zwilling verbunden" (659), and this experience transforms her completely:

> "ich bin dann nicht die Bürgerin Clarisse, als die ich getauft bin, sondern vielleicht ein glänzender Splitter, der in ein ungeheures Glück eindringt."(66o)

In this 'Mystik der Liebe' Ulrich experiences a similar communion with his surroundings - "Er war ins Herz der Welt geraten; ... Ingefühl verband die Wesen ohne Raum" (125), "man war 'keinen Scheidungen des Menschentums mehr untertan'" (ibid.) - which gives his life a completely new meaning:

> Es war eine völlig veränderte Gestalt des Lebens... Denn alle Fragen und Vorkommnisse des Lebens nahmen eine unvergleichliche Milde, Weichheit und Ruhe an und zugleich eine gänzlich veränderte Bedeutung. Lief da zum Beispiel ein Käfer an der Hand des Denkenden vorbei, ... es war ein unbeschreiblich das Herz rührendes Geschehen, ja nicht einmal ein Geschehen, sondern obgleich es geschah, ein Zustand. Und mit Hilfe solcher stillen Erfahrungen erhielt alles, was sonst das gewöhnliche Leben ausmacht, eine umstürzende Bedeutung. (125 f)

Clarisse's visit brings these strands - the search for a form of meaningful involvement in life, and the memories and fleeting glimpses of a different state of being - to a climax which is underlined by the death of his father and the subsequent enforced interruption of the life he has been leading.

Clarisse's claims that they share the same experiences and impulses is rejected by Ulrich, although she expresses his own feelings very closely at times. This ambivalence gives rise to a "dauernde rasche Bewegung" (660), "indem sie (ihre Worte) seinem Innern nahe kamen und sich davon wieder bis zur Absurdität entfernten" (ibid.).

The realization, "doch hatte sie in ihrem Anfall ... Aussprüche getan, die manchem seiner eigenen bedenklich ähnlich waren" (662), emphasises his growing awareness that his 'Urlaub vom Leben' has failed to solve the problem he has set himself. The feeling of despair at the "sinnlose Ohnmacht aller Bemühungen, deren er sich gerühmt hatte"(663) gives way, however, to a repetition of the "andere Zustand". His relationship with his surroundings is again profoundly changed:

> "Es ist ein anderes Verhalten; ich werde anders und dadurch auch das, was mit mir in Verbindung steht". (664)

In this state a strong difference between Ulrich's experiences and Clarisse's becomes apparent. Just as in the earlier 'Frau Major' instances, he retains "die Klarheit seines Urteils" (ibid.). In neither case does he experience the kind of 'Sinnestäuschung' which influences Clarisse so strongly. The disappearance of all distinctions between objects is described rationally and logically:

> Um das ganz nüchtern auszudrücken, diese Unterschiede werden sich wohl weder verloren noch verringert haben, aber die Bedeutung fiel von ihnen ab.(125)

and

> ... und da sich je weder an den Wänden und Dingen etwas wirklich änderte und kein Gott das Zimmer dieses Ungläubigen betrat und Ulrich selst keineswegs auf die Klarheit seines Urteils verzichtete ..., konnte es nur die Beziehung zwischen ihm und seiner Umgebung sein, was dieser Veränderung unterworfen war. (664) -

Through this strong element of 'Nüchternheit', completely lacking in Clarisse's surrender to feeling without reflection (62), Ulrich's experience is distanced from Clarisse's delusion, which in this scene gives the unmistakable impression that she is "bereits ein geisteskrankes Wesen" (662).

Ulrich remains sceptical about his sensation - "Einen 'Anfall der Frau Major' nannte er sein Befinden spöttisch" (664). In this critical attitude itself, however, he foreshadows the future significance of such experiences in his relationship with Agathe:

> Nach der Meinung seiner Vernunft bestand keine Gefahr, denn es war niemand da, mit dem er eine solche Torheit hätte wiederholen können. (ibid.)

He does sense, however, that he will in future still have to come to terms with this type of experience, as is indicated by his resolve "dieser Geschichte, wenn es sein müßte, mit aller Exaktheit zu begegnen" (665).

The tension between 'Torheit' and 'Exaktheit' dominates the second half of the novel, in the efforts of the 'Geschwister' to determine how they should live. The moral question, which has equated them with 'Verbrecher',[19] also presents problems from the standpoint of the underlying psychological state of

the pair. Their rejection of accepted moral laws is closely linked with an awareness that they are at the same time in a doubtful position in regard to established standards of psychological normality. This awareness represents the element of 'Exaktheit': although their conversations and actions constantly move in the direction of the 'Zustand' Ulrich has sceptically labelled as 'Torheit', they constantly examine this state, recognizing the need to distinguish between it and the symptoms of insanity.

This self-criticism is most obvious in the specific areas which involve their criminal tendencies most clearly: Agathe's 'Testamentfälschung', and their relationship bordering on incest. Ulrich considers Agathe's intention impossible to interpret, except from the point of view of mental illness: such an unmotivated crime is only possible in a "geistig Minderwertiger" (796), or as a part of "nervöse Minderwertigkeit, Ausfallserscheinung, Debilität" (ibid.). Hagauer's accusations - based on Agathe's wilful separation from him, rather than on the crime of forgery - portray a convincing picture of "sozialer Schwachsinn" (952):

> (er) schilderte Agathe die asoziale, des Gemeinschaftssinns entbehrende und gefährdete Anlage ihrer Natur als eine 'Minusvariante', die nie und nirgends den Problemen des Lebens tatkräftig und neuschaffend entgegentrete... sondern 'durch eine Glasscheibe von der Wirklichkeit getrennt' in gewählter Selbstvereinsamung verharre, dauernd am Rande der pathologischen Gefahr. (952 f)

Agathe is inclined to agree: "Ihr Verhalten kam ihr so sehr als das eines wirklich nicht ganz zurechnungsfähigen Wesens

vor" (954); and Ulrich insists on the principle:

> wenn man etwas ganz Unbegründetes für recht hält oder wenn gar ein Entschluß wie aus dem Nichts entsteht, dann verdächtigt man sich einer krankhaften oder schadhaften Anlage. (957)

Ulrich finds it impossible to condemn Agathe's action morally, and justifies it as "eine drastische Kritik des Moralischen" (959) - but he is unable to free himself of the suspicion that they are both "moralisch schwachsinnig" (961). Ulrich's appraisal of their feelings for one another is similarly critical:

> "Nichts liegt auch näher, als daß wir zwei psychologisch verdächtig sind. Inzestuöse Neigung, ebenso früh in der Kindheit nachweisbar wie unsoziale Anlage und Proteststellung zum Leben". (944)

These suspect actions and emotions are justifiable only from the point of view of the higher moral state they help produce. Despite his criticism, Ulrich is forced to admit:

> Wie immer, wenn er an sie (Agathe) dachte, war ihm zumute, er habe während der in ihrer Gesellschaft verbrachten Zeit einen anderen Geisteszustand gezeigt als sonst. Er wußte auch, daß er leidenschaftlich wieder in diesen Zustand zurück wolle. (870)

Agathe's 'Testamentfälschung' represents a new relationship to morality, which approaches the original strength of conviction which one lay behind rules which are now followed unthinkingly:

> Es kam ihr vor, es wären Recht und Unrecht nicht mehr allgemeine Begriffe und ein für Millionen von Menschen angerichtetes Kompromiß, sondern zauberhafte Begegnung von Mir und Dir, Irrsinn erster, noch mit nichts vergleichlicher und an keinem Maß zu messender Schöpfung. (798)

The element of 'Irrsinn' in new and strongly-held convictions is reflected in the tendency for extremes in moral behaviour to be designated as fanatical and insane even though they represent simply the complete fulfilment of the positive ideals which are generally accepted as valid:

> Während es verhältnismäßig natürlich erscheint, daß bestimmte, als "böse" bezeichnete Handlungen nicht begangen werden dürfen ..., wie etwa die Aneignung fremden Eigentums oder die Schrankenlosigkeit im Genuß, sind die ihnen entsprechenden bejahenden Überlieferungen der Moral - in diesem Fall wäre das also die volle Hingabe des Schenkens oder die Lust, das Irdische abzutöten - fast schon verlorengegangen, und wo sie noch ausgeübt werden, sind sie das Geschäft von Narren und Grillenfängern. (823)

If the ideal virtues are carried out to the full, they appear as insanity. Similarly, Ulrich finds that the "innere Bewegung" (748) of morality has been lost in traditional moral behaviour, and that the expression of this 'Bewegung' must therefore be equated with madness.

> "Oder denk bloß, etwas erhebt dich: woher ist denn das in die Moral geflogen? Wann sind wir so mit dem Gesicht im Staub gelegen, das es uns beseligte, erhoben zu werden? Oder nimm es wörtlich, daß dich ein Gedanke ergreift: im Augenblick, wo du diese Begegnung so körperlich spürtest, wärst du schon in den Grenzen des Irrenreichs! Und so will jedes Wort wörtlich genommen werden, sonst verwest es zur Lüge, aber man darf keins wörtlich nehmen, sonst wird die Welt ein Tollhaus! Irgendein großer Rausch steigt als dunkle Erinnerung daraus auf, und man kommt zuweilen auf den Gedanken, daß alles, was wir erleben, losgerissene und zerstörte Teile eines alten Ganzen sind" (749)

> "Wohlgefallen an einer reinen, tiefen und ursprünglichen Handlungsweise, das wie ein Funke evensowohl aus erlaubten wie aus unerlaubten Geschehnissen hervorschlagen kann."(823)

expresses his rejection of the "Regel" (762) in favour of

the 'Traumzustand' those laws once represented. This choice necessarily involves the moral intensity which, from the point of view of conventional moral attitudes, appears so extreme as to be insane.[22)]

The new morality Ulrich and Agathe envisage is possible only in connection with the 'andere Zustand' which has also been a constant topic in their "Heilige Gespräche". In this state "wo man dem unwesentlichen Leben entschlüpft" (762) normal categories no longer apply, "Und man kann nichts Niedriges tun" (763).[23)]

The essence of this state is the relationship of the self to the world. In this aspect, the 'andere Zustand' bears close resemblance to the periods of exaltation experienced by Moosbrugger and Clarisse. The basic factor in their moments of ecstasy is the breakdown of the limits of the personality, so that they can merge with their surroundings, without any distinction between 'Innen' and 'Außen'. The same phenomena characterize Ulrich's earlier experiences which have prefigured the state he and Agathe eventually experience together.[24)] In their discussion, the same issue of the relationship of the ego to itself, to other people and to the objects around it, is central.

The relationship of the ego to itself is paradoxical:

> "Man vergißt manchmal das Sehen und Hören, und das Sprechen vergeht einem ganz. Und doch fühlt man ge-

> rade in solchen Minuten, daß man für einen Augenblick zu sich gekommen ist" (751)

i.e. the self loses all its senses and attributes - "Man verliert sich" (761) - but is at the same time more aware of itself than normally. Ulrich explains this aspect of the 'other' awareness as the consequence of the development of the individual into a fixed personality. He recalls that in childhood "Innen und Außen kaum noch getrennt waren" (902):

> "Wir besaßen uns ja noch nicht selbst; eigentlich waren wir überhaupt noch nicht, unsere persönlichen Zustände waren noch nicht deutlich von denen der Welt abgeschieden." (902)

The development of the self - "in uns darin" (ibid.) - also brings with it the ability to see oneself from outside, as a separate entity. Self-consciousness therefore makes it impossible to be "in dich", except in moments of excitement or intoxication, "jene wenigen Augenblicke..., wo man von dir sagen würde, du seist außer dir" (ibid.). The normal state of the personality therefore means consciousness of self, which implies a certain amount of distance, of self-observation. The clearly defined personality, "umhüllt von einem durch und durch äußerlichen Sein" (ibid.) therefore works against the expression and fulfilment of the "Innerstes" (ibid.). Ulrich feels this process should be made "rückgängig", that the original state of undefined limits, which at the same time involved a more essential "Ichsein" (903), should be restored. In the paradoxical losing and gaining of self in the 'andere Zustand', this is achieved.

The goal, "Aus seiner vollen Wirklichkeit handeln wollen" (875), "nichts der Seele Gleichgültiges mehr tun .. wollen" (ibid.) becomes possible in this state. This type of action demands

> "daß man sich ganz bei sich sein fühlt und daß man sich auch bei allem andern sein fühlt, daß irgend etwas gesättigt ist, was jetzt leer bleibt, ich meine etwas, wovon man ausgeht und wohin man zurückkehrt." (907)

These conditions are fulfilled by the ideal of the 'andere Zustand', in which the 'Ich' can remain intact, while at the same time merging with everything around it. Thus the 'andere Zustand' offers a possible solution to the moral problem:

> Er (Ulrich) wies auf die merkwürdige Verwandtschaft hin, die in dem gehobenen Zustand, von dem sie sprachen, zwischen Denken und Moral bestehe, so daß jeder Gedanke als Glück, Ereignis und Geschenk empfunden werde, ... wodurch im Kopf nicht minder als im Herz der Genuss am Besitz seiner selbst durch ein grenzenloses sich Verschenken und Verschränken ersetzt werde. (765)

Ulrich's concept of the 'Tausendjährige Reich' combines both elements, the expression of the essential self and complete selflessness:

> "das ist das Tausendjährige Reich, geformt nach uns selbst ... Und so werden wir leben! Wir werden alle Selbstsucht von uns abtun, wir werden weder Güter, noch Erkenntnisse, noch Geliebte, noch Freunde, noch Grundsätze, noch uns selbst sammeln: demnach wird sich unser Sinn öffnen, auflösen gegen Mensch und Tier und so in einer Weise erschließen, daß wir gar nicht mehr wir bleiben können und uns nur in alle Welt verflochten aufrecht erhalten werden!" (801 f)

Their 'Tausendjährige Reich' is also called the 'Reich der Liebe', based on the complete communion between the "Zwil-

linge" (9o8).[25] This, too, is based on the concept of 'Außen' and 'Innen' merging, achieved in the state of being "zusammengewachsen" (ibid.). This ideal is fleetingly experienced; and expressed in quotations from the mystics: "Wir waren außer uns", "Wir hatten unsere Körper vertauscht, ohne uns zu berühren" (1o84). Ulrich sums up the experience as "das gesteigerte Selbst strahlt in eine grenzenlose Selbstlosigkeit hinein" (1o85). The state of union between sister and brother is directly parallel to the state of communion with the world:

> "die Einzelheiten besitzen nicht mehr ihren Egoismus, durch den sie unsere Aufmerksamkeit in Anspruch nehmen, sondern sie sind geschwisterlich und im wörtlichen Sinn 'innig' untereinander verbunden ... irgendwie geht alles grenzenlos in dich über." (762)

The ideal of the 'andere Zustand' thus offers the solution to the 'Frage des rechten Lebens', in providing the conditions necessary for a true relationship of the individual with himself, with others, and with the world. All the conversations between Ulrich and Agathe tend towards this state, and they become increasingly aware of it as a possible way of life. At the same time, however, Ulrich retains the sceptical attitude of seeing their experiences as related to madness:

> "eher muß ich wohl sagen, daß ein 'Mitten-inne-Sein', ein Zustand der ungestörten Innigkeit des Lebens ... wahrscheinlich mit vernünftigen Sinnen nicht zu fordern ist." (9o8)

The links between their 'andere Zustand' and states of in-

toxication, Moosbrugger's hallucinations or Clarisse's delusion, tends to substantiate this suspicion.[26] The constant examination of their feelings and experiences, however, points to a way in which their ideal represents a progress from the ecstasy of intoxications: the "Gesetz des rechten Lebens" (825) is to be not only "lösend wie ein Rausch" (ibid.), but also "nüchtern wie die Wahrheit" (ibid.). Moments of drunkenness, the intoxication of music, or Moosbrugger's ecstasy are all ephemeral experiences, forgotten as soon as the cause of the 'Rausch' recedes. Ulrich and Agathe, however, try to comprehend their experiences and to extend them to a 'zweite Wirklichkeit'. Clarisse's decision to accept her "unmögliche Zustand" (659) as a sign of her destiny and her task in life is more closely analogous with Ulrich's and Agathe's hope that a similar state may provide them with the basis of 'des rechten Lebens'. In Clarisse's case this means the unquestioning acceptance of a delusion - that of her role as an 'Erlöser' - and the affirmation of 'Wahn' itself, as the only possible form of conviction and decisive action. Whereas Clarisse simply accepts visions and coincidences "als ob ihr Schicksal plötzlich in den Sternen geschrieben stünde" (444), the constant questioning in the conversations of Agathe and Ulrich, and the attempts to work out a theoretical basis in Ulrich's "Tagebuch", represent a deliberate and thorough search for the true solution. And even when they reach the conclusion "So soll man leben!", this is immediately qualified: "Und manchmal erscheint es mir verrückt" (1213). This

aspect of distance and self-criticism provides an opportunity for their conclusions to be accepted as more reasonable. However, the dichotomy that their state

> "entweder eine unverständliche geistige Störung sein müßte oder das Fragment eines anderen Lebens ist" (1087)

remains largely unresolved. But the last completed chapter, "Atemzüge eines Sommertags" suggests a possible solution. In designating himself and Agathe as "Nihilisten und Aktivisten" (1150),[27] Ulrich implicitly recognises as valid both the contemplative way of life in the 'Tausendjährige Reich' and the activism of normal life:

> "Die eine (Tonart) sollte die des 'weltlichen' Gefühls sein, das nie zur Ruhe und Erfüllung kommt; die andere ... die eines 'mystischen Gefühls' ..., das dauernd mitklingt, aber niemals zur 'vollen Wirklichkeit' gelangt?" (1146)

Whereas Clarisse accepts her 'Wahn' as 'volle Wirklichkeit' and ends in complete insanity, Ulrich and Agathe remain aware of the gap between the ideal of the 'andere Zustand' and its continuous realization as a way of life.

Their quest thus ends in at least partial resignation - the earlier drafts of the final section suggest a more negative solution.[28] The negative outcome, however, does not imply that the 'andere Zustand' must be equated with madness; it remains 'das Fragment eines anderen Lebens', but possible only as 'Fragment'.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Forms of madness in Canetti's Die Blendung.

Obsession as structural principle.

In 1925 Canetti planned a series of novels modelled on Balzac's Comédie Humaine, a "Comédie humaine an Irren". The main characters of these novels were to include e.g. a space traveller and the fanatical founder of a religious movement, "Figuren am Rande des Irrsinns". The result of these plans is the one novel Die Blendung, which does not feature any of these projected extreme vocations. The characters of the novel are not divorced from normal society by the position they hold: the ivory-tower intellectual, the spinster housekeeper searching for a rich husband, the successful and popular psychiatrist, the retired policeman/caretaker and even the petty thief can be considered as representative of society - a little eccentric, rather than average citizens, but not unique or extraordinary. Canetti's intention was to present typical though exaggerated figures, "Übersteigerungen bestimmter Phänomene der Zeit" representing reality "vom Rande her", by caricature rather than with "den üblichen Mitteln des Realismus".[1)]

The representative nature of these figures is intensified by the fact that each character, even the most minor figure, conforms to the same pattern. Canetti conceived his protagonists, in accordance with the Balzac model, as monomaniacs

whose lives were completely determined by one obsessive idea.[2] But whereas the original concept involved a series of unique monomaniacs devoted to often extraordinary ideals, the obsessions of Die Blendung are the goals of normal society, taken to an extreme which produces caricature. Canetti discontinued the planned series after completing Die Blendung:

> Schließlich aber fand ich, daß ein Roman Gefäß genug sei. 3)

The one novel covers the ideas planned for the whole series because the essential factor in the gallery of monomaniacs is the form of the obsession itself, rather than its object, and this remains constant whether the mania concerns space flight, a new faith, or, as in Die Blendung, books, money, a chess championship or buttons.

Kien, the intellectual whose research is the whole content of his life, is the most obviously and most disastrously singleminded character in the novel. But every individual in the book, no matter how minor his role, is characterized by an obsession.[4] Just as Peter Kien is exclusively devoted to his books, his brother Georg, though outwardly less rigid and narrow-minded, is just as single-mindedly dedicated to the insane. Therese's obsession is more complex, consisting of four major elements: hunger for wealth, pride in her youth and beauty, 'Anständigkeit', and the search for love (in the sense of sexual satisfaction rather than emotional attachment, although she does not admit this to her-

self). But her overriding passion is greed: love seems to be paired with wealth as the due reward for a respectable life; happiness is achieved by winning the affections of a wealthy man through the charms of youthfulness ('wie dreißig') and personal attractiveness ('prächtige Hüften'); but wealth is enough to bring contentment if love fails, as in her relationship with Herr Grob.

Pfaff's activities are all motivated by pleasure in the use of his physical strength, by his lust for power; the high point of his earlier career was his prowess in making difficult arrests, usually forcing the prisoner into complete submission; as the caretaker his main task is to eradicate beggars from the building and its vicinity; and in his home he demands total slavish obedience from his wife and daughter, in submitting to his beatings, providing him with vast quantities of food, and devoting exclusively to him all the comforts of the home. His daughter Anna's obsession, in response to this treatment, is her vision of Franz, the butcher's apprentice, as a knight on a white horse, cutting off her father's head and carrying her away. Fischerle's dream contains various features - greed, pride in his intelligence, hatred of his deformity - which are all linked in his hope of becoming 'Schachweltmeister': he needs money to make possible a challenge against the reigning champion Capablanca, by which he hopes to achieve recognition of his genius,

fame and wealth, and the opportunity to discard the hump which is the symbol of his present misery.

The same pattern of characterization through a single ruling passion dominates the presentation of the minor figures like Fischerle's accomplices in the scheme to defraud Kien; the habitués of 'Zum idealen Himmel' and 'Zum Pavian'; the police officer and pawn-shop officials involved in Kien's interrogation; and the representatives of the business world - like the firm of Groß & Mutter which ignores Therese's outrageous behaviour because she is a paying customer, Grob who suggests murder to get at Therese's husbands supposed wealth, and Fischerle's tailor whose passion for recognition of his mastery of his profession drives him, too, to ridiculous lengths.

The objects of the obsessions are thus widely divergent, and in many cases trivial. But in each case this object is the centre of the individual's life, either as an achievement or ability he can be proved of, as an obstacle to be overcome, or as a goal towards which all his thoughts and efforts are directed. Canetti sees such an idée fixe as the essence of the private life of each individual, and this determines the mode of characterisation employed in the novel. Canetti explains his method as based on the conviction

> daß jeder Mensch einen Traum hat, der immer wiederkehrt, der am wichtigsten wird, von dem man getrieben ist, der einen von anderen Menschen unterscheidet - man könnte es einen Privatmythos nennen ... Und

> mir war es in der 'Blendung' sehr darum zu tun, Figuren zu schaffen, die gerade solche Privatmythen ganz klar ausdrücken, also vieles andere weglassen, was sonst zu einer Romanfigur gehört. 5)

The reduction of characterization to the individual dream is demonstrated e.g. in the 'Pavian' scene: the habitués of the 'Lokal' are presented, as a group, as being rough and violent, even in their friendship; beyond this, the only distinction made between them as individuals is not on the basis of appearance of profession, but solely through the designation of the private dream.

This one-dimensionality of character is the basic principle of the plot and structure of the novel. The entire action of the novel consists of each individual's pursuit of his dream, and each character exists only in this pursuit. Kien is introduced standing in front of the display-window of a bookshop discussing books, and the subsequent depiction of him as a character - beginning with the description of his daily routine and habits and his home - stresses the fact that books are the essence of his life. Therese first appears as a function of Kien's dream, when she answers his call for a duster: she exists for him, as she has for eight years, only in order to keep his books clean. On the other hand, the report of how Therese came to occupy this position reveals her aims - wealth through marriage - and indicates Kien's function in her life as the means towards that goal. "Kopf ohne Welt" depicts solely the efforts of each to advance his goal. Kien's marriage to Therese seems to promise this fulfilment: Kien has found someone who re-

spects books as much as he does, willing to serve as a permanent caretaker; Therese finds someone whose willingness to marry her provides appreciation and affirmation of her youth and attractiveness, and more importantly, access to a fortune. Each is indifferent to the aims of the other: Kien is not at all concerned with money, as his advertisement for a housekeeper had indicated ("Gehalt Nebensache" , 21); for Therese, earnings are the major consideration, but she is not at all interested in Kien's books. This "Jack Sprat"-situation should bring satisfaction to both parties, but leads to conflict instead, because each has misjudged the adequacy of the other as the means to fulfil his own proposals. This misjudgement is basically the failure of each to recognise the goal of the other.[6] Kien's dream of unhindered work is frustrated by Therese's insistence on the normal trappings of marriage - as represented by the 'Möbel' - and constant demands for a will. Therese is correspondingly frustrated by Kien's preference of his books over his relationship to her, and even more by the fact that his wealth has been squandered on those books. With the conflict caused by this clash of interests, a second element enters the actions of each individual, making the motivation of the plot more complex: each character acts not only in the straightforward promotion of his aims, but also in opposition to the other, to limit the influence of the rival aims over his own plans, or simply to revenge himself for the frustration of his hopes.

