Hannah Arendt and her Augustinian Inheritance: Love, Temporality, and Judgement

By

Chris White

Centre of European Studies

University of Adelaide, Australia
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Dedicated to Andrée Simone Hurburgh

Amo: Volo ut sis.
Abstract

Arendt left an unfinished treatise of judgement and a neglect of her own beginnings in philosophy. I intend to examine her initial study of the thought of Augustine and the concept of right love and match this to her final concern with the thought of Kant and her particular notion of the judging individual-in-the-world. An important emphasis will be placed on Arendt’s ‘idea of community’ and her reading of man as *homo temporalis* and as an extension to this I wish to propose an outline of her intended treatise on judgement. To do this I will highlight the role of trinitarian thinking in her work throughout her life and how this became the theme of her own world-view. From her analysis of Augustine’s trinity of memory, understanding and love to her temporal divisions of promise-making, forgiveness, and trust together with her final theory of the mind as thinking, willing and judging, Arendt remained close to this methodological triadic imperative.

I argue that her final trinity although never written in her intended third volume on Judging in *The Life of the Mind* series would have been remembrance, the understanding heart and some form of *Gemüt*. This trinity defines her unwritten theory of judgement and can be constructed because of Arendt’s temporal dimension of past possibility: a temporal dimension determined in reaction to Augustine’s and Heidegger’s emphasis on the future. This past possibility is her memory of the present that locates a reference point for action. Her theory of judgement would have reflected this possibility; a possibility captured by primitive Christianity and Roman experience of foundation, but lost in an Athenian-Judaean tradition of thought, but still captured within St. Augustine’s words. For Arendt this temporal dimension is achieved through storytelling where the individual history being told unfolds between past and future, and can convey a valid authority of tradition to fellow individuals-in-the-world in the form of a principle of judgement. I propose therefore that storytelling in Arendt’s thought reflects a temporal relationship between a theory of illumination and an ethic of inspiration; a relationship which relates the validity of authority as principle in foundation.
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Signed:

Chris White

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Introduction

Hannah Arendt: Love and the Moment of Judgement

1. Summary of Argument

Arendt left an unfinished treatise of judgement and a neglect of her own beginnings in philosophy. I intend to examine her initial study of the thought of Augustine and the concept of right love and relate this to her final concern with the thought of Kant and her particular notion of the judging individual-in-the-world. An important emphasis will be placed on Arendt's reading of man as homo temporalis and therefore her temporal dimension of past possibility. As an extension to this, I wish to propose an outline of her intended but unwritten treatise on judgement. To do this I will highlight the role of trinitarian thinking in her work throughout her life and how the trinitarian dynamic originally defined by Augustine became the theme of her own world-view. From her analysis of Augustine's trinity of memory, understanding and love to her temporal divisions of promise-making, forgiveness, and trust together with her final theory of the mind as thinking, willing and judging, Arendt remained close to this methodological triadic imperative.

I suggest that her final trinity, although never written in her intended third volume on Judging in The Life of the Mind series, would have been remembrance, the understanding heart and some form of Gemüt. This non-theological trinity defines her unwritten theory of judgement and can be constructed because of Arendt's temporal dimension of past possibility: a temporal dimension determined in reaction to Augustine's and Heidegger's emphasis on the future. This past possibility is her memory of the present that locates a reference point for action. I suggest that her theory of judgement would have reflected this possibility; a possibility captured by primitive Christianity and Roman experience of foundation, but lost in an Athenian-Judaean tradition of thought. This was because this possibility was captured within St. Augustine's words, and Arendt, using Heidegger's lectures on the subject as guidance, sought to delineate them for her own project. For Arendt, this possibility is a temporal dimension and its impact is achieved through storytelling. In storytelling as illumination the individual history being told unfolds between past and future, and can convey a valid form of tradition to fellow individuals-in-the-world and establish a principle in judgement. I propose therefore that storytelling in Arendt's thought reflects a temporal relationship between a theory of
illumination and an ethic of inspiration; a relationship which relates the validity of authority as principle in foundation even if no substantial principle can be determined from Arendt's extant work.

(i) **Arendt's Unwritten Treatise on Judgement**

Arendt knew from the start that the faculty of judgement provided no certainties. The operation of this faculty is obscure because it is about reflection and inner deliberation. The factors that make up the process are vague - defying precise definition - and lacking any comprehensive standards for evaluation. The contribution of discrimination, discernment, imagination, sympathy, detachment, impartiality, and integrity, (to use Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves' list), as secondary considerations contribute to what is one of the most difficult subjects in political thought. Arendt tells us that thinking, "prepares us ever anew to meet whatever we must in our daily lives." But thinking was a prelude period to judging: "That you must remain in a way empty after thinking . . . And once you are empty, then, in a way which is difficult to say, you are prepared to judge. That is, without having any book of rules under which you can subsume a particular case, you have to say "this is good," "this is bad," "this is right," "this is wrong," "this is beautiful," and "this is ugly"." This indicates the reason why Kant's *Critique of Judgement* was so important to Arendt's understanding. It was not because of her interest in aesthetics *per se*, but because the way we say "that is right, that is wrong" is not very different from the way in which we say "this is beautiful, this ugly." The purpose of this thinking was to lead to judgement, "the truly political activity of the mind." When considering the life of the mind after a period of exploring the life of the actor Arendt felt the blindness that derives from the conviction of the future and the infallibility of progress leaves the pleasure of thinking through remembrance, and willing was not in a struggle with judgement but rather should merely not be dominated by it. Furthermore, in an indication of her overall intent, Arendt felt that the relationship of these three faculties should be considered as a "treatise on good governance";

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1 The meditations in *Life of the Mind* are by no means confident. It must be remembered that *The Life of the Mind* was a product of an impatient thinker who could not afford the time for re-edits that the text demanded. The text of judging that Mary McCarthy included in the second volume was actually the lecture notes from a political philosophy course on 'judging' that she presented at the New School. Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*, (New Haven, New York University Press, 1981), p. 470.


4 The emptiness that Arendt has spoken about enables someone to judge "without any preconceived system." See Young-Bruehl, *For Love of the World*, p. 453.
suggesting that the faculties of thinking, willing and judgement should balance and check each other.\textsuperscript{5}

It is in ‘Willing’ that Arendt provides an insight into her own ontological underpinning of her philosophy of politics. Returning to Augustine and the concept of natality she observes the ability of the Occidental tradition to cloud this concept by returning to the idea of the older to stop the recognition of the new. This continual denial by especially the tradition of political theory, however, can be usurped, in Arendt’s eyes, by one potential alternative. While this is introduced as the potential ontological underpinning of a Virgilian philosophy of politics, it describes Arendt’s own perspective. This alternative, and therefore Arendt’s own particular purpose, is provided by Augustine the Roman, not as a Christian, and “the only philosopher the Romans ever had”. The simultaneous creation of man and time defines man as \textit{homo temporalis} and makes him novel through the occurrence of natality.\textsuperscript{6}

Arendt’s attraction to Augustine is partly his formative influence on the development of western thought.\textsuperscript{7} His use of the various traditions - neo-Platonic and Stoic in this instance - became the foundation of succeeding interpretations especially, and for Arendt’s understanding in particular, the concepts of the individual and the community. The dynamics that Arendt perceived in the continuing treatment of these elements find their initial articulation in Greek and particularly Platonic philosophy. However, the essence of Plato’s understanding is intensified by the Neo-platonic philosophers, and especially Plotinus.\textsuperscript{8} The division between \textit{vita activa} and \textit{vita contemplativa} becomes intense in Plotinus’ work and became a significant influence on the formation of Augustine’s Christian understanding.\textsuperscript{9} The indication of this is seen from reading Augustine. However, it was not the Christian Father that reveals this link, rather it is the Roman mind of Augustine that provides an initial understanding of this development. Just as Augustine was the constant companion of Arendt, Cicero was also always utilised when she turned to the tradition to try and clarify a point being made.

\textsuperscript{5} In a letter dated, March 31, 1969 (013824) Arendt writes to Kenneth Thompson of the Rockefeller Foundation, asking for funds. Arendt summarises her project in the following manner: “I want to analyse, describe and retrace historically the three mental activities which in my opinion are constitutive for all political action: thinking, action, judging. When were they first discovered and which were the events and experiences that caused men to become aware of them in Western History? What happened to each of them in the modern age? And which are their [varieties] political functions? And behind all these seemingly academic problems looms the question: How can we approach the question of evil in an entirely secular setting? How do we know good from bad?”


\textsuperscript{7} This is especially true, Arendt thinks, of the temporal understanding that pervades his work. See Arendt’s discussion of “Tradition”, p. 8 (023950) in her “Introduction” to her course “History of Political Thought” given at Berkeley in 1955.


\textsuperscript{9} Arendt’s rather severe reading of the implications of Plato’s thought becomes clearer when this is taken into consideration. An interesting take on this relationship see Paul G. Kurtz, “Practice and Theory: Civic and Spiritual Virtues in Plotinus and Augustine” in \textit{Arbeit, Masse, Meditation: Studies in Vita Activata and Vita Contemplativa}, Brian Vickers, (ed.) (Zürich, Verlag der Fachvereine, 1991).
The number of Ciceronian quotes by Arendt is not a coincidence as many of the elements in Arendt that surprise a contemporary reader are evident in the works of a Roman mind. The Cicero that Arendt saw is captured by Emerson when he describes Cicero's contribution to humanity as the picture of a man thinking.\textsuperscript{10} This man thinks with upmost human dignity and yet acknowledges equally those elements of the human existence that guide and limit this thought; the human passions, the individual's fragility, and the brief moment on earth between 'not yet' and 'no more'. Cicero, writing for the citizen with a blend of the political and the contemplative, is Arendt's unacknowledged role model.\textsuperscript{11}

These two influences must be seen, however, in the context of the Heideggerian in Arendt's framework, especially his reading of temporality, which provides an indication of why Arendt turned to Kant to accomplish her final purpose. Returning to the early influence of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle especially regarding the Greek's archai, Arendt is seeking a foundation that contains the principle. In the manner of this search, Arendt reflects Heidegger's methods discussed in \textit{Being and Time}. What needs to be acknowledged is that Arendt's particular method of thinking was also a statement of what she thought thinking was as a practice. Her concern is with the 'break of tradition' and its consequence for modernity and elements of thought in the succeeding era.\textsuperscript{12} Her reaction to Heidegger's thinking was based on its futural perspective, one shared by Augustine, but yet Augustine's also contains a relationship to the past. The 'not yet' in Heidegger's thought was integral to the notion of understanding.\textsuperscript{13} The purpose of his new way of thinking was to unleash thought in the present from that element of control. However, the 'no more' was not entirely redundant in relation to this methodology of thought. The past still had a role, if it could be harnessed appropriately in a method of return and recovery.\textsuperscript{14} This is clearly seen in \textit{Being and Time} when

\textsuperscript{10} MacKendrick, \textit{The Philosophical Books of Cicero}, p. 12. Emerson in his essay "On the Oversoul" also suggested that the "soul answers never by words, but by the thing itself that is inquired after." How therefore can Augustine seek to speak and persuade the ineffable? This paradox also confronted Arendt when she seeks to use both persuasion and illumination as direction for the neighbour. For a further discussion of this see the introduction by Quincy Howe Jr. \textit{For Selected Sermons of St. Augustine}, trans. and ed. Quincy Howe Jr., (London, Victor Gollancz, 1967), p. v

\textsuperscript{11} It is not a coincidence that when asked to write a laudatio for Karl Jaspers in \textit{Men in Dark Times} that Arendt turns to Cicero to introduce her Karl Jaspers.

\textsuperscript{12} This is very evident in her commentary on Benjamin that accompanied the collection of his essays she edited for publication. See especially Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940: An Introduction" in Walter Benjamin, \textit{Illuminations}, (Hannah Arendt, ed.) (London, Fontana Press, 1992), p. 50.

\textsuperscript{13} Heidegger interprets the \textit{die Gegenwart} as the 'Present', and though it can mean in the presence (of someone or something), Heidegger chooses the follow his reading of the etymological root-structure thus determining it to mean the present (as in past and future) but with the inference of 'waiting-towards'. See \textit{Being and Time}, [Robinson translation], p. 47, n. 2

\textsuperscript{14} A founding precept for Arendt is her act of recovery, especially in the concept of action. As Richard J. Bernstein phrases it; "she is attempting to describe and uncover for us what can be and has been achieved through political action... For in the act of recovery which describes for us the human freedom, dignity, friendship, joy, and immortality that can be realized through political action...we are not simply describing what is past. We are describing and remembering a human possibility which is as relevant to our lives as it was to those who actualised these virtues... This act of recovery, this reminder of what politics can be, this battle against those subtle forces conspiring to forgetfulness and thereby resulting in a loss of our own humanity is Hannah Arendt's most enduring contribution to political theory." Bernstein follows this up saying that "... it is a description which has powerful normative consequences..." though he never explicitly explains the possibilities of this understanding.
Heidegger writes, "[t]he retrieval of what is possible neither brings back "what is past," nor does it bind the "present" back to what is "outdated." Arising from a resolute self-projection, retrieve is not convinced by "something past," in just letting it come back as what was once real." This recovery, or act of retrieval, requires something else; "[r]ather retrieve responds to the possibility of existence that has-been-here." Instead, it seeks to recover the initial energy contained within the past. The present, or the temporal space in which this past is brought back from, emerges into a moment which still contains a residual notion of the Kierkegaardian resolution, standing between the 'no more' and the 'not yet'. Heidegger expresses this when he says . . . responding to the possibility in a resolution is at the same time, as in the Moment, the disavowal of what is working itself out today as the 'past.' Retrieve neither abandons itself to the past, nor does it aim at progress. In the Moment, authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives." An existential element of the Moment is a rejection, albeit a passive one, of the extensions of time into the past or into the future. While this advocacy is contained within Being and Time, the futural aspect that is also present in his other thoughts directed Arendt to a reconsideration of the importance of the past in the Moment.

This approach to the role of the past in the future is defined by the temporal dimension of past possibility – encapsulated by Arendt's notion that the act of foundation contains a principle, or a fundamental order reflected in the right action. With this in mind the thesis turns to the role of


15 In 1964, Arendt wrote an application for a grant. The project was to be a follow up to her work in The Human Condition called (tentatively) Introduction to Politics. This project is "at least four years old" and "Large parts of it exist in first draft". Consequently, it can be assumed that it was a significant expression of Arendt's understanding around this time. She says "In describing the twofold purpose of the work, Arendt reveals her particular methodology for re-thinking the political in the twentieth century. Arendt aims to look at the conceptual framework of political thinking, "means and end; authority; government; power; law; war; etc." She is concerned thought that she will be seen as 'debunking' these concepts. Rather, she stresses, she intends to determine where these concepts evolved from before they became like worn-out coins and abstract generalisations". Her intention, therefore, is to return to the "concrete historical and generally political experiences" generated these concepts. The method of return and recovery is essential to Arendtian thinking as "the experiences behind even the most worn-out concept remain valid and must be re-captured and re-actualized if one wishes to escape certain generalisations that have proved pernicious" [Arendt suggests that "What is Authority?" is a good illustration of this methodology at work]

16 Being and Time, p. 353, (O86 of Stambaugh). Arendt expresses her admiration for this approach in "Walter Benjamin" when she quotes Heidegger from Kants These über das Sein, p. 8. Using his words, she says he was "listening to the tradition that does not give itself up to past but thinks of the present." [Arendt's translation]

17 Arendt explores the absence in Heidegger's thought using Jaspers' concept of 'existential time'. This concept of time, separate but not exclusive to Kant's intuitive and therefore objective time, is between this concept of time and nuns stans. As Jaspers says in "acts of original freedom, in all forms of absolute consciousness, in every act of love . . . my temporality—not forgotten, but accentuated, rather, as decision and choice—is simultaneously broken through to eternity: existential time as a phenomenon of true being becomes both inexorable time as such and its transcendence in eternity," Jaspers, Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 59.

18 This leads to a consideration of another reflection in Heidegger's preliminary work before the publication of the final revision of Being and Time. These lectures on Kant were presented during the winter semester of 1925-6 and are considered to be an outline of the second 'unpublished' part of Being and Time. In the fourth section of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger lays out his revaluation of the foundation of metaphysics laid by Kant in the First Critique. This is a 'repetition' [Wiederholung] though it is a repetition after a 'destruction'. Heidegger explains his intent in the opening sentence by saying that his 'repetition' is a "disclosure of the primordial possibilities concealed in [the problem]. The development of these possibilities has the effect of transforming the problem and thus preserving it in its import as a problem. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 211. To achieve this requires, though, 'destruction' of the tradition is a particular way. Recovery of the original sources is the first stage thus allowing the problem to be revealed as a problem and the variations to come forth and be transcended.
remembrance in Arendt’s own work and explores this element through her engagement with Augustine’s latter trinity of understanding, memory and the will. Understanding this temporal dimension in Arendt’s thought requires a return to her dissertation and her approach to the problem of love in Augustine’s thought. In the process, I will examine the influences that would have informed Arendt’s study of love in Augustine and attempt to reconstruct her intellectual framework that would have guided her analysis. Subsequently, there is an examination of concepts such as *phronesis*, *eudaimonia*, *kardia*, and *kairos* and the way they are represented in her published study.

I will argue that Arendt sought to retain the primitive Christian emphasis in the use of these terms and was especially influenced by this final conception of time.\(^\text{19}\) Arendt’s dissertation acknowledges that western thinking is caught within the paradigm constructed by the Christian view fused with the Platonic view of humanity and its existence. The dissertation sets that terrain for Arendt’s later understanding of the political and the philosophical in the twentieth century that she revealed in later, post-World War II thought. Through Augustine Arendt creates a view of the human condition caught between the temptation of the vertical and the horizontal, between the transmundane and the mundane; ultimately demanding, as a consequence, a return to the act of foundation. This leads to an examination of the temporal dimension of *past possibility* in terms of both the self, the neighbour, and the world of Arendt’s actor and spectator. From this, it becomes clear that the role as a neighbour establishes the third context relevant to this study of Arendt’s thought; the individual-in-the-world, or as a constituent of the world constructed in-between people and out of the Augustinian desert. It is argued that this transient community of relationship can only work if there is a harmonious relationship with the individual that leads to a notion of illumination and an ethic of inspiration.\(^\text{20}\) In this manner Arendt’s work on Augustine is also seen as a point of initiation for her evolution to her final theory of judgement.

When Arendt turned to Kant in the final phase of her thinking she turned to him with very particular demands in mind. Her final point of destination with Kant’s thought is the role of the imagination in her temporal framework. Kant provides this entry point when he also says that imagination resides in the moment between past and future, or in Kant’s terminology between the ‘no

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\(^\text{19}\) The *Human Condition*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958) contains discussion of the Ancient Greek’s use of *eudaimonia*, *praxis* and *poiesis*, and *phronesis* (pp. 192-99 and p. 226) as well as the *New Testament* in the section where she discusses Jesus and the power of promise-making.

\(^\text{20}\) In a broad sense this is Arendt’s theory of knowledge. When Habermas and Bernstein suggest that Arendt retains a platonic theory of knowledge and therefore the distinction between *episteme* and *doxa* and *theoria* and *praxis* they are sidestepping the role of Augustine in Arendt’s thought and the actual ‘reason’ that Arendt held so highly, and hence her turn to Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*. See Jürgen Habermas, “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concepts of Power”, *Social Research*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-24 and Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 221-3.
more' of memory and the 'not yet' of divination. The present, or non-temporal moment (say, immortality or eternity as timelessness), involves the imagination. With the influence of Augustine in mind this directs the reader towards illumination. Arendt's use of Parmenides and Anaxagoras in her Kant lectures on imagination is an indication of this perspective. This provides an answer to the question of why Arendt sought to translate Verstand as intellectus and focusing on Vernunft or reason. This was to delineate the Verstand of understanding/intellect from the intellectus/intelligenstia central to Augustine's philosophical conception of the mind that was fundamental to her intention in The Life of the Mind. This particular conception of the intelligencia comes closer to the role of imagination in Kant and therefore Arendt's notion of understanding heart. It is suggestive to see this imagination as the inner sight similar to the Augustine's illumination. This illumination maybe brings about the unperceived presence of Being, the determinate element in productive or originary judgement of Critique of Judgement. This Being located itself in the source inviting a return to the foundation, becoming a law without a law. Again the harmonisation factor becomes apparent. In Critique of Judgement when imagination and judgement concur there is a production of pleasure as in this case, taste and the achievement of the sublime. The meaning of this is different from an Heideggerian disclosure rather a bringing out the presence of something here but still unseen, or the source in its role as inspiration and proper imitation. The important element of an ethic of inspiration that both Arendt and Augustine correspond to is love for its own sake. The significant aspect of this inspiration is that it does not lead to possessiveness. A vital consideration as it can therefore be shared by all without being lost. As Arendt's thought develops the love of social caritas turns to a new form in the political arena becoming almost the spirit of the eternal just as Augustine's love became the Spirit of the Trinity. The Augustinian love of spiritual Beauty is translated by Arendt into the principle of foundation which also retains his association with order: "ordinate in me caritatem". This particular trait of the Augustinian concept of love remains with Arendt as an undercurrent to her thinking later in her life and becomes especially apparent in her approach to Kant. From this premise builds a framework of good judgement that eventually sees Arendt turn to Kant's aesthetics in his Third Critique. Augustine provides an indication of the forces involved in this process when he equates love with weight, inferring responsibility if not an obligation; a "material body is borne along by its weight

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23 This is evident in Augustine, De Quantiitate Animae, 34.77 as Du Roy suggests in L'intelligence de la foi et la Trinité selon saint Augustin, (Paris, Veritans, 1966), p. 261.
24 Augustine, Song of Songs, 2.4.
in a particular direction, just as a soul is by its love.”\textsuperscript{25} This love leads to a delight but not one of use (uti) or enjoyment (fruit).\textsuperscript{26}

As a result, this thesis seeks to understand Arendt’s dissertation in these contexts. Having achieved this the purpose is then to explore her Augustinian-derived thought found in her later work on political theory and philosophy. This is especially the case with those elements that I suggest led to her interpretation of Kant’s \textit{Third Critique} and consequently the faculty of judging without a universal assisted by his concepts of sensus communis, exemplary validity, and enlarged mentality. Nonetheless, it is realised that inbetween these two points of her intellectual journey are her political considerations. In this period Arendt sought to recover \textit{vita activa} from the tradition of \textit{vita contemplativa} and support the fragility of this life of action through a continuing analysis of concepts such as storytelling, space of appearance forgiveness, and natality. Having established this context I will also show how Arendt further developed other secondary – though unexplored – elements of her conceptual framework such as illumination, initiation, inspiration and therefore correct imitation.

These underlying Augustinian-derived concepts also assist in understanding her final intentions with Kant’s work that involve his notion of \textit{Gemüt} in her unwritten theory of judgement. Though Arendt never specifically acknowledged this element of Kant’s thought in her interpretation, I argue it represents a potential and appropriate culmination of her evolving thought from the foundation of her original reading of Augustine represented in her dissertation. Therefore, the idea of \textit{Gemüt} becomes the controlling element in Arendt’s final trinity and an element that echoes her first attempt at philosophy - her concept of social \textit{caritas}.

\textsuperscript{25} Augustine, \textit{The City of God}, 11.28.

Chapter One

Approaching Arendt and the Question of Ethics

1. Amor Mundi and the Dignity of the Present

(i) Past Possibility and the Question of Love
(ii) Towards a Theory of Judgement
(iii) An Ethics, or a Treatise of Good Conduct

1. Amor Mundi and the Dignity of the Present

When Arendt further reflected upon her The Origins of Totalitarianism in the summer of 1950, she wrote:

[w]e can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean steam of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain.1

This points directly to her imperative for examining the questions central to this work. The dignity of a person and their relationship to their personal, societal and cultural past is unstable and therefore fragile. Yet, the escape route of ‘nostalgia’ or the ‘anticipated future’ from the ‘grimness of the present’ is not part of the answer. Arendt still wishes to retain the dignity of the present through an exploration of its worth and its relationship with both the past and future. Subsequently, it is the memory of the present not the memory of the past that Arendt seeks to explore. This is why in her discussion of Walter Benjamin she references Heidegger as similar thinker who “listen[s] to the tradition that does not give itself up to the past but thinks of the present”.2 In an echo of her men in dark times, the dignity of the present is intimately linked to the dignity of the individual. Furthermore, for Arendt, when she spoke about amor mundi, or love-of-the-world, she was also speaking about care-of-the-individual. The individual and the world were intimately linked in the present. From this connection Arendt develops an understanding that eventually leads to her consideration of judgment. This moment, or concept of the ‘present’, plays as a strong undercurrent in her work and is part of her enterprise that deals with the question of modernity.

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This understanding of her intellectual age and the ensuing attitude towards that age is partly the reason why Arendt approached Augustine for her dissertation study. The experience of Arendt in her youth was the experience of Germany in the 1920s. While these experiences had some material effect on Arendt as a teenager, a more prominent influence on her thoughts was the prevailing intellectual mood of the time.⁴ The two experiences of action and of thinking in a situation of crisis also have an impact upon Arendt’s later thought, but they are contained within a framework constructed in her dissertation. This leads to the Arendtian question, what should be “the relations between men in the sphere of concerted action?” In the last paragraph of her article in The Listener where she raises this question, Arendt leaves room for an appeal for thought; or, rather, thought that would reintroduce the self-confidence and pride that would prevent lapses in the dignity of man that was so well regarded in ancient times - simply, “the status of being human”.⁵ This is what it means when Arendt thinks of criteria for action; in other words, responsibility, dignity and fulfilling the definition of being human. Informing this understanding of being human, there are a vast number of notions that weave in and out of Arendt’s work, and these determine the criteria for action and therefore judgement in Arendt’s work.⁶

(i) Past Possibility and the Question of Love

One of Arendt’s most significant pieces of research has been neglected in many of her recent studies. This work is the dissertation titled Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin and was written under the supervision of Karl Jaspers in the 1920s.⁷ This dissertation exploring the thought of St. Augustine

⁴ Arendt’s father died when she was young and her mother, Martha, had to constantly look for incomes to supplement the meagre amount left to them. Arendt was a temperamentally and independent teenager and was eventually expelled from school at the age of fifteen. As a result of this, she was sent to Berlin to stay with the Levinas, who, in turn, allowed her to attend Greek, Latin and theology lectures at the University of Berlin (she even stayed in the student halls during term). With private study and a headmaster of höhere Schule as a tutor, she entered the University officially ahead of her year after passing the Abitur in the Spring of 1924. In fact, it appears that her teenage years were purely intellectual in their content with some detriments to her personal development. Subsequently, it can be said that, consistent with her later methodology, her experiences decided her focus even at this stage of her life. Young-Bruehl, For Love of the World, p. 34.

⁵ The argument at this stage returns to the first half of her paper and the discussion of the understanding of responsibility for those who do not occupy positions in the public sphere. These people, Arendt has determined, are those who can readily claim to have no responsibility. The seeming truism used frequently during the war trials was one of “I participated in order to be in a position to ameliorate, or change from within the effects of the government”. This and “if I had not done it others would have” are also the positions being attacked by Arendt. Arendt argues though the withdrawal of this support would have had a greater impact and the government would not have been able to proceed without its bureaucracy. This resistance of “responsibility” in government is usually regarded as irresponsible, but Arendt concludes it is this act that is the most powerful yet hardest to achieve. The result is one of “non-violent action and resistance which are being discovered this century”. “Personal responsibility under dictatorship”, The Listener, (August 6, 1964), p. 205. [An understanding that is very evident in the events of 1989. Consequently Arendt finisher with, “there should be no such idea of obedience in the twentieth century, and those acts that are carried out without initiation are still responsible for the consequences.”]

⁶ See “Personal responsibility under dictatorship”, p. 186. In this article Arendt traces the development of a new consciousness in those who take the lesser of two evils. These people believe that they have chosen the right way, but having done so they begin to assimilate their choice into a new scheme of their existence.

⁷ Heidegger also held Augustine in high regard and taught the thought of Augustine in one of his early courses. These are discussed in John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994), Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1995), and Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Freedom and Karl Jaspers’s Philosophy, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981). Augustine had been
provides the reader with a glimpse of Arendt’s thought in her early, formative years. At this stage of her intellectual career her concerns were purely intellectual and therefore philosophical. It can therefore be regarded as a source of Arendt’s early philosophical thought and the validity of this approach is supported by the name given to the first and only authoritative translation by E. B. Ashton and overseen by Arendt; *Love and St. Augustine: An Essay in Philosophical Interpretation*. The Second World War and the events leading up to it were yet to influence her life and thought. This dissertation is an introspective piece of research that is caught up with the feeling, techniques and designs of the time it was written; Germany in the 1920s. The defeat of the First World War brought chaos for Germany’s population and it was this atmosphere that surrounded Arendt during her youth and university studies. It is doubtful that the shy Hannah Arendt was overtly aware of the background that framed her existence in Marburg and then Heidelberg, but the malaise that beset the academic and cultural community would have been in evidence. During this period, sections of Germany’s academia were expounding a theory of crisis with a critical energy that was very attractive to many students. At the centre of this was the work of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger as well as the figures of Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard. When Arendt sought to reflect upon her experiences as both a student and a Jew in Germany during the emergence of National Socialism, she organised them in accordance with the intellectual scheme she had developed through her Augustinian examination. She sought an understanding of the modern mind that would enable the comprehension of this crisis of modernity. Subsequently, Arendt’s conception of modernity, developed under the guidance of Heidegger and Jaspers is complex. However, Arendt’s desire for

8 There are actually five versions of Arendt’s dissertation. I have however attempted to refer to the published version for simplicity although I worked frequently from the other versions. I highlight my use of these other versions when they have a bearing on my reading. The five are: the submitted thesis, the published thesis, the straight translation, a half completed edited version and finally a polished version of this manuscript titled *Love and St. Augustine: Love and Saint Augustine*, trans. Hannah Arendt and E. B. Ashton, with editing and interpretative essays by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1996). The working title of the work while being translated was *Love and St. Augustine: An Essay in Philosophical Interpretation*. The subtitle “An Essay in Philosophical Interpretation” describes the intent of Arendt’s examination of the concept of love in St. Augustine. This Christian Farther and former Manichaean Gnostic had to assimilate the presiding (Plotinus) school of Neoplatonic philosophy with the demands of a Christian view of the world. The resultant product of this assimilation still laid claim to a philosophical (as opposed to a straight theological) foundation. In fact this tension is the reason for Arendt’s examination of Augustine’s thought. The tradition of Western thought underwent a profound change in its composition after the rise of Christianity, a change that still presides over the interpretation of ancient philosophy today. But Arendt’s intent was from the start a philosophical one and it was this intent that drew severe criticism from her reviewers upon the completion of her dissertation. At that time a philosophical interpretation, that seemingly neglected the theological importance of Augustine’s work, was considered impossible. For an overview of the ensuing book’s reception see Robert Meyerson, “Hannah Arendt: Romantic in a Totalitarian Age”, Ph.D thesis from the University of Minnesota, 1972, chapter one.

9 Arendt revised her dissertation on Augustine during her most productive period between writing *The Human Condition* through to *On Revolution* and there are linkages between these works. Having decided not to complete her revisions, Arendt wrote three lectures on the question of morals. This timing is significant to how the changes to the dissertation should be read in this later period.
distinction making, a fundamental part of her methodology, means that she develops her answer in sections. Her definition and reading in Totalitarianism, her work in The Human Condition, and her reaction contained in Eichmann in Jerusalem are all represented in the essays of Between Past and Future. Arendt felt that the essay form was her best method of commentary and observation, allowing her to deal with single issues in the totality of her understanding. Each of these essays, at some stage of their development, contains the thought of Augustine.\footnote{References to Augustine can be found in: *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York, Meridian Books, 1958), 2nd Edition, p. 301 and 479; particularly the first chapter of *The Human Condition; Men in Dark Times*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973), pp. 90-1 and 132; and the early chapters of *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, enlarged ed., (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1993).} Her academic beginning in exploring Augustine remains with her throughout this period of her writing. Arendt uses Augustine’s thought as an illustration, a sounding board, or as a location for deliberation. In each of these occasions, Augustine becomes an exercise in description from which Arendt is able to convey her understanding and intention of using his thought.\footnote{This is especially true of her use of Augustine in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.} These moments are only glimpses, and her relationship to Augustine’s thought is not prominent in every twist and turn of the essays’ arguments. Yet she finds a place to express her understanding of Augustine in each one.\footnote{The length of *The Human Condition* means that Arendt expresses her debt to Augustine on only one occasion, and therefore leaving relatively few indicators to suggest his role in her thoughts. For this understanding the dissertation on love and St. Augustine needs to be read properly and under the influence of her later work.}

St. Augustine is a figure that reappears throughout Arendt’s intellectual career, especially from *The Human Condition* through to *The Life of the Mind*. Previously, this Christian thinker has only been directly considered in terms of Arendt’s conceptual understanding on a couple of occasions. References to Augustine have generally been focused on Arendt’s treatment of his understanding of the will in *The Life of the Mind*.\footnote{Willing, pp. 84-110.} The treatment of Augustine’s thought and his use of the concept of love has occurred on only two occasions.\footnote{Love as a sentiment or an emotion is rejected by Arendt in her later work but this does not invalidate the dissertation as a source for understanding. For an introductory treatment of love as sentiment in Arendt’s work and its possible relationship to Aristotle’s concept of friendship, consult Shin Chiba, “Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political: Love, Friendship, and Citizenship”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 57 No. 3, (Summer 1995), pp. 505-535 and especially p. 517. This article provides an interesting perspective on the concept of friendship in Arendt’s political work. However, as I will discuss later, this perspective fails to look beyond Aristotle to Augustine despite its apparent attempt. The article especially does not answer the role of the agnostic in Arendt’s thoughts (see p. 508) which is a common failure in those who depend upon Aristotle for their interpretation of Arendt.} This is based partly on the false assumption that Augustine is only a Christian Father. But Arendt did not necessarily read him though this lens only. Instead, as Arendt states in an article on Augustine printed in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1930,\footnote{No. 902, (12 April, 1930).} Augustine is “both a Roman and a Christian”.\footnote{Hannah Arendt, *Arendt: Essays in Understanding*, 1930-1954, Jerome Kohn, (ed.) (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1994), p. 25. For confirmation of this understanding see “What is Freedom?” in *Between Past and Future*, p. 167, where Arendt writes in relation to freedom, “[t]he only explanation that comes to mind is that Augustine was a Roman as well as a Christian . . . .” and “The Concept of History”, where Arendt states that Augustine was “. . . firmly rooted in the Roman tradition. . . .”, p. 73. In her lecture “Philosophy and Politics: The Problem of Action and Thought after the French Revolution”, Arendt distinguishes
understanding of the human condition in much broader conception than in the seminal work, *The Human Condition*. Augustine’s description of a complex individual in the world, which Heidegger had originally acknowledged, yet was slowly moving away from, was the attraction of Arendt to her dissertation topic. As William Barrett states in the preface of Robert Meagher’s book on Augustine:

It is not by chance that the most monumental philosophical analysis of human existence in our century—that by Heidegger—should have been produced after a long and reflective study of Augustine. Indeed, Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, which analyzes our human reality as essentially one of care and self-concern, is thoroughly Augustinian work—up to a point. For if we return to Augustine after reading Heidegger, we shall find the latter lacking. Heidegger’s Dasein—his incarnation of human being—does not have Augustinian love at its centre, and to that degree is empty and falls short of full personal being.17

Arendt initiates an intricate system for contemplating the individual in society that contains this centre. This individual—in relation to both their internal dynamic and their external actions—is the focal point of Arendt’s studies, both in published form and in her lecture formats. Her study in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* was not exactly an historical account, rather a study of the forces upon an individual in a community. In her understanding of political action, the individual was her focus and when she turned to the question of the mind and political judgement again, her concern was for the singular, or the individual thinking as an individual. Consequently this is a significant and constant theme in her work. Yet she was also concerned about their conduct in a society she believed in and needed. This desire to understand both the individual and the community in which this individual existed caused her considerable theoretical problems. This dependence on tradition and a search for a constraining authority seems at odds with the freedom given the individual in the political realm. Yet, the individual was expected to maintain the vitality of a community without destroying it in the process while the actor’s political action was expected to be without constraint in order to maintain the political as a vibrant realm. In return, the community surrounding this realm was never supposed to be threatened by this energy. This is a classic paradox of advocating the individual in the community. In her later work, Arendt focused upon the concept of ‘sensus communis’ and enlarged

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17 William Barrett in Robert E. Meagher, *An Introduction to Augustine*, (New York, New York University Press, 1978), p. xvi. Another important though broad indication of Augustine’s attraction for Arendt is contained within her dissertation when she states that Plotinus was important for Augustine. Arendt believes because Plotinus showed him the ‘strangeness’ of human existence and the “depth of the gulf between man and world”. *Love and St. Augustine*, p. 22. And it is this potential for revealing the strangeness of human existence which saw Augustine assuming the role he achieved in Arendt’s thoughts. This is because Augustine was the first to ask the question “Who am I?”. Or, as Arendt says, “the certainty of which all previous philosophy has taken for granted.” *ibid.*, p. 25. He is regarded by Arendt as being the first thinker not to inquire about the “mysteries of the universe or even the perplexities of Being” but, rather, the self and the ultimate investigation.
mentality as the foundation of sound political judgement, but this focus can be partially misleading. The element that Arendt was actually striving to define and extend remains only a potential, as the conceptual language provided by the western intellectual tradition was inadequate in its scope to convey.18 However, this concern for the other is also a reflection of Arendt’s concern for the individual and the manner in which the tradition conceptualised the individual’s existence. This task led her to ask questions about the ‘nature’ of the individual, and similarly question the foundations for society, the modern state and civilisation in general. Arendt’s approach has at its centre an understanding that politics is an ‘inherently valuable kind of enterprise’ and not one reducible to rules and principles of logic, dogmatic metaphysics, or the natural technical sciences. Consequently, as Peter Steinberger suggests, it is an approach that rejects an idea of justice that is premised on appeals to these foundations.19 But there is no absolute rejection of foundation in Arendt’s work - just the traditional foundational locations of religion, tradition and authority identified in Between Past and Future.20 In order to realise what these foundations are requires a re-evaluation of her underlying conceptual framework as these indicate through their design and implementation what her intentions were with this project.

Arendt is noted for her generation of a new vocabulary to investigate the experiences of the new, post-holocaust world but the concepts she used were produced by her interpretation of the phenomenological method. A sustained reading of Arendt’s post-war published essays and books as well as the many letters and lectures that have subsequently emerged allow many key concepts in her work to be recognised. These are extensively discussed in the secondary literature reflecting on her political commentary, and include ‘natality’, ‘human plurality’, ‘public space’, ‘the common world’

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18 The influence of Heidegger on her thoughts has become one of the most debated points in the present wave of interest, though none of the attempts to delineate Arendt from Heidegger have sought help from the dissertation. The dissertation contains one single reference to the author’s former teacher. As an indicator, Heidegger similarly wanted to overturn the philosophical tradition and to a significant extent did achieve this intention. In these terms, Arendt’s accomplishments are much less ambitious. But it was the method that Arendt had seen at work in the lectures and seminars of Heidegger she attended at Marburg. Husserl’s phenomenological method sought to reveal “things themselves” in the field of science. (Arendt discusses Husserl’s role in the tradition of German Existenz in “What is German Existenz?” by using the phrase “the things themselves”. Furthermore, Arendt determines his contribution by saying that “Husserl sought to re-establish the ancient relation between Being and Thought, which guaranteed man a home in this world, by a detour through the intentional structure of consciousness”. (p. 35). On the next page she suggests that Husserl’s contribution was not merely methodological as commonly assumed as he also allowed modern philosophy to escape the “fetters of historicism”.) The historical weight of traditions and presuppositions were to be placed to one side in order to return the clarified original. This founded Heidegger’s theoretical process though he applied it to an area of thinking that changed the contents and implications of the method. Heidegger, following the insights of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, refocussed phenomenology to the primordial question of Being and the role of the individual in this new surrounding. As Richard Wolin points out in Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1990), chapter two, this method also required the generation of an entirely new vocabulary because of its radical nature. Hofstadter also discusses the rudimentary elements of Heidegger’s ‘philosophy’ in his introduction to Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, introduction and translation by Albert Hofstadter, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988), Rev. Ed., pp. xvii-xviii.


20 See especially her discussion of the notion of foundation in Roman thought in “What’s Authority?” and “What is Freedom?”.
and the resulting ‘space of appearance’. These concepts are innovative and original in their implications as well as applications. Yet, they indicate a philosophical understanding that is not necessarily explained or justified in Arendt’s political writings. In this thesis, I will develop an understanding of concepts such as trust, forgiveness, conscience, promise making, imitation, habit, memory, inspiration that are evident in the dissertation and illustrate how they relate to the incomplete project Arendt set herself in The Life of the Mind. This phenomenological method was initially defined by Heidegger and she similarly embraced his research into Augustine and primitive Christianity. This is reflected, I believe, in her choice of Augustine as her dissertational study. In this study her use of concepts such as phronesis, kardia, kairos and eudaimonia form the background to her study of the concept of love. Consequently, I suggest, the basis of her vocabulary and conceptual framework emerges out of Heideggerian influence defined by his work on Augustine. Nonetheless, the questions that arose from her experiences form the reference point for her work. Arendt herself said that her “thought trains” were inspired and guided by her own experiences, but the approach she took in understanding these experiences was already formed from the time of writing her dissertation. She sees language as capturing the experiences of an action, event and era in the eyes of an individual. They become concepts as these experiences are conveyed through time. But they also become distorted or de-contextualised in the process. Her concern was to reveal the original meanings without generalities and distortions and to understand the implications of this new, revealed understanding. To do this Arendt wished to separate concepts that had become conflated in their modern usage and then strip away the meanings attached to them through their misappropriation and misuse. Arendt wished to return to the original and therefore her methodology played heavily on distinction making. In fact, her intellectual creations were driven by the need to make these distinctions.


23 A metaphor used by Margaret Canovan in Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992) but has its origins in Arendt’s dissertation. This phrase, “thought trains”, is considered usually to be a banal phrase with no more significance than merely stating the experimental pattern to Arendt’s thought. However, in the conclusion to The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1 Thinking, Mary McCarthy, (ed.) (New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1978), Arendt defines it further saying that “[I]t is the way these representations are related to each other by forcing them into the order of a sequence, and these sequences are what we usually call ‘thought trains’.”, p. 201. [hereafter referred to as Thinking] Regarding experience, it is a point repeated by Richard J. Bernstein in “Did Hannah Arendt Change Her Mind?”, p. 143 in Hannah Arendt; Twenty Years Later, (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1996). Larry May and Jerome Kohn, (eds.).

24 Young-Bruehl, For Love of the World, p. 318 also talks about Arendt’s method at the beginning of the section on The Human Condition.

25 Arendt’s sensivity to her tradition, both in terms of her methodology and direction, if not its relationship to the contemporary present she found herself in, is well illustrated in this unreferenced quote in her Congress papers from the opening pages of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety: “The age of making distinction is past. It has been vanquished by the system. In our day, whoever loves to make distinctions is regarded as an eccentric whose soul clings to something that has long
Arendt’s ‘woodsman’s path’, or her thought trains, lead to a different space than Heidegger - it leads to the space of memory. Arendt’s reading of modernity has memory in jeopardy. Involved in a desire for recovery is also that which modernity has already lost: an appropriate conception of memory. Modernity’s loss of the capacity to recover correctly is directly linked to its lack of appreciation of memory. Therefore, in Arendt’s eyes, if you understand memory you do not lose the capacity to recover. Arendt was writing her dissertation in an era where culture was thought to be in crisis and continually threatened with extinction and she links this concern regarding loss of tradition and authority with the loss of memory. As she develops her argument on the different concepts of love in Augustine she subsequently begins to focus on the concepts of memory, remembrance, and imagination. For Arendt, the loss of memory became the highest example of the division between thought and existence (and an example of this for her is the break between philosophy and political action). She is still critiquing the tradition with which she maintained an attachment to because no past is the same as nothingness. This understanding of “loss of memory” has some interesting effects on Arendt’s thoughts. Without memory, or tradition, an act faces not only the “abyss of freedom” that opens up in front of the actor each time they truly initiate a beginning, but when that act founds a political movement this effect becomes exaggerated. When this abyss is faced without tradition then maybe too much is being asked of the individual. This means memory acts as the collation of meaningful experiences. Thus we can only remember what we have experienced, yet Augustine goes further than sense perception and the notion of tabula rasa and includes, as God’s creation, the memory of God. In a turn in his thinking that emerges in Arendt’s own thought, Augustine rejects the Platonic reminiscence as an explanation for the origin of ideas or knowledge. Therefore Augustine in his Memoria rejects the memory of the past, replacing it with the memory of the

since vanished. Be that as it may, yet Socrates still is what he was, the simple wise man, because of the peculiar distinction that he expressed both in words and in life, something that the eccentric Hamann first reiterated with great admiration two thousand years later: “For Socrates was great in that he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not understand.” (p. 2)

26 Commenting in her introduction to “What is Authority?”, Arendt says that “[i]t is obvious that these reflections and descriptions are based on the conviction of the importance of making distinctions. To stress such convictions seems to be gratuitous truisms in view of the fact that, at least as far as I know, nobody has yet openly stated that distinctions are nonsense.” “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future, p. 93. This process of distinction making is the main approach to her study of Augustine. It is essentially etymological in nature coupled with an understanding of ‘forgetfulness’. In another essay, “The Concept of History” - published together with “What is Authority?” - Arendt states that fundamental distinctions were forgotten as though men were “stricken suddenly blind”. “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern” in Between Past and Future, p. 87. This tendency for Arendt to seek basic distinctions in order to highlight deficiencies in previous understandings leaves Arendt vulnerable to misleading, partial interpretations. This operates on two levels. The first is her overall understanding and second her substantiation of this understanding. For example, there is an understanding that her work in The Human Condition is a statement of her political perspective and that the agonal is at the foundation of her understanding of society. In fact, this position can be regarded as only one side of her argument and understanding.

27 Willing, p. 207.
28 Ibid., pp. 207-14, “The abyss of freedom”.

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present.29 Whereas Augustine sees this present as God present to the soul, with Arendt’s new temporal understanding of past possibility, she sees it in terms of the mind. Also, Augustine notes that while memory is limited by experience, imagination is not similarly constrained.30 This raises a question regarding the relationship between experience and the imagination and the role of ‘storytelling’ and ‘sensus communis’ in Arendt’s work. In this context lingering questions in ‘Judging’, such as the role of ‘common sense’ and imagination and their relationship to memory and remembrance, are assessed. Subsequently, memory becomes a complex and foundational idea for Arendt as she develops her understanding based on Augustine’s formative discussion of the faculty in The Confessions, Book X and this requires a reading of her work that is sensitive to Augustine’s influence.

As an indication of this influence, Arendt had Heidegger’s equally extensive lecture series on the same book in his analysis of Augustine. Yet what she actually intends with her own understanding is a temporal dimension that uses both Augustine’s and Heidegger’s reading to resist their emphasis on the future. An illustration of this comes from her reading of Walter Benjamin and his understanding of history and her treatment of Rahel Varnhagen immediately after her dissertational studies. In her reflection upon Benjamin’s life and work collected in Men in Dark Times, Arendt foreshadows her own attempts to establish the tradition of authority vital to her theory of judgement.31 Involved in Benjamin’s idea of citability is a temporal dimension that is essential for comprehending Arendt’s intentions with Augustine’s and Heidegger’s philosophy.32 She starts by noting the relationship of the past to the present if the accepted concept of tradition has broken down:

[i]nsofar as the past has been transmitted as tradition, it possesses authority; insofar as authority presents itself historically, it becomes tradition. Walter Benjamin knew that the break in tradition and the loss of authority which occurred in his lifetime were irreparable, and he concluded that he had to discover new ways of dealing with the past. In this he became a master when he discovered that the transmissibility of the past had been replaced by its citability and that in place of its authority there had arisen a strange power

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29 This reading of Augustine’s theory of knowledge is controversial and one of the most prominent difficulties for Augustinian scholarship. In fact the debate over this theory in Augustine’s thought was reignited in Germany in 1924 by the publication of Martin Grabmann’s work, Der göttliche Grund menschlicher Wahrheitsbehauptung nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin, (Münster, Aschendorff, 1924). There is no evidence to suggest Arendt was influenced by this publication, there is only a matter of coincidence. It is also worthwhile to return to her description of Benjamin’s and Heidegger’s task as “listening to the tradition that does not give itself up to past but thinks of the present” for an initial understanding of this notion. “Walter Benjamin”, p. 43. [Heidegger’s words, Arendt’s translation]
30 De Trinitate, Book 11, “The Image in the Outward Man”, p. 3.
31 See her essay on Benjamin in “Walter Benjamin”, Illuminations, p. 18 and pp. 54-5. For an extended analysis of Benjamin’s works and thoughts including a discussion of Arendt’s reading see Richard Wolin’s Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994).
32 There is an echo in Arendt’s theory of action of Benjamin’s own, unsuccessful doctoral thesis on the origins of German tragedy, its historical imagination and therefore its particular reading of jetzeit and moment. Given Arendt’s personal history it is interesting that Benjamin’s relationship with Bertolt Brecht brings to the fore some of these potential associations. See Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans. Anna Bostock, intro. Stanley Mitchell, (London, New Left Books, 1973).
to settle down, piecemeal, in the present and to deprive it of ‘peace of mind,’ the mindless peace of complacency.33

Next Arendt details a metaphor for the path of time and the way in which her temporal dimension delivers to the present an essential element in its attempts to hold together the moment between past and future:

this thinking, fed by the present, works with the “thought fragments” it can wrest from the past and gather about itself. Like a pearl diver who descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring it to light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in the depths and to carry them to the surface, this thinking delves into the depths of the past—but not in order to resuscitate it the way it was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct ages. What guides this thinking is the conviction that although the living is subject to the ruin of time, the process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallisation, that in the depth of the sea, into which sinks and is dissolved what was once alive, some things suffer a “sea-change” and survive in new crystallised forms and shapes that remain immune to the elements, as though they waited only for the pearl diver who one day will come down to them and bring them up into the world of the living.34

The “process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallisation”, and this describes how Arendt saw the process of time presenting the past and therefore providing the individual with the authority to determine the future. This is the dimension of past possibility which manifests itself in the activity of storytelling for Arendt, an approach evident in her treatment of Rahel Varnhagen. This form of biography as autobiography is a return with a future. As Arendt wrote, it “was never my intention to write a book about Rahel... What interested me solely was to narrate the story of Rahel’s life as she herself might have told it.”35

The impact of this temporal dynamic suggested in her reading of Varnhagen will be explored, focusing specifically on her need to return to the source encapsulated in the act of foundation. This element in her published work occurs when she discusses revolution in general, but especially when she analyses the foundation of Rome. But there is a dimension to her work that precedes this discussion. This is found in her study of Augustine. What is evident in this study is her reading of primitive Christianity and their community of foundation. From this study, a sense of her own foundational understanding can be determined. There is an image of right order that emerges when the temporal trinity of past, present and future are in harmony. In this harmony emerges the condition for knowing the right love and contained within this is an order or a principle for the contemporary that is captured in the working of a trinity of the mind.

33 From the same version of the essay in Illuminations but reprinted in Men in Dark Times, p. 193.
34 Ibid., pp. 205-6.
In following this direction there is a return to an illumination in the form of her methodology of investigation: "[w]hat I meant to do was argue with her, the way she argued with herself."\textsuperscript{36} Later, when she published \textit{Men in Dark Times}, she explored this dimension further suggesting that

even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination, and that such illumination may well come less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and in their works, will kindle under almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given them on earth—this conviction is the inarticulate background against which these profiles were drawn.\textsuperscript{37}

This illumination contained inherently within this dialogue with the past embraces a possibility, and therefore a future. Arendt's study of Varnhagen after her study of Augustine reveals a crystallisation of her fundamental temporal understanding of the individual in the world which is part of this 'inarticulate background'. The present as moment is mediated between a Jewish sense of time and Augustine's Christian legacy. The first focused on remembrance while the second is futural in its emphasis.\textsuperscript{38}

The present, location of the between past and future, is the individual's freedom and, while Arendt uses Augustine to discuss this possibility, as well as Kierkegaard, Benjamin, Heidegger, Hegel, and Nietzsche, her favourite writer, Franz Kafka, is used to reveal her train of thought on this matter;

Only insofar as he thinks, and that is insofar as he is ageless—a "he" as Kafka so rightly calls him, not a "somebody"—does man in the full actuality of his concrete being live in the gap of time between past and future. The gap, I suspect, is not a modern phenomenon, it is perhaps not even a historical datum but is coeval with the existence of man on earth. It may well be the region of the spirit or, rather, the path paved by thinking, this small track of non-time which the activity of thought beats within the time-space of mortal men and into which the trains of thought, of remembrance and anticipation, save whatever they touch from the ruin of historical and biographical time. This small non-time-space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the culture into which we are born into, can only be indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed down from the past; each new generation, indeed every new human being as he inserts himself between an infinite past and infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave it anew.\textsuperscript{39}


\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Men in Dark Times}, p. ix.

\textsuperscript{38} The Jewish position is highlighted by Benjamin when he says "We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. They stripped the future of its magic, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment." See "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in \textit{Illuminations}, XVIIB, p. 255. The Christian is found in Augustine whose antiworldliness was a result of an expectation of a future reward in the afterlife.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Between Past and Future}, p. 13. This is also used again in a changed form in \textit{Thinking}, p. 210.
Arendt states that men are also storytellers, not only rational beings, and memory becomes a realm where poetry becomes conversation - with the past, present and the future. Memory is a timeless world where the present is constructed through storytelling. By reading Arendt’s observation in this manner, this reflection using Kafka suggests a suitable focus for understanding her theory of judgement. The individual has a responsibility in the present and this is a need to seek in this moment an elusive indication of the right action. Therefore, it is guidance that “can only be indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed down from the past; each new generation, indeed every new human being as he inserts himself between an infinite past and infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave it anew.” With this in mind, Arendt’s dissertation on the thought of St. Augustine is read as a treatise on time as well as desire (or rather love).

Arendt’s concern is thinking ‘in time’ and the effects this has on our capacity to think as individuals. The importance of the present in the context of past and future is the perspective that Arendt evolves in her dissertation and later work. An individual’s relationship to time determines whether or not a person is an active thinker or not. The individual is linked to the world and this relationship is fundamental to their existence. When Arendt turns to a consideration of the mind, this relationship is still fundamental in her treatment. The result of this is an understanding of the individual who is caught between past and future. Standing in the present, the individual is tempted to either look back or look forward for a reference point therefore distorting who they are at that moment.40 At the end of her volume on Thinking, Arendt reveals her understanding of this faculty. She asks the leading question, “Where are we when we think?”. She replies to this question by saying that what becomes meaningful during the process of thinking is essence, or “distillations, products of de-sensing.” These essences have no spatial location; in other words, they “cannot be localised. Human thought that holds of them leaves the world of the particular and goes in search of something generally meaningful . . .”41 Yet it is also not temporary localised either. Thinking occurs in the “gap between past and future . . . only in reflection”.42 She goes on to say that the source of the present is in

40 While the thesis has dealt with the beginning of Arendt’s intellectual career, there is also the question of the beginning of Arendt’s political awareness. While Arendt suggests herself that she was already politically aware in the lead up to the outbreak of the Second World War, here is one incident that is rightly the cause of much conjecture. How does Arendt deal with the argument that Heidegger’s philosophical system - and therefore to a certain extent her system - laid the foundation of his political involvement? Arendt would have looked extensively at the thought that she had associated with Heidegger and his action of political involvement in the National Socialist Party. She does discuss this to some extent early in the post-War period in “What is Existenz Philosophy?”, pp. 34-56. Another revealing piece of literature titled “Heidegger the Fox” has since been published in Arendt: Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954, Jerome Kohn, (ed.) (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1994). Arendt would have had an opinion on whether Heidegger’s philosophy lead to his involvement (though her closeness to him as an ex-lover as well as his philosophy has to be taken into account). The treatment of the conclusion to this endeavour should be beyond doubt. Arendt as a Jew with close brushes with the German authorities and having left the country because of the threat the Nazi policies posed for her would have wanted nothing to do with such aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy.
41 Thinking, p. 199.
42 ibid., p. 206.
the conjunction between past and future. Her metaphor to describe this is a graph that has a straight diagonal line that stretches to infinity but starts at the intersection of past and future.\(^{43}\) It is in the present that Arendt’s concerns focus upon and both action and thinking are required to occur in this moment. Arendt’s individual also existed in this moment of the present, caught between past and future. The tension between the remembered past (common sense and judging) and the anticipated future (natality and willing) could only be resolved by thinking. And, this is the first topic before willing and judging: the will “is as obviously our mental organ for the future as memory is our mental organ for the past.”\(^{44}\) The faculty that used to look back is memory, while the one to look forward is the imagination. Yet, both these faculties of the mind use the same reference point, the moment of attempted eternity or timelessness.

This indicates a significant role for temporality in Arendt’s thought and requires an extensive investigation to delineate the influence it has on her later thought. This temporal dimension is past possibility as Arendt’s temporal dimension is evident in her thinking and, as such includes the notions of imagination, imitation and immortality which all play a role in her philosophical politics.\(^{45}\) Read in this manner, the source of Arendt’s most popular contributions to discussions in political philosophy and theory are evident in her dissertation. Arendt’s concern with natality rather than death; her need for a space, that later became a space of appearance; and plurality in understanding as well as an element of a community. The latter one is signalled when Arendt turns to a consideration of the foundation of a community. Each individual in the community is expected to be treated as an individual; the contribution of the other, standing next to one, is singular and in no way unified.

\(^{43}\) This is a repeat of her ‘parallelogram of forces’ in Between Past and Future, p. 12 and Thinking, p. 75.

\(^{44}\) Willing, p. 13. This is the temporal understanding that so influenced Martin Heidegger. For Arendt conceptualising the present where all are existing was the difficulty and lay at the crux of the problem of modernity. Its futural projection unhindered by thinking only habit was the disaster of modernity. This moment between past and future was given form by Augustine’s use of ‘no more’ and not yet; the remembered past and anticipated future. While the anticipated future struck Heidegger, Arendt wished to maintain its balance with the remembered past, or the lost treasure she sought in her later work.

\(^{45}\) This temporal interpretation is conversely emphasised in Arendt’s reading of the notion of end in Augustine’s thought. It is an end in a twofold sense. The first is the last point in a life and a “radical” indication of life’s transience while the second is an end in terms of life terminating and the point in which life is lived for. In this latter sense end could be seen as a point where life meets eternity - eternity is achieved by life and - in the former sense end or finis vitae “confronts life with its own ‘before’” and albeit “provocative” as Arendt describes it, this is the only meaning, summarised by “[t]he end itself is understood as sheer, irrevocable nothingness to which life keeps heading and from which life can only save itself by ’returning’” (Arendt) - in the latter meaning, the termination of existence, or the end, becomes eternity and is incredibly positive,” . . . and a bid for lingering gaze and reflective calm”. Arendt is saying that the twofold end does not necessarily mean two different contexts, rather they are linked through the concept of ‘referring’ / ‘returning’. Love and St. Augustine, p. 74. Arendt says that when we look forward we return to the ‘before’ and this ‘future before’ is immutability. In this context man as created and God as Creator does not matter. The ambiguity of the end displays the ‘guiding phenomenon’ of life or that beginning and end are interchangeable. The context for this comprehension is the ‘dubiousness’ of life when enclosed by “not yet” and “no more” and an uncertainty as to whether this contributes anything towards life itself. To understand this interchangability and its meaning, an ‘explanation of the world’ is needed as well as what beginning and end mean in terms of birth and death. It must be remembered that the world according to Augustine is also twofold and “factually heterogeneous”. When createdness and concrete mortality is considered it is life “with and in the world”. Life in this manner is not independent from the world, and neither is the world independent form this life. (Arendt says that this independence means “returning” from the world to the source). Instead life plays a role in the creation of this world and has a beginning and an end, or being taken out of it. Arendt is reiterating the notion of conjuncture in this section of the dissertation. The connection is that life and the world find themselves co-habitating and at a certain point, or in other words, they ‘co-joint’ for a period of time.
Arendt utilises this belief to the extent that reality is here and it is constructed by the community of faith; and faith later becomes trust aided by promise-making and forgiveness. This course of thinking allows Arendt to construct an alternative theory of judgment in the final stages of her life.

Her use of the temporal trinity of past, present, and future indicates the approach that is required to explore her thought. It should be remembered that Arendt maintains her critique of Augustine, and indirectly Heidegger, without seeking the answer in a conception that negates the dynamics for its initial existence. The tension in the relationship of the here and now of the individual and the anticipated future cannot be bypassed through a soothing and encompassing conceptual construction. This tension does have another release open to it: the past. The completion of the trinity of past, present and future, all equal in a Christian, and not a Neoplatonic trinity, provides Arendt with another pathway. This pathway is toward a similar unity but not a static completion. This aspect to Arendt’s Augustinian study becomes the foundation for her later work; a dynamic harmony in the form of a trinity.46 This theme becomes central to Arendt’s understanding, from work, labour, and action, to trust, promise-making, and forgiveness, and to thinking, willing, and judging and, as I argue, her final trinity of remembrance, understanding heart and her own notion of Gemüt.

(ii) Towards a Theory of Judgement

Arendt’s view of morality was far more complex than the discussion of right and wrong. Arendt, through her reading of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger, realised that the questions being asked in the tradition of moral philosophy were no longer adequate to understanding the correct actions of an individual.47 This suggestion is clearly illustrated by an incident discussed in Elizabeth Young-Bruehl’s biography. At the age of sixteen, while attending the University of Berlin after being expelled from school, Arendt became fascinated with the thought of prominent existentialist and Lecturer in Theology, Romano Guardini. Arendt returned to his lectures in 1952 and in a letter to her husband Blücher, she wrote about the number of students packed into the theatre to hear him speak. She

46 This change from the Plotinian to the Augustinian (and therefore Christian) Trinity is at the base of Arendt’s critique of Platonic influence.
47 In an often repeated sentiment, Arendt responds to many contemporary events by suggesting that a discussion of ethics and morality was misguided. When referring to Nazi Germany she says that it “was as though morality, at the very moment of its collapse within an old, highly civilised nation, stood revealed in its original meaning, as a set of mores, of customs and manners, which could be exchanged for another set with no more trouble than it would take to change the table manners of a whole people.” This leads to two questions for Arendt in order to specify what it is she wants to explicate in this matter. The first is those people who did not participate and even those who did not resist actively. The second is those individuals who did participate and still believed this was the correct moral choice. In the second case do conditions exist when it is a valid justification? Reflecting her notion of freedom Arendt says, “I think we shall have to admit that there exist extreme situations in which responsibility for the world, which is primarily a political one, cannot be assumed because political responsibility always presupposes at least a minimum of political power. Impotence, complete powerlessness, is, I think, a valid excuse.” “Personal responsibility under dictatorship”, p. 208.
writes, “Heard Guardini in his lecture course, with nearly 1200 people, sitting, standing, lying, packed in. He spoke, as ever, about Ethics; it was moral philosophy on the highest level but entirely inadequate.” 48 When reflecting on this letter, Young-Bruehl reads the description “totally inadequate” as a description of the quality of the teaching: in other words, an example of the deficiency of thought in the academy after the events of the Second World War. I argue that Arendt was saying that the quality of the moral philosophy was “on the highest level” and not, as Young-Bruehl suggests, insubstantial in quality. Instead, I suggest that Arendt was stating that moral philosophy was ‘totally inadequate’ for its intent.49

The reason why Guardini’s work was not sufficient for its purpose requires a reconstruction of Arendt’s understanding of the problem of the ethical, or non-problem as the case may be. This in turn requires a return to her reading of Augustine in the dissertation and an exploration of the implications of his influence on her contemporary political thought and her unfinished theory of judgement. In order to undertake this, there are three considerations that must be detailed. In other words, considerations which allow a proposition of what Arendt’s theory of judgement could have looked like if it indeed was finished before her death. Firstly, there is the question of the intellectual and political context of Arendt’s conception of judgement and, secondly, the influences on her way of thinking that can be used to determine the intellectual imperative that determines her solution of judgement. A final consideration will be the question of which periods of her thought, from pre-Second World War to her political writings after the conclusion of the War to her final philosophical writings, provide the most suitable material for this reconstruction.

To recall the first of these it must be remembered that the date of the letter was 1952 and Arendt had not yet attended the trials of Adolf Eichmann.50 In the seminal year of 1964, after the Eichmann book had been published and the controversy surrounding it was at its height, Arendt acknowledged several significant aspects to her thought. Firstly, that Eichmann contained an analysis in which the moral implications had not been fully understood. Secondly, that the book itself did contain some


49 An interesting illustration of how Arendt firmly believed that one could not talk about the ethical in Nietzsche was her reaction to a student’s attempt to collate examples of a potential ethical doctrine in Nietzsche’s thought. Her reaction was to simply throw it away – much to the apparent indignation of the student (who withdrew from her subjects in disgust). Heidegger in What is Called Thinking? also comments upon the same misunderstanding, and adds an extra dimension to this concern stating that “ethics as a mere doctrine and imperative is helpless unless man first comes to have a different fundamental relation to Being,” trans. J. Glenn Gray, (New York, Perennial Library, 1965), Lecture 9, Part 1, p. 89.

50 The sequence of events that saw her arrive in Jerusalem was initiated in 1960 with the Israeli kidnapping of Eichmann from Argentina. Arendt arrived in 1961 for the trial.
indication of what an Arendtian theory of political morals would appear like: as she states in a letter to Meier-Cronemeyer at this time, "[t]he writing was somehow a cura posterior for me. And that it was [as you say] an approach toward 'the groundwork for creating a new political morals' is true—though I would never, out of modesty, use such a formulation."51 Reflecting this, in an address entitled "Personal responsibility under dictatorship", Arendt reveals the reason why she would not be able to write a "Moralia" in the traditional sense.52 Instead Arendt sought a political critique of judgement; something she felt would be much less total and much more viable. It is in this address that we see the future direction of Arendt's work developing.53 Why did Arendt not pursue a Moralia if this was her life-long shadow? Because she felt the answer lay in the question of authority. Arendt tried to come to terms with the shift in modernity in the twentieth century. This predicament is highlighted in her book, Between Past and Future;

[authority's] loss is tantamount to the loss of the groundwork of the world, which indeed since then has begun to shift, to change and transform itself with ever-increasing rapidity from one shape to another, as though we were living and struggling with a Protean universe where everything at any moment can become almost anything else. But the loss of worldly permanence and reliability . . . does not entail, at least not necessarily, the loss of the human capacity for building, preserving, and caring for the world . . .54

Arendt was therefore seeking a source of authority in a world where the traditional ones had been removed. But as an indication of her thinking when she sought to discuss this matter she turned to the realm of vita contemplativa and started to write about the faculties of the mind. In her lectures of 1964 Arendt engaged Kant for this purpose, seeking to justify why his political philosophy should be found in his Critique of Judgement and his discussion of taste.55

In an important essay, "Understanding and Politics", published in 1954, which reflects significant aspects of this conceptualisation, Arendt argues that Montesquieu was the first to realise that morality was simply customs.56 The type of judgement that Arendt turned to, in order to salvage

52 "Personal responsibility under dictatorship", p. 186.
53 Although her preliminary lectures on Kant's political philosophy reveal the intellectual framework she intended to use for this purpose. See her lecture notes in the Library of Congress collection titled "Kant, Political Philosophy: Chicago, Fall 1964". [hereafter referred to as Kant 1964]
54 "What is Authority?", p. 95.
55 Her essay in Between Past and Future, "Crisis in Culture", was written at the same time as the first version of her lectures on Kant's political philosophy. The former briefly mentions the ideas developed extensively in the latter.
56 See pp. 314-5. Arendt refers to L'Esprit des Lois, Book VIII, Chapter 8. With the loss of the foundation, Montesquieu argues that the nation is only held together with "belief"—belief that their laws worked and therefore would work in the future. (Arendt follows a similar argument in her "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy", pp. 740-1.) The community is community of faith-in-common similar to the one Arendt defined as the Christian community in her dissertation. The demand for community was only partial and individuals remain in isolation. In similar ways she argued that the worldly community could only be a true community if they shared a common ancestry through foundation. Without this, according to Arendt, they had lost their capacity for political action as the individual becomes less than a full citizen. The way of acting in such a republic is based on tradition and this tradition can only resist new circumstances for a limited period of time before the laws cease their cohesive
the loss to which Montesquieu refers to, requires the individual to be in the world in the temporal dimension of the 'now' and the space created by the Arendtian community. Within these two defining elements, the positioning of the spectator is an important aspect in her theory and a reflection of her methodology of distinction making. For her, she sees personal judgements, especially aesthetic ones, always taking into consideration surrounding opinions. The isolation of the spectator, or the philosopher as solitary thinker, is not her focus. Alluding back to her assertion on plurality in The Human Condition, she rephrases the same understanding, only this time for the spectator that is present in her thoughts; "I am human and cannot live outside the company of men. I judge as a member of this community and not as a member of a supersensible world." In Thinking Arendt emphatically states that "]the spectators, although disengaged from the particularity characteristic of the actor, are not solitary." Its context is the community. Consequently, thought becomes intimate with political action in the form of judgement. In "Thinking and Moral Considerations", thinking is placed in the ephemeral sphere and judgement in the practical one. Contemplation seems to be defined as the discovery of truth, whereas judgement avoids this and instead is about the decision: "it is not knowledge or truth which is at stake, but rather judgement and decision." Judgement is not about founding rational certainty, but rather, "]the power of judgement rests on the potential agreement with others, and the thinking process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement." And again as judgement cannot "function in strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others." Yet, given her distinction between vita activa above vita contemplativa, she writes in The Life of

role in society. Consequently, as Arendt phrases it, "]the very source from which such answers should have sprung had dried up. The framework within which understanding and judging could arise is gone." Arendt chooses the concepts of understanding and judging as the most important facets affected by these developments. Yet Montesquieu's fears go even further, Arendt suggests, and in turn comes close to the contemporary predicament. The concern is the role of the temporal human nature. In the same way Jonas describes man as a human reed, Montesquieu says: "[m]an, this flexible being, who bends himself in society to the thoughts and impressions of others, is equally capable of knowing his own nature when it is shown to him and of losing the very sense of it (d'en perdre jusqu'au sentiment) when he is being robbed of it." (p. 316) The consequences are equally evident to Arendt after her reflection on the trial of Eichmann. (It is worth remembering that she also stated this position when referring to Nazi Germany: it "was as though morality, at the very moment of its collapse within an old, highly civilised nation, stood revealed in its original meaning, as a set of mores, of customs and manners, which could be exchanged for another set with no more trouble than it would take to change the table manners of a whole people." Arendt, "Personal responsibility under dictatorship", The Listener, (August 6, 1964), p. 205.) But what this extract from Montesquieu reveals is Arendt's continuing sensitivity to the Augustinian defined directive of 'know thyself'. Knowing his own temporal nature or self is important to the individual and the feeling (sentiment) it provides when it is realised. The important aspect is that this self is not self-sufficient and can never satisfactorily exist in isolation.

57 ibid., p. 67.
58 Thinking, p. 94.
59 "Thinking and Moral Considerations", p. 446 and then a repeat of this in Thinking, p. 193. As Yarborough and Stern suggest, judgement is the form that thinking takes on in the political world. Yarborough and Stern, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa", p. 337.
60 Between Past and Future, p. 223 and Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 15.
ultimately the Mind, “the principles by which we act and the criteria by which we judge and conduct our lives depend ultimately on the life of the mind”.

In this context the Life of the Mind series will be read as a treatise on the right conduct of man. Arendt felt throughout her life that ethics was not an adequate field of studies to explain the actions of man in terms of right and wrong. To talk of ethics and morals, Arendt suggests, is merely to talk of customs and habits. In the introduction to the first volume, “Thinking”, Arendt explains the reason for her inspection of the faculty of thought and her rejection of ethics and morality as concepts to discuss good and evil. What captured her interest in Eichmann and the “banality of evil” was the absence of thinking. In developing this idea, Arendt suggests that perhaps wickedness is not a necessary condition for evil-doing. This seemingly paradoxical assertion indicates the line of reasoning she was attempting to pursue. In terms of thinking, absence of wickedness in Eichmann lead her to ask whether it was possible that, “this activity be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually “condition” them against it?” Arendt is still concerned about the conduct of man but she will not discuss this conduct in terms of ethics and morality. The treatment of traditional questions in an untraditional way was not a development of her later thought. It was a consideration that had been with her during the middle phase of her life. However, because of Arendt’s prominent treatise of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt’s understanding of ethics is generally believed to have emerged during her reflections on his trial. The question of evil, coupled to ethics and this branch of philosophy’s neglect, leads to a question of thinking. Also – and just as significantly – the question of evil is defined by Arendt to be about thoughtlessness, and therefore its banality. It is this unique response, and one that involved Arendt in such controversy at the time, that can be traced back to her reading of Augustine. With Augustine’s notion of illumination and his use of Christian and Neo-Platonic framework of lightness and darkness and his temporal reading, an indication of Arendt’s understanding of judgement in the twentieth century can be located.

Without doubt, Arendt’s thinking on this subject had been developing for a long time and whilst the war and its atrocities had brought it into sharp focus, her foundations of thought lay in a

62 Thinking, p. 71 and also see p. 91. [my emphasis]

63 This was, for Arendt, a very close and personal example of how alienated thinkers can become when they withdrawal from the public space; Young-Bruehl comments that Arendt saw that “good judgement . . . presupposes a withdrawal from the world for thinking, but it does not necessarily follow from such a withdrawal.” Arendt agreed that Heidegger had shown a vast deficiency in his capacity for political judgement and an understanding of people as people. Heidegger’s alienation was confirmed by Glenn Gray, who, while in Germany editing Heidegger’s work for American publication, noted to his friend Arendt that Heidegger surrounded himself with “mediocre minds”. The lack of critical perspective was felt by Arendt to be partly the answer to Heidegger’s perplexing accounts. See Young-Bruehl, For Love of the World, p. 443.

64 She explains that because “we usually treat good and evil in courses in “morals” or “ethics” [this] may indicate how little we know about them . . . .”, Willing, p. 5.

65 Thinking, p. 6.
philosophy of crisis. Her morality, if it can be called that, is about the moment of crisis, when the traditions of ethics and morality cannot recall an answer to a dilemma.\textsuperscript{66} To understand what Arendt’s thoughts were regarding this moment and the resources an individual could depend upon requires a return to the dissertation and the thoughts of St. Augustine. The dissertation provides an insight into the philosophical foundations at work in Arendt’s later thought and the method of thinking that she applied to the questions raised by her experiences of the world.\textsuperscript{67} The concerns shown by Arendt in the context of Augustine’s work and examined in this first work appear on the surface to be very different from those that occupied Arendt in the post-Second World War. Arendt’s interests throughout her examination of philosophical and political theory questions are themselves determined by a question that caught her attention as a student. This overarching concern is the question of meaning in an age where the traditional sources were no longer valid.\textsuperscript{68} This post-Nietzschean understanding was derived from the time spent with both Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers and the general milieu of Germany in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{69} Consequently, understanding the import of Arendt’s dissertation requires an evaluation of her context in the 1920s. Consistently, her references always came from the tradition of German thought as did the formulation for the potential solutions and it is within this framework that Arendt can be examined.\textsuperscript{70} As Arendt comments tantalisingly herself, “if I can be said to ‘have come from anywhere,’ it is from the tradition of German

\textsuperscript{66} As an illustration of how significant this concern was to Arendt, in a reply to a letter from Richard King (007765) dated November 6, 1971, she says that in “Thinking and Moral Considerations”, “I stress that thinking in and by itself can prevent catastrophes only in the rare moments when the chips are down.” She continues to say that the reason she put the word “error” into quotation marks “in her discussion of Heidegger’s actions in “Heidegger at Eighty” I was because “I wanted to indicate that I think this was more than an error, - although one could interpret error in Heidegger’s sense, in which it means more than in our usual sense. But nothing Heidegger did or wrote fitted the complete ‘thoughtlessness’ of which I spoke in my essay. It was bad enough but he left the nazi enterprise after ten months, that is at the moment when he himself knew ‘that the chips were down.’”

\textsuperscript{67} Without this return certain difficulties beset any attempt to read a ‘cursory’ morality into Arendt’s work. Sometimes the solutions sought undermine the foundations of Arendt’s understanding, making a relational claim an unstable proposition at least. Here is one example of the way the concern is expressed: “[Not only are Arendt’s reflections on morality cursory and unconvincing, but the absence of a justification of the normative dimension of the political, that is, of the question of social and political justice in her work, is deeply disturbing.” Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctance Modernism of Hannah Arendt, (London, Sage, 1996), p. 194.

\textsuperscript{68} The context for this thinking is defined by Arendt when she says that she firmly situated in a post-Nietzschean world, and her thought is contained within those boundaries. Arendt believes that several forms of authority in society are now becoming rapidly irrelevant; forms that have traditionally been used to found and stabilise humanity’s immediate social environment as well as their expansive endeavours. In The Life of the Mind, Arendt makes this clear in her introduction. She is arguing that “God is dead”, or rather “the traditional thought of God”, as well as philosophy and metaphysics. Thinking, p. 10. But, as she is quick to point out, not necessarily the questions that the tradition has attempted to answer down through the centuries, only the way they were conceived and answered. Here Arendt, invoking Nietzsche’s famous aphorism on the subject, sees the new priority that is given to the senses as not only destroying the supersensory world, but more importantly the distinction itself.

Consequently, the entire referencing system used traditionally by an individual to demand order of the world is shed at the same time.

\textsuperscript{69} Jaspers as the philosopher of Existenz was attracted to those thinkers who could still talk to the contemporary period in the form of appropriation. The thinkers Jaspers choose for his work were thinkers of a certain dynamism who help an inquirer in the contemporary era come to terms with questions that are relevant, or “what is really at stake”.

\textsuperscript{70} Bhikhu C. Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy, (Atlantic Highlands, N. J., Humanities Press, 1981) argues in chapters three and eight that Arendt was consistent with these traditions throughout her career. This assumption will remain at the basis of my exposition.
philosophy." As such 'the tradition of German philosophy' is relevant to Arendt's philosophical understanding but it also refers to the cultural understanding that this philosophy encapsulated, especially during the period immediately after the First World War and into the late 1920s.

Therefore, to understand the foundations at work in the thought of Arendt, a clearer understanding is required of her introduction to philosophy through the supervision of Jaspers and Heidegger and then her purported turn from philosophy. Similarly, to understand Arendt's Augustine we should first turn to the understanding of the Christian thinker that her two teachers designed and then reflected and explored in their own works. The initial question of why a German Jew would study the founder of the Christian Church is given greater illumination when Jaspers describes the worth of the Bishop. Jaspers does not feel that Augustine can only be seen in the light of his attachment to Christian thought. Instead, by pre-empting the answer to his question on whether Augustine can be detached from the Christian faith, Jaspers writes "thinking with Augustine means: to experience the thematic and existential coincidence of his movements of thought with those of

71 "Eichmann in Jerusalem: Reply to Gershom Scholem", Encounter, Vol. 22, No. 1, (1964), p. 53. Another element that must be considered is Arendt's self-perception of her style of thinking. Appearing on television in 1964 Arendt says that she does not appreciate the label 'philosopher' replying "I am not a philosopher. My profession - if it can be called that - is political theory. I have bid philosophy my final farewell. As you know I did study philosophy, but that does not mean that I have stuck to it."

Quoted in Young-Bruehl, For Love of the World, p. 327.

72 This thesis intends to treat Arendt's work as philosophical in order to realise some of the problems evident in her ideas after an extended examination of her political understanding. In 1979, Stan Spyros Draenos writes that "[i]n keeping with the worldly orientation of her thinking, Arendt self-consciously refuses to elaborate ultimate philosophical positions and commitments. Indeed the very radicalism of her thought depended upon it. This refusal is nowhere more apparent, not to say problematic, than in her only attempt at 'philosophy,' The Life of the Mind, and accounts for the elusiveness of that work when read with philosophical concerns in mind . . . " Stan Spyros Draenos, "Thinking Without a Ground: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Situation of Understanding" in Hannah Arendt: The Recovery Of The Public World, Melvyn A. Hill, (ed.) (New York, St Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 209-224. The quote is from p. 214. [This article was actually written in 1972 and was updated for publication in 1979]. The continual tension between philosophy and politics evident in Arendt's work emerges in Draenos' statement when he suggests that Arendt's 'radicalism' required a deliberate lack of articulation of her philosophical foundations. A pervasive idea advanced by commentators who observed Arendt's political thought without a view to her methodology of political thinking is that Arendt had no stable or secure foundation from which to make the observations she made through her understanding. [For a discussion on this see Parekh, op. cit., pp. 15-20.] The view is clearly premised on the understanding that The Life of the Mind was "her only attempt at "philosophy"" and ignores the fact that Augustine was one of the most influential thinkers on the subject of the Mind. In other words, Draenos continues the myth of Arendt's work by not considering the long publishing career that commenced in 1929 with her dissertation.

73 There is another person who attended Heidegger's seminars at the same time as Arendt and became a close companion. The figure was Hans Jonas and his own dissertation was also on Augustine. Hans Jonas, Augustin und das pausinische Freiheitsproblem, [Augustine and the Problem of Freedom in St. Paul] (Göttingen, 1930). What is important is that Jonas and Arendt would have had a similar understanding of philosophy and modernity. It is significant that Jonas' best summation of German thought in the twenties comes in an epilogue for a book, The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the beginnings of Christianity, 2nd ed., (Beacon Press, Boston, 1963). This epilogue was an adventure, in an 'experimental vein,' around the relationship between the thought of his teacher, Martin Heidegger and the question of Gnosticism. Jonas is not the first to wonder at the equivalency of these two forms of thought, however he does seem to be the first to inquire into the compatibility of Heidegger's understanding and that evinced by the tradition of Gnosticism. As we have seen the argument put forward by Voegelin is very aware of the role - either direct, or in terms of influence as a negative - of Gnosticism in the twentieth century. The perspective that Jonas enlightens is one that researches back into the seventeenth century where the "spiritual situation of modern man takes shape" (p. 322). Jonas illustrates this understanding with a reading from Nietzsche; "more that two generations ago, Nietzsche said that nihilism, "this weirdest of all guests," "stands before the door." Meanwhile the guest has entered and is no longer a guest, and, as far as philosophy is concerned, existentialism is trying to live with him. Living in such company is living in a crisis." The quote by Nietzsche comes from Will to Power, §1.

74 The question of Arendt's Jewishness is developed decisively in Richard J. Bernstein's Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996).

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original philosophy." The potential of Augustine's thought is clearly at the forefront of Jaspers' own perception of this ancient philosopher's worth and not as merely a Christian thinker.

In order to understand Arendt's reading of Augustine there is a need to determine her reception of the direct influence of both Jaspers and Heidegger. This then provides an insight into the influence of Augustine on her own thinking. The first glimpse of Arendt's understanding of her philosophical context after the war comes in the form of an essay published in the *Partisan Review* in 1946. The essay, titled "What is *Existenz* Philosophy?", was for a long time the main public indication of her understanding of this tradition. The work is an explanation in English to an American audience of a virtually unknown German style of philosophical thought. It was also a detailed examination of the orientation of German *Existenz* and its roots in the western tradition. Significantly, it is also a statement of her impression of Heidegger's philosophy. Nonetheless, she taught a course on Jaspers and Heidegger in 1954 and she assumed a significant role in the translations of Heidegger's work, though always unacknowledged. The article is also importantly a statement of unreserved admiration for the thought of Karl Jaspers. Arendt states her position of the development of German *Existenz* and its participants - Schelling, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger.

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75 Jaspers, *The Great Philosophers*, Vol. 1, p. 228. Another answer to this immanent question comes from the paragraph before the one this quote is taken when Jaspers says that "[t]he greatness of Augustine for those who philosophise resides in the fact that the truth he awakens in us is no longer Augustine's Christian truth." But Augustine offers much more than an intense experience of thought, considered so rare in the twentieth century. These two volumes, however, are not the expected results given the initial intention. Hans Saner has revealed Jaspers' original intention in the thinker's Nachlass. One aspect was to focus on "forms of thought", the second "philosophic contents" such as existence, spirit, world and transcendence and the third - the one we have - "philosophic personalities". This summary comes from Richard Wisser, "Jaspers, Heidegger, and the Struggle of *Existenz* Philosophy for the Existence of Philosophy" *International Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol. 24, (June 1984), p. 145. One aspect of Jaspers' description of Augustine's Christian importance must also be noted. He comments about a "strange atmosphere of arrogant humility, of sensual asceticism, of perpetual veiling and reversal, runs through Christianity more than any other faith."


77 Nonetheless, Arendt played a large part in all of Heidegger's American reception. She did design a seminar series on the thought of both Jaspers and Heidegger in 1954, though only fragments of that course remain. Arendt was therefore continually thinking about Heidegger during her time in America and on her re-acquaintance with Heidegger after the war. In a discussion with Glenn Gray (letter dated October 30, 1962) they are discussing the then only English translation of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Both were annoyed at its looseness and compliment Ralph Manheim's work on Heidegger. Arendt was mentioned in the English translation which upset Arendt. She says that she spent two days talking to Robinson about his 'mistranslations' and gave up trying to convince him. In fact the new translation of *Being and Time* by Joan Stambaugh is an outcome of Arendt's influence. See *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New York, State University of New York Press, 1996). In some quarters this new translation has not been well received, for reasons presented in the critique by Thomas Sheehan, "Let a Hundred Translation Bloom! A Modest proposal about *Being and Time*, *Man and World*, Vol. 30 No. 2 (1997), pp. 227-38 and also "Heidegger's New Aspect: On In-Being, Zeitlichkeit, and The Genesis of Being and Time", *Research in Phenomenology*, Vol. 25, (1995), pp. 207-25.

78 All that remains in her archives is essentially a page of hand written notes. What is of interest is that Arendt does highlight the notion of conscience in Heidegger's *Being and Time* even if she does not develop this concern.

79 Karl Jaspers held a debt to both Kierkegaard and to Nietzsche, though in different ways. Kierkegaard's understanding, though admired by Jaspers, was rejected because of its conclusions. This is not to say that the understanding in its entirety was rejected, just those elements that drove Kierkegaard to place his faith in faith. Reason, despite its tendencies, was still a secure founding for Jaspersian conclusions. Nonetheless philosophical faith still provides the bridge just as religious faith did for Kierkegaard. Instead of looking out though, Jaspers wants to look inwards.

80 In terms of man Arendt defines *Existenz* as the "pure factual character of his existing in all its contingency". "What is *Existenz*?", p. 43. Schelling is the one thinker on this list not to be discussed although John Llewellyn provides an incidental explanation of why Arendt included him so prominently on this list. It is the way he associates Arendt and Kant with Schelling: "Arendt's application to politics of Kant's critique of art and aesthetic judgement in general is akin to Schelling's application of..."
Chronologically, the figures of Kant, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche were significant to the development of Arendt’s understanding, probably even before her exposure to the philosophies of Jaspers and Heidegger. A consideration of the possible dimensions of Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s influence also allows the brief indication of why Arendt turned to the work of Immanuel Kant in her later explorations, and why she conceived his work as being of benefit to her concerns. A significant part of the answer to these preceding questions regarding the influence of Jaspers and Heidegger on Arendt’s thought must be considered in conjunction with a treatment of Arendt’s potential reading of Kierkegaard and, with this established, Kant. 

In conjunction with this approach outlined above I will read Arendt’s work as a continuation from her dissertation to her *Life of the Mind* lecture series. There is a dominant tendency in the interpretations of Arendt’s to see *The Human Condition* as the central, most significant work of her many publications. This needs careful consideration because what is neglected is the fact that *The Human Condition* was published in 1958 – when Arendt was 52. Arendt’s articulation of the concerns that Kantian critique to philosophy in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*. See The HypoCritical Imagination: Between Kant and Levinas, (London, Routledge, 2000), p. 141.

While the following is speculation it should be remembered that Arendt started her philosophical career with Kant, then Jaspers [Psychologie der Weltanschauungen] and then Kierkegaard. Ending her intellectual career with Kant suggests a beginning at the end. (An interesting proposition is the relationship between Kant and Kierkegaard in Arendt’s eyes. She does not explicitly explore this although Ronald Green’s commentary in *Kierkegaard and Kant*: The Hidden Debt, (New York, State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 42 and pp. 86-95 provides a good starting point for further exploration.) She discovered Heidegger ‘late’ in her philosophical development (which started at the age of 14). See the relatively candid interview with Günther Gaus in 1946 where she asserts her philosophical heritage in this order. She mentions a sense of balance that includes her theological training and the synthesis she felt between Christian theology and philosophy even though she was a Jew. And, as she impresses, ancient Greek was no problem, especially the poetry. “Was bleibt? Es bleibt die Muttersprache [1964]” in Gespräche mit Hannah Arendt: Herausgegeben von Adelbert Reif, (München, R. Piper, 1976), pp. 17-8.

It is difficult, if not impossible to discern the role of Kant in Arendt’s early thought. He is mentioned at this stage because on several occasions Arendt adds him to her list of important thinkers. When she does, Arendt summarises her concern for philosophy in its contemporary form and the needs to re-establish a concern for the freedom and dignity of man, first made evident, according the Arendt, in the philosophy of Kant. Kant separated the venerable relationship of being and thought, and its foundation in the equality of essence and existence making him the “the true, if also clandestine, founder of a new philosophy: who has likewise remained till the present time its secret king.” “What is Existence?”, p. 38. Arendt adds that he also destroyed the tradition of philosophy as contemplation.

Later, during correspondence with Richard J. Bernstein, Arendt reflects on his approach to her own work that mirrors her own previously utilised method of understanding. In a letter written by Richard Bernstein to Arendt, Bernstein conveys his appreciation of her work and that he has just finished a conference paper on her work. He argues that he can see several consistent themes throughout her work, which allow her various understandings to be organised around. Arendt replies thus: “I am very much looking forward to seeing you in Toronto and really extremely curious to read your paper. You are, of course, entirely right about the same themes running through all my work, and I am even aware of it. I sometimes think that we all have only one real thought in our life, and everything we then do are elaborations or variations of one theme.” Container 7, Correspondence Folder B, Letter to Richard J. Bernstein (005216). The letter from Richard Bernstein has no reference number stamped on it.

Some, such as Margaret Canovan, have argued that this perception is incorrect, regarding instead, Arendt’s work in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is now out of favour with political theorists as they concentrate on *The Human Condition* and she believes that this is incorrect as they are so interconnected. Canovan, *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought*, p. 7.

The *Human Condition*’s role in describing Arendt’s political understanding is central but only if her political concerns are given priority in a reading of her work. The prevailing belief it seems, even amongst Arendtian scholars, is that the dissertation was not relevant to the ‘political’ Arendt of America. Several writers have examined the manuscript as well as the original German publication in the course of their research on Arendt’s thought but have found little if anything worthy of consideration in this work. Young-Bruehl’s synopsis on the dissertation in an appendix to her biography of Arendt suggests that the understanding shown in this early work was abandoned and that the philosophical concerns shown in the dissertation were abandoned because “the historical events which cast Hannah Arendt into political action raised questions that would not yield to such a ‘purely philosophical’ solution.” Young-Bruehl, *For Love of the World*, Appendix 3, p. 500. Yet, on the previous page, Young- Bruehl says during the course of commenting on Arendt’s revision of the text that “the concerns of the third part are restated in much less compact prose and much more clearly—at a distance—in *The Human Condition*.” ibid., p. 498. On the one hand, the
that determined this publication are her mature reflections as are the framework, conceptualisations and theory that she invoked in her analysis. These tools for analysis were developed and clarified in *The Human Condition*, making this work the best source of Arendt’s theoretical and philosophical understanding. As her readership increased, Arendt’s concerns also diversified, yet her foundational understanding remained the same.\textsuperscript{86} What is significant about the unfinished *The Life of the Mind* is that at the beginning of its conception Arendt suggested the trilogy was to be “a kind of second volume of *The Human Condition*.\textsuperscript{87} Interestingly, Arendt does admit that her turn to *vita contemplativa* was a turn to ‘trans-political things’.\textsuperscript{88} Nonetheless, *The Human Condition* will be treated as Arendt’s central text, but only because Arendt’s understanding of philosophy, its role in the history of the west and her particular view of the tradition of western thought is clearly stated in this volume.\textsuperscript{89}

As a distinction, Arendt’s separation of *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa* has a purpose; a purpose that is fundamental to Arendt’s understanding of the western tradition of thought.\textsuperscript{90} Arendt explains her understanding of the term *vita activa* at the beginning of *The Human Condition*. *Vita activa*, for Arendt, came into being at the same time as the western tradition of political thought. This moment was the trial of Socrates and a metaphor for the division between the philosopher and the *polis.*\textsuperscript{91}

Holocaust provides the breach between her work in Germany and that which developed during the Second World War in Paris and was consummated in America. But the “thought trains” of Arendt’s later work are already evident in her first significant study. Young-Bruehl is in part favourable to the understanding Arendt generated in the dissertation but she feels that Arendt’s experiences as a Jew are much more significant when her later work comes into focus. This point is not to be disputed. However, a fuller exposition of the dissertation is required in order to determine its worth. Young-Bruehl’s treatment of the dissertation is favourable when compared to those who do not bother to involve the dissertation in their treatment of Arendt. Reflecting upon the new publication of the dissertation, Richard Wolin provides an extreme example of this consideration. It must be remembered that this treatment occurred in conjunction with (and its tone could have been spurred on by) his review of Elsbeth Ettlinger’s *Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995). See Richard Wolin, “An affair to remember: Hannah and the Magician”, *The New Republic*, October 9, (1995), pp. 27-8.

\textsuperscript{86} For example, Arendt’s concerns after this book included the modern loss of meaning in the essays that comprised *Between Past and Future*, the trial of Adolf Eichmann, and consideration of the French and American revolutions in *On Revolution* and finally the lectures that comprised *The Life of the Mind.*


\textsuperscript{88} This admission was made during her preparations for the lectures that became *The Life of the Mind*. Hans Jonas, “Acting, Knowing Thinking”, *Social Research*, Vol. 44 No. 1 (Spring 1977), p. 27.

\textsuperscript{89} *The Human Condition* is a product of Arendt’s political thinking and while this method is clearly at work in this book a consideration of Arendt’s other work is needed to delineate the meaning of her understanding and consequently her assertions and conclusions. But it is as *The Human Condition* stands - that is, as a singular work of political philosophy - her influence is most heavily observed. The *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa* distinction is based on the idea that “the ancient truth of Being” can “reveal itself only in complete human stillness”. *The Human Condition*, pp. 15-16 and *Thinking*, pp. 6-7. Therefore, contemplation and truth are very closely related - and this is a reversal of the former, prevailing Homeric attitude of placing action over thought.

\textsuperscript{90} In 1964 when Arendt was applying for a grant she wrote a justification of her intentions and included the following summary: “The examination of the book is to focus on the political (the public realm) and action especially the various ‘modes of human plurality and the institutions that correspond to them’. She then goes on to say that “in terms of human plurality, there exist two basic modes of being together: to be together with other men and with one’s equals from which springs action and to be together with one’s self to which the activity of thinking corresponds.” Arendt continues to relate these dual modes as the relationship between thinking and acting, or politics and philosophy. She goes on to say “I have enumerated these two purposes for brevity’s sake. I do not mean that the book will fall into two parts. Ideally, these two trends should be so woven together that the reader hardly becomes aware of the double purpose.” (Library of Congress papers, no. 013872)

\textsuperscript{91} The term comes from an understanding of Aristotle’s *bios politikos* and is “a life devoted to public-political matters”. *The Human Condition*, p. 12. This life is divided from the pursuit of beauty and that of contemplation, emphasizing instead the praxis that is required to maintain and improve the *polis*. The categories of work and labour are not considered a life by Aristotle mainly because they were not free lives, but rather driven by necessity. But was not the life of a ‘politician’ also one bound by
loss of the polis - the ancient city-state - for Arendt also means the beginning of the disappearance of vita activa. Augustine is considered by Arendt to be the last to understand the meaning of vita activa in these terms. But vita activa’s denigration, from an activity of the free to the realm of necessity, left vita contemplativa as the only remaining activity that was free. The point of Arendt’s description is to highlight Platonic philosophy’s effect on the way the western tradition perceives one of the most vital elements in human association: vita activa. The ascent of vita contemplativa - reinforced by the Christianity of St. Paul - meant that vita activa was defined in relation to vita contemplativa’s status. This became a status that covered the whole spectrum of human activity. This is Arendt’s point: she rejects this definition of vita activa and the position that vita activa finds itself in the hierarchy of human activities; “[m]y contention is simply that the enormous weight of contemplation in the traditional hierarchy has blurred the distinctions and articulations within the vita activa itself.” Nonetheless, Arendt did not seek to elevate vita activa above vita contemplativa. This perception is of concern to Arendt, and she concludes her opening discussion on vita activa by saying that her “use of the term vita activa presupposes that the concern underlying all its activities is not the same as and is neither superior nor inferior to the central concern of the vita contemplativa.” This relationship provides an insight into how Arendt sought to guide political action in the vita activa with the assistance of the vita contemplativa.

(iii) An Ethics, or a Treatise of Good Conduct?

Arendt consistently argues that political action emerges out of moral concerns, and is guided by principles of justice and human dignity. In On Violence Arendt states that the student protests during the 1960s were led by moral concerns; they were “almost exclusively inspired by moral necessity? Aristotle felt that this was not so as the meaning of the polis did not suggest a necessity in the association. It was free because the polis was a freely formed association even though the Greeks acknowledged that political organisation was still a necessity.

92 It is in Plato’s sixth and seventh books of The Republic, that he states Book VI p. 484d; “Shall we make them Guardians then? Or shall we prefer the philosophers, who have learned to know each true reality, and have no less practical experience, and can rival them in all departments of human excellence.” From here Plato starts displaying his distrust of politics in earnest with the use of the sea-captain analogy, see p. 488.

93 The Human Condition, p. 17. Arendt follows on, arguing that even through thinkers such as Nietzsche and Marx have attempted the “turning upside down” of the philosophic hierarchy, they still left the conceptual framework “more or less intact” and still left vita contemplativa at the pinnacle of human activity.

94 In October 1973 Drake Tempest wrote to Arendt in admiration and asked a few questions about her work in The Human Condition. Of the three, brief questions only one attracted Arendt’s notice in the reply. Drake, finishes a question about the role of thinking by saying, “Iyou end your conclusion as you begin your prologue, namely with a praise of thought”. Container 20, Letters 7, 010209. Arendt replied thus, “I was struck that you became aware of the beginning and the end of The Human Condition because I think nobody else did except, of course, I myself. I’m just in the process of writing something about the activity of thinking in which I reconsider the relation between thought and action.” The reply is a carbon copy on the back (010209). Of course, when Arendt says ‘reconsider’ she means returns to the interaction rather than revise.

95 The Human Condition, p. 17. For Arendt, the effect that this Platonic hierarchy has had on western thought is easy to discern: contemplation is regarded as inherently superior by its many advocates. Moreover, it is the only genuine path to truth - almost, it can be argued, a self-fulfilling prophecy. This seems to be where the west has located freedom, in the withdrawal from interaction with the physical concerns that retard freedom’s accomplishment.

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considerations” and “acted almost exclusively from moral motives.”\(^96\) She continued saying that the students reflected a “conspicuous moral coloration of the movement” and that the moral factor has always been present.\(^97\) Arendt believed that actions do indeed have consequences and reflected upon these consequences and their effect on the process of action. She provided several passages that can illustrate this; for example, “[t]he boundlessness of action is only the other side of its tremendous capacity for establishing relationships, that is, its specific productivity; this is why the old virtue of moderation, of keeping within bounds, is indeed one of the political virtues par excellence.”\(^98\) This quote illustrates the type of thinking that Arendt sought to use to establish her theory of judgment. The notion of forgiveness in Arendt’s thought has a substantial contribution to make to controlling action as well as the custom of promise-making and -keeping. These ‘moral precepts’ come out of, or rather, “arise directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of acting and speaking, and thus they are like control mechanisms built into the very faculty to start new and unending processes.”\(^99\)

With these indications it is significant that Arendt suggests that the individual has not lost everything in rejecting ethics as they are still ‘thinking beings’ and, through a process of illumination, the past can still contain valuable information relevant to the contemporary. The only thing lost by the ‘thinking being’ is the constraints of the past traditions and its prescriptions.\(^100\) Nonetheless, her conception of judgement needs something to create certain boundaries in order to secure “foundations” of some kind, or its viability would be contestable, even before its legitimacy could be questioned. The subtlety and fragility derives from the historicized and anti-metaphysical tradition Arendt finds herself responding to. The foundations are merely contextual, based on convention rather than traditional precepts. This radicalisation of the foundational notion leads to a consideration of the use of a theory of judgement that evolved from such as position; it would seem worthless, especially when considered by the traditional context for judgement. In response to this characterisation, Arendt felt the problems that besieged political judgement was a problem of how the question was phrased. Arendt was distrustful of a philosophy that laid down a set of inviolable rules. Her distrust of the philosophical system is an indication of this attitude. In her eyes, the existence of

\(^{96}\) *Crises of the Republic*, p. 130 then p. 203.
\(^{97}\) *ibid.*, pp. 204-5.
\(^{98}\) *The Human Condition*, p. 191.
\(^{99}\) *ibid*, p. 246.
\(^{100}\) *Thinking*, p. 71 and also see p. 91. [my emphasis]
\(^{101}\) Arendt makes these arguments by implicitly using her own understanding authority in the twentieth century worked out in *Between Past and Future*. 
an individual was never a simple thing and therefore a set of rules to be consulted at the appropriate moment is an absurdity.102

The certainties that Arendt is looking for in a world where change is inevitable, even welcome, are again defined with the schema of future, past and present. Arendt wishes to retain the “human capacity for building, preserving, and caring for the world.” But what are these capacities that Arendt speaks so urgently about? The middle concern is for preserving but how exactly does Arendt envisage preservation occurring? These questions can only be asked in the framework of Arendt’s deeper understanding of the world and the reality that constitutes it. Along with this understanding of the individual as \textit{homo temporalis} and the other as the neighbour is also an equally significant need to understand the world they inhabit. This world is not the natural world of nature, rather the world generated by humanity. A consistent focus in Arendt’s work is a seminal concept for her: the idea of \textit{amor mundi}. Lawrence Biskowski argues that the substance of Arendt’s politics can be found in her understanding of the world; that is, ‘care for the world’. This interpretation founds itself on the idea that Arendt’s political action will always need to be vigilant of the world that this action leaves behind; as Biskowski puts it, action is measured by “what the world will be like in the wake of one’s acting.”106 It is therefore Arendt’s \textit{amor mundi} that provides politics with its substantive element and the most important tool to facilitate this project. Emphasising a rich strain of thought initiated by Heidegger’s \textit{Being and Time},

102 Even though Arendt states in \textit{The Human Condition}, p. 205 that action is purely agonal and should be judged on its greatness instead Arendt’s main concern in saying this was the destructive nature of ethics. It destroys spontaneity demanding conformity and predictability. The result though would appear to be in a similar vein to the fascist ‘deed worship’. This understanding has been strong in the history of political thought. Sartre and Lenin on the left, Tocqueville and Weber in the middle and Nietzsche and Sorel on the right. Arendt does include some of their understanding in her arguments. She could not deny their demand for energy in a society though it is doubtful whether she would ever follow their arguments through. In a sense Arendt is reading Kierkegaard’s tragic hero at this stage. He is the hero who cannot be judged with the rules of conduct in mind but must make his mind up.


105 The Arendtian commentator who takes the aesthetization charge to the extreme is George Kateb. Kateb sees Arendt as describing action for its own end; or the “existential supremacy of political action.” George Kateb, \textit{Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil}, (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983), p. 66. He goes on to say, “Action is its own end: its greatness as revelation needs no further validation, only philosophical elaboration. For Arendt, to press beyond the revelatory qualities of action is absurd because it is to demand an answer to the question, Why be human?” (p. 25) For Arendt there is “a single-minded adherence to the unique and supreme existential achievement of political action as revelatory speech.” (p. 28) A consequence of this becomes the ultimate rejection of ethical thinking in Kateb’s eyes; “as far as Arendt confines her thought to the action of the \textit{polis}, she severs the whole point of political action - its revelatory existential achievement, its creation of human identity - from moral motivation or intention.” (p. 30) This expressive conception of political action is, for Kateb, the Greek conception as well. It lacks moral criteria and Kateb advocates the subordination of action to control of moral criteria. Kateb’s charge is that Arendt dismisses moral judgement from her theory of action; “if morality is one kind of immorality, then a few moments of recklessness Arendt celebrates immorality.” And that “Arendt talks about particular acts in a general theory of action can too easily accommodate great substantial evils, even the system of evil known as totalitarianism.” Kateb, \textit{ibid.}, p. 33 and p. 31 respectively. The idea that Arendt actually prescribed a system that could become totalitarian is echoed by Martin Jay’s interpretation as well. Passerin argues that Kateb does not pay heed to the communicative dimension of Arendt’s thought.

Biskowski sees the solution to the ‘puzzle’, the search for “substantive ethical foundations of authentically political judgement” in the “care for the world”, or amor mundi.107 However, it is a reading that falls back onto the Heideggerian influence that only partially founded Arendt’s understanding of modern politics and philosophy, and it therefore presents the need for further investigation to fully realise the potential of this suggestive course of analysis. Another example of this is seen in Richard Wolin’s The Politics of Being. He suggests that we still do not have an adequate account of how Arendt’s political philosophy uses Heideggerian categories and he provides a few indicators of how such an account could be developed.108 For example, in The Human Condition Arendt’s ‘dramaturgical’ model of action, in which a person discloses their self through speech and deed, is the highest form of practical life. This model cannot be understood through any interpretation of Heidegger apart from, Wolin suggests, Heidegger’s understanding of “clearing” (Lichtung) - the locus of unconcealment. In other words, the ‘publicness’ of Arendt is the political philosophical version of Heidegger’s clearing, or “openness of an open region”.109 But Wolin also suggests that Arendt’s appropriation of Heidegger’s understanding could be so radical that their origins become obscure and therefore irrelevant. As Heidegger’s “publicness” is situated in inauthenticity, for Arendt it is human action and therefore the highest form of human existence, or completely authentic.110 This leads to the question as to whether decisionism is the appropriate description for Arendt’s model of action. The essence of Arendtian politics is the revelation of oneself in a public situation, but how does this person determine how to measure an action as just or unjust as revelation, and what is the normative basis for these decisions?

An indication of an approach to this concern comes from a consideration of the notion of care in Heidegger’s thought around the time Arendt was attending his lectures, and its reflection in her understanding of love. While Biskowski is correct in seeing importance in Arendt’s concept of the

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107 Biskowski, “Practical foundations”, p. 878. Biskowski argues in his article “Politics Versus Aesthetics”, p. 87 that Arendt’s work is “a lengthy exercise in moral interpretation under the disturbing and uncertain conditions of modernity.”

108 Wolin, The Politics of Being, p. 191, n. 3. In his book, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political, Villa attempts to delineate their intellectual relationship, inviting Nietzsche and others in to help this process. Several questions, however, remain at the end of Villa’s study, aside from the unexplored potential of Augustin’e and Kierkegaard’s role. The first is the meaning of Arendt’s attraction to the thought of Kant, and in a similar vein, her attraction to the role of science in the twentieth century. Villa misses Arendt’s place in the tradition of German philosophy. He assumes that German philosophy meant simply Martin Heidegger and to a lesser extent, Karl Jaspers. This perspective involves Nietzsche and Kant in a discussion, but only in terms of their philosophical system and not in terms of their thought’s position in the development of German philosophy since Kant’s First Critique.

109 Continuing this Wolin suggests that Arendt’s ‘worldliness’ could be seen as an appropriation of Heidegger’s own understanding of “world’ - as in Being and Time and “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Wolin does later turn to Arendt and Heidegger’s intellectual relationship. However, he chooses the context of Ettiger’s story of their letters. Wolin finds a sting in this relationship for their respective philosophies which is a shame. See Richard Wolin, “An affair to remember: Hannah and the Magician”, The New Republic, October 9, (1995), pp. 27-37.

110 He goes further saying that it would be interesting to understand the shortcomings of Arendt’s political philosophy and the possibility that they are traceable back to their Heideggerian origins.
world, it is actually Heidegger’s understanding of care (Sorge) and its evolution as a concept in his thought that is the most significant influence. In this regard it actually determines Arendt’s concept of the world and her temporal understanding of past possibility.111 As she announces in one of her lectures “[t]o be confronted with a world without a past -- namely the knowledge that it existed before us -- means to lose the trust that it will continue to exist when we are gone. In this respect: Care for the world” [additional margin comment].112 In this addition she also directs herself to a later section titled “What do I mean by politically minded?”. In this section, Arendt discusses her meaning of Amor Mundi. It is a dedication to the world, premised on the fact that we are not immortal, and the world is both public and common.113 This notion of care takes an important role in Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s thought in her dissertation. Her rejection of Augustinian individual’s self-sufficiency is also a rejection of Heidegger’s isolated self. The other – the neighbour in love – is an essential aspect to the Arendt’s individual-in-the-world.

An interpretation of this nature must acknowledge that Arendt’s public realm has a different imperative from Heidegger’s though its connection is through their respective use of Augustine. While Heidegger asserts that the “light of the public obscures everything”, Arendt believed in her own notion of the world, or rather her space of appearance. This was a concern because “public realm has lost the power of illumination which was originally part of its very nature.”114 This factor of

111 Heidegger’s apathy towards everydayness has been noticed by many and has formed the basis of several critiques. Stephen White alludes to the development of Heidegger’s thought while writing Being and Time in his book Politics and the Postmodern. In the section called “Politics, Will and Intersubjectivity”, White is following the development of Heidegger’s thoughts on several matters. Heidegger wanted to escape from willing and wanting, and this also demanded that he leave alone the idea of social actors and the tension and space that connects them. White follows Heidegger on this so he can work out the implications for postmodern reflection. See p. 35 for his argument. Heidegger’s authoritarian bent is his openness to a great leader as creator in the early part of his thought as is reflected in the conclusion to Being and Time. As White notes great leaders have to be sympathetic to the prevailing normative expectations of the masses; the benign dictator. This simple assertion from Heidegger, without any note of irony or mirth, illustrates one of the problems with Being and Time; it does not adequately conceptualise “intersubjective connectedness and obligation”. This is the point in which Arendt avers from Heidegger’s philosophy. She turned in the dissertation and the first philosopher of the will: St. Augustine. Her response to the ego or Self at work in his understanding is involved in her treatment of Augustine’s concept of love. Kirsten Harris’ analysis of Heidegger’s participation provides a context for this reading. “Heidegger as Political Thinker”, Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 25, (June 1976), pp. 3-28. It might become clearer when Arendt’s phrase “for the love of the world” is mentioned side by side to Heidegger’s Bodenständigkeit, just what interpretations this understanding could have. The solution can possibility be found when Heidegger talks about destiny [Schicksel] and earth [Erde] and “rootedness to the soil” [Bodenständigkeit]. But this direction is not as satisfactory let alone convincing as one would hope for. Suppose a leader had this quality, questions still arise; do these qualities equal a community? Are great political actions mediated by an imposing [middle] dimension? For example, measured by not only their creativeness by the competence of their interpretation of ‘normative webs’ that designate a community; but as Stephen White suggests, “by how such actions represent a valid interpretation of the normative webs that define a community?” White, Politics and the Postmodern, p. 37.


114 See Arendt’s speech “On Humanity in Dark Times” for The Lessing Prize given at the City of Hamburg in 1959. Men in Dark Times, p. 21. A few sentences later Arendt is more emphatic when she says “... what is lost is the specific and usually irreplaceable in-between which should have formed between this individual and his fellow men.” For more discussion on this see Jeffrey Andrew Barash “The Political Dimension of the Public World; On Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Martin Heidegger” in Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later, Larry May and Jerome Kohn, (eds.) (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1996), p. 261.
illumination is significant to Arendt's intention in her exploration of western thinking similar to Heidegger's project. But Arendt's basis for this concept can be found directly in Augustine. In De Trinitate, Augustine writes that "we must rather hold that the nature of the intellectual mind was so made that, by being naturally subject to intelligible realities, according to the arrangement of the Creator, it sees these truths in a certain incorporeal light of a unique kind; just as the eye of the body sees the things that are found all around it in this incorporeal light, and has been created with a capacity to receive it and with a suitability for it". Just as the idea of appearance is important to Arendt as part of her phenomenological methodology so is the concomitant concept of illumination. Just as Augustine's theory of illumination is his response to the threat of evil, where he eventually rejects Plato's 'memory of the past' for a theory based on 'the memory of the present', so Arendt's notion eventually becomes her reaction to the actions of Adolf Eichmann expressed as banality. In this phase of her thinking the temporal dimension of past possibility is still at work in Arendt's thought.

In an extension of this dimension in her work, during her theorisation of vita activa the Augustinian notion of greatness seen in the Roman and even Machiavellian context, and become her concept of the heroic explored in The Human Condition is also part of her framework. To understand the concept of illumination, her reading of inspiration and imitation this temporal dimension is essential. These will be examined, including a discussion of what their subsequent role is in her theory of judgement. In these terms, they relate to a notion of source or foundation and therefore an authority through the temporality of past possibility. Having established this reading, the role of an ethic of inspiration can be examined and it relationship to her unwritten unfinished of judgment.

The way in which this connection is made can be seen through her concept of exemplary validity. This emerges in the last few lectures in her course on Kant's political philosophy. In her conclusion to the lecture series, Arendt returns to Kant's introduction in the Critique of Judgement and follows his thinking once more. Kant's difficulty is the judgement of the particular (or, as Arendt quotes of Kant, "the faculty of thinking the particular") when judging without the general to guide it. Judging the

116 While I share his imperative, I disagree with Stuart Justman's reading of the role of disclosure in Arendt's thought, believing instead the concept of illumination is the correct course of analysis. See his "Hannah Arendt and the idea of disclosure", Philosophy Today, Vol. 20, Issue 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 23-37.
117 While I will reply heavily on Gilson's interpretation of this theory, this reflects Arendt's predilection for his thought. See Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, especially pp. 103-125. Alternative readings are available from R.A. Marcus in "Marius Victorinus and Augustine" in Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Thought, ed. R. A. Markus, pp. 331-367 and Anton C. Pegis, "The Mind of St. Augustine", Medieval Studies, Vol. 6, (1944), pp. 1-61. For an indication of this reading see Pegis, p. 30, n. 130 and his typically understated concern that "[h]ow this presence is to be understood is one of the notorious difficulties of Augustinianism".
118 From Kant's Critique of Judgement, quoted in Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 76.
particular with an extant precept - such as "a rule, a principle, a law" - causes Arendt and Kant no problem: the problem arises, and beckons the point of Arendt's analysis, when the particular does not have a general to aid the understanding of it. It is this moment - a moment that contains within it a lack of reassuring familiarity - that welcomes in the use of judgement that Arendt is attempting to conceive and facilitate in her deliberations. Experience, Arendt tells us, or an outside signification could be available to judge this particular, but in exception this may not be the case. Consequently, the emergency that this moment initiates requires now a standard to be derived from somewhere else; one would "need a tertium quid or a tertium comparationis, something related to two particulars and yet distinct from both." Arendt, though, does not see just one "tertium comparationis", but two of them. The first is located mainly in Kant's political writings and evolves around the idea of purposiveness. As Arendt describes it, this idea is "the idea of an original compact of mankind as a whole, and derived from this idea is the notion of humanity, of what actually constitutes the humanness of human beings, living and dying in the world, on this earth that is a globe, which they inhabit in common, share in common, in the succession of generations."\(^{119}\) This is source alone is exceptionally suggestive of Arendt's way of thinking regarding a source of standards but Arendt highlights a second "solution": exemplary validity.\(^{120}\) While the interpretative commentary's focus is on the second source, the first provides an indication of the framework of Arendt's thought and the importance of foundation and temporality in her thinking at this stage of her work. Nonetheless it must be seen in conjunction with her second suggestion. The notion of exemplary validity, introduced by way of illustrating how categories (such as Plato's idea or Kant's schema) help define an object (for example, a table), relies on having an example with which to compare. This standard remains, for Arendt, a particular itself but "its very particularity reveals the generality that otherwise could not be defined. Courage is like Achilles."\(^{121}\) Arendt therefore leaves us with two questions that need answering; first, how can a particular become a general without becoming a general and, second, how do we evaluate the choice of the particular?

\(^{119}\) ibid.

\(^{120}\) Arendt immediately after introducing this idea quotes Kant as saying "Examples are the go-cart of judgements" from *Critique of Pure Reason* B173.

\(^{121}\) *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, p. 77 (original italics). This again engages Arendt's understanding of "enlarged mentality", or the imagination's capacity to enable distant objects to be present. But, and this is a often repeated question aimed at Heideggerian derived thought, how are we, as either the spectator or the actor (more on this later), able to decide what is a worthy example. This is a pressing question in the context of judgement, but for the moment it must be noted that the move itself - from a particular that remains particular even when generalised to a generalisation of this particular - is presented as a *fait accompli* by Arendt, and one that she does not see the need to dwell upon. Arendt leaves this point to resume a discussion on the spectator/actor conception.
An illustration of a potential solution to the problem these questions indicate exists is provided at the end of Beiner’s interpretation of Arendt’s study of Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*. He has already established his reading of Arendt’s concept of political judgement, but he finishes with a chapter entitled, “Further Thoughts: Arendt and Nietzsche on ‘this gateway, Moment’.” In this section of his study, Beiner considers the relationship between Arendt and Nietzsche in the context of their consideration of the moment. In Beiner’s opening quote from *The Dawn of the Day*, Nietzsche laments the man who waits until the end of the day to make judgement on his activities. In this case the man is an uninterested judgement but without the energy expended during the day to maintain his clarity. But as Nietzsche asks, who has the time to ask after ‘life and existence’ in amidst their daily endeavours, and equally who having waited for the seventh day can know for “he had missed the right moment.” Through this comparison Beiner correctly recognises and uncovers the importance of the moment in Arendt’s work - both as a theorist of political action and a philosopher of the mind. In Arendt’s search for meaning, between the transcendental and the purely humanist options, she seeks a foundation in a halfway house. Meaning is nothing if it cannot escape the changing fortunes of time. In *The Life of the Mind*, “Thinking” and in a section titled “The gap between past and future” Arendt again quotes Nietzsche:

> Behold this gateway, dwarf! . . . It has two faces. Two paths meet here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for an eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another eternity. They contradict each other, these paths; they offend each other face to face; and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed above: “Now” [“Augenblick”]. . . Behold this Now! From this gateway Now, a long eternal lane leads *backward*; behind us lies an eternity [and another lane leads forward into an eternal future].

While Arendt has used the translation of Kaufmann for this quote, she has made one very important change; the Moment becomes Now and she indicates her understanding of its meaning by adding “Augenblick”. This is a strategic change reflecting her understanding of the Now as *Augenblick*, or the moment of *phronetic* insight. This is an indication of Arendt’s way of thinking, which equally captures the temporal nature of Arendt’s thought, but it needs to be broadened to include other notions involved in this process of insight as an approach to the problem of judgement. Again.

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122 Beiner, “Hannah Arendt on Judging”, pp. 144-156 undertakes a ‘fanciful’ and ‘speculative’ study of the confluence between Arendt’s intended study of judgement and Nietzsche’s notion of eternal return; a study that is in a decidedly Arendtian manner leading to more questions than answers.
124 But at this stage of his Arendtian study, Beiner is certain that Arendt changed as her focus shifted from action to the mind - a change determined by her search of the moment.
understanding Arendt’s method of distinction making is important here. Arendt respected the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and saw him highlighting certain destructive tendencies in the tradition of western thought that had evolved through the millennia, including a variant of Christianity.126 But Arendt’s work, with its primitive Christian imperative of foundation, sought to maintain the dignity of individuals in community and not advocate the sterile option of the aesthetic.127 There is still a Nietzschean element in this way of thinking and this emerges when her notion of judgement in the life of the mind is considered which requires an analysis of her involvement with Kant. It is the pathways established by her reading of Augustine which inspire both her reading of the crisis of judgement and the potential solutions available. This influence allows a reading of Arendt’s particular use of Aristotle, Kant and Nietzsche to reveal her intentions in her theory of judgement.

The Nietzschean dimension of Arendt’s thought has already received some attention. Biskowski, mentioned above, acknowledges the elements of Nietzsche in Arendt’s thought, or the agonistic and aesthetic aspects in her political theory.128 In fact, in his article, Biskowski is reacting against the overt Nietzschean interpretation argued by Dana R. Villa in an essay titled “Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action”.129 Published in 1992, Villa’s article drew a number of critical responses of which two were published in Political Theory as a response to his argument. One was by a sympathetic Nietzschean interpreter Bonnie Honig and the other by Jeffrey C. Isaac.130 Honig in her introduction sets up an Arendt balancing between two abysses. On one side

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126 This was a reading Arendt also retained for Machiavelli. As she reflects, “if you do not resist evil, the evildoers will do as they please. Though it is true that by resisting evil, you are likely to be involved in evil, your care for the world takes precedence in politics over your care for the self—whether this self is your body or your soul. (Machiavelli’s “I love my native city more than my soul” is only a variation of: I love the world and its future more than my life or my self”). Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 50.

127 The Arendtian commentator who takes the aestheticization charge to the extreme is George Kateb. Kateb sees Arendt as describing action for its own end; or the “existential supremacy of political action.” George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil, (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983), p. 6ff. He goes on to say, “Action is its own end: its greatness as revelation needs no further validation, only philosophical elaboration. For Arendt, to press beyond the revelatory qualities of action is absurd because it is to demand an answer to the question, Why be human?” (p. 23) For Arendt there is “a single-minded adherence to the unique and supreme existential achievement of political action as revelatory speech.” (p. 28) A consequence of this becomes the ultimate rejection of ethical thinking in Kateb’s eyes; “insofar as Arendt confines her thought to the action of the polis, she sever the whole point of political action - its revelatory existential achievement, its creation of human identity - from moral motivation or intention.” (p. 50) This expressive conception of political action is, for Kateb, the Greek conception as well. It lacks moral criteria and Kateb advocates the subordination of action to control of moral criteria. Kateb’s charge is that Arendt dismisses moral judgement from her theory of action; “if morality is one kind of immorality, then a few moments of recklessness Arendt celebrates immorality.” And that “Arendt talks about particular acts in a general theory of action can too easily accommodate great substantial evils, even the system of evil known as totalitarianism.” Kateb, Ibid., p. 33 and p. 31 respectively. The idea that Arendt actually prescribed a system that could become totalitarian is echoed by Martin Jay’s interpretation as well. Passer in argues that Kateb does not pay heed to the communicative dimension of Arendt’s thought.

128 As such, Biskowski is sensitive to the agon of Arendt’s theory of political action overwhelming the concerns Arendt that illustrated throughout her life’s work.


is the “dialogical consensualism of her Habermasian appropriators”\textsuperscript{131} On the other is the “creeping subjectivism of Nietzsche’s purely agonistic model”\textsuperscript{132} Villa tries to solve Arendt’s dilemma chronologically by seeing her addressing the Nietzschean element in her thought with a later, maturer reflection on Kant and his concept of sensus communis\textsuperscript{133} Honig thinks that this characterisation of Arendt’s thought is misleading. Not only this, she also is concerned about Villa’s characterisation of Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially his description of Nietzsche and his “excessive agonism”. Honig however thinks that Villa is on the right track; it is just that he is not investigating all the possible solutions. Honig still believes that a correct reading of Arendt is through Nietzsche and that the Nietzsche required is one that is not as ‘postmodern’ as Villa assumes. Honig asks for a reading of Nietzsche that considers the ‘institutionalism’ of Arendt and Nietzsche over the ‘aestheticism’ Villa provides in his treatment. It is strange that Honig sees Arendt (and Nietzsche) as institutional thinkers even if the institution is Nietzschean in its principles. But she has picked up on the considerable depth to Arendt’s understanding and that Arendt was not dependent on reductive ideas such as Nietzsche’s aestheticism. To do this Honig calls for a consideration of the other possible ‘stabilising’ factors such as “action in concert, promising, forgiveness, law, the public-private distinction, foundings, constitution-making, and amendment.”\textsuperscript{134}

Honig is correct to see that Arendt’s balancing act of was not because of lack of conviction but because she saw both the consensual and the agon at work in a society; the “tension is a site of contest in a democratic regime, a site from which action is generated.”\textsuperscript{135} This call seems strange because of its association with the work of Nietzsche. Honig has undertaken a considerably redemptive reading of Nietzsche’s work and now wishes to approach Arendt with this new understanding. Honig wishes only to dwell upon her Nietzschean Arendt and not to consider the other possible sources for her desire to stabilise Arendt’s political action. Honig argues that Arendt has a conceptual debt to Nietzsche, yet Arendt misreads him. In the footnotes Honig attempts to show the reasons for these partial misreadings. Arendt’s criticisms of Nietzsche’s rejection of the will is based on an incomplete quotation from Will to Power, and with promising there is a similar example from Genealogy of Morals.


\textsuperscript{131} There are several theorists who have graduated from Habermas to Arendt. Seyla Benhabib is one of these theorists as her opening line to one of her articles attests: “In a democratic polity agreement among citizens generated through processes of public dialogue is central to the legitimacy of basic institutions.” See “Judgement and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt’s Thought”, \textit{Political Theory,} Vol. 16 (1988), p. 1.

\textsuperscript{132} Honig, “The Politics of Agonism”, p. 528.

\textsuperscript{133} Sandra Hinchman, in her article “Common Sense and the Political Barbarism in the Theory of Hannah Arendt” \textit{Polity,} Vol. 17 No. 2 (Winter 1984), pp. 317-339, also argues that Arendt’s moral standards can be found in her conception of common sense.

\textsuperscript{134} Honig, “The Politics of Agonism”, p. 529.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{ibid.}
With the concept of forgiveness though, Honig argues that Arendt does not acknowledge debt. But it can be equally argued that it was Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and Arendt’s realisation of this through her reading of Augustine and his discussion of forgiveness that prompted Arendt.136 The individualism of Arendt’s thought is essential to her understanding of twentieth century politics and philosophical thought. In each of these readings, the theorists have utilised only one side of Arendt’s understanding without considering the Augustinian element in her thought. Without this consideration, they are not appropriately conceiving the real site for a perpetuating and vital society that provides the foundation for Arendt’s idea of community. Honig, by missing the element of Arendt’s Augustinian beginnings, does not realise that Arendt did not depend upon Nietzsche for her understanding of human interaction, rather her residual notion was Augustinian in its conception and was expressed in her dissertation.

The Augustinian element in Arendt’s thought is most apparent in the dissertation. In a consideration by Ronald Beiner of Augustine’s influence for an edited volume entitled Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later, the question of his impact is discussed.137 This chapter article concentrates on the conception of worldliness in the dissertation, or rather its contradistinction to Christianity’s antiworldliness.138 Building on Patrick Boyle’s initial treatment of the dissertation in “Elusive Neighbourliness: Hannah Arendt’s Interpretation of Saint Augustine” where he focused the themes of “ontology, stance towards the world, and relationships to others in the world”, Beiner asks questions about this world.139 In this manner, Beiner highlights the otherworldly element in Augustine’s Christianity and Arendt’s reaction to this focus. Arendt is concerned about Augustine’s (and Christianity’s) neglect of ‘this worldliness’ and the community of the social. My focus does consider Arendt’s treatment of Augustine’s anti-worldliness but in the context of his anti-temporality. His anti-

136 See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI, 11 and is mentioned in Being and Time, p. 164 [p. 159 of Macquarrie].
138 Beiner’s ‘challenge’ in his treatment of Arendt’s dissertation is the division of Arendt’s work between pre- and post-Holocaust writing and thinking. He points out that it is a division made with her encouragement using Arendt’s concern for ‘living experience’ as the genesis of thought rather than mere abstraction and contemplation. See Between Past and Future, p. 14. Quoted in Beiner, ibid., p. 269. Beiner is very sensitive to an equal abstraction of Arendt’s thought from “historicist and biographical reading” current amongst most of Arendt’s interpreters. A methodology of reading reflected in Arendt’s interpretations of individuals in the history of thought and her own appropriations made during the course of her thought. However, the ‘lived experience’ does suggest that Arendt did not have any experiences before the political upheaval of the early 1930s. Surely her sense of individuality and the necessities of living alongside others would have been powerful to the young and astute Arendt. (The experiences of the young Arendt are well-detailed in Young-Bruehl’s biography.)
139 Patrick Boyle was in one of the preliminary edited studies that considered the thought and influence of Hannah Arendt and was appropriately entitled, Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt. His sensitivity to the religious element in Arendt is profound but his intent is only expository even though he gives direction to future interpretations. He attempted to make sense of the dissertation and suggest a role for its argument in Arendtian scholarship in 1987 from its disordered manuscript form. Patrick Boyle, “Elusive Neighbourliness: Hannah Arendt’s Interpretation of Saint Augustine” in Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt, James Bernauer, (ed.) (The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 81-114. Boyle does discuss the community on p. 97.
worldliness derives from this aversion to *temporalis*. From this reading of Augustine, Arendt becomes sensitive to the dimension of time and she sees man's condition as *homo temporalis.* Nonetheless, Beiner is correct when he poses Arendt's concerns in terms of simple choice through oppositions; “Belonging or estrangement? Loving the world, or coming to view it as a desert? Being at home in the world, or “world alienation”? These are the alternatives with which Arendt grappled, not only in the book on Augustine but throughout her philosophical career.” This encapsulates the sense of contradiction inherent in Arendt’s way of thinking yet it does not highlight the imperative of not solving these contradictions, rather realising their meaning for human endeavour.

This dimension of temporality which is at work in Arendt’s work offers insight into her own contradictions. This is illustrated by Seyla Benhabib’s articulate evaluation of Arendt’s thoughts on judgement:

Arendt’s reflections on judgement do not only vacillate between judgement as a moral faculty, guiding action, versus judgement as a retrospective faculty, guiding the spectator or the storyteller. There is an even deeper philosophical perplexity about the status of judgement in her work. This concerns her attempt to bring together the Aristotelian conception of judgement as an aspect of *phronesis* with the Kantian understanding of judgement as the faculty of ‘enlarged thought’ or ‘representative thinking’.142

Benhabib captures the dimension in Arendt’s later thought where on one hand she seems to deal with the particular or singularity, while she also seeks to deal with the universal aspect of judgement and its impartiality. But there is a division in the temporal emphasis in these two approaches. In distinction, the first system, dealing with the actor is forward seeking and investigates the thought founded in the potential future. And the second, the spectator, deals almost exclusively with the past and the role of memory and remembrance. What needs to be considered is when they come together: the temporal dimension of part possibility.

In other words, this dualistic reading of Arendt’s concerns does not consider methodology of thinking that is trinitarian.143 The tripartite dimension of her thinking, which has gone unnoticed in commentaries, reveals the dynamic of her thought. Arendt locates the problem of Augustinian love as

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140 As Arendt says in her dissertation: “for Augustine, being and time are opposites. In order to be, man has to overcome his human existence, which is temporality: “Hence so that you too may be, transcend time.” Therefore the “transit” consists in transcending temporality, and what needs to be forgotten, and is forgotten, is mortality. Just as the lover forgets himself over the beloved, mortal, temporal man can forget his existence over eternity.” Love and St. Augustine, p. 29. [Arendt’s italics]
143 On this latter tendency it seems strange that Arendt analyses Augustine’s concept of love in three ways, distinguishes three categories in *The Human Condition*, and divides the faculties of the mind into thinking, willing and judging. Therefore understanding Arendt’s methodology and being sympathetic to her project, at least at this stage of her analysis, is required to avoid the simple conclusion that Arendt only wished to reconstruct the idealised Athenian polis.
love as desire. Her solution is therefore a conception of love without this desire. Love has already been presented as the solution to fear and unhappiness in Christian thought. The fact that Augustine has two loves that he wishes to choose between becomes illustrative of Arendt’s usual methodology to search for a solution to a problem. The formation and subsequent search for an understanding of their dynamic is the trait of Arendtian thinking that pervades all her work. In this case, the construction of a third love is sought to mediate between the two Augustinian concepts. The criticism made against Arendt’s project by Jaspers was that she sought to explain Augustine’s contradictions rather than to learn from them. Her search for a new love as a solution is made untenable by the fact that Augustine has already designed love as the solution to the antithesis inherent in life. John Burnaby in *Amor Dei* sets up Augustine’s ideal of man’s true end as three antitheses. These antitheses describe the relationship between the worldly good life that changes and the anti-worldly happy life in changeless eternity. The results of this are a relationship between conflict and peace (feeling and willing), action and contemplation, and faith and sight (seeing and knowing). The middle antithesis is significant for Arendt’s later work in *The Life of the Mind* as it is the bridge between the will and knowledge. While Augustine does not wish to dwell on this tri-conception of love (or lover, loved and love), Arendt sought to determine the true relationship of an individual to themselves, their neighbours and the world. Using this association she found a platform to determine a universal without compromising the particular involved: the individual as part of a community that does not compromise the plural nature of their worldliness. This requires an approach that is aptly described as the “way of the philosopher beyond Day and Night”.147

It is often this unstated dimension of Arendt’s conceptual framework that provides the clue to Arendt’s intentions. This is especially true with her reading of Augustine, the theorist who conceived the most powerful commentary of the trinity of man although in the shadow of the Holy Trinity. Of this Holy Trinity, it is the dimension of the spirit that fascinates Arendt - which becomes the spirit of the eternal, or the enigma of the now - a fascination that is reflected in her choice of love for her

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144 John Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, p. 82. However, from this it is uncertain as to the order of their relationship. St. Thomas Aquinas later draws the conclusion that contemplation and therefore the intellect, the pathway to God, is the primal element. Yet, Augustine is also the first advocate of the will and therefore action.

145 “There is a vision belonging to our time here ... If we believe, we see; if we love, we see ... He who has love needs not to be sent upon a long journey to see God ... He would see God upon His throne in heaven: let him have love, and God dwells in him even as in heaven.” *Enarrationes in Psalms*, CXIX, 4. Quoted in Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, p. 82. More significantly, Burnaby comments that Love—this is what Augustine means—is the confounder of all antithesis. It breaks the line between the here and the hereafter, between change and the changeless, time and eternity. It is peace in conflict, contemplation in the midst of action, sight piecing through faith. For in love the divine meets the human: heaven comes to earth when Christ is born, and man rejoices in the Truth.

146 It is Book VIII of *De Trinitate* that Augustine passes over this possibility.

dissertation and her construction of a third type of love social *caritas* to solve Augustine’s contradiction of *caritas* and *cupiditas*.

In this context, love in Arendt’s dissertation - especially love of the neighbour - is seen as a pathway of exploration into her foundational thinking.148 The dimensions of this exploration become evident when the context for Arendt’s study of Augustine’s thought is investigated. Heidegger, Jaspers and the milieu of Arendt’s Germany in the 1920s is considered.149 Heidegger’s project for *Being and Time* dwelt on the thought of Augustine.150 While Arendt treats this aspect of Augustine’s thought as a problem of the neighbour in his love of God, she is also exploring the impact of ancient Athenian thought on western thinking.151 This will be read into Arendt’s discussion as she develops *Social Caritas* as a resolution to this Augustinian dilemma. What remained in Arendt’s understanding and Augustine’s continuing influence on her thought was therefore not the grand plan of *Social Caritas*, but rather Augustine’s description of the individual-in-the-world. Subsequently, while the imperative that resulted in Arendt formulating *Social Caritas* may have been disappointing for Jaspers - and eventually Arendt – still the pathway and framework of exploration behind the attempt never left Arendt. At the end of the dissertation Arendt provides the insight into her concerns which involves the implication of the redemption of Adam through Christ:

[t]hus the fact people belong to each other is no longer determined by generation but by imitation. Through imitation, everyone may initiate the impulse of saving one’s neighbour. Imitation rests on mutual love, (*diligere invicem*). But this is never love in our sense which has become impossible in detachment from the world. Mutual love lacks the element of choice . . . . Love extends to all people in the *civitas Dei*, just as interdependence extended equally to all in the *civitas terrena*. This love makes human relations definite and explicit. Coming from the thought of one’s own danger that is experienced in conscience in God’s presence, that is, in absolute isolation.

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149 The editors, Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Starþ, in the accompanying interpretative essay to the translated manuscript form of the dissertation give broad consideration to its worth in this manner but do not develop the implications of any of them in detail. Scott also published her own article detailing her understanding of the meaning of the dissertation. See ““A Detour through Pietism”: Hannah Arendt on St. Augustine’s Philosophy of Freedom”, *Politics*, 26, No. 3 (Spring 1988). pp. 394-425. Their ongoing interest however is in Arendt’s concept of freedom, not necessarily the responsibility of the actor in this realm of the free. In this capacity they provide a sound insight into the potential dynamics of Arendt’s Augustine.


Thus, love does not turn to humankind but to the individual, albeit every individual. In the community of the new society the human race dissolves into its many individuals. Hence, the human race as such is not in danger, but every individual is.\(^\text{152}\)

The need for the individual in the world to comprehend existentially the role of the neighbour in his or her life provides an important element in understanding her later work.\(^\text{153}\) This eventually leads Arendt to the thought of Immanuel Kant for assistance in understanding the individual-in-the-world and the principles and their manner of direction. Arendt herself associates her reading of Augustine with Kant in her lectures on his political philosophy in 1964. The key is the existential element of love. She introduces him when discussing the idea of desire without possessiveness. As she notes "Augustin: Amo: Volo ut sis. A confirmation of the sheer arbitrariness of being: We have not made ourselves, we stand in need of confirmation. We are strangers, we stand in need of being welcome. I want you to be."\(^\text{154}\) Later in the same lecture Arendt further clarifies this, writing "It does not presume a "need or want". (What Aug. actually meant: I want you to be – independent of any need on my part, independent of any use etc. And the distinction between uti and frui which runs through Augustine has something to do with this.)"\(^\text{155}\) Her beginnings are very much related to her end.

Nonetheless, her theory of judgement is incomplete and has become the focus of much attention because of its ambitious nature. The argument over her interpretation evolved around whether she should have used Aristotle’s phronesis or continued to pursue the rigidity of Kant’s rationality.\(^\text{156}\) The attempt to mediate between these two positions has caused much of the debate.\(^\text{157}\) Essentially it is between the contextuality of Aristotle and the formalism of Kant.\(^\text{158}\) But Arendt was seeking to

\(^{152}\) *Love and St. Augustine*, pp. 110-1. [my italics]

\(^{153}\) Someone who takes up this concern is Garrath Williams who selects predominantly from Arendt’s political works to express an ethic of responsibility. Garrath Williams, “Love and Responsibility: a Political Ethics for Hannah Arendt?”, *Political Studies*, Vol. 46 (1998), pp. 937-950. A return to Augustine and Arendt’s dissertation is prominent in Lauren Swayne Bartold’s search for an ethics in Arendt’s thought. However, the focus on the role of the will in Arendt’s thought means that Bartold does not fully engage Arendt with the dynamic of Augustine’s thought and especially the rich implications of the trinity at work in Arendt’s philosophy. See “Towards an ethics of love: Arendt on the will and St Augustine”, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol. 26 No. 2 (2000), pp. 1-20, and especially p. 9.

\(^{154}\) Kant 1964, (032288). [Arendt now suggests her audience imagine the opposite.] In handwritten notes beside this, Arendt equates Augustine and Kant. “To their desire of existence regardless of profit: Augustin” and then “The beautiful teaches us to love without intentions[?] of profit. The *Metaphysics of Morals*, §17.” [From the “Metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of virtue, Doctrine of the elements of ethics, Episodic Section of Chapter two”, Ak. 6443. In Gregor’s translation she represents this state or stimmung as ‘disposition’. *Kant’s The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996). p. 192. See also p. 162 for Kant’s discussion of amor complacientiae (Liebe des Wohlgefallens).]

\(^{155}\) *Kant 1964, (032290).*


\(^{158}\) *Ibid.,* p. 134. As Benhabib expresses it, “a central issue in the current debate is whether a universalist moral standpoint must be formalistic, a prioristic and context insensitive or whether moral universalism can be reconciled with contextual sensitivity.”
achieve something that had been an unarticulated part of her ongoing and developing understanding of the individual-in-the-world. Arendt’s simple perspective is that the individual who is not self-sufficient exists in a world created with others. This is seen by Gottsegen when he develops his understanding of Arendt’s political community and specifically the way in which its citizens interact by offering the concept of *humanitas* with a cognate conception of *isonomy*, or formal political equality. The essence of this community is mutual understanding. Gottsegen rightly suggests that the ‘cognitive capacity’ needs to be understood in order to clearly comprehend how the realisation of this communication can come about. He offers his view of this scenario suggesting it is dependent on the interaction of the faculties of the will; individuals will a collaborative process determined by a common interest and the intellect follows this will. With this assumption, Gottsegen turns to the normative dimension of the community and its links to her theory of action. Gottsegen develops his argument in the right direction but he has underestimated the role of Augustine in Arendt’s thought.

The essence of an Arendtian community is mutual understanding and the question of her specific reading of *phronesis* is vital. In his reading, Beiner suggests that the concept of *phronesis* would have served her purposes well. He is correct in his assessment but it is not strictly the Aristotelian concept that he suggests. Rather there is already an extant residue of her primitive Christian understanding. Equally when he suggests “[w]e must inquire why she turned exclusively to Kant for inspiration when she sought to explore the theme of judgement . . .”, the answer is that she saw in Kant a style of thinking that responded to her own framework, founded in his early interpretation of philosophy. The key to this duality of actor/future and spectator/past and Arendt’s use of Kant and

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160 This is not to suggest a clear cut case of empathy, a specific solution that Arendt denied in “Crisis in Culture” in *Between Past and Future*, p. 221.


164 One influence that is not explored in this discussion but remains indicative of this approach is the writing of Martin Luther and especially his constructive reading of Aristotle’s notion of *phronesis* despite its use by Scholasticism. The combination of this notion with the kariological moment is essential to his argument. Subsequently, his critique of Aristotelian thought is found in Kierkegaard’s work as Kierkegaard similarly challenges the Christianity of his day. See John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, p. 198 and John D. Caputo, “Serje and Kardia: The Hermeneutics of Factual Life and the Categories of the Heart” in *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his earliest thought*, Theodore Kiel and John van Buren, (eds.) (New York, SUNY Press, 1994), p. 328.
Aristotle is the temporality of Arendt’s thinking, the relationship between past and future in the present. Therefore this must be seen in the context of how her understanding of primitive Christianity enters her political consciousness and the notion of principle in foundation guides her thinking through a temporal framework defined by past possibility. The question is how this relates to her reading of Kant at the very end of her intellectual career. In Willing, Volume Two of The Life of the Mind, Arendt intimates the way she should be read when she expresses that it is by virtue of this idea of mankind, present in every single man, that men are human, and they can be called civilised or humane to the extent that this idea becomes the principle of their actions as well as their judgements. It is at this point that actor and spectator become united; the maxim of the actor and the maxim, the ‘standard’, according to which the spectator judges the spectacle of the world become one.

In a section of her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt describes her intention with Kant’s thinking in the Critique of Judgement. Arendt tells her students that Kant never wrote his political philosophy but the best determination of its possible form is in “Critique of Aesthetic Judgement”. In other words, by looking at taste, judgement and production of artwork, he ‘confronts an analogous problem’. The themes of judgement are prominent but also communicability, spirit, a trinity, and the mind. These themes are indicative of Arendt’s thinking throughout her intellectual career. This is an insight into the style of thinking that Arendt used throughout her work and represent an outline of her intended culmination in the third section of The Life of the Mind. While the lecture is a direct articulation of Kant’s thinking it is also a fair indication of the framework she would have used to conclude her investigation of the mind. Its formulation relates back to her foundation in the thought of St. Augustine and his trinitarian concept of the human mind. In the lectures Arendt is working Kant to fit him into her understanding of the dynamics of the mind she is already seeing as a suitable structure for judgement. To understand Arendt’s thought and especially this underlying structure at this juncture of her thinking on judgment her Augustinian legacy becomes essential.

The point Arendt seeks to make evolves around the distinction Kant makes between genius and taste. Genius is the production of art, while taste for judging the produced art - which two is nobler though, Kant wonders? Subsequently, Arendt has Kant asking, “which is the condition sine qua non

164 This takes up Jasper’s (and Arendt’s) methodology of reading Augustine. Years later Arendt’s advice to her own graduate students still reflects this as she says that the key to understanding profound thinkers of the Western tradition is not seek to solve their contradictions, rather understand what causes them. See Arendt’s introduction in her lectures on “History of Political Thought”, Berkeley, 1955, pp. 1-5 (023944-48) in her Library of Congress papers.
165 Willing, pp. 270-1. This is also quoted in Richard J. Bernstein “Judging - the Actor and the Spectator” in Proceedings of “History, Ethics, Politics”: A Conference Based on the Work of Hannah Arendt, Patrick Boyens, (ed.) (New York, Empire State College, 1982), p. 157 where he says the “search to find some resolution between the actor and the spectator continues to be one of the deepest problems of our time”.

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to which one has to look in the judging of art as beautiful arts?”166 The answer to this perplexing question is given by Arendt in the form of a quote by Kant.167 In the quote Kant answers this question by saying that taste provides guidance for genius and therefore taste should be the dominant factor especially because of its communal nature.168 As a follow on to this, Arendt has Kant stating “for beautiful art . . . imagination, intellect, spirit, and taste are required,” and comments that he adds that “the three former faculties are united by means of the forth,” or in other words, taste which is judgement.169 In a step that seems to confuse her purpose Arendt now states that spirit is a special faculty apart from imagination, intellect and now reason which provides genius with the capacity to communicate subject notions that are ‘communicated to others’.170 Arendt sees this as meaning that genius can express “the ineffable element in the state of the mind [Gemütszustand]” and that which guides this communication is taste and is not the ‘privilege of genius’.171 Arendt is clearly attempting to fit Kant’s thought in the *Critique of Judgement* into her way of thinking in a trinitarian manner. This signals the fundamental role that Augustine is assuming in her thinking.

The notion behind this is that if the actor and the spectator do not have a familiar frame of reference then the communication would fail and the action or fabrication would become meaningless. Arendt expresses this in more Kantian terms. Arendt points out that we can speak of the genius in the singular but we can never speak of the spectator in the same way - they “exist only in the plural”. The spectator is always involved with fellow spectators and therefore they share the faculty of judgement. This is an old insight and Arendt traces it back to the Latin (and notably not the Greek).

Arendt quotes Cicero’s *On the Orator* and using him to note that the differentiation between a good judge and a bad judge is little though in the context of fabrication it is significant.172 Kant in his

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166 Arendt with *Critique of Judgement*, §50. Arendt acknowledges that although the two are portrayed as different there would be some people with both capacities.

167 In its entirety: “Abundance and originality of ideas are less necessary to beauty that the accordance of the imagination in its freedom with the conformity to law of the understanding [which is called taste]. For all the abundance of the former produces in lawless freedom nothing but nonsense; on the other hand, the judgement of the faculty by which it is adjusted to the understanding. Taste, like judgement in general, is the disciple (or training) of genius; it clips its wings . . . , gives guidance . . . , brings clearness and order [into the thoughts of genius] it makes the ideas susceptible of being permanently and generally assented to, and capable of being followed by others, and of an ever progressing culture. If, then, in the conflict of these two properties in a product something must be sacrificed, it should be *rather on the side of genius.*” *Critique of Judgement*, §50, P188. (Arendt’s deletions and additions)

168 This is despite, as Arendt points out, without genius what would taste do? Significantly Etienne Gilson makes a similar point about Augustine’s theory of the mind when he discusses the relationship between reason and intelligence. See *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, p. 270, n. 1

169 Pluhar uses fine for beautiful in an attempt to stop confusion over the word beautiful.

170 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 63.

171 See *Critique of Judgement*, §49. And to continue, the “judgement of the spectator creates the space without which no such object could appear at all. The public realm is constituted by the critics and the spectators, not by the actor or the makers. And this critic and spectator sits in every actor and fabricator; without this critical, judging faculty the door or maker would be so isolated from the spectator that he would not even be perceived.” Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 63.

172 *Ibid.* The quote in full is “For everyone discriminates [distinguish], distinguishes between right and wrong in matters of art and proportion by some silent sense without any knowledge of art and proportion; and while they can do this in the case of pictures and statues, in other such works, for whose understanding nature has given them less equipment, they display this discrimination much more in judging the rhythms and pronunciations of words, since these are rooted [influenza in common
Anthropology, Arendt believes, expresses the same thing; insanity is the loss of common sense and the ability to make judgements. The opposite is the sensus privatus, or the logical faculty. This can function without communication because it is about drawing logical conclusions. The interpretation of this private sense requires common sense though.

Arendt revises her position and suggests that all common sense, judgement, and discrimination all depend on the faculty of taste. Of the five senses three are of the external world and can be communicated with ease; sight, hearing, and touch. The other two are inner senses such as smell and taste and these are harder to communicate. They are therefore a private sense. The three objective senses can also represent something - they can be used to reconstruct the absent. This is the faculty that Kant calls ‘Imagination’ and excludes both taste and smell. The thing about these two senses is that they are immediate and overwhelming unlike the other three because they can be blocked. So, Arendt asks, why should taste become the faculty of judgement? And why this judgement and not another, such as a cognitive one? And why should this be based on private sense? Again why is taste dependent on that? The key is the imagination: “the ability to make present what is absent, transforms the objects of the objective senses into “sensed” objects, as though they were objects of inner sense”. Arendt notes that this happens by reflecting not on the object but rather on its representation. The idea behind this is that the object is now represented in the memory and that it cause either pleasure or displeasure and not the object itself - this is Kant’s “operation of reflection”. Kant, Arendt suggests, was very astute early on that in the private/subjective sense something nonsubjective was evident or present. Kant states that “the beautiful, interests [us] only [when we are] in society... A man abandoned by himself on a desert island would adorn neither his hut nor his person... [Man] is not contented with an object if he cannot feel satisfaction in common with others.” Arendt provides us with several other quotes from Kant, including quotes from Kant’s written papers but the most important one is the final one: “In Taste egoism is overcome”, or in other words, we are considerate. All this proves for Arendt that “the nonsubjective element in the non-objective senses is intersubjectivity”.

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sense, and of such things nature has willed that no one should be altogether unable to sense and experience them [cognitum].”

173 Arendt uses the examples of building, melody and velvet.
174 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 65.
175 Critique of Judgement, §40 (p. 160 of Pufanar).
176 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 67.
177 Critique of Judgement, §41 (p. 165 of Pufanar).
178 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 67.
By exploring Kant’s thought in the manner, Arendt generates a trinitarian conception of the mind and she holds the factor of communicability to be an essential element in this construction along with the faculty of memory and imagination. One of the central ideas is the role of the community in this way of thinking. Here a form of communication with the other in society is achieved through a particular state of the mind. This is a universality in an individualist format. Taste appears to be this factor, and Arendt has already described it as the bond between imagination, intellect, and spirit, where spirit is the bond between imagination, intellect and reason which allows the communication of genius. This double trinitarian model requires an unfolding through Arendt’s intellectual development to fully comprehend. The starting point is her dissertation on Augustine. Read through this lens, taste and intersubjectivity reflect a particular reading of the community and the relationship between individuals in that community. The foundation of a theory of judgement that Arendt is seeking to articulate through Kant’s Third Critique is connected to a perspective that involves phronesis, kardia, kairos and eudaimonia. These concepts are not defined by the Athenian tradition of thought however, and therefore the post-Augustinian Christian tradition, but rather by primitive Christianity reflected in the letters of St. Paul. Arendt, a young Jew, is seeking to delineate the experiences of these primitive Christians from the institutionalised Church and its use of Hellenic philosophy. 

179 This is captured in Robert E. Meagher’s existential An Introduction to Augustine, when he also suggests that the intrigue of Augustine’s thought is partly explained by his position in the history of western thought. He stood at the moment in history when the two great traditions of thought clashed at the death of an empire. Consequently humanity was conceived by Augustine in terms of human speech as the signifier of humanness and he therefore found in both traditions a path to follow. The word was of course much more important than utterances, instead the emphasis is not its uniqueness and encompassing at the same time. If, as Augustine did, you were to ask the question “know thyself”, the aspect that stands eminent as a consideration is the words of an individual. However to understand these words requires a methodology to determine the purpose of these words. Augustine had two traditions to draw upon and each gave him a different answer. The Hellenic tradition suggested speech as disclosure, while the Hebraic tradition suggested speech as creation. There is therefore a tension at work in Augustine’s understanding that travel on forward as his influence and the merger of the Hellenic and Hebraic tradition continues through other passages created by the ongoing tradition of western thought. At the heart of this division is a question of strength and weakness. Do we have the capacity to create the world in which we live in, or do we merely dwell in the world that is constructed previous to our existence?
Section I

Reading Augustine

For the Love of Storytelling
Chapter Two

Hannah Arendt: Towards the Possibility of Judgement

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1. Arendt’s Article on Augustine: Indications of Modernity

Arendt’s journey towards a theory of judgement starts at her engagement with Augustine, the Christian Father. In this manner, it is significant that John Caputo calls Arendt a jewgreek as he seeks a ‘counterethics’ in his book Against Ethics. While he appreciates Arendt’s perception of the fragility of action in modernity, his description of her thinking as a jewgreek limits his own understanding of how she seeks to protect this action. It must be acknowledged however that while Arendt is a Jew who educated herself not only in the philosophies of Ancient Greece and Rome but also in that which can be positioned inbetween these two paradigms of thinking for the west: the thought of primitive Christianity. The reason that this is important to understanding Arendt’s lifelong intellectual endeavour is partly to do with the question of why Arendt chose the subject matter of Augustine and love for her dissertation. Arendt ignored the theological attractions of Augustine’s work, in the process drawing criticisms from her reviewers, and instead used the emerging phenomenological methodology as a guiding light into the mind of Augustine and the foundation of Christian philosophy. Augustine stood at the change in periods, from the thought of Ancient Greece to the inclusion of Christianity’s worldview. Augustine’s intellectual dominance of the new Grecian Christianity means that his work is rich material for delineating the various foundations of the future modernity. The role

3 For an overview of the ensuing book’s reception see Robert Meyerson, “Hannah Arendt: Romantic in a Totalitarian Age”, Ph.D thesis from the University of Minnesota, 1972, chapter one.
of Christian thought together with the Gnostic and Neo-Platonic influences emerge in the origination and subsequent crisis of modernity. The experience that Arendt is seeking to uncover in her work is not the Greek and Roman secular experience, rather the lived experience of the primitive Christian before the colossus of Ancient Greek thought imposed itself on these pure experientially-based insights in the crystallisation of Augustine's Christian thought.4

(i) Storytelling: Through the Memory of Augustine

Just after Arendt had published her dissertation and in 1930, Arendt published an article on Augustine to help celebrate the occasion of Augustine's fifteenth hundredth anniversary. This reflection was entitled “Augustin und Protestantismus” and published in Frankfurter Zeitung.5 It was her first publication after the release of the revised dissertation the previous year and is read as a pertinent summary of the major aspects of Augustine's thought that had impressed her during her dissertational studies. In the article, Arendt provides the contemporary reader with an excellent measure of her general impressions of his overall contribution to western thought and life. Her purpose in the article was to provide an overview of Augustine's position as the forefather of the Christian understanding as it stood on the anniversary. Similar to the suggestion in her dissertation, Arendt acknowledges in Augustine's thought the role of the intellectual currents of the day. She even states that he was an intellectual 'dandy'; following fashion in his youth and never really abandoning his last fascination, Neo-Platonism in the form of Plotinus' writings.6 Early in the dissertation Arendt already saw the problem with Augustine's thought as reflecting this residue of Neo-Platonic thought evident in his work, though she never really expounded upon what the implications of this influence was in any detail. The problem that Arendt sees in Augustine's work is therefore determined to not necessarily be especially Christian in its origin; rather it is seen to be Platonic, or more

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4 This is where James Bernauer approaches Arendt perfectly in his article but he maintains that Arendt has a 'theological preoccupation' without clarifying the meaning of this exactly. See “The Faith of Hannah Arendt: Amor Mundi and its Critique-Assimilation of Religious Experience” in Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt, James W. Bernauer, (ed.) (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 9.
5 Frankfurter Zeitung, No. 902, (12 April, 1930).
6 She also makes the statement that she regards Augustine as a Roman thinker as this fascination of the human existence was bought to bear on the emergence of Christianity in the decline and last years of the Roman Empire. Arendt believed that many people, including herself, regard the Church as an heir of the Roman Empire. She says that the Christian church is the Roman Empire and this remark, although not significant for this short study, becomes exceptionally important for Arendt's later role as a political thinker. Arendt says that Augustine can only really be appreciated if his dual existence is understood, "as both a Roman and a Christian". But it also includes the essence of the Roman Empire, and by Arendt's reading, she makes this a reflection of primitive Christianity. Hannah Arendt, "Augustine and Protestantism" in Arendt: Essays in Understanding, p. 25.
specifically, Neo-platonic in origin.\textsuperscript{7} Plotinus' understanding utilised by Augustine has no difficulty with desire as freedom or rather the cessation of desire and its occurrence in the mind that is possessed by the individual.\textsuperscript{8} The consequence of this conception is that an individual ‘dies’ as he is no eternal option in his worldly preferences.\textsuperscript{9} In other words, the world in which the individual finds him or herself provides no access to the precious eternal, instead demanding another worldly option for satisfaction. For Arendt this worldlessness presented itself as a significant problem in Augustine’s thought.\textsuperscript{10} It led directly to her consideration of the role of the neighbour in his thought and consequently the role of love and it is this element of Augustine’s understanding that Arendt reacts to as she develops her own thought. Plotinus captures poignantly the strange existence of the individual in the world and yet dismisses the world in his philosophical deliberations. In doing so, Plotinus assumes that an individual is self-sufficient and it is an assumption that Augustine continues. Arendt realises the error of this way of thinking, stating simply that “Man is not self-sufficient".\textsuperscript{11} The neighbour plays a role in this statement from Arendt, yet this is an illustration of an even greater cause brought to pre-eminence in his thought: the temporal dimension of human existence.\textsuperscript{12}

In reaction to the influence of Ancient Greek thought, Neo-Platonic thinking, and Manichaean Gnostics on Augustine’s thought a new empire was created though his writings - as Arendt states it, the empire of the inner life.\textsuperscript{13} The soul becomes something new in this new empire as well and therefore its meaning is transformed into the modern, popular conception of the soul as the innermost essence. Arendt uses a storytelling metaphor to describe the change Augustine brought about. In this manner, Augustine’s \textit{Confessions} were not there to glorify

\textsuperscript{7} The result is an appreciation that includes “the hierarchical order, the rhetorical eloquence, and the claim to universality”. The Christianity of Augustine includes the legacy of the Platonic order by understanding the world in terms of the “philosophical-cosmological”.

\textsuperscript{8} For future reference, Arendt defines \textit{nost} as human spirit.

\textsuperscript{9} Arendt clearly associates life with action not contemplation in this sentence, though whether this is in Plotinus, or a radical interpretation or not is unclear. See Plotinus in \textit{Enneads}, VI, 8, 4 and VI, 8, 2. The question is was it desire that sent Arendt to action, or action to desire?


\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Love and St. Augustine}, p. 18. Arendt suggests that it is speaking of love that Augustine shows the detrimental influence of the ideas of autarchy and self-sufficiency and consequently sees the individual as separated from the external world and has no control over its existence - the external is the world but also the body. This, Arendt observes, “is an alienation from the outside world, which is much more radical than anything requested or even possible in orthodox Christianity", p. 41. Arendt suggests that “Augustine’s order of love is an indication of the utterly derivative character of all relations that go beyond the mere use of worldly data”. When an individual moves out of the sphere dedicated to surviving and looks to those around him or her, they are not as important as the relationship they have with God. The notion here seems to be that friendships on earth are secondary.

\textsuperscript{12} The space of appearance between birth and death is the context for Arendt. Tolle argues why Arendt rejected the idea of a human nature. See Gordon Tolle, \textit{Human Nature under Fire: The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt}, (Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1982).

\textsuperscript{13} This new world inserted into a mixed tradition of thought also demanded a new language, a difficulty that Arendt highlighted in her dissertation.
Augustine or to generate a public biography of his heroic deeds to be transmitted that was the prevailing Greek conception. In Augustine it is to reveal the true power of God and his capacity to redeem. This new ability of the Christian God to redeem focuses Christian theology and commentary on the role of time due to the Second Coming. Yet a life of sin needs strength in the individual to be redeemed and strength in the neighbour not to expect damnation. This role of time is seen by the role of memory in a confession. Its path of time is linear as it brings back from the past that which needs forgiveness to make to future better, "memory opens up this life for us; only in memory does the past take on everlasting meaning; only in memory is the past cancelled out and preserved for all time". The two purposes of memory appear to be at odds with one another, a contradiction in terms. But the role of the interpreter is important here. As Arendt notes, Augustine’s set of ‘confessions’ have been criticised as being falsified through either fabrication or exaggeration. In answer to this criticism, Arendt says, that a representation can never be faithful to the original - to argue so is absurd. Arendt is not interested in truth in this case, rather the concern is the role of the literature in Augustine’s life and those around him, before him and after him. All three time periods, past, present and future are effected by the book. Reality is not being sought by the author, only a message. Thus, memory is needed however ‘imperfect’ otherwise the past would not exist. Consequently memory becomes the essence of the Confessions and its meaning.

In this article Arendt reveals that, for her, the conception of memory is the most important element in Augustine’s Confessions. An illustration of memory becomes the main topic in his last chapter which is occupied by a “long philosophical discourse on memory in which memory is shown to be the essence of the inner life, that is, of the life of the Christian human being.”

14 The role of the actor in determining their story and its worth rather than the spectator is an important theme in Arendt’s work and one that she dealt with only in the final years of her life. See The Life of the Mind, Vol. I and II, especially the postscript in Vol. II.
15 Kierkegaard wrote about his times in a similar manner to Augustine, even publishing his own ‘confessions’ in Stages on Life’s Way. The first step that Kierkegaard takes when communicating his own life is to clarify the difference between memory and re-collection. The first pages of the chapter titled, ‘In Vino Veritas’, Kierkegaard is at pains to differentiate the powers of youth from the powers of age. The first has the power of memory while the second the powers of re-collection. Recollection is identity and seeks to maintain an eternal continuity in life for the individual while memory is simply indiscriminate. Stages on Life’s Way, edited and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 10.
17 This understanding is compared to her description of the modern meaning of the confession, at least the one taken up by the Catholic Church. It is one that is restricted by privacy and the power of the Augustinian confession is therefore also restricted. In distinction to the Protestant tradition that emerged from the actions and understanding of Luther. The Church as mediator between the soul and God has been vanquished, so the believer stands alone and isolated before the view of God, seeking the presence of God. For Arendt this change is significant as the Augustinian understanding of publicity has been restored. Not that Arendt is suggesting that everyone should publish their criticisms (although in her later work Arendt certainly felt this to be a mark of the legitimacy of an action). Arendt never expressed a reaction to Heidegger’s lack of confession. Was this because - in her eyes - he did not understand the role of memory in being?
This role of memory appears to be a private and contained role but for Arendt there is a dimension that she does not mention explicitly. In The Conversion of St. Augustine, by Romano Guardini, whose lectures Arendt attended, he links the confession not with the private world but the public one: "[t]he word [confession] signifies a stepping forth from the inmost reserve to the open, the public." Of course, Augustine conceived this as a step forth into a religious arena, but in his lectures Guardini emphasises that it is an arena for fellow men to also hear, not just God. The arena is a place for disclosure of an individual in a space of appearance constructed by fellow men.

In choosing these themes of worldlessness, memory, and meaning to highlight in her reflective article, Arendt also highlights her interest in Augustine as a philosopher of the temporal and her ongoing philosophical interest of the individual-in-the-world. The themes of the dissertation that this piece of work continues, though with a new, more specific focus, is the temporal aspect of the individual’s existence, or man as homo temporalis. The inner life, described in the various traditions as spirit, soul, essence or the mind is dependent on memory, one component of the temporal order. In following Augustine’s demand of stepping from the private to the public Arendt steps from the private to the public when she conceptualises society, now the arena for men to hear. Consequently, the world, mirroring the same temporal imperative, is the historical world, saeculum, “… the world in which we all live together as a matter of course”. This focus on memory is in contradistinction to the futural usually resident in Christianity and the life in anticipation for life after death. The destructive potential of this emphasis on the aspect of death in the individual’s existence becomes evident at the end of the dissertation when Arendt says,

[h]uman mortality, which formerly had been a necessity, here becomes a menace. Thus the necessary co-existence in the civitas terrena becomes a free inclining (inclinare) toward the other who is equally menaced. The mere reflection on the danger has detached the individual from the old companionship of fate.

The result is a community that wishes to be ‘of-the-world’, rather than a companionship based on the same fate. The effect on the individual becomes then a wish to avoid this ‘menace’,

20 Guardini continues in the paragraph; “... Here, for religious reasons, the step is taken God-wards. A private life with its acts, just as it unfolded from attitude and intellectual struggle, is displayed—publicly, but also piously—before God, but so that men may bear”. ibid.
21 Love and St. Augustine, p. 103. Arendt says that ‘danger’, or the inevitability of death, generates a feeling of togetherness. Death is regarded as a menace to the existence of the individual, rather than as it was previously seen - a step to eternity.
22 ibid., p. 109.
or to reduce its significance in life. The way that Arendt believes this is achieved is also through memory. What defines the investigation of this context is that “both the fight against it and the concern with it are comprehensible only by this fact of belonging to the world.”23 This is the common world that pervades Arendt’s work and it is a historic world shared by others in the world.24 And it is in the context of the temporal dimension of this shared world where the role of storytelling finds its genesis in the thought of Arendt.25

(ii) The Role of Temporality: Love and the Individual

That Arendt does not mention love in her 1930 article on Augustine seeking instead to portray Augustine’s role in the establishment of the Catholic Church is surprising especially when the concept of love had been Arendt’s focus throughout her dissertation. This is possibly an indication that her mood regarding her dissertation was already changing but not for her wealth of insights she derived from its formation. Arendt's examination of love in Augustine had other, more subtle priorities, that require, as Arendt talks about Augustine’s thought, some “subtlety of understanding”. Its purpose was to examine the “incongruities” of individuals’ existence in a world that was there when they entered and also remains when they leave. The major concern is stated when Arendt opens the argument to her analysis by describing her purpose as defined by the “neighbour’s relevance for the believer who is estranged from the world and its desires”.26 A further two pages on Arendt reiterates this link when she says that “[t]he several parts of this essay are linked only by the question concerning the other human

23 ibid., p. 107.
24 This is echoed in Jean Bethke Elshtain’s Augustine and the Limits of Politics, p. 91 when she says that “We are time-bound creatures, doomed or compelled to narrate our lives within temporality, within what Augustine calls the sanctum, can gather together the self and forge a compelling of not conflict free identity. Wisdom comes from experiencing the ambivalence and ambiguity that is the human condition. That is what Augustine called our business “within this common mortal life,” and any politics that disdains this business, this caring for the quotidian, is a dangerous or misguided or misplaced politics”.
25 This question becomes for Arendt a question of ‘free will’. Arendt did return to the question of love in Augustine. During her discussion of willing in her last phase of her life Arendt dedicated a section to Augustine, “the first philosopher of the Will”. Arendt explains that the volume Willing succeeds Thinking because she sees the need to “ask ourselves whether men of action were not perhaps in a better position to come to terms with the problem of the Will than men of thought . . ..”. Willing, p. 6. Thinking had caught Arendt’s attention because of the role it played - in terms of its absence - in the actions of Adolf Eichmann. Yet willing is the “spring of action”. It is in this context she returns, albeit briefly, to the question of love. Included in this discussion is a statement that was missing from her dissertation. This statement provides a clear and concise declaration of what prompted her phenomenological examination at the start of her intellectual travels; “[A]ugustine diagnoses the ultimate unifying will that eventually decides a man’s conduct as Love.”. Willing, p. 95. The role of love as “the weight of the soul” is also its guiding force (or law of gravity as Arendt puts it). Thus for Augustine the souls’ gravity is, in Arendt view, “the essence of who somebody is, and which as such is inscrutable to the human eyes . . . [and] becomes manifest in this love”. But together with this introduction of free will into the realm of human speculation comes the question of judgement, or how this powerful capacity should be used. This is one of the co-editor’s understanding of Arendt’s endeavour. “A Detour through Pietism”: Hannah Arendt on St. Augustine’s Philosophy of Freedom”, Polity, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Spring 1988), pp. 394-425
26 Love and St. Augustine, p. 3. Arendt details the premise of her examination as she proceeds to construct the limits of her discussion of Augustine’s thought. The first significant delineation that Arendt undertakes and the one that attached the most criticism on its eventual publication is the separation of Augustine from the religious. On this point Arendt is emphatic that Augustine can be read as a philosopher rather than a theologian.
being’s relevance.” The most difficult incongruity in Augustine (and therefore Christian tradition) that presented itself to Arendt was the notion of caritas. At the heart of Augustine’s exhortation is to worship and love God but what about loving yourself and even your neighbours?

Arendt therefore asks, why should an individual, seeking God and “isolated from all things mundane . . . be at all interested in his neighbour?” Again, Arendt clearly states her concern, “[i]n taking up caritas the necessary, ontologically based imitation, of every man becomes as explicit assimilation to God (sicut Deus). At the same time, this ‘being out of the world’ destroys the individualisation and isolation of man that are derived from this world.” The attitude of the Augustinian individual towards his neighbour, Arendt says, emerges out of caritas and has two manifestations; love of the neighbour as God loves him (sicut Deus) and as the individual loves himself (tamquam se ipsum). To these assumptions at the base of the relationship between the individual and the neighbour, Arendt adds two further questions; “how does the self-denying person meet his neighbour; and second, in this encounter what is the neighbour’s role?” This questioning leads to the subject of the earthly community and its character through formation.

In the dissertation, therefore, Arendt is concerned with Augustine’s individual through the role of the neighbour and therefore also the community in which they become involved. Arendt eventually suggests that it is guided by the wrong foundational principle. This principle is a

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27 ibid., p. 4. The relevance of the other when conceiving the individual is the central thought train that guides her through her study of Augustine’s thought and is a direct reaction to her reading of Heidegger’s philosophical understanding in Being and Time.

28 Augustine is quick not to preclude these from his consideration saying about the former, “it is impossible for one who loves God not to love himself. For he alone has a proper love for himself who aims diligently to the attainment of the chief and true good; and if this is nothing else but God, as has been shown, what can prevent one who loves God from loving himself.” Quotes from Vincent Brümmer, The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993) who reads Augustine’s understanding of love through De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae. De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, 26.48. A resolution, in Augustine’s eyes, is by loving God you are also loving yourself. For the latter, relationship to the neighbour is seen in terms of their loving God as you do. In other words, you love them as you would love yourself, “What, then, you aim at in yourself you must aim at in your neighbour, namely, that he may love God with a perfect affection. For you do not love him as yourself, unless you try to draw him to that good which you are yourself pursuing” (26.49). All things are therefore relegated by the love of God. To love anything else in a greater manner is not to love God at all. In his De Doctrina Christiana Augustine clarifies these different loves and the hierarchy involved in them in terms of frui und uti. In another commentary Augustine says that “[i]no enjoy a thing is to rest with satisfaction in it for its own sake. To use, on the other hand, is to employ whatever means are at one’s disposal to obtain what one desires”. De Doctrina Christiana, 1.4.4. See T. Sullivan, De Doctrina Christiana: A Commentary, (Washington D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 1952), p. 30.

29 Love and St. Augustine, p. 7.

30 ibid., p. 78.

31 ibid., p. 93.

32 Arendt takes the premise that Christian caritas is involved with the love of God. ibid., p. 98. From this premise and through Augustine’s thoughts Arendt thinks that she has revealed the connection between man and God is different in each case. As a consequence to this the ‘love of neighbour’ is ‘incomprehensible in its true relevance’. The three loves - of the neighbour, of God, and of one’s self - are involved in the traditional conception and all three are connected in its assertion. But as Arendt notes, Augustine always talks about the phrase “as oneself”, and this becomes central to her understanding of the individual as well. This focus on the individual in this manner signifies Arendt’s continual approach to the subject in her thoughts.
futural one. In reading Augustine to this point she is following the reading of him already undertaken by Heidegger in his course, *Augustinus und Neoplatonismus* delivered in 1920/1.\footnote{In the summer semester of 1921, Heidegger has formulated a course on “Augustine and Neoplatonism” and published in *Phänomenologie des Religiösen Lebens*, Volume 60 of *Gesamtausgabe*, (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1995). The notes on which they are based upon are supplemented by several sets of student notes, especially Oskar Becker. Heidegger evaluates the treatment of Augustine’s thought and asks how these commentators approach Augustine’s thoughts and for what purpose. In evaluating these commentaries in such a manner, Heidegger is treating them as primary texts rather than simply commentaries or secondary texts. The purpose of this treatment is to illustrate how Augustine has become an object in the tradition of western thought. Augustine has a position in the order of development whether he is an ethicist, the religious reformer or an epistemologist. (Heidegger uses the example of Troeltsch, Harnack and Dilthey respectively ([ibid], §1-3). Two senses of time are at work. ([ibid], 56, pp. 168-9) The first sees time as a line with which to order developments while the other sees it as a period of inclusive collective and therefore separate from the present. Augustine becomes an object in history. The second aspect that Heidegger highlights in his introductory study of the commentaries is the reason implicit in these different approaches. All three have a purpose in mind regarding their use of Augustine and therefore the past has a specific meaning for the present: “In each case, it is claimed that “the historical has such-and-such a meaning for the present.” This in itself already poses a problem.” It is this point that Heidegger wishes to take up by avoiding it, “Die Absicht geht weder auf ein Gesamtbild von >Leben und Werk< Augustins noch sollen die Werke als >Auszdruck der Persönlichkeit< verstanden werden in einem blickhaft darstellenden Sinn. Wo von Entwicklung und dergleichen die Rede ist, geschieht das ohne die dösdgebende Abzweckung” ([ibid], 56, p. 170). This understanding of time becomes a central concern for Heidegger’s later philosophy leading to the publication of *Being and Time*.}

But her concern in the dissertation is the implications of Heidegger’s reading for the individual-in-the-world. In these lectures Heidegger “introduces a phenomenology dedicated to recovering what was forgotten by the entire western tradition . . . but which, even if unthetically, was understood by early Christianity: life in its here-and-now facticity, factual life experience . . .”\footnote{Thomas Sheehan, “Heidegger’s “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion”, 1920-21”, *The Personalist*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (July 1979), p. 312.} This factual life experience discussed by Heidegger in these lectures becomes the template for Dasein in *Being and Time*. With *Being* the temporality of Dasein becomes significant and in a criticism that encompassed both Augustine and Heidegger, Arendt sought to counter the tendency that emphasised death in their view of the individual-in-the-world.\footnote{Sheehan, ibid., p. 315 later says, “In dealing with early Christianity, [Heidegger] spells out the pre-theoretical element in terms of life-experience, and the self-exceeding “drawnout-ness” in terms of facticity . . . In early Christianity this primordial *pers-ab-sentia-l movement is understood in terms of temporality, whereas in early Greek experience, the pre-ab-sential movement is thematized in terms of disclosure or “truth”. Temporality and truth—the two ways of looking at Heidegger’s one and only topic [Being]—are rooted respectively in his readings of early Christianity and of archaic Greece.” Together with the Roman then the American experience of foundation, these remain Arendt’s primary source of inspiration throughout her work as well.} The problem also involves the solution as Arendt eventually determines in her final chapter. The individual in remembrance travels along a path that brings them back from eternity and the releasement from craving, on his return from this releasement the individual’s relationship to himself and others is one of distance. This distance is caused not by a new ‘objective state’, only that previous relationships have been forgotten in the process. The individual has found himself in a state of self-denial and in total isolation in terms of meaning. A consequence of this is that the other - as well as the self - must be denied.
In her conclusion Arendt again stresses in a series of questions that she is perplexed as to why the question of the neighbour plays such an important role in Augustine’s thoughts. In looking for solutions to this problem, Arendt seeks ‘another empirical context’ that might explain the persistence of this idea in Augustine’s thoughts. This empirical context has to be ‘different in origin’ to bring the neighbour to a state of relevance. To do this Arendt first wishes to examine the question of common faith, which leads to assertions about ‘true fellowship’. A society of believers has two defining marks. Arendt suggests that the first one is that foundational principle is not mundane, worldly, or horizontal but is rather based purely upon ‘possibility’; it is in other words, futural. This possibility leads to the second one and “the community of faith that is realised in loving each other calls for and demands a total response from each person.” The worldly community similar to citizenship asks only one thing of a member, while the community of faith, the world inbetween, demands the ‘whole’ person. The isolation still remains however even though this faith is exactly the same amongst its community of believers and Arendt looks to the ‘common ground of experience’. To do this Arendt seeks to understand the conceptual framework that primitive Christianity used to articulate this experience in distinction to its Jewish heritage and prior to its subsumption by the Greek tradition of thought. While reading Augustine’s work Arendt seeks to mediate between the two elements of a ‘society of believers’: the City of God, which is futural and encapsulates possibility, and the City of Man, which is historical and therefore foundational. Without stating it explicitly, Arendt uses a new dimension of the temporal that combines both the futural and the historical. This is not fully developed by Arendt but it later emerges as the ‘past possibility’. For now, Arendt believes that this mediation leads to a new definition of love. This love is involved in this primitive Christian framework that is not an simple expression of their Jewish history and has not been subsumed within a Greek intellectual framework.