These impulses, determined by the individual idée fixe, are the driving forces of the action. The objects which dominate the first section of the novel, after the marriage - the furniture, Kien's bankbook and the will - do so because of their function in the characters' dreams.[7] For Therese the furniture symbolizes the realization of her hopes of a happy, normal, respectable marriage to a man of some wealth: it is a means of obtaining money, since Kien gives her a large sum specifically for furniture and she keeps a portion of it for herself; it defines her in the eyes of the furniture salesman, and therefore of the world, as a well-to-do married woman rather than as a spinster-servant; it establishes her position in the household vis à vis the demands of Kien's library which has until now been the major occupant of the apartment, determining the disposition of the rooms; it becomes a form of treasure stored up for the future; and it becomes the fulfilment of her dreams of 'Liebe' and 'Anständigkeit' in the relationship she imagines between herself and 'Herr Puda' the furniture salesman.

For Kien the furniture is a foreign body which invades his library-home and hinders his work, causing him to develop voluntary blindness as a means of self-defence. Similarly, Therese's demands for a will shatter the silence necessary for his work - the money involved does not matter to him, and he does not even realize that that is Therese's aim. Through this conflict Therese becomes a demanding, disturbing and threatening element which he tries to overcome by

turning to stone, until Therese finally throws him out of the house, not realizing that she is at the same time throwing away the object she is striving for, Kien's bankbook. Thus the conflict and frustration of two individuals' pursuit and defence of their private dreams form the subject of the novel.

In "Kopflose Welt" the same principle is followed. Kien is still simply the sinologist pursuing his profession; Fischerle is introduced as the money-hungry chess fanatic. As with Kien's marriage, their relationship is possible because each is interested exclusively in something to which the other is completely indifferent. Here again the novel depicts exclusively the individual's monomania in action: Fischerle's whole conduct is directed towards the extortion of Kien's money, followed by the arrangements for his trip to America to become world chess champion, while Kien extends his bibliomania to the extreme of his delusion of himself as the Saviour of captive and defenceless books. All other figures in this section - Fischerle's colleagues, the police, the Theresianum officials - exist only in so far as they become involved in these pursuits, even though this involvement never reaches beyond their manipulation of events according to their own interests. The scenes involving Kien's and Therese's dispute depict not so much the pursuit of the dream itself, as retribution against the enemy for thwarting

that pursuit, as Kien is accused of the theft of his bank-book, and defends himself against the imagined charge of murdering Therese for the sake of 'Wissenschaft'.

In "Welt im Kopf" the method of characterization is the same. Pfaff has so far existed only as a functionary in the dreams of others: Kien has called on his brute strength in his campaign against Therese; Therese has found in him compensation for the failure of her marriage and also an accomplice in enriching herself at the expense of Kien's library. In this section Pfaff comes into a position of power in his own right, when he takes charge of Kien, virtually treating him as a prisoner. The summing-up of Pfaff's past in the chapter "Der gute Vater" shows him to be a brutal tyrant, and the present action depicts this tyranny at work, with Kien as the helpless subject substituting for the wife and daughter he has already destroyed.

Georg Kien, too, is introduced solely according to his function as a psychiatrist, with the chapter "Ein Irrenhaus" recording his progress in his profession from his first meeting with a lunatic, to his present position as the director of an asylum, obsessed with his concept of the greatness of the insane. He appears within the action in order to deal with a case of madness, which he fails to recognise and cure, thus unwittingly fulfilling in this one instance his dream of

leaving the insane in the state which he considers preferable to normality; with the apparent accomplishment of his mission, he disappears from the scene once more.

This reduction of characters to the one dimension of their monomania, so that all their actions follow the same single impulse, leads to a certain predictability in the action of the novel; the complete matching of attributes ascribed to a character with the actions he is depicted as performing, and without the element of suprising conduct revealing previously unknown or neglected attributes.[8] However, although this predictability can be seen in the presentation of character and the overall direction of their actions, it cannot be applied to Canetti's inventiveness and comic fantasy in the detailed working-out of these tendencies. For example, Therese's susceptibility to the salesman's flattery, when buying her furniture, can be predicted, but not the absurd length she goes to in making advances to him in public; and Kien's inability to recognise the reality of a given situation can be deduced from the information given about him, but the illogical reasoning he uses to avoid accepting an unpleasant situation he cannot cope with - such as his assumption, when he finds Therese in his bed, that she is a thief who has killed Therese and is resting after the struggle - goes beyond predictability. Such behaviour is certainly clearly motivated and fitted into the pattern of character, action and reaction, but in its exaggerated comic absurdity, it passes beyond the limits of normal logical expectations and emphasises the point through

its very grotesqueness.

The obsessions of the characters determine their actions and thus provide the plot of the novel. They also determine the method of presentation of that plot. Canetti concentrates on their words and thoughts, rather than on explanatory authorial comment, and even the depiction of action is tied to the individual by the use of perspective technique: the incidents of the novel are not narrated objectively, but from the point of view of the character involved.

The subjective unreliability of this type of narration is demonstrated by the 'Mutstraße' incident. When a passer-by asks Kien where the Mutstraße is, Kien is so detached from what is going on around him that, although he hears the question, he does not relate it to himself, ignores it as addressed to someone else, and constructs a mental image of that third person. As the incident is described according to Kien's awareness of it, the reader has no way of knowing the real situation until this reality is forcibly impressed on Kien and thus transmitted via his new consciousness to the reader. Kien's reliability as a narrator is made even more suspect by the interpretation he gives the incident when he takes note of it in his journal - he gives an explanation of his behaviour which was not even suggested in the original account, thus providing a third version of the episode, but

still not one which can be regarded as objective and definitive. The perspective of the individual is restricted to what he considers worthy of notice, to that which fits into his system of values either positively or negatively. The narration of each scene is coloured by the terminology of the character involved, the terminology which expresses his dream and constitutes the 'akustische Maske' which is Canetti's major method of characterization. Each character is presented through the restricted vocabulary which recurs in every speech and prescribes the field of his thinking.[9] By introducing the individual 'akustische Maske' into the narrative itself, transforming objective report into inner monologues of the respective characters, Canetti is able to demonstrate the way the individual monomania goes beyond concentration on a single aspect of reality to distortion of that reality itself, to the projection of the private mania into the outside world, to delusion. Delusion dominates the thinking of all characters - and thus most of the presentation of the action - in its mild form as misjudgements based on deception and self-deception, more strongly as day dreams and fantasies and in the logical extension of these phenomena, hallucinations and fully-formed, unswervingly accepted delusions.[10]

Extreme negative judgements - like Therese's conviction that Kien is a murderer - result from the individual's assumption that his standards of behaviour are absolute and universal,

so that any deviation must be either criminal or insane. On the other hand, the observer often makes his 'Gegenüber' conform to his own behaviour pattern, by assuming that his own values are general, and judging the other's actions accordingly, despite evidence to the contrary: this is seen in Fischerle's judgement of Kien as 'Weltmeister der Hochstapelei', which is pure self-deception; and in Kien's judgement of Fischerle as a frustrated book-lover, which consists of the self-deception of value-projection, aided by Fischerle's deceptive acting-out of this role.

Day-dreams are an important element in the presentation of each character, as each individual clearly reveals his aims and secret hopes in wish-fulfilment visions. The inner monologue method of narration allows an unmarked transition from the depiction of real events to that of events in the imagination: since both are presented as occurring in the mind of the individual, rather than as depicted by an objective narrator, both have equal value as actual happenings, according to the individual's subjective awareness. This creates a complex interplay between fantasy and reality, illusion and the true awareness. In Therese's dreams of being loved by Grob and acclaimed by the whole city (67, 111, 117, 246-7) there is a strong element of "Sinnestäuschung" (119) and of acceptance of illusion as reality - "Das war kein Traum" (246) - but Therese is finally able to recognize and accept the

truth. Pfaff's vision of Therese's murder trial (90-93) is a similar projection of wishes into a real situation, but is very short-lived. Fischerle's dreams of his future in America contain a similar mixture of reality and illusion (particularly p. 323-324), and, as with Therese's visions of herself, some elements remain as firmly held convictions, but generally Fischerle is able to distinguish his hopes from the real situation.

Kien's fantasies are structurally similar, but with a stronger element of rationalization: his imaginings are as absurd as these of the other characters, but they always appear as the conclusion of a logical process, according to his highly eccentric form of reasoning, with the inevitable conclusion: "Woraus sich mit zwingender Logik ergab, daß Kien sich keineswegs selbst betrog" (61). Even in his most normal state, at the onset of the novel, Kien accepts illusion as reality, in his anthropomorphic attitude to his books which he corresponds with as with living beings. As he moves further into insanity, his fantasies become progressively more deluded: in his first vision of Therese's death, at the hands of an 'Einbrecher', he finally accepts his beating by Therese as proof that her murder is a delusion; however, when he is later convinced that Therese has been starved to death, even cutting off his own finger with a supposedly non-existent knife (thrown at him by the supposedly non-existent Therese) cannot shake his delusion. The "Welt im Kopf" of the last section of the novel

refers to this alternative delusional world which Kien has erected in his mind, which - more completely than even his library - excludes any contact with the external reality which would destroy it. In his hallucinations - and in the realities interpreted according to his delusions - during his approach to suicide, the private world of delusion proves its destructiveness.

Monomania: the private world.

The restricted horizons and isolation of the individual monomaniac is expressed in the physical space he inhabits. Throughout the novel, descriptions of man's surroundings have special significance, representing the object which is the essence of his life; but more importantly the fact that his life is limited exclusively to this obsession.

Kien's apartment is totally devoted to his library and to his work: four rooms are filled with books, with one serving as as study where Kien also sleeps, washes and eats, rarely entering the other rooms such as the kitchen which are the housekeeper's domain. Kien can think of no more suitable way of living - "Die beste Definition der Heimat ist die Bibliothek" (48) - and he spends almost all of his time within those surroundings. Kien is particularly proud of the special arrangements he has made to create this perfect library:

> Sämtliche Wände waren bis zur Decke mit Büchern ausgekleidet... Die Seitenfenster waren ... zugemauert worden... Die Versuchung, das Treiben auf der Straße zu beobachten... fiel mit den Seitenfenstern weg. Täglich ... segnete er Einfall und Konsequenz, denen er die Erfüllung seines höchsten Wunsches dankte: den Besitz einer reichhaltigen geordneten und nach allen Seiten hin abgeschlossenen Bibliothek, in der ihn kein überflüssiges Möbelstück, kein überflüssiger Mensch von ernsten Gedanken ablenkte... Nirgends ein Tisch, ein Schrank, ein Ofen, der das bunte Einerlei der Regale unterbrochen hätte... In seiner Bibliothek war selbst einem Elefanten die Möglichkeit, Lärm aus dem Boden zu stampfen, verwehrt. Drum schätzte er die Teppiche sehr hoch ein. (19 f)

The major significance of the layout of the library is not so much what it contains, as what it shuts out: light, noise, furniture, people, the activity of the outside world. The library is a private world containing only what is necessary for Kien's work, excluding everything which does not assist it: the library thus represents the monomaniac's reduction of the world to the limits of his single interest.

For Therese, too, Kien's apartment is a world. As a respectable housekeeper she is not interested in anything apart from her work and she has no more contact with outsiders than Kien does - "sie tut bloß ihre Arbeit" (24). Her dream concerns becoming, instead of the 'Dienstbot', the owner and manager of the household. This is indicated by her first actions after the marriage which symbolizes for her the acquisition of wealth: she reorganizes the living space, taking over three of the rooms which make up the library and filling them with the furniture she feels to be necessary for a respectable marriage. The equation of the apartment

with wealth becomes more apparent when it becomes clear that Kien is not a millionaire, that all his assets lie within his home. Paradoxically, Therese's expanding wealth - indicated by the increasing amount of furniture and the growing number of rooms grudgingly ceded to her by her submissive husband - brings with it an even more definite narrowing of her private world: after taking over all the rooms except Kien's study, she finally moves into this inner sanctum too, so that her own property will not be spoiled by use:

> Sie muß ihre Zimmer schonen ... Die drei neuen Zimmer hat sie abgesperrt. Jetzt sperrt sie auch die alte Kammer ab. (128)

Because of this concept of her rooms as treasure to be stored up for the future rather than space for living, Therese's world is restricted to a single room - shared with Kien and his desk - reflecting her singleminded mania. The closed world of her obsessive greed is also symbolized by the minor ability which is for her a major source of pride: her ability to write beautiful 'O's. This obsession with the zero is obviously linked with greed, as she uses this facility to add noughts to the amount of Kien's capital mentioned in his will, to take it up to the millions she believes it should be. But it also reflects monomania, since its most important qualities are that it is closed and small.

> Ihr liebster Buchstabe war das O. Im O-Schreiben hatte sie noch eine Übung von der Schule her. (Die O müßt ihr so brav schließen wie die Therese, hat die Lehrerin immer gesagt ...). Darum gerieten ihr die O so klein wie sie wollte. (101)

Pfaff's sphere of power, too, is limited to one single point: his apartment is one room, designated as a 'Sarg' - he has walled-up the other room since his daughter's death - with one small opening to the outside world, his especially invented 'Guckloch' through which he spies on passer-by to distinguish and dispose of beggars. The narrow and distorted perspective he has of the world is determimed by his peep-hole:

Die Welt bestand für ihn aus Hosen und Röcken.(73)

The spy-hole is not only the necessary means for carrying out his job and satisfying his mania for the exercise of power, but it also delineates the limits of his perception of reality.

The space which represents Fischerle's closed world is the space under his wife's bed: this was the only place he could disappear to when his wife brought her customers to their tiny room; it was also the only vantage-point from which he could seek out opponents for his chess matches, guessing from the man's speech whether he is a chess-player or not, but usually finding his offers rejected anyway. This cramped space - especially so for a hunchback - is for Fischerle the "Wiege seiner Laufbahn", a "Ruhewiege" (316),"sein Ideal" (323), with qualities which go beyond its usefulness for his ambitions, qualities which make him want to reproduce it when he achieves his dream in America. He imagines himself

in a specially-made small car -

> Man fühlt sich darin wie unterm Bett. Das Hinausschauen ist langweilig. Er schließt fest die Augen. Gar nichts bewegt sich. Unterm Bett ist er zu Hause. (178)

The bed fulfils the same function for Fischerle as Kien's library does, in shutting out the world and its activity, leaving him to pursue his dream unhindered.

Canetti's discussion of man's relationship to space in Masse und Macht further highlights the significance of the self-contained world of the individual. The need to shut out the rest of the world, most obvious in Kien's library and Fischerle's bed, is according to Masse und Macht subconsciously motivated by the fear of the unknown.

> Nichts fürchtet der Mensch mehr als die Berührung durch Unbekanntes ... Alle Abstände, die die Menschen um sich geschaffen haben, sind von dieser Berührungsfurcht diktiert. Man sperrt sich in Häuser ein, in die niemand eintreten darf, nur in ihnen fühlt man sich halbwegs sicher. Die Angst vor dem Einbrecher gilt nicht seinen räuberischen Absichten allein, sie ist auch eine Furcht vor seinem plötzlichen, unerwarteten Griff aus dem Dunkel. (M. 11)

This is clearly present in Kien's reflection on the attributes of his library, after it has been reduced to a quarter of its size by Therese's claims. Kien feels like a prisoner, separated by doors from his books, and missing the 'erfrischenden Weite', but this 'Weite' is strictly limited by the boundaries he has set up against the world:

> Es war, als hätte sich jemand gegen die Erde verbarrikadiert; gegen alles bloß materielle Beziehungswesen, gegen alles nur Planetarische eine Kabine erbaut, eine ungeheure Kabine, so groß, daß sie für das Wenige aus-

> reichte, welches an der Erde mehr als Erde und mehr als der Staub ist, zu dem das Leben wieder zerfällt, sie dicht verschlossen und mit diesem Wenigen erfüllt. Auf der Fahrt durch das Unbekannte war man wie auf keiner Fahrt. Es genügte, sich durch die Beobachtungsfenster von dem Weiterbestehen einiger Naturgesetze zu überzeugen: dem Wechsel von Tag und Nacht, dem launenhaften, unaufhörlichen Treiben des Klimas, dem Flusse der Zeit, und man fuhr von selbst. (57)

Kien has barricaded himself in with everything he considers reliable and unchangeable - his books - and shut out everything unknown, everything which does not have a fixed place in his value system.

Kien's rank as 'wohl der größte Sinolog seiner Zeit', again represented by his library which is the basis of his authority as a 'Professor' since he does not have a teaching post, is another important aspect of his barricade against the outside world, specifically against people. This, too, is explained by Canetti's theories.

> Die Menschen als einzelne sind sich dieser Unterschiede (des Ranges, Standes und Besitzes) immer bewußt. Auf einem bestimmten, sicheren Platz steht der Mensch und hält sich alles, was ihm in die Nähe kommt, mit wirkungsvollen Rechtsgebärden vom Leibe. Wie eine Windmühle auf riesiger Ebene, so steht er da, ausdrucksvoll und bewegt, bis zur nächsten Mühle ist nichts. Alles Leben, wie er es kennt, ist auf Distanzen angelegt, das Haus, in dem er seinen Besitz und sich verschließt, die Stellung, die er bekleidet, der Rang, nach dem er strebt - alle dienen dazu, Abstände zu schaffen, zu festigen und zu vergrößern ... Regungen und Gegenregungen versickern wie in einer Wüste. (M 14)

These barriers protect Kien even against his own impulses. The moment of communication with another human being, in the opening conversation with Franz Hetzger,[11] leads to the

offer of further contact. But Kien is able to thwart the immediately regretted gesture by means of the barricade he has erected - chiefly in the form of Therese, the appointed guard - on the basis of the importance and urgency of his work, which does not allow time for other activities. On the other hand, as soon as the barrier of rank between him and Therese falls, when he discovers that her respect for books is even greater than his -

> Diese Frau mußte ihn verachten. Sie war eine großartige Seele (38) -

the process of destruction begins. The inevitable consequence of this recognition is the marriage which eventually robs him of his library.

The essence of monomania is the individual's reduction of the world to the one area in which he feels secure. This process is represented in miniature in Kien's reaction to Pfaff's 'Faust', which he imagines as destroying Therese:

> Er selbst war so geringfügig und mager, daß er nichts zu fürchten hatte. Zur Vorsicht nahm er noch weniger Platz als gewöhnlich ein. Er war so dünn wie das Leintuch. Ihm konnte keine Faust der Welt etwas anhaben. (97)

By becoming smaller, the individual leaves less and less surface area open and vulnerable to attack, until he has reduced himself enough to withdraw from the reach of outside power. Therese, e.g., does not move outside her household because she fears threats to her wealth and her respectability:

> Sie sieht wenig in ihrem Leben. Sie ist nie über die Stadtgrenzen hinausgekommen. Ausflüge macht sie nicht, weil es schade ums Geld ist. Baden geht sie nicht, weil es unanständig ist.... Wenn sie nicht einkaufen müßte, würde sie am liebsten immer zu Hause bleiben. (29)

In Kien's case this is even more marked:

> Ja, das ist seine Heimat. Hier kann ihm nichts geschehen ... Jeder Mensch braucht eine Heimat ... die Boden, Arbeit, Freunde, Erholung und geistigen Fassungsraum zu einem natürlichen, wohlgeordneten Ganzen, zu einem eigenen Kosmos zusammenschließt. Die beste Definition der Heimat ist Bibliothek. (48)

This private world as the entire compass of his activity makes Kien the epitome of the specialist, as Canetti defines him in Aufzeichnungen 1942-1948:

> Ein Spezialist: Er sucht Gelehrsamkeit ohne Bewegung; seine Zweifel wollen so gerichtet sein, daß sie nur weniges gefährden. Er braucht einen guten, sicheren Boden, aber bloß einige sollen mit ihm drauf stehen ... Seine Herrschaft übt er durch die kleine Gruppe aus, der er zugehört. Er hat es leicht, alles zu verachten, weil niemand von seinem Gebiet etwas versteht und nichts anderes ihn wirklich interessiert. Er ist nie ernsthaft in Gefahr, solange er sich nur eng erhält. (A. 96)

The paralysis of schizophrenia.

The individual's fortification of his world of obsession against outside reality also expresses the paralysis of his activity by his monomania.

The single obsessions of the characters of Die Blendung are an intensified form of the specialisations of normal society, which Canetti considers a denial of the basic 'Vielfältigkeit' of man's nature.

> Ich glaube, es ist so, daß ... jeder einzelne Mensch eine Summe von Anlagen hat und daß viele dieser Anlagen sich letzten Endes aus dem Reichtum alter Verwandlungen herleiten, daß eigentlich kein Mensch eine Einheit ist und als Einheit leben soll. Die Vorstellung ... daß Menschen nur bestimmte Dinge machen, die sie dann immer machen, halte ich für eine der größten Verirrungen, sie widerspricht der menschlichen Natur. 12)

Man's ability to transform himself is for Canetti the essence of humanity -

> Ich glaube, daß der Mensch ein Verwandlungswesen par excellence ist und durch seine Verwandlungen ... zum Menschen geworden ist. 13) -

with the result that the development of every capability becomes, for him, man's most important activity. Monomania, the concentration of all energies exclusively on the one possibility, rules out any movement from one role to another, thus paralysing all other potentialities. Obsession is thus equated with absence of transformation, immobility and eventual paralysis.[14)]

This immobility is the major element in Canetti's understanding of paranoia.

> In der Bewegung ist zweifellos ein Heilmittel für beginnende Paranoia gegeben. Die Intensität dieser Art von Verwirrung geht aufs Statische. Man benimmt sich so, als ob ein bestimmter Platz bedroht wäre, der, auf dem man selber steht, und man kann um keinen Preis von diesem Platz weg. (A. 86)

The defence of the private world means paralysis and madness. An individual documented case of madness which Canetti discusses at length in Masse und Macht depicts this link between rigidity and madness explicitly - the case of Dr. Schreber, whose Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken were published in 1903. Canetti himself points out several

similarities between Kien's story and this case history, which he first read many years after writing the novel. The major parallel is that between Schreber's "Periode der 'Unbeweglichkeit'" and the chapter "Die Erstarrung" in Die Blendung. Canetti discusses this paralysis as

> die Fertigkeit und Abgeschlossenheit des Wahns, die ein Entrinnen sehr schwierig macht; nirgends Türen; alles fest verschlossen; vergeblich hält man nach etwas Flüssigem Ausschau, in das man untertauchen kann, mit dem man forttreiben könnte; selbst wenn es sich fände, wäre es abgesperrt; alles ist wie Granit. (A.V. 19)

- images which apply to Kien's encapsulation and petrifaction as much as they do to Schreber's paranoiac delusion system.

The 'Erstarrung' chapter is only the culmination of the fixedness and rigidity of Kien's character. Already in his concept of character he exhibits this immobility, by defining character as unchanging constancy:

> Wer unter den schlechten Schauspielern, aus denen die Masse bestand, hatte ein Gesicht, das ihn fesselte? Sie veränderten es nach dem Augenblick; nicht einen Tag lang verharrten sie bei derselben Rolle. ... Er legte seinen Ehrgeiz in eine Hartnäckigkeit seines Wesens. Nicht bloß einen Monat, nicht ein Jahr, sein ganzes Leben blieb er sich gleich. (12)

The 'Mutstraße' incident, which follows immediately upon this reflection, indicates that this constancy prevents normal responses to the activity of others or to the every-day happenings of normal life; character, accordingly, consists in the refusal to be interrupted in one's pursuits, even thoughts, by external "Zufällen" (13). The permanence of character is threatened by any contact with people, even

at one remove in their depiction in novels.

> Sie (Romane) zersetzen den besten Charakter. Man lernt sich in allerlei Menschen einfühlen. Am vielen Hin und Her gewinnt man Geschmack. Man löst sich in die Figuren auf, die einem gefallen. Jeder Standpunkt wird begreiflich. Willig überläßt man sich fremden Zielen und verliert für länger die eigenen aus dem Auge. Romane sind Keile, die ein schreibender Schauspieler in die geschlossene Person seiner Leser treibt. (35)

Character, rejecting all such stimuli, therefore means complete fixedness of man's capacities - thoughts, feelings, impulses, responses - in the one chosen direction. It totally excludes contacts with people and happenings which would demand the adoption of new attitudes, involvement in outsiders' feelings, thinking along unaccustomed paths.

Kien protects himself against these demands by ignoring them, through silence and through his refusal to acknowledge emotion by any kind of gesture. Remaining silent even under provocation is equated with character in the 'Mutstraße' episode. Here silence means refusing to be influenced by outside reality, this time in the form of an insistent passer-by asking for directions, even in the face of physical attack. Such extreme negation of response not only cuts off all communication with others, but also paralyses the mental activity of the individual into the form of his obsession.

> Die Macht des Schweigens wird immer hoch eingeschätzt. Sie bedeutet, daß man allen äußeren Anlässen zur Rede ... widerstehen kann. ... Das Schweigen isoliert ... Das Schweigen wirkt der Verwandlung entgegen. Wer auf seinen inneren Posten steht, kann sich nicht davon entfernen... Im Verstummen reissen alle Anlässe zur Verwandlung ab. Durch Sprechen spinnt sich alles zwischen

Menschen an, im Schweigen erstarrt es. (M. 338)

Kien's face is characterized by immobility.[15] His features have the sharpness and hardness of a machine -

> Er hatte wasserblaue Augen und überhaupt keine Wangen. Seine Stirn war eine zerrissene Felswand. Die Nase stürzte, ein senkrechter, schwindelnd schmaler Grat, in die Tiefe ... Der Mund war ein Automatenschlitz. (152 f) -

and they only move reluctantly and aggressively:

> Wenn Kien jemanden ansprach, verzog er keine Miene. Nur die Lippen bewegte er wie zwei scharfgeschliffene Messer. (194)

The stoic absence of response in the form of gesture or facial expression is demonstrated by Kien's behaviour after his arrest.

> Kien wird noch geschlagen, doch findet niemand mehr ein rechtes Vergnügen dabei. Er benimmt sich weder als Mensch noch als Leiche. Das Auswinden entlockt ihm keinen Laut. Er könnte abwehren, das Gesicht bedecken, sich winden oder wenigstens zucken, man erwartet allerlei von ihm, er enttäuscht. (262)

This behaviour not only expresses the ultimate of autistic withdrawal from the world, but also complete withdrawal from the possibilities for transformation within himself, which can only be developed in response to outside stimuli:

> Im Mienenspiel besonders drückt sich die unaufhörliche Verwandlungsbereitschaft des Menschen aus. (M. 430)

Kien's lack of 'Verwandlungsbereitschaft' is not peculiar to eccentrics like himself, but is demanded as the ideal human behaviour by stoicism, for example. Canetti explains this as expressing the epitome of individualism:

> Der tiefere Grund für diese Einstellung ist die Forderung nach einer konstanten Autonomie des Menschen. Man erlaubt es niemand, in einen einzudringen, und man dringt auch selber nicht in einen andern ein. Der Mensch soll die Kraft haben, für sich zu sein, und der Mensch soll die Kraft haben, sich gleichzubleiben. Eines geht mit dem anderen Hand in Hand. Denn es ist die Einwirkung eines Menschen auf den anderen, die zu unaufhörlichen, flüchtigen Verwandlungen reizt. Diese drücken sich in Gestikutaltion und Mienenspiel aus; wo beides verpönt ist, wird jede Verwandlung erschwert, und schließlich wird sie ganz unterbunden. (M. 43o)

Only on one occasion does Kien's behaviour not conform with this ideal. Fischerle's report of the 'Schwein' in the Theresianum who eats books arouses Kien to scream in rage and protest, pounding the pavement with his fists as he does so. His reaction is expressed - when he himself recalls the incident shortly before his suicide - in terms which directly refer to the image of stone as denoting the extreme of paralysis:

> Er heulte zum Steinerweichen. Pflastersteine hüpften auf und nieder. (41o)

Kien's reference in this image is to his feeling, on that occasion, that "selbst die harte Rinde der Erde weicher sei als ein Mensch" (216), that his fellow human beings remain unmoved by a plight which even the most unfeeling substance should respond to. For the reader, however, Kien himself has been identified with stone by the 'statue' incident, and the image of stone melting therefore applies to the unwonted surfacing of emotion, of inner movement producing external motion, in someone whose existence has seemed to deny the

possibility of such movement. Thus single expression of emotion, which has no real consequences in Kien's activity, denotes not so much mobility as fixation: it reveals once more his obsession, and the distortion of values which disregards the fate of people but reacts violently to an absurd rumour of maltreatment of books.

Similar images apply to Therese, although not to the same extent. The central image in her case is the 'gestärkte Rock' which represents her belief in her attractiveness and respectability, as a source of beauty and as an indication that she is unapproachable. These two aspects are basically contradictory: she uses her skirt to attract the admiration of men, but at the same time insists on being treated as an 'anständige Frau' - at least until she can reassure herself that the chosen man's attentions will bring wealth as well as sexual satisfaction. In the face of disappointed hopes she on one occasion approaches Kien's statue-existence but only momentarily:

> Halb aufgebracht und halb resigniert ließ sie die harten Hände auf den harten Rock sinken und erstarrte zu einer Holzpuppe. (27)

This skirt gives her the appearance of a machine, which she considers a source of distinction.

> Unter all den Männern in Hosen und Frauen in kurzen Röcken war sie die einzige, deren Beine, unter dem blauen gestärkten Rock, der bis zu den Füßen reichte, heimlich funktionierten. (67)

- the image typifies her mode of life, mechanically following

a single impulse.

More important is the role of the 'Rock' in her relationship with Kien. The skirt presents him with great problems on their wedding day -

> Der Rock gehörte zu ihr, wie die Schale zur Muschel. (45)
> Therese ohne Schale - ohne Rock - existierte nicht. (46)

He therefore imagines a fierce struggle which must take place before he can conquer her - "zertreten", "erbrochen" (45). But despite his visions -

> Seine Schuhe zerdrücken sie. Bald lag sie splitternackt vor ihm da, ein Häuflein Elend, Schleim und Schwindel. (46) -

he is forced to capitulate. His recognition, "Übertriebene Härte ist lächerlich" (ibid.) stands in ironic counterpoint to his own eventual petrifaction. The skirt continues to act as Therese's defence in their conflict.

> Beim Zusammenstoß geschah ihr nichts, sie war durch den Rock geschützt. Er tat sich natürlich weh. (112)

Therese uses her skirt as a hiding-place for the key to the rooms she has appropriated from Kien's library, and secure in this fortress, refuses to surrender them.

> Und wenn der Mann den Rock zerbeißt, ich geb' die Schlüssel nicht her ... Eine Frau tut alles für ihren Mann. Den Rock tut sie nicht! (129)

As the symbol of Therese's hostility and strength, her skirt is equated with a rock in the obsessive fears of the last stage of Kien's madness - "steif starr ein Fels" (340) - and becomes a threatening dream which he finds it difficult to banish:

> Auf Umwegen gelangt er an den blauen Fels, den er zerschellt geglaubt hat. Will der Fels nicht weichen... (ibid.)

The motif of petrifaction in Therese's case thus represents her obsessive greed and the aggressiveness with which she pursues it, in driving Kien to his destruction. In its function as barricade around her private world of wealth and respectability, she maintains it until she finds in Pfaff the possible accomplishment of her goals - "Er ... brach ihr den harten Rock herunter und nahm sie" (250). The breakdown of the barricade does not mean the abandonment of the private dream, however, but rather its accomplishment: the 'Rock' has existed as a bulwark intended for destruction, typifying the hypocrisy of Therese's concept of herself and her hopes.

The novel's depiction of rigidity culminates in Kien's attempt to turn himself to stone, the ultimate reaction against flux and movement.[16] Kien petrifies in fear, dreading an attack by Therese, and convinced that she can do nothing to harm stone:

> Nirgends Rettung, alles geht unter, wo man auch hinkriecht, die Feinde holen einen heraus, Kartenhäuser, brechen die geliebten Kulturen zusammen, vor Räubern barbarischen, Hohlköpfen harten.
> Da erstarrte Kien.
> Er preßte die dürren Beine eng aneinander. Seine Rechte legte sich zur Faust geballt aufs Knie. Unterarm und Oberschenkel hielten einander in Ruhe. Mit dem linken Arm verstärkte er seine Brust. Leicht hob sich der Kopf. Seine Augen blickten ins Weite. Er versuchte sie zu schließen. An ihrer Weigerung erkannte er sich als ägyptischen Priester von Granit. Er war zur Statue erstarrt. (141)

Training himself to sit motionless at his desk all day, Kien imagines that he aquires the 'Kälte', 'Härte' and heaviness - "Granit ist schwer" (142) - of stone, whose pressure "hätte den Stuhl zermalmt" (ibid.). As a statue he achieves the complete suppression of emotion and expression:

> Er ... unterdrückte ein unpassendes Lächeln. (143)
> Er unterdrückte eine freudige Regung. (145)
> Er sollte wohl fragen, was sie da mache.
> Hatte er gesprochen, so war er kein Stein mehr
> und sie schlug ihn tot. Sie lockte ihn aus dem
> Stein hervor ... Doch er bewahrte sein kaltes
> Blut und gab keinen Hauch von sich. (145)

When this restraint is broken down - when Therese tampers with his papers - he can no longer hold out in the state of motionlessness. But instead of returning to human form, he uses the hardness and heaviness of his stone body - "steinhart, Härtegrad 1o, Diamant, schärfste Kanten, zerschneidende" (145) - to crush the enemy.

> ... er wird sich erheben, ein kalter Stein, er wird
> sie an sich zerschlagen. Er wird ihre Stücke zu-
> sammenlesen und die Stücke zu Staub zermalmen. Er
> wird über sie zusammenbrechen, hereinbrechen, eine
> gewaltige, ägyptische Plage. Er packt sich, die Ta-
> fel der Zehn Gebote, und steinigt mit ihr sein Volk...
> Wer hat die Härte Gottes? Wer hat die Kälte Gottes?
> (146)

The invincible strength he feels within himself collapses in confrontation with reality, in the form of Therese:

> Sie speit, sie speit in sein Gesicht. Er spürt alles.
> Es tut weh. Er ist kein Stein. Da sie nicht zerbricht,
> zerbricht seine Kunst. Alles ist Lüge, es gibt keinen
> Glauben. Es gibt keinen Gott. (ibid.)

The same image of turning to stone, which here becomes a 'real' event in Kien's life as he himself sees it, recurs often in Canetti's discussions of madness in Masse und Macht. Isolation and paralysis are discussed here as the major symptoms of schizophrenia.

> An Schizophrenen fällt am meisten ein Mangel an Kontakt auf. Sie sind um vieles isolierter als andere Menschen. Sie wirken oft so, als wären sie zu sich selbst erstarrt; als bestünde keine Verbindung zwischen ihnen und anderen Menschen; als verstünden sie nichts; als wollten sie nichts verstehen. Ihr Eigensinn ist wie der von Bildwerken aus Stein. Es gibt keine Position, zu der sie nicht erstarren könnten. (M. 370)

Kien himself recognizes the potential for delusion and insanity in becoming fixed in one particular attitude, in the unchanging persistence of his character. Rejecting the fickleness of his brother's nature, he boasts of his obsessive constancy:

> "Ich stehe fest ... Wenn ich an einer Wahnvorstellung litte, wäre ich stolz auf sie. Was zeugt mehr von Charakter und Stärke? ... Du bringst keinen Wahn zustande. Ich auch nicht, aber ich hätte die Begabung dafür: den Charakter. ... Aber ich habe meinen Charakter bewiesen. Aus eigenem Willen allein, von niemandem unterstützt ... habe ich mich von einem Druck, einer Last, einem Tod, einer Rinde von verfluchtem Granit befreit." (389)

Kien here claims that by killing Therese he has overcome the paralysis of the statue existence forced on him by her threatening presence. He does not recognize that the 'Charakter' he imagines himself to be is the real 'Rinde von verfluchtem Granit'.

The parallels between the 'Erstarrung' chapter and Schreber's depiction of his period of immobility extend beyond the images of petrifaction themselves to the reason behind this behaviour.[17] Both Schreber and Kien believe that their paralysis is imposed by the demands of a higher authority. Schreber sees his activity as essential to God's plans; Kien sees himself as the instrument of God in punishing Therese - comparing himself with Moses - for the sake of 'Wissenschaft'. Both also see their motionlessness as necessary for retaining power: Schreber in the form of divine rays, Kien in invulnerability against attack and in strength to crush the enemy.

Schreber's immobility is described as that of a "Leiche" or "Mumie" (M. 529). The same image of death is linked with Kien's inner paralysis: he himself equates "Tod" with "Granit" (389); and his lack of responsiveness in the Theresianum incident makes him seem so much a "Leiche" (262) that his blood amazes everyone as "das erste Lebenszeichen, das Kien von sich gab" (263). Kien's 'Erstarrung' is equated with death, as well as madness, because it expresses his rejection of humanity, both in his withdrawal from his fellow-man and in its corollary, his denial of man's essence, his 'Verwandlung'.[18]

Power and paranoia.

Masse und Macht closes with a section entitled "Herrschaft und Paranoia", in which Canetti discusses - using Schreber as

the major example - the parallels between the behaviour of absolute rulers and the delusional systems of paranoiacs. He concludes that paranoia is in fact "eine Krankheit der Macht" (M. 516), although most paranoiacs fail to achieve the power they crave in their delusions. The elements which constitute this parallel between rulers and paranoiacs in the drive for power are all present in the manias and delusions of the characters of Die Blendung.[19)]

The 'Positionsgefühl' is established as essential to paranoia:

> Immer geht es darum, eine exaltierte Stellung zu verteidigen und zu sichern. (M. 502)

This impulse is clearly present in the monomania of each individual in the novel. Social status in the general sense is of cardinal importance for Therese, who as Kien's 'Frau' attempts to wipe out all traces of her former existence as 'Dienstbote'; for the police 'Kommandant' the cushion marked 'Privateigentum' serves to distinguish him from his "Untergebenen" (276); and Pfaff considers his status superior to Kien's, because it is he who has bestowed and enforced the title of 'Professor' on him. Each character's obsession is based on an area of activity where he can gain supremacy; Kien is the highest authority in Chinese philology; Fischerle is the unacknowledged world chess champion; and Fischerle's wife 'die Pensionistin' is the only prostitute in her circle who has a regular client and secure income.

Seeing everything in terms of his obsession, the individual therefore necessarily also relates everything to himself, since the obsession and the ego are closely identified. In this they compare, in varying degrees, with Schreber's attitude - although they generally see their position only in human terms, without reference to God:

> "Alles, was geschieht", sagt Schreber, "wird auf mich bezogen. Ich bin für Gott der Mensch schlechthin oder der einzige Mensch geworden, um den sich alles dreht, auf den alles, was geschieht, bezogen werden muß und der also auch von seinem Standpunkt aus alle Dinge auf sich selbst beziehen soll." (M. 533)

The feeling that everything depends on him is apparent, e.g., in Pfaff's attitude to his role in the imaginary arrest of Therese for Kien's murder: "der Staatsanwalt lebt nur von ihm" and "'Ich bin der Einzige'". (91)

The impulse to exercise control over others through supreme ability comes to the surface in Fischerle's dream of a chess match with a world master who cannot match his skill and must therefore submit to his commands:

> Als Gegner setzt er sich einen Weltmeister hin. Dem diktiert er stolz die Züge. Ein wenig verwundert über den Gehorsam, den er findet, tauscht er den alten Weltmeister gegen einen neuen aus; auch der läßt sich viel von ihm gefallen. Fischerle spielt, strenggenommen, für beide. Der andere findet keine besseren Züge als die von Fischerle befohlenen, nickt ergeben und wird trotzdem aufs Haupt geschlagen. (174)

His dream of wealth and success in America gives him power over the fate of others, such as the journalists whose jobs depend on getting an interview with him; he imagines this influence extended even into remote areas through his offer

of a scholarship to any taverns which display his posters and keep them sacrosanct (177); and he dreams of the supreme power of having an army of servants to act as his chess pieces:

> Die Dienerschaft ist livriert; in dreißig gigantischen Sälen spielt Fischer Tag und Nacht dreißig Simultanpartien, mit lebenden Figuren, denen er zu kommandieren hat. Er braucht nur Muh zu sahen (sic) und seine Sklaven rücken dorthin, wo er sie haben will. (ibid.)

Therese's status-seeking is centred on achieving the recognition her beauty deserves - "Sie ist die schönste von allen" (118); on proving her accomplishments in competition with other contenders for Grob's favour, a competition in which she is sure no-one can seriously rival her - "Keine hatte einen gestärkten Rock. Keine war wie dreißig" (111) and her capital is "das Höchste von allen" (ibid.); and on gaining enormous wealth -

> Die Lust, mit einem Schlag so reich zu werden wie gar kein Möbelgeschäft auf der Welt, wurde groß und größer. (116)

In all of these goals she is concerned with achieving the supreme position of the superlatives she always ascribes to herself, which no one else can measure up to. The passive power of this desire for respect becomes patently active in Kien's arrest, where she plays the role of accuser bringing the criminal to justice:

> Sie schreit mechanisch. Sie fühlt sich wohl dabei.
> Sie fühlt, daß sie die Oberhand behält. (258)
> Ihre Angst vor der Polizei weicht stolzen Gefühlen.
> Man tut, was sie will. Sie hat hier zu befehlen.
> So gehört es sich. (262)

> Sie war stolz, weil er sie erkannte, sie war die Hauptperson. (268)
> Sie war hier die Herrin, alles drehte sich um sie. (ibid.)

Pfaff's power, based on his threefold position as "er, der Polizeibeamte, er, der Ehemann, er, der Vater" (326), is more open and more brutally enforced. As such, it represents the climax of the drive for status and control. It is, however, simply an extreme instance of a universal tendency. This is indicated by the behaviour of the mob at the Theresianum, where each usurps for himself the power of the police, because this gives him the right to intervene.

> Die Menge umringt die Polizei mit Bewunderung. An der Uniform spürt man, was die immer dürfen. Die anderen dürfen es nur, solange die Polizei nicht da ist. (26o f)

Despite Kien's powerlessness and submissiveness in the face of such enemies as Therese and Fischerle, the role of power in his thinking is significant. His own standards make him one of mankind's greatest man:

"Man scheute ihn, wie alle Großen" (148).

He considers himself "einer von den obersten Tausend"(273), and as occupying a position which he believes even allows him to kill with impunity. The drive for power is for the most part repressed by fear in his dealings with Therese, whose demands and beatings he meekly submits to. Only when he imagines that Therese is in love with him does the thought of power become dominant:

> Er ist Herr über ein Leben. Er kann diesem armseligen Geschöpf, das sich in Liebe nach ihm verzehrt, die letzten Lebensjahre vergällen und verkürzen. (1o7)

Kien's image of himself, in the statue-episode, as the instrument of God's vengeance approaches closely the fanaticism of Schreber's delusion - but the illusoriness of this power rapidly becomes apparent. In his relationship with Fischerle, too, fear dominates at first - "Gehorchen und Horchen war hier für Kien eins" (156). But this soon gives way to the benevolence of a dictator when Fischerle becomes a grovelling servant, spreading Kien's papers like a "Höckerreptil" (17o), which Kien finds extremely gratifying:

> Kien lächelte, er war weder die Kriecherei noch den Buckel gewohnt und fühlte sich glücklich über die persönliche Ehre, die der Zwerg ihm antat. (ibid.)

Kien's power complex reaches its climax in his delusion of himself as the saviour of the world. His redemptive mission consists of a concrete plan to pay anyone bringing books to the 'Hölle' of the Theresianum the money he needs. This will have the two-fold effect of saving the books from the ignominy and danger of the pawnshop, by making it possible for the owner to retain them; and of ennobling the owner by reminding him of the dignity and worth of books, which he should in future handle with more reverence. But because he so inflates the importance of books, this eccentric but comparatively modest plan also becomes inflated to assume the proportions of saving the world from impending doom.

Kien's mission begings with horror at the disgraceful treatment of books on the sixth floor of the pawnshop, heightened by his fantasy of the building in flames, with the books cut off from any hope of rescue. This is for Kien equated with the collapse of civilization.

> Wohin wird uns diese Welt noch führen? Offenbar stehen wir vor einer Katastrophe. ... unser schleichender Verderb ist die Pietätlosigkeit, die in die Menschen gefahren ist, an diesem Gift gehen wir alle zugrunde. Weh denen, die nach uns kommen! Die sind verloren, sie übernehmen von uns eine Million Märtyrer und die Folterinstrumente, mit denen sie die zweite Million vollmachen müssen. (189)

Such visions of universal catastrophe provide another point of comparison with the paranoiac: a major factor in Schreber's delusion is

> das Gefühl des Katastrophalen ... eine Gefährdung der Weltordnung. (M. 508)

Schreber's "Weltuntergang" culminates in the vision

> die ganze Menschheit war untergegangen ... Der Einzige, der lebte, war er. (M. 509)

This has a parallel in Kien's conviction, not that he is the only person left alive, but that the is the only one who stands against this drive towards destruction, that he is "der Eine" (190), who has been called, through Fischerle, to prevent it.

Kien's martyr complex has been prefigured on several occasions: he has been tormented by a recurring dream of books going up in flames, with all his attempts to rescue them mocked by deception (32-35); when attacked by the mob im 'Himmel' he had

vowed not to betray his books - "er ist ein Märtyrer, er stirbt für seine Bücher" (167); and his first impulse in the Theresianum is to pull the building down around him, willing to die in the process as long as it means the end of this "Götzendienst" (184) - in an unconscious emulation of Samson's destruction of the Philistines. Kien has even explicitly compared himself with Christ, although not specifically as a martyr or redeemer:

> Auf das Haupt Christi, der krank und mager, mit schmerzverzerrtem Gesicht, aus einem Postament wuchs, setzte sich eine Taube ... Dem Volke leidet dieser Christus zu sehr, es meint, er habe Zahnweh... Da denkt er daran, wie einsam er ist. Daran darf man nicht denken, sonst bringt man es zu nichts. Für wen wäre er denn gestorben, wenn er am Kreuz an seine Einsamkeit gedacht hätte? - Ja, er war wirklich sehr einsam, sein Bruder schrieb ihn nicht mehr. (1o7) Christus wäre eher zu verführen gewesen als er. (1o8)

The condescension of Kien's tone in this instance becomes explicit when he equates himself with Christ as Redeemer, and even rates his own achievement more highly. At first the parallels are not conscious or deliberate on Kien's part. The chapter depicting Kien's mission is entitled "Großes Erbarmen", applying in the fist place, ironically, to the 'Pfandleihanstalt' which, following the example of Christ, invites the poor to come for refuge (181). The title also applies to Kien's task of taking pity on the pawned books, the defenceless victims of man's greed, and rescuing them from that same institution. His enthusiasm for his role inspires him to the point of seeing Fischerle as eternally saved by his cooperation - "Er ... war nahe daran, ihm die himmlische

Seligkeit in Aussicht zu stellen" (194). The concept of men being converted to reverence for their books by his work is also presented in distinctly Christian terms: "Ein reuiger Sünder, sagt er, sei mehr wert als tausend Gerechte" (196). The parallel becomes quite specific when Kien weighs his achievement against Christ's and decides that his own is superior because he saves books rather than people.

> Er bedauerte die Schwäche Christi, dieses sonderbaren Verschwenders. Speisung auf Speisung, Heilung auf Heilung, Wort um Wort zog an ihm vorüber, und er bedachte, wieviel Büchern mit diesen Wundern zu helfen gewesen wäre. Er fühlte, daß seine augenblickliche Verfassung der Christi verwandt war. Vieles hätte er in gleicher Weise verübt, nur die Gegenstände der Liebe erschienen ihm als Verirrung. (212 f)

This moment of extreme hybris coincides with the moment of his greatest sense of power. Even though he is forced to leave his post by Fischerle's warning that the police are on their way to arrest him, he is confident that his authority is invincible.

> Von Herzen verachtete er die schmutzigen Pharisäer, die ihn bedrängten ... Ausdrücklich stellte er fest, daß seine Feinde sich nicht blicken ließen. Was fürchteten sie? Die moralische Kraft seiner Fürsprache? Er bat für keine Sünder, er bat für unschuldige Bücher. Sollte in der Zwischenzeit einem einzigen von ihnen auch nur ein Haar gekrümmt werden, so würde man ihn von einer anderen Seite kennenlernen. Er beherrschte auch das Alte Testament und behielt sich die Rache vor. Ach, ihr Teufel, rief er, ihr lauert mir in irgendeinem Hinterhalt auf, ich verlasse erhobenen Hauptes euren Pfuhl! Ich fürchte mich nicht, denn hinter mir stehen ungezählte Millionen. (213)

The Biblical associations of the language in which Kien's convictions are expressed stress the degree of power and authority he assumes as the self-appointed instrument of divine

justice, in redeeming the innocent from their enemies and exercising vengeance against the unjust.

Kien finally sees 'Erlösung' achieved, not by his efforts at the Theresianum, but by Therese's death, "die endgültige Erlösung der furchtbar verfolgten Menschheit" (284). As with his image of himself as an all-powerful avenger, this links power with death - a relationship which Canetti maintains as the essence of power. Power is expressed by the command, epitomised in the death sentence (M. 348). For the exercise of power it is essential that the ruler have control over the life of his subjects, able to destroy them in case of rebellion or non-cooperation. Kien's entire relationship with Therese, particularly the frequency with which he imagines her death, demonstrates his wish to remove such a potential source of danger, and his completely unfounded belief that it is within his power to accomplish this. The happiest time of Kien's life is therefore the period of recuperation - after his fall from the ladder - when Pfaff visits him each day:

> Wenn der Mann um zehn Uhr zur Tür hereintrat, sagte sich Kien voller Freude: Ein gefährlicher Mensch, er schlägt sie in Stücke. Täglich frohlockte er über Theresens Untergang und pries in Gedanken das Leben, von dem er auch früher schon mancherlei wußte, ohne sich zum Preisen veranlaßt zu sehen. (1oo)

His submission to Therese, expressed even more forcibly than usual by his complete dependence on her at this time, gives way for these brief intervals to the feeling of power,

through the strength of Pfaff and the daily "Jüngste Gericht" (ibid.) he holds. The ruler role Kien plays here is stressed by his designation of Pfaff as a 'Landsknecht', suggesting that he is his own hired soldier, with the accompanying feeling that he himself is not threatened by this force.