36 Love and St. Augustine, p. 98.
37 ibid.
38 The idea here seems to be an emphasis on faith Arendt is saying that while faith is different for each, the faith is ‘radically’ a common faith. A consequence to this radical faith is that a fellow individual becomes viewed as simply “from the perspective of the potential faith that would make him a fellow believer”. Arendt continues saying that “... at the same time, this faith is understood as a last and most radical possibility of being human”. The text points to Part II, chapter 2 for this point. Still, Arendt now seems to change tack and says that this ‘radically common faith’ does not unite individuals rather retains their isolation. This is because a common reference point vertically does not have any significance on a horizontal level. As Arendt says, it “is irrelevant to the being of the individual”. However, what does produce a community of the faithful? Or how can internal faith become external bonds? By making this inquiry in this manner, Arendt believes she can locate the “common ground of experience” which makes the community applicable for the individual’s consideration. And Arendt asks a further question; “where does this experiential ground come from that can no longer be traced by the inner dialectics of faith?” Craving and referring back, already described by Arendt, are involved with the divine grace alone. They have no relationship to the community. Yet ‘faith as faith’ is tied to “a distinct and concretely historical fact”. The question of the neighbour does not come from “I am a question unto myself”, rather it is a “historically pre-existing reality”. ibid., p. 99.
In order to determine the implications of Arendt’s thoughts throughout the dissertation her understanding of this primitive Christian thinking needs to be determined. In the period from 1917 to 1919, Heidegger had used the texts of Augustine in his “Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Religion”. During the development of these lectures, Heidegger had consumed the writings of Wilhem Dilthey on Augustine and having satisfied himself with this commentary developed his own understanding. What is important for Arendt’s reading of Augustine is that this understanding was centred upon the tenth chapter of De Trinitate. In this section of De Trinitate Heidegger highlights the certainty that Augustine had regarding the existence of the self. This certainty is repeated again in Descartes’ work, yet in Augustine’s understanding there is a significant affirming implication to the results of persistent doubt. This is a vitality, or form of energy that through affirmation generates life. This happiness and affirmation though involves a turn from the world of the senses into an inner sanctum obtainable through the process of self-reflection in the manner of ‘as oneself’. In highlighting this aspect of Augustine’s thought Heidegger was not seeking the Platonic end, rather he was seeking the source of the soul and its ground.

This is a partial glimpse of Heidegger’s frame of mind when with the commencement of her studies in Marburg Arendt met her ‘hidden king’, Martin Heidegger. He had shed his own theological period and was turning to Aristotle for answers to the problem of metaphysics and its conception of thinking as seeing and therefore Being as a being-in-view, or a constant presence. Consequently when Arendt surprisingly chose Augustine she was making a significant statement regarding how she read Heidegger’s emerging initial position that eventually became the thought of Being and Time. When she chose love as a topic of her

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39 The texts used by Heidegger were The Trinity including the chapter ‘On the Will’, On the 83 Questions, chapter 9, Against the Academicians, chapter 3, §24 (on the senses) amongst others. See the list on n. 48, p. 524 of Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1995).
40 From Steven MacKenna’s translation for The Fathers of the Church series (vol. 45) book 10, section 14; “if he doubts, he lives; ... if he doubts, he wishes to be certain if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know ...”, p. 508.
41 This is discussed in Heidegger’s “Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus” Lectures §§5, ibid., p. 164.
42 This phrase to describe Heidegger’s pre-Being and Time period is not merely one generated by infatuation, rather a description of his effect and influence in this period without ever having published anything substantial. See John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994), especially chapter one which includes Arendt’s description of the ‘hidden king’.
43 Pöggeler, Der Denweg Martin Heideggers, (Pfullingen, Neske, 1983), 2nd ed., p. 46.
44 Kisiel suggests that this religious focus by Heidegger is over and the turn to Aristotle is to a less God-defined understanding and a more ego-centric and ontologically structured analysis of human action. Heidegger distinguishes between the two virtues of practical action; art and prudence. These are differentiated by art being external and prudence as internal and self-referential – action for its own sake. Kisiel, Genesis, p. 219. At this point Heidegger also clarifies the three questions that sustain his examination through to the final draft of Being and Time. The three questions are fundamental and include: What does the ‘world’ mean here? what does ‘in’ a world imply?, and “how does ‘being’ in the world appear? The last question is clearer if it is posed as “who is in the world?”. From these three fundamental questions Arendt methodology of thinking derives its direction and ultimate search for meaning.
dissertation she was also issuing an indication of where her intellectual mentor was failing in his development. Quite unremarkably though she found her supervisor to be Karl Jaspers whose work, *Die Psychologise der Weltanschauung*, had inspired Heidegger. But in his subsequent reading of the work highlighting its methodology he failed to heed the warnings contained within. These warnings were regarding the implicit consequences of reading the lessons of primitive Christianity through the framework of the Greeks. The result was that when Heidegger turned to Aristotle in his quest for an answer to 'what is Being?' he failed to compensate for the effect it would have on his individual's relationship to the world. The differences turn on Heidegger's reading of care as *sorge* thus neglecting the dimension of *cura*. As Heidegger develops his reading of *uti* and *frui* they become modes of caring (*curare*). Despite the Christian context of Augustine's thought Heidegger is reading him as part of the secular tradition. The result is an interpretation of the word *cura* as *Bekümmertsein* or 'being-troubled'.

The important aspect of this coupling of terms occurs in *Being and Time* where the word for caring becomes *sorge* as Heidegger drops *cura*. In the Latin etymological tradition *cura* is related to *quero* (search or seeking). The idea is that the question being asked is always seeking an answer that is described by anxiety. The object of *frui* is alone, always enjoyed purely for its own sake. There is no relation to anything else while *uti* is always use of something else to an end. These definitions and understanding by Augustine lead to the conclusion that "the eternal unchangeable things are to be enjoyed, the temporal changeable things are to be used as a means to some other end." Heidegger suggests that *frui* designates Augustine's essential attitude toward life. The Neoplatonic tradition reveals its continuous influence on Augustine in

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45 Jaspers first appeared on Arendt's intellectual horizons soon after he came to prominence with his study, *Psychology of World Views* in 1919. She read this volume in 1922 after she had acquainted herself with Kierkegaard and Kant, *Youth-Burden*, *For Love of the World*, p. 36. Heidegger's involvement in Augustine's thought is part of a transformation that was directing him towards his analysis in *Being and Time*. The eidetic treatment of religion, representative of the young Heidegger changes to a historical treatment as life itself is seen not as an object but in its full, turbulent existence. Kisiel, *Genesis*, p. 218. *Life* is regarded as such that it does become the Augustinian understanding in that "I have become a question unto myself". In early 1919 Heidegger gave a course "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews" where he comes to terms with what philosophy actually is and should therefore be. Heidegger's definition is repeated by Otto Pöggeler from remarks Heidegger made during the seminar: "Phenomenology is the investigation of life in itself. Despite the appearance of a philosophy of life, it is really the opposite of a worldview. A worldview is an objectification and immobilising of life at a certain point in the life of a culture. In contrast, phenomenology is never closed off, it is always provisional in its absolute immersion in life as such. In it no theories are in dispute, but only genuine insights versus the unoriginal. The genuine ones can be obtained only by an honest and unreserved immersion in life itself in its genuineness, and this is ultimately possible only through the genuineness of a personal life". This definition of philosophy is an indication of the attractiveness of thinking that besieged Arendt in her time at Marburg, ibid., p. 17.


the description of beauty as being involved in the highest good (*summum bonum*). But the
Christian conception of the factic life resists a complete assumption of Plotinus’ understanding
of *frui*. While the external representation of the self makes it appear that they are the same, the
internal remains separate and the love of God is different from - deriving from a different
course as well - the *life of the self*. Arendt rejected the Aristotelian emphasis in Heidegger’s
thought seeking instead to retain the primitive Christian perspective that evolves around the
other. Ironically, her guide for this rejection was Augustine who had made a similar mistake to
Heidegger in his own theological investigations. Consequently, the use of concepts such as
eudaimonia, *phronesis* and *kairos* and the topic of much of the commentary on Arendt are
different from those presumed to be at the heart of her thought.

2. Love in Actuality

The order of love in Christian thought is a concern because while designating the priority of
love as what is above us in regards to what is below us, there is a problem for that which stands
beside us. This order is determined by the “highest good” yet the attitude towards the world
that is constrained by either enjoyment or use is no longer adequate. Arendt declares that a new
kind of love is required and one that is not love as craving. Arendt designates this love as ‘social
caritas’. In this definition when love has accepted the ‘right order’ it is no longer craving or
desire. It no longer craves an object and therefore gives up this controlling factor, instead it is
determined by the general order of everything or what the lover is part of even if the lover is
the point of reference. The ‘order of everything’ refers to the world which is a particular
conception of the world. It is the world in-between created by man on earth out of the desert
that does not use (*itt*) nor enjoy (*frui*) this man-made world. Understanding what Arendt
means by this ‘order of everything’ requires an investigation into what she was reacting against.

In Heidegger’s *Being and Time* the concept of order is mentioned only once but is plays an

51 This means, Arendt continues, is that the worldly and material which includes the body, is lower on the order of love
and “must be loved for the sake of the highest”. The highest must be loved for its own sake. It is all still from an
individual perspective, and one that Arendt seems to want to stress (twice in a couple of paragraphs) saying that “Not
everything, but only what stands in some relation to myself, is included in the love of love”. She continues this line by
saying “this relation is established in a community (*societas*) of those who, like myself, can achieve happiness only in
regard to God and the highest good” and therefore are “closest to me” (*prosum*), my true neighbours.” *Love and St.
Augustine*, pp. 29–40.
52 “In a similar way, I establish this relation to my body as the apparition of my earthly existence. Therefore, there is
a difference between the mere use of the world (*itt*) in complete alienation from it and this love that also is directed
toward the world, even though it is not permitted to enjoy its objects for their own sake (*frui*).” *ibid.*, p. 40. [Arendt then
Augustine quote]
important, if underdeveloped, role. He says that “[t]he principle of order has its own content, which is never to be found by means of such ordering, but is already presupposed in it”. Inherent in each level of order is its order that can be brought back to a foundation. While this understanding is poetic Arendt is seeking one for praxis through her reading of love in Augustine. Arendt through her investigation of Augustine seeks a love that is primary and creates a new world inbetween: “[e]strangement itself gives rise to a new togetherness, that is, to a new being with and for each other that exists beside and against the old society.” It is significant for Arendt’s emerging framework that Augustine sought to associate the Spirit with caritas in his trinity and the role of Spirit was the function of ordering. This ordering is the same as the Christian Trinity. The emphasis in the primitive ‘lived-experience’ of Christianity is on the horizontal not the ‘hierarchical order’ of the Platonic. It is a love that acknowledges the relevance of that “which is beside and next to me, I-myself and my neighbour.” It is this association that drives Arendt’s love in the dissertation and remains with her way of thinking into her post-World War Two explorations of vita activa in European thought.

(i) Seeking the Right Love

In the dissertation Arendt argues that it become evident that Augustine’s methodology of opposition (use and enjoyment and ends and means) does not encompass another kind of love - one that does not exist under the label of craving. She says that the vertical of above and below is the suitable realm of caritas but she asks, what about that which “is beside and next to me, I-myself and my neighbour, is neither to be “used” nor to be “enjoyed””? What is therefore required is a concept that is completely different and, this becomes the purpose of Arendt’s conclusion. Arendt determines the solution to this problem around a basic Aristotelian assumption regarding human nature: the search for happiness. The Augustinian ego has the

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53 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 52 [p. 77 of Macquarrie].
55 Love and St. Augustine, p. 108.
57 Love and St. Augustine, p. 40. Arendt is pointed in her statement regarding this as she determines that what is required is a concept that is completely different and that is the purpose of Part II, chapter 3 and Part III of her dissertation.
58 These relationships are relevant to Arendt’s discussion of love as desire, Arendt says, because of its relationships are ordered from outside, the view point of the “highest good”. The idea that Augustine’s attempt to examine love (as craving) cannot sustain itself and needs further broadening of its understanding. Arendt argues that “[t]he strong influences of Stoic and Neoplatonic terminology in Augustine’s early thought takes it revenge hero, and the result is all the more confusing as these [quoting Hans Jonas] “formal concepts remain unchanged throughout all the stages” of his development”, ibid. pp. 40-41.
59 She maintains the belief in happiness as a fundamental imperative of the individual again turning to this in her essay, ‘What is Existens Philosophy?’ in Essays in Understanding, p. 169.
priority here as the individual is only interested in their own satisfaction. Using Augustine's distinction between use (uti) ("a means for obtaining something else") and enjoyment, Arendt says that happiness is obtained when the lover and the loved become one. Consequently "[t]he fulfilment and end of desire is "enjoyment" (frui)" and "[t]his is the goal towards which love aims and which constitutes "happiness"". This reveals the fundamental disposition of the Augustinian individual because, as Arendt says, "[s]elf-love is the root of all desire, of caritas as well as of cupiditas". The satisfaction of the individual in the world is paradoxically at the centre of Augustine's work. The ego of self-love in their attitude towards the neighbour is given several choices by Augustine and yet Arendt argues that these choices are not possible. By loving God the neighbour becomes irrelevant as the individual avoids that which resides on the earth and is perishable. This is linked to the concept of time that Augustine (and Heidegger) develops in his understanding but it is worthwhile, initially, in separating them from each other. However, it must be remembered that both these forms of love lead to an isolated individual; "Both caritas and cupiditas testify to a fundamental isolation of man from whatever might bring him happiness, that is, to a separation of man from his very self".

This leads Augustine to define love and incidentally happiness as; 
"[c]raving or love, is a human being's possibility of gaining possession of the good that will make him happy, that is, of gaining possession of what is most his own". At this point Augustine's understanding of love becomes involved with a related concept of fear and then evil. To love involves a risk and this risk of loss becomes a source of fear and evil; "the desire to have (appetitus habendi) turns into a fear of losing (metus amittendi)". According to Augustine, "[n]one will doubt that the only causes of fear are either loss of what we love and have gained, or failure to gain what we love

60 Love and St. Augustine, p. 32 (B:033157).
61 ibid., p. 19 (B:033144).
62 ibid., p. 20 (B:033144).
63 ibid., p. 9.
64 Heidegger discusses the relationship between fear and loving: "Fear and desire thus always belong together. One is not possible without the other". Heidegger goes on to explain that Augustine's insight does not stop here and reveals that the tension (or discordance) is present within fearing/desiring as well. Asking whether something being feared is "lamentable or joyous, good or bad". As Heidegger goes on to say, "Thus, the distress of concern is not simply there but is itself experienced in a specific way, as miserable or joyful. Curare itself is pervaded by ambiguity and insecurity. This discordance is itself indicative of the trial that belongs intrinsically to being human, not just to something that comes from the outside. Möesta is an all too human onus: "I am a burden to myself". (Chapter 28) Inasmuch as this burden and insecurity constitute the essence of factic life [later, Dasein], "I have become a question to myself". (Chapter 33) The question belongs to the very being of human life. Kiesel, Genesis, p. 203. Heidegger concludes his lectures with a summary of the two basic fears he sees apparent in the work of Augustine and also relevant to understanding the individual in the world: "first, timor servitus, "worldly fear," the anxiousness which befalls us from the world-about and the world-with. In contrast, there is timor castus, "selfly fear," which is motivated in true hope, in the confidence brought alive purely out of itself. This fear is developed in connection with the concern (Bekümmernung) of life for authentic self-experience", ibid., p. 217.
and have hoped for'.

Evil is that which takes happiness or the craved away and therefore the individual must 'shun it'. Temporal things therefore, by their very nature are what we fear being taken away from us. The temporal good exists independently of the individual and being temporal will eventually cease to exist; but the individual is related to this temporal good through craving. From the perspective of the individual, one is "[c]onstantly bound by craving and fear to a future full of uncertainties, we strip each present moment of its calm, its intrinsic import, which we are unable to enjoy. And so, the future destroys the present".

In this single sentence there are two very important indicators of Arendt's reading of Augustine. The first is the role of death in Arendt's argument and therefore her reading of Augustine. It is still important to her understanding and therefore the argument of her dissertation that she rejected Heidegger's death-oriented philosophy but this does require some qualification. Arendt acknowledges this problem and does not seek to resolve it, instead agreeing that, in Augustine, "life characterised by death craves something that, in principle, it cannot obtain, and pursues it as though it were at its disposal".

Death is at the end of all lives and also the reference point of every moment. "Human life is always "not yet"" and the present is defined by the future or the expected future and the expectation is defined by the person's desire at that moment. When these desires are fulfilled, they are replaced by other desires or cravings, but they are always overshadowed by death; "every fulfilment is only apparent because at the end looms death, the radical loss". Consequently the future is threatening and thus only a moment without a future can be free of worry and without concern of dispossession. This possession is simply life itself and the idea of vitæ beata is 'life itself'; or a life with a particular state that cannot be dispossessed, or a sense of living. Secondly, the happiness mentioned here seems to take on an Aristotelian character but Augustine is trying to express a particularly Christian understanding of the concept with overtones of the eschatological. The last quote is full of this inference. The temporal nature of the individual and especially its futural emphasis in a Heideggerian reading of Augustine removes the potential obtainment of calm from the moment and therefore its 'intrinsic import'. This characterisation of the moment -- and its temporal primacy -- in this sentence indicates Arendt’s sustaining

65 Referenced to Eighty-Three Different Questions.
66 Luce and St. Augustine, p. 10.
67 ibid., pp. 12-3 (B033134).
68 ibid., p. 13.
69 ibid., pp. 13-4.
perspective in her reading of Augustine. The 'enjoy' of this sentence is not the Augustinian frui, rather a sense of pleasure that corresponds with an Augustinian not Aristotelian notion of happiness. The differentiation of these two types of happiness are the most significant aspect of Arendt's reading.

This leads to an inquiry regarding what Arendt actually means by happiness (both vita beata and eudaimonia) in the context of her dissertation. This also highlights the influence of the Heideggerian and Augustinian emphasis on isolation and death. An indication of her response is provided by her statement above. Both of the elements contained within her discussion above require the achievement of harmony in the Arendtian individual, a state of being that becomes a leitmotif for Arendt and founds her conception of judgement through its various transformations. The solution to judgement without a universal is shadowed in her proposal of a love without desire. In order to see how this emerges through her dissertation requires an analysis of her 'solution' to the Augustinian contradiction: social caritas.

(ii) Three Types of Love: Caritas, Cupiditas and Social Caritas

The main distinction between the two forms of love – caritas and cupiditas – that Arendt finds in the work of Augustine is the object that these two forms of love lead the individual to desire or, the common ground of these two Augustinian concepts is appetitus.70 Appetitus is present in both forms of love. Augustine begins his concern with love from the point of craving or desire.71 Consequently Augustine links the two because “to love is indeed nothing else than to crave something for its own sake” and then says that “love is a kind of craving”.72 Arendt then goes on to suggest that “every craving (appetitus) is tied to a definite object, and it takes this object to spark the carving itself, thus providing an aim for it” and this defines loves, as Augustine writes, as “a kind of motion, and all motion is toward something”.73 It is the link between the individual and reality and is that which controls the urge of the thinking being to escape material reality and gaze at their own thoughts from outside their own world; “Desire mediates between subject and object, and it annihilates the distance between them by

70 As Arendt explains on two occasions, "caritas, like any love, must be understood as craving and is distinguished from cupiditas by its object alone". Love and St. Augustine, B.033152, p. 27. This is repeated earlier when she says that "all craving is determined by its object and turns into caritas or cupiditas by what it seeks." ibid., p. 25./B.033115.

71 As he says, "[t]he relationship of man to a thing (rex), that is, to everything that exists, is determined by love as desire."

72 From Eighty-Three Different Questions 35, 1 and 2.

73 See ibid., 1.
transforming the subject into a lover and the object into the beloved". This loosely translated notion of desire is all important to Arendt’s understanding. Yet, she argues that the source of this understanding is not the New Testament but rather the tradition of thought from Aristotle to Plotinus and in particular the Stoic school of thought. However for Augustine, the Stoic pursuit of fearlessness or self-sufficiency cannot occur because as a Christian this salvation cannot happen in this world.

The next element that Arendt requires in her explication of Augustine’s understanding is the idea of enjoyment. Arendt believes that this ‘good’ is defined by Augustine in two different and unrelated contexts. Arendt discerns two possible definitions of “good” at work in Augustine’s thought up to this stage. The reason, Arendt believes, is due to his dependence on the language of Greek philosophy to articulate his understanding. And, as she adds, this is especially relevant to the discussion of appetitus. Arendt makes a comment about Aristotle as the initiator of this line of thought and adds that he does not make this fear part of an understanding of man. The first is the good as an object of craving and one that operates in this world. While the second is that defined by the fear of death. In a similar view, Arendt believes, death also has two interpretations corresponding to here and now and the future. The first interpretation of death in Augustine is death as a representation that life cannot control itself entirely while the second is the worse evil, its antithesis. The first is internal while the second is external; “only when death is regarded as the upmost evil, meeting life from outside, is the unity of the argument (love as craving) preserved”. However, the element that actually heightens the consciousness of the individual is the loss of this possession, even if the possession remains a mere potential. The exact description of these actual or potential possessions is irrelevant to the way the individual feels. In fact, this matter is impossible to determine and therefore a distraction because a definition would never fully encompass the possibilities. A result of this understanding is that “a happy life (beata vita) is actually life itself” and therefore the fear is the threat of no life at all. The conclusion to this is seen by Arendt as the reasoning that leads to the Christian attitude towards death; “[t]hus the good love craves is life, and the evil fear shuns is death” but as a consequence “life on earth is a living death, mors vitalis, or vita mortalis. It is

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74 Ecce and St. Augustine, p. 18 (B:033143). Desire cannot exist for its own sake, rather it needs an external focus. This object must also be within the awareness of the individual. An individual cannot desire what does not exist. Of course, it does not necessarily have to be an object, but it is assumed to be a “good”; Arendt summarises this saying “[t]he thing we know and desire is a “good” (bonum), otherwise we would not seek it for its own sake”, ibid., p. 9.

75 ibid., p. 12.
altogether determined by death; indeed it is more properly called death.” In summary, and pre-empting Arendt’s conclusions, the result of all this is the Christian faith and its story of immorality because the goal in these terms is simple - fearlessness. The eternal life after death is a life without fear of loss. It is a life without a future and hence without the fear of dispossession; “[t]his fearlessness is what love seeks. Love as craving (appetitus) is determined by its goal, and this goal is freedom from fear (metu carere).”

There are two things that determine what is the correct love. The individual seeks happiness and they only achieve happiness when they possess what they desire. Yet the individual becomes what they desire as they become one with possession. This results in a calm as love is stilled by the possession. As such the individual is what they desire. As a consequence the Augustinian individual in wishing to avoid fear seek a possession that will never be lost. And therefore they seek eternity; “[e]ternity is “what you cannot lose against your will”’.77 The only eternity that can be found by the individual is that which is not of the earthly world (because all in the world is doomed to die or perish). The continual existence of death therefore determines the appropriate object of love and this object eternity can also be defined as freedom from fear. So caritas is this love that the individual driven by desire to seek happiness should choose as it achieves freedom from fear. On the other hand there is cupiditas. This love is also examined in terms of whether happiness can be obtained through this direction. In Arendt’s reading, cupiditas is outward looking and desires objects in the world. Yet, as Arendt has already revealed, in Augustine’s understanding objects to be loved in the world will always be lost. The main reason for this is that being external the objects are always beyond the control of the individual and consequently things I “can lose against my will”.78 Therefore, with cupiditas, happiness can never occur. When an individual loves the world it must be acknowledged that one must always eventually leave it; “in cupiditas, man has cast the die that makes him perishable. In caritas, whose object is eternity, man transforms himself into an eternal, nonperishable being.”79 To want the world is to want something that is always only transient. This leads to the Christian self-denial. If fear of loss is the main propulsion for life and one therefore seeks certainty, ‘love of the world’ is the wrong love. The correct love must therefore be love of ‘eternity and the absolute future’. Arendt then says that “Augustine calls this right

76 Arendt with Augustine quote from Eighty-Three Different Questions, 34.
77 Love and St. Augustine, p. 13 (B:033135), Arendt quoting Augustine (unreferenced).
78 cupiditas amatere possum. Ibid., p. 20 (B:033145).
79 Ibid., p. 18 (B:033143).
love caritas: the “root of all evils is cupiditas, the root of all goods is caritas”.80 Desire itself is then not wrong, rather what you desire determines what is right and wrong. And again love is not wrong but what you love is the important aspect; Augustine warns that “Love, but be careful what you love”.81 The sentence next to this assertion is “Caritas says: love of God and love of neighbours; cupiditas says: love of the world and love of this age (saeculum)”.82 The problem is the definition and understanding of the ‘neighbour’ in caritas. This becomes the crux of the problem for Arendt which requires mediation in terms of its temporal nature.

Arendt changes the focus of her investigation from the individual, her primary concern, and focuses on the other in love and the moment. This new individual is also an individual that seeks self-denial in his way through the world to the other world. It is because of man’s relationship to God that a relationship emerges with the world that God created. Consequently this relationship is constructed around the God-man dimension and the question emerges in Arendt’s investigation that if God is to be loved, how can one love the neighbour in his particularity and what in the world is worth living for? The solution is Social Caritas although we are not too interested in the validity of this solution but rather in the dimensions it introduces into Arendt’s way of thinking.

Arendt summarises the problem of the isolation of the individual and the proposed connection to the neighbour. Arendt wishes to detail how an individual can meet their neighbour and escape the isolation inherent in caritas. The dominant understanding of the neighbour is deficient and needs rehabilitation, but there is another source that requires unravelling. As Arendt says in the dissertation “by the fact of referring back, man as creature gains his own being” and this occurs in God’s presence. The return, however, through providing the individual with his own being and the subsequent isolation that occurs “is the sole source of neighbourly love”. The result of this search, Arendt believes, will lead to a new love. This new love is dependent on the return and the remembered past. Arendt terms this new love as “social” caritas”. What Arendt is introducing into her thinking is the notion of foundation as the reference point. This social caritas is justified because “human beings belong together due to their common historic descent from Adam” and “[e]ven though this belonging

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80 ibid., p. 17 (B:033139) quoting Augustine from Commentaries in the Psalms, 90,1,8.
81 Augustine, Commentaries, 31.5.
82 As the editors of Arendt’s dissertation point out. Love and Saint Augustine, p. 17.
is of the world, it gives the neighbour a definite relevance even in self-denying love". 83 What is also important is the association that Arendt makes when locating this beginning. Self-understanding is significant in this process: "[t]he prerequisite of the right comprehension of my neighbour is the right comprehension of myself". 84 This leads for Arendt to a state where a commonality between individuals emerges allowing communication to establish a successful bridge between isolated individuals. This comprehension is the surety "of the truth of my own being that I can love my neighbour in his true being, which is in his createdness". This means for Arendt that you do not love him in the "concrete and worldly encounter with him" but rather in his createdness. This is something that you see residing in him and notably, something that he is unaware he is; "For you love in him not what he is, but what you wish that he may". 85 Arendt has previously described the search for the source that man undergoes and how it leads ‘beyond the world’ to the absolute source or the Creator. Because it is out of the world - "exceeds every source that is historical and immanent in the world" - it must relinquish "any independent choice and any originally established relation with the world". 86 Arendt stresses the worldliness aspect that is rejected in this search for the absolute source regarding "[t]he historical source of man would be the very token of his worldliness and would accord with his being of the world". 87 Arendt states that because man is tied to his own ‘source’ (which in this instance is God) he cannot relate to the neighbour for the neighbour’s sake or even for his own sake; "[m]an’s absolute isolation in God’s presence leads to absolute self denial and therefore a release from all originally established relations with the world". 88 The purpose is to return to the source to achieve an understanding of the meaning, "an understanding of my own existence

83 "ibid.", p. 95. Self-denying love means to deny the love of oneself too completely and this means that all others must be loved completely regardless. The consequence is that the indistinguishable occurs and a desert appears to the lover. No identity can be determined and therefore no object for the lover to love. Also as a consequence to this it means that you do actually to love them as yourself - in denial.
84 Note the potential relationship to understanding Arendt’s thesis in The Life of the Mind.
85 Augustine in Homilies on the First Epistle of St. John, VII, 10. All this leaves the lover and the neighbour in isolation as there is no relationship, as it is merely a ‘summons into God’s presence’. In self-denying love, Arendt believes that the individual denies himself and the neighbour but he does not forget him. Arendt shows this in part one of chapter three, however. "I deny the other person so as to break through to his real being, just as in searching for myself I deny myself". Love and St. Augustine, p. 96. This process of denial seems to be one of purification or a way round the obscurity of the other’s being. Through denial one can “break through to his real being”, and achieve the ‘who’ rather than merely the ‘what’. This understanding of denial is phenomenological in its initiation as it seeks the unfettered in a person’s existence.
86 "ibid.", p. 94 and then 95. Therefore Arendt confirms once more “[l]ove of neighbour leaves the lover himself in absolute isolation and the world remains a desert for man’s isolated existence”. Yet Arendt goes even further and says that “this “as God” destroys every human standard and separates love of neighbour from any earthly love”. "ibid.", p. 94. Arendt now turns from her summary of the consequences of Augustine’s choice in love as desire to the one that he neglected. The light of cupidities becomes more favourable because even though it is the wrong “before”, it must be remembered that its purpose is located in its forward inclination, or being “after the world”.
87 "ibid.
88 "ibid.", p. 95.
as originally fraught and weighted with meaning”. The ‘denial of the other person’ is not the purpose of this; in fact it is the beginning; “the neighbour’s original being is pointed out in the denial that is a comprehension of his being”.89 In Arendt’s eyes without God another source must be located where meaning can be determined.

The search for all in this is the eternal in the individual that is not only always present but the source of the individual. In Augustine we can see his emphasis on death and as a result its determination of the future both as a problem and as a solution. Death is at the end of all lives and also the reference point of every moment.90 This leads to the priority of an attitude of antiworldliness in Augustine and therefore a rejection of this understanding in Arendt.91 The Augustinian conceptions of love both result from the same source and utilise the same faculty. What is different is the result of deciding ‘about our abode’ - this world or the one to come. These alternatives are external to the individual. Yet, as man is not self-sufficient, love is a necessity and “the question of who [an individual is] can only be resolved by the object of [their] desire.”92 So Arendt introduces into the formation of a person’s identity a foundational link and a decision regarding a person’s nature.93 Augustine is seen by Arendt as saying that man searches for that which will last forever, the essential self. For Arendt, however, this essential self in Augustinian terms is the eternal in an individual that is disclosed by illumination of the foundational moment as ‘past possibility’. This is because the Augustinian search only reveals that death is the only stable element in a person’s life and that human existence is unreliable.94 In other words, this “whence” is the source and the eternal and “Love proves its strength precisely in considering even the enemy and even the sinner as mere

89 ibid., p. 97.
90 It is interesting to note that Arendt asserts that “death, not just fear of death, was the most crucial experience in Augustine’s life. With exquisite eloquence he describes in the Confessions what it meant to him to lose his friend, and how "he became a question to himself" as a consequence of this loss”. ibid., p. 13 (B:033125-6). (unreferenced quote from Augustine). Later on in Arendt’s life she held experiences (especially political experience) as vital to understanding the world and as a complement to her understanding of ‘words and deeds’ in her work.
91 This antiworldliness is well captured by Augustine when he describes the following journey, “suppose, then, we were wanderers in a strange country, and could not live happily away from our fatherland, and that we felt wretched in our wanderings, and wishing to put an end to our misery, determined to return home. We find, however, that we must make use of some mode of conveyance, either by land or water, in order to reach that fatherland where our enjoyment is to commence. But the beauty of the country through which we pass, and the very pleasure of the motion, charm our hearts, and turning these things which we ought to use into objects of enjoyment, we become unwilling to hasten the end of our journey; and becoming engrossed in a factitious delight, our thoughts are diverted from that home whose delights would make us truly happy. Such is a picture of our condition in this life of mortality. We have wandered far from God; and if we wish to return to our father’s home, this world must be used, not enjoyed.” Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 1.4.4.
92 Love and St. Augustine, p. 18 (B:033143).
93 Arendt says that if man can “be said to have an essential nature at all, it would be lack of self-sufficiency”: ibid., p. 19 (B:033143). Man is thrown into the world and is distinct from everything, especially that which will deliver happiness. ibid., p. 20 (B:033144).
occasions for love. It is not really the neighbour who is loved in this love of neighbour—it is love itself."95 Love becomes Arendt's focus, or the third element in the trinity that also includes the lover and the loved. Arendt now says that "[w]e saw above how, in the search for its own self, human existence itself becomes the object of craving and desire: that is, a 'thing' that is loved as though it were objectively extant, a 'true life' outside the present life." And she continues saying, "This 'reification' of existence is completed precisely by its projection into a future of timeless stability. He who returns from the absolute future to regulate the world will see even his own present existence as a 'thing' among things, to be fitted in to the rest of what exists." Love as desire means that a man can decide (through judgement) on their conduct by referencing the future; "[h]is present mode of existence was hope and anticipation".96 With his view of the future and his belief that it could hold the 'highest good' and its inherent objectivity, man can use this potential to generate an 'order' and decide which objects he should love and how he should love them. However, this ordering with reference to the anticipated future, an individual ignores or at least avoids self-love and the love of the neighbour. The hermeneutical relationship between the lover and the object - which not only affects the object but also the lover - invalidates its pre-futural arrangements with the world including that which brings about self-love. The problem with this conception of love was that love as craving was not suitable, or adequate, because it expected to crave something in the future.

Arendt summarises her understanding obtained in her conceptual examination of Augustine's notions of love. The problem as she sees it, is that the definition of love as desire is a problem. In this guise, love demands dependency on the future through the prospective attainment of the 'highest good' and through this futural gain, the present is understood. A major problem of this notion that desire is forward looking and forward looking only, neglects a proper understanding of what happiness it seeks actually is. Also to actually desire happiness, a conception of what this happiness is must be present before the initiation of desire can occur. Otherwise the expectation would be that an individual decides to desire and then proceeds to seek something to desire. In asking this of Augustine's conception of desire, Arendt is making plain her understanding that desire is not an a priori mental state, rather it is derivative in real life. The dependency on the future leaves out a dependency on the present. It is the past that

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95 ibid., p. 97. Arendt finishes this section saying that "[t]hus the neighbour's relevance as a neighbour (which was previously described as a discrepancy) is overcome and the individual is left in isolation".

96 ibid., p. 45.
produces the understanding of what the happy life is, and should desire when this has occurred. In summary, desire can only desire something it has acknowledged of beforehand. Augustine, Arendt says, saw this knowledge residing in memory. Augustine sees memory’s role in deciding what to desire as similar to how it enables an individual to remember what he or she appears to have forgotten. ‘Appears’ is the correct term here because if you have forgotten something completely you would not know that you have in fact forgotten it in the first place. Consequently, an understanding of what it means to exist in a happy life is present in an individual’s understanding already, even if it is only a faintly perceivable quality. This search for a new love, dependent on return and remembrance, is at the heart of Arendt’s dissertation. Arendt has found an answer to a question that only arises later as she responds to Heidegger’s thought. This involves the problem that Heidegger has transferring his understanding of the factual Christian experience into a non-theological context of Dasein. The self of this lived experience is embedded in the context of man’s relation to God. This becomes apparent when Paul’s notion of knowing, or the eidenai dimension of factual life that becomes phronesis, is considered and the dimension of past possibility through return and remembrance not death becomes Arendt’s reference point.

3. Primitive versus the Hellenic: Reading Augustine and Aristotle

While seemingly a passing observation in the dissertation, an aspect of Arendt’s concern regarding the tradition is the neo-platonic terminology used by Augustine to express his understanding of the emerging Christian experience. This is the essence of Arendt’s concerns that the tradition of western thought has forgotten the originary experiences that its philosophical vocabulary was initially developed to express. This leitmotif of her work found inspiration in Augustine’s use of the Greek tradition to articulate the primitive Christian experience contained in the New Testament. More specifically, what is the focus of Arendt’s ongoing critique of Heidegger’s thought is his use of an Aristotelian eudaimonia and phronesis. This is seen by Arendt as the basis for his move to an ego-based understanding of the modern

97 Arendt asks the question, is it an innate idea, prior to all experience? In fact, Arendt says that it is not simply an innate idea, rather it is “specifically stored up in memory as the seat of consciousness”. Arendt continues saying, “When happiness is projected into the absolute future, it is guaranteed by a kind of absolute past, since knowledge of it, which is present in us, cannot possibly be explained by any experience in this world.” Ibid., p. 47. So do we remember the happy life? Augustine answers, “Is it like the way we remember joy? Perhaps so, for even when I am sad, I remember joy, just as when I am miserable, I remember the happy life. But I never saw, or heard, or smelled, or tasted joy with the bodily sense. I experienced it in my mind when I rejoiced and knowledge of it has clung to my memory.” Quote from ibid.
individual rather than retaining the insights of primitive Christianity provided by Luther, Pascal, Kierkegaard and Jaspers.

In this understanding there is an element of the New Testament theologian Rudolph Bultmann with whom Arendt studied while concurrently attending Heidegger’s lectures. Heidegger, with the assistance of Bultmann at one stage, sought to recover the lived experiences of antiquity that had been encapsulated by Aristotle’s philosophy.98 At the same time Heidegger thought that he would also be retrieving the experiences of the New Testament Christian. The reason there is no differentiation, Caputo suggests, is because for Heidegger this would result in the same factual life being uncovered as this life was considered – at this point in his intellectual development – formal and ahistorical.99 Bultmann, however, sought to locate only the Christian experience of existence and this amounted to a reversal of Heidegger’s existential analytic refusing the universal, instead seeking the Christian specific. For New Testament theologians applying the principle of Heidegger’s thought sought to determine their ‘living existential Christian message’ (kerygma).100 Immediately after Jesus the man died, historical communities formed and ‘gave mythological formulation to their collective memories of Jesus’. These memories it was believed contained the Christian truth. When Arendt was faced with the decision of studying Augustine over Aristotle she made a decision that meant she stepped away from Heidegger’s ahistorical individual towards Bultmann’s historical analysis (and others at Marburg). The later concepts of return and referring, foundation and storytelling find their genesis in this decision and lead to more differentiation from the Heidegger project such as the implications of eudemonia and phronesis.

A primitive Christian conception of phronesis that considers the other directs Arendt to reject the dominance of vita contemplativa, and look instead to the implications of forgiveness leading therefore to a Kierkegaardian notion of earnestness, and the moment as singular. Throughout this analysis is an overarching appreciation of the idea of harmony in the mind, the soul, and in

society. It is with the use of these insights that Arendt sought to examine the particular and the implicit, non-dictatory universal it contains. This is aided by another fundamental element in Arendt’s thought emerging at this time. In Heidegger’s challenge to Ernst Troeltsch’s metaphysics of religion, he again turned to the first text of the New Testament, Paul’s Letters to the Thessalonians. Therefore, in his Augustine course in SS 1921 Heidegger sought to reveal how Augustine emphasised the Greek notion of theoria or contemplatio when discussing his understanding of primitive Christianity. The end result is not a moment of revelation in the moment of reception but rather the purity of thought prevalent in the Hellenic tradition. Action of the moment is replaced by contemplation in response. Heidegger thought that Luther, Kierkegaard, and Dilthey all failed to unravel this as a new possibility as they remained eventually under the spell of Greek concepts. By the time Heidegger had turned to Aristotle in his quest for being, Arendt also made a similar determination. For Arendt kairological time is the time of action, (or being-awake in Paul’s I Thessalonians. 5:3) against the demand of chronological time associated with the notion of presence that leads to contemplation and quietism. Arendt wished to retain the active element in this understanding of temporality. Fate does not determine the condition of man therefore disabling his capacity for judgement. Heidegger in his lecture refers to the I Thessalonians 1:10 and Paul’s statement that they must remain in state of readiness when he says “you have turned to God and away from idols in order to serve a living and true God and to wait for his Son from Heaven.” This waiting is not anticipation of this expected event rather a readiness or judgemental condition in the kairological state of the ‘now’. Sheehan in his interpretation of this passage suggests that ‘[t]he Christian—or Pauline—meaning of eschatology Heidegger calls a Vollzugzusammenhang mit Gott.


102 This course on religion was taught at the University of Freiburg and while religious thinkers continue to appear in his work and studies, in the following years Heidegger disavowed the religious understanding announcing his belief in the inherent “atheism” of philosophy late in 1922. Heidegger moved to Marburg and a change in emphasis occurred as he left this religious aspect behind and consequently an acute interest in the moment. By the time Arendt reached Marburg the theological aspect to Heidegger’s understanding of Augustine had diminished. In fact, Augustine became involved in the development of his hermeneutic phenomenology as Heidegger looks to encompass the intentional dynamics of the phenomena he now sees as important. As Kistiel phrases it in his work, “[i]n short, formal indications, as phenomenological expicata which prefigure the phenomena in the full panoply of their vectorial tendencies, ultimately seek a nondisturbing access to the very temporality and historicity of the pretheoretical phenomena” and the religious experience comes closest to the possible subjects. Genesis, p. 217.


106 van Buren, “Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther”, p. 165.
a context of enacting one’s life in uncertainty before unseen God. The weight has now been shifted to the “how” of existence.¹⁰⁷ Heidegger replaces God with death, however, therefore denigrating the role of faith in the parousia of Christ while seeking to retain the original dynamics.¹⁰⁸

(i) Eudaimonia: Vita Beata as Harmony

The Confessions is the greatest example of Augustine’s terminological confusion and significantly its location is in the complex reasoning of Book X. This was Heidegger’s textual focus as he explored his phenomenological Augustine. At a particular point of his investigation in the Confessions, Augustine’s conceptual framework becomes bankrupt.¹⁰⁹ The weight of his Neoplatonic background finally corrupts his message. Both Heidegger and Arendt drew this conclusion and used it as their main point of entry into Augustine’s thought. Equally for both of them, the implications of this bankruptcy loom large, although only Heidegger continues this investigation further. In his WS 1925-6 lecture series, Heidegger similarly analysed the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia as contemplation, which becomes part of Augustine’s enjoyment of God. This merger of the two intellectual frameworks lay the foundation for the western tradition transmitted through the work of Thomas, Descartes, Kant and Hegel.¹¹⁰ The new philosophy can no longer express what Augustine is seeking to express in his words of the Confessions. The truth he is writing about is prior to the truth of the philosophical canon yet it is expressed in these words. It also challenges this conceptual notion by seeking a non-cognitive way to truth. Nonetheless, Augustine still attempts to use the Greek tradition to express his thought here, using the concept of sumnum bonum and its definition of the immutable.¹¹¹ A consequence of this is that the new truth is equated with frui while everything else in the world is under the countenance of uti.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ For a discussion on this see Burren, “Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther”, pp. 159-61.
¹¹¹ The lectures on Augustine by Heidegger detail Heidegger’s examination of the lactic life through Augustine’s work on uti (using) and frui (enjoying). Heidegger observes that Augustine is in agreement with the Greeks that the good is the immutable, and the immutable is the ‘highest good’ (sumnum bonum), or Truth and Being. When frui is the state of being then it is in accordance with the highest good and therefore Truth and Being. Kiesiel, Genesis, p. 200.
¹¹² In De Doctrina Christiana Augustine further clarifies frui and uti introducing a tripartite classification: objects to be used, objects to be enjoyed and objects to be used and enjoyed. De Doctrina Christiana, 1, 3. The neighbour, however, is still to be defined in this scheme De Doctrina Christiana, 1, 22. And it must be remembered that which is loved for its own sake is the happy life. See Kiesiel, Genesis, p. 204 for further discussion on this.
The relationship of this Heideggerian reading is close to Arendt’s own reading, especially in Part II ‘Creator and Creature: the Remembered Past’. At this point she is still strictly within a Heideggerian framework of hermeneutic interpretation. Yet while she follows closely his entrance into Augustine’s thoughts in the Confessions she appears to not pursue it to Chapter 33 and the question of knowledge. But this hesitancy is only apparent if her thoughts are read without the influence of the Thomastic Gilson. In his seminal work on St. Augustine’s thought he argues that delight (delectatio) is ‘closely associated’ with love. This is because delight is the very thing that love pursues in the object it is loving, and is especially significant if the love of love becomes the object. Arendt’s social caritas is a rejection of love as desire and the achievement of delight becomes its replacement. Arendt seeks this solution because through her investigation in the dissertation she sees the difficulty that Augustine runs into because of his conceptual framework. This delight leads Arendt to a pre-philosophical (and therefore pre-reigious in Augustine’s work), primitive Christian understanding of truth; “Happiness is the Joy which comes from truth”.

Through their interpretive frameworks, Heidegger and Arendt arrive at a point where truth becomes an issue in Augustine’s thoughts. In the Tenth Book, Augustine seeks his God through the faculty of the memory, or at this stage, the mind. Moreover, he also realises that he must go beyond the simple existence of memory and therefore forgetfulness to find Him and that the process of searching holds the answer he is seeking. This acknowledgment by Augustine leads him to establish a new way of conceptualising man’s existence. This fundamental re-conceptualisation of man’s life is due to the sense of anxiety he gets from this search for God because implicit in this search is the sense of living, or “. . . so that my soul may live”. To achieve this, Augustine reasons, he must understand how to live the happy life bringing about a realisation of what is therefore intended in life. The happy life, or vita beata, is now consolidated as the focus of Augustine’s investigation. One thing that Augustine is certain of is that it is

113 Love and St. Augustine, pp. 45-97.
114 “Delectatio quippe quasi pondus est animae. Delectatio ergo ordinat animan ... ubi delectatio, ubi thesaurus: ubi solum cor, ubi beatitudo aut miseria” from Tractatus De Musica, 6.11.29.
116 Love and St. Augustine, p. 40 and a further example is on p. 41 (B:033170-1). Arendt says that this deficiency in his terminology ‘takes it revenge’ on his thinking: She uses Jonas, a fellow Augustinian doctoral student, to support her in this claim in the revisions (p. 41, n.16).
117 Confessions, Book X, Chapter 33.
118 O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of the Mind, (London, 1987), p. 136 doubts that the mind = memory (self) rather suggests that memory becomes the mind when the memory is at work and other faculties appear passive. He even says in a footnote that Proust is the reason why many readers associate this when reading Augustine.
119 Confessions, Book X, Chapter 20.
contained within himself, as the gravity of the soul (pondus animae). Only a strong will or desire achieves this good life and it comes to presence only through concern (curare or Bekümmerung). The happy life is therefore a state of living particular to the individual and requires the state of delectatio, (or pleasure) that leads to joy in truth (quadium de veritate). The happy life becomes interrelated with the establishment of truth. But this truth is a primitive conception of truth.

In the dissertation Arendt starts her discussion of this by saying that Augustine’s ‘order of love’ is defined by his Roman manner as ‘virtue’ in The City of God. Arendt quotes Augustine linking these two ideas; “[h]ence it seems to me that a brief and true definition of virtue is the order of love”. This is, however, as Augustine admits a simple definition. At length it is a complex idea and involves Augustine’s Platonic legacy and it leads Arendt to her concept of social caritas. By following this association the foundations that Arendt lay for her unperceived political work can be determined. Arendt indicates her understanding when she that “love that has yielded to the right order can no longer be understood as craving and desire because its direction is not determined by any particular object but by the general order of everything that is.” This is love in on a higher plane but what is the ‘general order of everything’ in this sentence? By reading Augustine with an eye on his Platonic (through the neoplatonists) the meaning of this statement becomes clearer. The relationship between Spirit and ‘ordering’ takes on a new dimension when with Augustinian originality he starts to identify Spirit in the Trinity with caritas in On Human Responsibility. When a man loves a women he both lusts after her body and, in Augustine’s eyes, loves her within, seeking a

120 Tractatus de Musico, Chapter Book 6, 11, 29.
122 Confessions, Book X, Chapter 33.
124 ibid., p. 36 from The City of God, Chapter 15, §22.
125 It is interesting to see Augustine in comparison to Plato’s treatment of love in The Symposium, where Plato believes that man loves the material and not the form, or the beautiful body and the beauty itself. See Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch, (London, Gollancz, 1961), p. 155. In On Human Responsibility, Augustine starts to stress that while man has the knowledge of the Good in the impressed ideas, he is so stupid or dark that he cannot aspire to them. His love is weak for the Good. This becomes a motivation of negativity, in Augustine, because man desires the wrong and therefore evil. Later on Augustine maintained the distinction between an individual’s property and the community’s. Thus there are two loves, one private and one social. And the right attitude towards good become an attitude to towards what is common, not that which is to be acquired for personal use. See Literal Commentaries, 11.15.19-20 for a description of pride that rejoices in private goods and how perverse-love identifies what is common with what private - and how jealousy prevails. There seems to be a great foundation for Arendt’s distinction between private and social here. But the terminology changes as the private wishes become in Arendt’s understanding the social and the social becomes the political.
126 Love and St. Augustine, p. 39 (B033169).
mutuality of love. This is a spiritual beauty that he perceives and it obtains a state of the soul where peace is achieved – outside the usual fear of loss – and the soul is at rest through a communion with another. The inability of Augustine to articulate this non-cognitive state leads him to illustrate his meaning through powerful analogies:

And have the sense of the body their delights, while the soul is abandoned by its own pleasures? . . . Give me a man in love: he understands what I mean. Give me a man who yearns; give me a man who is hungry; give me a man travelling in the desert, who is thirsty and sighing for the spring of the eternal country. Give me that sort of man; he knows what I mean. But if I talk to a cold man, he does not know what I am talking about.

This is the Platonic idea of beauty in an Augustinian context; a Beauty recognisable to all. This beauty does not inspire the desire to possess unlike worldly, material goods that only inspire pride. Rather this beauty just leads to inspiration: “Love, who are always ablaze . . . excite me”. In this conception of inspiration is the seed that will eventually take Arendt to her interpretation of Kant. For now, returning to the beginning, this inspiration is the right love, or the right order of love that Arendt discusses in her dissertation. This is therefore the inspirational beauty that in Aristotle is Kalon that leads to a Greek theory of ethics. It is the primitive Christian happiness not the summa bonum of the Aristotelian genre that is sought by Augustine to achieve vita beata. This leads to a new definition of truth as the right action, not a cognitive truth of the philosophical tradition, and to the entrance of phronesis into their thinking. This new way of knowing is further revealed from a similar hermeneutical examination of the role of phronesis in Augustine’s Neoplatonic thought.

(ii) The Meaning of Phronesis in Augustine

Heidegger had already investigated a similar path to Arendt’s Augustine but on this next comparison the divergence from his uncompleted path becomes apparent, as does the move to the influence of Jaspers. In his lectures on Augustine Heidegger extends his consideration to all

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128 Sermon, 34.2.4. See Canning, 1987, pp. 77-83. This explains why Arendt ignored the sensuous nature of Augustine’s concepts of love. It simply did not enter into he focus on this ‘divine’ love.


130 On John’s Gospel 26.4.

131 Confessions, 10.29.40. (amended translation). In this state someone is also free because they have the capacity to be free. In the following line Augustine says “Give what you command and command what you will.” This encapsulates Arendt’s true definition of freedom as only when ‘will and to-be-able-to‘ coincide in the world of man. See John, M. Rist, Augustine: ancient thought baptized, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 157.


133 Arendt is quite clear about this when she replies to Gunnar Hultgren’s suggestion that he is “a voir s’il n’est possible d’en trouver une explication et une solution dans une manière différente d’envisager le summa bonum.” Love and St. Augustine, pp. 43-4, n. 24. Arendt responds by saying that it is precisely the notion of God as summa bonum that creates the difficulty.
twelve verses of Thessalonians I and in doing so locates the advantage of knowing the moment as a situation in conjunction with the mood of the heart (kardia). The harmony of the mood with an understanding of the context the individual is in provides a more appropriate response, or the right action/love. This knowing is a dynamic between a particular type of comprehension, mood and discourse. Heidegger again uses Paul’s Letter to the Thessalonians as the source of this interpretation. This type of knowing is not theoretical knowledge but rather practical knowledge or phronesis. To determine the complete picture of this concept of practical knowledge it must be seen in relation to an emphasis on mood. Significantly, and a point that will be raised later in the next chapter, the harmony between the two is brought about through communication such as preaching, or the Christian ‘bringing of the message’.

At this stage of Heidegger’s conceptual development the notion of phronesis being investigated in his interpretation seems to be an Aristotelian concept. Moreover, this is another example where Augustine used the Greek framework to discuss specifically primitive Christian experiences. But, when Heidegger turned to phronesis he turned to a knowing that dealt with the ever changing, to motion rather than stasis, a type of thinking reflected not just in Aristotle but also the Bible. In his lectures examining the factual life of primitive Christianity illustrated by St. Paul in his letters, Heidegger makes the following observation: “within the first twelve verses of the epistle there is a striking repetition of two sets of terms: on the one hand, various forms of the verb genesthai (to have become), and on the other, forms of the verbs mnaomai (I remember) and eido (I know-infinitive eidenai; perfect tense used as present: oida).” The temporal of these points is highlighted in Heidegger’s lectures. Sheehan in his interpretation also suggests a way of reading this passage:

[1]This kind of “knowledge” differs from any ordinary cognition or memory, for it is ‘comprehension of the situation’ and hence is had only from out of the situation . . . from out of factically lived experience. We recognize here what Being and Time will call ‘Versetzen’ as ‘Seinskonnen’—which is not to be translated as understanding qua ‘potentiality for Being’ . . . , but rather as ‘savvy’ or ‘know how’.137

In Being and Time as well as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and The History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger lays great emphasis on a fundamental understanding of Verstehen that is

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134 In WS 1920-1, Heidegger talks "how care is defined by a particular type of understanding, mood and discourse", Van Buren, "Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther", p. 162.
136 “Phänomenologische Interpretation des Galaterbriefes”, §§16 and §§17.
before the common cognitive conception prevalent in the discussions on this topic. In §68 Heidegger describes what his understanding is not; “neither a definite kind of cognition, as distinct from explaining and conceiving, nor a cognition in general in the sense of grasping something thematically.” In fact, in Being and Time Heidegger devotes several sections to discussing his particular concept of understanding. He begins §31 by saying, “Attunement is one of the existential structures in which the being of “there” dwells. Equiprimordially with it, understanding constitutes this being.” His concept of understanding is one of the central elements in his ‘fundamental ontology’.

The interesting dimension of Heidegger’s design for understanding is its futural possibility as “[o]ne has this kind of understanding by taking risks, trying things out, “projecting” them”. The priority of possibility is important over the usual epistemological emphasis on the actual. It is not simply cognitive at all, rather it reveals the ‘existence-structure’ that is prior to its cognitive worth. It does this through Seinkommen, or ‘able-to-be/can-be’. The ‘able-to-be’ is Arendt’s later ‘to-be-able’ and ‘can-be’ is her will. This moment of equality is when power really emerges in the individual. The potentiality is not an Aristotelian understanding, but instead self-awareness. We are aware of the ability-to-exist and the possibilities. As a consequence to this, understanding in an existential sense is prior to the cognitive one. The notion of understanding expressed in this definition is one of futural emphasis in a ‘Know Thyself’ endeavour. The character of understanding in this Heideggerian sense is Entwurf, or throwing forward. This involves an understanding of Heidegger’s conception of the world. Possibility becomes the important aspect that determines proper understanding. The framing of this term by ‘projecting’ is interesting when considered with its fellow terms genesthai (to have become) and mnemonai, (I remember): out of the past comes the future, or rather possible futures based on multiple of conceived potentials. The strict futural emphasis in Heidegger’s eyes becomes related and dependent on the past in Arendt’s. The comprehension part of the trinity of knowing has a particular temporal aspect – past possibility.

138 Being and Time, §68, p. 308 [p. 336 of Stambaugh].
139 Specifically §18, §31 and §68.
140 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 134 [pp. 142-3 of Stambaugh].
142 Pre-understanding or ‘existence-structure’ is the imagination of Arendt’s first treatment of the subject in 1954. Heidegger’s particular conception of ‘understanding’ is anticipatory in its emphasis and an element in his thinking that had consequences in political life.
The structure of these Christian and Aristotelian concepts of *phronesis* is the same. In a sense, both are *nous* and a kind of insight that used principles that evolve and require 'practical-cognitive' skill to apply. The particular is seen as self-contained and yet a universal can be determined from its situation that involves an extant principle. The difference in emphasis becomes apparent, however, when the meaning of the word in these two different contexts is analysed. The etymological history of *phronesis* is illuminating. *Phren* is the heart, and in the oral tradition of Homer it is considered to be the soul covering both passion and reason. Aristotle and Plato derive their meaning from a different source, instead using the Pythagorean tradition that places thought in the brain thus making *phronesis* is noetic force. The Christian notion of *phronesis* – in distinction to Aristotle’s – is based on a much more embracing sense of to whom it applies and has mercy at its centre. While Aristotle conceived his *phronesis* to be applicable to the higher echelons of society, the Christian notion sought to embrace those that society generally rejected, the poor, meek, and ill. This is why *kardia* is important to this conception.

In other words, his care became *Sorge* neglecting the dimension of *cura*. In a modern context the bible is about caring for the poor around but still within the laws of society: laws that have generated the conditions of this poverty. The concept of the world in Heidegger does not consider those who cannot operate in public because of their circumstances. This is lack of appreciation of the flesh, seeing the body in strict phenomenological terms, as a mere function to thought that operated in comfort. Feeling remained private psychological states yet he did allow a role for *stimmung* in his thought. This mood or tuning is defined as a certain response to the world after an individual had found himself or herself. A response to the Augustinian directive implied in the belief that ‘I have become a question to myself’.

The difference therefore between the Aristotelian version of *phronesis* and the primitive Christian one appears to be the role of the other. This is not clear cut however and is the cause of the confusion for some commentators but the difference allows Arendt’s reading of Heidegger to emerge. For example, Heidegger does mention the other in this sense when he

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143 Note Aristotle’s *schemata* and Arendt’s dealing with Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* later in her life.
146 This is the reason why Thomas argues that it is *carrxia* not *prudentia* that defines virtues. In other words they ensure the application of principles is humane.
148 Arendt’s broader and more specific reading of this subject is not very enlightening. Later on in her life she does discuss this concept. Using Kant as her guide Arendt suggests that the context of judging is restricted to those with whom one judges and therefore does not have universal validity. She uses Aristotle to support her in this saying that what she has just described is *phronesis* or a political capacity of insight and this is distinguished from the singular wisdom of the
translates the Aristotelian *synesis* (comprehending the other) as *Rücksicht* and *syngnome* (forgiveness) as *Nachsicht* (when used in the sense of forbearance). This is the seed of Arendt’s later position in promise-making and forgiveness, assisted by her reading of Nietzsche, in a temporal context. Nonetheless, Heidegger did not pursue this comparison himself as he moved to the Aristotle of *Being and Time*. As Caputo says, “it did not draw his interest” as he “never noticed the revealing difference between Aristotelian and the biblical paradigms”.

Though Caputo does not provide examples of this, an important one in context is the transference of his primitive Christian readings to the phenomenological analysis of *Being*. This is seen in the call of conscience that Heidegger derives from his studies at this stage. It is deprived of is theological context and therefore the role of God. The knowing described above is dependent on the situation of factual life experience that demands a role for God. Heidegger does not consider this element but Arendt does with her concern for the other even in a non-theological context and this raises the question of a source for the individual other than God. Her own analysis of the self is more about the situation of the self amongst others to understand the “comprehension of the situation” that Heidegger pointed to in his lectures. This acceptance of the role of the disregarded other in Arendt’s thought had several significant implications for her Christian notion of *phronesis*. The role of mercy is a constituent element in this way of knowing. The basis of the application of these principles in the bible is not *nous* as such, but rather a sense of mercy. The application of primitive Christianity’s concept of mercy is

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130 This is seen in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 11 and is mentioned in *Being and Time*, p. 164 (p. 159 of Macquarrie).  
131 Caputo, “Sorge and Krankheit”, p. 331. Because of a Kierkegaardian framework at work in her thought, Arendt’s turn to Augustine as a subject of her dissertation provides a significant indication that this concern emerged early in her understanding of Heidegger’s work. Her understanding of Heidegger philosophy was generated during the most intense phase of its development; during the period of 1924 to 1925. During this period Heidegger made several significant changes in his language, terminology and, of course, understanding. The most resounding shift that occurred during this period of gestation was from history to being. Kisel, *Genesis*, p. 313. The main guiding line throughout this development is as, Kisel puts it, “the core of the drafts, the formal indication used in guiding their respective analyses of the human situation, nuanced differently in each of the drafts in its attempt to indicate the immediacy of experience—under way rather than finished, undergoing understanding instead of the stilling reflection of intuition—although they are almost the same: being in the world, to-be, ex-sistence.” Ibid., pp. 313-4 (original italics). 

The drift in these phases of *Being and Time* is a complex matter and determination can only ever be partial, partly because of its long gestation period, its incomplete nature, as well as the later inferences on its meaning from the author himself. However, some of the main intentions of the work are clear and one of these was Heidegger’s attempt to deal with the separation of the Cartesian Self from the external world. The first phase, ‘Being-in-the-world’, reveals this origin and Heidegger’s concern regarding modern individualism. Heidegger counters this path being travelled by western thought by returning to the Greek conception of the self. This ancient conception of the self determined it in terms of the community and cosmos. The most important element in this understanding is the boundaries of the self are not able to be clearly defined. These boundaries are always in flux and even trespass - as the modern understanding would define it - into oikos and the polis. For further research in this possible understanding see Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, (New York, Harper Torchbook, 1960), John Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy*, (London, Chatto and Windus, 1962) and M. J. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, (New York, Viking Press, 1965). 

involved with the heart (kardia). It is the ‘understanding heart’ that Arendt mentions in her essay, "Understanding and Politics". The result of Heidegger's studies that led him to the position of Being and Time, mercy and the role of the heart were removed from his thinking and, as a consequence the role of the other in his work diminished. Even if she is a little harsh in the process, the influence of the Aristotelian conception of the ego comes to the fore. The translation of Kierkegaard's existentialism by Heidegger produces a fundamental ontology. Yet it also a weak methodological and abstracted version of Kierkegaard's exhortations to personal authenticity. The "ontic-existential" message from Kierkegaard is lost in the "ontological-existential" development of Heidegger's understanding in his Being and Time. In other words, Heidegger takes Kierkegaard's call to personal authenticity and strips it of any existential significance. This is reflected in his 1925 lecture series entitled Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, although the sympathy of this element in his interpretation can still be seen in his approach to the question. The question of empathy (an emotion having a suggestive resonance with Arendt's primitive conception of the neighbour) and therefore the role of the other is a point of discussion for Heidegger when he says that the "rejection of this pseudo-problem of empathy—how does an initially isolated subject reach another?—by no means implies that being-with-one-another and its comprehensibility does not stand in need to phenomenal clarification." But significantly, he adds it "only claims that the question of co-Dasein must be understood as a question of Dasein itself." In her Jaspers/Heidegger seminar, delivered in 1951, Arendt purposely translates Section 12 of Heidegger's Being and Time for her students and her focus of discussion. The section is titled, "Being-in-the-World outlined from

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152 As an example of how this continued to play a role in Arendt's thought, in Between Past and Future, p. 157, when talking about freedom she refers to the human heart.
153 "What is Existent?", p. 37.
155 In a letter to Mr. George F. Ackerman. Arendt replies to his concern over the use of 'masses' in her work. (Container 7, Folder Correspondence "A", 004672). This emerged out of an article by Mr. Henry Fairlie who spoke of the demeaning use of the word 'masses' by German immigrant academics. (Fairlie's article was published in New Herald Times, 31 Dec. 1973) Arendt objects to this characterisation of her understanding of the masses and the idea that she implies that the masses are "an amorphous mass of depersonalised units with no personal individuality and no public character". (Container 7, Folder Correspondence "A", 004710) She replies by quoting from On Revolution, pp. 247ff which says "theoretically, the most relevant and most pernicious among certain: theories is the equation of "people and "masses". In the process, she rejects the grouping of her ideas with others, such as Eric Fromm and Herbert Marcuse, because simply she has nothing in common with them.
the viewpoint of in-Being".\textsuperscript{157} What is happening in Heidegger’s lectures, and something that can be regarded as symptomatic of Heidegger’s thought as far as Arendt’s later commentary was concerned, is a changing role of the world as well as the other in his thinking. Heidegger, himself, recalls his earlier classifications of the world to inform his students of a fundamental change in his interpretation. The ‘with-world’ (Mitwelt) of the early Heidegger becomes the ‘being-with’ (Mitsein) reflecting the change in emphasis in conceiving Heidegger’s individual and their context.\textsuperscript{158} It is a change that fully eventuates in Being and Time.\textsuperscript{159}

Though Arendt never addresses the relationship of Heidegger’s and Kierkegaard’s philosophies in her work, there is contained implicitly in her development, a partial return to Kierkegaard’s position.\textsuperscript{160} This is especially evident in the importance she gives the ‘public sphere’ and the ‘common world’ for the individual.\textsuperscript{161} Arendt rejected Heidegger’s eventual ego-centric, distanced conception of the self, as Arendt says, “the most essential characteristic of this Self is its absolute egoism, its radical separation from all its fellows”.\textsuperscript{162} Kierkegaard seeks the authentic self within the self already constituted in the world. He does not seek that outside himself to enforce his search and to provide the contents. Augustine’s own search for the self provided Arendt with her own material. Kierkegaard wanted to construct a scaffolding and did indeed seek to structure the search. Yet when the end had come into focus this structure was to disappear as its task of communicating the implied gave way to the individual flourishing under their own impetus. Behind this is the question of meaning in life and therefore authenticity. This is indicated for Kierkegaard in two ways. The first is passion, the passion of

\textsuperscript{157} Library of Congress papers, (024229-31).

\textsuperscript{158} Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 333 [p. 242 of Macquarrie].

\textsuperscript{159} Sein und Zeit, p. 118. Stambaugh provides a clearer translation of his treatment, see her translation of Being and Time, p. 112. Heidegger says “[the world of Da-sein is a with-world. Being-in is being-with others. The innerworldly being-in-itself of others is Mit-sein.” Kisiel, Genesis, p. 363 is quick to interpret this passage as suggesting a return to his original position. Regardless, Arendt’s reading is clear.

\textsuperscript{160} Arendt first heard of Heidegger in the early 1920s and when she commenced her university studies in the autumn of 1924, she chose his lecture theatres for her philosophical education. Pursuing the emerging school of Husserl’s phenomenology at the University of Marburg, she encountered its most dynamic teacher, Martin Heidegger. Young Bruce, For Love of the World, p. 46. Arendt did not complete an extensive discussion of other of these influences in her work though her latter work was more critical, less explanatory in its intent. Arendt’s underlying respect for both these thinkers also seemed to preclude her from publicly entering many of the public debates that surrounded her and American academic circles in the post-war years. There is one notable exception to this in Heidegger’s case with her article “Martin Heidegger at Eighty”, and her selective treatment of his thought in The Life of the Mind series. The New Review of Books (October 1971); reprinted in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays, Michael Rush, (ed.) (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 293–303. An indicative piece, less academic and more reflective is a posthumously published piece, “Heidegger the Fox”. Arendt: Essays in Understanding, Jerome Kohn, (ed.) (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1994). Arendt does talk specifically about Kierkegaard in a short article for the Frankfurter Zeitung, No. 75-76, 29th January, 1932. In this article Arendt acknowledges the importance of choice in his thought, although she says in an aside this notion of choice has taken on a somewhat abstract quality.

\textsuperscript{161} In 1923 Heidegger acknowledges his debt to Kierkegaard in regard to his descriptions of “public” but wishes quite emphatically to avoid the modishness of Kierkegaard prevalent at the time. Kisiel, Genesis, p. 275.

\textsuperscript{162} This criticism was made public and published in 1947. See “What is Existential Philosophy?”, Partisan Review, Vol. 13 No. 1 (Winter 1946), p. 50.
commitment, while the second is a return; a “return to the genuine origins of our selves, our feelings and our beliefs”. This is a search of origins for originality to become evident. There is a notion of originality at work in Kierkegaard – or in Arendtian terms, beginnings. In latter years of her own thinking Arendt equally seeks a foundation for the primitive Christian experience. Contained within her deliberations that became The Life of the Mind is the pervasive notion of enlarged mentality. The notion is a response to Heidegger’s failure and is based on this temporal notion of mercy.

This is the framework for Arendt’s understanding of the individual-in-the-world. The individual is seen through its temporal nature and the relationship with the other is equally determined in this manner. The question becomes the point of this relationship and how it is to be conceived. This is equally true for the relationship to their own self and world. It should be noted that harmony is paramount in this relationship although what actually is this relationship is still to be determined. In seeking this direction Arendt quotes Augustine in De Trinitate, “[w]hat else is love except a kind of life that binds, or seek to bind, together some two things, namely the lover and the beloved? And this is so even in external and carnal love”. While Augustine goes on to say that carnal desire is not an appropriate love, partly because it is an external love, rather it is the (Augustinian) soul that should be loved; “[w]hat is it that a friend loves in his friend other than the soul?” However, the Augustinian soul like other terms used by Augustine in his deliberations is difficult to determine. Yet when matched to Arendt’s understanding of the Augustinian soul a clearer picture of her particular focus starts to form. Even at this stage of her thinking the mind and its role in the individual’s life is important. An indication is given by Augustine’s belief that to go ‘higher in our ascent’, as he says, is to reach a stage where each individual in the love of God can understand each other and where they have

163 Quoted in Golomb, In Search of Authenticity, p. 39.
164 John Burnaby, Amor Dei, p. 82. However, from this it is uncertain as to the order of their relationship. St. Thomas Aquinas later draws the conclusion that contemplation and therefore the intellect, the pathway to God, is the primal element. Yet, Augustine is also the first advocate of the will and therefore action.
165 “There is a vision belonging to our time here … If we believe, we see; if we love, we see … He who has love needs not to be sent upon a long journey to see God … He would see God upon His throne in heaven: let him have love, and God dwells in him even as in heaven.” Enarrations in Psalms, CXLIX. 4, Quoted in Burnaby, Amor Dei, p. 82. More significantly, Burnaby comments that Love—this is what Augustine means—is the counterfeit of all antithesis. It breaks the line between the here and the hereafter, between change and the changeless, time and eternity. It is peace in conflict, contemplation in the midst of action, sight piecing through faith. For in love the divine meets the human: heaven comes to earth when Christ is born, and man rejoices in the Truth.
166 It is Book VIII of De Trinitate that Augustine passes over this possibility.
168 Quoted in Love and St. Augustine, p. 18. B.033143 from Augustine, The Trinity VIII, 14.10. The edited manuscript is incorrect in locating this passage in Book VIII as 10.14.
searched for their understanding of God. The importance of this is that the searcher has found the correct process and location for this search and similarly so has his neighbour. In Augustine's eyes finding God is a universal experience shared and understood by all those who participate, even if they are still isolated in their temporal existence.

Before this search is pursued, however, there is a need to establish the context in which this occurs for Arendt. This requires a consideration of the community and the framework from within which the search proceeds. This is especially important because of the role these criteria will play when Arendt turns to the political and seeks to guide the actor in the space of appearance without the assistance of modernity's universals as the foundational security. The form of the community encompassing the temporal beings and its implications for truth will be determined in the next chapter.

169 This ascent goes from outer sense (related to anima) to internal sense (related to animus) to intellect (or spiritus). See Confessions. Book 10.7.11.
Chapter Three

The Storytelling Community of Homo Temporalis

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1. Modernity's Lost Treasure: Love and the Right Action

Arendt left an unfinished treatise on judging when she died in 1975. Her theory was expected to be dependent on Kant's Third Critique for its proposal and analysis. However, I believe there is an intellectual influence that would have had a significant impact on her final articulation of the third section of her trinity; thinking, willing, and judging. This figure is St. Augustine whose role in her intellectual endeavour is still a relatively unexplored aspect for her thought.1 Her first philosophical proposition was a solution of social caritas, or a solution of how to love in the world, and with those who share it. Read in this manner Arendt's social caritas can be seen as an attempt to define a new form of judgement.2 An additional element that is required to be analysed is the context for her understanding of the individual which defined by that individual's temporal condition as homo temporalis. The richness of Augustine (and Arendt's interpretation of him) is dependent on seeing him, as Arendt did, as a thinker primarily situated between ‘two’ traditions of thought: Athenian and the Hebraic. These traditions have an impact on the temporal nature of the individual in the community and this dimension, though a hindrance to the Augustinian member of a community, is used by Arendt to affirm the individual’s common place amongst others. In Augustine’s thought love took this role and in the guise of right action, love is a guide to

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1 The most comprehensive discussion has been the interpretative essay “Rediscovering Hannah Arendt” by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, who were the editors for the extant translation of Arendt's dissertation. See Love and Saint Augustine, trans. Hannah Arendt and E. B. Ashton, (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1996).

2 This possibility is alluded to in the interpretative essay from Scott and Stark. They suggest that even when Arendt was undertaking revisions she remained faithful to the fundamental aspects of her original Augustinian analysis and that Augustine's caritas therefore remains an essential part of her understanding of the individual self. They believe that Arendt's revisions if seen as a pattern suggest it was merely her reading of the tradition and Augustine's influence that underwent revisions. Love and Saint Augustine, p. 121. They even propose without following it up that the imperative of caritas can be seen as the "basis for founding new communities on common moral judgment as well as the existential, determining "fact" of shared history." ibid. p. 122.
an individual's actions in the world.\textsuperscript{3} Love of the neighbour is regarded by Augustine to be at the centre of all laws in Christianity and we love our neighbour simply because, as Arendt suggests, “[t]he law bids us love one another.” This regulates the actions of the individual-in-the-world or “what is done in the world by man who regards the world as a desert and lives in relation to his own source” and “[s]ince the world has always been constituted by men, it defines how men act towards each other.”\textsuperscript{4} Arendt’s interpretation of this aspect of Augustine’s thinking leads her to establish a new framework involving the temporal dimension of the ‘now’ as past possibility and the element of storytelling.

\textit{(i) Time: A Moment in Crisis}

A significant part of the intellectual culture surrounding Arendt in the 1920s was attempting to examine a crisis; a crisis of the moment.\textsuperscript{5} This problem is framed by the relationship of the past, present and future. The result is one of embracing the future and a deification of the notion of progress.\textsuperscript{6} Modernity with its primacy of science and its belief in reason and progress was being questioned. In Arendt’s critical review of Karl Mannheim’s \textit{Ideology and Utopia} published in 1930, just after the publication of her dissertation, Arendt provides a glimpse of her developing

\textsuperscript{3} Kierkegaard also considered the notion of love in terms of the neighbour, though this time from within the Christian tradition. \textit{Works of Love} contains the best illustration of Kierkegaard’s ‘transvalued morality’. It is transvalued because it is no longer in accordance with deontological ethics of duty (as espoused by the Judge in \textit{Either/Or}) nor teleological ethics. The main point to note in this is that Kierkegaard believes that there is no tension between love of the self and love of the neighbour. The implications of the Christian imperative of “Love thy neighbour as thyself” is seen by Kierkegaard as allowing a compatibility with loving oneself. In this relationship between one and the other, both are enhanced given the background of God’s unconditional love for both. The relationship to God an individual has in Kierkegaard’s eyes is set forth in \textit{Fear and Trembling} when he describes the environment for teleological suspension of the ethic that allows an ethic of love to occur. For further clarification of this attempt see Calvin O. Schrag, “The Kierkegaard-Effect in the Shaping of the Contours of Modernity” in \textit{Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity}, Martin J. Matusik and Merold Westphal (eds.), Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 16, n. 13.

\textsuperscript{4} Love and St. Augustine, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{5} At the centre of these discussions was Martin Heidegger as he reflected upon Oswald Spengler’s \textit{Decline of the West} and ruminated on the role of technology in the world. Hans Sluga, \textit{Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany}, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1995). See especially Chapter 1 “Moment of Decision” and Chapter Three “Politics of Crisis”. A characterisation of these discussions appears in Hans Blumenberg’s \textit{The Legitimacy of the Modern Age}, trans. Robert M. Wallace with Introduction, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1955). Blumenberg’s argument, succinctly put, is that the illegitimacy of modernity is “latent in the modern age’s claim to carry out a radical break with tradition, and in the incongruity between this claim and the reality of history, which can never begin anew.” ibid., p. 116. Blumenberg’s augment is based upon the German understanding of modernity and one that gets its full expression in Karl Löwith’s \textit{Meaning of History}, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949).

Blumenberg’s book is a response to Löwith’s understanding of the secularisation of modernity within the framework of Judeo-Christian thought. The point to Blumenberg’s critique of Löwith’s position is that the Christian tradition saw the terminal instance as being initiated by a transcendental power. Modernism’s conception of progress rejects this and sees it as an ‘immanent’ aspect of humankind. The problem as he sees it is that the result is one without either the theological understanding of the Judeo-Christian conceptions of terminal instances such as the Final Judgment, or the Greek conception of the importance of the past and the present. The role of gnosticism in modernity’s construction is noted by Blumenberg. Other thinkers who argue this correlation are Eric Voegelin and Hans Jonas. The role of gnosticism in German thought is an interesting one. Arendt saw the transition of Augustine from a Manichaean to Christian amidst the philosophy of ancient Greek thought.

\textsuperscript{6} The understanding of the theological and ancient conceptions and their reception in modernity is reminiscent of Martin Heidegger and this should come as no surprise due to Löwith’s formative years being spent as Heidegger’s student and teaching assistant. In the introduction to Blumenberg’s book, Robert Wallace notes the similarity, as well as differences of Löwith’s, Strauss’ and Hansah Arendt’s understanding of Modernity. All three were linked to Heidegger and even if, as is the case with Strauss, it is a relationship of antagonism though with a note of respect. Modernity has a particular conception in this intellectual tradition.
awareness of significant questions in both political philosophy and theory.\(^7\) Mannheim’s thesis in *Ideology and Utopia* was the topic of much discussion in Germany at the time as socialists tried to determine its validity and therefore worth to their analysis of history and society.\(^8\) Her concern in the review and one that she states in the introductory paragraph is the theoretical premises built into Mannheim’s work, or as she describes them, “the book’s basic philosophical intent.”\(^9\) In constructing this perspective on Mannheim’s (and sociology’s) work, Arendt displays a concern for the foundations of thought of the modern age, or in her words “the questionable nature of all modern thought”.\(^10\) The nothingness of modern man is achieved by the loss of immortality.\(^11\)

Together with the loss of remembrance comes also the loss of the potential of eternity.\(^12\)

Importantly, the question of the role of past and future is also involved in Arendt’s argument. The descriptions of ideology and utopia are representations of past (the source of a worldview) and utopia (the escape into the future). Arendt does not believe that detachment is the prerequisite of genuineness and agrees with the sociological argument against philosophy. However, the presumed opposite and counter to this, an anchor in communal life, is equally rejected by Arendt.

The dichotomy of solitude and the community are seen as a mistaken framework. While Arendt does not mention Augustine by name, her example of Christian love is suggestive that social *caritas* is on her mind. Between these two opposites Arendt declares a third one involved in the Christian concept of brotherly love: “this is the possibility of living in the world but being guided by a transcendence that does not conceive of itself as realizable on earth (eschatological

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\(^7\) This is also an essay where Arendt first reveals her understanding of the meaning of Heidegger’s and Jaspers’ philosophy and indirectly Kierkegaard’s and Augustine’s. This is only a glimpse, as I have suggested, but it does allow the reader a furtive look in to the mind of Hannah Arendt during the time of her dissertation. The priorities of the review structure Arendt’s discussion of philosophy, however she was concerned about the nature of philosophy in comparison to that illustrated by sociology. Mannheim’s book *Ideologie und Utopie* is used to explore the possibility of freedom in philosophy, sociology and, at the end of the piece, psychoanalysis. At work in this work is the distinction between the ontic and the ontological and the source of meaning. Young-Breuhl, *For the Love of the World*, pp. 83-4 believes that Arendt displays a position that still reveres the autonomy of philosophy and the principle of love for living.

\(^8\) Arendt’s concern is the apparent ‘situationless’ of Mannheim’s argument, even though he believes that “all thought is situation-bound”. The privilege he discerns for himself in the quest to find a reality is actually a problem about the possibility of purity of thought.

\(^9\) “Review”, p. 28.

\(^10\) As the translators, Robert and Rita Kimber, point out Arendt uses the term *Geistigkeit* to describe this ‘modern thought’. The term involves the German word for ‘spirit’ but refers to the existence of a mental sphere or level rather than a religious, transcendental one.

\(^11\) The question of meaning is important to Arendt. When considering philosophy’s claim to absolute validity and the way sociology, through tracing philosophy’s existential-boundness, can question this claim, she says that philosophy can except this charge without losing its ‘meaning’. Clearly the truth element associated with philosophy is not a prime issue for her. Instead meaning is foundational to Arendt, not truth. Coupled as it is with thought, Arendt believes that meaning and thought are partners in philosophy, despite sociology’s claim in the guise of Mannheim’s thesis.

\(^12\) This concern was maintained throughout the next few decades. Alfred Kazin recalls Arendt’s main intellectual concern at the time he met her in New York, just after the Second World War, being “the decisive break with tradition”. Alfred Kazin, *New York Jew* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 196. (This quote appears within quote marks in Kazin’s text as well.) She believed that “[m]odernity was a tragedy because of the wrong thinking behind it” and she wanted to eschew the gap that remained, the nothingness, the “extreme situation” of “modern man”\(^\prime\)’ (p. 197) and then p. 198. It is unclear whether Kazin is aware that the description “extreme situation” is a concept from Karl Jaspers. Regardless it is a significant description.
consciousness)."\(^{13}\) This abstraction (or "remove from the world") involves neither ideology nor utopia. The example of Saint Francis of Assisi is presented as having "lived in the world as if it did not exist and realized this "as-if-it-did-not-exist" in his concrete life.\(^{14}\)

Much of the thinking that occurred around this time was all about the thinking of time, but not the historical aspect. This is seen in Heidegger’s thought because for him the meaning of Being is Time.\(^{15}\) At the initial stage of Heidegger’s schematic development towards Being and Time care is very important as philosophy becomes ‘caring questioning’, or care in action: “self-caring” – Selbstbektümmernigung. Yet the purpose of philosophy is considered to be the understanding of the present, or, as Rüdiger Safranski puts it in Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, to “sharpen our sense for the throbbing heart of Time, for the “moment”.\(^{16}\) This moment becomes very important but at the same time presents a difficulty. The moment has to be uncovered, or disclosed and discovered; “The moment of vision is nothing other than the look of resolute disclosedness in which the full situation of an action opens itself and keeps itself open.”\(^{17}\) The moment is a mark or virtue of authenticity and this moment must be approached and its path to a decision acknowledged. This “moment of vision” is very much part of the culture of the 1920s. Many of Heidegger’s contemporaries were developing their own particular understanding of the moment, all inspired by the originator of the moment, Kierkegaard.\(^{18}\) Kierkegaard’s moment is that moment when the leap of faith beckons the individual. The time of history and that moment in time becomes insignificant as Christ embraces the individual without the constraints of historical time and therefore in the now of eternity. The moment confronts and is expected to shatter the pre-existing normality of the passing, historical time. This change in the fundamental dynamics of time through the concept of the moment coordinates the aspect of decision. There is both a vertical as well as horizontal aspect to this time of the moment.\(^{19}\) This moment is also a presence of mind as the individual needs to be sensitive to the demands and opening of time. As Safranski illustrates through Kafka’s The Castle, K’s missed opportunity through lacking the presence of

\(^{13}\) “Review”, p. 40.
\(^{14}\) Arendt further defines this characterisation as “a world historically structured in a particular way and one whose historicity is seen as absolute”. \(ibid.\)
\(^{16}\) \(ibid.\) The presence of mind becomes part of the search for a rupture or break as is evident in Bloch’s notion of Spuren (Traces), Benjamin’s Einbahnstrasse (One-Way Street) and Jünger’s Abenteuerliches Herz (Adventurous Heart).
\(^{17}\) Gesamtausgabe: Ausgabe letzter Hand series ed. Hermann Heidegger, Frankfurt.
\(^{18}\) Ernst Bloch’s “darkness of the lived moment”, Carl Schmitt’s “moment of decision”, Ernst Jünger’s “sudden fright” and Paul Tillich’s Káros are examples of the extension of this understanding.
\(^{19}\) See Rudolf Otto, The Saint published in 1917. This desire for the moment of intensity is at the heart of the Dada movement prominent during this time.
mind becomes a 'metaphysical horror scenario'. The right state of mind thus becomes important to grasping the moment in history. Kierkegaard's moment allows the Other to break in to an individual's life. This forms the Kierkegaardian community. On the other hand, Nietzsche had the individual break out from the other, and the birth of the free spirit.

In other words, Kierkegaard invites the Absolute in his work while Nietzsche keeps it individual; Nietzsche's moment achieves the absolute of spontaneity, freedom or possibilities. Arendt with her understanding of Social Caritas and the concern for the neighbour cannot take Nietzsche's path of pure individualism, staying instead close to Kierkegaard's. From this moment, for Arendt, there emerges the chance of a decision in this temporal location. Heidegger's moment is also the state of exceptions but also with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard something that allows an entrance and an exit. This moment changes and Arendt is sensitive to this change and its implications. Involved in Arendt's reading of Augustine is responding to this demand for a consideration of the moment. The concept of time is very important to Augustine and in turn the reason why Augustine was very important to Martin Heidegger. In her reading she develops an understanding that "[f]earless possession can be achieved only under the conditions of timelessness, equated by both Augustine and Plotinus with eternity". Arendt does equate timelessness with eternity. She seeks this in another way — still following Augustine's lead by formulating a response that later develops into storytelling and the space of appearance. This moment of vision leads to Arendt's space of appearance. As the name suggests it is a visual arena but this does not take into account man as homo temporalis in Arendt's thought.
importance of storytelling in her work is grounded in the fact that it is an aural medium not a visual one.

In this understanding there is the seed of Arendt's rising political awareness. Her ambitious concept of *social caritas* sought to answer some of the problems in Augustine's work, but concurrently it also provides an Arendtian analysis of the direction her estranged mentor Heidegger was taking in his thinking.\(^{27}\) While Arendt did not sit through Heidegger's lectures on Augustine during her time as his student, he nonetheless generated the framework for her initial examination of the community of the temporal individual and their framework of reference. Heidegger felt that the tradition of western thought had lead to a 'dead-end' (Irweg) and therefore required a return to the 'primordial origin' to start afresh.\(^{28}\) This position demanded a consideration of past possibilities, a methodology that became an essential temporal dimension for Arendt.

What is significant when reading Arendt's dissertation is that while Heidegger reached back to the pre-Socratic philosophers, Arendt reached back to Augustine and equally sought an answer using his hidden understanding of primitive Christianity and their foundational experience.\(^{29}\)

This is an indication that she thought from within this conflation of Gnosticism, Platonism and Christianity something had been forgotten; something that became her lost treasure.\(^{30}\) In the process of the recovery of this lost treasure, Arendt is seeking her own non-theological source: a foundational reference for the individual-in-the-world in her humanist phenomenological approach. Her understanding of the temporal and an approach to the human condition through

\(^{27}\) However, this intention should be compared to Jaspers' own designs on the history of western philosophy. While Heidegger's radical view of the tradition is one that inspired Arendt's approach to its consideration, Jaspers' supervision would have required a different one. As Jaspers says in his *Philosophical Autobiography*, "great metaphysicians of the past furnish us irreplaceable means of thought, but not in such a fashion that, in penetrating the present situation, we could apply them as a cure". See "Philosophical Autobiography" in *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1957), p. 89. Jaspers' suggests that there is a methodology being provided to the contemporary, but not the answers. Again, as Arendt approached her Augustine with Heidegger's philosophical enterprise in mind. She encountered a method being utilised by Jaspers in his work on Augustine. For a detailed comparison of Heidegger's and Jaspers' approach to the tradition see Richard Wissner, "Jaspers, Heidegger, and the Struggle of Existence: Philosophy for the Existence of Philosophy" *International Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (June 1984), pp. 141-158.


\(^{29}\) In the dissertation Arendt spends some time discussing the fusion of Christian thought of the New Testament and that of Athenian philosophy. Athenian philosophy (and especially Aristotle's) is considered through the understanding of Augustine and the dimensions this added to the development of the modern understanding. The individual in their revealed state is delineated between these two conflicting schools of thought. The language of Augustine is frequently Greek, but the meaning is intended to be Christian. Throughout her dissertation Arendt highlights and discerns the clash of thinking evident in the language and a clash that obscures Augustine's thought. As will be shown in the next section, Arendt is very concerned about the locating the histories in his thought as she delimits his work. This operates, however, not only in terms of language but also cosmologies and expectations. Therefore Augustine was at the centre of this concern for some German intellectuals.