The more important sphere of power for Kien, however, is based on his library, the sphere which is "in seiner Gewalt" (6o). This is the source of his greatness and therefore the sphere which he must defend, in the first instance through the schizophrenic technique of isolation, again typical of the paranoiac ruler.

> Als den paranoischen Typus des Machthabers könnte man den bezeichnen, der sich die Gefahr mit allen Mitteln vom Leibe hält ... Er wird freien Raum um sich schaffen, den er übersehen kann, und jedes Zeichen ihrer Annäherung bemerken und erwägen. (264)

On the other hand, the defence of position is closely involved with crowds, a major concern of the paranoiac:

> Für die Eigenschaften der Masse hat niemand ein schärferes Auge als der Paranoiker oder der Machthaber... Denn er ... befaßt sich mit den Massen, die er befeinden oder beherrschen will. (515)

To counter danger, in the case of open combat, the ruler needs the assistance of a subject crowd, willing to risk death on his behalf. Kien's subject crowd is his army of books, which he calls to arms to guard his world against the threat Therese represents.[2o] Therese is only a single individual, but Kien sees her as a conspiring hostile crowd, designating the threat as "viele Feinde"(77). Recounting the story of the massive book-burning in China in 213 B.C., Kien

places Therese in the context of all the book-destroyers of history, more or less as their latest successor (78); she represents "der Schlamm des Analphabetensumpfes" (79) which threatens to swamp the intellectual elite. The central importance of the death sentence, the power to squash opposition with the ultimate force, is evident in Kien's pleasure at the gruesome details of the execution of the book-burner Li-Si and the annihilation of his whole family (ibid.). The organisation of his army and the call to war indicate the extent of the power he intends to bring to bear against the enemy: the books are not inanimate objects but instruments of death

> "Zwischen deinen Lettern wirst du ihn (den Feind) totpressen, deine Zeilen seien die Keulen, die auf sein Haupt niederprasseln, deine Buchstaben die Bleigewichte, die sich an seine Füße hängen, deine Deckel die Panzer, die dich vor ihm schützen! Tausend Listen hast du, ihn zu verstricken, tausend Blitze, ihn zu zerschmettern, du, mein Volk, die Kraft, die Größe, die Weisheit der Jahrtausende." (81)

Kien's army, the subservient crowd he uses to gain or confirm his power, exhibits, in his ideal vision of it, many of the characteristics of the crowd as defined in Masse und Macht: it is closed, united by a common goal and kept together by an outside threat, and composed of equals. But this equality does not extend to Kien, who sets himself up as the army's supreme commander: he is not part of the crowd, but its ruler. His imagined success in this role gives rise to a "Machtgefühl" (82); on the other hand, the obstinacy of the French philosophers who object to his democratisation

of the troops threatens specifically his right to claim this authority:

> Sie verhöhnten seine lächerliche Gestalt. Er wisse mit seinem Körper nicht umzugehen, drum ziehe er in den Krieg. Er sei immer bescheiden gewesen, drum erniedrige er sie, um sich zu erhöhen. Das sei die Art aller Liebenden: sich Widerstände vorzutäuschen, um siegen zu dürfen. (83)

In this imagined accusation which Kien - as is his custom - invents on behalf of his books, he exposes his own secret urge for power, but then angrily rejects this indirect recognition of his hidden motives.

Kien justifies his power-seeking as the heroic response to an outside threat, the hostile crowd embodied in Therese. The feeling of being persecuted by a conspiracy of enemies is a typical compulsive obsession in the delusions of the paranoiac.

> Konspirationen oder Verschwörungen sind bei ihm an der Tagesordnung... Der Paranoiker fühlt sich <u>umstellt</u>. Sein Hauptfeind wird sich nie damit begnügen, ihn allein anzugreifen. Er wird immer eine gehässige Meute gegen ihn aufzuregen suchen... Die zur Meute Gehörigen halten sich erst versteckt.... Aber die durchdringende Geisteskraft des Paranoikers vermag es, sie zu entlarven. Wo immer er hingreift, zieht er einen Verschworenen heraus. (M. 505)

Greatness, such as Kien's position as a supreme intellect, is no safeguard against attack, but rather attracts it, as an exalted position invites challenge: for the paranoiac "Größe und Verfolgung hängen ... aufs engste zusammen" (M 533). This connection between greatness and persecution is more clearly demonstrated by Kien's conviction, at the height of

his 'Erlösungswahn', that the whole police force of the city is directed against him, in an effort to thwart his divine task. Kien's persecution complex is artificially constructed by Fischerle, who plays on his sense of his own greatness:

> "Der Polizeipräsident hat einen besonderen Verhaftungsbefehl ausgestellt, weil Sie ein höherer Mensch sind. Sie wissen selbst, wer Sie sind, was brauch ich Ihnen da weiter zu sagen!" (214)

This is enough evidence to convince Kien of the truth of Fischerle's claims, although he admits himself that he has no concrete proof - "Ausdrücklich stellte er fest, daß seine Feinde sich nicht blicken ließen." (213) The obsession with an unseen enemy comes to the fore in the build-up to Kien's suicide, when his feeling of guilt at Therese's death, coupled with the ordeal of the Theresianum investigation, adds weight to the sense of being under attack. His delusion of persecution by a hostile crowd plays a big part in his lighting the fire and his surrender to it. He is convinced that an army of police is on the way to arrest him for Therese's murder -

> Gegen ihn das ungeheure Aufgebot. Mannschaft zu Fuß und zu Pferd. Funkelnagelneue Revolver, Karabiner, Maschinengewehre, Stacheldraht und Panzerwagen - aber gegen ihn ist alles umsonst. (41o)

- and tries to burn the red stripes out of the carpet because they can be mistaken for blood. In the depth of his persecution mania, he even sees his army of books as in revolt against him; his subservient crowd is transformed into a hostile one:

> Aus der ersten Zeile löst sich ein Stab und schlägt ihm eine um die Ohren. Blei. Das tut weh. Schlag! Schlag! Noch einer. Noch einer. Eine Fußnote tritt ihn mit Füßen. Immer mehr. Er taumelt. Zeilen und ganze Seiten, alles fällt über ihn her. Die schütteln und schlagen ihn, die beuteln ihn, die schleudern ihn einander zu. Blut. Laßt mich los! Verdammtes Gesindel! (412 f)

With his final defection he stands alone, with the whole "Räuberhölle Welt" (ibid.) waiting for his death - the ultimate persecution which finally drives him to suicide.

The same paranoiac concern with hostile or subservient crowds recurs in the obsessions of the other characters.[21] In Therese's case the hostile crowd appears in the form of her rivals for the position as Kien's housekeeper, but she remains confident of her superiority:

> Sie sah das Gesindel die Treppe herunterfliegen und freute sich aufrichtig darüber. Keinen Augenblick lang befürchtete sie, selbst als Gesindel behandelt zu werden. (22)

The same situation recurs in the competition she imagines for the favour of Herr Grob. Therese rejoices in the conflict with unequal opponents who assure her victory. Her confidence in the success of her beauty - in winning the affection of Grob, and of gaining wealth and power - is so great that she sees herself as a crowd, with complete control over the world around her, and owner of the total mass of its wealth:

> Zu Dutzenden sanken Frauen wie Dreißig in die Arme von Pudas mit Lippen, Augen, Schultern und Wangen. Die blauen gestärkten Röcke fielen zu Boden. Prachtvolle Hüften bewunderten sich in Spiegeln.... Ganze Geschäfte lachten vor Stolz über soviel Schönheit ... Auf der ganzen Erde gab es einen einzigen

> Reichtum, und der war zusammengeflossen. Er gehörte niemand. Er gehörte nämlich jemand allein ... Die Sparbücher platzten. Die Truhen mit der Aussteuer platzten auch.... Zwei Menschen gab's, die sich aufs Umgehen verstanden. Der eine Mensch war eine Frau, der gehörte alles. Der andere Mensch heiß Puda, dem gehörte nichts, dafür durfte er mit der Frau umgehen... Was man sagte, das stimmte sofort. (247)

Therese's ideal world is one of unlimited growth of wealth and flattering attentions, all exclusively in her power. As a penniless crippled Jewish dwarf, Fischerle is the epitome of the victim, and he has a corresponding persecution complex: as well as feeling constantly under attack by the police, Fischerle fears a universal conspiracy against him as a Jew, involving not only personal enemies - "Ein Jude ist immer auf der Hut vor Todfeinden" (16o) - but also supernatural powers who can make a church collapse and bury him because he has no right to be there (218). The fulfilment of Fischerle's dream is based on the opposite state: he envisages himself as in command of vast possessions and masses of subjects. He sees himself in a "Mammuthotel" (175), discussed at length in all the newspapers, and surrounded by a thousand reporters offering him huge sums for his story; then living in a "kolossaler Palast" (177) with "gigantischen Sälen" (ibid.), visited by great queues of people, and giving away generous gifts of money. The images of size, growth, extravagance equate Fischerle with the 'Paralytiker' as Canetti defines him in Masse und Macht, obsessed with 'Wachstum' of any kind. (M. 469)[22] But the main factor in Fischerle's dream world is the reversal of his actual relationship to the real world. As a dwarf he has always been inferior to the rest of

humanity, but in his imagined position of power "klein sind die Menschen" (176). As he approaches realisation of his dream Fischerle exaggerates his sway over the masses to the extent of imagining thousands risking their lives for him - not to defend him, but simply in the hope of getting near their idol:

> New York besitzt zehn Millionen Einwohner. Die Bevölkerung ist in einem Freudentaumel ... Hundert Millionen Taschentücher wehen zum Empfang, an jeden Finger bindet sich jeder Einwohner ein Stück... Tausende fallen für ihn ins Wasser. Man soll sie retten, befiehlt er, er hat ein weiches Herz. (323)

The paranoiac urge for growth and power culminates in the right to decide the fate of masses of people, having control over life and death; and using this power with the air of granting gracious pardon. Fischerle's imagined power is that of the absolute ruler who is not bound by concepts of justice or mercy. His final victory is the death of his enemy Capablanca, who he imagines has prevented his recognition as world chess champion, at the hands of his followers: "Capablanca wird von der wütenden Menge zerrissen" (323).

The power to cause massive destruction is a major attribute of the tyrannic ruler, who retains his sovereignty by such displays of mass force. The vision of such an occurrence is the height of paranoia, as demonstrated by Schreber's delusions of himself consuming multitudes of spirit-beings which are irresistibly attracted to him, or in his vision of a cosmic catastrophe of which he is the sole survivor.

Kien's visions of mass-death do not go to these dramatic extremes - they are rather hyperbolic figures of speech - but they do indicate his belief that the lives of others depend on him. His claim, in reference to his fellow-philologists, that "Über seinen Tod wäre die Mehrzahl zu Tode erschrocken" (16), demonstrates not only the wish not to be outlived, but also the conviction that this is within his power as a matter of course. In his defence plea he uses the same kind of rhetorical figure of speech when he claims,

> Einen von den obersten Tausend vorzeitig sterben zu lassen, wäre ein Selbstmord an der armen Menschheit. (273)

- just as Therese's death means, for him, the salvation of the world, his own death would cause the death of all mankind. The idea of causing mass annihilation reaches its climax when it is realized in Kien's final destruction of his books - his personal crowd - in the fire which brings his own death. The burning of his books represents the reversal of Kien's value-system, the realization at his own hands of the destruction he has obsessively feared. The switch from excessive fear of fire to affirmation of it is a consequence of the manic hallucinations and memories which haunt him in his library, but the exact cause of the reversal is difficult to determine.[23)]

Canetti's discussion of the link between fire and the crowd in Masse und Macht shows a similar reversal in the attitude of mankind towards fire. Man has always been awed by the

swift and violent destructive power of fire, but he has also tamed and harnessed this power for his own use - symbolized by the matchbox.

> Massenangst ist die natürliche, man möchte sagen ewige Reaktion der Tiere auf große Feuer, und es war einmal auch die Reaktion des Menschen. Dieser aber hat sich des Feuers bemächtigt, er hält den Brand in seiner Hand, und er muß ihn nicht fürchten. Über die alte Angst hat sich seine neue Macht gelagert, und beide sind ein erstaunliches Bündnis eingegangen (M. 84 f).

Kien's mission consists of opposition to fire: "Unglückliche erlösen, vom Flammentod loskaufen" (236; but with his death he becomes a fire-raiser. This transformation can be interpreted as the acquisition of a new source of power, a new crowd in his command instead of at war with him. The fire begins as a means of defence against police persecution. And there is a strong element of revenge against Georg: in his anger at Georg's suggestion that he might set fire to his library, Kien had threatened, "Die Bücher vermach' ich nicht dir. Lieber zünde ich sie an"; and as the fire spreads he repeats the vow for vengeance, "Georg bekommt keine Bücher." (413).

Kien's decision to turn the destructive instrument of fire against that which he has previously defended combines these elements of desperate defence against outside attack, and revenge. Convinced that the police are about to arrest him, he sees his death by execution as inevitable. The earlier wish not to die alone, not to be outlived, becomes action with his decision to die with his library. This action parallels

"die Neigung der Menschen, zu Feuer zu werden" (M. 86) demonstrated in the example of besieged cities:

> Belagerte Städte, die keine Hoffnung auf Entsatz mehr haben, zünden sich oft selber an. Könige mit ihrem Hofstaat, aussichtslos bedrängt, verbrennen sich. (ibid.)24)

Seen in these terms, Kien's auto-da-fé becomes the mass-suicide of a ruler, trapped in his library - fortress by threatening forces he cannot overcome.

> In der Schlacht hat man es auf den Leichenhaufen der Feinde abgesehen ... In Massenselbstmord wendet sich diese Aktivität gegen die eigenen Leute. Mann, Weib, Kind, alles bringt einander gegenseitig um, bis nichts mehr da ist als der Haufen der eigenen Toten. Damit niemand in die Hände des Feindes gerate, damit die Zerstörung vollständig sei, wird Feuer zu Hilfe genommen. (M. 315)

Rather than surrender, Kien destroys himself, thus depriving the enemy of victory and asserting his greater power, the ability to prevent the enemy enforcing their will - "Die Polizei bekommt ihn nicht" (413). By destroying his library, too, he also deprives them of the spoils of victory:

> Und alle wollen was, und keiner bleibt, und keiner kann es erwarten. Früher wurde die Habe mit dem Toten verbrannt, ein Testament war nirgends, und übrig, übrig blieben die Knochen. (413)

By destroying the spoils of conquest, the victim avenges his death by the manner of his death, which he has chosen himself. Kien also carries out, in this same action, the threatened revenge against Georg, and against his army for turning on him:

> Blutig haben sie ihn geschlagen. Er droht ihnen mit dem Feuertod. So rächt er sich an allen Feinden! Die Frau hat er umgebracht, das Schwein liegt verkohlt, Georg bekommt keine Bücher. Und die Polizei bekommt ihn nicht. (413)

Kien's final stance - as he waits, high up on the ladder, for all below him to be overcome and destroyed - is an expression of ultimate power.[25] At this point he is in command of two crowds, his books and the fire he is using to destroy them, both instruments of vengeance; and he sees himself as gaining victory over all his enemies outside by this same action. His attitude towards these crowds is that of the paranoiac ruler:

> Man wird die Vermutung nicht abweisen können, daß hinter jeder Paranoia wie hinter jeder Macht dieselbe tiefere Tendenz steckt: Der Wunsch, die anderen aus dem Wege zu räumen, damit man der einzige sei, oder in der milderen und häufig zugegebenen Form, der Wunsch, sich der anderen zu bedienen, daß man mit ihrer Hilfe der einzige werde. (M. 533)

"Ein Irrenhaus".

The chapter headed "Ein Irrenhaus" provides the only shift of focus within the novel from Kien and his surroundings. Whereas all other characters are introduced primarily through their function in Kien's affairs, Georg Kien is first introduced as a character with a specific nature and background, before he is drawn into Kien's world. He has already featured as a name, a memory for Kien, and as a victim of a hoax-telegram for Fischerle; but his story is related independently of the surrounding action, being linked to it only by the arrival of the telegram at the end of the chapter. This switch to a completely new environment and set of characters suggests that this chapter is to provide a foil to the rest

of the action.[26] The title indicates a switch from normal society - which has constantly and in many different ways been revealed as fundamentally mad - to the world of those who are specifically designated as insane, and, clearly distinguished from them, their doctors and guards. The changeover is made more pointed by the two juxtaposed sentences respectively ending the previous chapter and introducing the new: "Hosen" culminates in Kien's delusion and its result - "Er beginnt an seinen Verstand zu zweifeln" (35o); the new chapter begings with the sight of "der berühmte Psychiater Georges Kien" (ibid.), appearing as though to provide the solution to Kien's problem, although neither brother envisages this at this moment.

The presence of Georg, with the report on his professional background, provides an opportunity for a discussion of madness on a theoretical level, to balance and comment on the madness which has become apparent in the novel's plot. Insanity is here presented on many different planes: in the actual cases of Georg's patients; in the theories of Georg's predecessor; in Georg's opinion of his predecessor's theories; in the development of his own beliefs, and the depiction of his methods; and in his assistants' interpretations of his theories. Each level comments on the other, contradicting, relativizing or nullifying it, without any authorial guide designating any view as definitve.

The first view presented is that of the previous director of the asylum, distanced by references to Georg's and the patients' negative opinion of him and perhaps coloured by Georg's perspective. The former director's attitude to psychiatric medicine, which is equated with the official view, is academic - interested in fitting patients into an established system - rather than personal. His private view of insanity equates it with a major character defect, excessive egotism -

> Verrückt werden eben die Menschen, die immer nur an sich denken. Irrsinn ist eine Strafe für Egoismus.(357) -

and he therefore considers the insane criminals and his asylum the equivalent of a prison, aiming to suppress the insane rather than cure insanity. The solipsistic monomanias of the other characters of the novel substantiate his views on insanity as egoism, and in this sense his theory could provide an interpretive comment on the action. But the short description of his own activities reveals the same essential nature and mode of existence as has been depicted throughout the novel. His life parallels Kien's particularly closely: his only interest is 'Wissenschaft', which he pursues with "die Hartnäckigkeit eines Irren" (ibid.) and with great pride in his position as an 'Autorität' in his field; he shares Kien's attitude to other people - "Menschen ... waren ihm gleichgültig" (ibid.) - useful only as objects for research; his three marriages are consequently as disastrous as Kien's to Therese; the 'riesige Material' of his investi-

gations, like Kien's library, serves only to construct an hermetic system - "Er hing an die Fertigkeit des Systems" - which enables him to ignore the world outside it since "Ich weiß alles " (ibid.).

The narrow and inhuman philosophy of the former director stands in strong contrast to Georg Kien's theory of madness: the exposition of Georg's ideas occupies the bulk of the chapter, establishing him as the direct opposite of his predecessor. Georg's philosophy has developed from a chance meeting with an extraordinary madman which convinced him of the "Großartigkeit der Irren" (358) and persuaded him to become a psychiatrist with the intention "von ihnen zu lernen und keinen zu heilen" (ibid.).

The major impetus in his idealisation of this one case of insanity is the contrast it provides to his own former way of life, which he assumes to be typical of normal society. The 'Gorilla' has cut off almost all ties with the human race; his world consists of two rooms; and his only communication is with his nurse. Georg admires particularly the language which the 'Gorilla' has invented and uses exclusively, although only his nurse can understand it.[27] Georg's own former attitude to life is expressed in his view of the novel, which also reveals his earlier view of the function of language:

Früher hatte er mit Leidenschaft gelesen und an neuen

> Wendungen alter Sätze, die er schon für unveränderlich, farblos, abgegriffen und nichtssagend hielt, großes Vergnügen gefunden... Keine verwirrenden Wendungen, keine fremden Worte, je öfter ein Geleise befahren war, um so differenzierter die Lust, die man abgewann. Die gesamte Romanliteratur ein einziges Lehrbuch der Höflichkeit. Belesene Menschen wurden zwangsweise artig. Ihre Teilnahme am Leben der anderen erschöpfte sich in Gratulation und Kondolation. (353 f)

Language is accordingly a system of clichés designed to reduce contact between individuals to conventional trivialities; a superficial form of expressing reality to avoid examining or comprehending its depths -

> die zackige, schmerzliche, beißende Vielgestalt des Lebens, das einen umgab, auf eine glatte Papierebene zu bringen, über die es sich rasch und angenehm hinweglas. (ibid.)

The gorilla's language is the reverse: his gestures are crude, but "verständlich und einladend" (355); his words are charged with deep emotional content - "Er sprach stärker, mehr aus der Tiefe, hinter seinen Lauten lauerten Affekte" (355); his tone and gestures themselves express the meaning of his words; objects are designated by different words, depending on the emotion they arouse at the time, so that each expression reveals the speaker's relationship to any given object at that specific time; the interplay between himself and his surroundings through the medium of this flexible language creates "ein wildes, gespanntes, gewitterreiches Leben" (357 f).

The depth and intensity of this emotional life impresses Georg as the antithesis of the shallowness and emptiness of normal society.[28] One incident in particular, the goril-

la's passionate communion with the earth, convinces Georg of his greatness, expressed in the vitality of his relationship with the world:

> In wenigen, gewaltigen Worten, die wie abgeschnittene lebende Baumstämme ins Zimmer geschleudert wurden, vernahm Georg ein mythisches Liebesabenteuer, das ihn bis zum tiefsten Zweifel an sich selbst erschütterte. Er sah sich als Wanze neben einem Menschen. Er fragte sich, wie er begreifen könne, was von tausend Klaftern tiefer kam, als er je hinabzusteigen gewagt hatte. (356)

The gorilla-like madman has achieved the "Mut zum Sein" (357) which normal man suppresses, and the primitive power of his uninhibited self expression enables him to transform reality according to his own image. This is evident in the change in his secretary - "stärker, erregter, hingebender" (ibid.) - and even in the inanimate objects of his surroundings, which bear "den Spuren seiner Wirkung" (358) to the extent that "Was um ihn war, entstammte ihm". Georg's admiration culminates in a parallel with God's creative power:

> Er bevölkerte zwei Zimmer mit einer ganzen Welt. Er schuf, was er brauchte, und fand sich nach seinen sechs Tagen am siebenten darin zurecht. Statt zu ruhen, schenkte er der Schöpfung eine Sprache. (ibid.)

The major importance of the gorilla lies in the transformation he causes in Georg's philosophy and his way of life. Georg becomes convinced that he is "ein Halbmensch für den praktischen Gebrauch" (356), and decides to give up his practice as 'Frauenarzt' to take up a form of life which will express his essential nature, focussed on devotion to others, specifically the insane. Georg dedicates himself to the in-

sane because he sees, in the gorilla, madness as equated with greatness: the gorilla is not mad and great, but his greatness consists in his insanity - psychological normality and greatness are therefore, for Georg, incompatible.

The selflessness with which Georg dedicates himself to the insane is central to his new philosophy: he is prompted to take up this profession not only because of his view of the insane, but also because of his new awareness of the crowd:

> Früher hatte er persönlichen Neigungen, seinem Ehrgeiz und den Frauen gelebt; jetzt lag ihm nur daran, sich unaufhörlich zu verlieren. In dieser Tätigkeit kam er Wünschen und Sinnen der Masse näher, als die übrigen einzelnen, von denen er umgeben war. (365)

The revolutionary methods he devises to treat the insane are based on this capacity to 'lose himself' and thus enter the private world of his patient's delusions, as he had done by learning the gorilla's private language. To accomplish this admission into a world which exists only in the mind of another individual, it is necessary to suspend his own personality and assume the role designated for him by the imagination of the patient:

> Könige redete er untertänigst als Eure Majestät an; vor Göttern fiel er auf die Nie und faltete die Hände... Er wurde ihr einziger Vertrauter... Er beriet sie mit heller Klugheit, als hätte er selbst ihre Wünsche, immer ihr Ziel und ihren Glauben im Auge... schließlich sei er doch ihr Minister, Prophet und Apostel, oder zuweilen sogar der Kammerdiener. (352)

The purpose of this acting is the opportunity "in die fremde Seele zu schlüpfen" (ibid.), by absorbing himself in the fan-

tasies of others - "So lebte er in einer Unzahl von Welten zugleich" (353) - to the extent that he "zu ihnen gehörte und ganz in ihre Gebilde aufging" (ibid.).