\(^{30}\) It is this sense of a lost treasure that pervades her later work and became a focal point for her political thinking. For example, see the introduction to *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, enlarged ed., (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1993).
the individual as *homo temporals* requires a consideration of her own kairological framework and therefore the role of storytelling.

A realisation of this dimension founded in Heidegger and developed in her dissertation requires a separation of two particular elements vital to Arendt’s development of her understanding of the individual-in-time and the subsequent search for a reference point. The first requires an investigation into the world in which Arendt conceived the individual’s existence. Because Arendt was only interested in the world inbetween individuals not the natural world *per se*, the idea of community is this actual focal point. The second aspect leads on from this important clarification, and it is the form of knowing that regulates the individual’s action, communication, and reference point in this context. When examining these elements it is important to recognise the presence of Jaspers; a figure who has always been acknowledged by commentators but rarely discussed. His influence, however, is best determined through an examination of his most significant mentor, Soren Kierkegaard. In fact the movement of Arendt’s thought away from Heidegger’s emerging ego-centric tendency is countered by Arendt through her appreciation of the Dane’s influence on existential thinking. It is very hard to determine what Arendt’s philosophical understanding was before she selected Augustine and the topic of love for the dissertation studies with Karl Jaspers. The only way of shedding some further light on the dissertation and the thoughts of Arendt that it contains is to read her backwards, or think as if

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22 This is best illustrated by Jaspers in his *Nietzsche nor Heidegger*. These comments written in 1954/5 reflect the overtones made by Arendt in her “What is Existenz?” article written a decade earlier; an article complimented by Jaspers. Jaspers writes, “At the time when Heidegger’s work appeared, large sections of mine were already worked out; it was not at all influenced by Sein und Zeit—I still believed there might be analogies there but I did not look for them since I only read what was of benefit to me and nourished me—Heidegger nor his work gave me much benefit nor nourishment. Apart from the analogies, which are based on our common ground in Kierkegaard, I consider his work so heterogeneous from mine in motivation, context, and philosophical intent that—considering the measure and the manner of his objectifications that can be so easily become dogma because they can be learned—I always have to deplore the circumstances that Heidegger is considered immediately and readily in accord with my philosophy, and my philosophy is misunderstood accordingly. This is due to the tendency, present in those readers who merely absorb and give back, to objectivise and doctrinalise all philosophies, and whom Heidegger meets half way—not I, at least not when it comes to the crucial element of philosophy itself”. Translated by Edith Ehrlich, Leonard H. Ehrlich and George B. Peiper in Karl Jaspers: *Basic Philosophical Writings*, p. 503, n. 122.

23 In this manner Jaspers provides a suitable suggestion as to Arendt’s use of Heidegger’s thought, though not his particular foundations. Jaspers responded to the association often made between his philosophy and Heidegger’s by saying “I consider his work so heterogeneous from mine in motivation, context, and philosophical intent”: the same could have been said by Arendt. Jaspers, *Karl Jaspers*, p. 503.
Arendt had written the dissertation under the influence of Kierkegaard. There is no doubt that the dissertation is a reflection of Heidegger’s influence yet in attempting to then understand her dissatisfaction with his philosophical perspective it is worthwhile to attempt to establish a position before this fruitful examination commences. By suggesting that Kierkegaard was the first philosophical influence on Arendt’s seminal years several aspects of her early thought come into perspective. The first is the choice of love as a topic for her dissertation, and the second is the chance to clarify what she was attempting to achieve with her examination of Augustine. Overall it should be noted that in her use of and reaction to Heidegger – especially through her reading of modernity – Arendt sought to ground the real community of man thus allowing her to locate the source of their reference point with her own temporal dimension.

(ii) Kierkegaard, Truth and Storytelling: Faith, Trust and Right Comprehension

An illustration of how the two elements – community and knowledge – eventually return to complement each other can be seen in the relationship between Kierkegaard’s and Hegel’s thought in Arendt’s reading. A pervasive idea contained in Arendt’s work, and one will later become significant for understanding her polemical work on vita activa and vita contemplative, is an attempt to conceptualise the mind correctly and in harmony with a worldly reality. This is evident in the thesis with her consideration of appetitus (desire) and love as social caritas. The best indication of Arendt’s intention comes from another German who started out his intellectual career pondering the role of Christian love. This German is G. W. F. Hegel whom Arendt identified herself with though she believed she had resisted the temptations he had succumbed to through philosophising. In his early theological writings, Hegel argues that Liebe provides a unity in existence and that it therefore overcomes Kant’s demand for an autonomous individual.

34 Kierkegaard was certainly the modern heir to the tradition of thought initiated by the great Christian Father. In a recent monograph on Kierkegaard, Westphal compares the Dane to Augustine. The reason for associating them is due to a similarity in their perspectives on individualism, or more specifically for these Christian thinkers, the individual before God. For Augustine the direct relationship between the human being on earth and the God in heaven is bare and immediate. In a dialogue written in Augustine’s Soliloquies he presents this imaginary conversation: “A: I desire to know God and the soul. R: Nothing more? A: Nothing whatever”. Augustine, Soliloquies, Book 1, §2 in An Augustine Reader, ed. John J. O’Meara. (New York, Image Books, 1973), p. 42. See Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society, (Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987). See the introduction to chapter 3 titled “Kierkegaard’s Politics”.

35 Kierkegaard, with his demand for a leap of faith, echoes this relationship and followed this understanding. He also questioned the implications of such a relationship, however.

36 In the notes to her lecture series, “Machiavelli to Marx” delivered at Cornell University in the Fall of 1965, Arendt criticises Hegel for his failure to address the future in his thought. She says, “And once you have brought the dimension of Time into philosophy, you cannot avoid the dimension of the future.” (023498). Kierkegaard is used in her criticism of Hegel and in a comment taped to her notes she says “Listening to philosophers discourse upon reality is often just as misleading as seeing in the window of a secondhand store a sign which says: Pressing Done. If you bring in your washing to have it pressed, you have been taken in. The sign hanging there is only there to be sold”.

37 This association comes from an aside written on reflection after a conference on Christian Ethics. It was found in her personal papers in the Library of Congress collection.

Hegel later replaces his Liebe with reason in his scheme of thinking as he also turns to the community. Nonetheless, the essence of this belief in love is not lost from his later thinking due to his complex understanding of reason. Arendt mirrors this evolution as she turns from her social caritas or the right action to an order of love and eventually to harmony in her final unwritten treatise on judgement. Arendt continues to be concerned about the philosopher’s individual reflected in their conceptualisation of freedom. Arendt’s rejection of the Augustinian individual’s “self-sufficiency” is premised on a similar intention although she is wary of Hegel’s later answer in the Weltgeist, or the World Spirit of history. This provides further illumination when seen in distinction to Arendt’s reading of Heidegger’s position.

Arendt believes that Heidegger’s turn in philosophy eventually mirrors this Hegelian path, evident when she refers to Heidegger’s own World Spirit. Yet many people have criticised Heidegger’s conception of authentic existence for not considering the individual and their connection to others in any detail. In his descriptions in Being and Time, Heidegger emphasises the isolation of the individual in their Being-towards-Death. This anticipated future involves the individual in their singularity and therefore others are rejected, neglected or ignored reflecting Augustine’s Christian position. This leads Arendt to search for another temporal context that allows the other to remain yet still provides an authentic existence. Earlier in Being and Time, in the chapter ‘Care as the Being of Dasein’, Heidegger says that

>[In Angst, the things at hand in the surrounding world sink away, and so do innerworldly beings in general. The “world” can offer nothing more, nor can the Midas-sein of others. Thus Angst takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the “world” and the public way of being interpreted.]

As Arendt sees it, this distance that is generated by freedom towards death must be balanced with a sense of heightened awareness of being-in-the-world. Even Heidegger says that “far from transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a worldless occurrence that it brings Dasein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and itself before itself as being-in-the-world.” Returning to Hegel’s early view a clue is provided by his thought; the Christian religion of love not only provides for a close relationship with God, but also with others

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39 Although this characterisation and subsequent criticism does emerge until much later in Arendt’s life its source is present in this turn in her thinking. For her later articulation see Life of the Mind, ‘Willing’, p. 50.
41 See the freedom toward death description in Being and Time, p. 266 [p. 245 of Stambaugh],
42 ibid., p. 187 [p. 175 of Stambaugh].
43 ibid., p. 188 [p. 176 of Stambaugh].
in society; "[i]n love the separate does still remain, but as something united and no longer as something separate; life senses life."44 This love leads to an appreciation of life, heightened in its sensitivity similar to the final Augustine's delectatio, the pre-cursor to his notion of truth.45

For Arendt when she started her examination of Augustine's concept of love, time was already an essential element of her thinking due to her reading of Kierkegaard and contained in this approach was the germ of her understanding of storytelling.46 The harmony of phronesis and mood of storytelling through communication such as preaching or the Christian 'bringing of the message' was discussed and in this context the notion of the moment needs to be considered its a kairological framework. Brian Stock in his Augustine the Reader notes that in De Ordine Augustine's rationale, the faculty of reason in the soul, is differentiated from rationabilis, action and speech through the use of reason.47 This particular aspect of reason leads to the conclusion for Augustine that "reasonable action deals with the right living".48 In this guise, reason forms the community (ratio communis) and "the natural bond that unites them is speech."49 Speech contains the elements of the correct relationship between individuals in the community and leads to a communal comprehension, or an understanding of 'truth' in a community. So what is Arendt's rationale?

There is a need to explore Arendt's notion of the community and how it leads to the kairological.

44 Early Theological Works, trans. T. M. Knox, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 304-5. In The Life of the Mind, Arendt that "there exists no metaphor that could plausibly illuminate the special activity of the mind, (i.e., thinking) in which something invisible within us deals with the invisibles of the world." Later on she says, that the only thing she can think of is "being alive". The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, p. 123. This fits with what Arendt says when discusses the metaphor of the burning fire: "[while the former [chemist] is left with wood and ashes as the sole objects of his analysis, the latter [alchemist] is concerned only with the enigma of the flame itself: the enigma of being alive. Thus the critic inquires about the truth whose living flame goes on burning over the heavy logs of the past and the light ashes of life gone by". “Walter Benjamin”, Men in Dark Times, p. 157.
45 Kierkegaard seems to be in a difficult position. She appears to follow Kierkegaard's extended commentary on Hegel's work turning to the individualist's 'self in society' through her social caritas. This is evident in her emerging reaction to Hegel's direction. Yet, in terms of the individual's lack of self-sufficiency, she wishes to follow the early Hegelian option. This highlights the problems that face Arendt as she seeks to maintain the dignity and freedom of the individual in the modern world, especially a world where the later Hegelian/Marxist influence has become dominant. The solution that Arendt seeks is involved in her use of storytelling and the emergence of a new temporal dimension through the moment.
46 It is not coincidental that the role of the moment in an individual's existence comes into focus in Either/Or during a discussion on love. Either/Or, Part II, p. 123. In order to elucidate on the moment in his thinking, Kierkegaard illustrates his meaning through a discussion of beauty and how aesthetics changes from the spatial to the temporal, or from painting to music and poetry; "music has time as its element but has no continuance in time; its significance is the continual vanishing in time; it sounds in time, but also fades and has no continuance. Ultimately poetry is the highest of all arts and therefore also the art that best knows how to affirm to the meaning of time." ibid., p. 156. This intimation of a new temporal condition from Kierkegaard becomes the essence of storytelling for the political Arendt in her space of appearance.
47 De Ordine, 2.11.31: "Nam ratione esse discretum, quod ratione uteretur vel uti posset, rationabile autem, quod sitone factum est et dictum." (p. 125, lines 28-30)
48 ibid., 2.12.35. (p. 127, lines 1-5)
49 Stock, Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation, (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1996), p. 133. This passing remark is inspired by this reading of Arendt's dissertation, referenced to pp. 75-90 of the German original. (The final section, 'Social Caritas' in translation). Stock's exploration of Augustine is defined through the Christian Father's capacity as a 'reader of the written word' making this observation on speech very interesting indeed.
This requires an understanding of how Arendt conceives knowing through trust and not understanding in the context of her community.50

In the opening to the third and final part of her dissertation titled “Social Life”, Arendt clearly describes her concern; why does the neighbour remain in Augustine’s thinking despite his devotion to God and God alone? Arendt looks for another “empirical context” that retains a presence in Augustine’s thought if not his theory; one that stands outside of his understanding of the Christian faith. Arendt turns to the experiential ground of Augustine and his understanding of the early Christian followers where he describes them as having “faith in common”.51 Arendt asserts that the relational aspect of this understanding can indicate two things. The first is the futural aspect of this faith - the possibility of what can happen in the future based on a transmundane reference. The second leads on from this because of its radical possibility in that it demands all from each individual in this community of love, just as God demands all from an individual. Even though the Christian religion is a religion of individual faith, the startling similarity of each of these individual responses brings about a homogeneity that refuses this distinction. Arendt relates this understanding to a ‘worldly’ community. These communities have a requirement that only part of the individual needs to belong to these worldly communities to be part of them.

The point that Arendt is making is the distinction between a faith that places the individual as an individual in the presence of God and yet provides them with a community of common faith. This construction of a community through faith though must be seen in distinction to the capacity for isolation that faith also brings upon an individual. The acts of craving and referring back are dependent on God. The point being that even though all share the same faith, this faith does not necessarily mean that an individual needs to acknowledge this and understand its significance; “[t]he simple sameness of the God in whom they all believe does not as yet bring about a community of the faithful”.52 The most significant element in the earthly community, *civitas terrena*, is foundations, or in the primal Christian understanding, its common descent from Adam. Because of this common descent all individual’s share a common ancestry and “[t]his kinship creates an equality neither of traits nor of talents, but of situation” or, simply put, “[t]hey all share

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50 The worth of this discussion is given further validation by Arendt’s particular translation of *Verstehen* and *Verstand* in *The Life of the Mind*.
51 In the *Homilies on the First Epistle of John* I, 3, Augustine says, “Those saw: we have not seen and yet we are fellows because we hold the faith in common”.
52 *Love and St. Augustine*, p. 99.
the same fate." Therefore an individual has others who are connected to their self by this common destiny. From this the community is linked; through their fellowship or as Arendt translates it, societas. Every member of this community is born with this primal character in their lives. Arendt translates the Latin phrase tamquam radicaliter as ‘rooted’ to suggest this relationship. Therefore from this an interdependence is generated and this underlies all interactions in the community.

The tolerance from this situational equality shown in society results from this premise. In a footnote, Arendt quotes Augustine saying, “Since it is by mutual give and take that human society is bound together.” Practical knowledge can be generated but it will always be belief that founds a society. Arendt continues and says that “[w]e comprehend all history, that is, all human and temporal acts, by believing—which means by trusting, but never by understanding (intelligere).” Arendt says that “[t]his belief in the other is the belief that he will prove himself in our common future.” With this understanding proof is not required but belief is and this founds and coheres a community. She believes that “[r]ather it rests on necessary belief, without which social life would be impossible.” But what is visible is the belief in a community rather than any substantial practical knowledge. What is therefore important in this belief (credere) is trust rather than understanding (intelligere); “[t]he continued existence of humankind does not rest on the proof. Rather, it rests on necessary belief, without which social life would become impossible.” Arendt has determined the difference in knowledge required in different locations of human society. Now Arendt says that “until its relevance is known, men’s mutual interdependence cannot be replaced by the isolation in which the individual searches for his being.” The individual’s self relates to the community although this equality is hidden. Arendt quotes Augustine saying that the will cannot be seen and therefore trust must be involved in the acknowledgment: “[s]eeing is a possibility of knowledge and an evident one at that. However, knowing another’s will towards me is relevant only in mutual interdependence”. It is this ‘interdependence’ that Arendt says “essentially defines social life in the worldly community” and is clearly visible in the daily form of people living together. In suggesting this, Arendt pre-empted the basis from which she analysed

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53 ibid.
54 Note the use of societas in The Human Condition.
55 Love and St. Augustine, p. 101, n. 12.
56 ibid., p. 101. This passage suggests Arendt’s distinction between understanding and knowledge.
57 Note the use of equality in all this and the understanding of interdependence that is founded partly on this belief.
58 Love and St. Augustine, p. 101.
59 Equality only emerges if death is not regarded merely as a fact of nature but rather as an indication of sinfulness.
60 Love and St. Augustine, p. 101.
the crisis that European thinking would be facing after the Second World War and offered a
rebuke to Martin Heidegger. However, before this can become a consideration, the two aspects of
the community and the kairiological mentioned above need further examination.

(iii) Arendt and Kierkegaard: Searching for the Idea of Community

Kierkegaard refused to call himself a philosopher because the scientific revolution resulted in a
separation of experience and knowledge. Truth had become the consequence of thought not
meaning. Its objectivity had meant that the particular had given way to the universal. Philosophy was no longer interested in the individual. With this rejection of the individual
automatically came the rejection of the neighbour, and therefore society. Kierkegaard uses the
analogy of playing dominos: “one does not live, one does not act, one does not believe; but one
knows what love and faith are, and it only remains to determine their place in the system. In the
same way the domino-player has his pieces lying before him, and the game consists in putting
them together.” The attempt therefore is to reintroduce singularity into issues of thinking and
subsequently society. This is the ground of shared experience but without an automatic claim to
the universal. Kierkegaard regards the contemporary thinker as a curious creature, and therefore
“to think existence sub specie aeterni and in abstract terms is essentially to abrogate it, and the merit
of preceding is like the much trumpeted merit of abrogating the principle of contradiction.”

An attempt to delineate Arendt’s early concept of judgement can also be related to
Kierkegaard’s examination of similar concerns. Continuing his concern with thought in the
contemporary age, Kierkegaard asserts that true thinking of the communal is apparent when in
the moment of decision thought considers ‘the background’ or “the more [det Meret] that will not

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61 Two Ages, p. 86. This essay was developed out of the review of Two Ages a book by Fru Gyllenborg and follows on from
another polemic titled, The Revolutionary Age. See the introduction by Alexandra Dru in Seren Kierkegaard, The Present Age,
trans. and intro. by Alexandra Dru, (Fontana Press, 1962), p. 10. The essays seem to found the culture of crisis and contain
many of the prominent points that were later taken up especially by the existentialists. The review was written in 1846, just after
The Concluding Unscientific Postscript. It became more than a review, as Kierkegaard saw within its story the story of
two separate cultures that intrigued him, the age of the (French) revolution and the present age. When talking about the
reception of the Present Age Westphal says that “[t]his little book has had a remarkable, though to my knowledge,
un traced, history within the existentialist tradition...”. Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society, p. 44. The
work of Kierkegaard that details his understanding of the (then) contemporary era is titled the Two Ages. The full title is
Two Ages: Age of Revolution and the Present Age, A Literary Review, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong,
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1978). In the two essays the extended literary review contains.
Kierkegaard develops a polemic that accuses his age of being “essentially one of understanding and reflection, without
passion”. His comparison of the ‘revolutionary age’ of the French Revolution and that of his own ‘present age’ are repeated
in the following century with the publication of The Human Condition and On Revolution.

62 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, “The Subjective Thinker”, 53 trans Swenson, p. 307. This was in Kierkegaard’s gives a
rejection of Hegel’s seminal influence of thought through logic. See Between Past and Future, p. 57 for further associations.
In an interesting comment that proceeds this quote Kierkegaard say that in the “scientific moment of thought”, imagination
and feeling are left behind and thought remains as the last stage.

63 See Two Ages, p. 62.
64 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 273.
merge in the individuality". The moment of decision is in itself the ethical act and it seeks “not to move from the individual to the generation [usually translated as race from the Danish Generationen] rather from the individual to the generation to achieve the individual.” From the dissertation, Arendt was aware of the importance of generation as well as its destructive nature. Subsequently, while Arendt does not discuss her justification for examining Augustine’s concept of love, it is suggestive to think that this examination was a continuation of Kierkegaard’s examination of the individual influenced by an early Hegelian idea of love.

Her examination of Augustine was as the first philosopher of the will but also as a philosopher who sought to clarify the role of love in the earthly community. The first philosopher of freedom, a guarantee of singularity for the individual, was confronted with the role of the neighbour in emerging Christian theology which had therefore sought to understand how this freedom also meant obligation. This is also the potential starting point of Arendt’s concept of plurality. Just as Kierkegaard was attempting to establish the idea of the community, Arendt was seeking her own understanding of the individual in the world through a similar notion of plurality. Plurality is a society of differences, and love is an element in an individual’s life that is shared in the community of the individual. This balance between the individual and their ‘society of the other’ is illustrated by Arendt’s most prominent claim in her analysis of Augustine’s thought, that man is not self-sufficient. Similarly, Kierkegaard is wary of claims that society does not in fact reflect the idea of community. In rejecting a commonality, individuals are characterised as isolated beings, self-sufficient. The thought that seeks to conceptualise the individual is its own framework, as “it ignores the concrete and the temporal, the existential process [or becoming], the predicament of the existing individual arising from his being a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal situated in existence.” The Kierkegaardian ‘idea of community’ means just that, it has meaning, not truth and therefore cannot be explained rationally in a Hegelian manner using intelligere. Rather, in

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65 Either Or, Vol. II, p. 143. This is in a chapter called ‘Aesthetic Validity of Marriage’. Kierkegaard discussion the moment at length.
67 See “this decent is defined by generation and not by creation”, Love and St Augustine, p. 104 and “it is the very possibility of isolation that enables us to detach ourselves from human history and from its irrevocable enchantment by generation” Love and St Augustine, p. 106.
68 Christianity Unscientific Postscript, p. 267.
69 The notion of community at work in say Aristotle is an external notion, while the idea in Kierkegaard is an internal one. Elsebeth Egstrup, “A Questioning of Justice: Kierkegaard, the Postmodern Critique and Political Theory.” Political Theory, Vol. 23 No. 3 (August No. 3), p. 430.
Kierkegaard’s eyes, it is based on faith. For Arendt, however, this solution was outside her own framework of understanding as she was seeking the development of a new “humanism” through German phenomenology. Nonetheless, this ‘idea of community’ still grows out of the thinking being. As part of his nature, Kierkegaard believes that man has always longed for a community as both a social and political being, and suggests that those who weary of the crowd or the masses are mistaken, instead “…the cure is precisely to learn all over again the most important thing, to understand oneself in longing for community.” Arendt follows this course herself and this reasoning allows a reading of her solution in a different light that can lead to an analysis of her attempts to ground a community with social caritas, and a regulating principle for this new notion of community: love as trust.

In order to proceed in this direction it is useful to return to her essay on her tradition of thinking. After the Second World War, Arendt was asked to comment on the development of German Existenz for the New York journal, Partisan Review. In this introductory article Arendt for the first time discusses her reading of her mentors. If this description of Heidegger’s and Jaspers’ thought in the post-war article is taken as a true statement of Arendt’s thoughts concerning the philosophers involved in her tradition of thought it is constructive to use it to capture a picture of their developing understandings from the pre-war years. In doing so a few

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70 See Arendt’s discussion of this in the dissertation. Arendt argues that what is visible is the belief in a community rather than any substantial practical knowledge. What is therefore important in this belief (credere) is trust rather than understanding (intelligere); “[t]he continued existence of humankind does not rest on the proof. Rather, it rests on necessary belief, without which social life would become impossible.” Love and St. Augustine, 101.
71 The Hinchmans argue that in her thinking Arendt had two related intentions. The first was the development of a new “humanism” in German phenomenology rather than then the liberal-socialist tradition and the consequent convictions about human nature and its behaviour. The second which will be considered later, was showing how this humanism was taken in a different way from the direction Heidegger took. Arendt was convinced that classical liberalism and socialism had some structural problems. For example, they saw man as social not political animals. Therefore, these ideologies saw political institutions as unnatural only existing because of the economic order and the vacillation of human nature. Phenomenology and existentialism provided much more specific alternatives to the liberal-socialism dualism because they were so all encompassing in their understanding of the contemporary situation. This will be examined in Section II. Lewis P. Hinchman, and Sandra K. Hinchman, “In Heidegger’s shadow: Hannah Arendt’s phenomenological humanism”, The Review of Politics, Vol. 46 (April, 1984), pp. 184-5.
72 Jegstrup in “A Questioning of Justice” uses Blanchot’s notion of ecstatic to explore this ‘idea of community’. While Jegstrup does not explicitly articulate this connection, it is not a coincidence that she also looked at the thought of Hannah Arendt in the context of Danish Jews and their experiences of the holocaust in the Second World War.
74 Jegstrup herself attempts to determine a regulating principle for her Kierkegaardian community and uses the phrase ‘love as obligation’ to explore this possibility. See “A Questioning of Justice”, passim.
75 Within the article there remain strong links to her work on Augustine in the dissertation from seventeen years ago. The themes cover the relationship of the individual to the universal, the capacity of man as the Creator (not a creator), and contradiction. Also the placement of Man as the master of Being, the right relation to Being as meaningful, the homelessness and isolation of man (in a desert), the need for community, and at a fundamental level in her analysis is the ongoing concern for the meaning and implication of the Now and immortality.
76 Arendt’s own portrait of Jaspers in “What is Existenz Philosophy?” emphasises the tentativeness of Jaspers’ project. For her this is an admirable trait in Jaspers the man and one that characterises his philosophy. The real worth of Jaspers’ work is the thought trains that he sets in motion rather than a manifest system of answers; “Jaspers has come to all the fundamental problems of contemporary philosophy, without answering or settling any of them in a conclusive way.” What has been the cause for criticism in some of Jaspers’ commentators is a point of celebration for Arendt. This is emphasised when she compares Jaspers to Heidegger amidst her description of Jaspers’ thoughts. “What is Existenz Philosophy?”, p. 55.
significant elements can be highlighted and these elements enable us to construct a context for understanding Arendt’s pre-war thoughts. Emerging in this article is her insight that the *vita activa* must be salvaged from the tradition of the *vita contemplation*, as the modern tradition of philosophy has constantly refused to accept the world of man, seeking instead to re-configure and then fit man back into the natural world of causality. In other words, the ‘idea of humanity’ is incorrect and consequently so is the tradition’s understanding of the ‘regulating principles in all political activity’. Arendt follows the tradition of thought she identifies with Existenz philosophy. In her view this tradition finds its foundation in the thought of Kant “who is the real, though . . . secret founder of modern philosophy”. Kant’s contribution in this context was to disrupt the unity of thought and Being and, as Arendt later comments, the ‘pre-established harmony between man and world’. Yet he did not proceed far enough in his thought and remove the security of Being from man’s existence. This security was retained in Kant’s determination that man was only subjectively free ‘in himself’ not objectively, or in the world of nature where causality ruled. While modern philosophy, she concludes, has defied this they have always mistakenly fallen back onto fate in the process. A discussion of the individual and the multi-faceted world in which they reside dominates Arendt’s framework of discussion in this article.

A replacement for this way of attempting to understand the world is an Augustinian ‘discordance of Being’ (not the Being of ontologies), allowing Arendt to perceive a solution to this disharmony. Man can now attempt to create a world, or a home, out of the desert even though the existence of alienation can never allow the world to be a real home. Arendt says here emphatically that man is uncomfortable in the world as a home, but he can create one in which he does feel comfortable - but he must make it himself in order to be worldly. As can be seen from these

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77 The conclusions that emerge from this reading must always be aware that inbetween Arendt’s dissertation and this article is the Second World War and the Holocaust.
78 *Essays in Understanding*, p. 172.
79 ibid., p. 168.
80 ibid., p. 170.
81 Arendt uses Nietzsche’s *amor fati*, Heidegger’s resoluteness, and Camus’ rebellious man as examples, ibid., p. 171. The exception is Jaspers.
82 The comparison of Jaspers’ concept of “failure” with Heidegger’s “Fall” is initially to avoid a misunderstanding but it becomes a statement of what is admirable in Jaspers’ philosophy and consequently what is not in Heidegger’s. Jaspers’ concept of “failure” is not a “structurally necessary” Fall from one’s authentic Being as a man”, by which Arendt means Heidegger’s understanding. She goes on and says that “Jaspers holds that in philosophy every ontology claiming it can say what Being really is, is a slipping-away [Abgleiten] into the absolutising of particular categories of Being.” However, in the process, he is not to think of himself as a Creator, only as a creator. Being therefore should be seen as surrounding us, (encompassing?) and therefore ontology is ‘liquidated’; or as Arendt says, “with the liberation of the world from the ghost of being and the illusion of being able to understand it, there disappeared the necessity of having to explain it monistically from one principle—namely, from this all-pervasive substance.” *What is Existenz?*, p. 55.
concurrences much of the language, and imagery is derived from the Gnostic, Stoic, Neoplatonic and early Christian discussions about the world and the role of man. Consequently Arendt conceives the world in which man resides as beyond his grasp; it appears as a desert. Nonetheless, man can construct his own world in this desert. Arendt suggests that in the Being that surrounds us and is ‘unknowable’ there is an island that allows Man to exist ‘unmenaced by the dark Unknowable’ and therefore be free.83 Any attempt to step outside of this world and reach for the ‘true’ reality starts a disintegration of man. Man realises that he cannot know nor create Being and therefore is not God and therefore understands the limitations of his own existence. The role of philosophy is not to construct a Being and make man subservient to it, but rather to trace these limitations, the limitations of human Existenz. Jaspers talks of the need for ‘unconditional deeds’ in extreme situations. They include death, contingency, and guilt.84 These are present in the work of Kierkegaard and further developed by Jaspers; both used consciously in Heidegger’s intellectual and conceptual development.85 This deed evolves through communication with others and these other people collaborate in reason and through this process illustrates the freedom of man and nurtures this freedom.

There is a warning however, implicit in this project, that man’s capacity to create is not equal in its capability as the Supreme Being. The world exists before Man and will exist after. Man is inbetween these two significant temporal limitations and man must always remember that he is a temporal being. As a consequence to this man will continue to feel separated from the world of being, the natural world, but he can create a home for himself and this world is the common world, created along with other men. Man (or Existenz) is never isolated and is dependent on communication with others. As a summary to her understanding of their respective was of thinking, Arendt says that whereas in Heidegger’s thought others destroy Existenz, for Jaspers “Existenz can develop only in the togetherness of men in the common given world”.86

This description of Jaspers’ thought also describes Arendt’s intentions with her theory of political action. In fact, she goes so far as to describe the basis of all suitable politics when she

83 ibid.
84 Arendt’s own classification. ibid., p. 45.
85 “Situations such as: that I am always in situations, that I cannot live either without struggle and without suffering, that I inductively take guilt upon myself, that I must die—these I call limit situations”. Jaspers, Philosophie, Vol. II, p. 203.
86 “What is Existenz?”, p. 55. Arendt’s use of Augustine has gone from a Heideggerian use of the Christian Father to a more Jasanian interpretation although it still retains the same conceptual framework only now based on an Augustinian schema.
suggests that, human freedom and dignity are the “regulative principle of all political action”.\textsuperscript{87} This pre-emptory comment by Arendt frames her pursuit for the rest of her intellectual career. Freedom presents the demand of and opportunity for a life of dignity. This dignity in Arendt’s understanding has two dimensions; each equally as important as each other. The first is the need for trust as an ability to construct the stable world of individuals in a temporally fragile environment (or the Augustinian desert). The second is a bond between individual in this stable world based on communication and right comprehension. Both of these definitions lead to the Arendtian space of appearance and the activities that occur in this space but the second aspect establishes a sense of how an individual should think.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p. 42. In the newly translated version of this article in Essays in Understanding, p. 170 the ‘autonomy of man’ is the ‘dignity of man’.

\textsuperscript{88} This is poignantly illustrated by Arendt’s focus on the thoughtlessness of Eichmann, the humanitas of Jaspers and other such men in ‘dark times’ and Kant’s description of stupidity to detail admirable or distasteful individuals. Both good and bad in the community of men helped form Arendt’s ideals, and her perception of the appropriate life of the mind.
2. Now in the Community

This returns to the Arendtian conception of the community that was emerging from her dissertational studies. Similar to Kierkegaard’s ‘idea of community’, and through reading Augustine, Arendt develops her own understanding of community, establishing how the individual can conceive of, and participate in, this collective identity. Using her post-War thought, her understanding of community has been investigated in several commentaries. Gottsegen posited the idea of *humanitas* in his search for the Action-Ideal, d’Entrèves used the ‘communities of memory’ in his communitarian-based discussion, and Sheldon Wolin initiated the discussion suggesting in Arendt’s *polis*: “the audience is a metaphor for the political community whose nature it is to be a community of remembrance.” Similar to the editors of the translated version of the dissertation, Scott and Stark, each of these approaches involve the faculty of memory in their analyses, suggesting in broad terms that the collective memory of experiences brought individuals together with a sense of community. There was no doubt that this bond between individuals would be fragile, based on a type of tradition and therefore authority, and where storytelling would play a central role in the communication of this idea of community.

(i) *Storytelling, Memory and the Order of Love*

In *Love and St. Augustine*, Arendt explores the aspect of mortality present in the worldly community and the subsequent imperative of a search for the creator. In her understanding of Augustine’s love it leaves this world but returns three times and this triple return is utilised by Arendt to explore “the relevance of the neighbour” for her own purposes. Time is intimately involved in this search in the form of memory which is regarded as the storehouse of personal experience. In the dissertation, it is seen as a mental faculty and Arendt commits a lot of space in her investigation to understanding its role in Augustine’s thought. Simply put Arendt says that in Augustine’s work a space of memory is created which allows past and future to meet. In response to this Scott and Stark suggest in their interpretative essay that “caritas bridges reason and judgement in the space provided by memory” and that *caritas* and free will turns the Heideggerian “they” into a true community of neighbours who are loved for themselves and also

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90 Scott and Stark, “Rediscovering Hannah Arendt”, p. 142.
for their “Common Source”. The editors were intent on exploring Arendt’s concept of free will in her interpretation of Augustine and in doing so they suggest that the glimpse that we are left with – of Arendt’s judgement from her reading of the Critique of Judgement in the lectures on Kant – is inadequate without the assistance of the dissertation. In the dissertation Arendt does analyse Augustine’s model of judgement though she argues that it is ambiguous. There are two sides. The first is the world being alien because of the appetitus model of love. This creates desire for the eternal, for God and therefore beyond this world. The second occurs when on return to the world the Augustinian individual realises that he is merely a thing in the world and therefore regulated. Nonetheless, the editors continue, the dissertation can be used to establish a foundation that she drew upon to develop her reading of Kant. From their reading of the dissertation, they see the basis of judgement as this mental space where past and future meet in the present and provide the point of judgement for the observer (and as well as the actor). They recommend the concept of ‘memory’ as this space becomes “the existential context for the mental act of judging”. In summary they suggest that “both forms of caritas require a return to the world to either regulate it or to found new moral communities.”

What they have not explained however is the details of the role of memory in Arendt’s early thinking. The link is caritas through Arendt’s transformation of this love into social caritas and the implications of this solution regarding her concerns surrounding Augustine’s conception of a love that does not adequately embrace the neighbour in their worldly existence. Amidst Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s conception of freedom, is also an emerging advocation of responsibility that exists contemporaneously with this new found capability and includes the faculty of memory. Arendt spends much of her life evolving her analysis of Augustine’s faculty of memory which at the same time provides her with the material to refine her understanding of the principles that should be the guide for this faculty’s use. This is the art of remembrance. It is this aspect of Arendt’s mental faculties that becomes the main determinant in an individual’s life, especially as part of her idea of community.

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91 *ibid.*, p. 143.
93 In doing so they recognise the problem that continually beset Arendt’s thinking, the tension between freedom and the law. This characterisation is provided with a further dimension when it is defined as the tension between the passion of the daytime and the law of the night, a characterisation reflected in Jaspers’ own thought.
95 This mental space is also regarded as the foundation of thinking and free will. *ibid.*, p. 148.
96 *ibid.*, p. 149.
Throughout Arendt’s examination the role of caritas can read in two different ways; as the desire for the eternal, or as the union of creator and created. Scott and Stark suggest that it is desire for the eternal that creates a reference point from which judgements can to be made and consequently the Augustinian individual is informed by the ‘order of love’ in a ‘world’ created and maintained by men. But love (caritas) inspired by desire (appetitus) is in contrast to the habits constructed by cupiditas and this has an effect on the human free will. It is the union of the lover and the loved through caritas that inspires Arendt’s thinking on this subject. The former option and the preference presented by the editors is a misreading of Arendt’s intentions though they are correct regarding the centrality this plays in her thought. Arendt seeks a different kind of immortality that is not eternity as such. Rather it is a timelessness that results in the moment through harmony, or a balance between the temporal stages. This particular timelessness is achieved in a state that produces this mood of harmony that becomes important to Arendt’s framework.

This is a complex point in Arendt’s development from a Heideggerian-based analysis of Augustine towards her own understanding premised on a new conception of the temporal at work in the individual’s life driven by the need to acknowledge the other. The idea of community leads to a consideration of memory, both individual and collective. The futuraly defined dimension indicated by Heidegger’s investigation is sound if used for building a community in the inbetween and out of the Augustinian desert, but not when it determines a life lived in anticipation of death. The love of the neighbour is too immediate and too restrictive. The Augustinian individual aims only to be satisfied with this worldly option, as they “have a justifiable existence only to the extent that they can be “used” for the sake of something that is radically different and separated from them.” The neighbour can be regarded as beside me purely because he has entered into the same relationship with God and the absolute future. The relationship is one of mutual help in loving God or being helped to love God but this is an indication that this love is still love for the sake of. And this Augustinian position will “rule out

97 This is similarly reflected in her discussions in The Human Condition. In the final part of her introductory section Arendt uses the comparison between eternity and immortality to highlight the neglect of the vita activa, and also the need to achieve a balance between the rectilinear and cyclical concepts of time: See pp. 17-21.
98 Arendt suggests that the Stoic and Neoplatonic elements emerge when Augustine talks about the notion of enjoyment the future. Though, as she continues, the future is a particularly Augustinian as well as the idea that this future designs an order that can order the present: “[I]ndeed, insofar as the future is anticipated in desire, the “highest good” is drawn into the present and can dominate and regulate life in this world. However, the fact that death that will part man absolutely from the world and his present existence is not minimized” Therefore man is not able to reach the desired perfection or happiness as long as he exist in this world. Love and St. Augustine, p. 41.
meeting my fellow men (in their concrete worldly reality and relation to me) in their own right."

Arendt’s temporal order emerges through her consideration of a new order of love. In the order of love, the neighbour is beside me, horizontally on a vertical scale, but also on the same level as the “tripartite hierarchy”, and therefore Arendt suggests I should “love him as myself”. In an indication of her own direction Arendt says that Augustine is aware of this problem, and that he does not simply turn another individual into a means not an end unto itself. Consequently Arendt has Augustine saying, “[i]t is a great question whether men should enjoy or use each other, or whether they should do both”. And he comes to the following conclusion: “[f]or if we love somebody for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of something else, we use him. But it seems to me that he should be loved for the sake of something else. The happy life is grounded in what must be loved for its own sake; and the thing which constitutes this happy life is not yet at our disposal, although the hope for it consoles us in the present time.” The hope that it will occur stays us in the present and Arendt argues, it is “actualised in love and determines its order”. Hope comes first and then love evolves out of its presence and Arendt states, “[i]t is not love that disclosed to me my neighbour’s being”.

This order of love emerges out of hope or the futural but Arendt is aware of the role of Augustine’s faculty of memory. Arendt is seeking to reconcile this tension between what can be described as anticipation and remembrance in the manner of the passion of the daytime and the law of the night. The temporal dimension at the heart of Arendt’s understanding is therefore past possibility. This dimension becomes essential to Arendt’s developing theory of judgement and her later turn to the political. It is important to establish the framework from which Arendt is seeing Augustine’s work and its implications for her own position. The community based on memory relates through anticipation and establishes an order of love. The individual however must be called to this understanding of the other from a life lived in a different, restrictive temporal dimension. This life is lived in habit and this habit must be broken. The other is the call to the right order and therefore the right action in love. This order of love establishes the bond and therefore

99 ibid.

100 Arendt says with concern that “Augustine’s order of love is an indication of the utterly derivative character of all relations that go beyond the mere use of worldly data”. Simply, when an individual moves out of the sphere dedicated to surviving and looks to those around him or her, the neighbour is not as important as the relationship they have with God. ibid.

101 Her quote marks, though no reference.

102 Love and St. Augustine, p. 42.
the trust to stabilise this fragile world of the inbetween. The bond emerges through a process of communication and the right comprehension.

The relation of the moment to eternity also plays a role in another Arendtian idea: storytelling. This storytelling appears to derive from a romantic interpretation of the anti-platonic maintenance of the Homeric tradition of public storytelling. In a similar manner to Heidegger’s preaching - the Christian ‘bringing of the message’ in his discussion on phronesis - Arendt develops a theory of storytelling in communication or the discourse of care. This is a reflection of Heidegger’s trinity of care (mood, comprehension, and discourse) and from this influence Arendt develops her own primary trinity. This trinity evolves out of a discussion on the moment without time; eternity and timelessness. In the Confessions Augustine presented himself with the problem of whether time had an extension or not. The examination by Augustine is about whether the moment or the particular can simultaneously be the eternal or the general.

Augustine’s treatment of time in the Confessions is Platonic in its imperative. This work’s focus on Genesis demands an examination of the role of time in the divine. The present become a focus for this discussion: “As for the present, if it were always present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be time but eternity. If, therefore, the present time only by reason of the fact that it moves on to become the past, it would not be time, but eternity... In other words we cannot rightly say that time is, except by reason of its impending state of not being.” The argument focuses on the question of whether the present has an extension or not. His discussion in Chapter Eleven leads to the conclusion that God’s knowledge should leave us in awe and our own knowledge fragile in its temperament. The role of genesis though introduces an interesting slant for Augustine. What is the relationship of time and eternity? The present without extension is still continuous and therefore extended, or how can the present be both momentary and eternal? Taking his lead from Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists in general, Augustine argues that this contradiction has a solution, or rather it is explained by the Soul. There the present has three dimensions, past, present and future and these three dimensions of time exist in the Aristotelian sense of the discrete, or the Now. Using the framework Augustine has now reached

104 This is the concern that Arendt picks up in her examination of Kant’s Critique of judgement much later in her life.
105 Time is the image of eternity captured by Plotinus in the Enneads, III, 7, 1.
106 Augustine, Confessions, Book 11, §14.
§22 of his Confessions and is still no closer to a satisfactory conclusion. Prayer and the Psalms are now involved in the argument. This strange turn in Augustine’s thinking is because he has found a way to allow the discrete present to contain the continuous extension of past and future. From §25 onwards, Augustine uses the example of speech over and above his example of motion. How do you measure the voice or speech? While the voice is heard it passes from the future to the past but does it have an extension? The answer to this question leads to a perspective that grounds Arendt’s concept of storytelling.

Augustine wants to understand what is going on when he says a prayer or a psalm to and about God. The approach he uses is temporal in nature. The soul contains the three phases of time, past, present and future. Time in fact is the product of the activities of the Augustinian soul. A literal translation of Augustine’s description is expectation, attention and memory.¹⁰⁸ This is Arendt’s first step towards her own trinity of the mind that we later see emerge as thinking, willing, and judging: a trinity with the same temporal elements.¹⁰⁹ The soul in the present maintains a relationship to the continuum or eternity. By §28 Augustine is using the example of a song as his illustration. The individual remembers the whole of the song before he or she begins to sing the song and before the song is commenced there is the expectation of the song in its entirety. The past contains the future just as the future will contain the past. As the song is sung it changes from expectation back to memory again. How are these three periods combined into one? Which element is the instigator of the unification? In fact, according to Augustine, it is the song. The song, or in Arendt’s understanding the story and its telling, unites the particular and the whole.¹¹⁰ The story therefore reflects the temporal state of past possibility that is fundamental to her response to Heidegger and leads to her later examination of judgement. In a sense Arendt’s reading of Heidegger’s reading Jaspers’ reading of Kierkegaard provides her with the insight that links these three elements of her thinking together. Kierkegaard says that this relationship “is the secret of conscience; this secret that an individual life has with itself; that it is simultaneously individual and universal.”¹¹¹ Arendt’s conscience directed by her reading of Augustine establishes her paradigm of the mind.

¹⁰⁸ Augustine, Confessions, Book 9, 828. “Nam et expectat et audet et meminit”. In Pine’s translation see p. 278.
¹⁰⁹ From Augustine’s soul Arendt arrives at her mind. Willing is the future, judging is the past and thinking is the present as timelessness, not eternity.
¹¹⁰ See Stock, Augustine the Reader, p. 133.
This solution in storytelling, or at least the Augustinian song at present, also provides the temporal context for conscience and judging. Consciousness is also very important because of the journey from *nunc stans* to *memoria* and as acknowledged by the editors but it also leads into timelessness.\(^\text{112}\) It breaks the ‘habit’ of thought and calls the Augustinian man back into the presence of god. It breaks the rule of habit maintained in the world.\(^\text{113}\) For Augustine there is no togetherness or being at home in the world that can lessen the call of conscience but for Arendt “[i]n the human world established by man, the individual no longer stands in isolated relation to his very own “whence”; rather, he lives in a world he has made jointly with other men”\(^\text{114}\). In Arendt’s eyes the call of conscience into the presence of God becomes the Christian determination of the source.\(^\text{115}\) Arendt asks whether it is possible because when man seeks his own presence as eternity, through the process of ‘referring back’ he reveals another being through a face-to-face confrontation and it is a being that he hitherto had never realised existed. This being is not ‘capable’ of finding ‘being as eternity’ without help and it is caused by the eternal dependence; a dependence expressed in imitation.\(^\text{116}\) This imitation though is more subtle than it appears, Arendt assures the reader. Arendt states that imitation is the basic ontological structure of man’s existence. Imitation means simply that man has not yet ‘called himself into being’, or the right temporal order. It does not mean that man can never achieve this being or “the “whence” of his createdness.” In Augustinian terms the conscience is the source of our need to return to Being, yet the power to do so comes from the Creator and is divine grace and is outside of ourself. “We defined the “outside ourselves” of the Being that makes us what we are as the twofold “before” of eternity”. The command is ours even though it was placed by God in our nature and the acknowledgment of this inadequacy, makes us aware of the Creator. This is a new direction and lays bare our sinfulness; “which is inevitable and ingrained in one who is “of the world” and thus


\(^{113}\) The will is weighed down by habit and is a sickness of the mind. Arendt continues to describe the power of the will being held down by habit. The acknowledgment of the inability of the will demands a return to God and now God becomes not simply the Creator but also a helper and giver. But He can help only those that have been humbled (*humiliiatus*); those that realize their own incapacity. After this a new relationship between the Creator and the creature is occurs as “Grace is God’s renewed acceptance of the creature He has made and corresponds to the plea for help in the renewed turn to God”. This is God’s love and really allows a re-creature to happen; “It is love (*allectus*) only the humbled can know and accept”, *Love and St. Augustine*, p. 89. Or, “[m]an is re-created by being delivered from his sinfulness and thus form being of the world”; *ibid.*, p. 90. This new relationship allows man to see the world as a desert again though this time he is not lost; “[h]e can live in the world, because in *caritas* he now has the “whence,” and thereby the meaning of this life.”

\(^{114}\) Augustine’s understanding destroys the meaning of being together on earth: “[t]here is no fleeing from conscience. There is no togetherness and no being at home in the world that can lessen the burdens of conscience”, *ibid.*, p. 84.

\(^{115}\) *ibid.*, p. 85.

\(^{116}\) In the original German volume Arendt’s explanation of this turns to the present tense and with inclusive pronouns.
has already chosen the wrong “before” through habit”¹¹⁷ Arendt translates this as a conscience that calls man into the right temporal order that is the ‘twofold “before” of eternity’. The eternity is now the Arendtian timelessness achieved through harmony though not of the Augustinian soul, but rather though the individual’s mind. Arendt has established her own trinity.

What it also means is that this call of conscience is an inherent capacity, however, it is only acknowledged when man is in habitation and this returns to the role of freedom in Arendt’s thought.¹¹⁸ It is lack of power and not lack of will that prevents man from adhering to the law of Being. Therefore, at the heart of this matter is the difference between ‘to will’ and ‘to be able’.¹¹⁹ As Arendt reads Augustine, in God, power and will exist together. In humans, their lack of power over their own being is the problem and again makes them dependent upon the Creator though more decisively this time. Man is searching for his own being and has turned away for the world and it is God’s decision whether this inherent goal of mankind and his imposed ‘isolation’ from the world will be successful: “[e]ven in conscious acknowledgment of the law (sub lege), man gains nothing but a knowledge of sin. His sin as such remains in the discrepancy between will and power”.¹²⁰ The concerted attempt of the creator to ‘return in conscience’ means that the creature feels the law bestowed by the Creator, yet he cannot adhere to it completely and again realises the Creator. From this experience, man encounters ‘grace’.¹²¹ Arendt’s reading of this is simply to realise that without the community man cannot follow through the will because there is no power to do so. This acknowledgment leads to an acceptance of the neighbour and an attitude encapsulated by a sense of togetherness.

The power of the will is weighed down by habit and is a sickness of the mind.¹²² In Augustine this faltering brings the individual back to their dependence on God. But He can help only those that have been humbled (humilitas). After this, a new relationship between the Creator and the creature occurs as “[g]race is God’s renewed acceptance of the creature He has made and corresponds to the plea for help in the renewed turn to God”.¹²³ This new relationship allows man

¹¹⁷ ibid., p. 88.
¹¹⁸ In this state, the demand that is contained within the individual actually comes from outside the individual. Arendt gives an example of what she is saying. The command, “Thou shalt not covet” is an illustration of the demand inherent in an individual. “Thus the fulfilment of the law is the “perfecting of good” and the “consuming of evil””. ibid., p. 86.
¹¹⁹ In this is a new confrontation with God that puts us in the ‘presence of God’ (coram Deo) just when we realise our inadequacy. God makes a demand of us as law and we cannot achieve the laws demands “The gulf between will and power corresponds to the uncertainty of “to will” and “to will” (partim velle, partim nonle). What commands in the law is our conscience, which at the same time is our will”. ibid., p. 88.
¹²⁰ ibid., p. 87.
¹²¹ An Augustine quote saying that the capableness of man’s will is given by God.
¹²² ibid., p. 89.
¹²³ This is God’s love and really allows a relationship to the creature to happen. “It is love (dilectio) only the humbled can know and accept”. ibid.
to see the world as a desert again though this time he is not lost. For Arendt what is significant for the individual is the implications of their relationship to their source: he "can live in the world, because in caritas he now has the "whence," and thereby the meaning of this life." Arendt follows this by saying "caritas accomplishes the "tending to be," as cupiditas accomplishes the "approach to nothingness"." The first quote refers to the return while the second refers to the future. In caritas both the past and the future are referred to at the same time. In this process articulated by Augustine there is a transformation of the individual. The Christians call it a humbling before God and a condition of grace or humiliatus. Of course, their divine grace occurs in caritas and as 'referring back' this caritas is also referred to as "loving back" (redamare); "[o]nly in this return of love can man refer back so as to come to the truth of his existence." Arendt takes this as a movement towards discovering the source or the 'chance of actualisation'.

With this establishment of the temporal dimension that provides the foundation of Arendt's enterprise in her dissertation there is the understanding that allows a return to Heidegger's thought. He also has this element as part of past possibility as part of his notion of conscience. The call of conscience in Heidegger is involved in his interpretation of Aristotle's praxis as he moves from his theological phase towards Being and Time. This call emerges out of nowhere and through a rupture in the accepted continuum of history. Therefore it is new and is mirrored in the idea of natality which emerges out of Arendt's exploration of Augustine's 'no more' and 'not yet' in the dissertation. The new breaks the old order by inserting itself into the continuum that is the old world. Is there a new world as a consequence of this birth? Time provides the answer as the old

124 ibid., p. 90. And also "Man is re-created by being delivered from his sinfulness and thus from being of the world."
125 ibid., p. 91. Arendt now quotes Augustine quoting Corinian I, 27-28 saying "And you have chosen the ignoble things of this world, and the despised things, and those which are not, as if they were, to bring to naught the things that are". [Pine's translation is much clearer saying "For you have chosen what the world holds weak, so as to abash the strong; you have chosen what the world holds base and contemptible, nay you have chosen what is nothing, so as to bring to nothing what is now in being." ] Arendt now argues in a footnote against both Nietzsche and Scheler. The point of disputation seems to be the result of the 'bring to naught' / 'bringing to nothing' in this sentence. Arendt sees Augustine saying that the chose represented in this sentence is very completely destructive, whereas Nietzsche and Scheler see it as causing a reversal. Arendt feels that it is the 'annihilation, not the reversal, of all human conduct'. A precursor to her argument in The Human Condition.
126 This is a reference to a non-theological alternative to "divine actualisation". Love and St. Augustine, p. 78. In her dissertation 'actuality' is used to describe how the Creator does not seek to make man dependent upon him as a conscious one, though he is of course dependent on the Creator’s creation. But the actualisation cannot occur in caritas. The divine actualisation is something that is not really of this world, as it seeks something without and takes man from within the world. And because God is outside the world, a relationship with God also takes man outside the world and he then becomes as well something that is without, not within the world. The attachment to God takes an individual from the world and allows him to rise above it.
127 The notion of creation contains an inherent assumption that it has come to be (fieri) and therefore the 'structure of transience' - each creature in this comes from 'not yet' (transudum) and leads towards 'no more' (non-mo). ibid., p. 27. As will be discussed in his next section, Arendt attaches vital importance to this understanding of the individual: "[this small] non-time-space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the culture into which we are born into, can only be indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed down from the past, each new generation, indeed every new human being as he inserts himself between an infinite past and infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave it anew". Between Past and Future, p. 13.
world is the past, while the new event becomes a possibility. The relationship in time is the one of past possibility. The past as such is dead while the new reveals the future as possibility. At this moment the chronological concept of time is useless but the kaiological Augenblick, especially as moment of vision, provides an appropriate framework for understanding its dynamics.

The basis of moral judgement in Arendt's thought has its foundations therefore not in an exact replica of Heidegger's call of conscience but rather in 'conscience through caritas' that creates links with the creator but also the neighbour. The call does not rely on Augustine's God and instead on standing alone like Heidegger's call. Arendt's locates the foundation of the new as the source that retains the contextual relationship of knowing the call of conscience requires. This conception of knowing becomes clearer when Jaspers' and Kierkegaard's notion of conscience is involved with the understanding of the biblical prônesis. At the beginning of Heidegger's studies that lead directly to Being and Time, his use of conscience was at its infancy still to emerge in its final form in the book. Jaspers, in his Weltanschauungen, uses Kierkegaard's concept of conscience to explore his limit situations. Conscience leads the individual to the position where they can seek inner truth amongst other possibilities and possess the quality, like prônesis and memory, of being both universal and individual in nature. This is a personal conscience and one that requires a specific mood that is the attunement to the internal. This attunement is therefore a balance or sense of harmony that leaves the individual receptive through silence (Schweigen) and listening (Gehórsam). This attunement is similar to Heidegger's attunement. Arendt's concern is Heideggerian in its emphasis but not in its entirety.

This notion of understanding is Arendt's concept of trust that emerges in her dissertation but becomes a substantive element in her thinking as she reflects on the political and becomes a significant element of her framework in The Human Condition. This description shows the role of storytelling in her notion of trust and its emphasis on the past as future possibility. This leads to a

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128 See Being and Time, pp. 326-9.
130 There is another basic comparison between Arendt and Jasper's thought. Regardless of the direction or content of philosophy taken by Arendt there is certain belief she shared with Jaspers. Arendt termed it "thinking without banisters" while Jaspers described it as "[at] the end we have no firm ground under us, no principle to hold on to, but a suspension of thought in infinite space—without shelter in conceptual systems, without refuge in firm knowledge or faith. And even this suspended, floating structure of thought is only one metaphor of Being among other ..." quoted in Kurt Hoffman, "Basic Concepts of Jaspers' Philosophy" in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, (New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1957), p. 112 and is from Mon der Waîheit, p. 185 of the original. The plurality of Arendt as well as her frequent reference to 'enlarged mentality' of Kant's is echoed in Jaspers charge that philosophy must locate and search through all available view points. It seems very suitable that Arendt referred to Kant's enlarged mentality when writing about Jaspers in Men in Dark Times. In fact Jaspers felt that to take a singular position on the path to Being is to entertain an intellectual will to power. Instead Jaspers asked for the opposite, an openness to see reassurance in a satisfying Verständnis, but to listen, in the open, horizonless space, which encloses all horizons, to all that speaks to me, to perceive the light-signals that point a direction that warn, that entice — and perhaps announce that, which is ..." Waîheit, p. 187.
discussion of Arendt's theory of knowledge that is at work in her work that is suggested to have a Platonic foundation. By reading the dissertation and Augustine with this in mind Arendt's concern for the prevailing theories of knowledge and their limitations is discussed and the notion of trust is introduced as a possible alternative theory of knowledge. Coupled with her reading of modernity and the tradition from within which she sought answers, the moment of decision in a kairiological framework becomes the next focus.

(ii) *Homo Temporalis and Kaiological Thinking in the Crisis of Modernity*

This sensitivity to the question of time in Heidegger's developing thought manifests itself in another way and leads to an interest in the work of Aristotle. Heidegger is developing an understanding of presence in his lectures around this time. Consequently, the notion of space is also very important. Involved in this discussion of space is the concept of *kairos*. This involves opinion-formations which becomes life and death situations, human action, and especially decision-making. 131 Using this understanding, Heidegger analysed and utilised in *Being and Time* the ancient Greek notions of *kairos*, the 'moment, or *Augenblick*, while the related Greek conception of Being as 'presence' (*Anwesenheit*) is seen the error founding the misguided tradition of western thought. 132 At this stage, Heidegger approaches the work of Aristotle (not Parmenides yet) and especially *Nicomachean Ethics* in his 'confrontation of the ontological tradition'. The development of Heidegger’s thought through the twenties has a strong link to the thought of Aristotle. 133 From SS 1921 to the end of 1924 Aristotle played a consistent role in Heidegger’s exegesis that eventually became the first draft of *Being and Time*. The focus highlighted by these passages of Aristotle’s thought that received the most attention are *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book 6). The theme of human disclosure in the first division reflects on the art of making objects and in the second


133 The Heideggerian Aristotle that emerges from this period is ambiguous in his role, being regarded as modern, premodern as well as a phenomenologist. Franco Volpi says in the opening of his article "Being and Time: A "Translation" of the *Nicomachean Ethics*" that Heidegger's work is the 'most significant philosophical confrontation' of Aristotle's thought this century. Why then would Arendt having listened to the message of Heidegger’s thought then return to the Aristotle of old? The following article in the book, Walter Brogan’s "The Place of Aristotle" continues the explanation of Aristotle in the development of Heidegger’s early thought. This gives further rise to the potency of the Aristotelian element in Arendt highlighted in several commentaries. These articles are reprinted in *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his earliest thought*, Theodore Kiesel and John van Buren (ed.), (New York, State University of New York Press, 1994).
human action. The themes already being developed in Heidegger's previous lectures and courses become, through his engagement with Aristotle, less dependent on God and primal Christianity and more ego-centric in the ontological framework of human action. It is Aristotle's distinction between two forms of practical action; art (dependent on an external element ready-at-hand (Zuhandenheit) or poiesis) and prudence (inherent in the act and therefore the self or praxis) that becomes the focus, and subsequently the apparent neglect of the significance of the moment. But this is only apparent because both these forms of practical action involve time and Heidegger retains this sense of time - and the moment - in these two through their differentiation.

As discussed in the last chapter by the time Arendt reaches the lecture rooms of Marburg, Heidegger has divested himself of an overtly theological orientation and has moved on to discovering the tradition of ontology in the works of Aristotle. Arendt would have sat through and listened to Heidegger's lectures titled “Interpretation of Platonic Dialogues (Sophists, Philebus)”, and possibly a lecture “Being-here and Being-true according to Aristotle: Interpretation of Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics”. What these lectures contained is the final turn from an Augustinian perspective to his Aristotle investigations. The expected course on Augustine for SS 1924 is replaced by this lecture on Aristotle as Heidegger takes up a Greek orientation even though he maintains some previous terminology such as Augen-blick as the moment of phronetic insight. This link provides an insight into Heidegger's conception of Praxis and Arendt's reading of this change in emphasis that drifts away from her preferred pathway that becomes her own. With poiesis, when the instrument at hand breaks, it reveals reality and the

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134 See the introductory essay by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren in Reading Heidegger from the Start, p. 10. This is also discussed by Franco Volpi essay “Dasein comme Praxis” in Heidegger et l’Idée de la Phénoménologie, eds. Volpi et al., (Dorchrech, Kluwer, 1988), pp. 1-44 and further developed in “Being and Time: A Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics?”, trans. John Protevi in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his earliest thought, pp. 195-211.

135 In the “Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics” delivered in 1929-30. Heidegger still says that the moment allows in the ‘inner terror’, though after his move back to Freiburg there is a change in his tone. See lecture in Basic Writings; from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. and trans. David Farrell Krell, (London, Routledge, 1993), p. 105. Arendt's distinction between work and action utilises Aristotle's own distinction between poiesis and praxis. However, there is not a complete overlap. On the question of acting, Aristotle distinguishes between making and doing or between poiesis and praxis. The distinction is made in Aristotle's understanding because of the separate telos involved in each of these activities. See Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, Chapter 3, 1140a, 1-5. In praxis it is the ‘quality of the deed’ that is the end whereas in poiesis that is an act of fabrication or rather the inherent purpose involved in this act is the end. This distinction becomes clearer when the agent is considered. In poiesis the end is outside of the agent but not in praxis which is an end to itself. From this description, it is easy to see Arendt categories of work and labour falling within poiesis while praxis encapsulates action: “... in acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world.” The Human Condition, p. 179.

136 It is important to note that the subject matter was mostly on Aristotle despite the title. Published as Platon: Sophistes, Vol. 19 Ingeborg Schüssler, ed.) (Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1992).


138 Einar Övereng, “Heidegger and Arendt: Against the Imperialism of Privacy”, Philosophy Today, Vol. 39 No. 1, (Winter 1995), pp. 430-444 argues that to understand the intellectual relationship between Arendt and Heidegger it is not Arendt that needs to be re-evaluated, but rather Heidegger who needs to be drawn to an understanding in terms of praxis rather than poiesis. When Arendt talks about action revealing the ‘who’ rather than the ‘what’ she is using this distinction to illustrate the meaning of this assertion. Arendt's existential background comes to the fore here as she is rejecting the notion that humans have an essence. However this belief is only that humans do not have an essence as such, rather this essence is
existence of a principle of order.\textsuperscript{139} Without this rupture future time is simply yet to be what has always been. The instrument at hand is now seen in a world that was there already and therefore \textit{poiesis} has a past orientation. This practical action of the maker is dependent on a plan of action, or a blueprint. The rupture reveals a new plan in \textit{poiesis} but this plan can also be ruptured suggesting that a new plan will be revealed. What becomes apparent is that there will always be a new plan leading to an infinite chain of plans. But this would only occur if there was a timeless plan, or a plan in a changeless state which must be outside of time because in time there is inherent change. Heidegger argues that this is apparent in the fact that in \textit{poiesis} the materials do not have their own time demands. Rather the maker imposes the time frame.\textsuperscript{140}

In contrast, this is not the same for \textit{Praxis}. In the Plato Lectures Heidegger interprets Aristotle’s praxis to suggest that there is a right time to act (\textit{agathon}).\textsuperscript{141} This involves sensitivity to the moment. This moment occurs similarly to \textit{poiesis} when the right order breaks down and the revealing of a new order. In the last chapter we saw Arendt determining the Augustinian right order as no longer craving and in terms of the right action through her examination of his concept of love. Arendt’s interpretation of this \textit{praxis} is reflected by her discussion in the dissertation of the ‘order of everything’ and the ‘chain of generation’. Her later approach to totalitarianism is premised on the fact that the tradition could not deal with this new phenomenon, and this figures in the underlying tenet of action in \textit{The Human Condition}. For Heidegger, \textit{Dasein} does not see the new because of his fallenness and subsequent isolation. This condition however is broken by the call of the other through conscience and therefore \textit{Augen-blick} as the moment of \textit{phronetic} insight.\textsuperscript{142} The relationship between these two concepts is founded on sharing the same type of temporality and the role of the other.\textsuperscript{143} The neighbour, mercy and \textit{kardia} are still playing a role in the Arendtian interpretation of Heidegger.\textsuperscript{144} In conscience you call yourself and follow similar to their ‘who’. This description occurs in opposition to an object that does have a stable essence. The space where this revealing occurs therefore becomes very important. This is this revealing cannot be done in private through reflection on the self, The concept of worldliness becomes important here. The common world is one of disclosure and is not made. In other words it has no end involved in its ‘fabrication’ and is therefore not fabricated. Arendt summarises this in \textit{The Human Condition} when she say that; “[t]he public realm, the space within the world which men in order to appear at all, is therefore more specifically “the work of man” than is the work of his hands or the labour of his body”. \textit{The Human Condition}, p. 208.

\textsuperscript{139} See \textit{Being and Time}, p. 52 (p. 77 of Macquarrie).


\textsuperscript{141} Plato: \textit{Sophist}, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{142} ibid., p. 156, n. 12.

\textsuperscript{143} As Felix Murchadha says “[t]he experience which lies at the heart of phronesis is that of interaction, of dealing with what is not within one’s power, with what may act and react unpredictably, namely other people. at its most intimate a lover or a friend.” Felix O. Murchadha, “Future or Future Past: Temporality Between \textit{Praxis} and \textit{Poiesis} in Heidegger’s \textit{Being and Time}”, \textit{Philosophy Today}, Vol. 42 Issue 3 (Fall 1998), p. 263.

a call of a trusted friend. As a call is aural – like the storyteller and the preacher – not visual it can come out of nowhere without any spatial configuration; in other words it cannot be seen coming. You must always be ready to hear and because it is unpredictable one must be ready to act anew. Therefore in praxis an act is always unpredictable because of the type of time (kairos) involved in the act.

While this transfer of Heidegger’s focus is complex, it heralds a change in his understanding of the individual in the world. Arendt comments on this change in broad terms after the war in her commentary published in the Partisan Review and reveals her understanding of man as homo temporalis as the situation of the self. It should be remembered from the last chapter that the phronesis Heidegger and then Arendt sought was a “comprehension of the situation . . . from out of factically lived experience”. The situation in Heidegger’s eyes did not remain in the theological context of the primordial experience. Arendt attempted to retain this through the other. The self is defined by the situation and therefore understood by this context and this makes the other is important to Arendt for conceiving the individual. In the ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’ article when Arendt turns to Jaspers after her criticisms of Heidegger’s Self, there is a significant change in tone. Arendt’s understanding of Man, which is at the basis of all her political writings and draws upon her examination of Augustine’s thought, finds a conducive reception in the thought of Jaspers. Heidegger attempted to redefine Man through the question of the nature of Man, consequently rejecting the otherworldly Christian man. Arendt also seeks a new understanding of man along similar lines, or the modern conception of a biological and

William B. Eerdmans, 1985; p. 611. It has several meanings: such as, the centre of inner life; understanding, source of thought and reflection; source of the will; and feelings, emotions, desires and passions. All influence Augustine’s and therefore Arendt’s reading of this term.

146 Being and Time, p. 163 (p. 206 of Macquarrie).

147 Aristotle separates several forms of knowing: making (technē), scientific (epistēmē), philosophy (soφia) and intuition (nous). In terms of judgement phronēsis (practical wisdom) is important to Arendt against that of technē (making) or judgement of the practical that provides general rules, not for specific instances. Phronēsis is also taken over kairos because soφia is about necessary truths - as there is unchanging logic to the world, to uncover something must lead down a specific path to discover it - truth is already there waiting to be discovered. Phronēsis is about choice and therefore so designated answer. Deliberation is the start of this decision-making paradigm (called boulessis or prohaireis, in other words, the process that paves the way for decision making or the actual act itself). Reason is not intimately involved in the process.

148 Arendt’s position is that the imperative to philosophy should arise from our situation. This should be the start of what is being - opposite to Heidegger’s. See J. Glenn Gray, “The new image of man in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy”, New European Philosophy (or European Philosophy Today), G. Kline, (ed.) (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1963), p. 31.

149 Later, as Arendt responds to the events of the world, certain themes emerged more concretely in Arendt’s philosophy and this description provides a vivid illustration of Augustine’s place in her philosophy. Jaspers’ solution: Arendt tells us, is not more philosophy directed towards a new totality, rather an ‘appeal’ to life of the individual and these around them. In Jaspers’ conclusion to his discussion on Augustine he states that someone who believed that Augustine started a tradition whose most recent manifestations were Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The ‘self-penetrating’ of the agent initiated by Augustine, attracted Arendt to these two founders of Existenz thought. This intensity of the self as a question is something that while recognised by Jaspers was grasped by Heidegger. This method of communicating the meaning of ‘Jaspers’ investigations finds its seeds in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, just as does his desire to restore Man to a state of freedom.
evolutionary man and its foundations in the Greek, rational animal (zoon logon echon). In
distinction to Heidegger, Jaspers seeks to understand the situation of the self because philosophy -
including a philosophy not specifically focused on the individual - cannot afford to ignore the
individual. Arendt sought to avoid the ego-centric view of the individualist Existenz
philosophy. In the following paragraphs of the article Arendt not only expresses her admiration
for Jaspers’ open way of thinking, but her language obtains an ease that is different from the
previous treatments in the essay. Arendt characterises Jaspers’ thinking as a critic of all systems
that seeks to protect Man from the reality of his Existenz. The expansive nature of these
doctrines means that the individual is provided with a foundation that denies any meaning or
responsibility. Jaspers gives an indication of Arendt’s response to this when he says that
Augustine provides the reader of his work with an adventure into the “innermost point where the
soul transcends itself, the source of speech and guidance, where men can meet as men.”

The atomised individual of Heidegger is rejected in Jaspers’ understanding as Man retains his
capacity for spontaneity and his relationship to others in freedom. These two capabilities present
Reality not as the processes of thought which means that a reality of this nature maintains its
‘giveness’. Arendt provides two extra illustrations of this giveness as “the incalculability of one’s
fellow men, or the fact that I have not created myself”. The escape of reality as only available in
thought provides “the triumph of possible freedom”. In this context philosophy is only “a
preparation for the reality both of my self and the world”, as Arendt phrases it, and this leads to a
space where “an unconditioned deed that would invoke transcendence”. The importance of
“words and deeds” (as Arendt puts it) in the ‘space’ of human interaction is something that is
repeated time and time again in her work. The non-theological dissertation also looks for this
space and tries to answer where it is in the existence of man. Augustine has provided Arendt with
a staring point that developed through politics and back into philosophy.

150 For a discussion of Heidegger’s concept of man and its place in his philosophy see Gray, “The new image of man in
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy”, pp. 31-58. What is interesting about this article is the influence that Arendt had on Gray’s
reading of Heidegger. This is represented in the letters available in her Papers at the Library of Congress. While this
conception of man occupied Heidegger’s thought because of its influence on the western tradition, he eventually
concluded that Being should define man. Heidegger points out that logon usually translated as indicating the faculty of
reason, is derived from the verb indicating to talk or to hold discourse. See Sein und Zeit, p. 25 (German).
151 This aspect of Jaspers’ approach is described in greater detail by Wisser, “Jaspers, Heidegger, and the Struggle of
152 Arendt follows this point in her analysis of French existentialism in “Concern with Politics in Recent European
154 First Arendt’s words and then this quote by Jaspers though no reference is given. ibid., p. 53.
From this understanding of Existenz, Arendt believes that a positive philosophy can develop, one that "proceeds from Existenz", and one that goes back to the 'uncompleted path' offered by Schelling in the aftermath of Kant's challenge of a subjective freedom and objective necessity. This reflection on Arendt's part clearly states her role for thought in the twentieth century; the construction of a positive philosophy that draws upon the past and its questions but only because of its influence on the present. Jaspers was aware that appropriation, and not ahistorical constructions, was occurring. There are two interpretations then, one of the thinker and the other of the age. This can be taken further in its inferences by saying that one must be a philosopher of the present to be a philosopher of the past. This final concern is highlighted when she says an individual exists when Existenz "which I am continually but momentarily, which I cannot grasp by Reason, is only this of which I can be unquestionably certain." Arendt seems to be developing her understanding along the approach laid out by Jaspers in his work and in recoil to Heidegger's conception.

The emphasis that Arendt places on the present offers an insight into the later development of Arendt's political thinking. The immediacy of the present, placed between past and future, is reflected in Arendt's theory of political action. The accepted view by many of Arendt's commentators and critics that the lack of control - presumably inherent in this spontaneous present - cannot contain any restraint needs to be considered in view of Arendt's development of the present into a space in the public realm. The transfer of Arendt's understanding from the temporal to the spatial is a delicate operation in Arendt's thought and one that requires the foundations to be clearly evident. Arendt sees Augustine as answering this question as the space residing in the memory. The memory, or the "storehouse of time", is the space in which resides that which is "no more" in a similar way to expectation is the space where "not yet" resides. You cannot measure something that has passed but instead you measure something that is placed in

155 ibid., p. 37 and then p. 42.

156 An important aspect to this approach is the worth it places on the philosopher as well as the philosophy-being inspected. The personality of the individual who through their work has become 'great' was an attraction to Jaspers. This simple sketch leads towards an understanding of Jaspers as a teacher and his perception who is significant and why in the history of human thought. This portrait of Jaspers also confirms an element in Arendt's own approach to Augustine. The idea that Arendt approached Augustine because of love is given a philosophical rather than an overly sentimental justification. Personal experiences as a way of approaching the tradition, understanding the person who wrote that philosophy and finally realising their importance because of questions of the present that they have something unique and timeless to contribute.

157 This is an approach that encompasses the notion that experiences and their stories contain important indications to answer in life. The understanding of an Existenz philosopher must take consideration that a philosopher's own Existenz. This kind of sensitivity to a philosopher's life and their understanding is very evident in Arendt's philosophical-biographical essays such as those published in Men in Dark Times and is an component of Arendt's storytelling.

158 "What is Existenz?", p. 43.
be stored and expectation that time exists at all." The 'now' then is the only legitimate tense in these terms; "In the Now, past and future meet". They exist together for a 'fleeting moment' when they can be stored in the memory. But at this point it is as though time stands still and this point is the moment of eternity for Augustine. But life as such never stays still, is always moving and therefore man can never live in this 'present'. For someone to live just for eternity after death means that "the will to possess and the will to dispose of something have become simply absurd". To desire desiring results in fear and as desire of external objects is to enhance life then the end of all desire is the desire for life itself and "[l]ife is the good we ought to seek, namely true life, which is the same as Being and therefore endures forever. This good, which is not obtained on earth, is projected into eternity and thus becomes again that which lies ahead from outside. For man, eternity is the future, and this fact, seen from the viewpoint of eternity, is of course a contradiction in terms."163

(iii) **Kariological Thinking and the Political**

The end-point of this kariological conception of time that is realised by Kierkegaard and discussed by Jaspers in *Weltanschauungen* involves the moment and this notion of mood of the heart. Heidegger discusses this time in his Lectures when analysing St. Paul.164 Augustine sees this moment as the soul as if the soul is time and is characterised by a mood generated as things pass and disappear. Kierkegaard makes the human self a synthesis between the past and the future based on the moment, or situation.165 From the future to the present requires a leap that allows something new into the world because of the moment.166 In Kierkegaard this understanding leads to two other concepts: contemporaneity and repetition. Contemporaneity is a

159 And it should be noted this seems to be the source of Arendt's title for her book, *Between Past and Future*. Arendt does not reference this herself but in Aristotle's *Ethics* he talks of pleasure against movement occurring in the instantaneous, or 'in the now', or at the point of time that separates past and future. (Book 10, 1174b, 7-24)
160 Arendt also quotes Plotinus, "Generally speaking, the past is time ending now, and the future is time beginning now.” *Enneads*, Book III, 7, 9.
161 "The good, which can be understood only as a correlative to love defined as craving and which is unobtainable for mortal life, is projected into an absolute present commencing after death". *Love and St. Augustine*, p. 15.
162 ibid. Arendt seems to be explaining why Augustine turned to the Christian faith; she explains the role of a death of a friend in his life. Arendt believes that this event made him introspective. As she explains on the next page - "fear of death" in his early years had recalled him from "carnal pleasures" and it was Paul in the New Testament that focused his understanding significantly on the question of death. It seems that Arendt is explaining Christianity as the Christianity of Augustine which was the Pauline version.
163 ibid., p. 16. There is a problem here with her use of life as it seems to have dual meaning in these sentences. One is life on earth while the other is 'true life' (which she equates with Being). The contradiction in terms I assume refers to the fact that eternity - Augustine's anyway - is the moment between past and present, or rather the point of their overlapping.
166 See *Concept of Anxiety*, pp. 82-90, pp. 108-17 and pp. 419-32.
view of the past as alive and open to the present and which has futural possibility. The past becomes the future in the moment. Repetition is also contained within this understanding as recollecting forward through the future and the moment.\textsuperscript{167} Repetition is a challenge to fate and a challenge to the tradition that an individual uses to make a decision. Memory is the forgetfulness that this repetition challenges. The past referred to by memory is the inauthentic given. Pöggeler says that “Memory, which only recalls the past theoretically, presupposes the forgetting of this repeatedly required revocation. It thus retains the past only on the basis of this forgetting.”\textsuperscript{168} This means that repetition is the heightened moment that demands a new decision, not a mere restatement of what has past and gone.\textsuperscript{169} There is a warning in Pöggeler’s analysis of this aspect especially about memory as the storehouse. The question remaining is that what it contains could be arbitrarily chosen. Therefore the real art is what to remember, or rather the act of remembrance.

Arendt goes from the challenge of this inauthentic given to \textit{phronesis} in the context of a new decision that has to be made. The act of remembrance provides this solution through Arendt’s reading of \textit{phronesis} and \textit{eudaimon}ia. She is seeking a solution that fits within her framework. We see later in Arendt’s thought that storytelling fulfils this role of transmitting this type of knowledge but the questions remains as to how this is done. In a similar way, Augustine faced this problem and discussed his solution in the \textit{Confessions} where he involved prayers or psalms in his reasoning. This moment is the new beginning that Arendt talks about when looking at new events. A closer look at the foundation laid by Heidegger’s studies of the kariorological in both time and ethics provides some insight into the solution that Arendt sought to explore later in her life.

In his \textit{Augustinus und Neuplatonismus} Heidegger also analyses how the new Christian tradition’s conception of Kariological time also suffers from Augustine’s intellectual constructions. In his reading, the experience captured in the fourth and fifth chapters of Paul’s Letter to the Thessalonians I reveals how a Christian lives in perfect time where past, present and future are all

\textsuperscript{167} See also \textit{Fear and Trembling}, p. 149 and p. 131 as well as \textit{Concept of Anxiety}, pp. 89-91. Bruehl-Young, in her work on Jaspers and prior to her biography of Arendt that emerged from this work, highlights that Jaspers, like Kierkegaard, used the Greek understanding of recollection together with his own concept of Repetition. Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth \textit{Freedom and Karl Jaspers’s Philosophy}, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981). See footnote, p. 240. However, instead of saying that “all that is has been”, Jaspers says that “Existenz which has now been now becomes”. Also in \textit{Repetition} Kierkegaard reveals his understanding of time. Kierkegaard’s treatment of the Platonic understanding of recollection see \textit{Repetition} and also \textit{Philosophical Fragments}/\textit{Johannes Climacus}, edited and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983), SV IV, 179-90; Stagos, SVVI 15-21; and Postscript, SV VII, 172-73. In Plato see \textit{Plato’s} 230, 275a; \textit{Phaedo}, 73-76, 92; and Memo, 85-85. Also see Collective \textit{Dialogues of Plato}, Edith Hamilton (ed.), pp. 457-98, 526, 55-60, 73-74, 369-70.

\textsuperscript{168} Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurskak and Sigmund Barber, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1987), p. 148. Pöggeler is the first to examine this notion in Heidegger.

present and leads to a state of expectation. Unlike the Greek conception of constant presence, Heidegger's thematic concern, the Christian appears to live in a state of futural anticipation of the Second Coming. This Christian moment becomes a very important aspect in Heidegger's thought. Being and Time seeks to understand the implications of this and conceive of a new philosophy to deal with it. The leading question is whether or not the moment conceptualised in this letter can be dealt with by the tradition of thought that deals with universals. This encapsulates the new philosophy sought by Heidegger (and then Arendt who seeks to understand the decision). Moreover, the difficulty of the Greek framework being imposed on the primitive Christian experience is evident. In 1927 in Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger even thought he could see Aristotle's attempts to understand this moment in the Nicomachean Ethics. But Aristotle according to Heidegger "was unable to connect the specific temporal character of kairos with what he formerly recognised as time (as the nun or now)."

The moment is therefore an exceptionally important element in exploring this issue. Because of the manner in which the Greeks saw time, the moment becomes the eternal that is the connection of the past and future. Time in the cosmos becomes a circle. The past therefore is recollected (from dispersion?). The Jewish concept of time seen in an historical sense is futural, seeing the forthcoming last judgement as always contained in the moment. For the Christians the moment becomes the moment of decision. The Christians achieved this balance between past and future because their consciousness was determined by two equally important moments in the past and the future: the birth of Christ, and the possibility of redemption and the Second Coming and salvation. When an event becomes and takes the form of a crisis this moment is freed from its restrictions. The response of the individual cannot be defined – nor determined – by the past. The culture or the rules of the tradition that usually determine an action in the course of everyday life are no longer valid. These sources are no longer adequate to the demands of this new moment. It therefore becomes a unique event: an event that demands a unique action. The question remains, however, how should this unique action operating outside of the traditional system of values to evaluated? Heidegger's concern in the context of this part of his interpretation is to direct the attention of his listener to the potential inauthenticity of the Heideggerian individual. This individual does not see this moment at all but instead ignores its intrusion into their life allowing

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171 Quoted in Püggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, p. 146.
172 Püggeler, “Destruction and Moment” in Reading Heidegger from the Start, p. 145.
them to fall back into security of the ‘They’. For Arendt, however, this moment raises some powerful considerations. The potential freedom of this moment and the ability of the individual to start afresh if they must has a powerful impact of Arendt’s thinking. This is the concept of natality and source of her critique of history in Arendt’s later thought. The question of how to evaluate the action of the resolute individual in this unique context still remains. When asked how one acts in the moment, Kierkegaard answers with ‘earnestness’ and by allowing a myriad of possibilities to present themselves. This provides an indication at least of Arendt’s evolving view, where this earnestness becomes human dignity and the question of how a unique action can be evaluated by a non-dictatorial universal.

From this examination of both Arendt’s first extended philosophical analysis and a close examination of her position in the tradition of thought she claimed to belong to, a foundation to her conceptual framework has been established. This way of thinking is the pre-War Arendt and one which did not survive her experiences unchanged. As she emerged from the war she turned to the political as a frame of reference, but without an established, though evolving, framework to utilise. The most powerful element of this political period was her theory of action. What was not stated with similar emphasis was a framework for establishing a valid action. This is not a morality in Arendt’s specific understanding of the term, rather an attempt to provide direction for an individual who had lost their traditional bearing in the world, or a groundless world. This framework can be seen in its genesis as a lecture given by Heidegger. In the winter semester of 1921-22, during the lecture “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles” Heidegger talks about a Kairological ethics based on his reading of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Aristotle. Kairos is defined in Aristotle’s thought as a category that guides things; “There are many skills even of the things that fall under one category e.g. that of kairos, for kairos in war comes under strategies and in disease under medicine.” Aristotle, similar to Arendt, is interested in that critical moment when pre-givens are no longer adequate. That moment exists neither in the past nor in the future but belongs to both. The past is used as an aid to search the future to understand what now means. Understanding what ‘now’ means - a special understanding of the word meaning here - enables a decision to be made. In other words, Judgement is this decision.

173 See Being and Time, p. 328 [p. 376 of Stambaugh]. And others suggested by Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, p. 437.
175 Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a.
What is important here is Heidegger's Kierkegaardian interpretation of Aristotle's practical writings in which phronesis played such a strong role. Heidegger is seeking his answers through an Aristotelian framework that Arendt does not follow. Yet she clearly responds to Aristotle's archai when sketched in its dual senses, one of principle stating points of both action and ontological inquiry. This outline of practical philosophy calls or urges the reader forward and heralds or motivates a way - a way for the reader and listener; "The beginnings/principles have great importance. For what follows for the beginning/principle seems to be more than half the whole." The theory of action is always incomplete in the beginning. The ontology of human existence must be particularised to its application or field. Practical philosophy goes from theory to praxis to theory again. Aristotle wanted rough guidelines: guidelines that set out the terrain for the active person. They are not proposed to simplify the solution to a problem or even construct the problem.

In Heidegger’s thought and especially in Being and Time, this present is absent. In Being and Time he builds up an understanding of the three horizons of time. The 'existentials' in Heidegger's philosophical work can be divided into these three categories (for the purpose of illustration only) yet that of 'present' is empty (though only if talking about authentic existence). As a feature of Heidegger's study this period is missing. The present is referred to continuously, yet only in relation to something else and never as a point itself. The moment of decision illustrates this point. When a decision is made the future and the past (Geworfenheit) are employed in the “moment” (Augenblick) though this moment has no duration but rather a presentation. As Hans Jonas says it is “a creature of the other two horizons of time, a function of their ceaseless dynamics, and no independent dimension to dwell in.” However, Jonas argues that there is a designation of the present in Heidegger’s thought. The concept of Verfallenheit or ‘everyman’ and those attributes Heidegger related to it such as idle chatter presides in this moment without relationship to past or future. This is in comparison the roles of past and future in the existence of being. As Jonas divides them, the past (“facticity”), is necessity, having become, having been thrown, guilt while

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176 See Buren, The Young Heidegger, p. 352 for a further discussion of this point. Buren believes that this started the rehabilitation of practical philosophy that became evident in Arendt's work as well as Gadamer.

177 Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a.

178 ibid., 1096a-1097a.

179 ibid., 1095a. This is against Plato's perfect realm understanding.

180 Buren, The Young Heidegger, p. 333.

future ("existence") is anticipation of death, care, and resolve. What remains for the present is nothing. The tension between the past and the future produces a moment of present but nothing can reside within this moment unless it is apathetic; "[l]eaping off, as it were, from its past, existence projects itself into its future: faces its ultimate limit, death: returns from this eschatological glimpse of nothingness to its sheer factness, the unalterable datum of its already having become this, there and then: and carries this forward with its death-begotten resolve, into which the past has now been gathered up." 182

The relevancy for this understanding is Arendt’s conceptualisation of ‘between past and future’. This phrase became her favourite book title as well as indicating a perspective in her work and is also very important to her dissertation on Augustine. This moment of presence is also a moment of crisis as a decision is made, a decision that leads into the next moment and the next decision. The moment for Kierkegaard is of course the moment of decision - self-choice (he thought that Plato and Hegel made the moment a ‘mute abstraction’). 183 Arendt talks of a similar moment when man uses his capacity to forgive. The moment in the eternity of man’s existential time is also a new beginning, and moment of principle. 184 Yet similar to Kierkegaard and in a rejection of Nietzsche, Arendt still seeks to retain the relevance of the neighbour through kardia in her approach to this moment of decision. The community is very important to Arendt’s consideration of this concern. In a consideration of judging Arendt has a specific conception of the community that emerges out of her reading of Augustine, especially as she deals with the clash of singularity and universality in this context. This element is slow to emerge as first Arendt is personally and philosophically confronted with the unfolding events of the 1920s and the outbreak of the Second World War. When Arendt approaches the political in her post-World War II writings this framework is used to examine the failure of the tradition through the emergence of totalitarianism and the implications of the tradition of thinking to combat these new

183 The role of the eternal in temporal existence is also seen in Goethe’s Parable (Märchen), a katros, is a man’s redemption and time is the greatest gift of God. See Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre.
184 In the description ‘a moment of presence’ the meaning of present is ambiguous as it is in the English language. Presence can also mean something more solid than a ‘visiting’; the presence of an object. This presence Heidegger calls ‘standing before me (zuhänden) indicating that this presence does not really interest him. Yet it is still related to the past-future dynamics as it is related to the moment of presence. Its consideration though is similar to that of Veralnheit. But this notion of objects not worthy of consideration has larger consequences than a merely disinterested attitude towards tables and chairs. Heidegger is really talking about nature and existentialism does not concern itself with nature. As Bhikhu C. Parekh, Heraclitus Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1981) points out. The idea here is that the ancients used theory to look at nature and now nature has no use so theory is also redundant. This was a dignified activity because of the two-world argument put forward by Plato.
circumstances. Arendt uses her Augustinian insights to establish a new framework that deals with the individual-in-the-world.
Section II

Judgment and *Vita Activa*

The Political: Action and the Search for Meaning
Chapter Four

Temporality and the Principle of Action

Lost Treasure and the Search for Principles

(i) The Lost Treasure: Arendt’s Augustine in the Political


Freedom, Action, and Augustine in The Human Condition

(i) Reading The Human Condition: In the Political World

(ii) The Space of Appearance: The In-between out of the Desert of the World

Arendt’s Guide for Political Action

Augustine and The Human Condition: Homo Temporals and Trust

(i) The Human Condition and Trust: Power, Force and Strength

(ii) Homo Temporalis: Trust, Promise-Making and Forgiveness

Lost Treasure and the Search for Principles

The search for a guide to Arendt’s political action has been an ongoing discussion especially since Arendt’s did not provide her readers with a possible solution by completing her third volume of the Life of the Mind. The search is not for an ethical system due to Arendt’s disavowal of this possibility. Instead it is a search for her lost treasure: a principle for acting transmitted through the act of storytelling. Therefore the dimension which is significant for the political act is time. The notions of immortality, memory and imitation appear to play small and insignificant roles in her specifically political writings. But each of these three elements is connected by the strong focus she is developing in The Human Condition and one which is a direct continuation of her pre-World War Two phase; that is, man as homo temporalis. Arendt, a thinker who dealt with spatiality in political reasoning, is actually a temporal thinker by nature, an illustration of her intellectual foundation based on Jaspers and Heidegger and their readings of Augustine. In this manner Arendt’s dissertation on the Christian father provides the indications for her later, more political work. I argue that my reading of her dissertation on love and St. Augustine provides an indication of how Arendt would have sought to argue her own guide to political action. From this basis and by revisiting her use of power, trust, promise-making, and forgiveness in her political work of The Human Condition I suggest there is an indication of how this style of thinking led Arendt to her theory of judging and a concept of authority through principle in foundation.