These two elements - constant transformation, through participation in the inner life of others - stamp Georg as the antithesis of his brother, whose existence is dominated by hermetic isolation from others, and by the immobility of his unchanging 'Charakter'.[29] The designation of Georg as 'Schauspieler' recalls one of Kien's earliest statements in the novel, contrasting his strength of character specifically with the role-playing which fickle humanity usually indulges in (12). Kien has also commented on Georg's 'Wankelmut', proved by his switch from gynaecology to psychiatry - a character defect so grave as to force Kien to break off contact with his brother. Georg's life of constant transformation is thus clearly established as the opposite of his brother's single-mindedness and consequent paralysis of personality. Georg's behaviour thus represents, in contrast, the flexibility of living-out the many possible modes of human existence which are present as potential in the personality of each individual, demanding expression. Kien's denial of change includes the denial of experience, which is in essence an enforced change in awareness. Nothing is permitted to change Kien's mind: "Das wußte er zum Vorhinein, Erfahrung war hier überflüßig" (12). Kien not only physically

shuts himself off from experience, but also avoids it by his propensity for finding in outside reality only what he wants to see there. This is contrasted with Georg's urge to experience everything humanly possible, satisfied by his assumption of a multiplicity of roles in his contact with patients - "als er in Hunderten von Erfahrungen wühlte" (358). The stoic inexpressiveness of Kien's features, indicating his resistance to any outside influence or stimulus,[30] is countered by the extreme flexibility of expression in Georg's face, in response to the words and actions of his patients:

> Seine Gesichtsmuskeln, von seltener Beweglichkeit, paßten sich im Laufe eines Tages den verschiedensten Situationen an. Da er täglich mindestens drei ... Patienten zu sich lud, hatte er ebenso viele Rollen zu erschöpfen, die flüchtigen, aber treffenden Winke und Worte auf seinen Rundgängen nicht gerechnet, denn diese zählten zu Hunderten. (352)

In the contrast of petrifaction versus flexibility and vitality, Georg's course thus represents a positive factor, correcting the obvious faults of his brother's denial of the basic element of man's existence, his multiple potentialities.

Similarly, Georg's participation in his patients contrasts with a basic quality in Kien which is presented negatively: his avoidance of contact with others. Again, Kien's principles condemn specifically those qualities and activities which now appear as the major traits of his brother. Participation in the lives of others is a natural tendency in Georg's character, evident in his role-playing behaviour even before his

conversion - "Unwillkürlich ging er mit den Damen um, als liebte er sie" (354). Kien's attempts to understand others - when he does not reject them outright as barbarians - consists solely of projection of his own values into their behaviour, so that his judgement is normally the exact reverse of the true situation. His refusal to attempt communication or understanding with the people around him, his failure to understand the people he is forced into contact with, makes him quite unable to cope with those members of his milieu who pose a threat to him. Georg's life, on the other hand, consists of seeking and finding empathy with one individual after another. But his central concern is not so much with the individual as with the mass of humanity as a whole.

In his philosophy the dominant issue in human life is the relationship - basically the conflict - between the individual and the crowd, extended to include the whole of the human race.[31] The individualism of his society, in Georg's view, runs counter to the basic instinct in mankind towards unity:

> Von der viel tieferen und eigentlichsten Triebkraft der Geschichte, dem Drang der Menschen, in eine höhere Tiergattung, die Masse, aufzugehen und sich darin so vollkommen zu verlieren, als hätte es nie einen Menschen gegeben, ahnten sie nichts. (365)

The individual who instists on his individuality is thus involved in an elemental conflict with one of his basic drives: in the attempt to uphold his separate identity, the individual struggles against one of the basic forces within himself:

> Den sogenannten Lebenskampf führen wir, nicht weniger als um Hunger und Liebe, um die Ertötung der Masse in uns. Unter Umständen wird sie so stark, daß sie den einzelnen zu selbstlosen oder gar gegen sein Interesse laufenden Handlungen zwingt. (365)

Georg believes the crowd instinct to be the stronger, and predicts its eventual victory. He expresses this drive in his own way of life, rather than fighting against it, and through his co-operation in selfless activity approaches realization of "Wünchen und Sinnen der Masse" (365). Georg's professional attitude is therefore the complete opposite of his brother's elitist solipsism. Kien sees his research as of the highest good for mankind, and even sees himself as the saviour of the world, without evincing the slightest interest in the humanity he claims to serve. George, however, sees his own work, his personal involvement with individuals, as part of the unification which will one day encompass all mankind. The major burden for Georg's theories rests on his experiences with the insane:

> Auf <u>eine</u> Entdeckung tat sich Georg etwas zugute, auf eben diese: die Wirksamkeit der Masse in der Geschichte und im Leben des einzelnen; ihr Einfluß auf bestimmte Veränderungen des Geistes. Bei seinen Kranken war es ihm geglückt, sie nachzuweisen. Zahllose Menschen werden verrückt, weil die Masse in ihnen besonders stark ist und keine Befriedigung findet. (ibid.)

The connection Georg establishes between the suppressed and unsatisfied urge to join the 'Masse' and mental illness can be applied to the condition of Kien and the other characters of the novel. The urge to collect or rule a crowd - in the

abstract form represented by groups of objects, or imagined entities, or growth itself - is present in all characters and plays an important role in their obsessions. But the drive to merge into an all-embracing union is opposed by their extreme individualist self-seeking, expressed in those same obsessions. The crowd drive, evident in its substitutes, the mania for power or growth, is thus made subservient to the individual's urge urge for self-advancement. The element of insanity in all these characters results from these two factors: extreme self-seeking as insanity, and the ultimate revenge of the repressed crowd.[32] The primary means of suppression of the crowd urge in society generally is the 'Bildungsgürtel' of civilisation, which denies the existence of anything so primitive in man, just as Kien denies man's normal instincts. Georg's admiration of the insane becuase they have "sich weit genug von den übrigen entfernt, um für Irre zu gelten" (368) implies a distancing from society's concept of 'Bildung' - exemplified to the highest possible degree by the gorilla's rejection of civilization and its means of expression - and thus a greater receptivity to the demands of the 'mass-soul'.

But the image Georg presents of the madmen he idealises contradicts his corollary ideal of the selflessness of the 'Masse'. Georg in fact expresses the greatest admiration for the total independence, the solipsism made absolute, of the insane:

> Wir sitzen, er (der Paranoiker) ist besessen; auf den Erfahrungen andrer wir, von eigenen er. Er treibt mutterseelenallein, wie die Erde, durch seinen Weltraum. ... Er glaubt an das, was seine Sinne him vortäuschen. Wir mißtrauen unseren gesunden Sinnen. Die wenigen Gläubigen unter uns klammern sich an Erlebnisse, die andre vor Tausenden von Jahren für sie gehaht haben. Wir brauchen Visionen, Offenbarungen, Stimmen - blitzartige Nähen zu Dingen und Menschen - und wenn wir sie nicht in uns haben, holen wir sie in der Überlieferung. Aus eigener Armut werden wir Gläubige. Noch Ärmere verzichten auch darauf. Und er? Er ist Allah, Prophet und Muslim in einer Person... Wenn es ein Leben reiner Geistigkeit gibt, so führt es diese Verrückte! (360)

Many of the qualities of the insane, according to this definition, parallel closely those present in the other characters of the novel, particularly in Kien: domination by an obsession; isolation in a private world; the belief in delusions; the prevalence of visions prompted by obsessive fears or wish fulfilments, rather than awareness of reality; teh self-sufficiency of a private value system, accepted so absolutely that it can even elevate the individual to the level of a religious leader, an 'Erlöser' figure.

Georg also refers to his patients in terms of the single-mindedness and strength of character of Kien's monomania and schizophrenic paralysis:

> Sie waren die einzigen wirklichen Persönlichkeiten, von vollendeter Einseitigkeit, wahre Charaktere, von einer Geradheit und Macht des Willens, um die sie Napoleon beneidet hätte. (358) 33)

This is reinforced by the image of barricades - like Kien's library or Therese's 'Rock'/'Muschel' - which the individual uses to protect himself from danger from outside: Georg's re-

fers to his patients' "fest ummauerten Städte" (367), their delusional worlds. The gorilla's two rooms, like Kien's library, represent a 'ganze Welt', cut off from the rest of the world like a separate planet. His physical seclusion reflects his separation from the rest of humanity, in that he no longer considers himself a human being: "weil er selbst einmal zu den Menschen gehört hatte" (358).

Similar images occur in the presentation of the asylum attendants: they too are surrounded by barriers which seclude them from the outside world -

> Wohlbestallte Assistenten, hatten sie irgendwo ihre vergitterten Fenster und drückten die Köpfe daran; (366)

and each dreams of living alone in a private world in which everything exists only for him -

> Lieber wären sie jetzt Mohammedaner gewesen und hätten sich, jeder allein, in kleine, wohlausgestattete Paradiese gesetzt. (ibid.)

The lack of communication which dominates the depiction of society throughout the novel also prevails within the asylum, contrary to Georg's ideal of the individual's participation in all around him. The conversation of the patients with one another represents an 'acoustic mask' expression of a personal and incommunicable obsession. The only exception is Georg's rapport with them, which is not achieved by any others:

> Da erwarb er ... das Vertrauen von Menschen, die sich jedem andern gegenüber hinter ihre Wahngebilde versteckten. (352)

Each simply reiterates his obsessive fears, wishes or plans without noticing the mutual imcomprehension, because communication is not envisaged on a more profound level: the claim "wie gut sie sich verstanden" (367) is as ironic in this case as it was in Kien's misunderstanding of Therese (and vice versa) according to his own values projected into her statements. Georg sums this up when he refers to them as

> seine schönen raren Vögel, sie sind da ganz fremd, jeder aus einer anderen Heimat, keiner versteht den Nächsten, sie beschimpfen einander und wissen es nicht einmal. (374)

The opening scene of "Ein Irrenhaus" presents this graphically:

> Zwischen den Kranken spielte sich ein zäher Kampf um den beschränkten Platz an den Gittern ab. Ein Kopf stieß gegen den anderen. Mit Beschimpfungen wurde nicht gespart. (350)

The insane, in the state which Georg apostrophizes as the ideal, present a clear parallel in miniature to the struggle of each individual in the outside world to fulfil his obsession in opposition to the claims of all others and of his own humanity.

Thr urge for selfless union in the 'Masse' therefore approaches realization only in Georg Kien. But the self-sacrificing air of his intentions is negated by his attempted expression of it:[34] this discrepancy is so great that Georg's behaviour equates him with the obsessive power-seeking of Kien and his collegues. Georg's actions as 'Schauspieler' are complemented by a hunger for applause, without which he cannot function:

> Dreimal täglich, bei seinen Rundgängen durch die Säle, wurden ihm Ovationen dargebracht. Er hatte sich daran gewöhnt; je heftiger man ihm entgegenlief, je stürmischer man ihn bedrängte, um so sicherer fielen ihm Worte und Mienen ein, wie er sie brauchte. Die Kranken waren sein Publikum. Schon vor dem ersten Pavillon hörte er auf das vertraute Stimmengewirr. Kaum hatte ihn einer durchs Fenster erblickt, als Richtung und Ordnung in den Lärm kam. Auf diesen Umschlag wartete er. Es war, als fingen alle plötzlich zu klatschen an. Unwillkürlich lächelte er. (360)

This need for acclaim gives some weight to his assistants' claim that his major drive is simply to be the centre of attention -

> In ihm lebt die krankhafte Neigung, soviel Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zu ziehen wie sie; (365)

and that this is the result of an inferiority complex -

> Warum beneidet der Direktor die Narren so?
> ... Weil er selbst einer ist, aber nur ein halber.
> (ibid.)

- satisfied by the 'Triumphen' of curing his superiors, his patients.

The desire for recognition assumes paranoiac proportions with his dream of himself as leader of an army of the insane:

> Vielleicht vergrößert mein Ruhm die Anstalt. Mit der Zeit werden zwei- bis zehntausend daraus. Pilgerzüge aus allen Ländern vervollkommnen mein Glück. Eine allgemeine Weltrepublik steht in dreißig Jahren zu erwarten. Man ernennt mich zum Volkskommissär für Irre. Reisen über die ganze bewohnte Erde. Inspektion und Parade einer Millionenarmee unbrauchbarer Geister. Links stelle ich die Schwachsinnigen auf, rechts die Starksinnigen. Gründung von Versuchsanstalt für überbegabte Tiere. Heranzüchtung verrückter Tiere zu Menschen. Geheilte Narren entlaß' ich aus meiner Armee mit Schimpf und Schande. (367)

Although the desire to see others dead is never depicted

concretely, as in Kien's visions of Therese's death, the dream of himself as an army commander inevitably carries the association of force and the power and the wish to kill. This is emphasised by Georg's awareness of the hostility of his collegues, both to himself - "hoffentlich bald sterben" (366) - and his patients:

> Er wußte, daß sie den Kranken übelwollten und fürchtete für deren Schicksal, falls er plötzlich wegstürbe. (364)

This sense of persecution, seen also in his recognition of 'kleinliche Sabotage' by his assistants, leads to the formation of the hostile group of his patients, "seine Freunde", against "seine Feinde hinter ihm" (366), his assistants: here again he divides the world into the friendly and the hostile masses of the paranoiac ruler. The paranoiac urge for growth and the lust for power are obvious in the army he envisages: the crowd drive expresses itself in the hope of a huge increase in the number of patients from 800 to 10,000, culminating finally in the magic figure of the 'Millionenarmee'; the obsession with personal position is seen in his vision of himself as 'Volkskommissar', whose sphere of influence encompasses the whole earth; the concept of all the insane of the world forming an army under his command demonstrates that his interest in the crowd is not the selfless ideal of merging into a mass of equals, but the egotistic drive to be absolute ruler over it.

Georg's idol, the gorilla, is a model of the absolute ruler

who assumes virtually divine powers. He has 'created' the world he inhabits, and his authority in it is indisputable. The only other inhabitant of his world is his nurse, who has become his slave. He has virtually created her, too, since through him she has been "bestimmt, verändert, gestaltet" (357). Georg's first discovery about him is that he

> hier die Herrschaft über seine Pflegerin führte, eine junge Witwe, dreifach an ihn verraten und verkauft. Sie dürfte ihn nie allein lassen, sie mußte ihm in allem zu Willen sein. (354)

The nurse is allowed no independent life, and her feelings are never considered in his behaviour, so that he ignores her completely on occasion; she exists only to serve him;

The authority and influence which Georg himself assumes is also expressed in religious terminology. From the success of his republic for the insane he promises himself "Pilgerzüge aus allen Ländern" (367), a form of reverence normally reserved for the divine or sacred. His healing powers make him a saviour capable of resurrecting the dead to life:

> Die Angehörigen der Kranken vergötterten ihn, sie rechneten auf Wunder ... Und binnen kurzem stand er als Heiland da ... von Tausenden, denen er ihre Nächsten wiedergeboren hatte, verehrt. (359)

The ingenuity of his methods of treatment is described by analogy with "die (Wege) des Herrn beim Auszug seines Volkes" (358): again the crowd element dominates, but with Georg distinctly set apart as leader and Lord.

The qualities in himself which Georg sees as the means of selfless communion with the crowd - his role-playing and his empathy with the feelings of others - are also revealed as sources of power. This is evident in his treatment of Kien, Therese and Pfaff, where he adopts the 'akustische Maske', and the value-system it represents, of each individual in order to mould their reactions to further his own purposes.[35] But even with the patients he purports to love, his behaviour appears as a means of exploitation. In his drive for 'Erfahrung', they provide him with unlimited growth in vicarious knowledge and awareness, which he revels in - "als er in Hunderten von Erfahrungen wühlte" (358) - as much as Fischerle does in his mountain of money ("Am liebsten wühlt Fischerle in Bergen von Banknoten" (172)). He uses his patients to expand his own realm of experience -

> Er lernte von ihnen mehr, als er ihnen gab. Sie bereicherten ihn um ihre einmaligen Erlebnisse (353) -

and raise himself to the supreme position of "einen der umfassendsten Geister seiner Zeit" (ibid.). His acting represents constant 'Verwandlung', but it is, like the obsessions of the other characters, a role he is trapped in:

> Freundlichkeit war ihm zur Haut geworden; manchmal wünschte er sich, aus ihr zu fahren. (368)

And like the other characters, he is also trapped in the circle of deception and self-deception which enables them to judge others only by their own standards, leading to constant misjudgements and delusion.[36] Georg condemns Kien

for this:

> Statt sich in die andern zu verteilen, maß er sie, wie er sie von außen sah, an sich, den er auch nur von außen und vom Kopf her kannte. (369)

But his own analysis of Kien's situation makes the same mistake: prompted by his erroneous interpretation of the telegram as genuinely from his brother, he sees in Kien's illness only a means of obtaining help through deception:

> Georg sah sich hier als wichtigen Teil eines Mechanismus, den ein anderer zur Erhaltung seines bedrohten Selbstgefühls in Bewegung gesetzt hatte. Ein Fingerglied der Linken war die Komödie wert. Noch immer tat ihm Peter leid. Aber dieses Vortäuschen einer Verstörung, dieser Mißbrauch fremder Würde, um die eigene wieder instand zu setzen, dieses Spiel, das man mit ihm trieb, der mit anderen zu spielen gewohnt war, mißfielen ihm. (390)

Georg is blinded by his own concepts of the greatness of the insane, as well as by resentment of rivalry in the field in which he is master, and can therefore not recognize the madness of his brother: his evaluation, too, consists of projecting his own values, primarily the use of role-playing to advance his own ends, onto his brother and accepting this illusion as confirmed reality.

Ironically, it is Kien who on this occasion judges his brother correctly, to reveal that Georg's world is restricted to one defended position with the obsessive single-mindedness of the paranoiac. Georg's dedication to the insane does not represent the expansive love of the mass-soul in action; this is indicated by the tone of resentment when he claims "Alles will heute Liebe" (367) as he turns his

back on his wife's need for him. Peter sums up the situation correctly when he asserts: "Du lebst von deine Irren, ich von meinen Büchern" (388). Georg's existence is bound up with his library, and he reacts in the same way when he sees his position threatened by the possible disgrace of Kien's murder trial. (374). Georg is forced to admit:

> Peters Worte hatten Sinn. Ohne seine Kranken konnte Georg wirklich nicht leben. Er verdankte ihnen mehr als Brot und Ruhm; sie waren das Substrat seiner geistigen und seelischen Existenz. (390)

Despite his apparent mobility, Georg cannot move from the one sphere which is the object of his obsession, where "Voller Ungeduld erwarteten ihn achthundert Gläubige" (407). Like the ruler/paranoiac, Georg cannot live without the position of almost divine reverence and authority accorded him in the "Ort wo er ebenso absoluter Herrscher war, wie Peter in seiner Bibliothek" (406).

Georg is thus as one-sided and self-seeking as the schizophrenics and paranoiacs of Kien's world;[37] and the world Georg idealizes contains all the negative characteristics of normal society. One of Georg's madmen draws the equation: "Madame, wir leben in der Welt!" (368): the inhabitants of the asylum and of the society outside it exhibit the same characteristics, and suffer the same forms of madness.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion: the motif of madness.

Like the criminal motif, the image of madness in literature expresses discordance between the individual and society; the two themes are usually linked in discussion of 2oth century literature in particular as representing comparable extremes of human existence.[1] Madness has added significance, in that it also represents a radical dissonance between the individual and reality.[2] The individual's disturbed relationship to reality is frequently realized in actions against society: the madman is often violent, dangerous and criminal. However, such manifestations of insanity are secondary to the insanity itself: the madman's behaviour is abnormal because he views reality, including his social context, from an abnormal perspective. The madman's alienation from the world around him is thus more extreme than the criminal's, even though it may often be less obvious. Since the basic factor in insanity is the state of mind, whereas the central element in criminality is the state of social relationships in action, the madman's abnormality is more deeply rooted in the sphere which involves the nature and meaning of man's existence. The criminal has distanced himself from the normal values of society; the madman has, by his illness, been alienated from the normal nature of man.[3]

This distinction does not prevent the motif of insanity from functioning as a symbol of the state of society as a whole.[4] Although the madman is more radically set apart from his so-

ciety, he still acts as a reflection of tendencies within that society, but the image he presents is likely to reflect a more profound disturbance than the criminal's rejection of social mores. The role of madness in the novels under discussion involves more directly the questions of human existence, the sphere of ideals and beliefs, and the metaphysical basis of values.

In Die Blendung the equation of the madman with society is complete and straightforward, like that of the criminal in the same novel. Here the distortion of normal social standards of behaviour, demonstrated by the criminal motif, is closely linked with insanity. The private laws of the individual, which make his desires legitimate, but those of his fellow-man criminal, are part of the private world created by his monomaniac obsession. The violent extremes to which these private legal systems are extended are subjectively justified by each character's view of himself as an absolute ruler, revealed by the motif of paranoia. Thus criminality and insanity coincide completely, with the madness of the individual determining his criminal actions, intentions, judgements and values.

The significance of insanity within the novel, however, is not restricted to those aspects which become apparent in the criminal tendencies of the characters as such. The mono-

mania and schizophrenia elements of Kien in particular present a model of madness as the ultimate alienation from reality.[5] The unconscious motivation behind the construction of private realities is revealed as fear of the unknown world: the individual is able to cope only with a small sphere of reality, ordered by his system of values and dependent on his control. Fear of encountering the unknown also determines his rejection of change within himself, the denial of man's basic capacity for 'Verwandlung' and development. In this way, Canetti's madmen are alienated not only from external reality, but also from the reality within themselves.
The ideals and values of society - e.g. learning, love, respectability, wealth, fame, devotion to the sick - are thus reduced to distorted caricatures: they do not correspond with the reality they purport to serve and order; and they are revealed as instruments of the individual's violent self-seeking. Each character's relationship with the society around him consists in fear, self-assertion and aggression. Concepts of social community break down completely in the face of radical individualism which not only operates according to its own laws, but creates its own world of reality.

The basic situation in Die Schlafwandler is comparable. There, too, the motif of insanity reveals the fragmentation of the social structure into private value-systems which pervert society's values from their true function and distort the

individual's awareness of reality to the point of delusion.[6] But even in his portrayal of the ultimate disintegration of value-structures and the final loss of values, Broch presents a less destructive image of man's efforts to come to terms with the world around him. Whereas Canetti exposes society as unchangingly composed of insane individual systems, Broch's analysis of decline points to both a former state of unity under a common value system and the possibility that such a value basis - in a completely new form - may be found again. Even the illusory closed systems of Broch's characters in many instances - e.g. the uniform, the Christian household, justice, 'Erlösung' - indicate a sense of community and of transcendent meaning which Canetti's world lacks completely.

The difference becomes apparent, e.g., in the alternative concepts of 'Erlösung' depicted in each novel. Both are presented as delusions, but the dimensions of each mission vary considerably. Kien's concept of salvation involves nothing more than the safety of books: even his broadest aim, the general betterment of mankind, really means only the development of a more reverent attitude towards books. And the 'endgültige Erlösung der furchtbar verfolgten Menschheit' is the death of his own personal enemy, whose widest influence extends no further than Kien's own library. Esch's mission, too, is attached to one particular enemy and is for a long time chiefly concerned with his death. But Bertrand does embody dominant forces within society, and

the fate of Ilona is part of an all-embracing vision of justice and a general state of 'Unschuld': although it develops into a closed world Esch's crusade does have a broader basis of social and spiritual awareness than Kien has ever envisaged. Broch condemns the closed value systems of his characters as psychotic because they fall short of fulfilling their function, to provide a metaphysical basis enabling the individual to deal effectively with reality. In the world of Die Blendung, the question of metaphysical values does not exist - Kien's concept of history as a god is the nearest approach to it - and any vision of the capacity to control reality takes the form of a paranoid delusion of grandeur and power.

In Die Schlafwandler the psychotically closed value systems are balanced by the neurosis of value breakdown. Neurosis is a negative state, in that it indicates the loss of values, and the corollary insecurity of the individual, who becomes incapable of dealing adequately with the world around him. In comparison with his concept of psychosis, however, Broch sees neurosis more positively: it indicates that reality has penetrated the barriers of the pseudo-system. Thus neurosis points forward to the possibility of value-reconstruction in the same way that Huguenau's absolute freedom points to a potential recreation of an absolute value. In the case of Pasenow, Joachim and Esch, neurosis is accompanied by moments

of awareness of the sphere of metaphysical absolutes. Although this awareness forces Pasenow into complete apathy, and is distorted by Joachim and Esch into closed systems, the potential remains valid.

This becomes particularly clear in contrast with Die Blendung, where the horizons of each character remain strictly bounded by his solipsistic drive for self-assertion, regardless of any external considerations, either social or metaphysical. Whereas Broch suggests a norm against which the deviation can be judged - at the same time suggesting the possibility of a re-creation of that norm - Canetti simply presents the deviation as the normal reality of society. Canetti's criticism is not conveyed through an external perspective, but presented graphically by the grotesque comedy of deviation in action. In this way, Broch's systematic value theory provides a 'Sinngebung' for his depiction of value fragmentation as insanity; while Canetti simply presents the same basic situation, taken to an ultimate extreme which carries its own condemnation, without any balancing perspective of sanity.