1 An indication of this perspective can be seen in Jaspers’ own work when he says in a potent statement that “[i]n acts of original freedom, in all forms of absolute consciousness, in every act of love … my temporality—not forgotten, but accentuated, rather, as decision and choice—is simultaneously broken through to eternity: existential time as a phenomenon of true being becomes both inevitable time as such and its transcendence in eternity.” Jaspers. Philosophy, Vol. 3, p. 56.

2 It takes her biography of Rahel Varnhagen and the need to examine her political existence for her Augustinian implications to come to the surface. It is at this point of her development that the influence of Heidegger can be seen diminishing and the influence of Jaspers emerging. For an indication of this transition see Rahel Varnhagen, p. 118 and pp. 153-57; and Kant’s Lectures on Political Philosophy, pp. 70-77.
It is not until after the dissertation is completed and the commencement of events leading to the outbreak of the Second World War does the elements of Arendt's Augustinian studies take on a specifically political form. The ground for her notion of judgement especially in its early form is the notion of plurality, a term that reflects the inherent tension between the individual and their living world. In the process, Arendt is establishing a pathway from her dissertation to her reading of Kant's Critique of Judgement in The Life of the Mind series.

Arendt, in her political thinking, sought to retain the freedom of the individual and still provide a framework of responsibility for their endeavours. It was Arendt's intention to keep the individual and their world balanced or in harmony. This notion of harmony becomes a key concept to understanding the imperative at the heart of Arendt's thought in her political phase. This approach to her work has some significant implications. She is frequently accused of only seeking to defy the realm of \textit{vita activa}, then she intentionally segregated this idea conceptually simply to highlight the dominance of \textit{vita contemplativa}. Similar to the individual, both these sides of life, action and contemplation, are required to achieve this harmony.

Primarily Arendt seeks to achieve this through the idea of principle and the concept of memory although this emphasis develops into a new framework as she turns to remembrance as the significant faculty. Although an ambiguous term in Arendt's work, principle becomes an important reference

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3 In \textit{The Human Condition} Arendt made this notion central to her examination but it was introduced without an extended introduction. This also highlights Arendt's reluctance about examining her foundations. This is illustrated by Parekh's concern regarding Arendt's concept of publicity. Parekh says that although it was a central notion in Arendt's work, and is "crucial to her ontology, she neither clearly defines it nor articulates its structure". Bhikhu C. Parekh, \textit{Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy}, (Atlantic Highlands, N. J., Humanities Press, 1981), p. 92. Written without the insight of Arendt's personal papers, his study locates the problems of Arendt's conceptual genesis and their beginnings appear to be fragile in nature. This is echoed by the Hinchen's examination arguing that her definitions and explanations are compelling but her justification for the method is never entertained. For example, Arendtian categories such as labour, work and action just appear with no epistemological foundation or even origin. Lewis F. Hinchen, and Sandra K. Hinchen, "In Heidegger's shadow: Hannah Arendt's phenomenological humanism", \textit{The Review of Politics}, Vol. 46 (April, 1984), p. 183.

4 Another way of expressing this that reflects Jaspers' influence is that Arendt was seeking the "way of the philosopher beyond Day and Night." This is phrased in her Berkeley lecture series on Political Thought in 1955. Second Session, p. 2 (024464).

5 Leroy A. Cooper also reflects on this aspect in her thinking when he says "what is interesting and suggestive about Arendt's thought is the way she connects these conditions with the familiar polarities of change and permanence, unpredictability and stability, novelty and order." "Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy: An Interpretation", \textit{Review of Politics}, Vol. 3 No. 2 (July, 1986), p. 146 and p. 161.


7 To quote Arendt, "neither man's capacity for change nor his capacity for preservation is boundless, the former being limited by the extension of the past in to the present—no man begins afresh—and the latter by the unpredictability of the future. Man's urge for change and his need for stability have always balanced and checked each other." \textit{Crisis of the Republic}, pp. 75-79. Again Arendt stresses this aspect when she says "permanence and durability are what human beings need precisely because they are mortals—the most variable and futile that we know." \textit{Between Past and Future}, p. 95 and p. 11.
point for action yet its manifestations are brief and apparently unstructured. When she does mention it, there is a tendency for them to be as an adjunct to the point she is making. For example, she says that separate from the intellect and the will, action 'springs from something altogether different which . . . I shall call principle,” and this becomes inspirational through imitation because “as such the principle inspires the deeds that are to follow . . .”9 What is also important to note here is that of the emerging Arendtian trinity. She rejects intellect and the will, allowing a third undefined dimension to carry the responsibility of guiding her actors. This element of her trinity is eventually labelled ‘judging’, suggesting a complex gestation period before its final expression that never eventuated. The temporal becomes evident as the template relationship between future, past, and present emerges. Promising commands an action to honesty, while forgiveness generates acceptance of the unforeseen consequences of an action.10 Trust is a binding force between participants in the political. This last one leads to another notion, power, and is conceived also as only generated in collaboration, the real Arendtian freedom, thus avoiding the consequences of the totalitarian will.11

Are these possibilities enough to stabilise the public realm in the manner Arendt sees them as able to, and, if so, are they enough as presented by her public works? They do require the spontaneous action to exist, but are they guaranteed by it? These questions go to the heart of Arendt’s project in The Human Condition and the answers to them provide a framework for her thought into the incomplete The Life of the Mind. While there are many topics that Arendt covered in her work ranging over political theory, political history, sociology, and philosophy, it was the consideration of the stability of political action or, in other words, the individual-in-the-world that was a continual reference point for her thought. Her work in the dissertation provides the insight required to understand how she sought to achieve stability in the political, and also comprehend it in the realm of contemplation. The framework that emerges in her post-holocaust writings is articulated in the guise of a lost treasure: a treasure that must be recovered from the tradition of thought and in this framework resides the thought from her dissertation.

9 Between Past and Future, p. 152 while the second quote is from On Revolution, p. 213. There is another suggestion of this in On Revolution, where Arendt discusses novus ordo saeculorum and the beginning and the principle become 'coeval'. See pp. 212-3.
10 The Human Condition, p. 237.
11 ibid., pp. 199-207.
In the preface to a collection of essays, *Between Past and Future*, published in 1956, Arendt talks about the loss of the treasure, meaning tradition. This is the idea of principle and is related to the loss of meaning in the world for guidance. Together with this principle, remembrance is essential to Arendt's attempt to salvage this treasure that is lost in existential time. Using René Char and Franz Kafka to illustrate her point, Arendt asks whether this lost treasure ever existed in the first place; "Does something exist, not in outer space but in the world and the affairs of men on earth, which has not even a name?" This vague but substantial treasure has in the past gone by the names 'public happiness' and 'public freedom', though Arendt argues that we fail to comprehend this notion of 'public', or the manifestation of the community. Regardless, the loss is compounded by the relationship between the past and the future in the present. Because tradition had been unwilling to pass the treasure onto the next generation that would have maintained the 'willed continuity in time' thus breaking the chain of human (existential) time, it is lost. It is not alone in this failure because it is "consummated by oblivion, by a failure of memory" and until there is remembrance nothing, regardless of what it is, can be done. With this assertion Arendt is suggesting that a new relationship between past and the future in the present is required. Remembrance appears to have a role in this relationship although she is not clear on its specific role. The type of temporality she is utilising is the dimension of past possibility that assisted her approach to the dissertational studies.

In this context, in her essay "What is History", Arendt talks of 'the growing meaninglessness of the modern world'. A person cannot act without meaning, it is a necessity for the existence of the individual-in-the-world. Yet, it is important to note, Arendt states equally emphatically that "[m]eaning . . . can never be the aim of action, and yet, inevitability, will rise out of human deeds after action itself has come to an end". In previous times there had been many sources for meaning though the present era provides none. Arendt acknowledged on more than one occasion that thinking in the twentieth century had lost all meaning and that this was an essential part of the process. In fact, by the end of her life she was willing to state that the faculty of thinking had only one purpose, that thinking was "the quest for meaning". The general description of this aspect of the tradition is seen in a search for meaning, or rather more specifically what it is that allows the production of meaning in

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12 This concern is especially evident in the first two essays. These essays are defined by Arendt in her introduction as critical; more than experimental and concern the modern break, in distinction to essays on political concepts and application. See *Between Past and Future*, p. 15.
13 Arendt argues that this treasure existed during and just before the revolutions in America and France at the end of the eighteenth century. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
16 Willing, p. 78 and then *Between Past and Future*, p. 79.
the modern world. This is significantly termed ‘depth’ by Arendt in her essay “What is Authority?”.

In this essay she argues that “[w]ith the lost of tradition we have lost the thread which safely guided us through the vast realms of the past” though her concern is not with the tradition, instead she is concerned for the loss of the past.17 As a result of this loss, Arendt issues the following warning:

[w]e are in danger of forgetting, and such an oblivion—quite apart from the contents themselves that could be lost—would mean that . . . we would deprive ourselves of one dimension, the dimension of depth in human existence. For memory and depth are the same, or rather, depth cannot be reached by man except through remembrance.18

There are echoes of this understanding in Nietzsche’s thought as well, and which provides an illustration of Arendt’s intentions. In this respect Arendt shares the same concerns, looking in the same location but with a much different emphasis. In Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, 4th part, “The Drunken Song”, he says “. . . joy wants eternity. Joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, wants deep eternity”.19 The word deep conveys the same impression as ‘depth’: both are concerned about the forgetting that leads to oblivion and the loss of an eternity. This was something essential to the human condition, an anchor that was certainty with timelessness.

In order to understand the relationship to the past that Arendt seeks in her work requires a return to the beginning of her thoughts. This relationship finds its expression in her study of Augustine, and is illustrated by another warning given by Arendt towards the end of her dissertation; this past is also a chain that “fettered each successive generation to a predetermined aspect of the past” 20 At the end of the concluding chapter, and referring to the Augustinian individual, Arendt says, “it is the very possibility of isolation that enables us to detach ourselves from human history and from its irrevocable enchainment by generation”.21 Arendt utilises the tradition of thought in which she became well versed in just before the events of the War. The return sought by Arendt in her reading of Augustine is a return through the tangled web of the western tradition of thought. In this tradition Arendt was seeking this lost treasure that modernity had failed to capture. Augustine stood at the point of convergence in the western tradition between the Athenian heritage and the new direction of the Judeo-Hebraic religion, Christianity. Arendt was conscious of the implications of this fusion.22

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17 Arendt’s return and recovery in her work can be seen as paradigmatic, held up for imitation. The influence of both Augustine and Cicero are seen in this methodology used by Arendt.
18 Between Past and Future, p. 94.
19 Quoted in Beiner’s “Interpretative Essay”, p. 151.
20 Between Past and Future, p. 94.
21 Love and St. Augustine, p. 101.
22 Although taking a different direction to this thesis in a ‘speculative’ work on Arendt’s thought, Tim Roach also uses this fusion as point of discussion. He investigates the ‘tacit metaphorical implications of [Arendt’s] personal logic’ that relies on a “Christian-inspired sensibility”. Timothy Roach, “Enspired Words and Deeds: Christian Metaphors Implicit in Arendt’s
Augustine symbolised the complexity of this transformation and out of her examination of his thinking Arendt reveals two problematic notions; the relationship of the individual to their neighbour and the notion of the present. Caught between the past and the future, the other in an individual’s existence is constantly deemed irrelevant. With the re-instatement of the other comes a need to reconsider the present, and if the present becomes important the other gains new importance. In Arendt’s eyes, philosophers and authors from Kierkegaard to Kafka are preoccupied with the meaning of life. Her approach to Augustine was inspired by a single statement, “Love means that I want you to be”. The openness and frankness illustrated by such an assertion is instilled by the concern for a meaningful existence and its direction to someone else. In a world without transcendental references how was an individual to see the world and those with whom they shared that world? There was therefore a need to construct the world so that it could be shared, thus becoming meaningful in the process. This was not the material world of artifices but rather the world inbetween the individuals, non-material yet tangible in human interactions.

Love was initially considered as the binding force, yet this revealed itself in the holocaust to be untrustworthy, or too transient. This left the question, what could be constructed by man and still be trustworthy? However, while Arendt’s examination of Augustine’s thought concerning the topic of love seems to fail her, as her conclusion seems to indicate, her intellectual armoury is strengthened by the analysis of love in Augustine’s work. More specifically, the many of the elements she highlighted in her study emerge in her attempt to deal with the failure of tradition. The Trinitarian love in actuality still remains with Arendt but it has now been transferred to a new triadic relationship. It is this conceptual framework that Arendt initiated in her dissertation provides the groundwork for her later explorations in the realm of the political as well as provide the direction of thinking that
eventually leads back to the question of philosophy. While some of these remain with her, for example those residing in her assumptions about the individual-in-the-world, some find themselves developed and transformed by the demands of engaging in the theory of the political. This emphasis on the past when analysing the individual, their neighbours, and the world is drawn out by Arendt in distinction to the study which Heidegger developed by depending upon the anticipated future.


In *The Human Condition* Arendt is a philosopher of action and action is the highest activity for her. The opening quote from Dante in Chapter V in this work provides a preliminary understanding of her project on action. The quote includes several key ideas that she inherited from her study of Augustine. Every actor seeks “the disclosure of his own image”; an essential image found in memory that the process of remembrance discloses. The actor takes ‘delight’ and achieves joy in doing so “since everything that is desires its own being” and seeks to relate between the lover and the loved and this love produces a state of harmonious existence, therefore “nothing acts unless it makes patent its latent self.”

This echo of her Augustinian framework reveals an insight of the answer given what she is attempting to accomplish with her study of *vita activa*. There is a concordance resonating between the actor who is simply an acting being as present and the world of disclosure. Arendt has sought to delineate *vita activa* from the tradition of *vita contemplativa* to allow this element to be located. Arendt’s purposeful emphasis on action and freedom requires some further exploration in order to reveal this framework with which she is developing her analysis. For example in *Between Past and Future* Arendt discusses freedom in the following manner providing an insight into her purpose. She talks about the Platonic dualism giving way to an Augustinian concern and therefore the introduction of the Augustinian “hot contention” that was actually within the soul itself. Significantly this conflict was between understanding (reason, knowledge, insight) and desire; not reason and passion (the modern conception). The conviction of philosophers in antiquity was that reason would overcome the passions and banish them completely.

But thought in solitude paralyses the will rather than

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25 *The Human Condition*, p. 175.
26 The result was Socrates’ conviction that virtue was a kind of knowledge. *Between Past and Future*, p. 159. Arendt’s approach is illustrated perfectly by the following typed extract that stands alone and unreferenced in Arendt’s archive (023916). Its message must be important to Arendt. It says: Benedict Spinoza: Opening paragraph of the *Political Treatise*: “Philosophers conceive of the passion which harass us as vices into which men fall by their own faults, and, therefore, generally deride, bewail, or blame them, or execrate them, if they wish to seem unusually pious. And so they think they are doing something wonderful, and reaching the pinnacle of learning, when they are clever enough to bestow manifold praise on such human nature, as is no where to be found, and to make verbal attacks on that which, in fact, exists. For they conceive of men, not as they are, but as they themselves would like them to be. Whence it has come to pass that, instead of ethics: they have generally, written satire, and that they have never conceived a theory of politics, which could be turned to use, but such as might be taken for a chimera, or might have been formed in *Utopia*, or in the golden age of the poets when, to be sure, there was least need of it. Accordingly, as in all sciences, which have a useful application, so especially in that of politics, theory is supposed to be at
generating the imperative to action: “willing in solitude is always velle and nolle, to will and not to will at the same time.”27 The insight of Augustine evolves from the fact that he acknowledged I-will-and-cannot is possible and therefore I will and I can are different – a point not appreciated in antiquity.

Later on in the essay Arendt again describes the clash of the two wills, stating that “the will is both powerful and impotent, free and unfree.”28 The central tenet of Arendt’s analysis comes to the fore: freedom can only eventuate when I-can and I-will coincide. This means that freedom is related to I-can not I-will and this is the link to action and the political realm. But behind this examination of freedom is a more persistent theme in Arendt’s work; an appreciation of the role of the mind in the human world.

The importance of the mind as an avenue of investigation into the world politics and therefore freedom and action is transparent for Arendt. In describing the operation of freedom in society, Arendt states a relationship between the intellect and the will; “[a]ction insofar as it is determined is guided by a future aim whose desirability the intellect has grasped before the will wills it, whereby the intellect calls upon the will, since only the will can dictate action ...” This explanation is followed closely by a further statement that the Will follows judgement, “i.e., cognition of the right aim”.29 Action, or I-can’, “liberates ... willing and knowing from their bondage to necessity ...”. Therefore, Arendt says in summary, “[o]nly where I-will and the I-can coincide does freedom come to pass.”30 It is significant that in this essay the relationship between the independent faculties of the mind as the intellect, judgement and then willing is stated. At present, however, what is of interest is that Arendt turns to that which guides action and to that which is ‘without’. It is neither the will or intellect, nor motive or predicted consequence, that determines action, rather something Arendt hesitantly calls ‘principle’. The dimensions of this notion of principle only emerge if the dissertation is considered because the decisive fact of being human is the act of creation.31 This is linked to type of action; that is, action is purely spontaneous.32 This activity escapes the beginning and ends of labour and work, which drawn out of natural effects and causes, or the necessity of labour and the false sovereignty of

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27 The Human Condition, p. 151.
28 The Human Condition, p. 151.
29 Between Past and Future, p. 158.
30 Between Past and Future, p. 161.
31 Her understanding of revolution evolves from this understand of a common heritage that founds her community in the conclusion of the dissertation. This can be read in distinction to her later work, especially around the time she was developing her essay series after the publication of The Human Condition and revising her dissertation for an interested publisher. On this subject The Human Condition contains discussion of the Ancient Greek’s use of eudaimonia, praxis and poiesis, and phronesis (pp. 192-99 and p. 226) as well as the New Testament when Arendt discusses Jesus and promise-making.
32 The Human Condition, p. 176.
work. But action occurs within a context for the individual-in-the-world regardless of the purity of the spontaneity. The community therefore would always be part of an adequate discussion of the actor. When Arendt turned to the political, a focus already anticipated when she chose the topic of biography of Rahel Varnhagen - a study of thought in situ - Arendt used her particular language to understand the significant events and their implications.33

In determining a guide to action a significant point is that the Athenian polis becomes Arendt’s reference point in The Human Condition. The Nietzschean aspects of her work are clearly articulated in her understanding of the role of heroic self-disclosure.34 The role of acting and speech are very important in this process of non-teleological activity. Ends are not involved in these actions, only new beginnings. If ends do occur they are unknown at the commencement and the only result of importance that occurs in this process is the revelation of the actor - the ‘who’ rather than merely the ‘what’. This leads to the question, is it anarchic? Arendt’s portrayal, especially at this level, suggests that no constraints exist for the actor and their actions are therefore ‘boundlessness’. The context of the individual, with the contradiction of the concurrence of isolation and dependence, is at the heart of her theory of political action and this is defined in the fragility of human action. Therefore what Arendt wishes to stress is a comprehension that politics is essentially ‘boundless’ and it is also ‘unpredictable’. “The Frailty of Human Affairs” is the subheading that Arendt gives to this understanding in The Human Condition.35 The frailty comes from the premise that for action to occur there needs an interaction of more than one person; “action and speech are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of the acts and words of other men.”36 On the other hand it is boundless, as one action initiates another action ‘that strikes out on its own’; “the smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation.” This makes action – of all kinds – its “second outstanding character: its inherent unpredictability.”37 The emphasis on ‘boundlessness’ is to illustrate Arendt’s criticism of contemplation and the inadequacy of the conceptual frameworks that it creates to control the realm of political action.38 However, this is not as exact as it appears. Arendt

33 In this manner, Arendt was not then a political theorist, and while she appreciated the implications of political models of the state and society, she, herself, never sought to articulate a coherent model. Her writings responded to the conceptualisation of the individual in the various models available for the analysis in the twentieth century.
34 On this point I agree with Dana Villa’s reading of the Arendtian individual-in-the-world. See Arendt and Heidegger, p. 7.
35 The Human Condition, pp. 158-192.
36 ibid., p. 188.
37 ibid., pp. 190-1.
38 The pursuit of truth through reason is justified by the belief that it already exists in established truths. In an essay “Truth and Politics”, Arendt considers truth, opinion, and politics. Truth posited by philosophy is seen by many, such as Hobbes and Spinoza. There is a similar reflection when Heidegger discusses authority: “in time this is first, reason: in reality this is first-authority comes first yet when we look at it, reason leads us to authority.” The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Introduction and
does not reject contemplation out of hand, but rather the way it has developed in the tradition and she considers the role of concepts such as promising, forgiveness, and power as a framework of this ‘boundlessness’. These are a continuation of Arendt’s appreciation of the temporal nature of the individual and the primitive Christian influence on her thought. An example of this continual consideration comes almost immediately after the publication and public digestion of her thesis in The Human Condition. The work in On Revolution sees within its own thesis a return to the question of promising and power especially; “[t]he grammar of action: that action is the only human faculty that demands a plurality of men; and the syntax of power: that power is the only attribute which applies solely to the inbetween space by which men are mutually related, combine in the act of foundation by virtue of the making and the keeping of promises, which, in the realm of politics, may well be the highest human faculty.” Echoing Nietzsche and his search to overturn the western spirit of vengeance and resentment, Arendt asserts the power of promise-making and forgiveness. In her examination of the American constitution, Arendt sees the contract encapsulated within it as promising and therefore the transformation of violence into power. This beginning is controlled by the mutuality and deliberation contained within its foundation. The authority is not an apriori; rather it occurs contemporaneously with the act of foundation itself. Questions such as these lead us to inquire about the space Arendt believes is required for genuine politics to occur, a pre-defined structure. The theatrically inspired notion of improvisation that seems to occur in Arendt’s Founding Fathers implies an undetermined direction as well as end. In The Human Condition Arendt does provide an answer to this question and it is an answer that takes on increased performance as Arendt’s perspective matures. The answer is contained within the notion of a storyteller. The storyteller is introduced into Arendt’s published thought in The Human Condition; “[a]ction reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian, who indeed always knows better what it was about than the participants.”

Given the focus that Arendt places on the actor in her scheme of political action, this introduction seems to be out of keeping with her general intent. The actor, Arendt believes, is a future looking
individual, seeking to construct the future through their actions. However, Arendt seems concerned that meaning is not also being constructed with their activities. The role of the spectator is given this role and is a theme that she examines later as she turns towards the *vita contemplativa*. Just in case a reader decides that the actor can also generate meaning, Arendt makes a significant differentiation between their two roles early in her examination. The actor can and does weave stories from their actions in the public arena, yet only the historian or storyteller can provide the real meaning of their actions.\(^{44}\)

Several questions come immediately to mind for the reader. What is the relationship between these different stories, or how do they relate in the public sphere? Also, why does the actor generate stories if they are invalid compared to the storyteller, and why does the storyteller have preference in Arendt's understanding? What is the intent of these stories and how do they relate to the development of a recovery of the political? Arendt's rejection of the role of the legislator, especially the Kantian legislator, gives some understanding of why she introduced the storyteller into her account, especially while her attention was drawn to the political actor. Her concern is with the meaning and purpose of the political actor; a clear indication that she was not leaving the political actions of the actor unconstrained in society.\(^{45}\) Arendt rejects the idea that storytellers are the source of sovereignty in her interpretation, avoiding the introduction of rules and principles into the storyteller's incantations. The storyteller, like the political actor, is neither the legislative nor the legislator.\(^{46}\) Arendt's consistent persuasion, and one that drew her to Kant's *Third Critique* later in her intellectual career, was that rules and their other general label principles were dangerous and corrupting. The production of meaning, as Arendt sees it, does not involve this disruptive interference, instead it allows the activity of thinking to involve itself in the political realm and without its literally 'demeaning' assumptions that have characterised the tradition of western thought. The principles Arendt is interested in are temporal. These principles of order are not declarative or prescriptive. In fact they are a kind of temporal contradiction and are inherent in beginnings. This is why they require a storyteller to convey the story and its meaning.

This reading of the role of storytelling and action derives from the one work that enables a reader to gauge Arendt's sentiment after the publication and reception of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* – her

\(^{44}\) ibid., pp. 181-188 for more on this distinction.
\(^{45}\) ibid., pp. 196-7.
\(^{46}\) ibid., p. 63 for a possible discussion of Kant's understanding that political activity can only be legislative.
essay "Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding)", published in 1953. In this essay Arendt returns to her own foundations and therefore the influence of the thought of Augustine. This is reflected in the particular notion of phronesis she is using. While several themes are entertained in this writing but the most significant discussion for her political understanding evolves around the temporal. Reflecting on her conception of history Arendt states the importance of singular events because “[w]henever an event occurs that is great enough to illuminate its own past, history comes into being.” History is not extant but must be created continuously, and conceived afresh each time. The event is a beginning that also uncovers something else that is new: “[w]hat the illuminating event reveals is a beginning in the past which had hitherto been hidden.” The lost treasure that Arendt is seeking though requires history not to unfold but to be revealed as “[o]nly when in future history a new event occurs will this “end” reveal itself as a beginning to the eye of future historians.” Thus the future is unpredictable; “because the moment even a foreseen event takes place, everything changes, and we can never be prepared for the inexhaustible literalness of this “everything”.” As an illustration, for Arendt, the thought of modernity, reflected in the work of Locke and Hobbes, has lost this particular understanding; “[t]he central position which the concept of beginning and origin must have in all political thought has been lost only since the historical sciences have been permitted to supply the field of politics with their methods and categories.” Arendt is seeking to reposit this lost element in contemporary thought.

In attempting to do so, Arendt turns to another tradition of political thinking. In Greek thought arche means both beginning and rule in the manner of Heidegger’s discussion in his lectures “Phänomenologische interpretationen zu Aristoteles” in 1921-22. This is still relevant, as Arendt stresses in her article “Understanding and Politics”. and can be seen in the contemporary era in the thought of Machiavelli. Machiavelli signifies the revival of this tradition of thinking beginning. But it is a tradition that does not necessarily return to the Greeks at this point as its beginning but rather the Romans. Machiavelli argues that the act of foundation, or the “conscious beginning of something

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48 "Understanding and Politics", p. 319. As Arendt says, "history without events becomes the dead monotony of sameness, unfolded in time—Lucrètus’s etiam sunt anni sunt omnia semper. Ind., p. 320.
49 ibid., pp. 319-20. Arendt is suggesting a linear concept of history that is broken into beginnings and ends rather than one which has neither and therefore no events, or a cyclical one. This understanding means that Arendt can argue for a kind of reconciliation between the Athenian and the Hebraic concepts of time.
50 ibid., p. 321.
52 Heidegger focused on which Greek thinker introduced this notion. He argues that Anaximander was the person recorded in the literature who is responsible. See "On the Being and Conception of Physics in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1.", trans. Thomas
new", requires violence.\textsuperscript{53} The Romans reflect this understanding in their political understanding. These reflections lead Arendt to the Roman Augustine. His notion is that man was the beginning, a reflection of the Roman understanding of foundation in Remus and Romulus. She says that “[i]f the creation of man coincides with the creation of a beginning in the universe . . . then the birth of individual men, being new beginnings, re-affirms the original character of man in such a way that origin can never become entirely a history of the past, the very fact that the memorable continuity of these beginnings in the sequence of generations guarantees a history which can never end because it is the history of beings whose essence is beginnings.”\textsuperscript{54}

In this assertion Arendt encapsulates the dynamics of the temporal dimension she is seeking to explore. The past is the past and yet it can never remain simply the past. As an origin it remains a possibility, therefore both historical and futural. Memory provides this link with its ‘memorable continuity’ maintained by generations. It can never end because it is always starting afresh. Nonetheless this leads to the question, what is the original character of man that Arendt is referring to in this extract? Arendt alludes to this particular line of thinking when she notes the importance of beginning, but this time in terms of origin and therefore the source; “. . . a being whose essence is beginning may have enough of an origin within himself to understand without preconceived categories and to judge without the set of customary rules which is morality.”\textsuperscript{55} This vague conception is partly the purpose for Arendt’s exploration of action and then the mind. This link between Arendt’s first piece of extended analysis of philosophy is closely linked to her final contribution. In the last sentence of “therefore Willing” Arendt talks of an impasse which “cannot be opened or solved except by an appeal to another mental faculty, no less mysterious than the faculty of beginning, the faculty of Judgment, which at least may tell us what is involved in our pleasures and displeasures.”\textsuperscript{56} In this Arendt is indicating two things: firstly, that the pathway of thought has an ‘impasse’ and, secondly, that she associates the faculty of judgement with the faculty of beginning when conceiving the two.

\textsuperscript{53} It is significant to note that Machiavelli is important to Arendt partly because of his thought but also because of his courage. Looking for courage as part of a writer's contribution to the western tradition is indicative of Arendt's particular way of reading the history of thought and its impact of contemporary thinking in an era of crisis. This is separate from the content of his thought. Nonetheless, Francis Winter's incredulous concern over the role of Machiavelli in Arendt's thought because she was a Jew and especially after 'Auschwitz and Hiroshima' will be answered by examining her alternative readings of conscience and power based on the influence of Augustine. Francis X. Winters, "The Benality of Virtue: reflections on Hannah Arendt's Reinterpretation of Political Ethics" in \textit{Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt}, James W. Bernauer, (ed.), Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 192.

\textsuperscript{54} "Understanding and Politics", p. 321.

\textsuperscript{55} ibid. [my italics]

\textsuperscript{56} Thinking, p. 217.


\textsuperscript{57} "Understanding and Politics", p. 321.
This suggests that in Arendt's thought the characteristics of judgement follow the characteristics of beginning.57

Arendt's desire to sweep away the vestiges of the tradition in a Nietzschean manner is very evident here. But she also indicates that she is conceiving of a way of replacing the notion of morality and therefore the vacuum left in its absence. The source and imitation in the guise of the umbrella term, the beginning, form a part of this replacement yet there is another dimension that requires a similar articulation in order to complete the investigation. In an indication of what was to become the final stage in Arendt's thinking, she introduces a concern for a faculty of understanding: "[i]f the essence of all, and in particular of political, action is to make a new beginning, then understanding becomes the other side of action, namely, that form of cognition, distinct from many others, by which acting men . . . eventually can come to terms with what irrevocably happened and be reconciled with what unavoidably exists."58 Arendt finishes this reflection with a summary statement of "As such, understanding is a strange enterprise."

Indicating the evolving dynamics of her own conception of the mind, she says that "[p]reliminary understanding, which is the basis for all knowledge, and true understanding which transcends it, have this in common: They make knowledge meaningful."59 Her early reading of phronesis is her reference point for this statement. Especially when she states that there is a possibility that this process of reaching a state of 'comprehension' may only simply confirm what the initial offering of understanding proposed and it is this initial understanding that is always engaged in action.60 Arendt is saying that there is a kind of 'intuition' at work in action - such as a rejection of totalitarianism - and this is beginning to reflect her return to Kant and a consideration of his conception of the mind and its processes. Yet the imperative in her thinking which is evident in this essay on her 'strange enterprise' can be devolved back to her dissertation and its intimate discussion of the individual-in-the-world that it contains. The difficulty with Arendt's discussion without an attempt to fill in this lacuna is the ambiguous notion of origin expected to reside in an individual and how does this affect capacity to judge without traditional morality? For Arendt these moments of crisis, where man's capacity to judge without the aid of tradition is challenged, seem to have another eternal reference point. This reference

57 Young-Bruehl, when reflecting on the thought of Karl Jaspers, says that "[f]reedom is the beginning and end, the alpha and omega, of existential elucidation. Between the not yet and the no longer of the though-motion of transcending there is freedom-revealed to Existenz in its own action, the paradoxical presence of eternity in existential time." Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Freedom and Karl Jaspers's Philosophy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, p. 28.
59 ibid., p. 311.
60 ibid., pp. 310-1.
point is the focus of Arendt's search for the *lost treasure* and its location can be determined by an examination of the notion of the present at work in her work.
Freedom, Action, and Augustine in The Human Condition

The fundamental imperative behind Arendt’s work is the concept of freedom. This idea or understanding is probably the destination of most of the political and philosophical thinkers of the Western tradition. Each, however, conceives it in substantially different forms, shapes and sizes. In her essay “What is Freedom?” Arendt asserts that the question of freedom is only a question for the political and not the philosophical. She even says that the involvement of the philosophical “has distorted, instead of clarifying, the very idea of freedom ...”61 Arendt was no different and constructed her understanding of freedom in the shadow of this tradition. Her reaction was to the tradition of liberum arbitrium of the philosopher.62 At the end of her essay Arendt describes her notion in a comparison of her understanding and tradition; “... the philosophic shift from action to the liberum arbitrium, the ideal of freedom ceased to be virtuosity ... and became sovereignty, the ideal of a free will, independent from others and eventually prevailing against them.”63 This ‘freedom of choice’ in Arendt’s eyes is a very narrow conception of freedom, and embraces only a deliberative concept of freedom. This Stoic conception retains the individual’s place in a deterministic universe; the answer being to accept your place and enjoy freedom only in the mind.

In distinction to this, Arendt introduces a concept of freedom that focuses on Man’s capacity to make beginnings. Again the role of the individual in a deterministic universe provides the context of freedom.64 But this time it is the individual’s capacity to produce something new into this world, something without a cause other than Man’s being and precipitated by that individual’s birth.65 Arendt refutes the philosophical freedom, or the inner freedom, “the inward space into which men may escape from external coercion and feel free.” This space, Arendt points out, is not the heart or the mind because they are always in “interrelationship with the world”, rather a space of absolute

61 To complete the sentence: “... such as it is given in human experience by transposing it from its original field, the realm of politics and human affairs in general, to an inward domain, the will, where it would be open to self-inspection.” Between Past and Future, p. 145.
62 “We deal here not with the liberum arbitrium, a freedom of choice that arbitrates and decides between two given things, one good and one evil, and whose choice is predetermined by motive which has only to be argued to start its operation ...” ibid., p. 151.
63 ibid., p. 163.
64 In “What is Freedom?” Arendt opens her essay by discussing the contradiction between consciousness and conscience that “... tells us that we are free and hence responsible, and our everyday experience in the outer world, in which we orient ourselves according to the principle of causality.” ibid., p. 143.
65 Arendt always maintained an interest in literature that focused on science and scientific research. This aspect of her research is generally completely ignored and therefore Arendt’s understanding of the arguments between philosophy and science. For an example of this see her use of Arnold Gehlen’s Der Mensche: seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (1955) in The Human Condition, p. 177, note 1 and especially her opening reference in “What is Freedom?” when Arendt uses Max Planck’s “Causation and Free Will” (The New Science, New York, 1959) in her discussion which were “written from the standpoint of the scientist”, p 144, n. 1, pp. 294-5.
freedom. She obtains the guarantee of domination over the internal in distinction to the unknown of the external. She rejects this approach because it is determined by the philosopher's way rather than as a response to the context of the individual. More importantly in doing so she indicates her true focus for freedom, 'the heart or the mind' - two options that reveal the Augustinian source of her conceptualisation. Therefore while Arendt is defining her understanding of freedom she is also defining her understanding of how the mind stands in her referential framework. How The Life of the Mind becomes the 'second volume of The Human Condition' is made clearer through this distinction. Arendt signifies her expectation of the heart and mind and that her concerns of vita contemplativa are not necessarily and simply the mind per se, but rather whose that are disentangled and isolated from the world.

Arendt argues that this beginning produces something that is then beyond the control of the producer. With this in mind the traditional conception of freedom's association with sovereignty becomes questionable. The freedom is merely the point at the beginning and action's unpredictability means that its relation to sovereignty is untenable. In fact, in this view, freedom is related to non-sovereignty. This description of action occurs in an intellectual environment that emphasised the determinism of an individual's existence in society. Arendt's argument is to emphasise the individuality of each human being and their potential in each society. Freedom requires others or 'the company of other men who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them—a politically organised world, in other words, into which each free man could insert himself by word and deed.' Freedom is therefore related to disclosure or the 'who' rather than 'what'. It finds its description in action and not in terms of the capacity to choose and its place to be rightly in politics; "[t]he raison d'être of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action." The difference between these conceptions is evident when the actual position of freedom in the existence of the individual is highlighted. The freedom to choose is a result of an individual's actions while the freedom to begin is at the very start of an action. Arendt regards freedom as much more fundamental than the rhetoric of the philosophical tradition based on liberum arbitrium.

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66 Between Past and Future, p. 146. Arendt ascribes this phenomenon to late antiquity and those thinkers who had no use for the world.
67 Arendt again distinguishes terms and this time it is between freedom and liberation. Liberation is defined as the removal of constraints, an event preceding freedom.
68 The description of action in The Human Condition is chosen to convey this impression to the reader and is therefore aggressive in its forceful portrayal should not be underestimated when evaluating her conception of freedom.
70 Between Past and Future, "What is Freedom?", p. 146.
In the introduction to the first volume of *The Life of the Mind* Arendt talks about the tradition of *vita activa* being defined in terms of *vita contemplativa*.\(^71\) Consequently, *vita activa* is seen as ‘laborious’ (to use her adjective), and is spurned for the truth seeking of contemplation. The result is that all activities, “whether you laboured and tilled the soil, or worked and produced use-objects, or acted together with others in certain enterprises” are merely activities and are not ‘passivities’ or contemplation.\(^72\) Subsequently, they are not regarded as relevant by the tradition that defines it. Arendt felt that this matter could be viewed differently, an understanding she felt she alluded to in her study of *Vita Activa*, or *The Human Condition* with a quote from Cato; “man is never more active when he does nothing, never is he less alone when he is by himself.”\(^73\) In Arendt’s eyes, the result of this unchallenged, almost dogmatic, perception carried through the history of western thought was that only contemplation could arrive at truth. Those not involved in the endeavour of contemplation were then regarded as ignorant, uninformed and irrelevant. Moreover, politics became part of the ordinary world together with other realms of activity; activities that were dependent on the search for answers, or truth, that occurred in the realm of contemplation. But this denied the particular and distinctive nature of politics, a nature that also can make it impenetrable to rational, philosophical inspection. The result of this inspection by philosophy into the indeterminable world of politics is a misunderstanding of what occurs within its boundaries, and consequently a disposition to reductionism and simplification that confused the understanding of the subject matter.

From this perspective, and its subsequentadvocacy of freedom and action as imperatives, Arendt utilises the other concepts that she introduces in *The Human Condition* such as plurality, natality, and the space of appearance. These concepts function as beacons or ontological signposts from which the problems of freedom can be discerned and confronted through. Their purpose is to display the meaning of Arendt’s understanding against the traditional conceptions. But where does Arendt derive her understanding that is against this tradition. What are her sources of understanding? Observing her development of the concepts used to define her discussion of freedom and action there is a subtle consistency at work. The first is plurality which Arendt, in the opening of *The Human Condition*, states as being the condition of ‘all political life’. Arendt wishes to state that the individual in society is a particular and unique entity and should be treated as such when “men, not Man” are under

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\(^71\) Thinking, p. 6.
\(^72\) *ibid.*, pp. 6-7. “contemplation is not an activity but a passivity”, p. 6.
\(^73\) Or, rather, as Arendt herself states, ascribed to Cato by Cicero. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
consideration. But she goes on to say that “Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.” Arendt wants to stress that while we are different we are still human and therefore the same. While the strangeness of this statement is acknowledged - the fact that we are the same as we are different - the purpose for now is to stress Arendt’s treatment of the individual. She wants to say that each man is different and should not be treated as an entity yet they are all part of a species being.

The second is the concept of natality, or ‘beginnings’. Arendt looks to the Greek word archein which she describes as meaning “to begin”, or “to lead” (and “to rule”) as well as to set something into motion. This principle of beginning is the same as the principle of freedom. This beginning is the reason for a person’s uniqueness and if they are unique then they must be able to be separated. This distinction is seen through action and speech although they not exactly equal: “[i]f action as beginning corresponds to the fact of birth, if it is the actualisation of the human condition of natality, then speech corresponds to the fact of distinctness and is the actualisation of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being among equals.” Speech is required to give action its revelatory power as well as its subject or agent. Without speech action would be worthless.

Both speech and action however are close because they are both involved in the disclosure of ‘who’ somebody is, rather than just the ‘what’. Plurality and natality have been used to get to the heart of Arendt’s project - the revelation of the unknown individual. The third aspect, ‘the space of appearance’, is now introduced although it has already been discussed previously in an earlier section. But this time the relationship to plurality and natality becomes transparent. To complete the description above and to reveal ‘who’ someone is requires a space and it is a space of appearance, or the public realm. As Arendt says, “[t]his revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness” and further on, “action needs for its full appearance the shining brightness we once called glory, and which is possible only in the public realm.”

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74 The Human Condition, p. 8. As Heidegger says, “Every being has a way-of-being. The question is whether this way-of-being has the same character in every—as ancient ontology believed and subsequent periods have basically had to maintain even down to the present—or whether individual ways-of-being are mutually distinct. Which are the basic ways of being? Is there a multiplicity? How is the variety of ways-of-being? How can we speak at all of a unitary concept of being despite the variety of ways-of-being? These questions can be consolidated despite the variety of ways-of-being? These questions can be consolidated into the problem of the possible modifications of being and the unity of being’s variety.” Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, intro. and trans. Albert Hofstadter, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), rev. ed., p. 251.

75 “With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was created and not before.” Ibid., p. 177.

76 Ibid., pp. 176-9.

77 Ibid., p. 180. The use of the descriptive ‘glory’ causes many of her commentators concern yet they fail to remember Arendt’s
These few pages of *The Human Condition* develop and describe the crux of Arendt’s concerns during this period of her life. She wishes to reclaim the importance of the individual in an era concerned about institutions. The meaning of this phase only become apparent when an attempt to understand the methodology of Arendt’s political thinking is made. Throughout this description of Arendt’s basic understanding she wishes to emphasise the true characteristics of politics - novelty, freedom, and plurality. This involves freedom of the political actor and to make action a necessity, an understanding that this actor is different from other actors. Without difference, dispute would not occur; and without community, resolution would not occur either. Arendt is firm that politics is about creation, initiation and natality that denies the destructive trap of cause and effect. This is why action is central in the hierarchies of human activities and why Arendt reacts against the tradition of western thought. Its foundation in Platonic philosophy has severed the human from meaning by disregarding human experience. The result was a Platonic philosophy that removed innovation, plurality, membership and remembrance from the realm of political philosophy. The tradition is seen as continuing this severance, though Arendt acknowledges notable exceptions to this inclination. But as Arendt points out, this deification of contemplation in Platonic philosophy was in stark contrast to the understanding of pre-philosophic thought. Homer’s storytelling revered action as the most important activity of man, an activity that, in Arendt’s view, founded the Greek *polis*; founded that is, in pre-*polis* experience.\(^78\)

In *The Human Condition*, Arendt says consistently that action is symbolic in character and the web of human relationships are maintained by communicative interactions. Therefore, action entails speech - language articulates the meaning of our actions and co-ordinates the plurality of agents. Also speech entails action because not only is speech a mode of action but action is how we check the sincerity of the speaker. Speech must equal action. This link between speech and action is central to Arendt’s conception of power - the potential that occurs when people act in concert. It is actualised “only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities.”\(^79\) What is the purpose of the disclosing power in speech and action? One of its central functions is the disclosure of the identity of the agent. People reveal themselves by distinguishing ‘who’ they are from ‘what’ they are; “[i]n acting and

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76 ibid., pp. 196-7.
77 ibid., p. 200.
speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world. . . This disclosure of ‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is. . . implicit in everything somebody says and does.” A(andt’s other two categories, labour and work, do not reveal the ‘who’ of the agent, rather only the ‘what’. A(Arendt says that this is because “from the humble making of a use object to the inspired creation of art works, has no more meaning than is revealed in the finished product and does not intend to show more than is plainly visible at the end of the productive process. Action without a name, a ‘who’ attached to it, is meaningless, whereas as work retains its relevance whether or not we know the master’s name.” Consequently only action and speech reveal a person’s identity, however it is speech that is closest to revelation because without it action loses its quality of revealing. A(Arendt says that

[s]peechless action would no longer be action because there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words. The action he begins is humanly disclosed by the word, and though his deed can be perceived in its brute physical appearance without verbal accompaniment, it becomes relevant only through the spoken word in which he identifies himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do.

Actions do not speak louder than words - they need speech and the other way round, demanding the “intersubjective confirmation of intentions and the willingness to share one’s motives.” Therefore the revelatory quality of action and speech is contingent on plurality and solidarity, as Arendt says, “where people are with others and neither for nor against them - that is, in sheer human togetherness.” This revelation does not guarantee in advance what identity will be revealed though; “Who somebody is or was”, Arendt continues, “we can know only by knowing the story of which he is himself the hero - his biography, in other words. . . Thus, although we know much less of Socrates, who did not write a single line and left no work behind, than of Plato and Aristotle, we know much better and more intimately who he was, because we know his story.”

In this context the storyteller is very important because they divulge the identity of the person. Narratives “tell us more about their subjects, the ‘hero’ in the centre of each story, than any product of

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60 Ibid., p. 179.
61 Arendt’s attitude to Marx’s concept of labour. “While [labour] was an ‘eternal necessity imposed by nature’ and the most human and productive of man’s activities, the revolution, according to Marx, has not the task of emancipating the labouring classes but of emancipating man from labour; only when labour is abolished can the realm of freedom supplant the ‘realm of necessity’.” Human Condition, p. 104. Parché “Hannah Arendt’s Critique of Marx in Human Action: The Recovery Of The Public World.” Melvyn A. Hill, (ed.) (New York, St Martins Press, 1979), pp. 67-100 provides a corrective to this interpretation.
62 The Human Condition, pp. 180-1.
64 The Human Condition pp. 173-79.
67 Ibid., p. 186.
human hands ever tell us about the master who produced it." The historian has an important role to play as

[a]ction reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about than the participants. ... What the storyteller narrates must necessarily be hidden from the actor himself, at least as long as he is in the act or caught in its consequences, because to him the meaninglessness of his act is not in the story that follows. Even though stories are the inevitable results of actions, it is not the actor but the storyteller who perceives and "makes" the story.99

The weaving of narrative out of action is 'partly constitutive of their meaning' and allows an evaluation of significance and import. This, in part, means action is very fragile and unstable, unlike products of work. Remembrance alone saves the actor from oblivion and futility.90

So far though the attention has been on the actor, but there is also the existence of the spectator; consequently we have seen only one side of the story as narratives in turn need an audience to hear them.91 What is this audience that is required to allow narratives to exist? Sheldon Wolin says, "audience is a metaphor for the political community whose nature is to be a community of remembrance".92 Or, as Arendt explains using ancient Athens as an illustration, remembrance was vital as "men's life together in the form of the polis seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible and the most ephemeral of man-made "products," the deeds and stories which are their outcome, would become imperishable."94

Polis as a metaphor appears frequently in Arendt's writings, and by this she seems to mean an association "where a public realm of action and speech was set up among a community of free and equal citizens."95 But, more importantly,

[The organisation of the polis ... is a kind of organised remembrance. It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men, who outside the polis could attend only the short duration of the performance and therefore needed Homer and "others of his craft" in order to be presented to those who were not there.

88 ibid., p. 184.
89 ibid., p. 192.
91 ibid., p. 102.
94 The Human Condition, pp. 197-98.
95 d'Entrevès, Modernity, Justice and Community, p. 103.
Arendt was not suggesting a political structure, but, rather, suggesting a vital aspect to any political association, the in-between world created out of the desert; "[t]he polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organisation of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be." In other words, the polis stands for space of appearance, "whenever men are together in action and speech" and therefore a space of appearance protected by remembrance. Nonetheless it is a space that is intangible and highly fragile. What Arendt is suggesting here is that this space appears only during human action and human deeds, yet it is permanent as a potential space; a suggestion justified by Arendt by her observation that it can arise suddenly in history through revolutions.

(ii) The Space of Appearance: The In-between out of the Desert of the World

This assertion by Arendt appears to demand a political arena where actors can combat each other as they seek victory in a verbal gladiatorial manner. But the reasoning in The Human Condition needs to be read with the dissertation in mind. Each creature in this space comes from 'not yet' (nondum) and leads towards 'no more' (ian mon). This first condition would design his search for his own being and make the question about "before" a process of seeking his own being based on these two aspects of his existence. In other words, an individual comes from nothing or non-being and this is the 'final limit'. This final limit is important because at this place or point "the creature meets its proper being because it has been called into being." Before the creation there was therefore Supreme Being and absolute nothing; the Supreme Being does not have an origin and therefore the First Principle is part of the creature's relation to beginning and this is one of 'coming from'.

In the space of appearance the act of foundation becomes political. In the Christian conception, reflected in Heidegger's reading, death undoes life as a political actor because permanence is sought outside this earthly realm. The search for permanence in a natural world of transience requires a rootedness to combat its inherent fragility. This permanence is found by Arendt in the certainty of

96 The Human Condition, pp. 198-9.
97 "No more" is ahead and is death and between "not yet" and "no more" is life itself. Though this is dependent on man seeing the world as being created by the Creator as well as partly created by man - the inquiry of the curious means that it leads to a question of things that are not of himself; about what precedes the createdness. The result is that questioning can lead to two things; about 'whence' and 'whether' both though are about the negation of life, though each has different substantiation and implications - one the source of life and the other death (same negativity but different in kind).
98 Love and St. Augustine, p. 70.
99 Man is seen as inbetween being and non-being and time becomes the most important way of viewing him in this position. Time is actually this period or space and in a footnote (108) Arendt says that this time called "tending not to be" from the Confessions (XI, 14, 17) as an individual goes from "not yet" to "no more." Arendt says that "time is not only the idea of transience—time itself is transience."
birth not death. Therefore returning is very important. The positive aspect of a human's life is the past and seemingly only its past, and memory is the only way of ‘arresting transience’ and capturing the past. Arendt says that “[t]his is because in memory the past is not pure past (not just “no longer being”), but the past is “presented” as present” and that “Death throws the living back upon their own source”, in that, it threw them to before they existed and they began in the world. This is a particular “not yet”, particular to an individual. Yet, this “not yet”—which Arendt tells us is the real “before”—is a time where all individual differences disappear - in death all individuals return to the same source - ‘death is the great equaliser.” In death both “no more” and “not yet” occur as in death an individual is thrown backwards into the “not yet.” Arendt relies heavily on her interpretation of Augustine to deny the death-oriented philosophy of Martin Heidegger. As Arendt says this process indicates that the “not yet” is the most important aspect in an existence which is oriented towards death and that in this death the “not yet” is important; “[w]e exist only insofar as we relate directly to the “before” and “not yet” of our existence.” This is a display of Arendt’s temporal understanding at work in her criticism of Heidegger. The future is not rejected or ignored. In fact it becomes involved in the past and emerges out of it.

Man can look to the world in order to create that which is permanent. Augustine provides a “twofold” theory of the world that provides a possible clue to where the conclusion of the search for eternity might be found. God is the Creator of the world while man merely inhabits the world made by God. Yet man who is part of this world is also active in this world and therefore has the capacity to make a world for himself; as Arendt puts it “the world is a place where things happen.” God has made the world, but man also, through his capacity to will, can also make a world. This capacity of the will can create the second world in Augustine’s understanding. There “the world is therefore partly constituted by man who inhabits the world” and he can make his own environment. This particular world is created by love because it is constituted “by habitation and love (diligere).”


100 Arendt says that life ‘coming from “not yet” ‘tend to be’” yet it ends as it must do if it begins so it is not wholly yet is not wholly nothing. The ‘tending to be’ occurs in the ‘referring back’ consequently the ‘not yet’ of life is not nothing as it is an origin. The beginning is independent of the end and the “no more” of death is simply the “no more” of material wealth. Life must be transient because referring back would not occur. So the end means a beginning and joy is an individual’s enquires on ‘referring back’. Arendt says that “[d]eath is the ultimate removal from our source that is, from the Creator” and “Life loses its being to death if life has moved away from the source of its being.”

101 Love and St. Augustine, p. 72.

102 This process though not a ‘given’ in any sense. In Arendt’s eyes, this process brings about an affirmation, an escape from the death of life direction. Death is good as it allows an initiation of questioning, but its negative aspects can also be destructive. These Arendt wants to escape. The path of this escape is to realise that the initiation of questioning returns from thoughts of death and allows one to meet the Creator or Being. Through this questioning, the view of the “not yet” or the source is seen from the position of death. The result is that this source is not a negative; but rather positive, as it is the Absolute Being. However, death now becomes an ‘absolute nothingness’.

103 Ibid.
love is the Augustinian influenced love and brings a world into being, not just through the creation of
the world by God - as in the ultimate beginning - but through making the world and man's part in this
endeavour; "what happens by the will is guided by the love of the world (dilectio mundi)." Arendt
continues and says that "[l]ove of the world, which makes it "worldly," rests on being "of the world"
(De mundo)" and yet man being in the world does not necessarily mean he is worldly. Arendt says that
"man has the chance of not wanting to be at home in the world and thus keeping himself constantly in
a position to refer back to the Creator..." and "only by making himself at home in the world does
man establish the world as such." In other words, Man must find the world and then make it; "man's
dependence as a creature on "finding" in his "making" expresses the particular strangeness in which
the world as a "desert" (eremus) pre-exists for man."105

Reflecting her later dismissal of work and labour in The Human Condition, at the time of the
dissertation Arendt perceives a problem as man does not have the same privileged relationship to his
man-made world. After this material world has been constructed, man confronts it continually as an
outsider - it maintains its existence even when the maker (man) withdraws from it. He therefore has
no power over it. And because man has no power over it, and can detach himself from his product
when this occurs, he returns to the 'strangeness' of the world.106 After man has created his own
environment this environment returns to being part of God's creation because the material was part of
the divine fabric (fabrica Dei) and therefore not under his power. Therefore the solution is for man to
find a way of creating a world that exists "independently of pure createdness" and therefore as part of
God's creation and possession. This reading by Arendt emerges in The Human Condition as the space
of appearance in the political arena. But Arendt's original development of this idea continues and
leads into a consideration of the mind. This location has profound implications for the interpretation
Arendt was seeking in this phase of her thought. She continues suggesting that lacking use of the
material also provided for him in this world, there can only be one other possibility. Again the will

104 ibid., pp. 65-6.
105 ibid., p. 67. The three questions that Arendt raises in her discussion of Augustine's thought can only be understood through
his position in the development of western thought. The problem of interpreting Augustine's thought come to the fore here.
Arendt argues that the first and last questions can only be answered in two different ways and these two are not compatible
- Augustine's Being is the Greek understanding of Being which is one of everlastingness. And it is therefore only the 'semipermanent
structure of the universe'. However the last one is a Christian answer and is dependent on the creation of everything and its
inherent 'endurability'. Augustine is also adhering to the Christian understanding of the difference between universe and
world, where world stands for that which is constituted by men. ibid., p. 58. This is very obvious where Arendt gets her
understanding of what the world is - in-between. From this he should be able to work out the significance for Arendt is actually
saying when she says that it is 'in-between'. So one on side of these sources, in the Greek world, man is part of a totality and its
structure. On the other side, in the Christian world, man starts to see a point for him outside the world and to reflect back on
this possibility. Arendt having realised this tension in Augustine's thought now states what she is attempting to do with this
characterisation.
106 This is true even if man 'makes' the world around a design that is of a particular advantage to himself. Any product that
man produces and releases on completion into the world, he then sees it as part of the world and it therefore confronts him as
part of that world.
indicates the way. Instead of the will allowing this material to become the world, it is the source of the will that becomes the material - the space in which the mind dwells. This does not refer to the brain because that is still God's creation. It refers instead to the thoughts that the consciousness of man creates. The world that can be created is not material and yet it exists, and it is man's own creation with 'createdness'. The createdness of man leads to the question of a First Principle. The Christian emphasis on creation and not the Greek ontological understanding of perpetual Being allows this element to become significant. By being able to create a space, with a beginning, then the principles becomes important. Instead of an Aristotelian teleological principle, Augustine's thought enables the emphasis to change from the end to the beginning through the exchangeability of beginning and end. The drive of anticipated future becomes now the search for the source. The search for the source evolves into the moment of creation of this space between men.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{107} To further explore the implications of this in Arendt's political thought there is a need to return to Arendt's idea of community in this political context. Before this can happen, however, the individual in her work of this period must be conceptualised. The forces perceived by Arendt to be stabilising the individual in the world of transience are constructed through the idea of community. Only this time Arendt conceptualises this through a uniquely constructed Roman experience. This relationship still reflects the insight Arendt gained from Kierkegaard and retains the element of the kantological, as the moment of decision it seeks "not to move from the individual to the generation rather from the individual to the generation to achieve the individual." Referenced to Journal entry, no. 4110. \textit{Journals of Soren Kierkegaard}, trans. Alexander Dru, (London, Oxford University Press, 1938) and Soren Kierkegaard's \textit{Journals and Papers}, trans. and edited by Howard V. Hong, \textit{et al.} (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1967).
Augustine and The Human Condition: Homo Temporalis and Trust

Trust is considered by Arendt to be a constituent element in the construction of a satisfactory space of appearance and Arendt’s discussion of power, force and strength. In this notion we have the germination of her future change away from a simple ‘action for action’s sake’. Her project in The Human Condition is quite specific so when Arendt moves onto a discussion about the position of moral standards in Periclean formulations, her conclusions are quite disturbing. Arendt links civilisation to the existence of moral criteria that enable a judgement of human behaviour, but only for ‘human behaviour’. She then separates action from the category of human behaviour and consequently moral judgement. This separation leaves only ‘action for action’s sake’: “Greatness, therefore, or the specific meaning of each deed, can lie only in the performance itself and neither in its motivation nor its achievement.” Arendt sees this notion of action in Aristotle’s notion of energia, or actuality; an event that does not seek an end and does not demand consideration outside the event itself. It is an end in itself and, moreover, the highest “actuality” there is for humanity. But Arendt returns to the primitive Christian conception of this actuality as love. Trust is now the articulation of this in her political works and it is only through this inter-relational aspect can the inbetween world occur. This is the Arendtian way of comprehending this world, a style of phronesis through trusting not understanding. The implications of this approach, however, do not become evident until she turns to the question of the mind in the vita contemplationis, but her political works provide significant insight into her understanding of the transformation of her love to trust. Trust becomes the expression for a particular type of mutuality.

Again the temporal context of this element in Arendt’s thought must be understood. From this conception of energia in ancient Greek philosophies the notion of action has slowly been relegated in Arendt’s eyes to the extent that Adam Smith sees all performance activities such as healing and performing arts as unproductive labour and therefore worthless. Arendt sees this occurrence in the rise of homo faber in the understanding of man in his own context. Here man is identified with what he produces and not “the work of man”. In other words, the creation of remembrance in the public realm of an Augustine influenced, not Aristotelian, understanding.

104 Human Condition p. 206.
109 ibid., p. 187.
Arendt, in *The Human Condition*, when discussing the Periclean formulations of power notes its short-lived rule. The idea of 'trust in power' seemed to come and go, even before political philosophy had been born. The Platonic and Christian perspective that is now so strong on common perception is that simply 'power corrupts'. The phrase by Lord Acton that "absolute power corrupts absolutely" is seen by many in society as the ultimate expression of the end goal of politics and organisations in general. Pericles, though, still thought that both did not corrupt and that a great person could remain great in their intent whilst at the same time holding power. *Dynamis* is the word used by Pericles to describe the result of acting and greatness on the general population. Consequently, the transmission of this *Dynamis* was through speech - the dividing factor between animals and the human kingdom. This retained a dignity in politics that was, in Arendt's eyes, in need of recovery. But, in answer to the criticism that action is merely measured in the context of action and no criteria for appraising it are offered by Arendt, the context of her exposition of Periclean action has to be read closely.

Arendt's analysis of action in the chapter of the same name examines this Periclean, or Athenian notion under the heading, "Power and the Space of Appearance." In this section, Arendt conceptualises her idea that the basis for any public realm will always be the 'space of appearance' that comes into being 'wherever men are together'. This space is entirely dependent on the actuality of this togetherness and its temporality is dependent on this factor alone. While the space is dependent on togetherness, the power that derives from this occurrence is dependent on action and speech, or 'where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds are not brutal'. This sub-clause, often over-looked, is the vital element in looking for the criteria or criterion of Arendt's conception of action. If they are then Arendt thinks that they will be used to violate and destroy not to 'establish relations and create new realities'. The power that Arendt describes, the fragile power of union, is the power that vitalises and actualises her public realm, and creates 'potentialities'. This is the power of past possibilities, or rather power as past possibilities. Arendt sees this is summarised in the Greek word, *dynamis* (and Latin *potentia*, and German, *Macht*), and is created afresh each time its potential is realised, unlike, as Arendt says, force or strength:

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100 _ibid._ p. 205.
111 _ibid._ pp. 199-207.
112 _ibid._ p. 199.
113 As Arendt stresses, there is always this 'potentiality' not necessarily its automatic activation.
"[w]hile strength is the natural quality of an individual seen in isolation, power springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse". Strength and power are very different things for Arendt, illustrated in the way she understands non-violent resistance, or, for her, the 'ironic' description of 'passive resistance'. This is an example of power overcoming strength. The only limitation of this power is its demand that people live together, though Arendt says that 'power is boundless', acknowledging in its potential needs togetherness to actualise.

Arendt seems to see the division of power into differing sections in society to be the way of generating more power, through checks and balances as long as the 'interplay' is not checkmated by the resolution of one section that they are right. This ability to generate more power through division would be dangerous, as the achievement of 'omnipotence' would become a distinct possibility. But, Arendt says, power depends upon the fragile existence of human togetherness. While the Arendtian attributes of strength could allow this omnipotence to occur power has this existential limitation.

Force is the third topic for Arendt in the context of this discussion. Force is seen as a possible replacement for power, a replacement that strength was not. With force, an individual can coerce the multitude through the control of the means of violence. In this situation, Arendt believes that though force can replace power, it cannot substitute for it. The result of a society run by force and its inevitable downfall, is its impotence. The lack of public sphere resulting from the successful use of force then becomes its destruction as creativity is stifled. But violence can destroy power quicker than it can destroy strength and strength's resistance to violence comes from the heroic or the Stoic action, thus the individual's identity is maintained. This resistance though is itself weak in the face of the mob mentality. Here, strength is replaced by 'the combined force of the many'. Arendt does believe that there are advantages to this, however, she warns against this when the public realm is also destroyed through this acting together. The conclusion is that power is the vital force that maintains the public realm and protects the space of appearances. This is a positive attitude to power and its effect in society. The space of appearances is essential to human existence as well as being dependent upon it. This interdependence produces meaning in the human world as it becomes the site for evaluation. This space of appearance is maintained by power and allows natality or new beginnings to emerge, and be considered.115

114 All references from ibid., pp. 200-1.
What is also at work in *The Human Condition* is Arendt's understanding of time; an understanding that becomes very significant for interpreting Arendt's work. Arendt explores the absence apparent in Heidegger's thought by using Jaspers' concept of 'existential time'. This concept of time, separate but not exclusive to Kant's intuitive and therefore objective time, is between this concept of time and *nuns stans*. This understanding was developed under Martin Heidegger, whose inspiration came from Augustine's thought. Its influence reveals itself in her discussion of eternity and immortality, but also in the caveat she places on action at the end the chapter on the subject: "Irreversibility and the Power To Forgive" and "Unpredictability and the Power of Promise."

Arendt acknowledges humanity's perpetual dictatorship to the discipline of time, but argues that promise-making and forgiveness in the web of relationships can confound the sense of hopelessness that comes from this state. In this manner she adheres to the thought of Nietzsche who had already considered this dimension to human life. Nietzsche describes his individual as one who can make promises, and in keeping these promises possess the 'memory of the will'. This appears to be contractarian, even nearing the guise of Rousseau's Social Contract. But the imperative behind this description of man is temporal rather than political. Consequently, Arendt invokes this Nietzschean concept for this purpose. When an individual makes a promise they intend to keep it at some future point in time. People make promises, generally, with the understanding that they will not forget that promise. When people do forget it is not something that happens to them rather something they do. The point Nietzsche seeks to make here is that remembering is *not* forgetting, or the retention of the intent to do something promised. This is the 'memory of the will'. This, however, is not the temporal nature that Arendt is wishing to retain.

The next step in Nietzsche's use of promising is where this dimension becomes very important. This involves the idea that an individual will make a promise with the intent to fulfil it later and in doing so asserts that they will be the same person and therefore obliged to keep the promise. An individual making a promise states that they are the same person, or continuant in time. They establish an identity in time. An extension of this, in Nietzsche's thinking, is that this capacity subverts nature, as the individual must become ordered and regular. This is achieved by inflicting pain on those who

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116 *ibid.*, pp. 236-247. These subtitles reveal the sense of paradox or contradiction that Arendt was fervently aware of in her writings.


break their promises. This motivates men to make a memory for themselves. From this reasoning, the striving for immortality in a secular world becomes conditioned.

In the introduction, I briefly described the meaning of Arendt’s theory of political and its inherent nature to be ‘boundless’ and ‘unpredictable’. Arendt wishes, however, to protect political action and its worth against these necessary and vital elements in its role in society. To do this Arendt introduces the capacity to make promises and provide forgiveness. Arendt leads into this section by discussing freedom and the western philosophical tradition. Within this tradition, freedom is seen to identify with sovereignty yet, Arendt points out, if an event of freedom occurs with non-sovereignty (defined as “being able to begin something new and of not being able to control or even foretell its consequences”) then existence becomes absurd. “In the view of human reality and its phenomenal evidence, it is indeed as spurious to deny human freedom to act because the actor never remains the master of his acts as it is to maintain that human sovereignty is possible because of the incontestable fact of human freedom.” The question that Arendt sees evolving from this observation is whether, without sovereignty, the potential of action can still survive.

From labour and its escape from imprisonment of necessity into work and fabrication’s valuelessness (means and ends), a further step is possible - the faculties of action and speech. The problem of necessity is solved by fabrication yet this is meaningless. Meaning is derived from action. These two interrelated faculties (we are told) generate meaning in stories. Action, however, by nature is irreversible and its consequences unforeseeable because of its inherent unpredictability. Yet, the dangers of this last category though are not insurmountable. What is relevant to Arendt here is the fact that forgiving in this instance is man’s salvation in the face of the problem of irreversibility. As well, the unforeseen consequences of one’s acts - their unpredictability - are not entirely without resource. This is a temporal emphasis in Arendt’s use of these terms. She was not advocating for example a Christian need for forgiveness in a system of morality.

119 ibid., p. 2.
120 This section of the argument in The Human Condition is generally taken a face value with little attempt being made to understanding their full implications. This is simply because without their location in Arendt’s conception of time, they appear very superficial. The neglect of concepts such as these - in terms of their existence as well as their worth - has produced a distortion of Arendt’s understanding. This is partly because the dissertation as the ground of the genesis of Arendt’s understanding contains the acknowledgment and part development of these ideas and concepts and this has not been considered in this way.
121 The Human Condition, p. 235.
122 In ibid., n. 74 Arendt speaks of the “existentialist” (her quote marks) conclusion similar to her own. She says that their conclusions are firmly within the tradition despite their suggestions to the contrary. Existentialism is rebellious to the tradition though. However, she believes that it returns to “religious values” (her quote mark), though values without a foundation in faith or religious experience, instead exchange values and are exchanged in this instance for “values of despair.”
123 ibid., p. 235. In the note to this (75) Arendt compliments Kant in his “courage to acquit man from the consequences of his deed, insisting solely on the purity of his motives, and this saved him from losing faith in man and his potential greatness” in the face of determinism and the ‘thing-in-itself’ (“the secret of absolute reality”).
124 ibid., p. 236.
In the rejection of the moralist’s understanding of forgiveness in a manner similar to Nietzsche, Arendt embraces the power of forgiveness. But she does it in a significantly different way to both the moralist’s and Nietzsche’s approach. The moralists use forgiveness not to deal with a person’s guilt but to rather confirm it publicly. The forgiveness that Arendt envisages is one of “constant mutual release.” Honig argues that this to counter balance Nietzsche’s concept of forgiveness as a vengeful one but it is still reactive. In The Human Condition Arendt says that forgiveness is a “form of re-acting against an original trespassing, whereby far from putting an end to the consequences of the first mistake, everybody remains bound to the process.”

In the dissertation Arendt investigates Augustine’s notion of the original sin and the way it establishes relationships in the earthly community. The role of remembrance is in place to reject Nietzsche’s lords who are unable to forgive and therefore choose to forget. Remembrance is a cohesive element in all of society rather than the choice of an elite. Remembrance returns to the foundation of a society and the factor that binds a society in the presence of others.

Given the fragility of action and the generation of meaning, the stability that emerges from this practice is one that can be established in the desert of an Augustinian nature. It is man-made and only stands between men and therefore only exists when men are in each other’s presence. The solution is therefore the faculty of making and keeping promises and the faculty of forgiveness:

[The two faculties belong together in so far as one of them, forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of the past, . . . ; and the other, binding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in the relationships between men.]

Without these two faculties, Arendt argues, action would be severely disabled. Forgive releases action from the slavery of ultimate and perpetual responsibility and with it, the fear of perpetual obligation. Promises generate the possibility of community because without which man “would be condemned to wander helplessly and without direction in the darkness of each man’s lonely heart.” This is a particularly melancholic description from Arendt but it points towards a conceptual underpinning that must be examined to fully realise the implications of her position. These two faculties, supported by plurality as well as supporting them, are vital to Arendt’s view of possible

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125 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Book 2, §10 and 11.
126 The Human Condition, p. 237. There is a similar expression of this point in “Labor, Work, Action”, p. 41.
127 It also stabilises identity through the public realm where there are others who can confirm one’s self in the presence of others. Without this possibility of plurality both these faculties mean nothing.
128 The Human Condition, p. 237.
guiding principles in the public realm. In fact Arendt asserts that they are diametrically opposed to the principles espoused by Plato when he admits his notion of rule. Within this understanding of rules is a conception of morality that is only dependent on the relationship 'between me and myself', as Arendt phrases it.\(^{130}\) With only this particular relationship determining the codes of conduct with others, a distortion occurs as the evaluation of my own conduct becomes dependent on the product of one’s own introspection. The consequence of this is that the internal relationships of a man’s mind, soul and body become the template for his relationship with another person leading to a concern for Arendt.\(^{131}\)

Returning to the temporal dimension of Arendt’s analysis, in this section of *The Human Condition* Arendt is further developing her understanding of existential time. Following from her understanding of Heidegger and Jaspers, Arendt is seeking to mediate between the past and future by reformulating the understanding of the present. In rejecting Heidegger’s reliance on the future in his philosophy she is also wary of Jaspers’ dependency on the past. Jaspers does not allow beginnings to achieve the significance they gain in Arendt’s work because Jaspers believes that we are bound too tightly by our past; as he states succinctly, “I can never start afresh.”\(^{132}\) Arendt’s concerns regarding this emphasis do not emerge until the essence of her thought is considered: the search for a valid form of guidance in the moment between past and future.

Arendt is concerned about thought in modernity despite the attention she gives to the political in her published work; and the concern remains the moment of decision that her own tradition of thought focused upon in the 1920s. For Arendt, at the centre of the political individual is a mind or the inner self that seeks to appreciate and respond to the world they live in. The reality in which they believe they live is constructed through the past and develops into the future. The point at which this individual can achieve the greatest understanding of their position is in the present, a possible moment of eternity – without fear and trepidation – and with a greater regard of the influences at work. Thinking about thinking was Arendt’s continual theme and this included the way thought responded in the world, to the world as well as the way thought understood its own role and understanding. In conceiving it in this way her moment therefore appears to be a mediation between the thought of Jaspers’ and Heidegger’s but her understanding is gained from her early reading of

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\(^{130}\) Ibid.

\(^{131}\) Arendt is warning against a morality that is culturally-based. Heeding the warning of history and her own experiences of pre-war Germany she is concerned about a morality that enables an individual to say ‘no’ even when all around are saying ‘yes’. The suggestiveness of the Trinitarian conception here is diverted by Arendt to an individual’s own existence, not the communal existence prefigured in society.

Augustine. And it is in her dissertation that Arendt is seeking some answers to the vaguely defined questions she has generated. She attempts to find a way of escaping the absolutes of real time and an accomplishment of the fearlessness of eternity. Again she finds an indication in Jaspers' own beliefs allowing her to explore the possibilities in her own manner. In *Philosophy*, Jaspers provides his own particular concern and possible solution when he asks, "[w]hat is time then? As the future it is possibility; as the past it is the bond of fidelity; as the present it is decision."133 In the third volume he adds that this fidelity or faithfulness implies a 'continuity and commitment'134 and the future is open - in the moment when they meet, the present becomes a powerful moment, a moment that reaches eternity.135 Arendt seeks this in her exploration of the notion of trust, promise-making and forgiveness. And in an equally indicative manner Jaspers' formulation also contains the moment as a moment of decision, leading to the question frequently asked of Arendt's work, so how should a political agent in particular decide on their course of action? Arendt, whilst saying that humans need to think, judge and act. rejects the tradition that has normally aided these abilities - metaphysics.136 In this context political action includes both the physical act and the act of speech - words and deeds.137

Where is this reference point for Arendt? Arendt believes that authority is essential to the stability of the world inbetween and therefore to find her reference point Arendt turns to a concept of authority.138 Authority is generated by the relationship of the individual and the origin.139 This is because Arendt pursued an archial history of being allowing new origins to appear while Heidegger was an archical.140

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133 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 57.
134 Quoted in Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Freedom and Karl Jaspers’s Philosophy*, p. 47.
135 This is the dynamic of Arendt's understanding illustrated when Jaspers says that "[e]membrauce and foresight alone give me access to being. If I grasp the cipher in both, they become one. What I remember is present as a possibility that can be regained in foresight. What I see in foresight is empty unless it is remembered also. The present no longer remains simply the present: if I read the cipher in a foresight permuted by remembrance, it becomes present eternity." Jaspers, *Philosophy.*, Vol. 3, p. 151.
137 *The Human Condition*, p. 173.
138 Gottsegen in *Political Thought of Hannah Arendt*, (New York, State University New York Press, 1994) determines a similar focus in his *Action-Ideal* and explores this in a section titled *Roman Roots of Authority*. He does not consider Augustine in his thinking losing the true dimensions to Arendt's foundational politics.
139 *Between Past and Future*, p. 93 and *On Revolution*, p. 201.
Chapter Five

Between Past and Future and a Trinity: Foundation, Immortality, and Authority

1. Between Past and Future: A Kairological Reading

(i) The Mind in the Gap: Kafka’s Immortality and a Source of Authority

(ii) Asking the Romans: Foundation in Time

(iii) Immortality and the Community: Timelessness not Eternity

2. The Roman Trinity: The Meaning of Authority, Tradition and Religion

(i) Inspiration, Imitation and the Source; or Action in the Space of Appearance

Arendt’s turn to the political, and away from her primary philosophical concerns of her study in the 1920s, has her seek meaning first in the pre-polis experience reflected in Homer’s storytelling (The Human Condition) and then in the foundational experiences of the Romans (Between Past and Future). As she picks through the tradition of thought the twentieth century inherited, she finds many illuminative occasions that echo the experiences of the Romans, though now as revolutions and not as Romulus and Remus. In Arendt’s discussion of immortality in The Human Condition she introduced several new avenues of inquiry such as speech and deed, remembrance, and storytelling. Although referring to the Roman concepts of authority, tradition religion, and law amongst others in Between Past and Future, the implications are far broader when she says that they cannot be understood without being centred on the idea of foundation. In essence, all of these Roman concepts that are evident in Arendt’s later thinking find their genesis and framework in the thought of St. Augustine and her understanding of the primitive Christian experience. One of the major points of interest from these essays and lectures is whether or not Arendt was trying to invent a decidedly Roman response through the Roman mind of Augustine and Cicero. The most significant aspect of Cicero that maintained Arendt’s attention is his introduction of a particular vocabulary into the western tradition. Cicero’s brilliance, Arendt suggests, was his ability to capture the experience of the

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1 It is interesting to note that in the opening of On Revolution Arendt first notes the experiences of Athens and then Rome under the theme of a just war. See pp. 12-3. Romulus and Remus together with the foundation of Rome are discussed on pp. 20, 28, and 228-10. Romulus separately on p. 123.

2 See The Human Condition, pp. 18-21, 55-6, and 314-6 amongst others.

3 On Revolution, p. 207.

4 Only on one occasion does Arendt indicate the relationship between these two eras of thought when she links the thought of Cicero to St. Paul in On Revolution, p. 230.

5 I have used the translations of Paul MacKendrick, The Philosophical Books of Cicero, (London, Duckworth, 1989) and I have also followed Arendt’s selections from Loeb Classical Library.
empire, or the political in terms of its meaning. His experience of the political resulted in an admiration for the powers of persuasion, the role of gloria, and the role of the Maiores (the Roman Founding Fathers). All are reflected in Arendt’s conception of the contemporary and the political.

What occurs through Arendt’s reflections on Cicero’s example is that she generates a new conception of immortality as timelessness for the individual through the community. The direction of Arendt’s discussions in her course lectures such as ‘Philosophy and Politics’, as well as her work in Between Past and Future, all indicate the need to return to her own intellectual genesis in order to fully comprehend the conceptual foundations she was taking for granted throughout this published material. This provides Arendt with the understanding for her own trinity.

In a lecture on political thought given in Chicago in 1963 Arendt, as part of her introduction, said “[O]nly at the end of the course, probably during the last session, shall we ask the pertinent question about this activity itself – in other words, the question where we are localised in time and space, what our relation to the world and to time (past & future) may be when we find ourselves thinking. Or: To what extent is the activity of thinking a politically relevant activity?” Significantly, in the margin of her lecture notes there is a comment of ‘(Past & Future, Gap)’. This is Arendt’s key to understanding the intentions in her thinking. While the final phase of Arendt’s thought reflected in The Life of the Mind provides some light on an appropriate interpretation of the passage above and the extra notation, it is actually her dissertation which provides a potential reading. In this context, an examination of the dissertation’s conceptual framework is required with special sensitivity to her reading of Christianity.

In Between Past and Future, Arendt pursues a reading of the western tradition of political thinking, especially the Roman trinity of authority, tradition and religion, that seeks to develop these elements in her thought by evaluating some closely connected ideas: foundation, immortality, and authority. These three political ideals still reflect her temporal framework through the conjunction of past, present and future respectively and it is by this pathway of thinking that Arendt seeks to explore a foundation of authority in her modern world.

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7 Between Past and Future, pp. 121-2.

8 See ibid., especially pp. 119-20 passim.

9 Library of Congress papers, Lectures, “Introduction into Politics”, Chicago, (Fall 1963), (023796), (Hereafter referred to as “Introduction into Politics”).

10 Although largely unspoken in her published works, the temporal dimension of past possibility and the translation of love to trust are still apparent in her reasoning through this period of her thinking. They do not explicitly emerge until she returns to the question of transcendent in the final phase of her thought trains.

11 It is in ‘Willing’ that Arendt provides an insight into her own ontological underpinning of her philosophy of politics. Returning to Augustine and the concept of natality she observes the ability of the Occidental tradition to cloud this concept by returning to the older to stop the recognition of the new. This continual denial by especially the tradition of political theory,
Also from this introductory quote it is clear that Arendt holds the notion that the mind or the self was closely connected to the question of the community. This is captured in her phrase the individual-in-the-world as a description of her concerns. This self in a community is framed by their condition as *homo temporalis* and as such led Arendt to say in her dissertation that “[w]hile the world exists, so does the past”. Her reference for this understanding of the individual was Augustine’s concept of memory when he says that “[t]he triumph of memory is that in presenting the past and thus depriving it, in a sense, of its bygone quality, memory transforms the past into a future possibility.” This is an expression of Arendt’s reading of Augustine’s memory as memory of the present and not a platonic memory of the past. During this middle period of her thinking, however, this must be both read and understood in terms of her conception of the political. Subsequently, the role of Augustine is as a Roman not as a Christian father, and more specifically, as part of the Roman tradition of thinking transmitted through Cicero, Machiavelli, de Tocqueville and Montesquieu.

The Roman mind that Arendt saw in Augustine emerges, for example, when Arendt considers the role of habit and imitation in his thought. Arendt sees the significant aspects mirrored in the thought of Cicero; an unacknowledged partner in her analysis of Augustine.

However, can be usurped, in Arendt’s eyes, by one potential alternative. While this is introduced as the potential ontological underpinning of a Virgilian philosophy of politics, it describes Arendt’s own perspective. This alternative, and therefore Arendt’s own particular purpose, is provided by Augustine the Roman, not as a Christian, and “the only philosopher the Romans ever had”.  

12 As Augustine says, “ought there then to be no bond (trinucleum) of love among people? Most assuredly there ought to be . . .” (“Quid inter ipso homines nullumme esse amoris trinucleum debet? Imo zero ista debet . . .”). See De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, 1, 26.  

13 *Love and St. Augustine*, p. 107. When Arendt turns to temporality as important to the “stigma of all created things”, she considers that it is only men who through the capacity of consciousness can acknowledge this in their existence and realize that God is eternal and they are not. Arendt says that “[i]n these cases essence precedes existence: “For the essence (ratio) that is established as a created thing antecedes in the word of God the creature that is established.” Arendt quoting Augustine, *Love and St. Augustine*, p. 54.  

14 *Love and St. Augustine*, p. 48.  

15 This reading of Augustine’s theory of knowledge is controversial and one of the most prominent difficulties for Augustinian scholarship. In fact the debate over this theory in Augustine’s thought was reignited in Germany in 1924 by the publication of Martin Grabmann’s work, *Der göttliche Grund menschlicher Wissenswerkeinnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin*, (Münster, Aschendorff, 1924). There is no evidence to suggest Arendt was influenced by this publication, there is only a matter of coincidence. It is also worthwhile to return to her description of Benjamin’s and Heidegger’s task as “listening to the tradition that does not give itself up to past but thinks of the present” for an initial understanding of this notion. “Walter Benjamin”, p. 43. [Heidegger’s words, Arendt's translation]  

16 The role of St. Paul’s thought in Augustine also gave rise to Arendt’s concerns regarding the worldliness of his later understanding. While Christianity found a worthy companion in Plato’s antiworldliness, is was the location where eternity resided that influenced Arendt’s work. Arendt sees Augustine as dividing love into three particular spheres - the love of God, love of the self and the love of the neighbour. The middle love, self-love, is considered to be at the root of all desire, both *caritas* and *concupiscere*, and is also divided into two.  

17 These thinkers are essential to her lectures “The History of Political Thought” given at Berkeley in 1953. In another lecture series. Arendt says, “[h]ence, French as well as America Revolution began to ransom the archives of Roman antiquity to find answers to questions which had been lain dormant during the centuries of Christianity this is the reason why the ancients are being studied with new interest. We need their help.” Library of Congress papers, “Introduction to Politics”, (Chicago Fall 1963), p. 1b (023861). [Hereafter referred to as “Introduction to Politics”]  

18 These illustrations, however, are not elements that exist alone in the thesis. They are related to an understanding that involves the fusion of traditions in Augustine's thought, the role of the will (or desire), and memory. In these three locations of thought-bound up in Augustine's thinking, are the themes of time, the present, past and future and space (worldliness and appearance), return and search for a source, and the significance of trust and faith in a community as well as desire, the neighbour, the mind, identity, conscience, free will, happiness, and equality. While the original and central concern was the topic of love, each of these elements mentioned become important to the analysis that Arendt pursues in her political thought.
The influence of her dissertational reading leads her to examine the Roman Trinity in search of her own dynamic relationship. Her use of Augustine in this context provides an indication of her direction: “For the mainstay of [Augustine’s] philosophy, Sedis animi est in memoria (“the seat of the mind is in memory”), is precisely that conceptual articulation of the specifically Roman experience which the Romans themselves, overwhelmed as they were by Greek philosophy and concepts, never achieved.” It is Augustine’s concept of the mind (or spirit or self depending on the translation or interpretation) that Arendt thinks she needs to develop in order to understand the questions developed in The Human Condition and her search for the principle for action. In this context, the work in Between Past and Future is a travelling point from the realm of vita actionis to vita contemplationis in her thought paths. With this new focus Arendt simply explores the other side of her distinction in the anticipation that she can rescue something from her tradition of thinking that could possibly point the way towards a new start. As such, foundation and the source are the key words to her search through the Roman experience as she explores action in the world. It is in Arendt’s lecture material that her sense of foundation (and an associate notion of imitation) is examined, albeit indirectly. This element of her thought is connected to her search for authority in a modern world without metaphysical fallacies through an investigation of secular notions of immortality. It is important to this search, also, that in the dissertation Arendt conceived the basic ontological condition of man as imitation and discusses this in terms of Adam as the founder of the earthly community. From this position and by establishing the importance of principle in the everyday world she locates a new authority.

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20 Between Past and Future, p. 126.
21 In her last lecture of “Introduction into Politics” (023846), Arendt purposely defines thought and contemplation in distinction to cognition and logical process. She ends with Kafka’s parable regarding time (023847).
22 Some of these elements are detailed by Arendt as she examines the significance of the tradition of Greek philosophy and their Neo-platonic form in relation to the thought of Augustine, a major Father of Christianity. The tradition had a significant influence on Augustine as he discovered Christianity; converted and then sought to justify his faith. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, (London, Faber and Faber, 1967), chapter 11. The Neo-platonic thought of Plotinus was Augustine’s Plato, hence Augustine’s understanding of the Greek tradition of thought is conveyed through the works of Plotinus. The role of this element in Arendt’s understanding becomes apparent when her attacks on Plato are considered. Frequently, Arendt’s criticisms of both Plato and Aristotle have been characterised as the work of an intransigent anti-Platonism. Arendt and Heidegger, pp. 82-3. But the tenets of Platonic thought Arendt was attacking were manifested overtly in Plotinus’ thoughts providing the imperative for Arendt’s direction. Arendt then interpreted back the characteristics she had determined to Plato.
23 Bonnie Honig also undertakes this search for a new Arendtian form of political authority in modernity by comparing her reading of the American Constitution with Derrida’s. Honig, however, does not see the element of past possibility in Arendt’s thought. See “Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic”, American Political Science Review, Vol 85, No 1, March (1991), pp. 97-113. Although not part of the present discussion, what is equally significant for her later work in The Life of the Mind is that this authority can only be determined by illumination not through a process of recollection or disclosure. For this to happen the mind must be in harmony with this world of the inbetween created by the individual out of the Augustinian desert.
The temporal understanding that pervades Arendt’s thought is one of past possibility in the timeless moment of decision and it is with this dynamic in mind that she turns to Franz Kafka. His example provides her with a precise illustration of her intention;

Only insofar as he thinks, and that is insofar as he is ageless—a “he” as Kafka so rightly calls him, not a “somebody” — does man in the full actuality of his concrete being live in the gap of time between past and future. The gap, I suspect, is not a modern phenomenon, it is perhaps not even a historical datum but is coeval with the existence of man of earth. It may well be the region of the spirit or, rather, the path paved by thinking, this small track of non-time which the activity of thought beats within the time-space of mortal men and into which the trains of thought, of remembrance and anticipation, save whatever they touch from the ruin of historical and biographical time. This small non-time-space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the culture into which we are born into, can only be indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed down from the past; each new generation, indeed every new human being as he inseris himself between an infinite past and infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave it anew.27

The answers that Arendt is looking for in her ‘experimental’ work in Between Past and Future is illustrated expertly in her use of Franz Kafka’s quote. The space that the mind occupies is not spatial but rather temporal, although it is a particular type of temporality — a timelessness — that suits Arendt’s requirements. This new path suggested by Kafka is a response to the individual’s place in time as an individual. For Arendt as she explains in a lecture, the purpose of Kafka and this parable in particular is to “gain some experience . . . to gain the position of the present and to be at home in it.”28 Yet there is a universality about this existence as the location for this “may well be the region of the spirit or, rather, the path paved by thinking, this small track of non-time which the activity of


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27 “Introduction into Politics”, (023848).
thought beats within the time-space of mortal men and into which the trains of thought, of remembrance and anticipation. Arendt inadvertently gives her definition of ‘spirit’ in this passage, as a path paved by thinking. Just as the translation of mens as always caused problems for translators from ancient texts, defining Arendt’s conception of the mind or spirit provides equal difficulties. The ‘small non-time-space’ can only be indicated, a task she set for herself in The Life of the Mind. The mind is possibly this space and the complexity of the moment between past and future is located by Arendt in several different contexts. Taking over Heidegger’s (and Aristotle’s, Kierkegaard’s and Jaspers’) kariological framework for her analysis, she uses her understanding of Augustine’s foundational thought to realise a synthesis between the age and the individual. When Arendt asks how are the past and the future to be linked in society, she is also asking how is the individual to perceive this relationship? The individual is inserted into the order of things, thus creating a new order, and consequently must decide how to interact with this new world.

In the study of Augustine for her dissertation and in the context of her actuality of love, Arendt locates a foundational principle when she is looking at the collective of living together in the world-of-the-inbetween and a source of authority. In understanding the basic ontology as imitation coupled with the Heideggerian Aristotle’s insight of beginning containing ‘half the whole’ in terms of principles and guidelines for action, Arendt has established a framework for how the individual stands in the world which leads to the question of how the individual should judge their own actions and those around them. Her answer is to look to the Augustinian conception of the trinity. Just as Augustine looked to the shadow of the Holy Trinity to understand the mind, Arendt also looks to his psychological trinity to understand the needs of the contemporary mind. It is in this exploration that Arendt uses and develops several of the insights she gained from her dissertational study of Augustine. The ‘small non-time space’ represents the search for the eternal as timelessness in a secular age and requires, Arendt insists, a reconsideration of both the Christian and the Greek temporal conceptions. By this direction it is clear that there is no introduction of a third element into Arendt’s thought. Her confidence in the western tradition pervades her thought and it is here that she is seeking her tentative answers. As there is not another tradition that Arendt wishes to introduce into her explorations, she believes the answers are contained within the history of the tradition that eventuated out of the complex fusion of the Platonic and Pauline trains of thought.

29 Between Past and Future, p. 13.
For example, in her essay “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future, Arendt talks about two general schools of political theorists who emerged out of the modern age: the political scientist, utilising the discoveries in science, and the theorist returning to the lessons and experiences of the secular Roman Empire. Arendt turns to the thought of Augustine to examine this latter context. Augustine becomes not a Christian Father or even a ‘philosopher’ in Arendt’s reading, but instead a Roman reflecting the experiences of a Roman in the Empire. In this manner Arendt’s understanding of the primitive Christian manifests itself in her reading of the Roman. She states this association later in the essay when she says the “strong anti-political tendencies of early Christianity are so familiar that the notion of a Christian thinker’s having been the first to formulate the philosophical implications of the ancient political idea of freedom strikes us as almost paradoxical. The only explanation that comes to mind is that Augustine was a Roman as well as a Christian, and in this part of his work he formulated the central political experience of Roman antiquity, which was that freedom qua beginning became manifest in the act of foundation.” The early Christian becomes a Roman in Arendt’s mind and seeks a temporal as well as a worldly harmony for the individual-in-the-world involving the act of foundation. In a more contemporary response, Arendt has Montesquieu, “the greatest representative of this political secularism”, reflect this notion of harmony. He too was acutely aware of the ‘inadequacies’ of the philosophical and Christian tradition and postulated instead of l’exercice de la volonté, a notion of political freedom captured by the phrase la liberté ne peut consister qu’à pouvoir faire ce que l’on doit vouloir. Arendt therefore returns to the Romans and their thought as an illustration par excellence of what she is seeking in her own work. Her solutions are not found in either the explicit platonic or Christian traditions of thought unsullied by one another, but rather in the Roman environment where the fusion took place and gained precedence.

30 For Arendt, Hobbes is an illustration of the first and Montesquieu the second.
31 This is reflected strongly when Arendt considers the understanding of freedom in “What is Freedom?” Even though Augustine introduced via St. Paul the tradition of liberum arbitrium, in his only ‘political treatise’ The City of God, another non-philosophical notion of freedom is discussed. As Arendt puts it, this notion is founded in the Roman experience, or Augustine’s ‘Roman Mind’. Thus, it is not the inner freedom of future philosopher rather freedom in the world. Between Past and Future, pp. 165-7.
32 Between Past and Future, p. 167.
33 Arendt states that the emphasis is on pouvoir, Between Past and Future, p. 161. Referenced by Arendt in Essais des Lois, Book 12, 2 and Book 11, 3.
34 Arendt refers again to the Greek polis and its lessons for twentieth century politics; “[I]f use the word ‘political’ in the sense of the Greek polis is neither arbitrary nor far-fetched. Not only etymologically and not only for the learned, does the very word . . . echo the experiences of the community which first discovered the essence and the realm of the political.” This time however she refers also to the Roman experiences in antiquity: “If we understand the political in the sense of the polis de son end or raison d’être would be to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as virtuosity can appear.” To avoid any misunderstanding, on the next page she is emphatic in her direction when she says: “[I]f any attempt to define the concept of freedom from experiences in the political realm sounds strange and startling because all our theories in these matters are dominated by the notion that freedom is an attribute of will and thought much rather than of action.” Between Past and Future, pp. 154-5.
In *Between Past and Future* Arendt argues that the beginning of the modern age saw an emphasis on political action and political life, and not on a treatment of the historical process. In her eyes, thinkers in this era dealt with their concern for the future by erasing the past. Hobbes extended his understanding so far as to posit a teleological conception of action. The Aristotelian first cause was no longer in Hobbes’ philosophical gaze, but rather the purpose of man.\(^{35}\) Subsequently, the political had returned to the centre stage in the early modern era. However, politics did not last long before it was eventually removed by a particular type of history represented by Marx’s philosophy of history *and* politics.\(^{36}\) What is important for Arendt is the relationship between meaning and action; “[m]eaning, which can never be the aim of action and yet, inevitably, will rise out of human deeds after the action itself has come to an end . . . ”\(^{37}\) Action unto itself is in a sense meaningless, though it does lead to the production of meaning. The problem that Marx generates is that his work does not distinguish between meaning and end.\(^{38}\) The conception of history at work here is not the finite past or future, but rather one with a beginning and an end. The difference is that if a definite end is conceived then that individual moment becomes a means to that end. The result is a history where the laws of motion can be determined. This therefore makes history equally irrelevant because the end is all that matters and without their history the individual cannot achieve a political immortality. Equally in this situation meaning cannot be generated; “single events and deeds and sufferings have no more meaning here than hammer and nails have with respect to the finished table.”\(^{39}\) The continual process of ends even negates the end eventually - one end is negated for the new end.\(^{40}\)

With this Arendt turns to Kant. Kant’s political philosophy is also involved in this concern with history to the detriment of politics. Kant, however, in Arendt’s eyes, was not comfortable with this transition. His history was the history of Herder, and Kant did not retain the faith in history. However, Kant did realise that a backward glance down through history led to an understanding of the “intention of nature” and the “guiding thread of reason.”\(^{41}\) This Hegelian aspect of Kant, seen in

35 In fact, Arendt suggests, causes were so downgraded that Hobbes allowed even animals the capacity to determine causes. It was no longer the preserve of the single species of man.

36 Arendt, as you would expect, seems to lament this period of political action and political life, referring to their *philosophy of politics, Between Past and Future*, p. 76. With the removal of political action from the agenda history, makes its final entrance. Political theory was still developed but only with the destiny of despair - illustrated, in Arendt’s eyes, by Tocqueville.

37 Ibid., p. 78. It should be noted that the importance of the observer is evident in this formulation.

38 In Marx, meaning becomes ends and ends become meaning resulting in a formulation that Arendt first considered with Augustine and his use of *praetorius* and *uit*. Marx was concerned initially with action and Arendt defines him as the thinker who stood between concern for politics and concern for history.

39 *Between Past and Future*, p. 80.

40 As Lessing asks, “what is the use of use?” See Arendt’s discussion of Lessing in *Between Past and Future*.

his understanding of the "ruse of nature" and his almost dialectical "antagonism of men in society", provides Kant - and this is important for Arendt - with meaning of the whole, but rather than the "meaninglessness of the particular." In doing so Kant was able to realise the foundational problem that beleaguerers all philosophies of history and progress; the fact that all generations strive merely for the future generation and never for themselves. Arendt says, quoting Kant, "and that only the last should have the good fortune to dwell in the [completed] building." Even though Kant removed a theory of political action from his thought, Arendt regards him as a thinker who understood the concerns of an age because he retained the question "What shall I do?" at the centre of his philosophy rather than allowing the other concerns of metaphysics to dominate. *Vita activa* remained a superior concern over *vita contemplativa*, a concern that even Marx and Nietzsche could not retain.43

Coupled with this concern of 'what to do' Arendt highlights a by-product of the modern era or more specifically that "... the secularisation of our world implies the revival of the old desire for some kind of earthly immortality ", and an immortality that the political could have supplied to the individual. At this point in time, Arendt argues, action did not fit the demands being made on it in the new age; action is the least motivation and the most futile of achievements. The result is an indeterminable sense, a "melancholy haphazardness (trostlose Ungeführ)." But where is the individual in this scheme of thinking? Arendt sees as a consequence the loneliness of Men; "[t]he modern age, with its growing world-alienation, has led to a situation where man, wherever he goes, encounters only himself." Men, in Arendt's eyes, are considering themselves 'self-sufficient' and consequently their understanding of the implications of time and its meaning is also lost. The result of both is a loss of nature and a loss of human artifices and man finds himself either very alone or very crowded (the masses). Neither of these contain a common world. The sense of community built upon a secure foundation is the concern for Arendt. The answer is a space of appearance but again this conception means little if it is not coupled with the temporal dimension of this space – the moment. History is important to Arendt in spite of this concern for the moment, because it actually assists the structure of the moment.

In the process of examining the thought of Augustine, Arendt constructed an understanding of the community which she later transposes into her consideration of politics in the modern era. While

42 *Between Past and Future*, p. 83. Kant from the Third Thesis in *Ide*. [Arendt's insertion]

43 Kant was however, as Arendt points out, still troubled by the hierarchy within the *vita activa*: "[i]t is a sign of the political rank of Kant's philosophy that the old perplexities inherent in action were brought to the fore again," *Between Past and Future*, p. 84.

44 *ibid.*, p. 84 and 85 respectively. Arendt is quoting Kant in the second reference.

45 *ibid.*, pp. 89-90.
lamenting the turn of politics to a damaging form of history as progress and therefore to the future and the false expectation of the present generation in their endeavours for the unknown, if not fabricated, future generation, Arendt realises that the concept of the temporal is the problem in contemporary thinking on this subject. Foundation and the considerations implicit in this subject require analysis. When approaching the end of her dissertation Arendt noted a change in emphasis in the community perceived by Augustine. The new meaning of equality changes from sin to love; the pre-given association of sin makes way for one based on freedom of choice and the obligations that occur with it. However, as Arendt observes, this new Augustinian community is still built upon the old foundations of ‘community-in-sinfulness’. Because we all derive from Adam, Augustine reasons, we are all sinful. There are therefore many communities and peoples but there are really only two cities - good and bad and one founded on Christ and the other, Adam. Arendt says that in a similar sense to this there are two loves; “love of self (or then world) and love of God.” Our sin through birth was always there. However, the possibility of imitation required Christ’s time on earth and the occurrence that the grace of God can be freely chosen: “[t]hough freedom of choice recalls the individual from the world and severs his essential social ties with human kind, the equality of all people, once posited, cannot be cancelled out . . . [and i]n this process, equality receives new meaning—love of neighbour.”46 The consequences of this understanding is the new attitude that the individual has towards the world - its living environment and the new concept of equality.

Augustine’s analysis of the being of man started as man in isolation, or more specifically complete isolation. Man’s origin is both the sin of Adam which is also the beginning of the man made world and the separation of man from God; “his descent is defined by generation and not by creation.”47 Because of this, the world, previously a strange alienated place, becomes the home of this new man; “[t]he world is no longer an utterly strange place into which the individual has been created. Rather, by kinship in generation the world has always been familiar and belongs to him.” The importance of this new man is his relationship through generation, whether this is a definition of history, tradition, or a common past in Arendt’s eyes is left uncertain. The fact that God created each is no longer the only fact that relates man to his neighbour; generation and descent become important and the world therefore becomes familiar through this process. It is in this conception of being that we can

46 Love and St. Augustine, p. 102. In Between Past and Future Arendt repeats this assertion saying that freedom is not liberum arbitrium, rather it is when I-can and I-will coincide. See p. 151, passim.
47 Arendt says that Adam, the first man, is the ‘source’: “[t]he first man, the source, hands down this indirectness by way of all men through the historically made world.” This sharing is man as social being. Love and St. Augustine, p. 103-4.
"understand the obligatory function of equality". Reflecting the notion of *kardia*, love involved in this is one of mutual interdependence. Remembering that Adam represents the Arendtian community and encapsulates her understanding of foundation and principle, love has now become trust and she is continuing to develop its temporal dimension in her thinking.

When considering this factor in *Between Past and Future* Arendt discusses two distinct models of foundation - the Greek and the Roman models - in terms of an analogy using architecture. In the Greek model, the act of foundation was undertaken by the builder who arrived, constructed and then left before the dwelling could begin properly. The action therefore was constrained or contained within the framework achieved through the prior and separate act of building. In the Roman model, making was not separate to the beginning. Action and beginning anew were inherent in the process of foundation. It was the "central, decisive, unrepeatable beginning of their whole history, a unique event" and one that engaged all the following generations. As Arendt details it further: "[a]t the heart of Roman politics, from the beginning of the republic until virtually the end of the imperial era, stands the conviction of the sacredness of foundation, in the sense that once something has been founded it remains binding for all future generations. To be engaged in politics meant first and foremost to preserve the founding of the city of Rome." Action rather than fabrication determines Arendt's understanding of the ideal *polis* and this act of foundation contained the principle that defined the parameters of the subsequent life of the city or *polis*. It is the beginning or act of foundation that establishes the authority and each generation remains related to this act and therefore the principles. Authority is generated by the relationship of the individual to the origin. With this portrayal it seems as if Arendt has tied each generation to a rigid anchor that would eventually constrain the actors or participants in the political realm. But, as Arendt argues in her dissertation, it

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48 *ibid.* p. 104. Later Arendt again says, "[e]xtremgament itself gives rise to a new togetherness, that is, to a new being with and for each other that exists beside and against the old society." *ibid.*, p. 108.

49 "However, redemption occurs without merit on the part of the individual; all are redeemed together, just as all were found together in the same situation." Consequently Christ does not change anything; "the sinful past has established the earthly city and made the world the home of human interdependence." *ibid.*, pp. 104-5. As a consequence, "[t]he neighbour is a constant reminder of one's own sin . . . [t]he neighbour is a living warning of pride because he is never viewed as he happens to be in the world." *ibid.*, pp. 105-6. (To explain this Arendt points to Part I, Chapter Three, "The Order of Love" and Part II, Chapter Three, "Love of Neighbour").

50 *Between Past and Future*, pp. 120-22. There is evidence here that Arendt was rejecting the social contractarian model. She was seeking to avoid the social contractarian model of the popular will as the "will of the multitude . . . is ever changing by definition . . ." and a structure built on this as its foundation is built on quicksand." *On Revolution*, p. 163.

51 Arendt refers to them as a "craftsman or architect" or as "the builder of the city wall, someone who had to do and finish his work before political activity could begin." *The Human Condition*, pp. 194-5.

52 This is a problem not of the fragility of action based on this model but rather that the will is boundless and therefore the boundaries set up by a popular constitution would change as any moment a will in the multitude decided. This reflects a hesitancy on Arendt's part to embrace entirely an arbitrary concept of action. But she does not want to extinguish its creative ability either.

53 Quote from *Between Past and Future*, "What is Authority?", p. 121.

54 *ibid.*, p. 120.

is for each generation to re-establish its relationship to the act of foundation. Where do these principles come from, and how are they understood by each generation and how do they guide the action of the political actors? It would be easy, however, to see Arendt simply advocating a space of appearance in a political community as a form of eternity. To understand Arendt’s purpose in her essays the space of appearance must be broken down into the constituent parts that form the whole; the act of foundation, beginning or initiation, and the notion of a principle.

(ii) **Asking the Romans: Foundation in Time**

In the Tenth Session of her course ‘Philosophy and Politics: What is Political Philosophy?’ is titled simply ‘Rome’. Referring to Hegel, she continues her argument regarding the relationship between philosophy and politics by talking about the flight of the Owl of Minerva and his location of the source of thinking in Ancient Greece. But in doing so, Arendt suggests, Hegel denies its true source. This particular choice however is not the correct location in Arendt’s eyes as both politics and philosophy found their source in the desire for immortality, or *athanatidzein, aeternaire*. Consequently the understanding of Hegel is actually only true for Rome. This was because of their circumstances in that their only philosophy was written as the empire came to an end; first with Cicero at the end of the republic and secondly with Boethius at the end of the empire. This particular approach to the world at hand, and the empires that are built within it is regarded by Arendt as something which is lacking in Heidegger’s mind. Conversely it is exceptionally evident in Augustine’s. However, Heidegger eventually was only attuned to the Greek and, to a lesser extent,

56 It is interesting to note that in the opening of *On Revolution* Arendt first notes the experiences of Athens and then Rome under the theme of a just war. See pp. 12-3, Romulus and Remus together with the foundation of Rome are discussed on pp. 20, 28, and 209-10. Romulus separately on p. 123.
57 See *The Human Condition*, pp. 18-21, 55-6, and 314-6 amongst others.
58 On *Revolution*, p. 207.
59 Only on one occasion does Arendt indicate the relationship between these two eras of thought when she links the thought of Cicero to St. Paul in *On Revolution*, p. 230.
60 I have used the translations of Paul Mackendrick, *The Philosophical Works of Cicero*, (London, Duckworth, 1989) and I have also followed Arendt’s selections from *Leib Classical Library*.
63 See ibid., especially pp. 119-20 passim.
64 Arendt’s emphasis on the Roman is highlighted in *Thinking* where she discusses in ‘The Roman Answer’ the type of thought so effective for the contemporary. In terms of Hegel she suggests that the “profound Roman influence on even so metaphysical a philosopher as Hegel is quite manifest in his first published book, where he discusses the relation between philosophy and reality: ‘The need for philosophy arises when the unity of body has disappeared from the life of men, when the opposites have lost the living tension of their relatedness and their mutual interdependence and have become autonomous,” namely: the need for reconciliation.” The role of the Roman experience in this is that thinking occurs because of existential reasons, or because of a desirability of man and world, not because of reason’s own demand. The result of thinking therefore must be harmony.” *Thinking*, p. 153.
65 Library of Congress paper: “Philosophy and Politics: What is Political Philosophy?”, New School, (Spring 1969), Tenth Session, p. 28. [Hereafter referred to as “Philosophy and Politics”]
the Christian in his thought. While Arendt sought her criticisms from the same source, she was also attuned to Augustine's Roman mind, one that was existing in the world.67

When talking about this loss of human immortality through remembrance, the foundation and beginning of Rome provided a manner for men to participate in immortality. Arendt continues in her essay, saying "that the sanctification of the gigantic and almost superhuman effort of foundation (tantae molis erat Romanam coneare gentum) of laying the fundamentals for a new hearth and home became the cornerstone of Roman religion and religious service almost identical with political activity." Just as Arendt highlighted Augustine's examination of man's attempt to mirror God, Arendt uses Cicero to articulate an earthly, political version; “there exists nothing in which human virtue accedes closer to the holy ways (numen) of the gods than the foundation of new or the preservation of already established cities.”73 Cicero wrote to aid his fellow citizens seeking the Good of the community. Cicero concentrated on the ethical and the practical life seeking vita beata and virtus. His works were consequently very practical writings responding to the issues of the time, such as practical guides to the good life and seeking an appropriate ordering of both social and political existence. The context of this new way of thinking is highlighted by the historical circumstance Cicero wrote from. Between the Greeks and the writing of Cicero, the Athenian relationship between the individual and society was dismantled.74 But the individual was left confused after the break up of the city states even as new responsibilities was conferred in the large empire. In a reaction to this the Romans brought their experiences to the philosophy of the classical Greeks. Greek philosophy was made to respond to Roman experience. This relationship can be summarised in the following manner,

67 In The Life of the Mind, Arendt seems to favour Nietzsche's position regarding German philosophy: that it "is the most fundamental form of... homesickness there has ever been: the longing for the best that has ever been existed; at last one longs back for that place in which alone one can be at home: the Greek world!", Willing, p. 157. But she continues her commentary, seeking to place a critical distance between her own position and this one.

68 This is especially true, Arendt thinks, of the temporal understanding that pervades his work. See Arendt's discussion of "Tradition", p. 8 (029950) in her "Introduction" to her course "History of Political Thought" given at Berkeley in 1955.


70 Arendt's rather severe reading of the implications of Plato's thought becomes clearer when this is taken into consideration. An interesting take on this relationship see Paul G. Kuntz, "Practice and Theory: Civic and Spiritual Virtues in Plotinus and Augustine" in Arbeit, Musse, Meditation: Studies in Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa, Brian Vickers, (ed.) (Zürich, Verlag der Fachverleih, 1991).

71 MacKendrick, The Philoctrical Books of Cicero, p. 12. Emerson in his essay "On the Oversoul" also suggested that the "soul answers never by words, but by the thing itself that is inquired after." How therefore can Augustine seek to speak and persuade the ineffable? This paradox also confronted Arendt when she seeks to use both persuasion and illumination as direction for the neighbour. For a further discussion of this see the introduction by Quincy Howe Jr. for Selected Sermons of St. Augustin, trans. and ed. Quincy Howe Jr., (London, Victor Gollancz, 1967), p. v

72 It is not a coincidence that when asked to write a laudatio for Karl Jaspers in Men in Dark Times that Arendt turns to Cicero to introduce her Karl Jaspers.

73 "Philosophy and Politics", Section I, p. 10.

74 Library of Congress papers: "Philosophy and Politics: The Problem of Action and Thought after the French Revolution", p. 10 (hereafter referred to as "The Problem of Action and Thought"). This is a lecture given at the University of Notre Dame in 1954.
"tradition should not define experience, experience should define tradition". The result was an enlightened and humane outlook on life and the individual. It established the Roman spirit and it was driven by a desire to see the world in harmony; a view reflected vehemently in the writings of Cicero. In his work, De Officiis Cicero says "And it is no mean manifestation of Nature and Reason that man is the only . . . And so no other beauty, loveliness, harmony in the visible world." The problem is that from this new Roman experience no new political philosophy arose. What emerged was bound too tightly to its beginning in Greek thought. Arendt is primarily seeking the experience from which these writings emerged but a theoretical framework is provided many years later when the classics returned to Europe. An indication of Arendt's interpretation of this is provided by a series of lectures on the renaissance thinker, Machiavelli. This early modern was hailed by Arendt not because of his 'Machiavellian' understanding of politics, something Arendt was conscious of but not distracted by in her reading. Rather she looked to his influence in the tradition of thought that had found its imperative in the Roman condition and those who loved the world and still sought immortality.

The direction her thought took from this starting point can be clarified by the way she interpreted those thinkers in a tradition of thought she respects. Introducing her topic with a discussion of the state and its definition according to Machiavelli, she turned to the role of virtuosity in his thought. With the rise of the new state against the Church a new person arises in society, from the private realm to the public realm. This is also against the ideals of Plato who was concerned as a philosopher that the worse person would rule. Machiavelli is concerned not for the philosopher's life but rather for the world. Later in her lecture Arendt paraphrases Machiavelli again, saying, "[t]hose who do not love the world but love their own soul are bad for the world." With this criticism of anti-worldliness Arendt turns to her focus of discussing Machiavelli's question of immortality. To do this Arendt is concerned with The Prince not The Discourses. She separates these two texts in an addition to page twenty-five of her Lectures. In The Prince, Arendt suggests, Machiavelli was interested in founding a new realm where it is possible that an individual can shine and find greatness. However, in The Discourses, Machiavelli is concerned with a 'different state of affairs' because the foundation of

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76 Cicero, De Officiis, Book 1.4.14. Simon Critchley in The Dictionary of Continental Thought, p. 11 argues that in the Third Century there is a bridge between understanding (epistemology) and reason (ethics) and the mediator between nature and freedom.
77 In On Revolution Arendt rallies to him because he "was the first to visualise the rise of a purely secular realm whose laws and principles of action were independent of the teaching of the Church ...", p. 36.
the realm has already been laid and the ‘whole people’ maintain its greatness and participation ensures an individual’s fame. This, as Arendt puts it, ‘changes everything’.79 This is similar to the Ancients Greeks after Homer is ‘dispensed’ with and the institution participates in making athanatidzein possible.

Arendt describes the rise of the new man, though in Renaissance terms it is now the condottieri, or as she puts it referring to Machiavelli, one “who knows how to “base well” . . . and give the thing “greatness”: on the look out for “great men who redeem their countries.”80 This reflects the new man of the Roman tradition, or “Novus Homo” of Cato and Cicero. This is compared to the established nobility; the ‘Known man’ of the aristocracy.81 Continuing her examination of Machiavelli she states that this man “will be a Founder of something new and therefore concept of foundation; and he will liberate his country, therefore concept of Liberty.” And it is the actions of these new men who found a new organisation, body politic, must follow certain standards which are equally “new”; new morality, but not reason of state: Not the state, an institution, reason, but Men” and it is Men in the plural, and not man. In an addition, Arendt says that Machiavelli’s concern was not “to teach ‘how not to be good’” but rather to teach “for foundation and preservation.” But this does not mean, as Arendt stresses, that Machiavelli sought to teach his readers how to be bad. Arendt therefore summarises Machiavelli’s work as saying that the State is “the realm of politics, as the new public domain” and with this is the “rise of new men who are capable of founding.” With this Foundation virtu and fortuna [are] the chief forces involved” and “greatness [is] the ultimate criterion.” And to understand Machiavelli’s criterion in this respect, Arendt quotes the Discourses “unlike the arts which shine by their intrinsic merits, which time can neither add nor diminish . . . things as pertain to the actions and manners of me . . . (are such that) we do not possess such manifest evidence.”82 But virtu and Fortuna are not ends to themselves. They seek to achieve “Gloria” though not necessarily for the Prince or individual but rather for “whoever is involved in the business of the world.” Though this in itself does not achieve the eternal. Only when Gloria becomes Fame does it achieve this status. “Glory is the height of appearance and is possible only where others see and I am seen.”83 Or, as Arendt says in another addition, “[Machiavelli] sees greatness as something which is like beauty, showing itself,
exhausting its meaning when it has shown itself, therefore endowed with an inexhaustible meaning” and in Machiavelli’s eyes this is the reality of being. This appearing leads to earthly immortality, as “Action is what makes immortal.” This position of Machiavelli is anti-Platonic because Plato did not believe these had intrinsic merit, yet – as Arendt now points out – the Romans did. As Arendt puts it Cicero thought that, “the foundation and conservation of cities is where humans most attain to the ways of the gods.”

This is also Machiavelli’s understanding, greatness and action are in the image of foundation. At the top of her first page Arendt has added a phrase from Machiavelli’s work “Past: not simply enjoy but Imitation: regula generale: competition with the Ancients.” The act of foundation to be imitated but there still remains the question of actually what is to be imitated in this act of foundation? The new men are virtuous but what virtues are being described by this label and what is the Glory or greatness being sought? In Between Past and Future, Arendt presents us with an insight into her conception when she defines the outcome of Machiavelli’s virtù and fortuna: “the interplay between them [virtù and fortuna] indicates a harmony between man and world—playing with each other and succeeding together . . .”

Significantly, she then defines virtù, or “a specifically human quality”, as “the response, summoned up by man, to the world, or rather to the constellation of fortuna in which the world opens up, presents and offers itself to him, to his virtù.” Given that Arendt’s thinking is temporal in its nature, the broad notion of the past needs to be defined to understand her intention here, and this requires a return to Arendt’s understanding of history.

(iii) Immortality and the Community: Timelessness not Eternity

In the essay “What is History?” Arendt says that the element that makes the individual mortal is the fact that his or her life is not an eternal recurrence, rather it is rectilinear. In a world of Being, man is merely coming and going. What does interrupt the cyclical nature of the cosmos is the singular, the ‘single instances and single gestures’. Daily life, also characterised as cyclical or habitual, is interrupted by these occurrences and these instances become the material of history. The everydayness and frequency of the natural are also part of the political realm. Therefore they have been initiated by men and therefore were a beginning however, they became automatic; “[t]he truth is that automatism is inherent in all process, no matter what their origin may be—which is why no

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84 “Machiavelli Lectures”, (024022), p. 28.
85 She completes the sentence thus: “which is as remote from the wisdom of the statesman as from the excellence, moral or otherwise, of the individual, and the competence of experts.” In this passage, Arendt also reiterates her desire to read between the Platonic and the Christian traditions, Between Past and Future, p. 137.
86 In this case they are the historical rather than the cosmic. The political realm envisaged by Arendt: does not become the final revolutionary stage, rather it is in for the long haul through the history of mankind.
single act, and no single event, can ever, once and for all, deliver and save man, or a nation, or mankind.\textsuperscript{87} The assumption that everything made by a mortal was also mortal, was broken by the understanding that if a mortal imbued his or her work with something immortal then it would too become immortal. Therefore, “human capacity to achieve this was remembrance, Mnemosyne, who therefore was regarded as the mother of all the other muses.”\textsuperscript{88} In the Greek world, it was mortality that determined man’s misery. Hence, the interchangeability of ‘men’ (anthropoi) and mortals (Thnetoi). Therefore greatness was equated with immortality. The poets were charged with “preventing oblivion of what was worthy of eternal remembrance.”\textsuperscript{89} However, this was not a satisfactory situation because of its dependency on the poet for immortality. In a similar manner immortality is usually associated with the aesthetic realm of human existence and not the political, or the building of communities. The Greek thought however, as Arendt shows using Pericles, that the latter is a much more natural way of achieving fame. This was to the detriment of the poetical or Homeric storyteller as they became unnecessary through irrelevance. The remembrance through the word had been replaced with the space of the public-political. The individual, recounting the words and deeds was replaced by the political space for the achievement of immortality. In Arendt’s reading, the ‘polis’, in distinction to other forms of living together, is initiated by the “desire of men to secure for themselves a safe place of remembrance for everything great” and the desire to remove themselves from the control of the poets.\textsuperscript{90} The post-Socratic, anti-political version was the philosopher contemplating the eternal, rather than acting for it. Christianity followed this course. Christianity’s experience of the fall of Rome meant that the earthly was perishable. For Plato and Aristotle the search for immortality was in the consideration of things immortal, not with fame and its dependency on the human community; “they no longer trusted the political community to be equal to the task of remembering that which is great.”\textsuperscript{91} At this moment thought and action were separated in human existence. Repeating again Arendt’s treatment of this topic in The Human Condition, in this essay she states where permanence can be sought: “[o]nly through words can human action acquire its dignity” and “... meaningfulness of the whole human condition in its entirety and in all its aspects is guaranteed beyond doubt wherever it speaks and being heard by

\textsuperscript{87} Between Past and Future, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{88} “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern” in ibid., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{89} Philosophy and Politics, Section I, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{90} Later on, Arendt offers a few illustrations of what these other forms of associations such as kinship, jusfica or depotism, ibid., p. 10. These are interesting because they offer us an insight into the elements of conciliation that Arendt deemed important.
\textsuperscript{91} Between Past and Future, “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern”, p. 73.
others." Arendt formulates an understanding of immortality in this essay. Again, Arendt is concerned about the activity rather than the end its entails. The word is used by Aristotle and is regarded by Arendt as untranslatable. The point to this word as a description is that it emphasises the activity of "immortalizing" (as Arendt puts it). The note accompanying this paragraph best describes the type of endurance sought by the secular man as "to act in a certain way in order to assure the escape from dying." Aristotle is accredited with its ‘philosophical’ use; a use not repeated by the Romans and their understanding of eternal fame - aeternare. The stress, from Arendt’s perspective, is that, in terms of immortality, an activity but merely a belief is implied in this word. But Augustine does not follow the Christian tendency in this matter. The Christian element in Augustine’s thought was of course anti-political. The early Christian Fathers rejected the political and therefore its future conception of political freedom, yet Augustine was also a Roman, and as a Roman could only reflect the experiences of a Roman; “that freedom qua beginning became manifest in the act of foundation." The point of the secular was not a recontextualisation of ideas, rather a change in the political circumstances of human society. Individual immortality is argued to have returned to the consideration of man, either of the soul or the body. Christian immortality however, was not transformed into a secular one retaining the afterlife, instead it is a return to the Greek and Roman

92 The Human Condition, p. 199.
93 "Philosophy and Politics", Section I, pp. 9-10.
95 ibid., pp. 44-5. The result of this conception is that man-made things are more likely to be considered immortal, as part of nature though the source of material, they continue the characteristic of permanence. That which is not part of the natural cycle, words and deeds of man, becomes momentary, and then without trace - though only if ignored by the faculty of remembrance. In this process, the action and speech, the deed and word are made into the written word and therefore encounter permanence.
96 ibid., p. 167. Arendt says that historian now trace the lineage of the modern age back to the Middle Ages. In the process, however, they avoid a significant element in the rise of the secular age (‘and the concomitant eclipse of the transcendent world’). Were the aims and understanding of the new era simply continued without any consideration into the new location of the earth? These historian argue that “the gradual transformation of religious categories into secular concepts” and justify it because of the general abyss that the understanding of ideas resides, its divorce from ‘real experience’. In this state, anything can be justified through universal interrelationship of ideas in their pure existence, or ‘extreme subjectivity’. ibid., p. 69.
97 See "Philosophy and Politics", Section I, p. 16. Arendt says that the separation of the politics and the church, embodied in the Holy Roman Empire, removed the religious from the public realm (though not by making it merely private). Religious beliefs still remained and were part of the intellectual's understanding yet they saw no need to recourse to it for their understanding. Political ideology no longer played a part in the worldly affairs of men. The public realm and the meanings it contained were no longer under the jurisdiction of God.
understanding that sought immortality in the body politic. This central organisation of man in society is defined in distinction to outside and a life “without meaning and dignity.” These two elements were lacking because their words and deeds could leave no trace. Cicero, Arendt points out, argued that political communities were man’s way of enabling human virtue to mirror the gods.

The search for immortality therefore was sought in a different manner. In an echo of Arendt’s trinity in The Human Condition of promise-making, forgiveness, and most importantly trust, Jaspers in this sense describes immortality “as fidelity in action, as trustworthiness.” In other words, as Jaspers summarises it, immortality is now in the world; its achievement is a matter of the right frame of mind. Establishing this particular frame of mind becomes Arendt’s concern in her later work and the examination eventually leads to the question of the life of the mind. At this present juncture of her thoughts, however, this focus is on the suggestiveness of several themes she located in her examination of Augustine’s work and their reflection on her contemporary love-of-the-world. The conception of immortality and its association with the act of foundation can be found in Arendt’s use of time in her dissertational interpretation of Augustine’s thought. The achievement of security is the achievement of stability and therefore permanence. This can only be found in Augustine’s view through the attainment of eternity for the individual. This is also intimately connected to the role of desire in an individual’s life; “both caritas and cupiditas depend on man’s search for his own being as perpetual being, and each time this perpetual being is conceived as the encompassing of his concrete, temporal existence.” The fragility of man’s individual existence is negated by the achievement of ‘perpetual being’. This search for ‘timelessness’ as Arendt now conceives it leads Augustine into an exploration of the role of time. Because of the Present as a moment of Past and Future means that both cancel each other out; “[t]he presentation of past and future in which both coincide annihilates time and man’s subjection to it.” Yet, Augustine proceeds to comprehend the human existence

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99 Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, p. 138
100 Karl Jaspers provides an indication of Arendt’s thinking when he says that “...” Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 237. In this quote Jaspers’ distinguishes between eternity and immortality. Immortality is great deeds and words, or an attempt to transcend an impermanent world. The direction of seeking immortality is also about the direction of love; “this life—this is how the seeming paradox must be phrased—decides in time about what is in eternity. The decision, made on the strength of love and at the bidding of conscience, is the manifestation of what already exists in eternity. The presence of eternity equals immortality... Immortality is not an object of our knowledge; it is the spirit of love.” Philosophy and the World, p. 138
101 As was discussed in Chapter Two, with his focus on transience Augustine is conscious of man’s search for happiness. If desire is the permanent element in the human condition, then a satiation of desire and a removal of its inherent destabilising faculty would be the primary goal. This is achieved by reaching a position where what is desired cannot be taken away, thus removing all fear of dispossession. Subsequently, in terms of an individual’s life and his existence in the world, the goal of the individual in the Augustinian world is simply the achievement of ‘happiness’. The definition of this concept in Augustine’s eyes is equally as simple, it is the achievement of security or the negation of fear. It is also a reversal of isolation, an accomplishment of this alone is not enough.
102 Love and St. Augustine, p. 77.
103 ibid., p. 57.
from a futural perspective. The individual who stands in this moment of time has though a futural preference in the way they interpret this moment.103 Through Augustine, Arendt analyses time in terms of the individual and their desires, seeking to display the tension that Augustine allowed to exist in this individual.104 The fusion of traditions in Augustine’s work places a continuing tension on his understanding as he seeks a Christian understanding within the framework of the Athenian intellectual heritage. Arendt treats Augustine’s Christian ‘anticipated future’ first and then focuses on his Athenian conception of the past.

The emergence of the Church as the political institution on earth is at odds with its anti-political stance when it was under the control of Rome. It could do this through Augustine who, Arendt asserts, is the spiritual author if not the designer of our present concept of history. As part of the Roman tradition, Augustine conceived the Civitas Dei, a Roman city where the dweller seeks immortality, by combining it the Christian afterlife.105 Augustine’s aptitude is aided by the Latin language. According to Augustine, “to live” concurs with inter homines esse, or “to be in the company of others.” The Roman could therefore never leave the company of men and the city even in death. With the removal of the religious in the modern age, what became of the immortal? The return to humanism involved in the secularisation of the world, did not in turn realise a return to the Greeks or the Romans behaviour regarding immortality. This was because the world of the Greek’s and Roman’s was imperishable or eternal. This was no longer part of the seventeenth century man’s beliefs: “Now both life and world had become perishable, mortal, and futile.”106 Absolute mortality only becomes part of man’s existence after several centuries of turbulent thought had passed. The potential immortality of mankind become evident when the secular searches for the ‘enduring permanence’. Arendt returns to her studies of Augustine and sees time in its ‘twofold infinity’, or as past possibility.107 In this essay Arendt argues that this allows an immortality, similar to the Greeks and the Romans, in that they disclose greatness and permanence and mentions the present in the form of how the twofold infinity establishes a ‘time-space’. This introduces an overlooked aspect to

103 And it is this futural tendency in Augustine’s thought that negates both self-love and neighbourly love in distinction to the love of God. ibid., pp. 45-6.
104 Throughout Arendt’s treatment of Augustine is her concern for his conception of time. It is a conception that seeks to mediate between the Athenian tradition of thought and the Hebraic. The development of Augustine’s thought from desire to memory to the mind again returns to desire when the demands of the individual described in Augustine’s thought is reconsidered. Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s treatment of love in his work leads to several conclusions, but the main focus point in Arendt’s examination is the concept of time at work and how it guides Augustine’s assumptions.
105 ibid. p. 74. Note the difference in definitions at work here. This refers of course to the modern age, not our modern world. We are part of the Modern World, while the Modern Age stretches back even further.
106 ibid. p. 73.
Arendt theory: the space of appearance is not necessarily, and therefore not restricted to, a physical dimension. It is rather temporal in its nature.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{108} ibid. In this brief discussion, Arendt comments on the disadvantages of this two-fold infinity in comparison to the ancient conception - permanence has become a perpetual motion, a 'flowing process' and not a 'stable structure'. Also while the ancient conception found its place in cities, states and nations, the contemporary version encompasses the world and mankind becomes distinct from nature or species of speech or reason (to mention Aristotle and the medieval philosopher's definition of man).
2. *The Roman Trinity: The Meaning of Authority, Tradition and Religion*

In *Between Past and Future*, Arendt reveals glimpses of the framework she is using in her thought and the new trinity that she considers to be the most important one in comparison to the Roman Trinity: the trinity of authority, tradition, and religion. This trinity is being translated into a contemporary trinity revitalised for the new political Arendt is still conscious of in her works. Religion becomes the central concern for her Augustinian thinking. Foundation provides Arendt with this element of her trinity as she seeks the bond conceived as *social caritas* in the dissertation and now trust. This foundation defines the community in Adam but there is still the question of how it perpetuates itself in the world that is the Augustinian desert. This is determined by Arendt as the foundation as source and its temporal relationship to the community. This is equally reflected in her concept of natality. This understanding of beginning provides Arendt within her established temporal framework of past possibility with a reference point for the individual-in-the-world.

It is in the essays of *Between Past and Future* that Arendt develops her framework from the broad concept of natality discussed in *The Human Condition* to cover its significance, the description of her space of appearance, and the search for eternity in the new age. Consequently, her exploration of memory and immortality now turns to the roles of initiation, then imitation through inspiration. When Arendt talks about a 'new indifference' in history, she does not explore it, but instead argues that our present concept of history as she has described it evolves out of the context of the immediate post-religious age: or the period when the assurance of the afterlife and its gift of immortality had been removed from the minds of men, yet the belief in its relevance was still to be cleared. Arendt clearly states here that our prevailing concept of history is no longer relevant or applicable to the age in which we live. She herself is proposing a new concept of history.\(^{109}\) As discussed, the argument sustaining Arendt through this course of the essay is that this historical, automatic process that captures each generation needs to be disrupted to stall the decline of societies. In suggesting this, Arendt is advocating an escape from a particular type of history but not an escape from tradition. The key to this is the notion of authority.

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\(^{109}\) *Between Past and Future*, p. 75.
Arendt while criticising the attitudes of modern intellectualism does not return to those of the pre-modern traditions. ¹¹° In fact Arendt goes further and says that the tradition does not aid in the search for an understanding of freedom. The two traditions she has in mind are those that generated the first mention of freedom or free will, the philosophies of late antiquity, and the Christian and modern one.¹¹¹ Both argue that one must leave the world in order to find freedom; that is, the inner dialogues of thought or the inner conflict of a Christian or Kantian notion.¹¹² Simply put, the traditions of classical and Christian do not adequately conceive of freedom.¹¹³ Nonetheless, while the experiences of freedom have been lost by these two traditions they have been retained in “non-philosophical literature, from poetic, dramatic, historical, and political writings” because they have not used the same conceptual framework. Strangely, Arendt does not think it would be worthwhile to attempt to distil a language from these writings. Instead, Arendt gains her insight from the etymological significance of the Greek and Latin verbs equal to the modern verb “to act”. These definitions are to begin, to lead, and to rule, as well as to carry something through. In Latin they are agere, to set something in motion, and gerere defined by Arendt as “the enduring and supporting continuation of past acts whose results are the res gestae, the deeds and events we call historical.”¹¹⁴ This is action as initiation. The significance of the approach by Arendt is to highlight the actual experiences of being free. Arendt describes both the Greek and Roman experiences that are conveyed in these Greek and Latin verbs. The Latin verb also illustrates the element of foundation in the city of Rome leading to a history that sought to “augment” this foundation and the responsibilities it engendered.¹¹⁵ The affirmation of beginning is in the birth of each individual in the world and is the beginning of an individual’s life that will cease with death. Even more significantly, she suggests, the beginning of their story that will not cease, but instead continue after death. As Arendt summarises it, to be human:

¹¹⁰ ibid., pp. 156-7.
¹¹¹ The concept of freedom accepted today was introduced by Paul and St. Augustine allowing a philosophically styled freedom to become current and replace the rejected concept of political freedom. ibid., p. 158.
¹¹² Arendt is rejecting the intimate relationship of free will and freedom, It was here that the struggle was waged and Arendt illustrates this with Augustine talking about “the “inner dwelling” of the soul” and “the dark “chamber of the heart.” ibid. Arendt is filling out the descriptions of Augustine from Confessions (Book 8, Chapter 5).
¹¹³ Arendt, a Jew, was very impressed by the life of Jesus of Nazareth, To the extent that in “What is Freedom?” she says that his deeds need greater appreciation of their philosophical implications. The understanding of freedom in parts of the New Testament are seen as containing powerful statements for the individual and that they are driven not by the will, but by faith. Arendt does not equate Jesus of Nazareth with Socrates, though the thematic development of the essay could be used to support this argument.
¹¹⁵ These languages lead to Augustine who introduced via St. Paul the tradition of liberum arbitrium. Yet Arendt finds in Augustine’s the City of God, another unphilosophical notion of freedom. This notion is founded in the Roman experience, or Augustine’s ‘Roman Mind’. Thus, it is not the inner freedom of future philosopher rather freedom in the world.
and to be free are the same: "[w]hat usually remains intact in the epochs of petrification and foreordained doom is the faculty of freedom itself, the sheer capacity to begin, which animates and inspires all human activities and is the hidden source of production of all great and beautiful things." In other words, it is a source of imitation. Freedom here relates to the capacity to begin and especially to initiate. Arendt’s reading of this association is initially obscure unless her framework in considered. This notion of freedom can be better described as inspiration that Arendt recognised in the dissertation as the right order of love. An action is right when it is the proper imitation of the principle inherent in foundation.

During her treatment of history in “What is History?”, Arendt explicitly returns to the role of Augustine in her consideration. Arendt suggests that the modern concept of progress has a religious and specifically Christian origin. The ‘secularization of originally theological categories’ has produced a new understanding of the world. But for Arendt it is a meaningless world, with only the potential for questionable meaningfulness at most. The search is for a common language that describes terms with a common validity. The source of this, the first philosophy of history, is Augustine in De Civitate Dei. Arendt concurs with this suggestion to the extent that in Augustine there is a notion that history generates meaning of single historical events. Yet this is not necessarily as evident as is suggested. The argument has at its foundation the cyclical history-speculations of late antiquity, rather than the classical history-concepts of Greece and Rome. A closer reading of Augustine reveals that he was more concerned with the time theories of his own era in their cyclical guise. To entertain the message of Christ’s crucifixion, time must have started anew and remained

116 Between Past and Future, p. 167 and quote from p. 169. Or as Arendt says, “Freedom is a ‘mode of being’”. Arendt is definitely finding the answer to Heidegger’s anticipated future in this commitment. The Christian elements in Augustine’s thought were of course anti-political. The early Christian Fathers rejected the political and therefore its future conception of political freedom, yet Augustine was also a Roman, and as a Roman could only reflect the experiences of a Roman; “that freedom qua beginning became manifest in the act of foundation.”

117 It is on the last third of the eighteenth century, in Hegel’s philosophy, did this notion of history become evident. Hegel is history, placed in opposition to all previous metaphysics that had sought answers outside of human affairs. With no permanence Plato could not look for truth. History by the nineteenth century because the sole location for truth, and books were regarded as containing this truth.

118 Arendt tackles the ‘liberal writers’ who have not stopped to understand the implications of definitions regarding tyranny, authoritarianism, dictatorship and totalitarianism. The role of authority is each of these is very different and has implications for the concept of freedom. The main idea is the notion that they are simply differences in degree.

119 Arendt suggests that, not Herodotus, not Homer, but Ulysses began history when, in his court, he listened to a recounting of his deeds. Words were the ‘imitation of action’. The paradox illustrated here, for Arendt, is the fact that the Greek, amongst nature and hence immortality, measured human greatness in terms of action rather than fabrication, or even words and deeds. Between Past and Future, pp. 47-56. Yet, action was considered the ‘most subtle’ of human endeavours, while greatness was measured in its permanence. The Poets were the first to offer a solution by casting speech and action in words and deeds and making them permanent beyond the life of the agent. This lasted though only until Parmenides, and especially Socrates and Plato. The result was a Platonic teachings that regarded immortality through the eyes of nature replacing the achievement of immortality through fame with procreation. Plato and Aristotle sought to deny man the ability to immortalise themselves and therefore evaluate themselves to the level of the cosmos (well, almost). History and nature were considered by the poets and storytellers to be of similar character.

120 See the chapter on Augustine in John F. Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948) and also Gerard J. P. O’Daly, “Augustine on the Measurement of Time: Some Comparisons with Aristotelian and
on a rectilinear course.\textsuperscript{121} But Augustine only claimed such a significance for this single event, not in the manner of modern commentators for all events. History as a problem emerged in Augustine's thought because of the fall of Rome and not the birth of Christ.

Arendt says that determining the modern concept of history as finding its source in Augustine should make one doubt its Christian source. In these terms, Arendt is saying that Augustine was not a Christian philosopher.\textsuperscript{122} Augustine ignored earthly history, refusing to believe that the fall of Rome was significant - simply because it occurred on earth.\textsuperscript{123} The Romans had a similar attitude, though its import is reversed.\textsuperscript{124} History was regarded as the storehouse of examples. Both believed that events were there simply for the acknowledgment that they would be imitated again and again carrying little significance in terms of the world. The Greeks, however, did not follow this understanding, seeing a heroic deed as a potential for imitation not as a standard, but rather as the measure of your greatness.\textsuperscript{125} The two kinds of imitation are at work here: "[t]his relatedness of human existence is actualised in imitation. To imitate, as well as to refer back to one's origin, is a general characteristic of human existence before it becomes a consciously adopted way of life."\textsuperscript{126} In the dissertation, Arendt says that "it is true that imitation as a basic ontological structure governed the entire context of life, regardless of whether it was correct or perverse imitation."\textsuperscript{127} But is the individual determined by this basic ontological structure? Arendt is sensitive to this concern, saying that imitation leaves each and every act separate from the 'human will that performs it'. Nonetheless, man's actions become a function of this imitation even though these actions are not done so with any particular knowledge of this. Instead, Arendt believes, as an ontological structure, it occurs independent of man and even while this imitation operates it leaves man with his inherent freedom.

Imitation in this sense has two meanings according to Arendt. The first meaning of imitation is defined by what happens when the individuality is removed by seeking 'out of this world' and second comes from her mentioning of boasting and the imitation that this can inspire. The concern for

\textsuperscript{122} Between Past and Future, pp. 65-6.
\textsuperscript{123} ibid., p. 66.
\textsuperscript{124} Christianity, Arendt believes, could only conceive of outer-earthly immortality, and not this earthly immortality of mankind.
\textsuperscript{125} To the modern mind, history tells an ongoing story to us and repetitions cannot occur, just as it has no end or beginning. Instead they reach back and forward into time without ceasing. The infinite is evident in this understanding. The birth of Christ as a measuring gauge is not Christian but now a secular justification for the infinite.\textsuperscript{126} Between Past and Future, p. 68. In this is the removal of 'eschatological expectations'. Mankind has become immortal on earth.
\textsuperscript{127} The moral import is not evident in the Greek conception as in the Roman and Christian, instead a drive to accomplish the best. This is the 'Greek agonal spirit'.
\textsuperscript{128} Love and St. Augustine, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{129} ibid., p. 79.
Arendt seems to be that ‘imitation’ means ‘habit’, or at least copying those around in order to survive, is part of human existence.\textsuperscript{128} However, this only works if imitation is not a premeditated act shown when the individual does not judge his actions in this light as right and wrong from the source. In other words, man can still be free if he does not dictate his actions by that of imitation. If an individual does not decide to imitate (or decides to “leave imitation objective”) and therefore does not make a decision to seek something external to him, he does not have dependence on something else.\textsuperscript{129} It is this second definition of imitation that she derives from Augustine’s thought which becomes Arendt’s fundamental understanding of ‘being-of-the-world.’ In other words, man is created and his being is only a source. His ‘concrete existence’ is controlled by temporality and this temporality prevents an individual from conceiving himself or herself as a whole.\textsuperscript{130} In Augustine’s interpretation man seeks this equality through imitation and in the process denies the legitimacy of the self-in-the-world. The desire to be like God is a rejection of the earthly self.\textsuperscript{131} But man is not a true creator, his role of creator is limited. He “cannot call himself into existence and cannot make anything out of nothing: in other words, he lacks true creative power, which is at the same time pure being.” The consequence to this limited power or potentiality is that he has limited material to work with; he is “of the world” and “make[s] himself a lover of the world by turning it into “his own country” (patria) and denying that it is a desert.” This is a desert because of the ‘thirst’ that one reckons with in the world. Thirst for what though? With these desires “he has perverted the original

\textsuperscript{128} Arendt clearly sees The Confessions as a catalogue of the problem of habits from Augustine’s experience in the world.

\textsuperscript{129} Arendt finishes this paragraph by saying that “[i]t is only when imitation is taken up explicitly that the demand of “being as God” appears.” \textit{Ibid.} Arendt says that the “eternal limit to this assimilation process of equality,” God is out of the world and though man aspires to this level he is always of this world and it is this that will always separate him from God and therefore pure Being: “[t]his is why man can never have himself as a whole (totum)” because “”[i]f he had himself as a whole, he would have his being, as the concept is here understood.” \textit{Ibid.,} p. 80.

\textsuperscript{130} While equality is the ideal it can not ever be realised - what is available as an option though is the search for resemblance. Arendt says again that man ‘createdness’ is the reason difference can occur because is distinction to God - without creation - whose “Supreme Being, as Being pure and simple, which makes all individual distinctions vanish because they pertain to createdness.” \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{131} Yet the desire for imitation means that man sets himself up as the opposite of God who he can never become. Arendt says that this is different and more radical than the attempt than the articulation of the connection between Creator (as Being) and creature; “where the world and man constituted an eternal imitation of the divine.” And “it is only; here, in his chosen love of the Creator, that the creature sees his limitations and his utter inadequacy of the demand that lies in being created by God, which also must mean “to God” as well.” \textit{Ibid.} So the relation to God in this way means and its too high demands on an individual means that man is dependent on God and “finds concrete expression in the law ad the impossibility of compliance (imperful).” What is this law? Well it pushes man to do what he ordinarily would not do and that is seek his own being (“advance to his own being”) and acknowledge his own “createdness.” This means realising that one does not simply exist but rather was created and that this means a certain fragility that has to be come to terms with the law ‘concrete’ demand is simply “Thou shalt not covet.” This expresses the understanding that “[c]ovetousness is the turn to the wrong “before”.” Again Arendt expresses the understanding that man is born into a world that already exist and when he leaves it remains “intact.” When man exists he loves the world, desires it, for “its own sake” and consequently loves the world which is the creation rather than the Creator. This focus on the world means that he forgets the Creator, or the “absolute priority of God.” Arendt goes on to say that “[i]n this process man sees that his own existence—death-determined, and thus obviously powerless over its own being—points backwards,” \textit{Ibid.,} p. 81. Yet, “he does not see that all creation...points backwards even when it is not mortal and transient.”
point of his createdness, which was precisely to show him the way beyond the world and to his proper source."

Habit is the cause of this mistaken path according to Augustine and it is habit that allows sin to take control of life. The world is constructed by those who perceive it to be theirs. Habit is part of the world (as it was created) and is part of man’s “second nature” and it is up to man to turn this “temptation” and escape its grasp. Everything had a beginning and therefore was not always there and therefore can be mutable as it has become what it is. For Augustine imitation is not the same as Becoming - imitation is something particular to man. Habit ‘opposes’ the two time frames of past and future because it sends man on a search for the wrong “before” and then to possess it; “Habit is the eternal yesterday and has no future” and “its tomorrow is identical with today.” What underpins this “levelling of temporal, transient existence” death in the future. Death is the final moment when the individual realises the limitation of “life’s power over itself”. This is when man turns to habit as habit is his only choice. There is a danger with its dependence on the past, and habit “shrouds” this: “[h]abit shrouds the dangers that this past turn to the world necessarily involves, since it contravenes the meaning of the creature as such. Death is a peril only where man’s dependence on his source has not been uncovered. To understand the dependence is the function of death.” Habit’s influence results in a construction of the wrong eternity as it seeks something imperishable out of life; “the inclination to sin springs more from habit than from passion itself.” The banality of habit is important here, especially against passion, as habit leads man into completely the wrong path: “[t]he creature, in search for its own being, seeks security for its existence, and habit, by covering the utmost limit of existence itself and making today and tomorrow the same as yesterday, makes it cling to the wrong past and thus gives it the wrong security.”

The lessons that Arendt learnt from Augustine’s reasoning on this subject are best illustrated by her reaction to later French existential thought. In an essay titled “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought” and delivered to the American Political Science Association in 1954, Arendt considers the activities - both intellectual and political - of contemporary Europeans philosophers. In particular, Arendt discusses the French Existentialism of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty,

132 ibid., p. 82.
133 Habit, through covetousness, asks man to believe that man is “of the world” and that this is his true source - man becomes the servant of “things made.” Death is important here as with this turn to man’s source as the world, it become an “indication of transience.”
134 His concern is the question of perversity, or to raise one’s self up and be where god is, that is ‘above all’. Though Plotinus is similar in thinking on evil to Augustine - just as is Plotinus’s notion of the well ordered universe.
135 ibid., p. 83.
Camus and Malraux. She asks that their dedication to the rejection of academic philosophy and the life of contemplation be acknowledged though she also directs concern at the result of their understanding. Their common approach is “that human existence as such is “absurd” because it presents insoluble questions to a being endowed with reason”. This is not Arendt’s position “that the present world has reached a crisis and is ‘out of joint’”, reflected in the Catholic interpretations of Gilson and Guardini. The result is an understanding where “[h]uman freedom means that man creates himself in an ocean of chaotic possibilities.” While Arendt is happy to acknowledge this, their solution does not give rise to a political philosophy. The expectation that this could ‘give rise to political principles’ or even ‘give direction to political choice’ is denied by them. In Arendt’s eyes, this leaves the only option available to them and it is an option they take up, seeking in response a complete transformation of the original world – the one fraught with meaninglessness. However, as Arendt points out, this can only occur by simply denying the original world - something she is opposed to in her own understanding. The common result is ‘activist or radical humanism’ and therefore an adherence to the belief that Man is his own God. And further to this is a desire to defy and therefore reject the human condition. In this picture “human nature, conceived as that of the animal rationale, to develop to the point where it builds a reality, creates conditions of its own.” The absurdity of human life is thus overcome, by an escape to a new reality of human artifice. Arendt argues, therefore, that you cannot build a world to encompass Man in an attempt to yet again change human nature to suit human existence. This is an attempt to deny the human condition that remains the same regardless of the circumstance man puts himself within. These criticisms of the French existential position and their origin in Augustine’s specifically Christian thought describes Arendt’s own emerging solution to a situation discussed before the Second World War. Arendt’s solution as stated in 1954 appears spatial in its dimensions suggesting that her ‘space of appearance’ should be seen as the correct approach to the problems she has outlined. She says in reply that all man can build is that which occupies the space between men, not anything from the material environment, and this

137 ibid, p. 439.
138 Ibid, p. 440. “He will defy God or the gods by living as though the limitations of his condition did not exist, even though he as an individual may never hope to escape them. Man can create himself and become his own God if he decides to live as though he were a god. From the paradox that man, though he did not make himself, is held responsible for what he is, Sartre concludes that he therefore must be held to be his own Maker.”
is dependent upon the ability of man to recognise his own ability and position in the world. These abilities refer to his condition as **homo temporalis**.\(^{139}\)

The important element of an **ethic of inspiration** that both Arendt’s and Augustine’s thoughts correspond to is love for its own sake. The significant aspect of this inspiration is that it does not lead to possessiveness. It therefore can be shared by all without being lost. As Arendt’s thought develops the love of **social caritas** turns to a new form in the political arena becoming almost the spirit of the eternal just as Augustine’s love became the Spirit of the Trinity.\(^{140}\) The Augustinian love of spiritual Beauty is translated by Arendt into the principle of foundation which also retains its association with order: “**ordinate in me caritatem**”.\(^{141}\) Captured in Heidegger’s notion of preaching, or the Christian “bringing of the message” which becomes Arendt’s idea of storytelling, is this idea of the aural.\(^{142}\) For Arendt, this is also an aspect of action articulated in Aristotle’s concept of **energeia**, or ‘full actuality’ and which becomes the ‘who’ of the actor.\(^{143}\) This disclosure of the actor is actually an illumination of the principle. In *The Human Condition*, Arendt says that “[g]reatness or the specific meaning of each deed, can only lie in the performance itself and neither in its motivation nor its achievement.”\(^{144}\) In stating this Arendt links greatness to the ‘principle’ with which she was seeking to use to guide action. This is a particular trait of the Augustinian concept of love that remains with Arendt as an undercurrent to her thinking later in her life. This premise yields a framework of good judgement that eventually sees Arendt turn to Kant’s aesthetics in his *Third Critique*. Augustine provides an indication of the forces involved in this process when he equates love with weight, inferring responsibility if not an obligation; a “material body is borne along by its weight in a particular direction, just as a soul is by its love.”\(^{145}\) This love leads to a delight, or a sense of well-being, not one of use or enjoyment.

It is with this perspective in mind that Arendt discusses the importance of imitation and its actualisation, or potential actualisation, through the Arendtian love designed in the dissertation. Free will is important, for free will implicitly also wills man towards his true source; a source that is at the

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\(^{139}\) In a further indication of Arendt’s belief in the condition of **homo temporalis**, she equates ‘the utmost limit of existence’ with the ‘utmost limit of the past and the future’. An individual conceiving themselves as a whole emerges as a significant goal in Arendt’s thinking. She has already sought to articulate this in *The Human Condition* by using trust, forgiveness and promise making. This is the only manner in which time can be restrained in the control of one’s life.

\(^{140}\) This is evident in *De Quantitate Animae*, 34.77 as Du Roy suggests in *L’intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin*, (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1966), p. 261.

\(^{141}\) Song of Songs, 2.4.

\(^{142}\) See the discussion in Chapter Three.

\(^{143}\) *The Human Condition*, n. 57, p. 206.

\(^{144}\) Ibid., p. 206.

\(^{145}\) *The City of God*, 11.28.
limit of past and future; “For him past and future coincide in reference to eternity.”146 In the last sections of the dissertation, Arendt develops further her understanding of free will and the involvement of habit.147 This discussion leads into a treatment of the notion of conscience. In the last sections of this chapter, Arendt notes that there are two ‘free’ wills - one from nature (properly called inclination) and one from love. The latter is considered to be stronger.148 The source the individual is shown as the utmost limit of its own past and chooses the wrong ‘before’, wrong because “it is not the “whence” of its existence”.149 The problem of this understanding becomes manifest when the notion of ‘return’ is considered. If man is part of the whole and is ordered by this eternal whole, a whole that is no longer connected to the Creator then the part or individual cannot refer back to his origin. Arendt further discusses the relationship of the whole, universe, origin and like; “[l]he universal order is as it is throughout eternity, and so is that which it orders, even though individual entities may come and go, grow and perish in their singularity.”150

For Augustine, the imitation provides the route of dependence on the creator for the product, while in Plato imitation puts dependence beyond the product and the maker (potentially Augustine's Creator).151 Augustine was aware of what was going on because he thought that Becoming can never be as eternal as it was for Plato: just as time was brought into being and will end, for Plato it is everlasting as is the motion of the heavenly bodies.152 Becoming becomes important as “[e]verything that is created exists in the mode of becoming.” The word fieri (to become) is important because it is the passive form of ‘to make’ (facere) and ‘to make’ and ‘to become’ are, as far as Arendt is concerned, the same thing for Augustine. With this in mind, therefore, the Creator is the unchanging one. If God

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146 Love and St. Augustine, p. 52. But as Arendt points out, Augustine distinguishes between beginning of the world and of time, the beginning of time Augustine calls the ‘principium’ and time itself or ‘intitium’ was created with the existence of the world and notably with the existence of change and motion, (p. 55) In this manner man was created to remember his beginning.

147 It should also be noted that passion is mentioned in terms of life. ibid., p. 83.

148 ibid., pp. 91-2.

149 Arendt continues, saying “[i]t is precisely by clinging always to the past that habit demonstrates the original sinfulness of man’s own will, since this will alone established habit as a haven where death would not remind him of the dependence of created human life.” ibid.

150 ibid., p. 62.

151 The whole becomes very important and this envelopes the individual. All this is Platonic in origin. Plato acknowledged that the universe's beginnings were a question however, her believed that an answer was too difficult and that if achieved that it would be of no use. The world or model even that was supposed to be of interest and Plato believe that it is open to an individual's comprehension through 'rational discourse' and that is always the same. So Arendt argues, there are three factors at work in Plato's understanding - simply, maker, model, and the product. The model has no beginning, is everlasting and without change. Nonetheless: the product does have a beginning, though is everlasting but only in its imitation of the model, and therefore it is 'semipermanent Becoming'.

152 Arendt goes onto Aristotle's understanding of Platonic philosophy - and in Aristotle, the cosmos of Plato has lost its beginning. See On the Heaven II, 238b 26-31. The cosmos now becomes that which holds together all the variants of the universe - again the whole is prior to the parts. The motion is circular and therefore without beginning or end. Eternity is therefore not from an imitation of something beyond it rather it is inherent within it. Aristotle goes on to say that the order of the cosmos must have existed before ever: the chaos that existed became ordered; or, in other words, the beginning of the cosmos is incomprehensible. This leads us to Augustine's Plotinus (the Greek thinker who influences Augustine the most). He thinks that the cosmos is everlasting, for without a beginning there can be no end and therefore confidence is struck. This isfatalism. But as Plotinus is concerned - unlike his predecessors - in the fate of man - and he raises the question of evil - the same as Augustine - but Augustine does depart from Plotinus when imitation is considered.
is not in becoming there is no indication that there is anything before him. Things come into existence and this is the first change. Then things always change and alter because they are thought between Being and non-Being, or they are simply in-between. Arendt is saying that man is not simply being but rather being in relation to Being as Being is "the very antithesis of [man's] own mode of existence."\(^{153}\) But this opposition is constructive as in it the individual finds their own being, in that in amongst his changeable existence there is the true existence. Just as tables, following Arendt's thoughts, have their own true being or idea, "human life exists in relatedness to Being." However, human life can never become 'true Being' (Arendt also says "the highest good") or immutable even 'self-sufficient' and yet it can never become nothingness. As Arendt stresses, it is not 'nothing' because it exists in relation to its origin. The 'hallmark' of human life is that it can consciously accept their reference point and maintain it in love (caritas). It is indifferent to human conduct in that it does not matter what humans do in the context of caritas or cupiditas.\(^{154}\) By this extenuating reading Arendt believes she sidesteps the implicit Platonism in Augustine. The past as origin through beginning or natality provides Arendt with her alternative source of authority in the moment and imitation its relationship to the future.

The Human Condition, building upon Arendt's work in The Origins of Totalitarianism, is provided with a companion in the collection of essays published in Between Past and Future. But Between Past and Future is also an indication of her directions for The Life of the Mind. In Between Past and Future many of the questions raised in The Human Condition are given a clearer context, though the answers continue to be simply a tentative possibility. Each of the essays in Between Past and Future explore themes that reach back to Augustine and, implicitly, her treatment of his thought in the dissertation. The concepts of remembrance, immortality and imitation are again raised, as are the concern for the singular and the moment of the beginning. It is suggestive that her revisions of the dissertation are contemporaneous with the genesis of these essays and they can be read critically side by side. Regardless, by isolating three individual concepts and attempting to understand their present meaning, Arendt continues her reading of the history of ideas initiated in the dissertation. In the process of this reading she assesses modernity's notion of authority and freedom and its role for history.

\(^{153}\) Love and St. Augustine, p. 53.

\(^{154}\) "Even wickedness could not exist without being related to the Supreme Being and imitating it." ibid., p. 53.
Arendt turns to the Roman understanding of the concept of authority emphasising what concerns her: "[t]he Roman understanding of political authority, where the source of authority lay exclusively in the past, in the foundation of Rome and the greatness of ancestors, leads into institutional structures whose shape requires a different kind of image."\textsuperscript{155} Arendt compares these political possibilities in terms of a pyramid. Each one locates the authority of the system in a different palace. Christianity is top with authority leading downwards, the Roman bottom, or beginning, leading upwards, the tyrannical pyramid however, has the middle layers removed. There are the rulers, and then the masses. Arendt now compares the totalitarian regime that is seen as an onion. In other words, each layer is another layer of dominion and another layer of authority. The difference is that people can move between these layers depending upon their belief, or perceived belief, in the system. This belief is gauged by the ability to maintain the lie, and subsequently reject reality. The liberals see freedom as receding, while conservatives see authority as receding but both see the oncoming of totalitarianism. Both see things in terms of streams or processes due to the birth of their thinking in the nineteenth century. Both assume that history can be changed while the end of their actions (or non-actions) is predictable.\textsuperscript{156}

She returns to the definition of authority, saying that people assume a similar argument in this regard too. If violence does the same as authority, then violence might as well be authority. This can only happen if you define authority in terms of order or obedience. Again, Arendt returns to a consideration of the Roman meaning, stating that authority is Roman in origin. As a concept, Arendt says, it does not exist in the Greek vocabulary. In Greek times of Plato and Aristotle, they used two kinds of rule that were evident in the public and the private realm. The first is based on violence, while the second was drawn from the Greek household and family life but it was still despotic by nature.\textsuperscript{157} In general, the point is that Plato and Aristotle saw authority in terms of ruled and ruler. The Roman trinity of authority, religion and tradition seems to be argued to be a necessity. Luther was wrong because he thought you could remove the authority of the church and leave religion and tradition intact. Hobbes was wrong because he thought you could remove tradition and the Humanists, because they believe you could remove both religion and authority and retain tradition.\textsuperscript{158} Arendt seeks to retain the trinity, hence her discussion on the consequences if it is

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Between Past and Future}, pp. 98-9. Arendt says that she will fill this statement in on p. 124 where she talks about the amalgamation of Roman political institutions with Greek philosophic ideas.

\textsuperscript{156} Arendt now turns to functionalism and she discusses hammer (again). Religion is replaced by communism and it serves the same purpose.

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Between Past and Future}, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{ibid.}, p. 128.
dismantled, and she does this by replacing religion with a concept that started out as love in her dissertation. The translation of this understanding into the political realm as trust based on mutual dependence undergoes another transformation as Arendt secures the inbetween world through the bond inherent in the source as foundation. Authority in the trinity is still, however, a concern.

In her essay “What is Authority?” Arendt returns to her particular view of modernity and the modern age. The modern age is determined by Arendt to have lost the presence of authority in the world; the “constant, ever-widening and deepening crisis of authority has accompanied the development of the modern world in our century.”\textsuperscript{159} The crisis is a political crisis, and can be seen in the processes of child-rearing and education. Arendt looks for authority not in the definition of authority, but rather a particular form of authority - the authority of tradition.\textsuperscript{160} Arendt distinguishes between past and tradition and defines her understanding of history. In the process Arendt also highlights how her reading considers a paradox of tradition: “[w]ith the loss of tradition we have lost the thread which safely guided us through the vast realms of the past, but this thread was also the chain fettering each successive generation to a predetermined aspect of the past.” Arendt chides those who react against progress with a simple regression to the past. Nonetheless, there is a need to re-balance the common perspective in the prevailing thought of the age and that of the individual between past and future. This thought has led to the past also becoming a problem because

we are in danger of forgetting, and such an oblivion—quite apart from the contents themselves that could be lost—would mean that, humanly speaking, we would deprive ourselves of one dimension, the dimension of depth in human existence. For memory and depth are the same, or rather, depth cannot be reached by man except through remembrance.\textsuperscript{161}

This is because “permanence remains bound to memory”.\textsuperscript{162} Authority rests on the past and provides an unshakeable foundation for the present, or a permanence in the moment between past and future. Consequently its loss to an age is devastating: “[i]ts loss is tantamount to the loss of the groundwork of the world, which indeed since then has begun to shift, to change and transform itself with ever-increasing rapidity from one shape to another, as though we were living and struggling in a Protean universe . . . .” Consequently, Arendt defines the loss of worldly permanence and reliability with the loss of authority. In the next sentence however, Arendt qualifies the significance of this loss,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{159} See Secrecy, Past and Future, p. 94.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. 91.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p. 94.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{162} “The Problem of Action and Thought”, p. 15b. Arendt again links this to Nietzsche’s assertion of stability through promises.}
\end{footnotes}
saying that it “does not entail, at least not necessarily, the loss of the human capacity for building, preserving, and caring for the world that can survive us and remain a place fit to live in for those who come after us.” Arendt evidently sees a particular element to authority - but is not dependent on it - which can allow the future to continue to be built. This element is remembrance, or memory, a capacity closely associated with history. The temporal understanding reflected in this is that of past possibility and a solution to the paradox of tradition and its authority.

With this in mind it is interesting to note that there is still the association of memory and remembrance in Arendt’s thought at this stage. The past is memory, which seems to be remembrance, but as Arendt explores this dimension of the political world as she turns to consider the philosophic dimension of her understanding, she begins to differentiate between the two. Memory as recollection is rejected. Instead, she turns to remembrance as inspiration as a source of principles in action, or the possibility element in her temporal dimension. The indication that the mind is important to understanding Arendt’s political thoughts can be summarised by a passage in her dissertation. When talking about the dependence of the creature on the Creator she provides an insight into her non-theological understanding of foundation. In the context of discussing happiness that is determined by God she says that,

> since the concept of happiness is present in us through a consciousness that is equated with memory (that is, since happiness is not an “innate” but a remembered idea), this “outside the human condition” actually means before human existence. Therefore, the Creator is both outside and before man.

But the creator is in man through memory. Consequently, as Arendt continues, the “absolute future turns out to be the ultimate past and the way to reach it is through remembrance.” This path leads to a questioning at the most fundamental level and occurs when “it acts in accord with its own phenomenological meaning.” Arendt states that “Createdness (creatum esse) means that essence and existence are not the same.” But they can converge. What Arendt does not indicate in the

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163 Between Past and Future, pp. 94-5.
164 Herodotus as the first historian and true historian because he wishes only to preserve in remembrance the deeds of man, “that which owes its existence to men.” Ibid., p. 41. The concern is the concern with immortality, though an immortality without explanation. His intent though was defined and inspired by the Greek concept and experience of nature. Their concept of time and being encompassed an understanding that things and events happened, came into being and remained, or were immortal and hence did not need the assistance of remembrance to save them. Arendt talks about the immortality of the soul and the afterlife as being, the former, beauty as the highest idea of the philosopher and the good being the highest idea of the statesman. Plato, it must be noted, mucked this distinction up. She is also concerned about the ‘fear of Hell’ and its removal in a secular world? As well, the contemporary loss in the future state on earth. Ibid., p. 133. As Arendt points out, Aristotle assumed man possessed immortality because he was part of the processes of nature, nothing more and nothing less. Yet the individual was not immortal, only humanity. This single instance of mortality came to mark out the signpost of human existence - even from the animals which were members of a species and not individuals.
165 Love and St. Augustine, p. 50.
166 Understanding this is the purpose of the chapter - as Arendt announces.
167 Love and St. Augustine, pp. 50-1.
dissertation is how this can occur. It is not until she investigates the faculty of remembrance much later in her life that this becomes apparent. Through tracing this path that reaches out to the future and then finds the need to reach back in order to understand requires the acknowledgment of a new dimension in the temporal. The “Supreme Being” is found in Christianity but it is also the “Primal Being” and from this standard everything is measured. The act of foundation is outside but also available through memory, or rather through remembrance and this leads to a measure of action. To achieve right comprehension of the principle, the two – the outside and the inside – have to be harmonious. As Augustine indicates “[t]here is both memory and love in the understanding which takes form in thought.”168 This statement reflects the need for a balance between the outside and the inside as well as the trinity of the mind. Arendt cannot accept the theological implications of Augustine’s reading but the philosophical ones are apparent for her. The authority of tradition is the link to the foundation and its principle.

Section III

Judgement and Vita Contemplativa

Beyond Ethics: Towards a Theory of Judgement
Chapter Six

Arendt and *De Trinitate*: Judgement Between Past and Future

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1. Arendt's *De Trinitate*: or, The Life of the Mind

The political phase of Arendt's thought also sees the development of her theoretical framework for dealing with the experiences of Europe after the First World War. Arendt subsequently turned herself to the faculties of the mind, provoked by her experiences in Israel and the thoughtless Eichmann. Arendt saw the rise of totalitarianism as an event unique to the twentieth century. As a consequence, for Arendt, its existence signifies a broken chain or relationship to the past, and judgement was an important element of this: it was "something which has destroyed our categories of thought and standards of judgement." Pre-empting this, as a student in Germany in the 1920s Hannah Arendt had developed her understanding of the western tradition of thinking in a period of perceived crisis. The response was the need to re-evaluate the western tradition that had informed modern, Western civilisation. The elements that Arendt had perceived as lacking in the events during the early parts of this century found articulation in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Then, after considering the questions and critiques in *Between Past and Future*, Arendt wrote her understanding in *The Human Condition*. After this focus the emphasis in the posthumously published work of *The Life of the Mind* can be seen as a turning away from the *vita activa* to the *vita contemplation*, and consequently a turning away from politics in general. Nonetheless, the trinitarian conceptions of both *The Human Condition* and *The Life of...*  

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of the Mind provide an indication of their relationship: through the thought of St. Augustine, Arendt's shift towards thinking as an appropriate subject for the theorist of action is due to the notion of thoughtlessness, or acting without thinking. Subsequently, Arendt sought to outline a theory that dealt with her concept of the banality of thought. The implications of this shift are varied, but there is a decidedly Augustinian influence in this new approach to the actions of the individual.

Arendt's concern with the faculty of the will evolves around the question of evil. Augustine argued that evil clouded the mind and obstructed the pure working of the mind. There was no illumination for the individual. This translates into Arendt's contemporary notion of thoughtlessness or rather the lack of real thought. At the beginning of her explorations into the mind Arendt asks the question: "[i]s not understanding so closely related to and inter-related with judging that one must describe both as the subsumption (of something particular under a universal rule) which according to Kant is the very definition of judgement, whose absence he so magnificently defined as "stupidity," an "infirmity beyond remedy"." To pursue an answer Arendt felt that she must first establish her conception of understanding, a traditionally vague term. While she examines these in an article titled "Understanding and Politics", the crisis of modernity is still with Arendt when she says that "[t]he paradox of the modern situation seems to be that our need to transcend both preliminary understanding and the strictly scientific approach springs from the fact that we have lost our tools of understanding." This situation of crisis, and the loss of understanding, leads to a discussion of the individual in the world: an in-depth consideration of Eichmann. This event highlighted a theme in Arendt's thought and became another way of illustrating her concern for the individual and their being-in-the-world in the modern age in each of her published works.

Therefore the political phase of Arendt's work was interrupted by the occasion of Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem. This, in effect, re-ignited Arendt's concern over the role of thinking in the present. The Life of the Mind is a result of this and one which details both the significance of her


This is explored in G. R. Evans' discussion of this element of the Christian Father's work in Augustine on Evil. But it must be remembered that Arendt considered the actor's judgement and the spectator's judgement during her work and this distinction is very important. G. R. Evans, Augustine on Evil, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 36.

De Trinitate, Book 12, “Knowledge and Wisdom” (4), Augustine says that Knowledge (abstaining from evil) is concerned with moral activity and the human history with instructs us therein" while wisdom is the "contemplation of those eternal forms or principles of which Plato wrote". However Augustine says that "through [Plato's] doctrine that the soul retains a memory of them from a former existence is unsatisfactory." Instead, he continues "[i]t is better that the mind is enlightened by a spiritual sun, as the eye by the physical.”


Ibid.
work on Augustine and the influence of her understanding of the political in her understanding of the mind. Her turn to the thought of Kant in her later years generated a further inquiry of the role of the Mind in these events. Arendt saw the future (anticipation) deriving from the past (remembrance) which she reveals in an interpretation of Hegel under the auspices of her exposition of ‘Willing’. As her focus remained on the fundamentals of time and space, Arendt explored the role of remembrance and imagination in an individual’s relation to the world around him or her and the fact that they have temporal imperatives and limits. This ‘no more’ and ‘not yet’ determined this individual’s interaction with the world and the state of mind that decided it. In fact, this mind (mens) eventually became Arendt’s focus as she furthered her understanding of action in the world. This individual stands between past and future for Arendt and, as a consequence, finds the world through two ways that are not compatible. Just as Augustine conceived his individual’s mind as a relationship between memory, understanding and the will, Arendt evolved her ‘mind’ into a relationship between thinking, willing and judging that fit this temporal trinity. Understanding the work Arendt undertook in _The Life of the Mind_ requires an examination of this particular dimension. And when it is seen through the lens of Augustine’s own deliberations the relationship of memory and remembering to imagination and judging provides an exceptionally rich source of material for investigation. While this becomes her direction, Arendt seems to initially tackle the many problems associated with the mind in what should be regarded as the very political essay “Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding)”. It establishes Arendt’s frame of reference for her political work and provides significant insight into the direction of her intellectual development and the transition of Arendt’s framework from the thought of Augustine to Kant.

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7 The position of Plotinus and Porphyry on the life of the mind, as well as Augustine's favourable reaction to it, provides an interesting comparison to Arendt's later purpose. Plotinus and Porphyry reaction to the cult of gods resulting in a treatise by Porphyry titled _On the Soul's Return_ (to God). A book that Augustine found especially powerful. The rejection of purification as a continued embracing of earthly goods, such as the religions, altar sacrifice of animals and their eventual consumption, instead advocating a "flight from the body" and consequently the material earth. A correlation to this was "it course a search for happiness in wisdom, through the adage, "Know Thyself". The Augustinian "A question unto myself" is a variation of this. The life of the mind therefore becomes predicated on rejection of earth and its society; the following quotes provide an insight into Augustine's thought on this matter; "exercise yourself to return to yourself; gather from the body: the spiritual elements dispersed and reduced to a mass of bits and pieces. The soul is thrust into poverty, the more that its ties to the flesh are strengthened. But it can become truly rich by discovering its true self, which is intellect", and "Our end is to attain the contemplation of Being". Quoted from Henry Chadwick, "Augustine" in _Founders of Thought_, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 212.

8 Arendt left not only lectures on Kant's conception of 'common sense' in her treatise on the _Third Ethic_ but also the imagination. This relationship is yet to be worked out satisfactorily in the secondary literature as the role of imagination has always been subordinated to the lengthier series of lectures.

The essay "Understanding and Politics" starts by clarifying the role of understanding in determining the way totalitarianism should be dealt with in the contemporary era. The essay becomes very quickly, however, an elucidation of Arendt's comprehension of the intellect in the contemporary world. The division of meaning and knowledge is outlined in the essay and represents the first concrete statement of Arendt's developing understanding of the life of the mind. She stresses again the tentative nature of understanding in the world and its lack of finality. This tension is the energy of life that Arendt noticed in her experiences. In The Life of the Mind when Arendt is answering her question, "What makes us Think?", she states her concern about a harmony that ignores 'disharmony, ugliness and evil'. The question of evil, coupled to ethics and this branch of philosophy's neglect, leads to a question of thinking, and the question of evil is about thoughtlessness. Cupiditas is seen as habit and through habit, the individual avoids acknowledging his real "source". An important development of this position is the potential clarification of Arendt's understanding of the Existenz authenticity. With cupiditas comes also an avoidance of thinking and responsibility. This suggestion, that thinking is linked to responsibility, comes to the fore in Arendt's discussion of Adolf Eichmann and the 'banality of evil'.

Reconciliation through harmony emerges as a powerful theme in Arendt's work as she seeks to reconcile the mind to the world, "for every single person needs to be reconciled to a world into which he was born a stranger and in which, to the extent of his distinct uniqueness, he always remains a stranger." This is in distinction to having the mind create the world, or to have reality constructed to match. This reconciliation involves the capacity of forgiveness which is "certainty one of the greatest human capacities and perhaps the boldest of human actions insofar as it tries the seemingly impossible, to undo what has been done, and succeeds in making a new beginning where everything seemed to have come to an end."
This role of understanding in an individual’s life is regarded by Arendt as a “specifically human way of being alive”; “[t]he result of understanding is meaning, which we originate in the very process of living insofar as we try to reconcile ourselves to what we do and what we suffer.”

16 Arendt talks of the fact that with this you now have “an inability to originate meaning”. This statement by Arendt is immediately followed by the statement that in the twentieth century the “growth of meaninglessness has been accompanied by the loss of common sense.” This is, in fact, stupidity in the Kantian sense. To illustrate this she turns to Paul Valéry, whom she describes as having the “most lucid mind” of the French, the “classical people of bon sens”. Using Valéry, she describes the events of the twentieth century as a “Kind of Insolvency of imagination and bankruptcy of understanding.”

Arendt defines common sense halfway through this essay: common sense, she suggests, “is only that part of our mind and that portion of inherited wisdom which all men have in common in any given civilisation” and the “political sense, par excellence”. Common sense presumes a common world and this is a world between men - a world that is easily destroyed. This introduction of the notion of common sense into Arendt’s thought signals a major stage in the development of her thinking. This approach to her concern regarding understanding and judging must be contextualised in her later reading of Kant. In a 1964 lecture Arendt reflects on Kant’s intellectual development and says “In the Crit. of Judgm. there is only one faculty which is added: Judgement or Common Sense: the judgement estimates what the things are worth with respect to us and the common sense is subject-directed but intersubjective: takes into account all others.”

In the Critique of Judgement Kant was searching in the cognitive faculties for a basis for feeling. But Kant had found that imagination played a great part in the process of apprehension and it was spontaneous and free in its application. But Kant also sees a little more than that as the issue of validity and universal

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16 ibid., p. 309.
17 ibid., pp. 313-4. This quote comes from Regards sur le monde actuel.
18 ibid., pp. 316-7 then p. 318.
19 Library of Congress, Lecture notes: Kant, Political Philosophy: Chicago, Fall 1964, (032282). On this theme she later also reveals why the Sublime in Kant does not interest her. The sublime in Kant is Jaspers’ ‘chiffre’ or cipher which Arendt defines as “in the sense of a secret writing to which we have not the key.” (032282 and 032287). Reason is absent in this process because it takes one out of the world and beyond intersubjectivity, “Solitude is Sublime. Company is beautiful” (032285) and later in her lecture Arendt says “Kant has an uneasy feeling throughout: ‘the concept of the sublime is far less important and rich in consequence than that of beauty’” (ibid, p. 309). This would have been Arendt quoting Kant from Critique of Judgement., §231 (032286). This similarly explains why the contemporary commentator is mistaken in associating her project with that of Lyotard. For Lyotard’s position in the context of reading Arendt, Jean-François Lyotard, “Le Survivant” in Ontologie et Politique des actes du Colloque Hannah Arendt, édité par Miguel Adensour (Paris, Editions Téoréa, 1989), pp. 257-276. For examples of the association see David Ingram, “The Postmodern Kantianism of Arendt and Lyotard”, Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 42 (September 1988), pp. 51-77 and James P. Clarke, “A Kantian Theory of Political Judgement: Arendt and Lyotard” Philosophy Today, Vol. 38 No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 134-145.
20 The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general.” Kant, Critique of Judgement, §§9. The merely given is transcended as well as the charm and emotion the subject attaches to the object, or at least the representation of the object. It does not necessarily know the object as it only wants to play with the signification of the presence of the object. Lastly, no effort is expended in its interpretation, its conceptualisation.
communication is still of concern. Taste demands that it is not mere sensation that creates the appetite, but seemingly the alternative is to impose an interpretative framework upon sensation to achieve apparent taste and this is too much for Kant. But the imagination does 're-configure' the pure experience, or rather the form (as opposed to matter) of the experience. Imaginative configuration is without concept (it does not concern itself with the material) and also without sensation as it goes beyond the given. So this is a special configuration and it takes harmony of the faculties to achieve. With this discussion Kant introduces the notion of sensus communis. The individual is only feeling what he/she presupposes everyone else would feel on the same occasion. But this is as far as the individual can go unless she/he delves into the search for transcendental philosophy. Knowledge and beauty are therefore bound together, though only beauty without purpose. These two being together are in harmony and this is the key to Kant's understanding of beauty.