Broch's poles of neurosis and psychosis recur in an analogous form in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. These aspects of the 'Zeitkrankheit' which combine to form the image of ethical idiocy produce a sense of purposelessness and insecurity which can be equated with the phase of value-disintegration and neurosis in Broch's "Gesetz psychischer Zyklen".[7] The

retreat into a psychotically alienated closed value system, the usual consequence of neurosis in Broch's system, has its equivalent in the idées fixes and delusions of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, ranging from the trivial obsessions behind the suggestions to the 'Parallelaktion'; to the 'Parallelaktion's' search for a 'Große Idee' and its 'Tatparole' which is ultimately fulfilled by the War; and to Clarisse's 'Erlösungswahn' and Meingast's affirmation of 'Wahn' and 'Tat'.[8] The growing irrationality which accompanies the decline into insanity in Broch's characters - expressed e.g. in such phenomena as 'Gleiten' and the confusion of identities - can also be seen in Musil's portrayals of various types of 'Rausch'.[9] The instances of 'Rausch' in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften convey insecurity - in the hallucinatory visions of the deformation of objects or physical surroundings - or the resolution of insecurity in sensations of unity with others, communion with the world, ecstasy. This polarity conforms with the overall polarity of diffusion and fragmentation giving way to illusory unity and conviction.

The motif of insanity is presented differently in each of the novels. Canetti depicts all of his characters as suffering a similar form of insanity, through situations and images which reveal their obsessive power-lust, schizophrenic solipsism and paralysis. Broch's scheme of psychic cycles combined with his views on the value-state of the age assigns each major character of Die Schlafwandler to a particular posi-

tion within the general insanity of the age. In Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, the image of insanity, like the criminal motif, is centred on the figures of Moosbrugger and Clarisse. Moosbrugger in particular acts as a touch-stone[10] against which the mental states of other characters can be measured. The technique of analogy and variation reveals similar attitudes, sensations, experiences and irrational states in common activities and experiences of normal society, contributing to the image of the mental illness of the age. Clarisse's delusion, too, acts as a touch-stone for the activity of the 'Parallelaktion' and the theories of Meingast.

Musil's technique allows for a more ambiguous interpretation of insanity within the novel. In the case of Ulrich and Agathe in particular, phenomena associated with madness in both Moosbrugger and Clarisse and their reflections in society take on added significance. The traditional alternative image of the madman as possessing a higher truth[11] - rather than simply as an alien form of human existence - is evoked by Ulrich's and Agathe's efforts to decide whether their 'andere Zustand' is a form of madness or a superior way of life. Their conscious examination of the possibilities offered by an alternative reality differs in form from the traditional concept of insanity as a visitation of divine truth, but it fulfils a similar function.

The more positive aspect of the motif of madness in Der Mann

ohne Eigenschaften is closely linked with Ulrich's basic principle of 'Möglichkeitssinn', which is from the outset described in terms of the "Einbildung", "fräumerei", "Hirngespinste" of "Narren" - but at the same time equated with "die noch nicht erwachten Absichten Gottes".[12] The sense of reality underlying Ulrich's concept is comparable with Moosbrugger's awareness of reality as unstable:

> Das Leben bildet eine Oberfläche, die so tut, als ob sie so sein müßte, aber unter ihrer Haut treiben und drängen die Dinge.[13]

Similar sensations of flux and instability experienced by Pasenow and Esch in Die Schlafwandler designate their value-systems as inadequate, although they themselves interpret this incommensurability as the fault of a deficient reality, rather than of the defective system they still consider absolute. In Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften the general situation is similar, but a shift in emphasis leads to the more positive perspective on madness. The concept of reality as fluid and flexible is in this case not per se a symptom of the mental disturbance of value loss. It rather indicates, in Ulrich's case at least, the objective awareness of the nature of reality, possible only for the individual who is not committed by personal conviction to any of the prevailing ways of ordering reality.[14] Whereas Broch's characters withdraw from unstable reality into apparently stable value systems, Ulrich accepts the instability of reality as the norm to which his values must conform.

The subsequent search for a flexible form of life to cope with a shifting and changing reality therefore involves more flexible concepts of morality and psychological normality: just as a crime may be a more moral act than unthinking observance of prevailing laws, experiences related to insanity may provide the key to a valid second reality. Ulrich's attitude involves awareness of both the dangers and the potential of this state, "eine Art Prüfung der Möglichkeiten".[15] The concept of a second reality implies on the one hand the ultimate alienation from existing reality like that produced by a private world of delusion. On the other hand, from the point of view of 'Möglichkeitssinn' alternative forms of emotion, thought and action are as valid as the established forms of normal reality. Ulrich's hesitance, however, makes it clear that the idea of an alternative reality does not allow the unconditional acceptance of subjective experiences as a higher form of existence: the solution to an unsatisfactory state of reality - made apparent by the depiction of the insanity of the age - cannot be found in a corollary personal delusion like Clarisse's, but in experiences whose validity can be proven. Although this dilemma remains unresolved in the completed section of the novel, the motif of madness still presents, in the explorations of Ulrich and Agathe, a response to the latent insanity of the age; and this response is characterized, despite the moments of 'Ergriffenheit', by a strong element of 'Nüchternheit' which separates it from parallel responses like Clarisse's.

The positive utopian aspect present in Musil's use of madness in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften has several parallels in Die Schlafwandler. Broch's cyclical system provides an indication that normality may be restored, and the story of Gödicke substantiates the concept of reconstruction and reunification following on the final stage of disintegration. Gödicke thus acts as a model, representing a higher awareness of the need for a complete rejection of past values, even though the truth he proclaims give the impression of insanity. He thus reverses the usual process within Die Schlafwandler, in which the neurosis of 'Wertzersplitterung' leads to withdrawal into a psychotic system: he accepts the state of valuelessness, recognizing that the process of fragmentation must reach its ultimate conclusion before reconstruction is possible. Bertrand Müller, too, expresses the awareness that the 'Gesetze' which represent the partial value systems must be completely broken down before any restoration of human unity becomes possible. Müller envisages a new state of unity and meaningfulness, but is unable to approach realisation of this state in his personal life. As is implied by Broch's theory of historical cycles, the problem is wider than a personal issue of awareness, and isolated individual attempts to find a solution are submerged in the general pattern of fragmentation: a disintegrated whole cannot be reunified by the awareness and efforts of one of its fragments. As a model of the disintegration of a whole value culture and

its eventual re-integration, however, Gödicke represents Broch's hope that a universal solution will be found, 'Einheit des Menschen ..., aufquellend aus Wahnsinn'.[16]

These two elements of unity and madness form the dominant ideals of the psychiatrist Georg in Die Blendung. His concepts of 'Masse' as the ideal form of human life and madness as the outbreak of the 'Masse' in the individual are combined with an idealisation of the madman as the only representative of 'reiner Geistigkeit'.[17] His praise of the private world created by the paranoiac recalls the enthusiasm of the surrealists at that time (1935) for the delusions of of paranoia.[18] The discrepancy between the individual's view of reality and reality itself, which is central to the motif of madness for Broch and Musil as well as for Canetti, is resolved by the surrealists in favour of the subjective reality. A major characteristic of Canetti's characters, their constant projection of their fears and wishes into external reality, was considered a positive faculty by the surrealist movement.[19] Dali, e.g., based his concept of 'paranoia-criticism' on the paranoiac's subordination of objective reality to subjective interpretation:

> Paranoia makes use of the external world to impose the obsessive notion with the disturbing particularity of making valid the reality of this notion for others. The reality of the external world serves as an illustration and a proof, and is put in the service of the reality of our mind. 2o)

This process is continually employed by each character of

Die Blendung to maintain the individual universe where he can rule and see his dreams fulfilled. What the surrealists saw as the reconciliation of desire and reality is, however, revealed in the novel as extreme alienation of the individual from reality: the delusion of the private world finally destroys the individual when the forces of reality can no longer be subordinated, as in Fischerle's murder and Kien's suicide. Georg's view of the nobility of madness is negated by his own insanity, which exhibits the same violent delusions of self-importance that are revealed as grotesque and ridiculous throughout the rest of the novel; and by the desperate outcome of the private universe, demonstrated in Kien's auto-da-fé. In Die Blendung, the motif of madness presents a more radical image of the alienation of the individual from society and from reality than that depicted in Die Schlafwandler or Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften: Canetti takes the motif to an extreme from which a return to normality seems impossible. No one within the novel stands outside the pattern of solipsistic individualism to judge its destructiveness or its distortion of human reason, emotions, ideals and behaviour, and of all concepts of community or ideals which transcend primitive personal drives. Madness - like the criminal motif - functions in all three novels as an expression of the isolation of the individual in a society no longer unified by a comprehensive value system, social structure or sense of purpose. In the society of Die Blendung this situation becomes apparent in the private laws which allow the individual

to pursue his own dream violently and ruthlessly, to the point of destroying the lives of others; and the portrait of the same society as completely dominated by uncontrollable irrational drives for power and invulnerability shows this distortion of human society as complete and irreversible.

The various representative individuals and social groups in the different phases of Die Schlafwandler express their value state through their connection with the criminal motif: Joachim von Pasenow's concept of the army and the moral and religious code of his family as a condemning judge, and Esch's obsession with guilt, sacrifice and justice reveal the individual's struggle to preserve an inadequate value system. This value system is threatened not only by the lawlessness and anarchy of the world around them, but also by their own lapses from the established code. Huguenau's fraudulent business dealings characterize his ruthlessly self-seeking personal value-system, while his act of murder demonstrates his momentary freedom from even this most limited of values. The motif of insanity, however, reveals the psychological states determining the criminal elements in each story: Joachim's and Esch's obsessions with their own crime and guilt are revealed as symptoms of psychotic closed value systems. These have been formed in reaction against the experience of value-insecurity accompanying the growing discrepancy between their values and the world. Huguenau's practical realism, moreover,

is shown to consist of completely irrational responses, which form a narrow private world, bounded by the limits of the individual and completely cut off from the surrounding world of reality. The portrayal of a society in disintegration is balanced by Broch's hope - discussed in the 'Epilog', backed up by the sub-plots of Huguenau - that a complete reversal will be produced from the stage of 'Nullpunkt'.

In Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, the figures of Moosbrugger and Clarisse act as focal points reflecting the suppressed violence of their society and the dominance of irrational, delusional elements in the individual's response to the diffuse purposelessness of his society and to the uncontrollable instability of reality. The search of Ulrich and Agathe for the solution to 'die Frage des rechten Lebens' involves comparable elements of crime and madness, as an integral part of their rejection of prevailing standards in the effort to find more valid and meaningful criteria for their way of life.

In its various forms in all three novels, the motif of crime involves the society depicted (in varying degrees of complicity) in actions which reveal the absence, negation, or loss of validity of traditional social values. The image of madness intensifies the negative aspects of this portrayal by exposing the roots of criminality and other deviations, in fundamental, abnormal psychological states. The position of

these motifs within each novel, the extent to which they are balanced by a suggested norm, and the nature of that norm, point to basic distinctions between the underlying philosophical assumptions, principles or systems of each novel. The distorted society which Canetti constructs in Die Blendung stands as an end in itself, without any balancing or transcending perspective. Broch's depiction of a similar, though less grotesquely portrayed society leads to a final perspective which envisages a reconstruction of a meaningful and unifying value structure, in accordance with Broch's theories on the nature and function of values. The utopian strain which dominates the closing sections of Die Schlafwandler is present from the outset in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, in a very different form: the amorphous reality which Broch sees as heading towards a final 'Nullpunkt' and corollary volte face into re-integration, is established by Musil as the background - accepted as such, not as a passing stage in an historical process - for Ulrich's explorations into 'die Frage des rechten Lebens', without any definitive solution being foreseen or achieved.

Footnotes

Introduction

1. See Freese, Wolfgang. "Vergleichungen. Statt eines Forschungsberichts - Über das Vergleichen Robert Musils mit Hermann Broch in der Literaturwissenschaft." Literatur und Kritik, 54/55 (1971), pp. 218-241.

2. Eisenreich, Herbert. "Das schöpferische Mißtrauen." Das Große Erbe. ed. O. Basil, Graz and Wien, 1962, p. 99 f.

3. Magris, Claudio. Der Habsburgische Mythos in der Österreichischen Literatur. Salzburg, 1966, pp. 278-295 (Musil); p. 335 (Broch); and p. 242 (Canetti).

4. Magris, Claudio. "Aktuelle Perspektive der mitteleuropäischen Literatur." Literatur und Kritik, 26/27 (1968), p. 332 f.
Cf. Csokor, Franz. "Umsturz im Roman und Österreichs Anteil". German Life and Letters, 8 (1954-55), p. 86.

5. Heger, Roland. Der österreichische Roman des 2o. Jahrhunderts 1. Wien, Stuttgart, 1971, pp. 12-26 (Musil and Broch); pp. 85-87 (Canetti).

6. Welzig, Werner. Der deutsche Roman im 2o. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart, 1967, pp. 192-2o5 (Musil and Broch), pp. 55-58 (Canetti)

7. Hamburger, Michael. From Prophecy to Exorcism. London, 1965, p. 139 ff.
Cf. Heer, Friedrich. "Perspektiven österreichischer Gegenwartsdichtung." Deutsche Literatur in unserer Zeit. ed. Wolfgang Kayser. Göttingen, 1959, p. 144.

8. Mühlher, Robert. Der moderne psychologische Roman in Österreich. Wien, undated, pp. 5 and 18.

9. Durzak, Manfred. "Versuch über Elias Canetti." Akzente, 17 (197o), p. 176 f. See also:
Broch, Hermann. Briefe. Gesammelte Werke 8, Zürich, 1957, pp. 151 f and 159.
Durzak, Manfred. Hermann Broch in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten. Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1966, p. 79 f.
Canetti, Elias. "Gespräch mit Joachim Schickel." Die gespaltene Zukunft. München, 1972, p. 12o.

Corino, Karl. "Geistesverwandtschaft und Rivalität." Literatur und Kritik, 54/55 (1971), p. 242.
Wotruba, Fritz. "Erinnerung an Musil." Robert Musil. Leben, Werk, Wirkung. ed. Karl Dinklage, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1960, p. 401.

10. Loewenstein, Kurt. "Juden in der modernen Massenwelt". Bulletin der Freunde des Leo Baeck Instituts, 11, (1960), 157-176.

11. Moser, Manfred. Elias Canetti. 'Die Blendung'. Diss., Wien, 1968, p. 32.

12. Durzak, Manfred. "Versuch über Elias Canetti." Akzente, 17 (1970), p. 178 f.

13. Curtius, Mechthild."Das Groteske als Kritik." Literatur und Kritik, 65 (1972), p. 299.

14. Dissinger, Dieter. Vereinzelung und Massenwahn. Bonn, 1971, p. 197 f.

15. Maierhöfer, Fränzi. "Wider die Waffe der Blindheit." Stimmen der Zeit, 95 (1970), p. 119 and 124 f.

16. Durzak. op. cit. p. 189 f.

17. Michel, Karl."Der Intellektuelle und die Masse". Neue Rundschau, 75 (1964), pp. 308-316.

Chapter One

1. See also the discussion of Joachim's closed value system, pp. 201-203 below.

2. See pp. 196-200 below.

3. On Bertrand's role in Pasenow cf.:
Mandelkow, Karl. Hermann Brochs Romantrilogie 'Die Schlafwandler'. Heidelberg, 1962, pp. 78-80 and 90f.
Kreutzer, Leo. Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie. Tübingen, 1966, pp. 159-162.
Herd, Eric."The Guilt of the Hero in the Novels of Hermann Broch". German Life and Letters, 18 (1964/65), pp. 35-39.

4. Cf. on the motif of the "Renegade": Zwoll, Cornelius v. Motifs and Themes in Hermann Broch's 'Die Schlafwandler'. Diss., East Lansing, 1965, pp. 92-101.

5. Cf. Kreutzer op. cit., p. 57-62.

6. Cf. Zwoll op. cit., pp. 101-105: the 'Brand' motif.

7. Cf. Kreutzer op. cit., pp. 49-56: 'Romantik'.

8. See e.g. Joachim's image of Bertrand (21); and the setting of his first evening with Ruzena (38).

9. Cf. Collins, Peter. Hermann Broch's 'Schlafwandler'-Trilogy. Diss., Sydney, 1967, p. 148 f.
Emmel, Hildegard."Das Problem des Verbrechens: Hermann Broch und Robert Musil."Das Gericht in der deutschen Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts. Bern und München, 1963, pp. 56-81.
Emmel stresses the failure of Pasenow, and to a lesser extent of Esch, to deal with Huguenau, pp. 59-61. By placing the emphasis on this aspect, Emmel suggests that the systems Pasenow and Esch represent could cope with the Huguenau type, but for the weakness of their representatives. The stress in the novel, however, is directed rather at the weakness of the system itself, as symbolized by its representatives: Pasenow and Esch cannot serve as the instruments of right because their concepts of justice and order are no longer valid, not simply because they cannot live up to these concepts. It is only because of this factor that Huguenau can embody justice, as the 'Henker' of an order which is no longer adequate and is therefore evil.

10. Cf. Kreutzer op. cit., p. 74 ff; Collins op. cit., p.180-3; pp. 420-423.

11. Cf. Collins' discussion of the antithetical poles of sleepwalking, "Sehnsucht nach der Heimat" and "Sehnsucht nach dem Gelobten Land". Collins op. cit., pp. 193-234.
See also "Existence as a state of Imprisonment". pp.234-319.
cf. Kreutzer op. cit. p. 115 ff: Kreutzer distinguishes between a 'romantischen' and a 'sachlichen' 'Strang', and follows these through in his analysis of Esch, pp. 118-152.

12. See Mandelkow op. cit. pp. 1o7-113, for an analysis of the 'Park' motif throughout the novel: 'Sachlichkeit'.

13. Esch obviously considers the impulse to murder to be a normal factor in the love-relationship, as is indicated by his comments to Lohberg on his engagement to Erna. (3o8 f).
Ernestine Schlant questions the appropriateness of the term 'Todestrieb' in connection with Broch's philosophy, based as it is on death as the 'absoluter Unwert'.
Schlant, Ernestine. Die Philosophie Hermann Brochs. Bern und München, 1971, p. 192.
In the case of Esch, the dominance of the 'Todestrieb' is clearly linked with the awareness of guilt and the wish to return to the original, lost state of innocence - "Oh, sich auszulöschen ... mit all der Ungerechtigkeit, die man trägt" (273); he equates death with the longed-for state of freedom - "Wer vor dem Tode steht, ist frei..."(3o5).

14. See p. 26 above. Cf. Cohn, Dorrit. The Sleepwalkers. The Hague, Paris, 1966, pp. 8o-89.

15. See p. 18 f above.

16. See p. 24 and 19 above.

17. Cf. Collins op. cit. pp.32o-347: "The Sleepwalker's Dream of the Redemptive Sacrifice".

18. Cf. Durzak, Manfred. "Apokalypse oder Utopie?" Etudes Germaniques, 24 (1969), p. 23 ff. See p. 54 below.

19. See p. 297, p. 3o5, p. 3o8. See also p. 27 f above.

2o. See Kreutzer op. cit., pp. 163-175.

21. See Zwoll op. cit., pp. 157-18o.

22. See p. 41 f above.

23. See Schlant op. cit., pp. 21-27: "Das Rationale und das Irrationale. Mythos und Logos".

24. See the discussion of 'closed' or 'aesthetic' systems, p. 179 f below. Cf. Schlant op. cit., pp. 27-3o.

25. See p. 39 above.

26. See Cohn op. cit., pp. 1o3-136: "The Ahasverus Poem", for an analysis of the Ahasver figure.

Chapter Two

1. Cf. Ziolkowski, Theodore. "The Artist as Criminal". Dimensions of the Modern Novel. Princeton, 1969, pp. 289-331. Ziolkowski uses the term to describe the role of the criminal in Sartre Saint Genet, Gide Les Faux-Monnayeurs, Döblin Berlin Alexanderplatz, Broch Huguenau and Musil Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. p. 323.

2. Karl Kraus makes similar accusations in articles from Die Fackel, 1902.1907, published together in Sittlichkeit und Kriminalität. München, Wien, undated. See particularly "Sittlichkeit und Kriminalität", pp. 9-28; "Ethik und Strafgesetz", pp. 66-70; "Irrenhaus Österreich", pp. 75-93; "Verbrecher gesucht", pp. 146-149; and "Gerichtspsychiatrie" pp. 293-297.
Cf. also Horst, Karl. "Recht und Macht". Kritischer Führer durch die deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart. München, 1962, pp. 60-63.

3. Cf. Emmel op. cit., pp. 68-72.

4. This is a recurring analogy in Musil's work. Cf. e.g. Ulrich's opinion, while contemplating a cathedral,

> "daß man genau so leicht Menschen fressen könnte, wie solche Sehenswürdigkeiten zu bauen oder stehen zu lassen. (130);

and the 1922 essay "Das hilflose Europa". (T. 627).

5. The same image, "wie ein Mörder", is used to describe Georg Gröschl's behaviour during the incident with Clarisse and Marion. (438).

6. See pp. 246-248 below.

7. Cf. p. 1474.

8. Cf. "Studie zum Schlußteil". 6. 1. 1936, (p. 1575 f).
Also: Arntzen, Helmut. Satirischer Stil bei Robert Musil. Bonn, 1960, pp. 178-189: "Die Parallelaktion führt zum Krieg".
Seeger, Lothar. Die Demaskierung der Lebenslüge. Bern and München, 1969, pp. 100-137: "Die Parallelaktion als negativer Idealismus".
Laermann, Klaus. Eigenschaftslosigkeit. Stuttgart, 1970, pp. 87-106: "Gesellschaft ohne Eigenschaften - die Parallelaktion".

9. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Werke in drei Bänden. ed. Karl Schlechta. München, undated. Vol. 2, p. 1o2o ff. For the influence of Nietzsche on Musil, see: Heydebrand, Renate v. Die Reflexionen Ulrichs in 'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. Münster, 1966, pp. 9-47 and 57-78.
Müller, Gerd. Dichtung und Wissenschaft. Uppsala, 1971, pp. 165-182.
Seidler, Ingo. "Das Nietzschebild Robert Musils." DVjs, 39 (1965), pp. 329-349.
Reichert, Herbert. "Nietzschean Influence in Musil's 'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften'." German Quarterly, 39 (1966), pp. 12-28.
Kimpel, Dieter. "Beiträge zur geistigen Bewältigung der Welt...". Deutsche Romantheorien. ed. Reinhold Grimm. Frankfurt/M., Bonn, 1968, pp. 376-384.

1o. See the discussion of 'Erlösung' pp. 265-277 below. Discussions of 'satire' and 'utopia' and the relationship between them include:
Arntzen op. cit., particularly pp. 176-2o5: "Die satirische Intention".
Rasch, Wolfdietrich. Über Robert Musils Roman 'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften'. Göttingen,, 1967, pp. 87-94: "Utopie"; 99- 1o9: "Ironie und Utopie".
Allemann, Beda. Ironie und Dichtung, Pfullingen, 1969, pp. 177-22o.
Sera, Manfred. Utopie und Parodie. Bonn, 1969, pp. 5-72.
Freese, Wolfgang. "Satirisches Fragment und heilige Form." Literatur und Kritik, 66/67 (1972), pp. 372-386.

11. Cf. Bauer, Sybille. Studien zu Robert Musil. pp. 67-86: "Vernunft und Erfahrung bei der Entdeckung des Richtigen"; "Verhinderung ethischer Setzung durch Reflexion".

12. Cf. Heydebrand op. cit., pp. 48-57: "Wissenschaft als Vorbild".

13. This dichotomy is expressed throughout the novel in the motifs opposing 'fest' to 'beweglich', e.g. 'Wirklichkeitssinn' is equated with "einen festen Rahmen haben" (16) and "Das Gefühl, einen festen Boden unter den Füßen und eine feste Haut um mich zu haben" (289).
Walter sees 'Festheit' as the positive counter-pole to the 'Zerfall' surrounding him (65, 67, 837).
Stumm and Arnheim complain that this stability has been lost (52o, 564).
Ulrich, however, equates stability with 'Erstarrung' (129 f, 132, 153). The moon-image is linked with paralysis: (13o, 131, 596, 821) also, by Stumm (464); the opposite state of flexibility and fluidity is expressed in the images of 'Nebel' (13o, 132, 581, 9o2), 'Tropf' (152 f, 273); cf. also the image of 'Kalk' as opposed

13. cont.
to 'Meer' (696). These motifs are used to express Ulrich's moral views (25o ff).

14. Cf. also Ulrich's discussions of other accepted forms of killing (254, 273).
This theoretical analogy later becomes a real issue for Ulrich, when he is confronted with Agathe's wish to kill her husband.
The problem is also an important issue in the last sitting of the 'Parallelaktion', when the pacifists and militarists combine to propose the motion "Für seine eigenen Ideen soll sich jeder töten lassen, wer aber Menschen dazu bringt, für fremde Ideen zu sterben, ist ein Mörder". (1o35).

15. Cf. Rasch op. cit., p. 43 f.

16. Critical opinion on the significance of the "Die Verbrecher" sub-title is widely divergent.
Kaiser, Ernst/Wilkins, Eithne. Robert Musil. Eine Einführung in das Werk. Stuttgart, 1962. The same title is given to the first half of their study, pp. 24-127, but here only other works and earlier versions are discussed; these criminal aspects are considered "überwunden" in Ulrich's and Agathe's 'Tausendjährige Reich'.
Cf. Rasch, op. cit. p. 33.
Rothe, Wolfgang. Schriftsteller und totalitäre Welt. Bern and München, 1966, p. 88.