The foundation of the validity of judgement is imagination and understanding being able to work together. Kant is working towards an understanding of "subjective formal purposiveness" which is at the centre of his endeavour at this stage. Imagination and understanding come across an object and in mutual agreement enter a process of "play". The play of imagination is in itself pleasurable; "[w]e dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself." Kant stresses that the harmony and the singular lead to sensus communis and universality; a

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21 The individual on perceiving something that goes beyond the ordinary pleasurable perception begins to wonder the source of this feeling. The feeling of the beautiful is always accompanied by the charm or emotion and consequently the individual wonders whether something more is affecting him. If the individual considers that this is actually so and acknowledges that she/he is not being influenced by interest, appetite or preference what else is there? The feeling of freedom in this perception is one that the object means nothing else to him other than its beauty, and beauty: that means nothing in connection to her/his situation then it must be the same for everyone else. Or as Kant says, "since the delight is not based on any inclination of the subject (or on any other deliberate interest) ... he must regard it as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person; and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every one." This leads to the conclusion that it is a logical judgement and that "it may be presupposed to be valid for all men": ibid., §6

22 Kant, of course, does go beyond this initial position. In his introduction Kant says that; "For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflective judgement, even when it has no intention of so doing, comparing them at least with its faculty of referring intuitions to concepts. If, now, in this comparison, imagination (as the faculty of intuitions a priori) is undesignedly brought into accord with understanding (as the faculty of concepts), by means of a given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as [purposive] for the reflective judgement." ibid., §VII

23 As Kant says, "innow a representation, whereby an object is given, involves, in order that it may become a source of cognition at all, imagination for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the representations. This state of free play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is given must admit of universal communication: because cognition, as a definition of the object with which given representations (in any subject whatever) are to accord, is the one and only representation which is valid for everyone. As the subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a judgement of taste is to subsist apart from the presupposition of any definite concept, it can be nothing else than the mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding (so far as these are in mutual accord, as is requisite for cognition in general); for we are conscious that this subjective relation suitable for a cognition in general must be just as valid for every one, and consequently as universally communicable, as is any indeterminate cognition, which always rests upon that relation as its subjective condition." ibid., §9.

24 ibid., §9. "The quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally, is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgement of taste."

25 ibid., end of §12. This is at the heart of Kant critique of taste: "it is subjective, it may be felt in its effect upon the mind, and, in the case of a relation (like that of the powers of representation to a faculty of cognition generally) which does not rest on any concept, no other consciousness of it is possible beyond that through sensation of its effect upon the mind - an effect consisting in the more facile play of both mental powers (imagination and understanding) as quickened by their mutual accord." ibid., §9.
representation which is singular and independent of comparison with other representations, and, being such, yet accords with the conditions of the universality that is the general concern of understanding, is one that brings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord which we require for all cognition and which we therefore deem valid for every one who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and sense conjointly (i.e., for every man).26

In the essay, “Understanding and Politics”, Arendt’s reading of the concept of common sense is given a background. Common sense relates to the Arendtian concepts of foundation, storytelling and eventually imagination. Arendt says that “[i]f the creation of man coincides with the creation of a beginning in the universe . . . then the birth of individual men, being new beginnings, re-affirms the original character of man in such a way that origin can never become entirely a history of the past, the very fact that the memorable continuity of these beginnings in the sequence of generations guarantees a history which can never end because it is the history of beings whose essence is beginnings.” Arendt suggests that there is guidance for the individual that does not depend upon the redundant concept of morality; because “. . . a being whose essence is beginning may have enough of an origin within himself to understand without preconceived categories and to judge without the set of customary rules which is morality.”27 This origin is the foundation that contains within its temporal nature principles that the art of storytelling conveys.

Arendt maintains the central concern for the role of understanding and judging. At this point she sees the need to expand upon the notion of understanding she is articulating in this essay. Everything that has a beginning also has a new story beginning with it but also an end. So therefore it cannot just truly ‘be’. Quoting Augustine, Arendt says that “[h]e [that is true being or God] who “is and truly is . . . is without beginning (initium) and without end”” but when talking about man; “[h]is end starts working with him from his beginning”, or that in life is his end and “[w]hile this life that approaches death is and is not at the same time, it also has as its source eternal Being.” This is unlike Being that it is beyond this and “Being relates to human life as that from which it comes to and to which it goes, and is “before” (ante) man in the twofold sense of past and future.”28 Here Arendt focuses upon that

26 ibid., end of §9. So only some objects initiate this reaction, begging the question as to what particular aspect it is in the object that does produce this reaction. Given that Kant focused on the subject (traditionally it was always the object); it still leaves the perplexing question as to what attributes in objects provoked the subjective reaction? Thus if through empirical experiments one can deduce which aspects cause these sensations then logically they can be found. Anticipation is Kant’s base for refuting this prescription is impossible because it create anticipation and thus interest. Beauty is found in exemplary instances, and if all agree, then they can become empirical examples and that is all; “A judgement upon an object of our delight may be wholly disinterested but withal very interesting, i.e., it relies on no interest, but it produces one. Of this kind are all pure moral judgements.”
28 It is only really at the end of Arendt’s dissertation, in fact, at the very end of her work, does she explicitly state what her analysis of Augustine’s conception of love means for her understanding. This topic is separate, but involved, in her discussion of love and the role of the neighbour. It must be remembered, though, that Arendt explicitly states that the ‘application’ of her analysis of Augustine’s concept of love will not be made, and consequently little indication is available to determine how such
which is 'between past and future'. Being human is to have a beginning and an end. Consequently, an understanding of what the past means is required. The traces of time operate from the absolute past and the absolute future. The twofold 'before' is both past and future and is essential in the understanding of the individual in the world. This is because it is "[t]hrough remembrance man discovers this twofold “before” of human existence" and memory plays its part in this as it recalls of the present that which resided in the past. But this is not all as during the “process of re-presenting” - the past is not only contextualised in the present but it also develops or accomplishes a possible role in the future. Arendt uses the instance of joy and sorrow to explain this notion. An individual remembering joy will also hope that joy will occur in the future. When remembering sorrow an individual will become aware of the perpetual possibility of disaster and "this is why the return to one's origin (redire ad creatorem) can at the same time be understood as an anticipating reference to one's end (se referre ad finem)" and this is extended when Arendt says, "[n]ot until the beginning and the end coincide does the twofold “before” acquire its proper meaning."

The role of the source and imitation seen previously in the discussion of political action, now come to bear in the emerging understanding of judgement. These are clearly linked when Arendt says, "[i]f the essence of all, and in particular of political, action is to make a new beginning, then understanding becomes the other side of action, namely, that form of cognition, distinct from many others, by which acting men ... eventually can come to terms with what irrevocably happened and be reconciled with what unavoidably exists." Thought, distinct from logical reasoning and cognition, is the actual topic in Life of the Mind. This definition gives contemplation the vital relationship to action. This is read against cognition which is essentially contextually bound in its application and methodology. It operates with distinct relevancy to the theories, concepts and behaviour required by its subject matter and is teleological in nature for Arendt by always being instrumental and goal-oriented in nature. True understanding on the other hand emerges from a condition prior to cognition. It evolves out of

study would have been developed. Nonetheless, there are some suggestive sentences that enable a tentative understanding of Arendt's mind around this time to develop. For example, in the last paragraph, she ends by saying that "With this, the being of man is understood as derived from a twofold source." Love and St. Augustine, p. 13.

29 ibid., p. 56.

30 The complexity of the problem Arendt has alluded to is acknowledged when she says, "[a]s such, understanding is a strange enterprise", "Understanding and Politics", pp. 321-2.

31 Arendt is aiming to avoid a teleological understanding of ethical action. Utility and the teleological are to be avoided. This is seen in Arendt's cognitive understanding stated at the end of her exposition of Work in The Human Condition. Arendt defines cognition as that which "always pursues a definite aim, which can be set by practical considerations ..." and an understanding that is prominent in labour, work, and science. Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 170. For more on this see Yarbourch and Stern, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplation", pp. 340-3; Hans Jonas, "Acting, Knowing Thinking: Hannah Arendt's philosophical Work", pp. 36ff, George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience. Edt. (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983), pp. 193ff. and Bhikhu C. Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy, pp. 60ff.
an initial relationship between preliminary understanding and knowledge. The status of understanding she is referring to here is a primitive condition. But she states that there is a possibility that this process of reaching understanding may only simply confirm what the initial offering of understanding proposed and it is this initial understanding that is always engaged in action. For example, Arendt says that there is ‘intuition’ at work in action - such as a rejection of totalitarianism.

(ii) From Augustine to Kant: The ‘Understanding Heart’ in Transition

The development of Arendt’s own trinity also leads to a discussion of the heart in the role of understanding and judgement. In this context, Arendt introduces a reading of King Solomon and his desire for an understanding heart in “Understanding and Politics”. The human heart is the “only thing in the world that will take upon itself the burden that the divine gift of action, of being a beginning and therefore being able to make a beginning, has placed upon us.” The ‘understanding heart’ - in distinction to mere reflection and mere feeling - provides the ability to live with other people and for them to live with us. The neighbour has this capacity to live in a common world with those around him or her. The depth of this association is significant. Arendt is indirectly referring back to her understanding of primitive Christianity from her Augustinian studies and also Augustine’s conception of the mind. What is important for Arendt’s consideration of the mind is Augustine’s conclusion that the human mind must be a reflection of the Holy Trinity - even in the course of De Trinitate, Augustine re-evaluates and changes his conception of the mind. Augustine therefore uses love, memory, and understanding as his trinity. What echoes in this understanding of the mind is Arendt’s own particular version of the trinity in The Life of the Mind. By establishing this connection another more subtle relationship can be explored; one of the most significant elements of

32 As detailed previously “Understanding and Politics”, pp. 310-1.
33 ibid., p. 322. What does this mean: “it may in some respect even somewhat resemble philosophy, in which great thoughts always turn in circles, engaging the human mind in nothing less than an interminable dialogue between itself and the essence of everything that is.”
34 ibid. This is not a sentimental request, as Arendt informs us with a strange analogy with paperwork.
35 The relationship of this Augustinian understanding to Arendt’s own developing one becomes clear when it is remembered that The Life of the Mind as divided into three interrelated, but independent and therefore dynamic faculties thinking, willing and judging.
36 Amor or Charitas is love but meaning desire, and is the fundamental motivation of man’s existence. This act of desire itself has no value as the object of desire determines whether or not is good or bad to desire in a particular case. If it is desires something deemed as lower it is “covetousness” (concupiscencia) and if it is directed towards God it is “charities”. You have to be careful as in The Spirit and the Letter, Augustine also uses the construction of concupiscencia bona to mean caritas. (6 (iv)). It is not the same as the will and the distinction is important because love involves feeling as well as the motivational force it generates. The association of Arendt’s emerging thought with a foundation found in her first extended analysis of philosophy, Augustine’s philosophy and his concept of love. Memoria means memory as the collation of meaningful experiences. Thus we can only remember what we have experienced yet Augustine goes further than sense perception and the notion of tabula rasa and includes, as God’s creation, the memory of God. Augustine notes that though memory is limited by experience, imagination is not similar constrained. De Trinitate, Book 11, “The Image in the Outward Man”, 2), Intelligencie means understanding similar to apprehension and not when the association is with comprehension (when this indicates realisation of meaning). It is associated through the Platonic scheme as knowing through sight while all else must be known through faith. Consequently sight as a sense is prioritised - to understand in the Augustinian sense is to see with the mind. The ‘act of understanding’ is therefore intuitive not discursive.
Augustine's understanding is his understanding of the heart and the role it plays in the existence of man.37

The ambiguity of Augustine's conception has had an interesting role in the succeeding discussion of this aspect of humanity's consciousness. Augustine's conception of "mens" or the mind can be defined not simply as the faculty of reasoning rather the intellect. A closer description can be obtained by calling it the 'rational soul', one that includes the capacity to feel, desire, and will as well as to think.38 In other words the life of the mind was not a simple scheme of logic, but a complex mixture of laws and passions, or primitive Christianity's kardia.39 This conception of the mind has had a significant impact upon the way the tradition has conceived the mind and its role in philosophical analysis and discourse. The influence of Augustine's conception of the Trinity derives from the questions he pursued in De Trinitate.40 In De Trinitate, especially from books nine to fourteen, Man is argued by Augustine to be a psychological image of the Trinity.41 The Trinitarian focus was already evident early in Augustine's thought and appears in Confessions42 where man is a blend of being, knowing and willing. With the age, Augustine started off believing that man is made in the image of God, then developed into an image of the whole Trinity.43 Augustine means by this that our minds are the amalgam of three activities, though they remain distinct - "self-memory, self-understanding, and self-loving".44 Augustine believes that the true self is already contained and that the material

37 Just as Arendt inherits an understanding of the trinity in the mind from Augustine, the Christian Father also inherited a conception from the Cappadocians. Their view became the view of the Council of Constantinople in A.D. 381. Consequently the trinity was conceived around the distinction between hypostasis and one ousia in the Godhead. This combination of three elements (or a plurality) in the One was regarded Platonically as one essence with three modes of being. For a discussion on this point see Cyril C. Richardson, "The Enigma of the Trinity" in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, Roy W. Battenhouse, (ed.) (New York, Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 237. While the original expression of this relationship was in Greek and therefore beyond Augustine's reach, this was the one that he first considers in his twenty year struggle with this topic. Augustine starts his examination of the Trinity by explaining to the reader how hard it is for him. Driven by 'compulsion' (1.3.6) yet cautioned by the danger of error, he sees no other greater profit from its success. (1.2.5).


39 Elsewhere Men is defined as the inner man. Augustine believed in using Stoic language for the Platonic idea of the inner self. This idea of the inner self becomes particularly an Augustinian notion and is seen in the Confessions, (10:16:9) where it is described as inner man or animus. (Also Against Praxeas, 24.2 and De Cælestib. 2.4, On John's Gospel 99.4, Letters, 238.2.12). In The Sermons, Augustine talks about the inner man being the Trinitarian group of memory, intellect, and the will. Echoing this in De Trinitate, Augustine says that the 'persona' equals the 'I' and this equals the trinity of love, memory, and understanding. See 15:22.42.

40 Remarkably this work has received comparatively less attention in the study of Augustine's thought than the Confessions and The City of God. Nonetheless, in these two works the concept of the trinity is fundamental to understanding the text.


44 De Trinitate, Book 9.4.4. In God these three activities work together perfectly but not in us though we can move towards perfection as well. We have two problems though; difficulty and ignorance or we cannot know who we are, as Arendt discussed in The Human Condition. Augustine sought in his own work to gain an understanding of God. He did this through the technique of introspection, seeking understanding of himself as a path to understanding God. For Augustine, however, the dictum "Know Thyself" leads not in the Socratic sense to a realisation of ignorance and the consequential acknowledgment of
reality has distorted if not superficially erased its presence from perception. This journey makes evident for Augustine an understanding of the mind as containing memory, understanding and love. Augustine’s dynamic energy of love was seen as the driving force of the individual, stronger even than volition. In Book 15 of De Trinitate, “Review and Re-valuation: Image and Original”, Augustine says that “the will, or the love which is will in fuller strength . . .”. Yet this is not as significant as that which follows this statement. He goes onto say that “[t]here is both memory and love in the understanding which takes form in thought.” This expression comes from Augustine’s mature Christian thought and had undergone a change through several versions, even in this text alone.

In this change we also see Arendt’s interests emerging. Augustine is involved in an interpretation of the Platonic tradition as it had developed into the Roman era. The mind is a complex entity, and not the stripped down version represented in modern thought. The relationship of this Augustinian understanding to Arendt’s own developing one becomes clear when it is remembered that The Life of the Mind has divided into three interrelated, but independent and therefore dynamic faculties: thinking, willing and judging. The relationship between the three faculties is left vague. Thinking, however, conceives its content in the form of generalities while willing and judging deal with particulars only; “thinking, though unable to move the will or provide judgement with general rules, must prepare the particulars given to the senses in such a way that the mind is able to handle them in their absence, in brief, de-sense them.” In a preliminary re-conceptualisation that has not reached its full potential, Arendt defines memory as ‘the mother of the Muses’ and remembrance as having to ‘do

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43 This comparison is however not as easy as it first seems. A second consideration of change is required because in a similar manner, Augustine’s description of the mind is not a simple as it appears. In the process of writing De Trinitate over a period of fourteen years, Augustine changed his mind as he developed his understanding. Gilson summarises the main three versions for the reader; the first is mens, notitia, amor; (De Trinitate, Book IX, 2-5, 8); the second is memoria sui, intellectus, voluntas; (De Trinitate, Book X, 11, 17-12, 19); and the third is memoria Dei, intellectus, amor (De Trinitate, Book XIV, 8, 11-12, 16). See Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch, (London, Gollancz, 1961), p. 219. While Gilson goes on to remind the reader that these variations all occur in the mens, or ‘the spiritual eye of the soul’ and all refer to the indelible image of God in each individual’s existence, he does not explain the development of Augustine’s thoughts. Gilson does however say that only sin has made this image distorted and unrecognisable. Hence evil is a lack of clarity in thinking for Augustine.

44 Augustine does not dwell on the trinity of love, however, because in the next Book of De Trinitate, he focuses instead on the relationship of knowing and willing. A new trinity emerges in his understanding that sees the mind as containing the faculties of willing and knowing that can reflect upon themselves, not simply look outwards upon the world.

45 Thinking, pp. 75-7.
What is absent must be de-sensed, and this ability to 'transform sense-objects into images is called "imagination."

The faculty of the imagination, Arendt informs the reader, is the modern term - though still inaccurate - for the biblical term 'understanding heart'. What we have here is the translation of Augustinian language into a Kantian context. Therefore, it should be noted that this conception of imagination has nothing to do with fantasy (which is Arendt's interpretation of productive imagination); rather, "imagination is concerned with the particular darkness of the human heart and the peculiar density which surrounds everything that is real." The darkness and density she mentions is equated with the 'nature' or 'essence'. Imagination is given the ability to determine that which is significant to an individual in the community. The power of this conception of imagination in the role of understanding is given a clear statement; "[t]rue understanding does not tire of interminable dialogue and "vicious circles," because it trusts that imagination eventually will catch at least a glimpse of the always frightening light to truth." In this sentence Arendt encapsulates the essence of her examination of the mind in the search for understanding. Trust figures again in her articulation, presenting the binding of the three temporal periods. This moment is expected to provide the glimpse of the presence of Being, or Augustinian notion of illumination that is the Heideggerian inner terror that he reflected upon before his move to Freiburg. This does not lead to irrationality because, as Arendt stresses, reason still plays a central role. She quotes Wordsworth as an illustration is what she intends to says with this conception; "On the contrary, imagination is but another name for . . . clearest insight, amplitude of mind/And Reason in her most exalted mood." Its power is evident because "Imagination alone enables us to see things in their proper perspective . . ." Arendt now says that connection is the important thing - determining which should be connected with and which should be rejected - this is part of the dialogue of understanding: "[w]ithout this kind of imagination, which actually is understanding, we would never be able to take our bearing in the world." And as Arendt says simply and forcibly at the end of the paper, "It is the only inner compass we have".

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48 Ibid., p. 55.
49 "Understanding and Politics", p. 322.
52 Ibid. This dialogue that Arendt is talking about is with the essence of totalitarianism.
This profound framework of understanding, even if it is in the course of comprehending the Trinity, becomes a powerful commentary on the human condition. In *De Trinitate* Augustine also develops a treatise of the psychology of man. As man is created in the image of God, the Trinity is also apparent in man. It is this part of *De Trinitate* in which Augustine is at his most original, the final and most mature section of the work. Augustine uses the analogy of man as the image of God to examine the subtle nature of the Trinity. This leads Augustine to delving into the nature of man in an attempt to find the best possible description that also explains the nuances of the Trinity.

Augustine’s major contribution to the development of the Christian understanding of the trinity is the role of the Spirit; it is cast by Augustine as the unifying component in this Godhead. This unifying bond of the Spirit is therefore cast as love in the analogy of the human condition. Love plays an important part in this discussion and in passing provides an insight into the role of *vinculum* in Augustine’s thought. Between the lover and the loved is the bridge of love. It is in the eight book of *De Trinitate* that Augustine reveals this understanding when he says, “he that loves, and that which is loved, and love” itself. This potent analogy of love is developed by Augustine and leads to a discussion of the mind’s love of itself. This lead to the mind is due to Augustine’s belief that it is in the mind where the image and likeness of God is captured. But Augustine reasons that if the mind loves itself there is no trinity evident; only the mind and love. Therefore, the mind must know itself first and this addition leads Augustine to describe the trinity of the mind as “the mind itself, the love of it, and

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53 Augustine himself acknowledges the difficulty of the subject he had chosen to examine. He also acknowledges the fruits of such a study because of this and its central place in the doctrine of Christianity. As Augustine states: “I am compelled to pick my way through a hard and obscure subject”, *De Trinitate*, (1.3.6). In the introduction, Augustine says “[I]n no other subject is error more dangerous, or inquiry more laborious, or discovery of truth more profitable.” *De Trinitate*, (1.2.5)

54 While Augustine did not question why the question of the trinity was also a central question of Christianity, he indirectly gives several reasons why and these reason flow into the tradition of western thought. The Christian trinity sees God in the tripartite: He is the father, the Son and the Spirit. This trinity allows a Christian to separate God from His creation. The divinity of God is separated from His creation, and therefore separating Him from a dependence of that creation. If God was the One and only: One then the created world would be part of the One. Another essential reason for the existence of the trinity in Christian thought is the need to set up a relationship between God and the world that includes both a relationship to and a relationship from. The Christian God in the form of Christ was both incarnate and transcendent. One of Augustine’s contribution to the discussion of the trinity is his understanding for the role of the Spirit in the tripartite conception. The relationship in the Godhead is formed by the Spirit. This deliberation became the Creed in West against the original in the Greek world. The role played by the Spirit is better illustrated by one of Augustine’s own analogies. The Trinity is conceived as the Lover, Beloved and Love. Demanding Christ is both is impossible without a devastating compromise. The difficulty lies in reasoning God as both though. Augustine never doubted the trinity as its truth came from revelation, yet he wanted to use reason to explain its presence. The authority of revelation provides the truth, but reason can also access this in hindsight.

55 *De Trinitate* was a slow and painful work for Augustine, a work of introspection as he tried to find a language with which to talk to God. His purpose is to understand how the faculties of the mind which are involved in the perception and storage of corporeal things accessed through the senses. His problem evolves around trying to understand how we can capture that outside of us, bring it within us and then being able to analyze it. The process is akin to Descartes’ questioning under the presumption of an evil tyrant, and asking what can we know for certain. Augustine also wished to know whether his God was a god and not a phantom. G. R. Evans, *Augustine on Evil*, p. 58.


57 Genesis 1:26 says “Let us make man after our image and likeness”.

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the knowledge of it". The relationship of these three components of the mind (and by analogy the Trinity) is one of equality. Ostensibly because the mind cannot love more than it knows of itself otherwise it would an impure and arrogant love that leads to transgression. The mind therefore comes to know itself and becomes dynamic through this desire. Referring to one of his previous assertions, Augustine suggests one can not love something that they do not know.

The traditional reading of this position sees Augustine advocating a discovery of the self. This is supported by a theory of knowledge that is disclosive in its nature. Revelation provides the access to this source of knowledge which is the self. But there is another reading of Augustine’s thoughts at this point in his life. This reading turns to illumination as the unveiling of the self. Disclosure locates the truth, suggesting a spatial location with illumination implicit in the act of discovery. Illumination does not suggest a location rather a sense of presence, or a sense of spirit to use Augustine’s trinitarian language. In *De Magistro* Augustine asks these questions about time and knowledge directly suggesting the past is images. The language of reflection or illumination is pervasive throughout Augustine’s exploration of Trinity. The presence of God is important for the Christian call of conscience, and turning to a mundane reading given by Arendt of *social caritas* in her dissertation, she talks of the role of Adam in the earthly community. When Arendt turns to the problem of the isolation of the individual and the proposed connection to the neighbour there is the role of foundation in her work. In the dissertation Arendt wishes to detail how an individual can meet their neighbour and escape the isolation inherent in *caritas*. The result of this search, Arendt believes, will lead to a new love. This new love is dependant on the return and the remembered past and she terms this new love as “social caritas”. This *social caritas* is justified because “human beings belong together due to their common historic descent from Adam” and “[e]ven though this belonging is of the world, it gives the

58 *De Trinitate*, 9.4.4.
59 For Markus this position indicates a retention of the role of Plato’s thought in Augustine. *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Thought*, p. 368.
60 It is important to differentiate this illustration of Arendt’s thought from the use of ‘presence’ in Heidegger’s intentions of deconstructing the western tradition of thinking. In the glossary of Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, he explains the meaning of this term in Heideggerian thought. The definition of *Anwesenheit* is ‘presence’. Heidegger first considers the full implications of ‘presence’ in his course on Aristotle in SS 1924. The heading *Gegenwartigkeit*, or presentness. In November 1924, Heidegger is exploring two difference ideas in this definition. One has spatial priority, as in location, and his described using a Latinised word (die *Präsenz*) and a temporal priority, or ‘Now’ (das *Präsenz*). However, by SS 1925, Heidegger is equating *Gegenwartigkeit*, *Anwesenheit* and *Präsenz* (‘presence’ or *Prräsenz*) means something different, such as ‘absence presence’ (remarkably similar to imagination though this is not mentioned). By *WS 1925–6, Gegenwartigkeit* is seen as an intense version of the present (‘empowering presentifying’, as Kisiel puts it). This means the ‘discoveredness of truth’. Which involves presence (Anwesenheit) and the present (Gegenwart) makes *Präsenz*. This was expected to be the topic in the second-half of *Being and Time*, but never was composed. Arendt is seeking to preserve the second definition while following Heidegger’s criticism of the first which was fundamental to his philosophical critique as discussed in Chapter Two.
61 See *De Magistro*, 12.3.9. Augustine says that the contents of memory are images, personal actions, numbers, and things received through the mind and not the sense such as the grammar. and so on. See G. B. Matthews, "Augustine on Speaking from Memory", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 2, (1965), pp. 1-14 reprinted in: *Augustine: A Collection of Essays*, R. A. Markus, (ed.) (New York, Modern Study in Philosophy, 1972), pp. 160-175. Since the fall, humanity constructs who we are from images of ourselves around us and our own particular self-image. This is helped by loving the wrong things, or *cupiditas*. *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7f.
neighbour a definite relevance even in self-denying love.”62 Because of the common descent from Adam all individuals share a common ancestry and “[t]his kinship creates an equality neither of traits nor of talents, but of situation . . . they all share the same fate”. Therefore an individual has others who are connected themselves by this common destiny. And from this the community is linked; through their fellowship or as Arendt translates it, societas.63 From this fact an interdependence is generated and this underlies all interactions in the community. Knowing the will of a friend towards you is only required in mutual interdependence. Yet in a twist to Augustine’s view we all derive from Adam and therefore we are all sinful. Consequently there are many communities and peoples of the world but there are really only two cities: good and bad or one founded on Christ and the other, Adam. Arendt says that in a similar sense to this there are but two loves: “love of self (or then world) and love of God”. Arendt however is seeking another dimension to this duality. In the process she turns to the question of sin. What is important for her later thought in this particular investigation is the notion of foundation and the role of this foundation in future generations.64

By continuing to analyse Augustine’s thought and in a Christian context, Arendt says our sin through birth was always there, however, the possibility of imitation required Christ’s time on earth and the occurrence that the grace of God can be freely chosen: “[t]hrough freedom of choice recalls the individual from the world and severs his essential social ties with human kind, the equality of all people, once posited, cannot be cancelled out . . . [and] . . . in this process, equality receives new meaning—love of neighbour”.65 The change in emphasis in the community - the new meaning of equality from sin to love - is that the pre-given association of sin makes way for one based on freedom of choice and the obligations that occur with it. However, this new community is built upon the old foundations of ‘community-in-sinfulness’. The consequence of this is an individual’s new attitude towards the world and a “new, crucial importance of equality”. To understand this, Arendt launches into a discussion of the worldly community going back to Adam which is based on an association that she does make explicit at this stage of her thinking. This association is that Adam represents the primitive community reflected in her dissertation and discussed in Chapter Two and Three. During the discussion, she mentions that Adam, the first man, is the ‘source’, or the “first man, the source,
hands down this indirectness by way of all men through the historically made world.” Augustine’s analysis on the being of man started as man in isolation: in fact, complete isolation. But Arendt rejects this view and man’s origin is both the sin of Adam which is also the beginning of the man-made world and the separation of man from God. Therefore, “his descent is defined by generation and not by creation”. Therefore the “world is no longer an utterly strange place into which the individual has been created. Rather, by kinship in generation the world has always been familiar and belongs to him.” The possibility of imitation turns to Adam and the proper life that Adam represents which is the foundation of a community-in-togetherness. Imitation and inspiration are involved in this reading and this in turn influences Arendt’s understanding of action in society.

Adam is foundational for the earthly community but what you do not seek is his disclosure; rather his role is one of illumination. This means for Arendt that you do not love him in the “concrete and worldly encounter with him” but rather in his createdness defined by generation through inspiration and imitation. This is something that you see residing in him and notably, something that he is unaware he is: “[f]or you love in him not what he is, but what you wish that he may.” This wish is temporal and illustrates the dimension in which illumination exists and that is past possibility. This is Arendt’s ‘call of conscience’ in its temporal dimension noted in Chapter Three. In an added dimension to this notion evident in Arendt, Rist talks about Augustine’s notion of our presence in Adam (and therefore Adam in us). When we are born we will live our personal life, or (persona vita). The soul is both universal and individual, and there is a dual life. In this manner Adam becomes the illumination as he is within the individual while the individual is within him. This becomes Arendt’s intent when she turns to Kant in search of a ‘law that is not a law’. The important part of this discussion emerged while Augustine was attempting to refute the Sceptic’s accusations. This element explains Augustine’s attempt to ground an epistemological theory. In Book Eleven of the Confessions, Augustine’s discussion of time eventuates after a long treatment of memory. Memory delivers the past as knowledge, and that same is said for the future. Augustine is saying that we do not know the past except in the Mind as the past no longer exists. Therefore, you can ‘know’ things

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66 Ibid., pp. 103-4. This sharing is man as social being. Now Arendt says that Augustine seeks an original definition of man as social being and this source that collaborates with this is different from the one she discusses in Part Two.
67 ibid., p. 194.
68 Augustine in Homilies on the First Epistle of St. John, VII, 10.
69 Rist, Augustine: ancient thought baptized, p. 126.
70 Maybe one eternal and one transient. ibid., p. 122.
71 Rist, ibid., p. 113, n. 61, discusses the two concepts of time involved in Augustine’s understanding of humanity. The first he developed was the cyclical understanding of the ancient Greeks. They believed that humans would return to its original state of excellence before the fall. The second is more Christian and believes that time is linear and goes from the Fall to Last Judgement and then a superior state. The first prescribes happiness on earth while the second ‘after’.
72 This in a way develops Plato’s thesis of Meno and Theaetetus.
first-hand (a particular understanding of knowing) and if it was in past it become ‘known’ (and a different type of knowing comes in). The question that arises from this understanding of the past is how can an individual protect ourselves against false knowledge from the past. While Augustine is not as worried about the philosophical implication of this though he is certainly aware of them. He does say however that we develop a belief in the knowledge of the past and the justification of that belief is therefore dependent upon the authority that provides this knowledge. Therefore given that the past is unknowable in the first sense of the word, the question moves from this to one of validating the authority. This treatment is expanded in the Confessions - what has the facility to do this is the memory, to which Augustine gives great power - a storehouse, depth and prodigious power. These are all used by Arendt to describe the power of memory but her use of this facility is evolving the more she explores the dynamics of this dimension.

Augustine’s dependence on Plotinus’ conception of ‘self-recollection’ is very evident here. Augustine, however, developed his understanding of self-recollection (or memory) as he turned away from the overt influence of the Platonic tradition. The Platonic concept of Recollection was part of Augustine’s understanding until he started his deliberations in De Trinitate. He had been dependent on the works of Cicero and Plotinus, following the general understanding of the day. In De Trinitate though there is a new attempt at justifying the notion of impressed idea. Augustine maintained the idea from Aristotle that we desire happiness above all else in our lives. This desire was part of the impressed ideas that includes not only happiness, but also wisdom, goodness, human nature and the eternal and just law. The last one, a just law, was an impression on the human heart. But in De Trinitate, pre-existence became untenable. At this stage Augustine is talking about an unplatonic version of ‘existence outside our propre vita in Adam’. In his work on Augustine’s thought, O’Daly argues that Augustine was talking figuratively when using recollection, “presupposing a theory of knowledge by illumination.” As such, there was never a theory of pre-existence of knowledge in

73 Confessions: Book 8.12, 9.16, 8.15, and 13.20 respectively.
74 And Plotinus’ dependence - to a certain extent only - on Plato should also be noted.
75 Rist, Augustine: ancient thought baptised, p. 30. In works by Augustine, such as Against the Sceptic, (1.9.22), Reconsiderations, (1.13), Scholiaires, (2.20.35), Greatness of the Soul, (20.34), and Letters, 7.1.2, this understanding is relevant.
77 De Trinitate, 12.15.24 and see also Reconsiderations, 1.4.4 and 1.5.2.
Augustine’s thought. The source of these re-interpretations is the seminal work of Etienne Gilson who Arendt later become to rely on for its detailed reading of Augustinian thought. Central to this reading is his interpretation of intellectus as a faculty above reason, or the soul proper. This intellectus is the inner sight.

Similar to the Neoplatonists, for Augustine this search for himself in terms of his soul is also a search for God. Arendt states that in Augustine’s thought, because man is tied to his own ‘source’ (which is God) he cannot relate to the neighbour for the neighbour’s sake or even for his own sake. Within an Augustinian self, therefore, is not only the self but also God. The necessity of the Neoplatonic project to ‘return to the self’ as Augustine assumed just after his conversion was to actually become a search for God. This is wisdom (sapientia) rather than knowledge (scientia) of the external world. In The Trinity, the difference in these cognitive states is examined as Augustine seeks a language to discuss the human mind in terms of the Trinity. Thus our own remembering, loving, and knowing leads us to God. For Arendt, God is replaced by the act of foundation. At best, Augustine suggests we can achieve self-understanding and self-knowledge and the root of all our knowledge is ourselves - but only of ourselves in terms of intentional objects. The words used by Augustine are nosse and notitia. These indicate that our understanding is still only explicit and we do not yet understand - scire and not intelligere.

So Augustine is generating a psychological profile of man in terms of perfection of God and the Trinity. The mind is where this perfection could hypothetically occur but what is the relationship between the three aspects? The weak link for man is in knowing ‘who’ he is, as only God can know us in this way. Arendt also believed this and therefore investigated the human condition instead. Augustine moves away from the Platonic idea that the earthly and corporeal body is a burden to our

80 Others such as O’Connell “Pre-existence in the Early Augustine” and Teske, “Augustine on liberation from time”, Tradition. Vol. 41, (1985), pp. 24-47 have also pursued this interpretation.
81 When talking about the soul Plotinus agrees with Plato and Aristotle, who disagree with the general understanding in Greek thought and culture at that time. Similar to Plato, Plotinus in On Beauty argues that the essence of beauty lies in a non-material realm of the intelligible being. The difference between Plato and Aristotle comes out when Plotinus attacks Aristotle’s understanding of the soul as entelechy. Seeing the soul as the body’s form, Aristotle moves towards the materialist but not close enough to be fairly included in this category. The tradition that became Christian had to reject metempsychosis [transfer of a soul from a dead body to a newly born one] because if the implications on the Christian understanding of creation and the eternal return of Greek conception of time. Taking up this Platonic formulation rather than the Aristotelian means that the Christian tradition seek ethics in laws beyond and in absolute standards. Aristotle and his empiricism takes a humanistic/scientific, even relative stance: in all this Plotinus returns to the inner experience, or a ‘return to oneself’ (see opening of the treatise in Enneads, Book 4, § 8 and xxviii). The separation of action and contemplation founds the philosophical treatise Plotinus writes. For more on this read On Contemplation, Book 3, § 8. The difference between Plate and Aristotle is the final’s concern with the One or soul and the latter concern with nature. As Aristotle’s work has been called metaphysical for more than one credible reason, Plato should then be called meta-psychology.
82 De Trinitate, 14.12.15.
83 Rist, Augustine: ancient thought baptized, p. 145.
84 Rist, ibid., says that this is a phenomenological psychology but the metaphysics is incomplete because Augustine does not know what a perfect man would be like. Only faith can be used to recognise the perfect man.
true existence and embraces the body and this life. So the perfection of man is dependent on the way the mind is conceived and interacts in its distinct faculties. In Arendt’s thought this is transferred to an understanding that this perfection allows the right action to emerge in the moment of decision. This harmony or the right state produces appropriate principles or criteria for judgement through an illumination. This is the correct blend of the trinity of memory, understanding and love, and the role of past, present and future are important here. This can be seen as another dimension in Arendt’s search for the right action, only this time through the temporal trinity. In the moment a decision is made to determine a future course of action, the past is important. Therefore, memory is important to Augustine’s trinity, and Arendt’s own particular discussion. The importance derives from Augustine’s search for authority, or a different concept of knowledge.

85 The idea here is that our minds are in the image of God though we are concerned with our bodies and are always focuses upon our bodies. But unlike the early Platonic Christian that determined Augustine’s understanding of this situation, and the idea that the body was an earthly nuisance and to be rid of if possible, Augustine now conceives relevance for the body aspect of the duality and this emerges in the Literal Commentary and The City of God and the later books of the Confessions. Still in the Confessions, Augustine is not yet ready to embrace the implications of this understanding fully. Instead when answering the self imposed question of “Who are you?” in Book 10, he answers ‘a man’ though he still talks about interior body and the superior soul. Later on he clarifies this and develops away from Plato even further, introducing a duality in the soul. This is “I am and I know and I will... I know that I am...”. In these three let him who can do so perceive how inseparable a life there is, one life and one mind and one being, and finally how inseparable a distinction there is, and yet there is a distinction. (13.11.12) Pines puts it thus “There are three things, all found in man himself, which I should like man to consider. They are far different from the Trinity, but I suggest them as a subject for mental exercise by which we can test ourselves, and realise how great this difference is. The three things are existence, knowledge, and will, for I can say that I am, I know, and I will. I am a being which knows and will; I know both that I am and that I will; and I will both to be and to know...”
Thinking, Willing, and Judging are basic and each are self-contained and obey their own particular laws. Nonetheless, they are dependent on ‘the stillness of the soul’s passions’, though not the mind’s.\(^6\) As Arendt says in *Thinking*, “[w]e are so accustomed to the old opposition of reason versus passion, spirit versus life, that the idea of passionate thinking, in which thinking and aliveness become one, takes us somewhat aback.”\(^7\) Arendt does state that man is totally conditioned existentially.\(^8\)

Subsequently, man can explore the reality of the world and those areas that can never be experienced such as eternal life, and speculate about the unknowable. Nonetheless, this examination can never change reality, although many philosophers have thought so and attempted to do just that. Arendt points out this at this stage to reveal with clarity her distinction being thinking and doing. Having stated this, however, Arendt then provides a condition on this position, and one that raises some problems for her examination. She says that our acts and their judgement depend on the life of the mind. The ‘sheerness’ of reality, in its un-interpreted state, is unchangeable by the philosopher’s gaze but man as a free agent can change his perception of that reality, especially without the traditional reference points. One of Arendt’s intellectual platforms, apparent in all her work, is that of plurality, derived from a conception of man as unique, yet existing in a common world: “plurality is one of the basic existential conditions of life—so that *inter homines esse*, to be among men, was to the Romans the sign of being alive, aware of the realness of world and self . . .”.\(^8\) Both the world and the self are there to be perceived and subsequently understood. The world is the world of the in-between, the man-made world resisting the onslaught of the desert which man is born into, and this is Arendt’s community. The self, or the individual-in-the-world, relates to this world through action and the faculties of the mind. The purpose of this relationship in the end is to achieve harmony between the two. This in fact is her definition of freedom, the concurrence of will and to-be-able-to.\(^9\) This is Arendt’s major concern in *The Life of the Mind* series and is contained within a fundamental recognition that determines this concern; that while man is totally conditioned existentially, time is a dominant factor in this existence. Man is *homo temporalis*.

\(^6\) *Thinking*, p. 70. Though later in this volume Arendt is at pains to say that even these stilled passions is not a precondition.

\(^7\) ibid., p. 51.

\(^8\) ibid., p. 70.

\(^9\) ibid., p. 74.

\(^{90}\) See for example her discussion in *Between Past and Future*, pp. 158-162.
With this in mind, Arendt asks the question, where are we when we think? First Arendt establishes the notion that thinking is ‘out of order’, meaning that it is the exception to the temporal continuum of the world of action. Aristotle was the only philosopher who was aware of the thinking process’s sense of ‘homelessness’, or its lack of temporal reference in its existence: or, rather, timelessness in Arendt’s reading. Thus, Arendt identifies an important dimension to her thinking: when thinking about the location of thought she suggests that our sense of realness inherent in sense sensus communis would be wrong if only determined by our spatial existence. Using Augustine as a reference, she reminds the reader that we are homo temporalis and that time should be a significant part of our condition: “remembering, collecting and recollecting . . . anticipating and planning in the mode of willing what is not yet.” This summarises Arendt’s fundamental perspective and leads her towards her understanding of judgement in an age without the aid of the Roman Trinity. The space of thinking is actually a non-time space, temporal not spatial; “[t]hinking annihilates temporal as well as spatial distances” It stretches the moment out, creating a ‘spatial habitat’ for itself, although we determine it thus by using spatial metaphors to describe it. It is therefore regarded as an extension between what lays behind and in front of us.

Following her second analysis of the Kafka metaphor for the location of thinking she observes two things that are relevant to her later work. The first reiterates what she has already said regarding the location of thinking, but now she reveals the implication of this location for thinking: “In this gap between past and present, we find our place in time when we think, that is, when we are sufficiently removed from past and future to be relied upon to find out their meaning, to assume the position of ‘umpire,’ of arbiter and judge over the manifold, never-ending affairs of human existence in the world, never arriving at a final solution to their riddles but already with ever-new answers to the question of what it may be all about.” The gap provides the individual with an opportunity to determine the meaning of actions in the ongoing continuum of reality. The second aspect to the use of Kafka is a clear statement of what she is looking for and the difficulties she is facing: “[t]his small non-time space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the culture into which we are born, cannot be inherited and handed down by tradition . . .” This suggests that the individual in their society is

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91 *Thinking*, p. 200.
92 *ibid.*, p. 201.
93 *Thinking*, p. 85. Arendt notes that no philosophical or metaphysical concept encapsulates this but the notion of *nulla stans*$\text{nulla stans}$ does in medieval philosophy.
95 *Thinking*, pp. 209-10.
stranded, helpless to establish a certainty from which they can determine a position to judge. Yet there is a sense in Arendt’s thought at this stage that there is a link back when she conditions this statement and says that “every great book of thought points to it somewhat cryptically”. She uses a saying from Heraclitus, who referring to the Delphic Oracle remonstrates, “oute legei, outhe kryptei alla semainei, or it does not say and it does not hide, it intimates.” 97 Each new generation therefore must fit itself into the continuum of time and “discover and ploddingly pave anew the path of thought”. Moreover, she continues to say that it seems likely that some texts can be used to aid this paving because these ‘great works’ have achieved their own particular non-time space, or present between infinite past and infinite future. These “timeless works . . . transcend their own finiteness”. 98 Arendt is still able to think that a reference point is available and that the location is in the stories from the past.

(i) Storytelling: The Foundational Principle

There is a need to return to thinking as an aspect of the mind in order to determine how Arendt is setting up this source for the contemporary age. Again the temporal aspect of Arendt’s thought is involved in her examination. Arendt discusses the order of the faculties and she says that willing and judging need ‘representation’, but she does not call this memory or remembrance, but rather thinking and the ability to de-sense particulars in their absence. Significantly, she uses Augustine’s De Trinitate, Book 11, chapter 3, to describe the process, thus providing the reader with an indication of her source for her deliberations. The image is stored in memory, and when the mind gets hold of it, it is ‘vision in thought’. This only occurs after a ‘two-fold’ transformation, however. This vision-in-thought then is taken by the mind and through the process of remembrance and imagination takes the visible object and remakes it as an invisible object stored in memory. 99 This is now awaiting use by thinking: “[t]hese thought-objects come into being only when the mind actively and deliberately remembers, recollects and selects from the storehouse of memory whatever arouses its interests sufficiently to

97 ibid.
98 ibid., p. 211. She ends the volume on thinking by quoting W. H. Auden from his poem “As I walked out one evening”:

O plunge your hands in water,
Flunge them in up to the wrist;
Stare, stare in the basin
And wonder what you’ve missed.
The glacier knocks in the cupboard,
The desert sighs in the bed.
And the crack in the tea-cup opens
A lane to the land of the dead..."

Arendt further explains her reading by again quoting Auden saying “Some books are undeservedly forgotten, none are undeservedly remembered”. The first quote comes from Collected Poems, p. 115, while the second from The Dyer’s Hand and Other Essays, (New York, Vintage Books, 1968).
99 There is some confusion here. The first assertions suggests that memory is not part of the mind while this suggests that remembrance does not equal memory though Arendt now says it is the mind, therefore memory is part of the mind?
induce concentration." Through this process, Arendt suggests, the mind "learns how to deal with things that are absent and prepares itself to 'go further,' toward the understanding of things that are always absent, that cannot be remembered because they were never present to sense experience." These are 'concepts, ideas, categories and the like'. Reason's need, or the quest for meaning is the same for philosophy's desire to search beyond as for the act of storytelling. Both involve the search for meaning. Arendt is suggesting here that the art of storytelling is about the search for meaning, hence principles, and similar to the philosopher's transcendental ideas and concepts? Therefore thinking implies remembrance. Later, on the next page of Thinking she says that des-sensed objects are drawn back into our minds (presence) by remembering and anticipation. Using the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice, she says that the faculty of anticipation derives from the faculty of remembrance, which is dependent on the imagination, reproductive imagination. This is defined by Arendt's temporal conception of past possibility as the source of meaning. Preliminary understanding sourced from her dissertation is the focal point in Arendt's investigation as she seeks the moment of harmony that opens up meaning for the individual. The real faculty is remembrance with its element of anticipation.

The division between meaning and truth is still a topic of concern for Arendt in The Life of the Mind. In the introduction to the first volume, 'Thinking', Arendt outlines the contours of her intended study. Part of this outline places special emphasis on the distinction between 'reason' and 'intellect'. This particular distinction is significant for Arendt's broader understanding but what is significant here is that she also divides meaning and truth; "(the need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same." This is reflected in the fact that her work in The Life of the Mind series places an interesting amount of importance on the separation of Vernunft and Verstand. Mary McCarthy, Arendt's editor in The Life of the Mind, spent considerable effort trying to convince Arendt that her translation of these terms were incorrect. In The Life of the Mind, "Thinking", Arendt states that what is critical to her understanding is Kant's distinction between Vernunft and Verstand, meaning "reason" and "intellect" (and not "understanding", even

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100 Thinking, p. 77.
101 ibid., p. 78.
102 ibid., p. 86. Does this mean judging and willing, or is it another element in the mind?
103 She does not say the imagination but the definition before can be used to label it as such. Arendt is suddenly talking about these two faculties but where do they stand in the life of the mind?
104 Thinking, p. 15 (Arendt's italics). This is a major divergence from Heidegger, and the implications of this separation need to be noticed. Arendt saw Kant as arguing that thinking and reason transcend cognition and the intellect because they deal with the unknowable. The problem is that reason is inspired by the quest for meaning not for truth (like cognition). Truth and meaning are not the same. The metaphysical fallacy of the western tradition is to interpret the quest for meaning on the same model as for truth. Heidegger makes this mistake in Being and Time, when he says "'Meaning of Being' and 'Truth of Being' say the same". Heidegger, What is Metaphysics?, quoted in Thinking, p. 15.
though *Verstand* derives from the verb *verstehen* or ‘to understand’). The justification, Arendt says, is that Kant used *Verstand* to translate the Latin, *intellectus*. The point is to retain the connotations inherent in the German *das Verstehen*, which “understanding” does not do justice to in terms of the greater meaning inherent in the word. Arendt is seeking a specific ability in her definition of the mind. When Arendt turns to Kant and the distinctions she wishes to make, she is seeking the capacity that makes sense of the world. In her dissertation she resisted understanding (intelligere), instead seeking a role for trust in the same manner Kierkegaard in his idea of community resisted Hegel.

The question that emerges is regarding the nature of Arendt’s notion of reason in this reading.

This apparent pedantry reflects the influence that Gilson is exercising over Arendt’s interpretation of Kant. The influence, however, comes from his reading of Augustine that Arendt became familiar with again when deliberating on her translation of the dissertation. The Thomistic interpretation used by Gilson for reading Augustine allows Arendt to decide her own approach to this aspect of Augustine’s thought. In Gilson’s estimation Augustine’s *intellectus* can also be called *intelligentia* and Gilson continues to suggest that the “accepted practice of thinking in terms of “faculties” leads us to speak of intelligence as a power in the soul really distinct from the mind and reason.” He goes on to say that “[t]hese real distinctions are foreign to Augustine’s thought, since for him intelligence is rather the result attained by the mind in virtue of its activity as reason.” *Intellectus* is the faculty above reason, or the soul’s inner sight. The description of this capability as *intellectus* or *intelligentia* according to Gilson is due to Augustine’s use of the Scriptures before he turns to the Hellenic tradition to explain his reading. Augustine’s justification of this is that reason can exist without intelligence (in Arendt’s terms it would be producing pure cognition) but intelligence cannot survive without reason because it is due to the capacity of reason that man seeks to attain intelligence, or ‘reason’s need’ that Arendt speaks about.

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106 In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 302/B 359, Kant distinguishes between understanding and reason as understanding secures the unity of appearances by means of rules and reason pursues “the unity of the rules of understanding under principles”.


108 An example of how this causes confusion is seen in John Burnaby’s attempt to clarify certain aspects of his own translation. Augustine used *intellectus* in a deliberate manner with a meaning that has been distorted through translation. According to John Burnaby, in the course of his translation of Augustine’s works, he believes that *intelligentia* means understanding when the implication is similar to apprehension and not when the association is with comprehension. But as Burnaby says *intelligentia* indicates the *realisation of meaning*, which in the modern sense is frequently expressed by the generalised concept of understanding. It is associated through the Platonic scheme as knowing through sight while all else must be known through faith. Consequently sight as a sense is prioritised - to understand in the Augustinian sense is ‘to see with’ the mind. The ‘act of understanding’ is therefore intuitive not discursive. Augustine: *Later Works* (including *The Trinity, The Spirit and the Letter, Ten Homilies*, *The First Epistle General of St. John*), ed. and trans. John Burnaby, *The Library of Christian Classics*, (London, SCM Press, 1933), p. 34.


107 The text most prominent here is Aquinas’ *On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists*.

111 Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine*, p. 259, n. 10. [my emphasis]

112 ibid.
But this must be seen in the context of a position stated by Arendt in *The Life of the Mind* series. From Arendt’s reading of the tradition in constructing his position she argues that Thomas Aquinas separated the two ‘apprehensive’ faculties as intellect and reason (and made the appetitive faculties of will and free choice as corresponding). Nonetheless, while the intellect and reason have been separated both still deal with truth. For example, intellect, or universal reason, is about mathematical truth, while reason, or particular reason, is about drawing particular conclusions from universal principles. The latter, particular reason, is the dominant one and Arendt determines it to be ‘discursive reasoning’; and ‘. . . in discursive reasoning the mind compels itself’.113 This is in distinction to the intellect where the mind has truth merely revealed to it. Arendt is seeking a type of reason that is intuitive, similar to the one she referred to in “Understanding and Politics” when she spoke of resisting totalitarianism. She is seeking an intuitive reasoning that is comprehensive not apprehensive. The question that eventually emerges is what kind of principles Arendt is seeking that can be used in the manner Kant is talking about in *Critique of Pure Reason*. Arendt is seeking a comprehensive capability which is actually Gilson’s *intellectus*. Only Arendt is seeing this *intellectus* in the context of her interpretation from her extensive studies of Augustine, for the dissertation conceptualises it in terms of trust. The trust that Arendt spoke about in her dissertation is the reason that she now discusses in terms of Kant’s thought. Gilson’s intelligence is the inner sight of the soul that Augustine discussed in *Enarrationes in Psalms* which is the Christian Father’s truth by illumination.114 This refers to Arendt’s primitive Christian element that developed into a proposition similar to Augustine’s *Song of Songs* and the question of the moment discussed by him in *The Confessions*. The story in the temporal dimension of past possibility presents the listener with the principles with which the individual-in-the-world can guide themselves. The intrigue of Augustine’s thought is partly explained by his position in the history of western thought. As Robert E. Meagher in *An Introduction to Augustine* explains, Augustine stood at the moment in history when the two great traditions of thought clashed at the death of an empire. Consequently, humanity was conceived by Augustine in terms of human speech as the signifier of humanness and he therefore found in both traditions a path to follow. The word was of course much more important than utterances, instead the emphasis is not its uniqueness and encompassing at the same time. If, as Augustine did, you were to ask the question “know thyself”, the aspect that stands eminent as a consideration is the words of an

113 Willing, p. 116.
114 Commentaries on the *Psalms*, 32. 22. Arendt refers to these Commentaries in several occasions in her dissertation and while she does not refer to this paragraph explicitly she does quote from the preceding one, suggesting at least that she was aware Augustine’s thoughts of the matter. See *Love and St. Augustine*, p. 87 of the original, p. 109 in translation.
individual. However to understand these words requires a methodology to determine the purpose of these words. Augustine had two traditions to draw upon and each gave him a different answer. The Hellenic tradition suggested speech as disclosure, while the Hebraic tradition suggested speech as creation. There is therefore a tension at work in Augustine’s understanding that travels on forward as his influence and the merger of the Hellenic and Hebraic tradition continues through other passages created by the ongoing tradition of western thought. Arendt embraces creation through her reading of natality but always seeks to retain the disclosive tradition that reflects her understanding of Heidegger’s thought. Illumination emerges out of a fusion of these two considerations.

This is illustrated when she says that the five senses give the intellect (apprehension, Verstand) the information to determine the existence of an object, as suggested by the German translation of the Latin, perceptio as Wahrnehmung, or truth through the perceptions. The sixth sense, however, is to do with reason (comprehend, begreifen, Vernunft) or meaning. It asks not whether an object exists ‘but what it means for it to be’. The confusion that Arendt is seeking to avoid is Verstand being mistaken for her conception of the understanding heart and its mixture of kardia and phronesis. This is reflected in her own foundational imperative that framed her dissertation – “Love means that I want you to be”. Arendt explains this understanding in detail stressing the end of the ‘threefold commonness’ is the acknowledgment of a reality. Yet the meaning of this reality is not provided by these five senses. The sixth sense is required, the sense that provides the context, or the meaning of the five senses’ collaboration:

[In the world of appearances, filled with error and semblance, reality is guaranteed by this three-fold commonness: the five sense, utterly different from each other, have the same object in common; members of the same species have the context in common that endows every single object with its particular meaning; and all other sense-endowing beings, though perceiving this object from utterly different perspectives, agree on its identity. Out of this threefold commonness arises the sensation of reality.]

Each of these five senses relates to the world through a ‘perceptible property’. Yet there is a sixth sense. The property of relation is reality. The sensation of reality, or the sheer thereness, is a context. This feeling of thereness is an existential condition that signals the condition of harmony in pre-

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116 At the heart of this division in Meagher’s eyes is a question of strength and weakness. For his Augustine asks the confronting question of whether we have the capacity to create the world in which we live in, or do we merely dwell on the world that is constructed previous to our existence? Phrased in this way Arendt must seek to find a relationship between these two worlds as well. This she does through the idea of simultaneity.
117 Thinking, p. 57. (Arendt’s italics) This distinction is of course at the foundation of western philosophy. See p. 58 for a discussion of Aristotle and then Leibniz.
119 Thinking, p. 50.
understanding in the sense of *delectatio*. Significantly for Arendt's investigation, she says that this context never appears entirely, just like Being. Disclosure which suggests revelation in entirety is therefore not the appropriate description, but rather the notion of illumination. In her section on Thomas Aquinas in *The Life of the Mind*, she discusses this identification of a sixth sense in the work of this inheritor of the Augustinian tradition. Aquinas defined his common sense as an inner sense, the common root of all exterior senses, because they need the realness to exist. On the next page of her analysis she further clarifies this notion by saying that thinking can neither prove nor destroy the feeling of *realness* arising out of the sixth sense. . .” which, she adds, the French call *le bon sens*, recalling her words in “Understanding and Politics”.121

(ii)  *Kairos and the Future: The Past as Possibility*

The most interesting aspect of the *Willing* volume emerges when it is read as if the third volume is ready for the reader to commence at the end of section IV. The topic of the conclusion to *Willing* is “The abyss of freedom and the *novus ordo seclorum*”. More specifically, it is the thought and influence of Augustine. The conceptual focus is on the notion of foundation, principles, the moment between past and future, and the Roman experience (and therefore Cicero, Montesquieu and Machiavelli).122

As previously mentioned, Arendt turns to the thought of Thomas Aquinas under the influence of Gilson. The lineage of Augustine is the basis for choosing this reference point in the history of the faculty of willing. But Arendt returns the emphasis to thinking as part of her discussion. The thought of Augustine has now becomes the monastic tradition of thinking. Augustine, regarded as a man of experience not a product of monastic seclusion, is advocated as a thinker whose thoughts emerge from experiences in the world.123 Experience in the Scholastic tradition is used merely to confirm their *vita contemplativa* derived conclusions. From this position, Thomas Aquinas therefore determines his seminal understanding of the role of thinking in the tradition. In discussing this Thomastic version of the mind’s workings Arendt reveals her understanding of the mind’s dynamic, and she does this by referring back to Augustine and interestingly the emergence of what later becomes her definition of the imagination – the faculty that holds the key to her understanding of judgement.

The will is given its objects by the intellect, and the apprehensive orders proceed and therefore dictate the appetitive orders. Arendt says that in Augustine the Intellect related to whatever was

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120 For a definition for Arendt's 'Being': “Being, since Parmenides the highest concept of Western philosophy, is a thought-thing

121 *Thinking*, p. 52.

122 The final sentence, in fact, provides us explicitly with the general link between the two volumes.

123 *Willing*, p. 113.
present in the mind. In Thomas this is further clarified as he says that first principles start the reasoning process that deals with particulars presented to it. Overall the conception of the mind in Thomas is that the will is regarded as the end while these first principles are regarding as the beginning but, Arendt warns, these are not temporal descriptions but rather logical ones. The first principles are defined later as Being, or Life and the life instinct.\textsuperscript{124} The implications of this are significant for Arendt as they taint the tradition of thought that bases its understanding on the mind and its faculties on this interpretation of Thomas' Augustine. As a consequence of Aquinas' interpretation the ultimate goal of the Intellect is now to exist forever while the Will's goal is seen as directed to particular goods. But the will is different from the desires and the will must ascend to a desire before it is pursued. In the later reading of Schopenhauer the Will becomes primal or the Thomastic first principle or life instinct. As the truth becomes that which the will demands to carry on living, the will dictates truth replacing reason in this role. This leads to the idea that the universal is nobler that the particular. This is very Aristotelian as Thomas also said that the sum is greater than the parts. Yet, in the tradition, Duns Scotus objected, and he is regarded by Arendt as the only one who really has taken this approach. The individual has greater 'ontological status' than the species. This leads to the idea that an individual is more important than the species (like Kierkegaard over Hegel, as Arendt points out).

With this in mind Arendt details a clash between thinking and willing. This clash is seen by her as having a significant impact on the way thinking has been conceived in the modern age. The temporal aspect of Arendt's interpretation again comes to the fore. In her view the Now of thinking is replaced by the futural aspect of willing. The introduction of progress resulted from this change. In doing so Arendt is prefiguring her conclusions that Heidegger was equally captured by this change in perspective and is essential to her own perspective when she discusses Jaspers and Heidegger and their ideas of the will in the modern age. She focuses especially on Heidegger and his early emphasis on the future (though not progress), although she acknowledges that the will was not necessarily at the centre of his philosophical treatise. The Augustinian term of Sorge, or care, became the philosophical term that encapsulated his understanding of the role of the future. This conception developed and in his later work it was transformed into a passivity of willing-not-to-will.\textsuperscript{125} Arendt focuses on the impact that this new perspective has on the role of remembrance and she does this by exploring Hegel's concept of history and the 'World Spirit'. In Hegel's thought the past becomes

\textsuperscript{124} ibid., p. 119. (Arendt's italics) The implications for this determination come later in the discussion.

\textsuperscript{125} ibid., p. 13.
simply the disappearance of the future.\textsuperscript{126} Hegel says that the I-shall-be becomes the I-shall-have-been. Therefore the past is produced by the future and thinking is the result of the will. The will finds its primacy. The implications for this become apparent for Arendt when she says that Heidegger also conceptualises this in \textit{Being and Time}: the three-dimensional temporal dynamic in Heidegger’s thought retains this Hegelian formulation, leaving the future as the foundational tense: “\textit{Die Gewesenheit entspringt in gewisser Weise der Zukunft}”.\textsuperscript{127}

To solve this problem Arendt believes that she needs to return to the original notion that love is desire.\textsuperscript{128} Humans aim to make him or herself happy. This happiness is premised though on life itself, which being mortal is not in the possession or control of the individual. Craving has to work from some point and it is always the present and includes the present notion of happiness. Subsequently it is always frustrated. As a consequence to this, a life (though only a self-reflective, thoughtful life) must project its desired happy life into the absolute future or eternity.\textsuperscript{129} This, Arendt suggests, gives us an insight into the way memory works through such remembrance. Augustine states that memory’s great power is its capacity to bring back the past. The importance swings from the future to the past as the future is based upon the past and memory drives expectation and it is in “the present in which they coincide that determines human existence.” In other words, this is the opposite to what she discussed regarding Hegel for \textit{The Life of the Mind}. This, as she explicitly states in the dissertation, rejects the understanding of Heidegger and his emphasis on the ‘expectation of death’ in his philosophy.\textsuperscript{130} Arendt now says that this process enables an individual to participate in the ‘immutable’; “the remotest past and the most distant future are not only, objectively speaking, the single twofold “before” of human life, but can be actualised as such while man is still alive.”\textsuperscript{131} The present thus becomes important because it is ‘now’ that focuses these two important aspect of existence, past and future, remembrance and anticipation.\textsuperscript{132} By understanding the way memory

\textsuperscript{126} As Heidegger says, “the past, the “having been,” has its origin in a certain sense in the future.” \textit{Being and Time}, § 65, p. 326.

\textsuperscript{127} By looking at the command of “love thy neighbour as thyself” the expectation is that self-love is important to understanding its meaning, yet it is not. The futural dependency of Augustine’s notion of love in this instance negates both self-love and love of the neighbour. What about that which is next to yourself - the neighbour? To be true to this statement what is required is a love that is separate from desire; love that is not a kind of craving is the best description of this goal. On the other hand, as Arendt points out, desire, being dependent on the future, seems to involve a love that is “nondesirable”.

\textsuperscript{128} This paints a particularly gloomy picture for a thoughtful person. However if they can possibly shed the unstable reference point of the desiring self, resulting in, as Arendt herself puts it, self-oblivion. This self-oblivion is not liberation, rather it means compete absorption of the self in the desiring process. The “horizon of human experience” is now restricted by the future and it is only this reference point that good and evil can be determined from correctly.

\textsuperscript{129} See \textit{Being and Time}, §46-52 as the footnote in the text suggests.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Love and St. Augustine}, pp. 56-7.

\textsuperscript{131} The potential for eternity therefore enables man to be ‘happy’ and remember here that the purpose is to escape time and achieve eternity; “[t]he presentation of past and future in which both coincide annihilates time and man’s subjectivity to it.” \textit{Ibid.}, p. 37.
works, we can determine whether this role of remembrance allows such a solution to be viable. Memory therefore transcends the present and to guard the past. Arendt concludes that “it is the nature of memory to transcend present experience and guard the past, just as it is the nature of desire to transcend the present and reach toward the future.” Instead of assuming that desire is forward looking only, we find that in fact it is dependent on the past – through memory. The direction of the looking back into the past is of course towards the creation of human existence. Following Augustine’s belief that remembrance is recollection, or the collection of one after a process of dispersion, as Arendt says, “[t]he search for the origin begins with recollection from dispersion.” Therefore, to have an understanding of happiness it must be present in the individual to begin with as part of being an individual. The dependency of the future leaves out a dependency on the present. It is the past that produces the understanding of what the happy life is, and should desire when this has occurred. And the amor amoris Dei, under whose auspices the recollection goes about its business, already presupposes a relation with God that the simple amor Dei, the craving for God, seeks to establish.” This is similar to confession, Arendt suggests, and the real purpose of this remembrance is not simply the search for the happy life, but, rather, the desire to gain an understanding of the One who ultimately created, or in Arendt’s framework, the moment of foundation. Arendt says in reference to her portrayal of Augustine’s thought that only humans can take themselves back to their

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133 The question of interpretation comes to Arendt’s inquiry at this moment as she argues that the present context influences the form of the past memory. The past is interpreted through the present and subsequently inspires the desire for the future.

134 Love and St. Augustine, p. 47. But there is another element in man’s life that makes him dependent – that is, desires – he desire the object. As Arendt says, “[t]he first time, however, this dependence arises out of the specific inadequacy of life and is always determined by the future, from which he expects ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in hope or fear.” The dependence from createdness is different though from this dependency on the object. It does not entail anticipation nor is it directed, rather it is based upon remembrance and a backward looking. (p. 51)

135 She sees herself as having set Augustine up as defining the Creator and eternity; that “the twofold ‘before’ grows out of these two intentions whose diametrical opposition he must reconcile. ibid., pp. 59-60. There is no doubt in Arendt’s mind that Augustine prioritizes the Christian element in his thought yet he still lingers with that conception of the Greek universe and in pursuing his notion of the “twofold” before he has to ignore the Christian aspect of his perspective. In summary, desire can only desire something it has acknowledged before hand. Augustine, Arendt says, saw this knowledge residing in memory; just as we call memory the faculty of remembering things past, thus we may without absurdity also call memory what in the present enables the mind to be present to itself that may understand by virtue of its own thought.” De Trinitate book 15, 14, 11 and not 11, 14 as the edited volume states.

136 Arendt asks the question, is it an innate idea; prior to all experience? In fact, Arendt says that it is not simply an innate idea; rather it is “specifically stored up in memory as the seat of consciousness.” Arendt goes further saying that “[w]hen happiness is projected into the absolute future, it is guaranteed by a kind of absolute past, since knowledge of it, which is present in us, cannot possibly be explained by any experience in this world.” So do we remember the happy life? Augustine answers this question, thus: “Is it like the way we remember joy? perhaps so, for even when I am sad, I remember joy, just as when I am miserable, I remember the happy life. But I never saw, or heard, or smelled, or tasted joy with the bodily sense. I experienced it in my mind when I rejoiced and knowledge of it has clung to my memory.” What should be noted here is the notion of the five senses do not provide a suitable reference point for the individual, rather something else is required in the mind. Love and St. Augustine, p. 47.

137 ibid., pp. 48-9. Remember that in the Confessions, (II, 1) Arendt asks why “the love of Thy love” cannot be the object of a desire? Arendt is linking the desire to be happy with a more significant, yet more disguised desire to find who created the desier. There is a dependence here and it is “already manifest in desire insofar as desire refers back to the self and not only aims at the desired good.” (p. 19)

138 The desire is dependent on God; “[t]hat man in his desire to be happy depends upon a notion of happiness that he could never experience in his earthly life, and that such a notion, moreover, should be the sole determinate of his earthly conduct, can only signify that human existence as such depends on something outside the human condition as we know and experience it. ibid., pp. 50-1.
own origin through the capacity of consciousness. She suggests that only when this occurs "can a created thing be said to be truly" and achieve an ontological status. And this involves the idea of desire without possessiveness. As she says during her lectures on Kant, "Augustin: Amo: Volo ut sis. A confirmation of the sheer arbitrariness of being: We have not made ourselves, we stand in need of confirmation. We are strangers, we stand in need of being welcome. I want you to be." 

This is a particular existential state, with participation of others (to welcome), and it must be seen in the context of Arendt's temporality. Arendt wanted to balance the past and the future in the present, respecting the present. To do this she had to balance the role of memory and imagination in the present. This is helped by the understanding that "the return to one's origin (redire ad creatorem) can at the same time be understood as an anticipating reference to one's end (se referre ad finem). The 'anticipated future' is still important to Arendt, but she wishes to balance the thought of Heidegger and his one-dimensional emphasis on this future. As Arendt says "[n]ot until the beginning and the end coincide does the twofold 'before' acquire its proper meaning" and this is in the moment because "the postulated eternity of Being makes beginning and end interchangeable in terms of the temporal creature's reference to its own existence." The Augustinian Creator resides in a location that is eternal [no-time], not of a different temporal mode; man who has three tenses of time can only unite them through memory and expectation.

It is significant that even though Arendt places the past as her foundational tense she does not infer any failure on Hegel's part however. The reasons for this become evident when she describes his attempt to re-balance the temporal dynamic. Arendt believed that Hegel wished that the future becomes the Now and therefore willing becomes thinking again. With this in mind it is significant that Arendt follows on from this and speaks in admiration for Hegel's notion that "thought precedes and shapes reality". This notion, Arendt points out, is the opposite of the Owl of Minerva perspective. Nonetheless, it is this attempted reconciliation – or in another term, a harmony – that Arendt admires.

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139 Arendt's original italics. She continues saying that "[w]ithout it, man's existence, like the existence of the world, is utterly perishable. For Augustine it is a matter of course that true Being and perishability are mutually exclusive." ibid., p. 51. Arendt quotes Augustine saying that "man is something so long as he adheres to him by whom he was made a man. For if man withdraws from God, man is nothing." This shows that man is dependent and this dependence is 'inherent' because it is an essential aspect of the act of creation.

140 Lecture notes: Kant 1964, 032288.

141 ibid., p. 56. Arendt focuses on the exchangeability of the beginning and end - and this, for her, gives rise to three questions that emerge out of Augustine's understanding. The first question is what is Augustine's understanding of Being as this enables him to determine man's "true being" that is represented to man as "the twofold "before" of absolute past and absolute future." The second is what is of 'this life' that enables man through "returning to the self" (redire ad se) to reveal something that he would not be able to reveal in the actual possibility of life in itself. Finally, Arendt asks, what is this life or rather world in which man exists within, a world that he "both does and does not belong" (p. 57).

142 ibid., p. 56.

143 As Arendt says "existence is fieri [becoming]", In this process an individual makes meaning of what otherwise would be merely a link of singular temporal units, and enables the individual to escape the 'distraction' of this otherwise meaningless progression.
She uses the example of the French Revolution and the idea that a reconciliation had occurred between the ‘Divine’ and the ‘secular’ and this is mirrored in her own relationship between Arendt’s ‘Divine’ or the Now of thinking and her secular or her vita activa. Consequently, the attempt to unite the futural perspective of the Will and the enduring present of thought was not successful. Arendt argues that Hegel would have seen it as a success, however, due to his cyclical view of time.

Yet the Will demands a rectilinear notion of time. Hence, behind Hegel’s solution is the World Spirit. Accordingly, recollection only allows the mind to take one more step further up the levels of existence. Arendt says that Heidegger attempts the same thing and in the process clearly defines her position. Hegel’s dialectic starts from Being (negating nothingness automatically) rather than Creaio ex nihilo (Arendt’s position), and it is therefore foundation. So when Arendt quotes Hegel saying “All we can think is “a Nothing from which Something is to proceed; so that Being is already contained in the Beginning””, she is rejecting that idea that being is contained within the Beginning but not the idea that something else is such as the principle of foundation.

The problem is one of beginnings, which is also highlighted in Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel. As he saw it, the great Hegelian system had no beginning. An illustration of Arendt’s understanding of this comes much later, but it is essential to the notion of the moment that is a focus in her dissertation. In The Life of the Mind, ‘Willing’, Arendt explores Hegel’s theory of the ‘triadic dialectical movement’ as she examined Hegel’s attempt to reconcile classical and post-classical conceptions of time. Inspired by the French Revolution, Hegel attempted to synthesise both the rectilinear and cyclical as he also reconciled the antagonistic thinking and willing ego. The ‘futural’ characteristic of the will and the ‘enduring present’ of thinking had to be reconciled by Hegel because, according to Arendt, while “the wills of men are necessary to bring the spiritual realm about”, the

144 Willing, p. 46.
145 ibid., p. 47.
146 ibid., p. 48.
147 ibid., p. 50.
150 In Repetition Kierkegaard uses Aristotle in his work, preferring the Aristotelian notion of motion over the Hegelian understanding of transition. James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 115. The problem of Hegel’s dialectic is that is does not explain how the initial movement to antithesis-thesis comes about in the scheme. What is the motivating force? Without this explanation, the process will always be only theoretical never real. The Hegelian scheme is only ever going to be a conceptual device. A real system requires the passions as well as the intellectual structure: passions that create that moment of creation and therefore its initial motivation. In suggesting this, he is following Pascal’s use of the heart and Rousseau use of emotions. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard uses the passion of faith as the great motivation and contrasts this to Hegel’s view of the conscience in The Philosophy of Right. See the section titled “Good and Conscience.” In Hegel, conscience belongs to the life between the ordinary and Sittlichkeit. In the latter, life is moral and therefore there is no need for the conscience. Conscience questions the norms and can decide being no longer or ever valid that evil is the only alternative. Or, as Hegel believes, an individual would equate their life with universal principles and institutions. What Kierkegaard is concerned with now, is the tendency in the tradition of thought to distinguish between the cognitive and appetitive orders, or between knowing and desiring and willing.
151 Willing, p. 47 passim.
spiritual realm is Now, the enduring present, in the minds of men. Arendt uses her own translation here and not the translation of Sibree whom she frequently quoted. Arendt wanted to emphasise her own reading; the result is not Sibree's "...as occupying itself with the True, has to do with the eternally present. Nothing in the past is lost for it, for the Idea is ever present; Spirit is immortal; with it there is no past, no future, but an essential now."\textsuperscript{152} Rather "what is true eternally, neither with Yesterday nor with the Tomorrow, but with the Present as such, with the 'Now' in the sense of absolute presence ..."\textsuperscript{153} The emphasis is on the 'Now' as timelessness between past and future.

Hegel's project though is within his larger project and is therefore still involved with his dependency on the future, or when the Owl of Minerva starts to fly. Men and their thinking will always have time while 'the flight' will arrest time completely. This is because nothing new could ever happen again for this flight to start. This reconciliation is a failure though as Arendt argues Hegel would not have thought so. The reason is that Being was rather Becoming in Hegel's thoughts. The assertion of Becoming for the thinking ego meant that its movement could be circular and, if the willing ego demands a rectilinear trajectory, where the beginning and the end occur in succession becomes the trajectory. This trajectory is actually the 'World Spirit' behind humanity's succession of the generations. However, Arendt cannot see Being as Becoming and deems that Hegel's attempt fails as it negates in the process both willing and thinking instead of relating them and maintaining their prominence. This system of Hegel also assumes a beginning that can never be. The question of where does the motion of the dialectical begin is never fully examined: partly, Arendt suggests, because of the difficulty and challenge of the answer. As such, in Arendt's terms, Being is assumed to always be (or the start that started the start). Hegel does not consider "Christian metaphysics" in this and therefore \textit{Creatio ex nihilo}. Hegel does not allow the thinking and willing ego in his understanding to cause friction, desiring instead to resolve their temporal problem. As a consequence, Hegel's system does not satisfactorily answer the question of the beginning. Hegel simply wished to design history for the future. Arendt wished to correct this emphasis in contemporary thinking.

As Arendt leaves it in the completed sections of \textit{The Life of the Mind}, with the temporal dimension of past possibility, the principle captured in the act of foundation provides the individual with their reference point for the acting world. The principle is part of the world inbetween, which is of the 'community-in-togetherness' that is now Arendt's space of appearance, established through the act of foundation and is similar to the role of Adam in her dissertation. The discussion of Adam is now an

\textsuperscript{152} ibid., p. 79. [Sibree's italics];

\textsuperscript{153} ibid.
exploration of a metaphor that Arendt associates with principle and foundation. What this principle is, however, is not specified by Arendt. Therefore, instead of this pursuing focus, Arendt concentrates on the conditions required for its revelation where the process is encapsulated by her notion of storytelling. Regardless, the individual though still has to comprehend the principle and this can only occur through illumination and the act of storytelling. For this to happen the individual must achieve the right state of mind. Arendt never explicitly articulates this state yet her original work on Augustine provides the framework for her intentions to be understood. Arendt develops her own trinity that requires harmonisation so that it can connect with the world and its principle and provide the authority for the individual. This trinity expressed in the terms being used so far is Remembrance, the Understanding Heart and Gemüt. With this reading it is now appropriate to explore Arendt’s reading of judgement in the context of the following observation: “... a being whose essence is beginning may have enough of an origin within himself to understand without preconceived categories and to judge without the set of customary rules which is morality.”

154 “Understanding and Politics”, p. 321,
Chapter Seven

Arendt, Kant and her Theory of Judgement: Memory, Understanding and Love

1. The Foundations of the Arendtian Trinity: Memory, Understanding and Love

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1. The Foundations of the Arendtian Trinity: Memory, Understanding and Love

An interpretation of Arendt's overall project in The Life of the Mind is provided by her own thoughts when she focuses on the need for harmony in the faculties in her volume on 'Willing'. In a strange section of this work, Arendt talks about tonality or the production of moods, and the way in which the mind affects the soul. Suddenly the reader is provided with a discussion on moods, or the affect the mind has on the passions of an individual. Having separated the soul and therefore the passion from the mind she seems to return to an Augustinian definition of the mind as a 'rational soul' and its encompassing of the passions as well. The will produces tenseness and therefore upsets the balance between thinking (serenity) and remembrance (melancholy), and therefore the harmony of the world. The self, defined as the faculties of the mind, achieves a harmony when the abrasiveness of the will's condition is assuaged by the harmonious association of thinking and remembrance. In an important indication of Arendt's thought, she suggests that this relationship interferes with the harmony of the Arendtian world, that is, the idea of community. Arendt's endpoint is to achieve and maintain this relationship so that the world and the self are in harmony providing the conditions for good judgement.


2 The importance of Nietzsche and Heidegger to Arendt's thought is obvious given her tradition. But it is not until the end of the two chapters on their role in the history of the Will that their significance for Arendt in her later thought becomes readily evident. These two thinkers, similar to Arendt, read the existence of man as being out of harmony. While the tradition had assumed that thinking and willing were simply two faculties of man, Nietzsche and Heidegger proposed them as antagonistic opposites. With willing this disjunction had been frequently commented upon in the tradition. The consciousness of man, with its two-in-one dialogue between command and resistance, is now regarded as being out of harmony. But now, with Nietzsche and Heidegger thinking becomes involved in this disharmony.
By taking into account this and the Augustinian element in Arendt's thought, a new interpretation of the final phase of her thinking can be made, one that is sensitive to her mature understanding of the individual-in-the-world. In Arendt's final return to Kant's thought, the influence of trinitarian thinking again comes to the fore. The Augustinian notion of love has now evolved to become the spirit in a similar manner to Augustine's own progression in the *De Trinitate*. In retaining the inference of ordering from Heidegger and her early reading of Augustine, the original notion of right love in Arendt's thought becomes the right action, and if only implicitly, her theory of judgement. This is apparent in her method of thinking where she states in the 1964 Kant lectures that the theory of taste in Kant's understanding is equal to his theory of judgement. In the same lecture, following this comment, she details what this taste is as a faculty. The principle of judgement in Kant's theory of taste presumes an order in nature. Arendt's theory of judgment makes a similar presumption of ordering of her own world initially - the public realm or space of appearance - but also the temporal 'order of everything' or the 'principle of order'. At the very end of these lectures (though not the notes) Arendt says "Judgments of this kind are possible because World corresponds to Humanity. What appears not in the tulip but as it were behind it is the idea of an ordered nature, and what appears not in my judgement but behind it, what it refers to tacitly, is an ordered human community - Humanity." Although important to her understanding, but as a marginal comment in her lecture notes, Arendt highlights the "Stress on Future" in Kant as well as her role of foundation and principle when she responds, "You turn to the past in order to find the truth because truth can be only where things begin." Arendt is seeking her principles in this manner because the two previous sources, faith and reason, no longer provide the appropriate foundation for guiding humanity in action.

In her later lectures on Kant, Arendt makes the influence of Augustine more explicit when she continues this analysis by saying that Kant saw taste as equalling imagination, the intellect, and spirit;

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4 In her Kant 1964 lecture notes Arendt says, "World defined as realm of appearances", Library of Congress papers. Lecture notes: Kant, Political Philosophy: Chicago, Fall 1964 (032257). [Hereafter referred to as Kant 1964]
5 Kant 1964 (032295). This is reinforced by her belief that the "Critique of Judgement is the only of his great writings where his point of departure is the World and the senses and capabilities which man or men (in the plural) fit to be inhabitants of it" (032259).
6 Kant 1964, (032252). On the principle of judgement, Arendt quotes Kant from the introduction of *Critique of Judgement* "The possibility of a teleological judgement about nature can be deduced from a principle of reason without necessary reflecting upon a principle of Judgement", namely as an independent human faculty. "The possibility of aesthetic . . . judgement, on the contrary, i.e. a judgement of Taste, can be justified only if we prove through a Critique of Judgement that judgement exists as a faculty containing its own principle". Concluding: "Hence it is actually only Taste . . . in which alone Judgement reveals itself as a faculty with its own special principle" (032257).
7 This is discussed in her 1955 lecture on political theory when she explores the breakdown of tradition in these terms: "The ordering principle, the standards of judgement were found in the world disclosed either by reason or by faith. Whereby Reason [sic] and Faith belong together. When faith was challenged, reason too was challenged, and vice versa." Library of Congress papers: "History of Political Thought", Berkeley, 1955, p. 9 (023952).
or what was, in Arendt’s reading, his trinity of the mind. She goes even further suggesting that the spirit is the special faculty over imagination, the intellect and now reason. In this context, Spirit is defined as the communicability of a state of mind and the ability to express a state of mind is Gemütszustand. 

Indicating she is still thinking politically, on the following page Arendt relates judgement to the creation of a space of appearance. This element of Gemüt becomes Arendt’s unspoken reflection of love from her dissertation that would have finalised her own trinity through the human faculty of judgement if the lecture series had been completed. It is this element of her lectures that reveal Arendt’s thought trains from Augustine to her potential destination in the philosophy of Kant.

(i) *The Individual and the World: Between the Singular and the Universal*

Arendt’s individual-in-the-world has now developed to a final stage in her thinking. Arendt’s concept of the individual as homo temporalis and the world as space of appearance provides her with the context for her notion of judgement. These elements provide a different interpretation of Arendt’s intentions in her final, unfinished work. They allow a reconsideration of how she intended to answer the question of judging in a contemporary world. Steinberger and Beiner follow Gadamer in radically subjectivising the Kantian aesthetic leading them to exclude cognitivist elements and a theory of judgement excluding knowledge. Beiner uses Habermas and Aristotle to restore content to the Arendtian theory of judgement. Steinberger sees Arendt allowing too much for ambiguity, ineffability and flux. Steinberger sets up a dichotomy between cognitivist and non-cognitivist modes of rationality and between cognitivist rationality and nihilism. He argues that Arendt’s theory does not provide the norms that are required to provide foundations for making judgements. Arendt’s theory, instead, is based in a ‘radically historicized, antimetaphysical, post-Nietzschean tradition’ and this tradition demands that the foundations are to be only ‘conventional or contextual’. In reply to this, Biskowski has found Arendt suggesting that these standards come from the human capacity to present the heroic or exemplary figure for comparison in their minds. But the question remains as to how we are expected to distinguish between the good and the bad in order to determine the appropriate examples. The criteria could exist, as Biskowski notes, in the broader spectrum of her political thought. Judgement for Arendt exists within the political tradition rather than the philosophical and

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8 This is evident however in her Kant 1964 lectures if not spelled out when she says, “I can communicate in judging of an object my subjectivity, or the “mood” into which the accord of my faculties brings me, and the effect of my being conscious of this mood, this accord in confronting things qua appearances, is a “quickening”, Belebung, of the mind.” (0522-7). 
9 *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 52-3. 
metaphysical tradition and it was this tradition that Arendt sought to re-endow with meaning. The Greek option that Arendt seemingly presents does not stand up to closer inspection. Her romantic notion of Athenian life is not stable enough for this; other themes in her work have to be referred to as Biskowski does when he opts for action and her Heideggerian understanding of the ‘world’. But as has already been investigated, Arendt’s references to the tradition provide a very different approach to this topic.

In Arendt’s reading of Kant’s Third Critique the method of thinking is very important; specifically its non-cognitive attempt at discerning the truth. This is radical subjectivisation of the Kantian aesthetic in the eyes of Beiner and Steinberger, and is similar, as both noted, to Gadamer’s approach. Steinberger says that Arendt’s theory of judgement cannot be “a master of knowledge”. Yet, taking different directions in response, Beiner has to look to Aristotle and Habermas to gain some moral and political content in her work, while Steinberger argues that Arendt sails too close to nihilism and relativism and retains too much ambiguity in her solution. In another approach, Dana Villa says that Arendt’s aesthetic is vital to her understanding but in a Nietzschean vein. The way Villa sees it, the attraction of Kant’s theory of judgement for Arendt was the solution to a problem she perceived required a solution to satisfy the demands of politics in the twentieth century. The creation of a space between the understanding of Plato and the understanding of Nietzsche is vital to her project of providing political action with a sustainable guide. The objective universal validity of Kant’s first two critiques that founds the cognitive and practical aspects is absent. Instead, what Kant formulates is one that resides in-between these dichotomies of objectivity and perspectivism. Both are drawn upon to create Arendt’s (and Kant’s) understanding of reflective judgement. For example Arendt sees the validity of this way as it retains the understanding of it “appears to me” because “each person occupies a place of his own from which he looks upon and judges the world”, while the other hand, the world by exist within this actually “common to all its inhabitants”. The relationship between the

11 ibid., p. 570.
12 Kant’s entire purpose in attending to the “Critique of Taste” was to ground feeling in reason. The first insight that facilitates this is the link between pleasure and purposiveness. Purposiveness (or, as Meredith, renders it finality) or rather the “purpose [again, end] is the object of a concept in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its object is its purposiveness (forma finalis).” In other words it is the link whereby the concept makes the existence of the object actual. Remember that Kant believed that the object could not exist unless the human mind could apprehend it. Just by recognising and acknowledging an object was not enough, as the object needed to be formed through a concept - or caused through a concept and process called noumenal causality. So distinguished because it could not occur in the world of phenomena. For Kant this needed a ‘will’ to allow this to occur so he has to explain the ‘will’ in §10. Hence the relevancy of this thinking to human freedom and responsibility and the use of the Second Critique for the Third.
particularity and the general is very evident in this formulation. The universal that Arendt is talking of is actually the universal of the world inbetween, created by men in the desert or the natural of Kant’s phenomenal world. Further a challenge to judgements that come out of this formulation can only be resolved by acts of persuasion as the platform of an objective principle is absent. The resolution by this process is with specified criteria or even a criterion.

Also attractive to Arendt in Kant’s theory of judgement was its concern for the singular without any reliance on the universal. This was the specific problem that Arendt was searching for an answer to in her turn to Kant. She was seeking to establish a relationship between the particular and the universal where the particular contained a universal that could be used to judge other events without a dictatorial imperative. It must be remembered that this line of thinking was considered by Arendt to be required only in the situation where the traditional methods of judging had failed and the standards that derive from that traditional thought were no longer valid in the context the individual found themselves in. This demanded a creative conception of judgement. The normal capacity of judgement was different, though just as important. To think representationally was argued to be central to this normal state of judgement. Kant’s aesthetic judgement was the source of Arendt’s reflections and she went so far as to assert that Kant’s unwritten political philosophy was contained within his work on aesthetics. “They were”, she stated in her lectures,

the only of [his] great writings where his point of departure is the World and the senses and capabilities which made men (in the plural) fit to be inhabitants of it. This is perhaps not yet political philosophy, but it certainly is its conditions sine qua non. If it could be found that in the capacities and regulative traffic and intercourse between men who are bound to each other by the common procession of a world (the earth) there exists an a priori principle, then it would be proved that man is essentially a political being.

In an early essay on Kant’s thought Arendt writes that it is normally argued that Kant’s political philosophy occurs in Critique of Practical Reason but suggests a different focus because “it can . . . be seen from all his political writings that for Kant himself the theme of “judgement” carried more

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17 The singular, or to say ‘this roses is beautiful’, is a singular judgement while ‘roses are beautiful’ is a cognitive, universal judgement. This is because the aesthetic judgement is made to satisfy a new stimulus. Therefore no previous concept is adequate to comprehend this new event, only the feeling it conjures. The result for Kant is a judgement that is subjective and non-cognitive. But it still was supposed to have a both universal consent and necessity, or the features of a priori judgements. But were these the same universality and necessity? Not really was Kant’s answer. The universality was not logical universality, but rather intersubjective. The necessity was similarly distinguished from logical necessity by its claim as ‘exemplary’ necessity of that particular instance. See Kant, Critique of Judgement. §18.74. Even with these specific definitions of universal consent and necessity, could they still lead to an a priori principle? Ind., (trans. Meredith), §§29:117. So Kant had argued that the singular could be universal and necessary, or a priori. What we have here is Kant being a die-hard ‘proceduralist’ that put procedure above the common sense. He wants to achieve something and as long as the procedure can be manipulated to facilitate it, the ‘logic’ of the outcome is beyond question.