17. Agathe takes over Moosbrugger's role in Ulrich's reflections on morality. Cf. Emmel op. cit., p. 78;
Rasch op. cit., p. 45 ff.

18. Laermann condemns the 'Moral des nächsten Schrittes' as "Dezisionismus", equating it with 'Seinesgleichen geschieht'.
Laermann, Klaus. Eigenschaftslosigkeit. Stuttgart, 197o, pp. 36-68.

19. Cf. Heydebrand op. cit., pp. 57-72: "Die Utopie der Exaktheit". Heydebrand discusses particularly Nietzsche's influence on this concept.

2o. Cf. Emmel op. cit., p. 78 ff.
Kaiser/Wilkins consider that the 'Testamentfälschung' episode should have been omitted from the novel, or changed radically to fit in with the revised ending they claim Musil intended.

21. Agathe's unmotivated crime can be compared with Lafcadio's act of murder in Gide's The Vatican Cellars (19o9). The concept of the gratuitous act was also important for the Surrealists, who considered an unmotivated theft, for example, as an expression of their 'liberated morality'.

21. cont.
See Nadeau, Maurice. The History of Surrealism. London, 1968, p. 16 f.

22. Cf. Arntzen op. cit., p. 190: "Das 'richtige' Denken Ulrichs führt bei Agathe zu 'falschem' Tun".

23. See pp. 283-288 below.
Cf. Karthaus, Ulrich. Der Andere Zustand. Berlin, 1965, pp. 135-142: "Das Problem der Moral".

24. Cf. Rasch op. cit., p. 127. Rasch interprets their 'Inzest' as a second crime, a "gesteigerte Wiederholung des ersten, die Bestätigung des Asozialen".
Rothe op. cit., pp. 77-88.
Heydebrand op. cit., p. 145 ff.
Brosthaus, Heribert. Zur Struktur und Entwicklung des "anderen Zustands". DVjs, 39 (1965), p. 425 f., p.430-434.
Cf. also Hocke, Gustav. Manierismus in der Literatur. Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1959, p. 247 f.

25. Cf. Mayer, Hans. Erinnerungen an Musil. Zur deutschen Literatur der Zeit. Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1967, p. 150.

26. This is virtually the same reason as Ulrich gives in the "Reise ins Paradies" chapter (1408).

27. See pp. 286-289 below.

28. Cf. Hüppauf, Bernd-Rüdiger. Von sozialer Utopie zur Mystik. München, 1971, pp. 139-146.

29. Musil's concept of the 'Reich der Liebe' was strongly influenced by Tolstoy's concept as depicted in Resurrection. Cf.

> "Tolstois Moral, im Verhältnis zu mir...
> Die Moral der 'Auferstehung' ist nicht einwandfrei... Ich halte meine eigene Problemfassung für eine berechtigte Fortsetzung (Nächstenliebe usw.)(T. 379).
> Wer "Versuche ein Scheusal zu lieben" ... u.a. liest, könnte glauben, ich käme von Tolstoi (T. 457).

Ulrich shares with Tolstoy's Nekhlyudov the rejection of prevailing standards of justice and morality and the corollary conviction that the criminal is often morally better than his society; and the central belief in the possibility of the "kingdom of heaven on earth", based on "the certainty that love is invincible".
Tolstoy, Leo. Resurrection. (transl. R. Edmonds) Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 170, 201, 401, 527 ff, 564, 566, 255.

3o. cont.
Cf. p. 1oo6, 1o22, 1o38.

Chapter Three

1. Cf. Manfred Moser. Elias Canetti: 'Die Blendung'. Diss. Wien, 1968, p. 1o.

2. Cf. Dieter Dissinger. Vereinzelung und Massenwahn. Bonn, 1971, p. 59.

3. See pp. 3o3-3o6 below. Cf. also Moser op. cit., pp. 15-19: "Die Verfügbarkeit der Argumente".

4. Cf. Dissinger op. cit. p. 93.

5. Cf.
   "Vor Gericht, nach seiner großen Rede, würde ihm diese kümmerliche Menschheit Abbitte leisten". (273)

   Kien's 'murder' is, in his eyes, negligible in comparison with mankind's culpability in allowing his work to be interrupted for a trial.

6. See M. 259-287.

7. See also pp. 341-344 below.

8. Cf. Dissinger's chapter on the motif of 'Blendung', op. cit. pp. 73-99.

9. Cf. Dissinger op. cit., p. 123.

1o. See pp. 3o6-313 below.

11. Cf. Dissinger op. cit., p. 123.

12. See p. 3o2 f below.

13. Cf. Dissinger op. cit., 173 f.

14. Cf. the "Einbrecher" episode p. 113 f and 116 above; and the "Vergiften" incident p. 123 ff above.

15. Cf. Moser op. cit., p. 13 f: "Die falsche Identifizierung des Anderen".

16. See p. 326 f below.

17. Cf. Dissinger ip. cit. p. 123.

18. ibid.

19. Cf. p. 3oo and p. 326 below.

20. Cf. Dissinger op. cit., p. 122.

21. See p. 347-350 below. Cf. Stewart, W.E. The Role of the Crowd in Elias Canetti's Novel 'Die Blendung'. Diss., Manchester, 1968, pp. 112-118.

22. Cf. Dissinger op. cit., p. 93, p. 170.

23. Baur, Rupprecht. "Gespräch mit Elias Canetti". Literatur und Kritik, 65 (1972) p. 277.

24. Georg's view of humanity as "Masse" has been interpreted as Canetti's utopia by many reviewers and critics, beginning with Hermann Broch:

> "Denn Canettis nahezu haßerfüllte Bevorzugung der grotesken und abseitigen Menschengestalt entspringt der Überzeugung, daß das Individuelle von vornherein bloß Verzerrung sein kann..., und daß die Aufspaltung der großen Einheit in Individuen immer nur das im wahren Sinne Abnormale ergeben muß... Er will das Individuum zu jenem letzten Nichts reduzieren, von dem aus erst wieder die Umkehr möglich wird. Und diese Umkehr ist Rückkehr ins Überindividuelle..." Quoted by Durzak, Manfred. "Versuch über Elias Canetti". Akzente, 17 (1970), p. 187 f.

This interpretation has been accepted by e.g. Parry, Stewart and Dissinger, who interpret Kien's death by fire as positive because it symbolizes a return to the "Masse"; and by Durzak, and Auer, who see the "Masse" as positive rather than negative. See: Parry, Idris. Elias Canetti's Novel 'Die Blendung'. Essays in German Literature ed. F. Norman. London, 1965 p. 163-166.
Stewart op. cit., p. 93 ff, p. 111, p. 123.
Dissinger op. cit., p. 141 f, p. 160 f. See pp. 341-344 below. Durzak op. cit., p. 188 ff.
Auer, Annemarie. "Ein Genie und sein Sonderling". Sinn und Form, 21 (1969) p. 978.
This approach generally assumes that because extreme individualism is presented as a "Verzerrung", the opposite extreme, the annihilation of the individual in the crowd, must be positive - although the crowd is only seen as a destructive element within the novel. The crowd is interpreted as negative by Moser, Michel, Roberts.
Moser op. cit., p. 165 ff.
Michel op. cit. p. 312, 314 f.
Roberts op. cit. p. 12 ff.

25. Cf. A. 167.

26. Fischer, Ernst. Bemerkungen zu Elias Canettis 'Masse und Macht'. Literatur und Kritik, 7 (1966), p. 13.

27. Cf. on Canetti's 'Tiersymbole'. Dissinger op. cit., pp. 65-69. Moser op. cit. p. 133 and 152 ff.

28. Cf. Stewart op. cit., pp. 5-75: "Repressive crowd symbols" and "Eruption".

29. Dissinger quotes the same examples of the behaviour of the "Masse" within the novel, but sees this as substantiating his positive view of the crowd: since Canetti depicts the crowd in the same terms as Georg Kien does, Dissinger argues, Georg's view must be the narrator's. op. cit., p. 141. Seeing the crowd in the same terms, however, does not necessarily involve evaluating those characteristics in the same way: Georg sees the crowd as positive, despite its violence; but Canetti gives no firm indication in the novel that the destructiveness of the crowd as he depicts it is outweighed by other, utopian , factors.

30. Interpreting the "Masse" positively is usually linked with judging Georg to be a sane, positive character, the mouthpiece of the author. See e.g.
Durzak op. cit., p. 177 ff, 189.
Auer op. cit., p. 978.
Dissinger op. cit. p. 55, p. 140 f, p. 198.
Stewart accepts Georg's views as correct, but claims he has been 'corrupted' by his position of power. op. cit., p. 26 f.
Hartung, Rudolf, "Fabel und Gestalt". Literarische Revue, 3 (1948), rejects the practice, "die Meinung einer Romanfigur als die Meinung ihres Autors anzusehen", (p. 345); but he interprets Georg's 'Massentheorie' as the narrator's comment, although nothing distinguishes it from the normal pattern of character-perspective used throughout the novel. (p. 346). Georg is judged negatively by e.g. Moser, op. cit., p. 169; and Roberts op. cit., p. 8. See pp. 344-364 below.

Chapter Four

1. Musil, e.g., speaks of "der Verbrecher als guter Mensch in der Literatur seit Dostojewski" (T. 682); Ulrich and Agathe base one of their conversations on morality on the characters of Stendhal and Dostojewski; and the influence of Nietzsche on Musil's moral views and the characters of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften has been noted: See note 9 (Chapter Two), p. 387 above.

2. Cf. e.g. Mayer, Hans. "Felix Krull und Oskar Matzerath". Das Geschehen und das Schweigen. Frankfurt/M., 1969.

> "Narren, Neurotiker, Verbrecher, Monstren, Artisten aller Art bevölkern die Romanwelt in unserer Mitte des 2o. Jahrhunderts... läßt sich von den Romanen auf den Zustand einer Gesellschaft schließen?" p. 67.

Welzig, Werner. "Anmerkungen zur Menschenzeichnung in der modernen Epik." Sprachkunst als Weltgestaltung. ed. A. Haslinger. Salzburg, München, 1966.
Welzig argues that "die Zeichnung exzentrischer und pathologischer Menschen im modernen Roman" results from the tendency to depict types rather than tell the story of an individual. p. 373.
Specific discussions include Ziolkowski op. cit.
Emmel op. cit.
Wilson, Colin. The Outsider. London, 1956.
Noble, C.A.M. Krankheit, Verbrechen und künstlerisches Schaffen bei Thomas Mann. Bern, 1970.
Sokel, Walter. Der Literarische Expressionismus. München, 1959. Sokel makes frequent reference to the criminal motif in the works of Expressionist writers.
Jens, Walter. statt einer literaturgeschichte. Pfullingen, 1962. References to "'Extremtypen',Irre und Mörder", p.127 f, p. 235, p. 323.

3. Lukács, Georg. Die Theorie des Romans. Neuwied and Berlin, 1971.

4. Gerber, Richard. "Verbrechensdichtung und Kriminalroman". Neue Deutsche Hefte, 111(1966), pp. 1o6-117.

5. Ziolkowski op. cit., p.
Praz, Mario. "The Metamorphoses of Satan". The Romantic Agony. Oxford, 1962, pp. 72-112.
Greiner Martin. Die Entstehung der modernen Unterhaltungsliteratur. Hamburg, 1964, pp. 116-126.

6. Wilson establishes this situation as typical for the outsider in literature in discussing Barbusse L'Enfer:

6. cont.

> "The Outsider's case against society is very clear. All men and women have these dangerous, unnamable impulses, yet they keep up a pretence to themselves, to others; their respectability, their philosophy, their religion, are all attempts to gloss over, to make look civilized and rational something that is savage, unorganized, irrational. op. cit., p. 13.

7. See p. 63-68 above.

8. T. 81o. Cf. Nusser, Peter. Musils Romantheorie. Kimpel, op. cit., pp. 374-395.

9. Cf. Moser op. cit., p.32. Durzak op. cit., p. 176 f. Roberts op. cit., p. 12. Dissinger op. cit., p. 95. See p.XVIIfabove.

1o. Paulson, Ronald. The Fictions of Satire. Baltimore, 1967, devotes a chapter to "The Central Symbol of Violence" in satire. He discusses the depiction of violence and brutality in satiric fiction, ranging from Apuleius and Petronius to Evelyn Waugh, culminating in "cannibalism as a metaphor for aggression"(p.9). Paulson interprets this extreme violence as either the "crime"(p.14) of persecuting the innocent, or more impprtantly, the punishment of the "criminal" (ibid.). The punishment, through violence, of the guilty is constructed in such a way as "to present the psychological reality of the vice, its ethos" (ibid.). This technique can be seen at work in Die Blendung: Kien's imagined punishment of Therese - forced to eat herself rather than die of starvation - demonstrates her all-consuming greed; Fischerle's hump, representing his ill-gotten wealth, is hacked off; and Kien himself dies with the library which has been his refuge from the threat of humanity, the symbol of his guilty isolation. The violent fate the individual suffers is the consequence of his own guilty actions so that violence becomes the "demonstration of folly and knavery"(p.19) in its victim as well as in its perpetrator.

11. See p. 119f, p. 131-133 above; p. 31o, p. 318, p. 323-326, p. 334, p. 338-344 below.

12. Canetti is, however, personally optimistic about 'overcoming' death. See Reinisch, Leonhardt. "Gespräch mit Elias Canetti: Wir werden 3oo Jahre leben". Neues Forum, 2o2/2o3 (197o), p. 987 f.

13. Arntzen, Helmut. "Deutsche Satire im 2o. Jahrhundert". Deutsche Literatur im 2o. Jahrhundert 1. Heidelberg, 1961, p. 225.

14. See p. 17 f below.

15. Die Schlafwandler, p. 662 f.

16 Cf. Ziolkowski

> "For Broch, one might almost say, the criminal is more than the symbol of an existing society: he virtually becomes a model for the inaugurator of a future society, a society in which men, relinquishing the useless ideals of the past, will gradually create a new ethical mode realistically adapted to the exigencies of the times." op. cit., p. 327.

Huguenau is a model in as far as he represents the relinquishing of past ideals and the significance Broch ascribes to this; but his 'Sachlichkeit' in no way represents an approach to the development of a new ethical mode - it belongs definitely to the last stage of value disintegration, not to the first stage of value reconstruction.

17. Cf. Freese's conclusions, "Vergleichungen". Literatur und Kritik, 54/55 (1971) pp. 229-237.

Chapter Five

1. The most comprehensive exposition of Broch's philosophy is: Ernestine Schlant: Die Philosophie Hermann Brochs. Bern, 1971. See also:
Erich Kahler: Die Philosophie von Hermann Broch. Tübingen, 1962.
Hannah Arendt: Einleitung to Broch: GW 6:5-42.
Wolfgang Rothe: Einleitung to Broch: GW 9:7-34.
Ernst Schönwiese: Einleitung to Broch: GW 10:21-36.
Manfred Durzak: Hermann Broch. Der Dichter und seine Zeit. Stuttgart, 1968, discusses philosophical influences on Broch's writings, particularly of Schopenhauer and Weininger.
Critical appraisals of Broch's philosophy are presented by:
Karl Menges: Kritische Studien zur Wertphilosophie Hermann Brochs. Tübingen, 1970. And:
Hermann Krapoth: Dichtung und Philosophie. Eine Studie zum Werk Hermann Brochs. Bonn, 1971.

2. Broch's early writings are discussed by:
Sidonie Cassirer: "Hermann Broch's Early Writings. PMLA, 75 (1960), pp. 453-462.
Manfred Durzak: "Ein Frühwerk Hermann Brochs". Neue Deutsche Hefte, 13 (1966), pp. 10-18.
Paul Lützeler: "Die Kulturkritik des jungen Broch: Zur Entwicklung von Hermann Brochs Geschichts- und Werttheorie". DVjs, 44 (1970), pp. 208-228.

3. Quoted in Durzak op. cit., p. 17.

4. Quoted in Lützeler op. cit., p. 220.

5. Cf. "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm": Werttheorie (1916-1928) Broch GW 9:39-45.

6. Cf. Schlant op. cit., pp. 55-59. Broch uses medieval Scholasticism as an example to illustrate this point (511 f).

7. This distinction between psychosis and neurosis is of course not peculiar to Broch. Cf. e.g. Andrew Crowcroft: The Psychotic. Understanding Madness. Harmondsworth, 1971, p. 20 f.
"The neurotic can therefore show unusual emotional reactions but, while we may occasionally think he is "different" we do not usually think he is mad. Anxiety-prone, obsessional or whatever, he shares our world, he acts as though reality is the same for him as for everyone else ... The very nature of reality changes for the psychotic ... And since reality changes there are also very marked changes in behaviour. Thus the neurotic lives in our world, partly or almost wholly; a psychotic is not only out of his mind, but out of our world."

8. See Kreutzer op. cit., pp. 1-48: "Die Theorie eines 'erkenntnistheoretischen' Romans".

9. Cf. Schlant op. cit., p. 184 note 15, p. 185 note 16; and Collins op. cit., p. 14 f and p. 187 f.

1o. See Schlant op. cit., p. 12.

11. Cassirer op. cit., p. 457.

12. Cf. Schlant op. cit., p. 29.
"Broch zeigt in den "Schlafwandlern" jedoch, daß das Unbewußte besser um diese Unwahrheit des geschlossenen Systems Bescheid weiß als der rational denkende Mensch. Seine Charakterstudien sind ein Beispiel dafür, wie geschlossene Systeme unter der beständig anwachsenden, unverarbeiteten Irrationalität in die Brüche gehen müssen".

13. Detailed analysis of these opening pages are made by:
Brinkmann, Richard. "Romanform und Werttheorie".
DVjs, 31 (1957), p. 173 ff.
Kreutzer op. cit., p. 81 ff.
Arntzen, Helmut. Der moderne deutsche Roman. Heidelberg, 1962, pp. 59-62.

14. Cf. Zwoll on "Sentimental Inertia", op. cit., pp. 241-251.

15. For the significance of the "void" throughout the novel, see Collins op. cit. pp. 4o-52.

16. Kreutzer postulates the Baddensen family as a model of the value system. op. cit., pp. 1-6. Kreutzer sees the "schöne Geschlossenheit" of their system as positive, in contrast to the obvious "Zerfall" of the Pasenow system. p. 76 f

17. Cf. Zwoll op. cit., pp. 18o-2o5, Collins op. cit., p. 149 f.

18. See Kreutzer op. cit., pp. 56-8o: "Wertbindung oder Emanzipation".

19. Cf. Collins' dicussion of "Consciousness and the disintegration of reality". pp. 23-87 esp. p. 27 f.

2o. See p. 1 and pp. 4-15 above.

21. Cf. Collins op. cit., pp. 73-76.

22. See p. 167 and p. 1o5.

23. See p. 11o and 619 f. See also p. 98 and pp. 13-16 above.

24. See p. 16 f above.

25. Collins equates the impairment of the sense of self-identity with 'Schlafwandeln' op. cit., p. 84 f.

26. Esch's search for 'Erlösung' has been interpreted both positively and negatively by critics.
e.g. K. Mandelkow: Hermann Brochs Romantrilogie "Die Schlafwandler". Heidelberg, 1962, p. 129 and 171, interprets it as integral to the positive close of ~~of~~ the 'Epilog'.
Collins op. cit., p. 336-338 indicates a negative view which he designates Esch's concept of 'Opfer' as "a euphemism for 'Mord'", "primitive" and "inhuman", and links it with the role of "Superbefriedigung" in Broch's Massenpsychologie. Kreutzer sees Esch's religious beliefs not as part of a new beginning, but as "endzeithaft". op. cit., pp. 136-139.
Cf. Osterle, Heinz. "Hermann Broch: 'Die Schlafwandler'. Kritik der zentralen Metapher". DVjs, 44 (197o), pp. 229-268. Osterle discusses the various stages in Broch's attitude towards Esch, concluding that the dichotomy between the "religiösen Pathos" of the Esch action and the "negativen Vorstellungen" of Huguenau is not satisfactorily resolved. p. 257 f.

27. See p. 41 f above.

28. See p. 214 f above.

29. Cf. Durzak, Manfred. "Apokalypse oder Utopie?" Etudes Germaniques, 24 (1969), p. 27.

3o. Cf. Durzak op. cit., p. 33 f; Kreutzer op. cit., pp. 19o-193. Miller, Leslie. "The Composition of Hermann Broch's 'Die Schlafwandler' and the Figure of Maurer Gödicke. Proceedings of Pacific North-West Conference on Foreign Languages. 6 (1965) pp. 44-49.

31. See Schlant op. cit., p. 17-2o: "Das autonome Ich".

32. This question runs parallel to the problem of Huguenau's position in relation to 'Schlafwandeln'.
Mandelkow sees Huguenau as the antithesis of the sleep-walker. op. cit. p. 136.
Kreutzer interprets Huguenau as bound, like all the other characters of the novel, by the "Geschichtsgesetz" of the "Wertzerfall" - particularly in his murder of Esch - and therefore a part of the "traumhaft-dämmerhaften menschlichen Dahinleben" of sleepwalking. op. cit., p. 198 f.

32. cont.
Collins claims Huguenau to be the most extreme 'sleep-walker', expressing the ultimate split between the rational and the irrational. op. cit., p. 458-462.

33. Cf. Zwoll, op. cit., p. 157-18o.

34. Collins designates Huguenau's action as "Angstbefreiung". op. cit., p. 31 f.

35. The relationship between Eduard von Bertrand and Bertrand Müller is discussed by:
Mandelkow op. cit., pp. 147-156.
Kreutzer op. cit., pp. 152-163.
Cohn op. cit., pp. 61-1o2.

36. Cf. Durzak op. cit., pp. 27-31.
Osterle op. cit., p. 254.
Collins op. cit., pp. 1o4-1o9, p. 18o f.
Herd op. cit., p. 38.

Chapter Six

1. Cf. Emmel op. cit., pp. 68-72;
also "Kritik an den juristischen Institutionen". op. cit. pp. 22-35.

2. Cf. Braun, Wilhelm. "Moosbrugger Dances". Germanic Review, 35 (1960), pp. 214-230.

3. Cf. Wilson, Colin. A Casebook of Murder. London, 1971. In the context of his discussion of actual historic murder cases, Wilson comments on the psychological realism of Musil's presentation of Moosbrugger:

> "A regular job provides a person with a certain stability of background, regular acquaintances and habits. It is the man who spends too much time sitting alone in his room, or wandering around without a regular home or regular sexual relief, who commits the extremely violent murder. Musil showed psychological insight when he made his sex-murderer Moosbrugger (in 'The Man without Qualities') a wandering journeyman." p. 135.

Wilson postulates this kind of figure as the archetype of the murderer in the 20th century.

4. It is not definitively clear whether this attack is actual, or already part of Moosbrugger's persecution complex. Moosbrugger does not have any real evidence that the workmen intended to attack him, but simply interprets their "kichern" (71) as threatening. His designation of their motive - "ihn ihre Überlegenheit fühlen zu lassen" (ibid.) - reflects his inferiority complex rather than the actual situation. On the other hand, this sentence is not relativized, as the surrounding sentences are, by subjunctive forms ("als hätte", "als wäre") or by terms designating reported speech ("wie er sagte", repeated three times in this paragraph).

5. Siegbert Prawer discusses the significance of the word "unheimlich" in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, in connection with Moosbrugger and with the other characters of the novel. He establishes a close link with violence, the urge to kill, and ultimately, the War.
Prawer, S.S. "Robert Musil and the 'Uncanny'". Oxford German Studies, 3 (1968), pp. 163-182.

6. See pp. 60-69 above. Kühn. Analogie und Variation, Bonn, 1965, pp. 33-41. Cf. Karthaus op. cit., pp. 62-73.

7. Kühn op. cit., p. 35 f. Braun op. cit., p. 221 ff.

8. See p. 83 ff. above.

9. Cf. Braun, Wilhelm. "Musil's Musicians." Monatshefte, 52 (196o), pp. 9-17.

1o. Cf. p. 1133.

> "Der Wahnsinnige, der in seiner Sinnestäuschung ein Messer zückt und damit einen Unschuldigen durchbohrt, der gerade an der Stelle seiner Halluzination steht -: in der Liebe ist er der Normale!" bestimmte Ulrich und lachte.

11. See p. 271 f below.

12. See note 8, (Chapter 2) p. 386 above.

13. Cf. p. 289.

> "In Begriffen eines Narrenhauses ausgedrückt, gleicht das alles lang andauernden Zwangsvorstellungen mit plötzlich einsetzender Ideenflucht, nach deren Ablauf eine neue Lebensvorstellung da ist."

14. Cf. Karthaus op. cit., pp. 73-78; Kühn op. cit., 51-6o.

15. Cf. Arntzen, Helmut. Satirischer Stil bei Robert Musil. pp. 184-187. Boehlich, Walter. "Untergang und Erlösung". Akzente, 1 (1954) pp. 35-5o. Seeger, Lothar. op. cit., pp. 114-131.

16. See pp. 26o-265 above.

17. Cf. Kaiser/Wilkins op. cit., pp. 167-194.

18. Ulrich's 'Eigenschaftlosigkeit' has been equated with neurosis: See: Sokel op. cit. p. 111 f. Mühlher op. cit. p. 5 ff. Cf. Praz, Mario. The Neurotic in Literature. Australian Humanities Research Council. Occasional Paper, 9, Melbourne, 1965.

19. See pp. 75-85 above.

2o. Cf. Brosthaus op. cit., pp. 39o-394.

21. See pp. 85-1o5 above.

22. Cf. p. 767 f.

23. Cf. Bauer op. cit., pp. 1oo-1o9; Karthaus op. cit., pp. 135-141.

24. See p. 245 and 247 above; and p. 267 f above.

25. Cf. Heydebrand op. cit., pp. 133-158; Müller op. cit., pp. 191-2o8. Rasch op. cit., pp. 124-134. Brosthaus op. cit., p. 418.

26. Cf. Heydebrand op. cit., pp. 125-128. Rasch op. cit., p. 123. Michel, Karl. "Die Utopie der Sprache". Akzente, 1 (1954) p. 34. Braun."Moosbrugger Dances", pp. 227-23o.

27. Cf. Heydebrand op. cit., p. 171.

28. See Kaiser/Wilkins op. cit., pp. 128-151 "Die Wendung des Schlusses". Rasch op. cit., pp. 35-77 "Zur Entstehung von Robert Musils Roman 'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften". Arntzen, Helmut. "'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften' - aber nicht von Musil". Neue Deutsche Hefte, 1o (1963) pp. 74-1o3.

Chapter Seven

1. "Gespräch mit Horst Bienek". Die gespaltene Zukunft. München, 1972, p. 93.

2. The parallel with Balzac's Cousin Pons is particularly close, evident even in minor details.
The home of Elias Magnus is a fortress defending his obsession with pictures, as Kien's library does his books; his precautions include vicious dogs, and more particularly, a doorkeeper who is generously bribed and "as strong as Hercules", and keeps watch through a spy-hole. The rejection of windows, which let in destructive sunlight, in favour of ceiling lighting also recalls Kien's arrangement of his library (p.142-145). Like Kien, Magus ignores everything outside his mania:

> "your Parisian monomaniac goes on living with his fantasy in blissful spiritual concubinage... They dress like tramps, and have their heads in the clouds ... They look as if they cared about nothing and were devoid of feeling. The never turn around to look at a woman or gaze in a shop-window. You would think their ambling progress haphazard, purposeless and brainless ... They are millionaires, collectors, the most impassioned men on the face of the earth."(p.146)

As the victim of others' obsessions, Kien resembles Pons, whose restricted life - " his room was the whole wide world" (160) - makes him vulnerable to their attacks. He shares Pons' fate, brought about by the same kind of people:

> "the terrible comedy of the death of a bachelor delivered over by the force of circumstances rapacity of covetous people assembled round his bed: people who, in this case, were aided and abetted by the all-consuming passion of a maniacal lover of pictures, the avidity of the egregious Fraisier ... and the greed of an Auvergnat capable of anything, even crime, in order to launch out in business."(p.181)

Pons' concierge La Cibot is the same type of character as Therese, representing "the concentration of inner resources in all coarse-grained people, who, instead of using up their intelligential faculties, like people who move in society, in day-to-day expenditure, find them ready at hand, strong and powerful, at the moment when that formidable weapon, the idée fixe, comes into play

2. cont.
in their minds"(p.140). Her activities, like Therese's are characterized by resourcefulness in the service of covetousness: her greed, too, leads to constant demands for a will, a poisoning plot, and harangues which ultimately amount to moral murder.
The world is depicted as dominated by this kind of obsession - "character is the main driving force in human society"(p.331).
Balzac. Cousin Pons. (transl. H.J. Hunt) Harmondsworth, 1968.

3. Brandt, Ingeborg."'Stendhal war meine Bibel'. Gespräch mit Elias Canetti". Welt am Sonntag, 8. 11. 1963.

4. Cf. Moser op. cit. pp. 10-13: "Terror der fixen Ideen".
Watson,Jan. "The One and the Many". Chicago Review, 20 (1969), pp. 188-192.

5. Quoted in Durzak "Versuch über Elias Canetti", p. 176.

6. Moser discusses the "Falsche Identifizierung des Anderen" through the "pseudo-logischen Verfahren der Erkenntnis". op. cit. p. 13 f.
Dissinger's chapter on the theme of 'Blendung' discusses this mechanism in detail. op. cit. pp. 73-98.

7. Curtius, op. cit., comments on the role of objects within the novel:

> "Was für Kien der Rock bedeutet, ist für Therese das Bankbuch, für Fischerle das Schachspiel oder die Geldrolle in der Achselhöhe (sic), für den Kommandanten die kleine Nase und deren Kompensator, die schöne Krawatte ... Es ergibt sich, daß die Leitmotive, die den Bau des Romans festigen, sich mit den "fixen Ideen" der Individuen decken." p. 295.

Curtius links this with the "Eindruck des Grotesken", expressing "Entfremdung, ... Verkrüppelung durch Geldbewußtsein, Verdinglichung." (ibid.), concluding that "der Geldfetischismus der Warenwirklichkeit hat humanitäre Werte vernichtet". (ibid.)
The importance of the objects in the novel in the obsessions of the characters is clear. However, Curtius' emphasis on 'Geld' seems to distort the actual situation a little: Kien's interest in money for the expansion of his library, e.g., is only a passing phase, and is not the major cause of his murderous hatred of Therese; the Kommandant is more interested in authority than money; Pfaff is more concerned with brute force as an expression of his power; Georg's obsession is directed at his patients. The major concern

7. cont.
within the novel is not so much with the object of the 'Fetischismus' as with obsession itself, in its universality - in many varied forms - and destructiveness. If there is any one factor common to all, it would seem to be the drive for power (authority, position), often dreamed of as being achieved through wealth, but also existing independently of money, though not of objects.

8. Cf. Forster's definition of the flat character.
Forster, E.M. Aspects of the Novel, Harmondsworth, 1970, p. 85 and pp. 75-81.
The abstraction caused by this reduction has been critically commented on by some reviewers, e.g.
Strachey, Julia. Horizon, 79 (1946) refers to the figures as "clockwork German Grotesques", "The springs which make these toys work are their obsessions ... Other insides have they none". She concludes that the result is inevitably "out of this basic monotony, surely only a tour-de-force in the macabre." p. 60-63.
Blöcker, Günter. Literatur als Teilhabe, Berlin 1966, p.253. Commenting on Broch's judgement of the "merkwürdige Abstraktheit der Canettischen Seelenlandschaft", Blöcker maintains that the novel remains "die ausschweifende Demonstration eines kritischen Vorsatzes".
Helwig, Werner "Die Gesichter des Elias Canetti". Merkur, 24 (1970), p. 787. Helwig makes a similar judgement: "Seine Sprache hält mit seiner Phantasie nicht Schritt. Das Wort will mit Gewalt nicht "Fleisch werden". Since Canetti's characters have their existence largely in the "Wort" of the 'akustische Maske', Helwig's comment indicates dissatisfaction with the mode of characterization.
Isaacs, Jacob. An Assessment of 20th Century Literature. London, 1951. Isaacs calls the novel "a morality tale in which the characters are the purest and most refined of abstractions" but counters that "Yet everything is sufficiently human for us to take an interest..." p.66 ff. His interpretation of the novel as an allegory points to a comparison with the 'Parabel' as defined e.g. by Klaus-Peter Philippi, with its "erzählerische Wirklichkeit von einem vorausliegenden Grund her auf einen von einer Argumentationsabsicht gesteuerten Ablauf reduziert." Philippi. "Parabolisches Erzählen". DVjs, 43 (1969) (297-332) p. 316.
Curtius' discussion of the grotesque in Die Blendung indicates that the basis of the "Argumentationsabsicht" is the "Vergleich" which the reader is intended to draw between the grotesque world of the novel and his own world: "es (gelingt) dem Roman ..., zu zeigen, daß es die eigene Welt ist, deren Möglichkeiten ausphantasiert werden." op. cit., p. 296.

8. cont.
The one-sidedness of the characters of the novel is one of the major 'possibilities' of the real world satirised in the novel: the abstract figures represent not a fault in narrative technique, but the major impact of the novel's critical intention - as has been recognized in all the major discussions of the work.
Cf. Broch's comments, quoted by Fried, Erich. Welt im Kopf. Graz and Wien, 1962, p. 9.

9. Detailed and comprehensive examinations of this technique are made by:
Dissinger op. cit., pp. 22-37 (referring to the "sprechende Mitwirken der Charaktere" p. 30); and pp. 73-98 (discussing the way this distorts reality).
Moser op. cit., pp. 35-56: "Die mehrfache Authentizität des Erzählers" ('akustische Maske', 'innere Monolog', "Stil der Anpassung", "anonyme Kommentar").

10. See pp. 135-138 above.

11. Dissinger considers this opening conversation between Kien und Franz Metzger a "Perversion des Dialogs", based on deception. op. cit., p. 70 ff. It seems, however, that this is the only genuine dialogue in the novel, presenting an instance of true communication, simply because Franz exhibits the same characteristics and interests as Kien. Kien projects his own childhood attitudes into the boy's remarks, and thus exaggerates the similarities; but the basic shared characteristics - the compulsive interest in books, the wish to own a library in which "alle Bücher drin sein (müssen)" (8) - are actual, not imagined as in all other instances.
Cf. also Dissinger op. cit., p. 96.

12. "Gespräch mit Joachim Schickel". Die gespaltene Zukunft. München, 1972, p. 126.

13. op. cit. p. 125.

14. Bergson, Henri. Laughter. Comedy. ed. W. Sypher, New York, 1956.
In this respect Kien corresponds closely to Bergson's definition of the comic character, expressed in similar images of paralysis. The immobility of Kien's facial expression is typical of comic facial features.

> "A laughable expression of the face, then, is one that will make us think of something rigid and, so to speak, coagulated in the wonted mobility of the face ... One

14. cont.

would say that the person's whole moral life has crystallised into this particular cast of features".(p.76.)

Therese's gait seems mechanical, as does the movement of Kien's face when he speaks. According to Bergson:

> "The attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body are laughable in exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine".(p. 79.)

The same applies to Kien's concept of character:

> "In one sense it might be said that all character is comic, provided we mean by character the ready-made element in our personality, that mechanical element which resembles a piece of clockwork wound up oncefor all and capable of working automatically".(p. 156.)

Even the murderous extremes of Kien's devotion to his 'Wissenschaft' are typical:

> "Another form of this comic rigidity is what may be called professional callousness. The comic character is so tightly jammed into the rigid frame of his functions that he has no room to move or to be moved like other men".(p. 175.)

Bergson also links this kind of figure with insanity:

> "Common sense represents the endeavour of a mind continually adapting itself anew and changing ideals when it changes objects. It is the mobility of the intelligence conforming exactly to the mobility of things. It is the moving continuity of our attention to life...
> Don Quixote sees giants where we see windmills. It is a very special inversion of common sense. It consists in seeking to mould things on an idea of one's own instead of moulding one's ideas on things, - in seeing before us what we are thinking of, instead of thinking of what we see. Thus it is reality that now has to bow to imagination, its only function being to supply fancy with a body. Once the illusion has been created, Don Quixote develops it logically enough in all its consequences; he proceeds with the certainty and precision of a somnabulist acting his dream... At the root of the comic there is a sort of rigidity which compels its victims to keep strictly to one path, to follow it straight along, to shut their ears and refuse to listen ... a character following up his one idea. The transition seems to

14. cont.

> take place imperceptibly from the man who will listen to nothing to the one who will see nothing, and from this latter to the one who sees only what he wants to see. A stubborn spirit ends by adjusting things to its own way of thinking, instead of accommodating its thoughts to things... Is there a name for this inversion of common sense? Doubtless it may be found, in either an acute or a chronic form, in certain types of insanity. In many of its aspects it resembles a fixed idea."(p. 178-18o.)

Kien's course of obsession, selective blindness and delusion, thus runs closely parallel to that of the comic type Bergson designates. Bergson also demonstrates the potential destructiveness of this type of behaviour, when he postulates laughter as society's corrective response to such a character:

> "What life and society require of each of us is a constantly alert attention that discerns the outlines of the present situation, together with a certain elasticity of mind and body to enable us to adapt ourselves in consequence. Tension and elasticity are two forces, mutually complementary, which life brings into play... If they are lacking in the mind, we find every degree of mental deficiency, every variety of insanity. Finally if they are lacking in character, we have cases of the greatest inadaptibility to social life, which are the sources of misery and at times the causes of crime."(p. 72.)

Kien's petrifaction represents the ultimate denial of humanity implicit in Bergson's comic type:

> "We laugh every time a person gives us the impression of being a thing."(p. 97.)

What makes the resemblance between Canetti's characters, particularly Kien, and Bergson's type so striking, is not simply the detailed parallels in physical and mental make-up, but the way in which Bergson's imagery of ossification, crystallisation, encapsulation etc. becomes actual in the novel.

15. Pfaff, too, is unable to express emotion in his facial features:

> "Der Mund versuchte zu lächeln. Durch den steifen, gebügelten, engsitzenden Schnurrbart wurde er daran gehindert. Da halfen zwei brave Fingerstumpen nach und drückten die Mundwinkel zum Lächeln zurecht. (9o f.)

16. Cf. Jorg Kühne's discussion of the 'Stein' motif in Musil's Grigia, in Das Gleichnis, Tübingen, 1968, p. 21 f. Kühne's reference to Ernst Bloch's discussion of "Ägyptisch Werdenwollen wie Stein" in Geist der Utopie seems particularly appropriate in view of the link Kien establishes between his petrifaction and Egyptian statues:

> "immer noch, in allen ägyptischen Gebilden und Gesichtern herrscht namenlose Angst vor dem Tode und kein anderes Rettungsmittel vor ihm als seine Bejahung, als das Verschweigen des inneren Lebens, als das Werdenwollen wie Stein."
> (Bloch, Ernst. Geist der Utopie. Frankfurt/M., 1964, p. 33.)

This formulation contains the essential elements of Kien's petrifaction and of the way of life which leads up to it: the search for invulnerability which leads to inner death and finally to the affirmation of death in Kien's cry "Es lebe der Tod!" (286), and in his suicide.

17. Cf. Dissinger, op. cit.,p. 176.

18. Cf. Dissinger, op. cit.,p. 179, p. 193.

19. Dissinger refers to the connection between each character's typical posture - sitting, kneeling etc. - and his drive for power.op. cit., p. 184 ff. Cf. also his references to Kien's "Erlöserrolle", and to his feeling of being "der einzige wirkliche Mensch" p. 19o; to his "Kausalitätslust" p. 191 f; to "Verfolgungswahn" and "Gefühl des Katastrophalen" p. 194 f.

2o. See Stewart op. cit., p. 6-13 (Kien's books as a crowd-symbol); and p. 51 (women as a hostile crowd).

21. See Stewart op. cit., p. 14-25 (Money as Therese's crowd symbol) and p. 26 f (The lunatic asylum as Georg's crowd).

22. Cf. Dissinger, op. cit., p. 187 f.

23. On the motif of fire throughout the novel see:
Stewart op. cit. pp. 83-98.
Moser op. cit., p. 165-173.
Dissinger op. cit., pp. 148-158.

24. Dissinger refers to this passage, too, to stress the desperation of Kien's mental state. But he does not see the strong elements of revenge and power as outweighing the positive element, of the return to the crowd, which he sees in Kien's suicide.

24. cont.
Cf. Moser op. cit., p. 171; and Moser, Manfred. "Dieter Dissinger: Vereinzelung und Massenwahn". (Review). Literatur und Kritik, 65 (1972) p. 313 f.

25. Cf. Dissinger op. cit., p. 184. Dissinger here interprets Kien's stance as his first moment of freedom, attained by surrendering to the crowd within. It is difficult, however, to reconcile the concept of freedom with the compulsion evident in the delusions and hallucinations which drive Kien to this death. Cf. also Stewart op. cit., p. 94 f.

26. See note 3o, (Chapter 3) p. 393 above.

27. Cf. Durzak op. cit., p. 171 ff.

28. Cf. Stewart op. cit., p. 112-118.

29. Cf. Dissinger op. cit., p. 124, p. 113-12o.

3o. See pp. 314-324 above.

31. See p. 155 ff above.

32. See Stewart op. cit., pp. 32-75 "Eruption".

33. Cf. Moser. Elias Canetti. 'Die Blendung', p. 11.
Moser sees this claim as indicating that Georg is the same as the other characters, judging others by projecting his own standards onto them: "Für jeden hat sich die Welt nach dem 'Character' zu strecken".

34. Cf. Stewart op. cit., p. 26 f.
Auer op. cit. p. 981 f.

35. See p. 151 above.

36. See pp. 135-138 and 3o3 f above.

37. Cf. Roberts op. cit., pp. 6-1o. Roberts demonstrates Georg to be the complement to his brother, not his opposite, and just as much a part of the world of madness.

Chapter Eight

1. See note 2 (Chapter 4) p. 394 above.

2. Sf. Schöne, Albrecht. Interpretationen zur dichterischen Gestaltung des Wahnsinns in der deutschen Literatur. Diss., Münster, 1951.
Ziolkowski, Theodore. "The View from the Madhouse". op. cit., pp. 332-361.
Struc, Roman. "Madness as Existence: An Essay on a Literary Theme". Washington State University Research Studies, 38 (1970), pp. 75-94.
Meyer, Hermann. Der Sonderling in der deutschen Dichtung. München, 1963.
Horst, Karl. "Die Not des Verfahrens". Das Spektrum des modernen Romans. München, 1964, pp. 139-145.
Praz, Mario. The Neurotic in Literature. Australian Humanities Research Council. Occasional Paper 9. Melbourne, 1965.

3. Ziolkowski suggests a comparable differentiation when he claims, in the conclusion to "The Artist as Criminal", that crime is "the manifestation of a deeper social disorder"; and that "in most recent literary developments, the figure of the criminal has given way to that of the madman as the only 'adequate child of our time'". op. cit. p. 331.
A similar distinction is implied by Paulson in his discussion of the relationship between the fool and the knave in satire:

> "It is possible for a fool to appear alone in a satire ....But a knave can never appear without a victim in sight." op. cit., p. 21.

i.e. the knave, or the criminal, can be judged as such only in a social context, whereas the fool, or madman, represents a state of abnormality which can exist independently of society, and must therefore involve a more fundamental question than social interaction alone.

4. Cf. Schöne, op. cit., pp. 7-11; Struc, op. cit., p. 76; Ziolkowski op. cit., p. 347 ff.
Meyer uses Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks as an example to illustrate the tendency in the 20th century novel for the mental illness of the individual to function as typical for his age; he sees this as negating the essence of the 'Sonderling', and introducing a new kind of figure. op. cit., p. 294.

5. Cf. Georg Lukács. op. cit. In the "Versuch einer Typologie der Romanform" Lukács establishes the essence of the world of the novel in the "Unangemessenheit von Seele und Werk, von Innerlichkeit und Abenteuer" (83). This takes on two basic forms, the first of which is "Die Dämonie der Verengung der Seele", characterized by the "grotesken Widerspruch zwischen vorgestellter und tatsächlicher Wirklichkeit"(p.85). Lukács' example is Don Quixote, but his references to "maniakalische Abgesperrtheit", "Wahnsinn", "Monomanie"(p.86) could also describe Kien's situation: the discrepancy between reality and the individual's ideals produces "ein groteskes Vorbeigehen aneinander oder ein ebenfalls groteskes, von gegenseitigen Mißverständnissen bedingtes Aufeinanderprallen" (84); despite this "sie (die Seele) kann in ihrer inneren Gewißheit durch nichts erschüttert werden, jedoch nur, weil sie in diese gesicherte Welt eingesperrt ist, weil sie nichts zu erleben vermag"(p.85).
The situation is thus closely analogous to Kien's, although he lacks the essential nobility which Quixote still retains.

6. Lukács' category of the "Verengung der Seele" applies here, too, particularly in reference to Joachim von Pasenow and Esch. The parallel becomes particularly apparent when Lukács refers to "die Periode der großen Verwirrung der Werte bei noch bestehendem Wertsystem", in which "der festeste Glauben zum Wahnsinn werden muß, wenn die Wege zu einer transzendentalen Heimat ungangbar geworden sind".(op. cit., p. 90).

7. See pp. 177-183 above.

8. Cf. Dissinger's comparison of Musil's characters with Canetti's, from the point of view of madness, quoting Berghahn's statement:

> "Musils Figuren gleichen einer Katatonikerversammlung, jede auf dem Höhepunkt ihres Wahns, im Spannungszustand ihrer leidenschaftlichen Geste festgehalten, jede fixiert auf ihre spezielle Idee".

Dissinger excepts Ulrich from this pattern, equating him with Georg in Die Blendung, since for both everything is "verwandlungsfähig". As has been indicated in the "Irrenhaus" section of Chapter 6, p. 344-364 above, Georg is as single-mindedly obsessed as the other characters of Die Blendung, and thus unable to function as a valid 'Gegenpol' to the other characters. Ulrich may ultimately be a "Versager" (Dissinger) in regard to the utopian attempts depicted in the novel, but his attempts

8. cont.
do form a positive counter to the society of the novel, and remain valid as indications of the direction a utopian search must take.
Dissinger op. cit., p. 197 f.
(Berghahn, Wilfried. Robert Musil in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten. Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1963, p. 99).
Curtius compares Leona, Lindner and the 'Parallelaktion' suggestions with Canetti's characters from the point of view of the grotesque. She concludes that Musil's "psychologische Einfühlungskraft" enables him to construct characters whose grotesque features have a basis in reality, in the "fixen Ideen" which are present even in apparently normal people, reaching their most obvious expression in the 'Wahnsinn' of "Neurotikern oder Psychopathen". op. cit., p. 299.
See p. XVIIIfabove.

9. See p. 2o4 f above ('Gleiten'); and pp. 246-266 above ('Rausch')

1o. Cf. Paulson op. cit. p. 145.: referring to Stertinius in Horace's Satire II, 3:

> "he uses madness as a satiric touchstone that reveals the irrationality in much supposedly normal behaviour."

Also: Ziolkowski op. cit., p. 347-349.

11. For examples of insanity functioning in a positive sense cf.: Ziolkowski op. cit., pp. 335-343 (Kreuder, Böll, Valentin), p. 344 (Renaissance) and p. 346 (Romanticism).
Schöne op. cit.: discussions of Büchner's Lenz, pp. 28-59; "Das Geniale" (E.T.A. Hoffmann and Thomas Mann) pp. 122-143; "Das Religiöse" (particularly Goethe's Gretchen in Faust I) pp. 144-17o; and the final summing-up, "Welt und Gegenwelt", pp. 194-2o1.
Struc op. cit., pp. 77-8o (Hoffmann's Ritter Gluck).
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Massachusetts, 1968, discusses the theme of madness in folk grotesque as a form of "festive" madness, "a parody of official reason" (p. 39), used to "escape the 'false truth of this world' in order to look at the world with eyes free from this 'truth'" (p. 49).

12. Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, p. 16, 17

13. op. cit., p. 241.

14. Ulrich's situation is comparable with Lukács second category of the discrepancy between the individual and

14. cont.
and reality, which he sees exemplified in the 19th century novel (Balzac, Gon~~t~~charow, Flaubert), depicting

> "die Unangemessenheit, die daraus entsteht, daß die Seele breiter und weiter angelegt ist als die Schicksale, die ihr das Leben zu bieten vermag. Sie ist eine ganz von der Konvention beherrschte Welt...: ein Inbegriff sinnesfremder Gesetzlichkeiten, von denen aus keine Beziehung zur Seele gefunden werden kann"(p.99).

The consequence of the individual's dealings with this "Außenwelt, ... vollständig atomisiert oder amorph, jedenfalls aber jedes Sinnes bar" (ibid.) is "eine Tendenz zur Passivität" (ibid.), "der Verzicht auf jedwede Rolle in der Gestaltung der äußeren Welt"(p.1o3).

15. Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, p. 765.

16. Die Schlafwandler, p. 686.

17. Die Blendung, p. 36o.

18. Cf. Enzensberger, Hans Magnus:"Elias Canetti 'Die Blendung'". Spiegel, 7. 8. 1963.

> "Ein paar Jahre ehe Hitler an die Macht kam, haben die Surrealisten einen offenen Brief an alle Psychiater der Welt publiziert. Sie forderten die Ärzte auf, die Tore ihrer Anstalten zu öffnen und sämtliche Patienten freizulassen. Nur Willkür könne zwischen Geisteskrankheit und Normalität Grenzen ziehen; zudem sei jeder Wahn eine schöpferische Äußerung, die zu unterdrücken mißlich wäre. Dem Psychiater, der in Canettis Roman auftritt, sind solche Einsichten nicht fremd.
> (p. 48)

19. See Nadeau, op. cit. pp. 183-19o
Cardinal/Short. Surrealism. Permanent Revelation. London, 197o, p. 34 f.

2o. Nadeau op. cit., p. 184.

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