18 In her Kant 1964 lectures she reiterates this saying: “Judgement the connecting link between the particular and the general” (032249) and then later “Judgement: the faculty of thinking the particular in connection with the universal” (032260).

19 Quoted in Beiner’s interpretative essay discussing Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 15.
weight than that of “practical reason”. Arendt saw Kant’s political philosophy in *Practical Reason* as a particular way of thinking that evolves around the age old ideas of non-contradiction and agreement with one’s conscience. But with *Judgement*, Arendt suggests, Kant provides a different understanding that exceeds this limiting conception by demanding the subject be able ‘to think in the place of everyone else’. Another important aspect of Kant’s thought here that is relevant to her political project is the more existential emphasis that this concept of judgement requires. No longer is the noumenal self-law-making for humanity in general but embodied subjects existing in the important world of appearances. Arendt argues that Kant’s moral theory does not consider judgement in the context of the particular; “For judgement of the particular - *This* is beautiful, *This* is ugly; *This* is right, *This* is wrong - has no place in Kant’s moral philosophy. Judgement is not practical reason; practical reason ‘reasons’ and tells me what to do and what not to do; it lays down the law and is identical with the will, and the will utters commands; it speaks in imperatives. Judgement, on the contrary, arises from ‘a merely contemplative pleasure or inactive delight’.” And this is the crux of Arendt’s analysis.

Arendt believes it is important in the third *Critique* that Kant does not see the subject merely as an abstract cognitive being but as they ‘really are’; that is beings in society and this society is still the idea of community. It is indicative that Arendt involves a concept of care in her own thoughts which is still close to its Augustinian roots. She suggests its lineage in her 1964 Kant lectures when she says “[w]hat Kant calls taste, Cicero called cultura animi, a mind so trained and cultivated that it can be trusted with judging and taking care of the world.” How clearly this perspective ties in with her emphasis on the mind is apparent when she states what she is investigating in these early, explorative lectures; simply “how adequate our faculties are for being at home in the world.”

Kant has moved from thinking about all intelligible beings to actually acknowledging that human beings are the subject and that they exist on earth in a society amongst other human beings. Kant now sees the particular first without the demand that it is subsumed under the universal that is pre-

21 To continue, “freedom is portrayed as a predicate of the power of imagination and not of the will, and the power of imagination is linked most closely with that wider manner of thinking which is political thinking par excellence, because it enables us to “put ourselves in the minds of other men”, ibid., and also the essay “Crisis in Culture” published in *Between Past and Future*, pp. 219-220.
23 Lectures on *Kant’s Political Philosophy*, p. 15. In her Kant 1964 lectures she gives an interesting link between Cicero and Kant when she uses a quote from Cicero’s De Officiis III “All men discriminate between right and wrong in matters of art and proportion through some silent sense without any knowledge of art or proportion.” Arendt follows this by saying, “This they do by virtue of communis sensus” (032252).
25 Lectures on *Kant’s Political Philosophy*, p. 13.
given. Moreover, he can see the possibility of the universal coming out of the particular.27 This fits in perfectly with the discourse required for the public realm because of its non-coercive nature; “[o]ne can never compel anyone to agree with one’s judgements - ‘This is beautiful’ or ‘this is wrong’ (Kant does not believe that moral judgements are the product of reflection and imagination, hence they are not judgements strictly speaking); one can only ‘woo’ or ‘court’ the agreement of everyone else.”28 Reflective judgement is seen by Kant as a judgement that does not require mediating concepts or categories that have been determined in advance.29 This aspect of the chapter on reflective judgement is the aspect that is most attractive to Arendt. The role of the particular in understanding a universal, which does not negate the particular; “one may encounter or think of some table that one judges to be the best possible table and take this table as the example of how tables actually should be: the exemplary table (‘example’ comes from *eximere*, ‘to single out some particular’). This exemplar is and remains a particular that in its very particularity reveals the generality that otherwise could not be defined.”30 Arendt takes this definition further. She does see reflective judgement as restricted to only objects, or heroes. History can also be the subject of reflective judgement. Arendt’s conception of storytelling means that the particular event in history can contain meaning that goes beyond its historical location. In this notion of storytelling is the answer to Arendt’s understanding of the Third Critique. When Arendt turns to the mind in her thinking, her initial investigation of this faculty though her dissertation returns to assist her. She is still conscious of Heidegger’s failure of the self, compounded after the turn. Her dissertational reading of *phronesis*, *kardia*, and *kairos* explicitly returns to her considerations and provide Arendt with the framework that leads her to utilise Kant’s ‘enlarged mentality’, *sensus communis*, and finally imagination in her theory of judgement. Her conception of the neighbour and her temporal dimension of past possibility are all embraced in her final project.31

27 Kant’s third critique contains a distinction between two theories of judgement. The separation of judgement into two categories, determinate and reflective, enables Kant to separate the situation where a universal legislation applies and that which requires a universal to be formulated. The second theory, reflection, is the attraction for Arendt’s purposes. The particular comes first and the universal has to be found for it. Consequently, Kant saw the determinate judgement as cognitive and the reflective judgement as non-cognitive. In the chapter of reflective judgement Kant goes further and divides it between “Critique of Aesthetic Judgement” and “Critique of Teleological Judgement”. The first part is about the understanding of beauty while the second is about the “finality of nature”. The first part of the book is what interests Arendt though both contain the feature that she is looking for, namely the lack of a universal that subsumes the particular given before its existence.
28 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 72.
29 “Critique of Aesthetic Judgement” is about the understanding of beauty and the emotive reaction that occur when something is recognised as beautiful, “the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept.” Critique of Judgement, p. 151.
30 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 77.
31 Kant’s thought in Critique of Judgement provides Arendt with the material she requires to develop her own path. It is not surprising that while Jaspers was very enthusiastic that Arendt was returning to Kant in her intellectual travels, even offering to arrange some joint seminars with her to teach Kant, he declined when he discovered the actual path she was seeking to take with the German master’s work. See Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: Love of the World*, p. 422.
Arendt was attracted to Kant’s notion of ‘enlarged mentality’ because it contained the ideas of the primitive Christian experience. This can be seen in the way Arendt presents her understanding of Kant’s “enlarged mentality” in “Truth and Politics”: “[t]he very process of opinion formation is determined by those in whose places somebody thinks and uses his own mind, and the only condition for this exertion of the imagination is disinterestedness, the liberation from one’s own private interests.” Consequently, even a philosopher in isolated contemplation is still in discourse with somebody else, whether they admit it or not. Yet, as we have seen in the last quote, this intersubjectivity also requires, for Arendt, a quality that is much discredited in today’s understanding: “the quality of an opinion, as of a judgement, depends upon the degree of its impartiality.” Arendt berates modern man in general, not just the philosopher; “nothing indeed is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in the lack of imagination and failure to judge.” Kant’s enlarged mentality was “putting ourselves in the position of everyone else”. For Kant this was an attempt at universality but it also reveals the shift Kant makes away from the preceding philosophy’s emphasis with beauty in the object to its conception in the subject. The faculties that determined beauty become the presiding factor in Kant’s scheme as he attempts to comprehend their “harmony” or seek the “basis of . . . pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties.” In the process Kant realises the importance of the capacity for social communication; “[t]hat ability to communicate one’s mental state, even though it be only in respect of our cognitive faculties, is attended with a pleasure, is a fact which might easily be demonstrated from the natural propensity of mankind to social life, i.e., empirically and psychologically.” Arendt’s initial conception of enlarged mentality contains the kernels of Gemüt in its formulation, and also the primitive concept of kardia; elements that were retained when she developed this idea into the concept of sensus communis.

The actual lectures do seem to be on the role of sensus communis in Kant’s thoughts and this brings into focus Arendt’s concern for an individual and whether they have any reference point in their response to the world. While Kant spoke about the common sense as having a role in founding a hypothetical universal validation of aesthetic judgement, Arendt changes its role and seeks a role for it

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33 As Kant says, “the investigation of the faculties of cognition and their function in these judgements, and the illustration, by the analysis of examples, of their mutual subjective finality, the form of which in a given representation has been shown above to constitute the beauty of their object.” Kant, Critique of judgement, §34. (my italics)
34 Kant, Critique of Judgement, §9.
35 Arendt defines “common sense” as “an extra sense . . . that fits us into a community”. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 70.
in understanding. This role is one of staking out the terrain in which knowledge can become objective in the Arendtian sense. This has meant that Arendt has rejected Kant’s ontological understanding in the first Critique where the theoretical relationship with the world that man constructs is where objective understanding can come from. This rejection derives from Husserl and Heidegger’s arguments against this foundation of knowledge and their suggestions that it is our immediate relationship to the world where this understanding should occur.36

Even though Kant’s notion of sensus communis is an aesthetic one, Arendt quickly utilises this in a political and even moral form.37 She does not adhere to the Kantian idea of humans sharing a ‘nature’ as rational beings, rather Arendt uses her notion of the human condition. The five senses that we are born with are compatible with the way the world exists: sight, smell, sound, tactile, and taste. Our interpretation of these five different signals is not always coherent, but the sixth sense is the arbiter between them – common sense.38 This gives us the sensation of reality that fits us into the world of appearances.39 This is not the only factor as it depends as well on intersubjectivity. In The Human Condition, she says “the presence of others who see what we see and hear assures us of... reality”, and later, in On Revolution she continues to say “as we can never be sure of anything that only we ourselves know.”40 People who do not exist in public have only sensus privatus to guide them, which in Arendt’s eyes is no guide at all.41 For the judgements to be communicable, they must be intersubjectively valid, they must be in terms that other could comprehend. This means, for Kant, the existence of some common ground for understanding, or sensus communis, a level beyond the subjective point of view; “[u]nder the sensus communis we must include the idea of a sense common to all, i.e., a faculty which, in its reflection, takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of all other men in thought, in order, as it were, to compare its judgement with the collective reason of humanity, and thus to escape the illusion arising from the private conditions that could be so easily taken for objective, which would injuriously affect the judgement.”42 This quote lays out the essential role of Kant in the project of Arendt. The “common sense” of Kant provides the way to liberate a

36 This is illustrated by a person kept in solitary confinement. His reality is affected and to be in this situation is “to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appearance. To men the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all;... and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but without reality.” The Human Condition, p. 199.
37 See Kant, Critique of Judgement, §40.
39 Thinking, p. 50.
40 The Human Condition, p. 50 and then On Revolution, p. 92.
41 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 71. The same is said for ideology; “ideological thinking becomes emancipated from the reality concealed behind all perceptible things, dominating then from this place of concealment and requiring a sixth sense that enables us to become aware of it.” Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 470-71.
42 Kant, Critique of Judgement, §40.
person from one-dimensional thinking; achieved simply by the method of placing yourself in other’s perspective.

These two notions of enlarged mentality and *sensus communis* have become a common reference point for Arendtian commentators to develop an ethical theory from her works. In his own commentary on Arendt’s theory of judgement, Lawrence Biskowski is right in a certain manner to point out that “[t]here seems little room ... for social concerns and justice in Arendt’s vision of politics and action. All that matter is that actions stand out and generate stories.” This also summarises the accusations, in the various interpretations and commentaries produced since her death, that have been made against Arendt’s work regarding the substantive content that appears lacking in her thought. In *The Human Condition*, Arendt seems to clearly advocate a position of ‘action for action’s sake’. It appears not to allow for the legislation between good and evil actions. In Arendt’s case if this criticism is followed through then it is possible to argue that her version of action has latent totalitarian characteristics as it is “similar to the fascist devaluation of private experience and cult of ‘deeds’ as against thought.” The romantic and fascist ideal of the ‘deed’ have entirely different frames of reference to Arendt’s theory of action. Arendt believed that moral rules could be utilised to control action in the public realm, moreover to promote and demand conformity and predictability in action and curtail vitalising spontaneity. Given this measure, politics would become then merely the administration of society, as someone interprets the rules of conduct with the consequence, for Arendt, that people become objects in the course of existence. This use of morality then denies the power for people to open the future; a power Arendt holds as vital to a vibrant society. Arendt, then, saw the solution not in a new morality of old, but contained with the actual dynamic of political action, the production of “common sense”. This common sense is produced through undertakings in

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15 This echoes the criticism directed at Heidegger’s early conception of authenticity in *Being and Time*.
17 As an example, Arendt discusses Sorel’s ‘deed’ theory that comes from nineteenth century ‘life philosophy’. Arendt notes this in *Crisis of the Republic*, (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), pp. 166-169. Sorel was also anti-intellectual, as history was between the extremes of *elen* and *dentace*, and political acts would shake up the mediocire age he lived in.
18 Flinchman, “Common Sense and the Political Barbarism”, p. 334.
19 Here is the potential to answer the criticisms, or on occasion even the advantages, taken by commentators of the apparent absence of morality in Arendt’s understanding. Common is no longer the ‘common’ of everyday language. Like Kant, Arendt redefines common as an aggregate every day not merely reoccurring. Her common sense relies heavily on the Latin *sensus*. Here it means meaning and significance, as well as opinion. All of these definitions are implicit in the usage of common sense by Arendt; all derived from a single meaning, or single root experience. As Flinchman describes this process; “[d]rawing the strands together, we might say that common sense is a consensus or shared opinion on the significance of a common life, an opinion that internalised by all members of a political community and which prevents them from undertaking actions that would be non-sensical or violate of the imperative of public existence and its preservation.” Flinchman, *ibid.*, p. 328. There is a tendency to describe this understanding in a Rousseauian mould. Nonetheless, it is not Rousseau’s General Will that Arendt criticises in Chapter Two of *On Revolution*. This is mainly for his assumption that general agreement would arise naturally
public, and the consequential considerations of another’s point of view. It must be remembered that action was a definite category of human behaviour. The “who” rather than “what” is revealed by this section, and is where the creativity is required. Ideology intervened in the individual’s conception of reality and the intersubjectively derived capacity to understand experience and thought. This vacuity of thought allowed the modern being to be receptive to evil without consideration.50

Arendt’s action has common sense as a guiding principle, where the fascist appeal to action was based on manipulated emotions that prevented consideration of the reasons for action; a vital element in the immediate success of the fascist movements. The ‘power to speak meaningfully’ was Arendt’s logos, not the affirmation of a transcendental absolute. This reflects Arendt’s debt to the potential Aristotelian and actual Kantian emphasis on the principles of freedom, human rights and autonomy. These are the ideals of the Enlightenment and therefore Hannah Arendt is trying to affirm these ideals through the use of an amoral morality, or common sense. So the faculty of judgement is of a similar nature. Common sense is not something we are born with, rather it is something that is continually appraised through public interaction, and therefore continually reconstructed. Without this process all beliefs become mere dogma and ideology. Public life requires “the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no common measurements or dominator can ever be devised.”51 Common sense therefore resides and arbitrates in the space present between human beings. It belongs to no one person and therefore cannot be control led decisively by any one, organisation or government. Without the association that creates it, it cannot exist and disappears.52

Another commentator who seeks to take the same direction is Michael G. Gottsegen in The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt.53 Gottsegen wishes to extend Arendt’s understanding of common sense through his understanding of her ‘Action-Ideal’ and produce a ‘postmodern conception of common sense’ with a sound exposition of its epistemological basis.54 The purpose is to maintain the element

without discussion. The idea that a common good exists beyond the existence of human beings is against Arendt’s basic assumptions.

50 In the context of Kant, ideology is to reason as common sense stands to judgement. Reflective judgement of Kant only really wants to find a general rule. This rule is then used to evaluate single particular cases. Reason on the other hand is unconditional. Understanding comes from experience and then goes further than experience to the universal. System building is then seen as the next step and consequently an ideology which from a single premise explains history, both past and future. See Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 350.

51 The Human Condition, p. 57.

52 It seems from all the discussion regarding common sense that Arendt was asking for a culturally homogenous community when saying that ‘only those who are fundamentally alike... can act together as equals in the public realm’. Quoted in Benjamin Schwartz, “The Religion of Politics: Reflections on the Thought of Hannah Arendt”, Dissent, Vol. 17 No. 2 (1970), p. 147.


54 Ibid., p. 140.
of human dignity of difference that emerges out of the “welter of perspectival heterogeneity”. This desire on Gottsegen’s part is driven by seeing Arendt as attempting to transcend the Cartesian epistemological dead-end that prevented the fruition of her idea of political action caused by the breakdown of common sense. This epistemological dead-end was grounded in the Ancient Greek roots of western knowledge. But Arendt is aware of the another form of knowledge from her dissertation studies. This dead-end of the singular perspective also leads to the question of the other. By attempting to maintain the dignity of individuals the dignity of others must also be respected. This association also has a role in Arendt’s understanding of Kant. Kant argues that politics must always bend its knee to the services of morality and therefore the political serves moral purposes or ends.55 The imperative to do this is the notion of ‘respect for persons’. But what does this respect for persons actually mean in terms of transferring it to the political realm?

Kant is asking us to see individuals as precisely that - individuals. They are unique and therefore vital to our existence. The notion of self-love has a position in the schema. The desire is to link the other to yourself and that seeking their survival and betterment, you are also surviving yourself. This is part of the Augustinian roots of Kant’s composition (and then transcendence) of his Platonic, Aristotelian, (and even Augustinian) intellectual roots.56 Arendt takes up the suggestion that Kant was still being political even in his analysis of the beautiful - political, that is, in terms of the ethical. Arendt’s reading of the individual-in-the-world allows her to do this and her justification is found in her initial study through Augustine of primitive Christianity and their experiential concepts of phronesis, kardia, and kairos. The Kantian element of respect is taken up by Arendt as a reflection of her love of the neighbour represented in the concept of social caritas.57 What is happening is a collapse of Kant’s political and ethical understanding into his aesthetic one described in his Critique of Judgement. Arendt lays down this intent with her search for Kant’s political philosophy in this text. However, Arendt’s lectures merely explain to us that Kant had an eye on the singular in a plural world, yet wanted to still locate a transcendental source of its appreciation. Her concerns with the Third Critique

55 Patrick Riley discusses Kant’s ethics in relation to Augustine’s. The focus is Augustine’s concept of free will and its source in his delecta. Arendt was careful to separate these two aspects to Augustine’s thought, therefore avoiding Riley’s reading. “Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth and Politics” in Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Williams, Howard Lloyd, (ed.) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992), pp. 11-3. Reprinted from Political Studies, Vol. 35 No. 3 (1987), pp. 380-2.
57 For Kant, respect drives the true moral choice. The same had to be true in the case of the judgement of taste. Beauty must drive the aesthetic - in order to remain pure and impartial. This is not to deny that certain happiness (in the case of aesthetics Kant’s talks about ‘charm’) could not be a side product of this process, but it could definitely not be its cause: “[a]judgement of taste which is uninfluenced by charm or emotion (though these may be associated with the delight in the beautiful), and whose determining ground, therefore, is simply finality of form, is a pure judgement of taste.” Kant, Critique of Judgement, (trans. Meredith), §13-14.64-5. So autonomy from outside influences categorises this process - free choice. §32:124.
point to an interesting use of this text. However, her graduate lectures are merely an indication of her intent. What we can discern from the published work available to us is simply what Arendt found attractive about Kant's thinking in the *Third Critique*. The question will always remain, what Arendt would have actually done with her understanding of Kant's political philosophy? While a reader has a fair idea of which direction Arendt was seeking in Kant, the final argument was never articulated in any form.

In the *Kant Lectures*, Arendt highlights the political aspects of notions such as 'the common world', 'publicity' and the complex notion of 'universality'. She also therefore highlights the role of the self in his thought and its connection to other selves in a community. This leads to the role of the neighbour. Arendt saw that the problem was in the way these rigid ideologies were accepted by the populations, or at least the sections of the populations, and preserved the rule of these regimes. Conventional morality in the form of the Christian code of ethics was itself brutalised at the same time as members of the populations suffered.58 The individual consciences that were supposed to protect the public in general seemed to have failed; seeming to be too self involved to tell the ramifications of an individual action in terms of the general direction of the community surrounding them. Even if the individual listening to their consciences did operate as opponents of the regimes, the lack of publicity meant it became merely another opinion, and an opinion lacking the weight of public argument.59 Arendt, having noted all this, decided to confront this problem in non-moral terms, therefore avoiding the language of moral analysis. This approach on how to examine these problems was suggested to her through her reflections on the Eichmann trial. In the book *Eichmann in Jerusalem* Arendt recorded Eichmann saying "... no one publicly objected to the Final Solution ..."60 This statement, and similar ones, lead her to realise that Eichmann's evil derived from the simple failure to see anything, including the issues contained within his actions, from another person's - or, more specifically, any person's - point of view.61 This assertion and her use of Kant's enlarged mentality echoes her original understanding illustrated in her dissertation and represented by her reading of *prironesis*.62

58 *Thinking*, p. 177.
60 The complete sentence by Arendt is: "As Eichmann told it, the most potent factor in the soothing of his own conscience was the simple fact that he could see no one, no one at all, who actually was against the Final Solution." But Arendt goes on to say he "did encounter one exception, however, which he mentioned several times, and which must have made a deep impression on him...[Dr.] Kastner, apparently embodied by the new turn of affairs, had asked Eichmann to stop "the death mills at Auschwitz". Eichmann had answered that he would do it "with the greatest pleasure" (heilich geno), but that, alas, it was outside his competence and outside the competence of his superiors-as indeed it was," *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, pp. 116-117.
61 *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, pp. 47-8 and p. 49. The damnation of Eichmann was based on the outcome of his actions. Conventional morality had been present in the education of Eichmann and he was an intelligent and considered man. But conventional morality had not inhibited Eichmann in his role as a member of the *Sicherheitsdienst*. (The Security Service of the Reichsführer S.S., headed by Heinrich Himmler. *ibid.*, p. 35.) What had gone wrong in the context of this man? What had prohibited this man.
For Benjamin Barber in *The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times* judgement is rightly seen as the tension between the individual and the community in political judgement, or the ‘political’ (plural) and ‘judgement’ (singular). It is about the individual in the community. The role of alterity is illustrated by this problem. Barber believes in the community rather than the individual, and this is his foundational position in his critique of political judgement. Barber argues that the many theories attempting to understand judgement see judgement as a cognitive faculty not political; the understanding of judgement as an epistemology, as a cognitive faculty. Peter J. Steinberger in *The Concept of Political Judgement* also considers this argument by Barber. Steinberger questions Barber’s understanding here, saying that all the verbs used to describe the process of judgement are for the individual. The individual composes the multitude that Barber emphasises; “political judgement is the multitude deliberating”. Political Judgement “is defined by activity in common rather than thinking alone.” Many modern, post-Wittgenstein, thinkers on this subject argue that there is no such thing as thinking alone. This is because there is no private language to think as an individual; all concepts evolve out of a collective form of life. Gadamer, Oakeshott, Arendt and Kant all acknowledge that thinking cannot exist alone. This is therefore bound up with the notion of “common sense”. Judgement is about agreement.

from seeing the evil of his actions, or allowing this evil to generate revulsion at their consequences? These questions and many others raised at the trial of Eichmann, led Arendt to the conviction that you could not simply impose a set of rules derived from outside or internally. What was in Arendt’s eyes a more powerful and reliable code was rather a simple appeal to the perspective of others. Here the evil of totalitarianism comes not for evil intent, but from evil reasoning that concludes in evil consequences.

The essay, “Truth and Politics”, was a recall on the topic of Eichmann, and resulted from a lecture tour after the publication and ensuing controversy of her book. The period that Arendt spent dwelling on the subject was extensive as the commentaries maintained the topic. The final essay was published in *Between Past and Future* and part of her discussion was on the topic of philosophy and politics. “Rational truth”, as she calls philosophy’s concern, is fundamentally hostile to politics and its active realm. This truth, being transcendental to life, becomes a given for society. The result is a coercive tool of the philosopher as other members of society are required to accept its status, or become estranged from the ‘reality’ of existence. What bothers Arendt most about the philosopher’s truth is the way it is obtained. Again contemplation is seen as being hostile to society. The element lacking in this truth is plurality; plurality that ensured freedom and natality: “Political thought is representational. I form opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent.” In the same paragraph as this statement, Arendt acknowledges her debt to Kant (even though Kant would not be able to acknowledge the reason why, we are told).


Barber, ibid., pp. 194ff.


Arendt’s use of Kant’s *sensus communis* does not mean that she provides a definition. The question of how ‘commun’ it actually is, is vague. As well as how it is created, conveyed and contained in which level of the community. Is it only the political community or the historical community, or the nation state identity that counts for the ‘community’? Also with the ‘enlarged thought’, how enlarged is this thought to be? Can it range outside of the mind? Of course not only the internal, imaginary boundaries are enlarged and a dialogue between the ‘I’ and the other ‘I’ appears to take place. This other ‘I’ becomes the neighbour and all its tensions and desires. There are elements of society that are normally suppressed such as racists and fascists, should these be included as contributors to *sensus communis* and, if so, how do they effect its final form?
Barber might understand that thinking alone occurs in the context of the community, but he
denies that "intersubjectivity" is involved: "[w]here intersubjectivity suggests individuals in
agreement, citizenship suggests individuals transformed by membership in a political association into
common sees who produce a common judgment."69 Judgement is about the multitudes in the end.
The tension between the individual and the community is a mis-definition of the problem. It is
between an individual and an individual(s) who are part of a community. Hence the relationship is
not between the 'I' and the 'We', rather between the 'I' and the perceived 'We' represented by the
other 'I'. This is a perception that a harmony needs to exist between the individual (their self and the
mind) and the world (the in-between world of the community) for good judgement to take place. This
is indicated in Arendt by the internal relationship she sets up between the inner 'I' and 'I' in an
internal Socratic dialogue.

Arendt reads the role of the self as important to understanding Heidegger’s turn and this also
indicates Arendt’s own definition of the individual’s self. What is important about Arendt’s reading of
Augustine early in her intellectual career is that she rejects Heidegger’s understanding, partly because
this understanding is the same as God in Christian theology. As she said in an early published
commentary, “man is compelled to assent to a Being which he has never created and to which he is
essentially alien.”70 The atomisation of the individual in relation to others was the result of this
understanding. In The Life of the Mind, Arendt provides further evidence of the early problems she
encountered with Heidegger’s work by introducing the temporal dimension. She comments on three
elements of Being and Time; Care, Death, and the Self. All of these elements are future orientated - as
Arendt herself comments later on - especially Care which eventually evolves into Heidegger
conception of the Will. Another important observation is that at this stage of Heidegger’s intellectual
development, and the one which Arendt is concerning herself with, all these concepts evolve out of
his study on Augustine.71 In this section of the lectures, Arendt comments specifically on Heidegger’s
Self. It is a label for man’s existence and the answer to the Heideggerian question of Who man is

69 Barber, The Conquest of Politics, p. 203.
rigid functionalism in which Man appears only as a conglomerate of modes of Being, which is in principle arbitrary, since no concept of Man determines the modes of his Being. "What is Existenz?", p. 48. In a letter dated 31 December, 1955 (009466)
while replying to Calvin Schrag on some questions emerging out of his dissertation studies Arendt says several things; she is
unhappy with Paul Tillich’s interpretation of Heidegger’s Sein; that “Sein and Dasein are never the same; Dasein is exclusively
used for the Sein of man.” Sein and time are never the same; “The charge of atheism against Heidegger is in my opinion quite
unjustified. Its rests entirely on interpretation and these interpretations are usually a bit arbitrary. He himself has once taken a
stand on this question. You find it in the Vortragausschuss der Studentenschaft der Universität Zürich, Aussprache mit
Martin Heidegger am 6 December 1951, Zürich 1952, p. 11.”; and also “Finally, I must warn you of my essay on Existentialism, especially
of the part on Heidegger which is not wholly inadequate but in part simply wrong. So, please forget about it.”
rather than what Man is. The evolution of the Self comes from the They and leads towards the
\textit{principium individuationis}. In the first volume, Arendt quotes Bergson in illustration saying “To will
always means: to bring oneself to one's self . . . Willing, we encounter ourselves as who we
authentically . . .”\footnote{Willing, p. 183. Quoting Bergson, \textit{Creative Mind}, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York, 1946), pp. 63-4.} This self though – as Arendt immediately points out – is not the creative self of
either Nietzsche or Bergson. Arendt compares Heidegger’s treatment of the Will in the pre-turn
replaced by that of the Will. An examination of the self cannot be self-contained, but rather requires
the illumination of willing. Hence, while following Nietzsche, Heidegger uses the will as both the
environment and tool of understanding. In the second interpretation of the will in Nietzsche’s thought
Heidegger emphases the destructiveness of what Nietzsche regarded as a creative faculty. The Will is
seen as obsessed with the future “which forces men into \textit{oblivion}”.\footnote{Willing, p. 178, (Arendt’s italics)} The consequence of this Will is
that it destroys the Present. Nietzsche’s Will attempts to control the future, against the traits of the
past. But as Nietzsche believes that everything that \textit{is} has become, destroying the past destroys the
present in which the future is demanded. The will is therefore resistant to - and therefore resentful of
the past, or that which by being backwards is beyond the will.\footnote{Arendt calls this a radical understanding of Nietzsche, an understanding that she herself provides during her reading in the
preceding chapter of Nietzsche’s understanding of the will. Because of this, Arendt’s reading of Nietzsche is an odd one. She
does not take time to illustrate her understanding of Nietzsche’s Will but, rather, distills the different conceptions of the will that
abound in his thought. The purpose of this delineation is not apparent, though each involves a different treatment of past,}
viewing the past destroys

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Willing, p. 178. (Arendt’s italics)

rather than of present and future.

\footnote{Arendt’s.} \footnote{See \textit{Discourse on Thinking} (Gelassenheit), trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 60 (p. 33 of original).}

\footnote{Willing, p. 178.}

\footnote{\textit{Being and Time}, Division II, Chapter II, \textit{passim}.}

The Self in Heidegger’s \textit{Being and Time} is the self of responsibility, the self of the “call of
conscience”. This guilt is the guilt represented by the German \textit{Schuld}, which, as Arendt specifies, is
both responsibility for and the debt one owes someone else.\footnote{Willing, p. 178, (Arendt’s italics)} After the turn the individual of ‘letting-
be’ used to be the authentic Self seen in \textit{Being and Time}. The call is now though of Being rather than of
conscience. This new thinker does not call himself to his self, but still hears the call, though now
issued by Being.\footnote{This ‘somebody’ in the They, listening to the call, is the salvation of the They who
are no longer engaged in ‘idle talk’, or \textit{Gerede}, instead after the reversal they follow the destructiveness
of willing. This call of conscience resides in Arendt’s thought with its foundation in Heidegger’s}

\footnote{See \textit{Discourse on Thinking} (Gelassenheit), trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 60 (p. 33 of original).}

\footnote{Willing, p. 178.}

\footnote{\textit{Being and Time}, Division II, Chapter II, \textit{passim}.}
thought prior to his turn. This Arendtian conscience still reflects the Augustinian foundation of her thinking. The community Arendt’s individual constructs in the in-between world with its primitive Christian conception of the other related through καρδία evolves on remembrance and gratitude. The drawing of ‘oneself to one’s self’ is part of this relationship as the will facilitates the establishment of harmony and, in Heideggerian terms, authenticity. The rejection of the futural in Heidegger’s thought is due to its imbalance. Arendt seeks to retain its harmony through remembrance in her temporal dimension of past possibility.

Arendt’s conclusion contains the assertion that the human condition of the acting man – that specifically of natality – is better positioned to comprehend the Will than that of the thinker’s; the “same self that the thinking activity disregards in its withdrawal from the world of appearances is asserted and ensured by the Will’s reflectivity.” Just as thinking prepares the self for the role of spectator, willing fashions it into an “enduring I” that directs all particular acts of volition.”79 Arendt comments that this ‘I’ is sometimes seen as a source of identity as well; the principium individuationis, or the “source of the person’s specific identity”.80 This is the Who rather than the What, or in other words the identity available through the space of appearance. This connection between the ‘enduring I’ and the space reveals again that Arendt conceived the space not specifically spatially but also temporally; as a particular type of timelessness. The question that remains is what is the role of judging as a faculty of the mind and how this relates to the Arendtian Self.

While the ‘I’ of Arendt’s thought is conceptualised in this harmonious relationship the idea of community requires further investigation. The idea of community is the inbetween world constituted by each individual, but there is also the existing world into which the individual is born and remains after they have left. These two worlds must be related even though they become one temporarily when the individual contributes to this space of appearance as an acting being. Arendt has actually already explored this problem as part of her dissertation. In a footnote to Heidegger in her dissertation she talks of these two worlds, ens creatum and dilectores mundi and this is an essential key to Arendt’s thinking on this matter that has resided in her thought throughout her political phase. She discusses her understanding of Augustine’s thought suggesting that he determined that really only the species, the collective of man, not the individual can participate in the ‘simultaneity’ of the universe and is

79 Willing, p. 195. In her lectures Arendt builds up an understanding of Nietzsche’s much abused ‘will to power’ and the role of promising. Essentially promising attempts to subvert the unpredictability of the future, “Basic Moral Propositions” Sixteenth Session, p. 3 (02554). While will in-power “over the future is inherent in all action, even if it cannot remove ‘one of the basic elements of the human condition,’” “The Problem of Action and Thought”, p. 15t.
80 Willing, p. 195.
therefore of a similar nature. This is Augustine's Greek influence at work, meaning that the universe is not a sum total of its parts nor is it created, implying that a creator exists outside of the whole. But the species, she points out, is only composed of individual men and "[h]ence, existence, but not essence, in the universe is actualised through time." This is the same for an individual's life as his entire life exists through "the actions of man which are its parts." This life is believed to be eternal and therefore must have the simultaneity that is of Being. Arendt suggests that this understanding - as she has presented it - has several severe implications. As the whole is indifferent to its parts, it does not depend upon them nor does it care for their actions. The uniqueness of humans, therefore, is not important to the whole and its worth is never a concern. Being equals the universe and time is not part of this or even subordinate to it. Another corollary to this is that as a part had no significance to the whole it can have no 'evil': a thing that seems bad for the perspective of a part can actually be a 'good' in terms of the whole; "[t]his quality of goodness does not arise from the particular things themselves, but is bestowed upon them by the universe." Wickedness is therefore an individual who tries to escape the predetermined path of the whole - a good man is "a well-ordered man" or homo ordinatissimus. Augustine says that temporal law is derived from eternal law. However, eternal law does not necessarily derive from God or the Creator; rather he still sees the laws as given by physics, such as motion and causal action, as part of the encompassing whole. Arendt reacts to this statement of simultaneity by simply changing the notion of world in her own thoughts but retaining the element of "all at once" (simul) by understanding the theological and cosmological eternal as timelessness. She chooses an extensive quote by Augustine to reveal her perspective on Augustine's Greek derived position on this matter:

"[t]hey attempt to grasp eternal things, but their heart flutters among the changing things of past and future and is still futile. Who will catch hold of it [the heart] and make it fast so that it stands firm for a little while, and for a little while may seize the splendour of eternity standing still forever, and compare this with the times that never stand still, and see that it is without comparison? Let [the heart] see that a long time could not possibly be long unless it be composed of many transient motions which cannot extend themselves all at once [simul], but that in eternity nothing can be transient since the whole is present; and surely, no time is ever totally present. And let

81 Arendt says "Being is for Augustine . . . the everlasting, forever lawful structure and the harmony of all parts of the universe." Love and St. Augustine, p. 60.
82 ibid.
83 An un referenced quote from Augustine. This does appear to be similar to Arendt's understanding though at the moment it is part of her description of what Augustine is saying.
84 This does seem to be getting to the heart of Arendt's later concerns over the role of the individual in society and maybe the 'whole' represents totalitarianism in modern times.
85 Is this the need for good judgement, a time when the understanding of a part bigger than appears on the surface is needed: equals good judgement? Arendt has Augustine fighting with the ancient problem of how can evil exist if God created the universe.
86 Love and St. Augustine, p. 65.
the heart see how every past is propelled out of the future, and every future
follows from the past, and all past and future are created and flow out of
what is ever present.\footnote{See Love and St. Augustine, p. 59 from
Confessions, 11.13.}

This quote contains many of the factors that Arendt took from her reading of Augustine. She again
uses Augustine’s words to characterise a temporality that Arendt chooses as her own, especially the
phrase “no time is ever totally present” indicating the temporal dimension of past possibility. The
reference to the heart is the Augustinian mind that later becomes Arendt’s. The “splendour of eternity
standing still forever” is Arendt’s timelessness not the Christian eternity. Its placement is significant
because it is within her discussion on simultaneity. This is the clue to Arendt’s interpretation of the
relationship between the particular and the universal. The evidence of this relationship is further
developed through Arendt’s focus on the concept of the world that is the next topic for discussion in
her dissertation – if not the translated edition.

In the original publication of her dissertation her extended reflection on the Greek influence on
Augustine thought was not as evident as in the revisions of the translated text.\footnote{See the line of
argument from pp. 40-13 in Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. In the revised, translated text the extended
investigation of Augustine’s Greek influence divorces these two points for the reader.} In the original
Arendt just relates the point she is making regarding this matter to Heidegger’s thoughts in “Vom
Wesen des Grundes”\footnote{Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, p. 42.}. She then continues straight into her
discussion of simultaneity, suggesting she wished to substantiate her reading of Augustine and Heidegger
on this point. The two readings by Heidegger refer to the world as \textit{ens creatum} and the world as \textit{ens in toto}, or \textit{dilectores mundi}. Heidegger
investigates the second way of understanding the world as constituted by man or as Heidegger
phrases it, “living with the world at heart” but not the first. Arendt states that it is her purpose to
investigate the first as God’s creation making the twofold approach (\textit{Doppltheit}) understood. These
two ways of conceiving the world are connected in Arendt’s eyes. The second involving the heart is
suggested in Heidegger’s interpretation and becomes in Arendt’s thought the world of the
understanding heart and her own \textit{dilectores mundi}. The first, Arendt states, is left undeveloped by
Heidegger. This world is the world created not constituted by God, or in non-theological terms, the
pre-existing world man is born into. Arendt finishes this section with the suggestion “[w]hen living
man finds his place in the pre-existing creation he is born into, he turns the fabric of creation into the
world.”\footnote{Love and St. Augustine, p. 66.} She is focusing on the impact of this pre-existing world on man the individual-in-the-world.

This pre-existing world is still the world of the community but it is a community through foundation:
the “fabric of creation”. The first world constituted by love in the individual’s world. The second world is the world of the universal, the one the individual is born into by foundation. This is the experience of community that the primitive Christian experience articulated through the letters of Paul. And this world gives rise to the *homo ordinatissimus*, a man in harmony with his self or ‘at heart’. This order requires a confluence between the foundation of the community and the individual. The link is the temporal dimension Arendt has been explicating throughout her work; the dimension of past possibility. The dimension comes into play through the individual’s use of their faculty of imagination which is the essence of foundation and one that leads to the principle of action.

(iii) Judgement: The Evolution of Arendt’s Trinity from Love to Gemüt

What is certain regarding Arendt’s unwritten finale is that she wished to base her theory of judgement on Kant’s third critique, *The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*. Her unfinished volume on judgement was to be a continuation of the themes examined in the two preceding reflections on thinking and willing, as well as the culmination of her life’s work resulting in the final statement on the concept of judging. But the book was never completed resulting in much speculation as to the final emphasis Arendt was aiming for. Arendt did, though, leave commentators with a skeleton of her thoughts on judgement before she died. These are in fact Arendt’s thoughts on political judgement from her lecture notes on Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*; notes which were to form the foundation of her volume of judgement and have been since her death published as *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*. This was a topic that had grown for her in interest as her understanding had expanded and developed from the *Origins of Totalitarianism*. Her early works never specifically concentrate on the notion of judgement, but there is much material contained in her literary output that can be associated with her understanding of political judgement. Judging develops in Arendt’s written work from ‘Understanding and Politics’ to ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, the chapters ‘Culture in Crisis’ and ‘Truth and Politics’ of *Between Past and Future* and then *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*.  

81 Kant’s intention to pursue a correlation between aesthetic and ethics is signalled from around 1764 and his essay Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. Previous to this work Kant has entertained a rationalist approach to aesthetics only to revise this method for replacement with the British conception of sensus communis and the intersubjectivity of agreement that this involved. This notion was to remain with Kant, as is evident by its discussion remaining in the final version of the distant *Critique*. However, one further shift in Kant’s thinking is worthy of note here, and away from the overt influence of the British school of aesthetics (but not completely as the continued reliance on “common sense” illustrates). Kant’s new destination was one of originality - his own “rationalist ethics”. The real starting point of the Third Critique comes in the form of one of Kant’s Nachträge. Kant states in this work that he wants to first examine what actually happens before arguing what ought to happen. This is a new approach to moral theory and one that, when combined with his understanding of the Sublime, indicates a substantial shift in his approach to ethics - the feelings resulting from aesthetic appreciation are now associated with “true virtue”. See John H. Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgement*, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 42-3.

82 *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy* were written for graduate students in the New School to allow her to extend her reflections involving Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* in “Thinking and Moral Considerations”. Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*, (New Haven, New York University Press, 1981), pp. 430-1.
Philosophy. In the chapter essays of Between Past and Future, Arendt considers the differences between judgement and opinion in the context of culture and taste, and the question of truth. These articles are very important to a consideration of Arendt’s preliminary examination of the question of judgement. What is important is to acknowledge the echo of the grounding she developed to explicate the argument of her dissertation; phronesis, eudaimonia, kardia and kairos in the form of remembrance, harmony (or Gemüt), the understanding heart, and past possibility are still providing Arendt with structural guidance for her deliberations. The relationship that these elements form is a trinitarian one although she never developed her true trinity before she passed away. Given the influence of Augustine that has been traced from her dissertation, the suggestion is that it would have been remembrance, understanding heart and her version of Gemüt: a trinitarian relationship best understood in reference to Augustine’s original formulation as memory, understanding, and love. The early form of love or spirit now emerging as the connection through an achievement of a harmonious mood that resembles Kant’s enigmatic concept of Gemüt that reveals meaning through a process of illumination.

The attraction of Kant’s third book in a search for ‘his’ political philosophy is Kant’s subjective consensus for community standards and norms that a theory of aesthetic judgement can comprehend. Coupled with the interpretation of Arendt’s thought developed in the previous chapters we are now in a position to understand the impact this particular element of Kant’s thought had on Arendt’s attempts to establish a non-cognitive theory of judgement. The concepts of Phronesis and Kardia are especially evident in Arendt’s thought throughout this development. In the first essay of Between Past and Future, she suggests “that the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in exactly the sense denoted by Kant, namely the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of view but in the perspective of all those who happen to be present, even that judgement may be one of the fundamental abilities of man as a political being insofar as it enables him to orient himself in the public realm, in the common world.”93 Having established the context of this capacity, Arendt continues through an association and at this introductory stage she considers the role of phronesis in judgement: “[t]he Greeks called this ability phronesis, or insight, and they considered it the principle virtue or excellence of the statement in distinction from the wisdom of the philosopher.”94 While phronesis indicates this there is also its connection with eudaimonia that is Augustine’s state of delectatio,

93 Between Past and Future, p. 91.
94 ibid., p. 221.
(or pleasure) that leads to ‘joy in truth’ (guadium de veritate). This is Arendt’s harmony, a state of Gemüit. In her 1964 Kant lectures she alludes to the understanding heart when she says that this state is “mutual accord” and “[o]nly by judging do I become aware of the harmony.” These dimensions in Arendt’s thought all relate back to Augustine’s theory of illumination and reading Arendt’s Kant through her understanding of Augustine’s thought provides a possible structure to her unfinished volume on Judgement.

Kant saw the appropriate relationship between reflective or originary judgement and the imagination as creating a harmony when the imagination becomes inner sense or a ‘law without a law’ directing the relationship between the universal and the particular. This ‘law’ becomes Arendt’s solution to the problem of determining a particular that does not take the characteristics of a prescriptive universal. Gemüit is the imagination and understanding in harmony and in the Critique of Judgement, Gemüit is the life principle. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant provides a role for Gemüit that provides a guide to the harmonious synthesis between Arendt’s remembrance (her original memory) and imagination (her understanding heart). It is involved in “receiving representations (the receptivity of impression)” and the “knowing an object through these presentations (spontaneity of concepts)”. In the Critique of Judgement these two capacities become central to his argument. In the opening paragraph of this work Kant ascribes the role of pleasurable perception to Gemüit. The two processes of Gemüit mean that when the individual regards something that is pleasurable Gemüit becomes aware of itself, or of its condition and as a consequence finds delight in its abilities. The Gemüitskräfte is therefore a harmony between the two faculties of the Kantian mind, between understanding and imagination. This is actually a joy similar to the Augustinian state of living. In §10 of Critique of Judgement, Kant follows this up saying that this is a harmony of powers between understanding and imagination, or more specifically their Gemüitskräfte.

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95 Confessions, Book X, Chapter 33.
96 Kant 1964, (032278).
97 See Critique of Judgement, §22.
98 In More in Dark Times, p. 27 Arendt characterises her approach to judgement and Kant by saying that the categorical imperative is inhuman, because it “is postulated as absolute and in its absoluteness introduces into the interhuman realm—by which its nature consists of relationships—something that runs counter to its fundamental relativity.”
99 See Critique of Pure Reason, Sections A 50/B 74.
100 Werner S. Pluhar continues this point in his introduction. He says it is “one that matches the form that imagination as such must have (as it apprehends, in general, something in empirical intuition) in order to harmonise with understanding as such so that cognition may arise. By the same token, the same assumed indeterminate lawfulness is one that matches the form of the power of judgement as such: i.e., it matches the harmony (which itself is a form) between imagination as such and understanding as such that is required for all judgement and cognition.” (Pluhar’s italics) See his section “Kant’s Account of Judgements of Tastes” in the “Introduction”, p. lvii.
The reconstruction of Arendt’s Kantian conception of the mind also involves a need to realise the relationship that Arendt perceived to exist between the individual’s mind and the world defined in her thought. Assistance for this purpose is provided by her concern for the history of the faculties she chose for her trinitarian analysis of the mind. A revealing pivotal point in her histories is a particular Christian thinker she dwells upon in this discussion: St. Thomas Aquinas. His seminal place in the translation of the Augustinian theory of the mind for the western tradition is evidence that Augustine was still exerting an influence over Arendt although now the Catholic interpretation of the Christian Father is through the erudition of Etienne Gilson, and not Heidegger’s earlier phenomenological version. Gilson’s subtle but authoritative influence emerges in Arendt’s later thought especially during The Human Condition and The Life of the Mind. For example, the role of Aquinas throughout the histories she wrote reveals the preferences of Gilson’s interpretations. On the question of Augustine’s theory of recollection, Gilson offers an alternate theory of illumination that influences Arendt’s own choices in her interpretations. Gilson’s inquiry into the evolving trinities of De Trinitate is another example of this potential influence but the most powerful illustration is the role of Gemüt in Arendt’s thought from her early reading of Augustine to her mature appropriation of Kant. Arendt was conscious of Gilson’s preferences for Aquinas in his understanding of the tradition of western thought but also admired his reading of Augustine as the Christian Father. The specific link is the concept of Gemüt, a term that remains vague in its articulation but rich in inference. In translation it emerges as the mind, or the inner sense, even the soul. Gilson calls this capacity the “stable disposition of the soul which conditions, in good or evil, the exercise of all its faculties.” This impact is evident on Arendt’s theory of knowledge that emerges out of her treatment of the mind in the Gifford lectures. Arendt’s Aquinas provides an illustration of her perceived link between the mind and the

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102 This is pertinent given the tone of her discussion regarding Aquinas in relation to Augustine’s interpretation by Martin Luther in “Augustin und Protestantismus” from 1930.

103 Arendt pays homage to Gilson in her recount of Augustine’s thought suggesting his seminal work establishes the framework for her analysis. See his role in her interpretations in Willing, especially p. 84 and pp. 113-7 as examples.

104 While only speculation, her return to the dissertation and then its lack of completion could be due to this influence.

105 Heidegger touched on Gemüt in his work and Arendt does acknowledge this in her work. This reference appears in an earlier version of her essay titled, “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought” and was left out in the final version. In this earlier version of the essay, Arendt provides a little more detail of her opinion of Heidegger’s philosophy and more specifically his potential political outlook. The version presented in Essays in Understanding, n. 5. Arendt directs the reader to Sein and Zeit §26 and §27. In both she refers to two sections of Being and Time. What is significant in this reference is the number of concepts that this part of the volume introduces. These include the Mind (Gemüt) and the present (Augenblick).

106 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 444. The location of this discussion in Gilson’s work is very interesting. When discussing Albertists and Neo-Platonists he turns to Paul Tauler and John Ruysbroek and says “Tauler’s mysticism aims to provide an opportunity for a soul created by God to return to its uncreated idea in God… Between the centre (or ground) of the soul and its faculties properly so-called comes the Gemüt… If the Gemüt turns to the depth of the soul, and consequently toward God, all the rest is and functions as it should. On the contrary, let the Gemüt turn away from the centre of the soul, all the soul’s faculties turn away from God. In short, the Gemüt is the permanent attitude of the soul toward its own centre.” In the footnote Gemüt is equated with the fundamental disposition of the will. See n. 30, p. 758. This medieval definition finds its source in Augustine and his attempt to define the trinity that was man.
world. Arendt refers to this inner sense in her discussion of 'Willing': “[t]he sixth sense's corresponding worldly property is realness”. Reality is the context and individuals appear in this reality as do the objects they perceive. However “the context qua context never appears entirely; it is elusive, almost like Being, which qua Being never appears in a world filled with beings, with single entities.” Being is a thought process while reality is a sensation. Aquinas called it the inner sense, the root of the exterior senses. The temptation – as Arendt calls it – is to equate this inner sense with thinking, or rather thought. It involves things that are reconstructed from reality but are no longer in reality. In other words, they are in the memory. But Arendt has developed this understanding of Augustine’s reference point acknowledging that while memory is the storehouse, retrieval is the essential capacity. Remembrance is the faculty that provides Arendt with the necessary focal point in her investigations.

In Arendt’s volume on Willing the next section on judgement must have been in her thoughts. As she proceeds through her examination of this faculty she is constantly indicating her future direction in her exposition. So in a different return to the tradition Arendt illustrates the framework of her next investigation. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, like Augustine, were interested in the Will. Also neither of them are willing to acknowledge the role of the memory as a faculty; “... of Augustine’s three mental faculties—Memory, the Intellect, and the Will—one has been lost, namely, memory the most specifically Roman one, binding men back to the past.” This loss is final as the memory does not return to the fold. Again without stating directly the implications of this loss, Arendt posits this turn in the tradition of western thought as a potential disaster. Arendt tells the reader that “quite apart from the consequences of the loss for all strictly political philosophy”, the loss of memory or sedes animi est in memoria, goes the understanding that man had Augustine’s temporal nature, or homo temporalis. While these two suggestions are left without further explication and frustratingly without a discussion of the consequences, she goes on to offer another dimension to her thinking. She does state that what is lost is the link between thinking and remembrance as Augustine equates the mind with the memory as remembrance has a natural affinity to thinking because all thinking arises

107 Willing, p. 51. In Arendt’s description of Heidegger’s thought there is an appreciation that occurs throughout Arendt’s work and is especially favoured in The Life of the Mind. Arendt always talks about the ‘sheer’ or ‘sheerness’ of things indicating a state of reality and its immediacy. The “ontological difference” in Heidegger is “between the sheeriness [Scheenheit]of beings and the Being of this isness itself, the Being of Being”. (p. 174)

108 Both are invisible, and this is where Pierce trips up. He thinks that “reality has a relationship to human thought” (Pierce), yet thinking is invisible, and involves invisibles. ibid., p. 31.

109 As Arendt says the discovery of ‘to will’ and ‘to be able to’ are not the same (velle and possit). This fact causes much tension and the solution is simply to do, or action. ibid., p. 38.

110 ibid., p. 117. All of these references are from the City of God while in the dissertation Arendt did not use the City of God as a source because it would have broaden her investigation too much. Love and St. Augustine, p. 103.
out of remembrance.\textsuperscript{111} The role of remembrance is therefore very important to the solutions that Arendt is developing in her work.

Kant played a significant role in the development of Arendt's understanding of common sense.\textsuperscript{112} Her Kantian source was \textit{Critique of Judgement}. Kant's \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} and \textit{Critique of Practical Reason} had argued that scientific knowledge and morality legislated for all rational beings and provided rules that were superior to contingent circumstances. It was up to the individual to apply those rules to their circumstances. This does not apply, in Kant's view, to the matter of taste, the determinant for pleasure or displeasure. For Kant, taste was to be different and it was the pinnacle of the aesthetic senses. It could not be limited by want, desire or material gain - it had to stand apart and above from these limitations. Kant therefore sought to discover a transcendental ground in the faculty of understanding thus establishing for taste a transcendental validity. To do this Kant notes its similarity with the judgement of experience; as "with all empirical judgements, it is, consequently, unable to announce objective necessity or lay claim to \textit{a priori} validity. But, then, the judgement of taste in fact only lays claim, like every other empirical judgement, to be valid for every one . . ."\textsuperscript{113} Neither of these types of judgement require \textit{a priori} as in logical understanding, but the empirical judgement does utilise universal rules that are \textit{a priori} valid (therefore intersubjectively valid and objectively truthful). This is his aim in the context of beauty; to ground it in the \textit{a priori} structure of the consciousness. However in beauty, taste is constrained by its judgements residing in the sphere of beauty and not concepts. Therefore logical rules are of no use to Kant; the "pleasure in the beautiful is . . . neither a pleasure of enjoyment nor of an activity according to law, nor yet one of a rationalising contemplation according to ideas, but rather of mere reflection."\textsuperscript{114} Kant rejects the idea of pleasure as enjoyment, law-based and rational, rather settling on a response to 'mere reflection'. Augustine articulated a similar rejection of \textit{frui} and \textit{uti} in his \textit{caritas}, therefore achieving the state of \textit{delectatio}\.textsuperscript{115} \textit{Phronesis} is embraced but on a foundation of a primitive or preliminary understanding. This was Arendt's project in her mature reading of Kant; to decide what it was about this Kantian 'mere reflection', a mental activity for itself, which allowed judgement to occur.

\textsuperscript{111} Willing, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{112} See the Twelfth Session of her Kant lectures in \textit{Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy}.
\textsuperscript{113} Kant, \textit{Critique of Judgement}, 87.
\textsuperscript{114} ibid., 339.
\textsuperscript{115} As discussed in the introduction, the key is the existential element of love: "Augustin: Amo: Velo ut sis. A confirmation of the sheer arbitrariness of being: We have not made ourselves, we stand in need of confirmation. We are strangers, we stand in need of being welcomed. I want you to be." Later in the same lecture Arendt further clarifies this saying "It does not presume a "need or want". (What Aug. actually meant: I want you to be - independent of any need on my part, independent of any use etc. And the distinction between \textit{uti} and \textit{frui} which runs through Augustine has something to do with this.)" Kant 1964, (032288 and 90).
At the heart of this search is a statement made in “Understanding and Politics” just after the publication of Origins of Totalitarianism. When discussing the reasons why an individual in the totalitarian regime should have rejected its reality she says that intuition should have been at work. This aside is not an admission that she is seeking a post-modern answer; rather this ‘sense’ “may in some respect even somewhat resemble philosophy, in which great thoughts always turn in circles, engaging the human mind in nothing less than an interminable dialogue between itself and the essence of everything that is.” 116 This is the actual inner ‘I’ and ‘I’ exchange in an internal Socratic dialogue and leads to the illumination that is sourced in her reading of Augustine. Returning to the last chapter’s discussion of Thinking, the link is in her reply to the question “Where are we when we think?”. She replies to this question by saying that which becomes meaningful during the process of thinking is essence, or “distillations, products of de-sensing”. 117 In other words, the product of imagination plays a role in the harmony between the self and the world. As Arendt says, “[w]ithout this kind of imagination which actually is understanding we would never be able to take our bearing in the world. It is the only inner compass we have . . . . If we want to be at home in the world on this earth, even at the price of being at home in this century, we must try to take part in the interminable dialogue with its essence.” 118 The act of foundation of the public realm and its role in an individual’s life is articulated through this process when the individual refers to the essence of the public realm which is the principle of acting in the world.

This is the return to the source that Arendt reflects upon in the work of Augustine in her dissertation and driven by the statement that “I have become a question to myself”. 119 The fact that the question has been raised is a suggestion that there is a disharmony or rupture in the individual. In an appropriate frame of mind – to use a modern phrase – or Gemüt as harmony of the mind, the return to the presence of God is successful, allowing judgement to happen. This is therefore linked by Arendt through remembrance to the conscience and good judgement as “[c]onscience puts him coram Deo, into the presence of God”. 120 In Arendt’s version God is replaced by the community that man has created inbetween for a space of appearance. 121 This seemingly all-encompassing Gemüt is the fundamental element in the abilities of man to feel, reason, and understand. It can be described as the

116 “Understanding and Politics”, p. 322.
117 Thinking, p. 199.
118 “Understanding and Politics”, p. 392.
119 As Arendt reflects in relation to Augustine’s thought: “[w]hat makes my neighbour appear in the relevance required for the commandment of love is that ‘I have become a question to myself.’” See Manuscript A:033348, or Love and St. Augustine, p. 52.
120 Love and St. Augustine, p. 54.
121 In terms of Tauler’s way of defining Gemüt the self and its mind seek a harmonious relationship with this created world. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 444.
spirit of man in the Augustinian trinity or the love of social caritas in Arendt’s original engagement with Augustine. In the Third Critique, Kant says that “the Gemüt is all life (the life-principle itself)”.122 It is associated with animus in contrast to Seele or anima in To Sömmering, Concerning the organ of the Soul. Gemüt is therefore the “capacity to effect the unity of empirical apperception” or an inner sense.123 It is essential for judgement; as Kant reveals in The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures, saying that it is a ‘mysterious power’ as the “the faculty of inner sense, that is to say the faculty of making one’s own representations the objects of one’s thought.”124 In a less expansive and therefore more precise mood, Kant provides another definition in the Critique of Pure Reason, saying that it is the “essence [Inbegriff] of all representations which in the same place occupy a sphere which includes the three basic faculties of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire . . .”125 The mind through remembrance and imagination and therefore Gemüt seeks a synthesis with this world. As man is homo temporalis and the temporal space of appearance has three dimensions of time this harmony is sought in the moment of timelessness or immortality.126 In this way Gemüt reflects the role of love or social caritas that Arendt articulated in her dissertation. Another important dimension to Gemüt that became important for Arendt’s political engagement is its universality through communication. Each individual participates in the communication that is universal because of this inherent structure of each mind. Storytelling, preaching, psalms and the song of songs all seek this moment between the listener and the talker. This foundational process of Gemüt is reflected in the foundational principle of the space of appearance and at this point becomes illuminated (not recollected or disclosed). This is the essence revealed through imagination and remembrance or the reception and presentation of images and experiences of the individual. With this harmony good judgement is achieved: Arendt’s final destination in the life of the mind.

122 Critique of Judgement, §29.
125 See Critique of Pure Reason, A §7. This is his own trinity.
126 The ‘twofold “before”’ is also relevant as only in this case it is “set aside in favour of God’s immediate presence”. The ‘before’ is levelled or past and present are equal and man realises this relationship in caritas and in its place is God’s immediate presence: “[t]hus caritas Deo is possible only on the ground of man’s structural link with his “before”,” Love and St. Augustine, p. 84.
2. Towards the Trinity: The Understanding Heart, Remembrance, and Gemüt

In the Postscriptum of The Life of the Mind Arendt is very frank about her tasks with willing and judging. They deal with the ‘not yet’ and the ‘no more’ respectively and also importantly with particulars in the world of appearances, not the generalisations of the thinking process in the world of invisibles. Arendt discusses the relationship between the three faculties. It appears from the perspective of the acting individual, she comments, that thinking lays the foundation for judging and willing, and judging determines the direction of willing. But the will is not the result of the intellect as the will breaks into the causal events of the world. The major purpose of her theory of judgment is an attempt to regain the dignity of man by reclaiming the role of judgement from the Hegelian ‘World Spirit’, or the passivity of the new Heideggerian individual. Apart from this desire, and in the course of her description of her direction, Arendt provides one of these indications. Judgement, she says, is the silent sense, or conscience. Moreover, Arendt points out quickly, conscience did not judge and therefore she is looking for an authority not from the transcendental above but from human rules and laws. This confirms her humanistic desire to locate a reference point for judgement that is not metaphysical, yet still transcendental in its scope. Judgement is taking on the role of the sixth sense that Arendt has been developing, but it also alludes back to her reading of Heidegger’s call of conscience and its non-theological implications. The source is manifest in this call that cannot lead into the presence of God. Rather another presence is the result, a presence of foundation. This point of past possibility now provides the Christian notion of phronesis with its presence, and still retaining its involvement of the heart (kardia) and therefore a sense of communal mercy. This element of mercy with the existence of the other leads to a sense of gratitude brought about by co-existence in the inbetween world created out of the Augustinian desert. This is Arendt’s ‘understanding heart’ and an early conception of imagination.

This is coupled with the complicit idea that Arendt was seeking a notion of ‘Willing’ that was non-autocratic and non-commanding. The only philosopher who had pursued a similar design for this faculty was Duns Scotus. Scotus, through the questioning of St. Thomas Aquinas, followed up on St. Augustine’s radical will. He embraced the particular over the general/universal, and by rejecting the ‘casual chain of events’ as a linear projection, instead argued for a plurality of causes that

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127 In the Postscriptum Arendt says that she will conclude the second volume with an analysis of judgement – not three volumes.
converged producing a new moment and a new happening. Scotus though did not link these thoughts regarding events to action or the free will. Arendt does however, subsequently embracing this new moment through natality and develops the implication of this capacity. This moment is a new beginning that has a relationship to the past even though a plurality of causes preceded it. This link is through the faculty of remembrance and is related to memory. By the time Arendt reaches her reflections in *The Life of the Mind* she has evolved her understanding of Augustine's memory realising that she needed to articulate a way of discerning what should be brought back from the storehouse of examples that was memory. The actor produces the examples and the spectator judges them and tells their story. Arendt has assembled an armoury of concepts from her dissertation and through her political writings that she now seeks to use to establish her theory of judgement. Imagination and remembrance are two faculties involved in the temporal that provide her with the facility of past possibility. This temporal dimension involved in the timeless present provides Arendt with the balance between past and future she has been seeking in order to establish a foundation for the individual-in-the-world. Each of these elements of past possibility, remembrance, and imagination provide an indication of Arendt's potential final trinity.

(i) *Past Possibility and Remembrance: Reading 'Anaximander Fragment'*

The temporal condition of the individual has been essential to Arendt's thought throughout her intellectual career. Her search for a new temporal dimension to salvage Heidegger's thought from the influence of the destructive Augustinian temporal imperative eventuated in the concept of past possibility. This temporal dimension occurred in the Now of the present and was possible because of the gap between past and future. It is Arendt's reading of *kairos* and therefore the moment of decision. It is a return and recovery that travels back to the past to generate a new future providing natality with its ongoing power: and the individual with the capacity to render judgement in their world. Only in *The Life of the Mind*, or in rather the complete trinitarian version, would Arendt attempt to articulate its undercurrent evident in her life's work, a life's work inspired by the thought of Heidegger but constrained by the sensibilities of Jaspers. Confirmation of this attempt comes in her final publication and at a time when she felt that her criticism could be made public, a feeling that derived from Heidegger's diminishing mental capacity as both their lives moved towards completion. Arendt

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130 Please note the actor is also the spectator when deciding what to do, another example of Arendt's distinction making.
131 The role of Heidegger in *her Life of the Mind* series occurred due to his old age and emerging lack of competency, allowing Arendt to freely convey her understanding without insult to her mentor. What is available to the reader is a complex
uses the occasion of the Gifford Lectures to reflect on Heidegger’s various positions and his ‘silence’ during his own intellectual development. There was an interruption of Heidegger’s ‘silence’ when he produced two extended essays. The first, Letter on Humanism, is the conduit of Heidegger’s own directions, while the second is “The Anaximander Fragment”. It is this second essay - regarded by Arendt almost as an aberration - that she finds the speculative Heidegger addressing the real potential of the question of Being. Arendt’s treatment of this essay is also an indication of how Arendt felt the question should be approached. In the process of explicating her reading, Arendt also provides an insight into her own thinking of the subject posed by Heidegger and her own project. The location of this essay is the first indication to Arendt of its worth. In Between Past and Future, Arendt talks of the Gap in history where the truth can be revealed. Arendt sees this enforced ‘silence’ of Heidegger and the defeat of Germany in a similar manner; a moment that becomes proximate to truth.

Arendt devotes some considerable time to Heidegger’s reading of The Anaximander Fragment. When Arendt could finally contemplate the meaning of his silence following this involvement in National Socialism, another consideration emerged. There are two silences here. The first is the most commented upon in the recent secondary literature and now termed as Heidegger’s silence. The second, and the one concerning Arendt, leads from the first and focuses upon the work produced in that silence: both the “Letter on Humanism” and, surprisingly, “The Anaximander Fragment”. Its relevance for Arendt’s understanding of Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism is significant.132 During the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger’s ‘turn’ produced a change in his thinking that Arendt suggests is a disdain for action.133 In a potent association with Augustine’s Adam, she comments that “the will to rule and dominate is a kind of original sin, of which [Heidegger] found himself guilty when he tried to come to terms with his brief past in the Nazi movement.”134 The passivity that Heidegger then succumbed to - if the critics are correct - meant action was no longer even being considered as a possibility for human existence. Arendt’s main point is the location of his actual reversal as a mood rather than his reversal stated in the Letter on Humanism. The location of the mood is between the first and second lecture courses on Nietzsche’s thought.135 The second is notable

interpretation of his ‘turn’, a reflection (and what appears to be an acknowledgment to a certain extent) of Heidegger’s own reading of his thoughts.

132 As Heidegger’s later writings reveal, his own reading of his decisions and actions are usually very different from those who comment upon them. As far as Heidegger was concerned The National Socialist Party that had inspired him had also failed him, resulting in his ‘action’ being linked to domination. As Arendt says, “the very possibility of taking action . . .”

133 Arendt does not, of course, deny the fundamentals of Heidegger’s new philosophy. Instead she focuses on his reversal as she seeks to determine the change in his thinking and its effect on his project.

134 Willing, p. 173.

135 Later published as four volumes entitled simply, Nietzsche. These volumes were initially published in 1961 and were finally translated into English by David Farrell Krell. See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. 1-4, (San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1982). Arendt was very influential in Krell’s relationship as a student with Heidegger, in a similar manner to Joan Stambaugh.
because Heidegger starts to interpret against the thought of Nietzsche, rather than explain his philosophy as was the intention in the first volume. The turn in Heidegger’s thought evolves around his own turn against Nietzsche’s conception of Will-to-power. The result, in Arendt’s eyes, is a ‘recasting’ of his entire reading of the western tradition from the Greeks to the present, replacing his concern for the Will with the relation between ‘Being and Man’. This change in perspective, though, does not mean, for Arendt, a change in focus: what still remained was Heidegger’s concern for “the question of the meaning of Being”.  

137 But the focus turns from Man to Being, making man the passive element in the relationship. A consequence to this change is that man can only wait for Being to disclose itself: “it centres on the notion that to think, namely, “to say the unspoken word of being,” is the only authentic “doing” (Tun) of man; in it the human acts and superior to them, actually comes to pass.”  

138 This reading of Heidegger’s turn to the passivity of man is as it stands now a common reading of Heidegger’s turn. Moreover, Arendt provides a twist to this, as her own interest emerges. The result of this change is a change in the relation of man to time. The state of man is one of a passive thinking being that waits to hear the “utterances of the great philosophers of the past”. But the condition of man is such that while standing in the now searching back through the past as a descent or Abstieg, there is a simultaneous expectation of the future, or avenir. Past possibility is read into Heidegger’s unrealised potential philosophy.

Her comments on Heidegger’s use of “The Anaximander Fragment” (and Heraclitus also) reads in all of the drafts of the lectures as an appeal to the way Heidegger should have read the pre-Socratics. The reading deals with the temporal in the Fragment and reflects Arendt’s own concern with the moment between past and future. In the context of the lectures, Arendt comments on the relationship between thinking and willing in Heidegger’s thoughts, a relationship that goes without reference — according to Arendt — before his turn. It emerges as a topic from Heidegger’s changing attitude towards the will during his famous interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought after his involvement in the Nazi Party. This reading, though, is Arendt version of Heidegger’s own reading — another ‘way of thinking’. That is not a repeat reading in the sense of a summary, or a supportive reading that attempts to gloss through his changes. Rather, Arendt wishes to follow Heidegger’s own thinking on

136 Willing, p. 173.
137 Arendt interestingly uses a quote from Jarava Lal Mehta when asserting this interpretation, rather than relying on her own understanding. Mehta is regarded by Arendt as the only author to ever fully recognise and capture Heidegger’s change in mood. She placed his book The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger on her university lecture reading lists. Heidegger also became familiar with Mehta’s interpretation, apparently giving it a favourable review, and instigated the change in title to Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision, (Hawaii: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), Revised Ed., on its republication. The regard for the book appears to be helped by Mehta’s background in Eastern Mythology which influences his approach to Heidegger’s thought.
138 Willing, p. 175.
the reversal and justifications of his latter phase of thought - another change in 'mood' and significantly regarded by Arendt as equally important as the one she has just evinced. Her purpose is to provide the context for her own particular reading of Heidegger's transformation of a thinker of man to a thinker of Being, one that closely follows his involvement in National Socialism and the final fall of Germany.\textsuperscript{139} This particular locality in the development of his thought is regarded by Arendt as an interruption containing 'hints' of possibilities and potential. After all this was the thinker that Arendt described in a tribute as "[laying] down a vast network of thought-paths".\textsuperscript{140} The fragment is rendered by Heidegger as "But that from which things arise [\textit{genesis}] also gives rise to their passing away [\textit{phthora}], according to what is necessary; for things render justice [\textit{diken didonai}] and pay penalty [\textit{adikia}] to one another for their injustice [\textit{adikia}], according to the ordinance of time."\textsuperscript{141} While there is strong imputation to read promise-making and forgiveness in the temporal suggestiveness of this fragment Arendt points to a reading that highlights the implications of the transience evident. Arendt immediately points out that the main theme in this fragment, as translated by Heidegger, is that of 'coming-to-be' and 'passing-away'. In between these two states is that of 'is', while whatever lingers in the present. This moment of lingering is the moment of presence between two absences. Heidegger states that this lingering is in the world of appearances, rather than the more typical statement of this unconcealment, or truth, residing on the side of Being. What is therefore un concealed according to this essay belongs not to truth but the beings.\textsuperscript{142}

Arendt details a reading of Heidegger that inverts the usual ontological difference between Being and beings. While Heidegger usually sees the concealment of Being as caused by beings, instead in this essay Being itself causes the concealment. Beings emerge from where they come from and linger due to the light provided by Being, and this consequently conceals Being. Beings eventually return to Being as they pass-away. Therefore, there is a becoming: "everything we know has become, has emerged from some previous darkness into the light of day; and this becoming remains its law while it lasts: its lasting is at the same time its passing-away."\textsuperscript{143} After this summary, Arendt goes on to say that becoming provides the measure for beings, rather than Being - its opposite.\textsuperscript{144} The result of this

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{139} Arendt uses Ernst Jünger's reference of "point zero" to describe this moment. \textit{Willing}, p. 188.
\item\textsuperscript{141} Quoted by Arendt in \textit{Willing}, p. 189. Arendt uses the translation of the essay by David Farrell Krell.
\item\textsuperscript{142} While natality is not mentioned explicitly in her interpretation, it is its presence in her thoughts that allows her to generate this understanding. The priority of death in Heidegger's usual thought is balanced in his interpretation by Arendt because of her appreciation of birth. The Augustinian focus on 'not yet' and 'no more' as equal to the life in between these two moments. Connected with time in this manner becoming emerges as an important factor in the consideration of Being.
\item\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Willing}, p. 191.
\item\textsuperscript{144} Conceived in this way, becoming is the light and being is the darkness and the ontological difference is between Being and becoming.
\end{itemize}
change is that man is no longer the initiator of the forgetfulness of Being, in a sense Being is by concealing itself as it reveals beings. Man no longer hides in "man" or inauthentic existence and life is no longer a waste for now "[t]he Oblivion of Being belongs to the self-veiling essence of Being..." No longer is the Heidegger 'World Spirit' at work, just a history of errancy or the common history of man in the world. Arendt has ridden Heidegger's philosophy of the influence of Being, a universal without application but acknowledged its role in the guidance of the individual. Moreover, the key to Arendt's reading here is illumination not disclosure. Light is provided for the individual to see. The capacity is still with the individual unlike disclosure where the implication is that Being provides the guidance. This requires a return to the past but one balanced with the needs of the present. Remembrance and imagination provide this role in the temporal moment of past possibility.

This therefore provides the context for Arendt's reading of remembrance that has emerged out of Augustine's memory. The role of remembrance provides a further indication of Arendt's potential trinity. In the revisions to the dissertation, Arendt concludes that the 'decisive fact' that determines a human being (as a "conscious, remembering being") is the act of creation, or birth. The significant part of this is that birth gives man a special capacity; "the decisive fact determining man as a conscious, remembering being is birth or "natality," that is, the fact that we have entered the world through birth." Arendt developed the concept of natality in her revisions of the dissertation and consequently they provide an indication of the evolving awareness of her understanding of Augustine. However, while natality became a significant element in Arendt's later worldview, in the original text she is more determined to undermine the death dependence of Augustine (and, indirectly, Heidegger). She does this through using the concept of remembrance and another concept that emerged later, thanking - one she sees in operation in Heidegger's thought. This aspect to Augustine's thought is considered by Arendt to be his most original contribution to western thought over and above his discussions on desire and fear. While man becomes a desiring being through the "[f]ear of death and inadequacy of life", the factor that "ultimately stills the fear of death is not hope or desire, but remembrance and gratitude." Gratitude in this early work is an underdeveloped

145 Quote from "The Anaximander Fragment", Arion, p. 618.
146 Willing, p. 192.
147 Love and St. Augustine, p. 51.
148 From Arendt's reading of Augustine, we see Augustine's importance in the relation of man through createdness with God. There is an indissoluble link between man and God because through this creation man 'became' but also if this link is neglected then all is lost; There is simply no escaping it as desire also makes a man dependent on the wrong things, as Arendt reminds us. 149 Love and St. Augustine, p. 52. Arendt is saying that the will-to-life is important but that it is also driven by something more foundational. The will-to-existence is evident in all situations that man finds himself and is the "hallmark of man's attachment to the transmundane source of his existence". (p. 54) Now the desire for the highest good is man's free choice, but on this aspect, the will-to-be, it does seem that this is an inherent part of man's volition. In fact Arendt says that it is part of the human condition. Arendt notes that Augustine's consideration of the human existence focus on the relationship between Creator
concept and marginal in terms of Arendt's overall conceptual framework. Nonetheless, it encapsulates a thrust in Arendt's work than is only evident in her work on the periphery. It is a notion intimate with the conclusion to the trinity of promise-making, forgiveness and trust.

On December 8th 1974, Glen Gray writes to Arendt having read her manuscript intended for the Gifford Lectures. In this aside, he picks up on a theme that is still emerging again in her work on the faculties of the mind. Having translated Heidegger's What is called Thinking?, he is sensitive to the confluents between Arendt's thought and Heidegger's. He opens his letter with this reflection: "Somewhere in your chapter on Aquinas and Scotus you mention the fact that these scholastics did not count memory as a power of the mind, however subtle they were in distinguishing desire, will, and intellect. In your chapter on Nietzsche and Heidegger on Will, I wonder if you will find it possible to note MH's reflections on memory, the best early in WHD?"150

Similar to Arendt, Gray's close intellectual companion, the idea of harmony was part of his understanding of the worth of memory and its role in the pivotal present.151 But he also links the concept of memory to that of willing: "[m]y guess is that his recovery of memory as a large aspect of mind influences his ideas on will and willing." Remembrance and gratitude are again merged in this line of thought: "Denken slips easily into andenken for him."152 Provoked by Arendt's work and presumably conversation, Gray considers his own direction: "I have a halfthought belief that memory may be the very core of mind, the basis for thinking, willing, desiring."153 This observation reveals how Arendt was forming her understanding of the faculties around a central focal point; "[e]arly in his Metaphysics Aristotle remarks that memory makes experience possible, one of those haunting 'asides' in Aristotle I prize so much. Every so often in him there comes a chance, offhand remark that is not supported further, almost an aphorism, and once noticed one never forgets." Gratitude and thinking are closely related in their purposeful underpinning. Thinking seeks an embracing and

19 Library of Congress papers: Container 35, Correspondence "G", letter dated December 8th, 1974 (not numbered). Gray later follows this up saying "In the myth of Theuth Plato complains that what is written in books is dead, only what is in mind and memory can still become, etc. It is strange that these great scholastics neglected to make memory as integral to mind as the other powers."
125 ibid. Gray goes on to assert that this understanding is very important to Heidegger's worth when he says "I confess that his thoughts on memory as gathering the dimensions of time and enabling us to balance past, future, and present in mindful memory seem to me among his best ideas."
125 ibid. Gray summarises his understanding of Heidegger's imperative revealed through his reading of Arendt's manuscript thus: "Heidegger has gone back to the Greeks for his notions of memory and its relation to time and temporality, remembering and forgetfulness."
125 ibid. He continues to say: "Apart from this, I have been pondering the place of memory lately, even the role of memorizing, and suspect that there is a lot to say that I have not read and which may not have been written. Such basic work as you are doing in these Gifford Lectures interests me so profoundly because it gives rise to new reflections of my own."
therefore relationship reflected in the act of thinking. But this current in Arendt's interpretation only prefaces some more specific instructions she provides the reading thinker on this subject.

In *Life of the Mind*, Arendt emphasised the differences in Heidegger's early and late writings, and focused on Heidegger's notion of the will - one of autocracy and affected by technology's negative influence resulting in his rejection of it and its replacement with thinking. This disassociation of thinking and willing was an aspect of Heidegger's thought that Arendt desired to attack, together with his understanding that thinking was a form of action. Arendt says that Heidegger "is no longer content to eliminate the willing ego in favour of the thinking ego-maintaining for instance, as he does in the *Nietzsche*, that the Will's insistence on the future forces man into *oblivion* of the past, that it robs thinking of its foremost activity, which is *an-denken*, remembrance . . ."154 The tension seen in Heidegger (and Nietzsche) between thinking and willing is therefore resolved in will-not-to-will. This conclusion, together with the final and perfect personification of the Hegelian World Spirit, results in the individual as the new Heideggerian passive thinker.155

Arendt reads Heidegger as saying that Nietzsche loses a biological understanding of the will (a will-for-life) to one of power, but instead of echoing Nietzsche's embracing of the creative power of this, it highlights its destructiveness.156 This destructive nature emerges from the will's demand for the future and its result of forcing men into oblivion (by destroying the past). The overriding consequence of this play between past and future is the destruction of the present, or everything 'that is' because it had 'become'.157 Arendt description of Heidegger's turn leads to an important statement for Arendt's own work. Arendt reads the changes in her own thought as a reflection of her own interests. Arendt's descriptions of Heidegger's thought maintain the focus of her own concerns; the relationship between past and future. In response Arendt seeks to counter this destruction because the

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154 *Willing*, p. 178. Arendt finishes off the sentence with a quote from Heidegger: "The Will has never owned the beginning, has left and abandoned it essentially through forgetting." Taken from *Nietzsche*, Vol II, p. 468. Arendt notes in a footnote as well as in the text that Heidegger develops his understanding of the Will along the same lines as his examination of the self in *Being and Time*. The difference being that the Will replaces the role of Care in his earlier work. Both of these concepts however, are based on the same thinker, Augustine.

155 Approaching this topic through the life of the mind allows Arendt to discuss action at a theoretical level, something that seems a paradox given her disdain of western theoretical thought. See Kimberly Hutchings, *Kant, Critique and Politics*, (London, Routledge, 1996), p. 89. In writing a philosophic text, Arendt needs to find a place for that thought. She does this by prioritising action over thought but not discard its role totally. This desire to retain thought in the political realm is an early warning of her intent to return to the philosophical realm as she did later in her intellectual career. It is also a refutation of the notion that Arendt turned from action to thought later in her life, whether due to the bankruptcy of her political storytelling, or because of the perceived inadequacies of her early position on political action. The life of the world and the life of the mind are always conceived as being related. To elaborate on this position Arendt asked, how can the mind withdraw from the world and not demean or ignore it; for example the Hegelian alternative where he absorbed the world into his notion of the spirit, Geist or the Stoic situation which avoided its existence.

156 *Willing*, p. 178.

157 Again Arendt quote Heidegger, though from *What is Called Thinking*. The final sentence is: "The revulsion arising in the Will is then the will against everything that passes-everything, that is, that comes to be out of a coming-to-be, and that endures." (Arendt's italics)
"world is irrevocably delivered up to the ruin of time unless human brings are determined to intervene, to alter, to create what is new". The location of the concern is also maintained from her early analysis of Augustine's thought, or, in other words, the relationship of man to the past and to the future. Arendt reflects on the change in Heidegger's thought in terms of thinking and willing but as the faculties of the future and the past. The 'foremost' activity of thinking is an-denken, or remembrance. After the reversal though Arendt notes two important consequences: that thinking is no longer subjective and that the "Oblivion of being", or Seinsvergessenheit, is part of man's relationship to Being. In other words, Heidegger has turned to Being and away from man. The second is of interest because it provides an illumination of how Arendt saw the proper relationship between the particular and the universal. Arendt describes the hiding of being from man by an analogy of the forest: "very much as the trees hide the forest that nevertheless, seen from outside, is constituted by them."

(ii) The Imagination and the Search for Political Principles

Arendt's lectures on Kant's 'unwritten' political philosophy also contain a fragment on the role of the imagination in Kant's Critiques. This approach has developed from her understanding heart and Kant's 'enlarged mentality'. Arendt opens her discussion of imagination by using two quotes. One is from the revised edition of The Critique of Pure Reason (traditionally referred to as the 'B' version) and the second from the Anthology from a Pragmatic Point of View. The significance of the first quote is in its choice of edition. Arendt's concerns can be traced back to her understanding of Heidegger's philosophical position prior to the Second World War. Heidegger in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics compares the first version of The Critique of Pure Reason (A) with the second revised volume (B). The difference in Heidegger's reading is the role of the imagination. The removal of the imagination from the consideration of philosophy by the Enlightenment philosophers and especially Kant is the concern. Imagination's removal saw it seconded by the Romantics and philosophers of aesthetics in retribution. The three sources of knowledge are reduced to two with the removal of the imagination the remaining sources being sensibility and understanding (receptivity and spontaneity). The 'faculties of the soul', as Kant phrased it, derive from three original sources, "which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, sense, imagination, and apperception." In the second revised version

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158 Between Past and Future, p. 192 and also another suggestion of this in The Human Condition, p. 246.

159 Willis, p. 174.

160 In her Kant 1964 lectures she states that enlarged mentality equals imagination (032267) and that "Imagination guides common sense" (032282).

161 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Kemp-Smith, p. 127 note. This assertion is replaced with a discussion of Locke and Hume.
Heidegger argues that imagination has a presence “in name only”. While it still has a function it is derivative in relation to the remaining faculty of understanding “under the title of a transcendental synthesis of imagination”. Its independence is now lost in the Kantian scheme of the Platonic inspired understanding of knowledge as seeing. With this demotion Heidegger reads Kant as being a philosophical coward: “He saw the unknown, and he had to draw back”. Heidegger reasons that Kant had actually made imagination the “common root” of both sensibility and understanding. The understanding of this faculty though is not stable enough, nor could it ever be, to ascribe such a significant role.

Yet Arendt does not mention this discussion, instead simply saying that Kant’s discovery of the role of imagination in the cognitive faculties is the greatest facet of The Critique of Pure Reason. Yet while Kant constructed his cognitive structure in the Critique of Pure Reason by having the intellect controlling the imagination, he changes by the time the Critique of Judgement is formulated in response to the exemplar. Now the “intellect is “at the service of the imagination”". From here Arendt immediately establishes that imagination is the faculty that presents what is absent and this is achieved by presenting an image to the mind. The significance of this description is only apparent if Augustine’s conception of memory is examined. The difference between Augustine’s theory of memory in The Confessions and Arendt’s faculty of the imagination appears insubstantial. Nonetheless, she quickly acknowledges this association, and immediately seeks to classify imagination as “a condition for memory, and a much more comprehensive faculty”. Remembrance is defined separate to the imagination as it becomes the simple ‘representation’. Representation represents what was once present while the “Imagination (the root of representation) which makes present what is always absent and can never become present altogether . . .” representation is the schema and “serves knowledge or intellect” while “[w]ith the exemplary. Here, the understanding serves imagination. And the judgements [handwritten changed from ‘products’] of taste are lookedon

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that ends Section 1 of Chapter 1, Book, 1 of the First Division. This assertion is repeated later in Version A on p. 115. (See p. 141 of the Kemp-Smith translation.)

162 *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 153.

163 This assertion by Heidegger has been the source of many exchanges with other commentators such as Dieter Henrich and both Gernot and Hartmut Böhme. The point in contention is whether Kant actually subscribed to the theory that a “common root” ever existed. Just as Christian August Crusius argued against Christian Wolff that subjectivity did not evolve out of a single faculty, Kant never believed this as a possibility. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd ed., trans. James S. Churchill, (Frankfurt, 1951), p. 149.

164 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 80.

165 Arendt quoting Kant from *Critique of Judgement*, General Remark to §22, translation by Bernard. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 84.

166 Arendt uses two quotes from Kant’s work to introduce her interpretation: “Imagination is the faculty of representing in situatian an object that is not itself present” and “Imagination (facultas imaginandi) is a faculty of perception in the absence of an object.” Referenced to *Critique of Pure Reason*, B151 (Arendt’s italics), trans. N. K. Smith, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1963) and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, §28, (Arendt’s italics), trans. Mary J. Gregor, (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1974) respectively.

167 Arendt terms this faculty as ‘reproductive’.
as exemplary.”\textsuperscript{168} In this the temporal aspect to the mind is defined by Arendt. She presents Kant as defining the faculty of memory together with the faculty of divination as faculties that associate the ‘no more’ and the ‘not yet’ with the present. Imagination does not require this ability of association because “it can make present at will whatever it chooses”.\textsuperscript{169} So the faculty of the imagination is the faculty of the present in terms of the temporal division at work in Kant’s own theory of the mind.

Arendt goes even further in her differentiation when she contextualises her notion of imagination in the history of western thought. Imagination, she states, has less to do with memory than any other faculty leaving room for her reading of remembrance that evolves out of memory. This new faculty that Arendt seeks to introduce into her discussion is illustrated through the work of the pre-Socratics, Parmenides and Anaxagoras. In Fragment Four, Arendt says, Parmenides called this faculty of imagination ‘nous’, or the presentation of that which is not present.\textsuperscript{170} Arendt now introduces the fact that Being is not present either, or the ‘it-is’ that is absent from the other senses. The significance of this introduction is not entirely clear. She may be seeking to clarify this with Anaxagoras’ phrase “\textit{Opis tôn adelôn la phainomena}” and the ‘glimpses’ of that which is there; not as a complete appearance but rather a suggestion of the nonvisible Being. The implications of this section of her analysis only become evident when linked to the other developments in her schema on the topic of thinking. They equally suggest that the faculty of imagination is the faculty that can see actually see this Being.\textsuperscript{171} Arendt’s Being, however, is the being of foundation and principle in the present that become apparent as appearance in the right state of mind for the individual-in-the-world.

The imagination presents to both the segments of the Kantian mind: the schemata for cognition and examples for judgement. The difference between sensibility and understanding, or intuition and concepts is again reiterated by Arendt. Intuition is the avenue for the experience and the concepts makes it comprehensible to the mind. The question that Arendt proposes is how do these two faculties come together? The answer is a synthesis, that is a consequence of the operation of imagination.\textsuperscript{172} The mystical nature of this process is apparent even in Kant when on one occasion he calls it an “art

\textsuperscript{168} Kant 1964, (032276). Later when she discusses harmony Arendt says “Intellcct serves Imagination, but also as playing together”. This is purposelessness though “purposiveness is shown” (032278), or “Imagination guides this interplay” (032281).

\textsuperscript{169} Kant’s Lectures on Political Philosophy, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{170} This is also an element in her discussion of ‘What is Politics?’ in Library of Congress papers, Introduction to Politics, Chicago: Fall 1963, pp. 6-7 (023807 and 023809 respectively). It directly follows from a discussion of immorality and politics.

\textsuperscript{171} Because of this reasoning Arendt says in her Lectures that through this process metaphysics now becomes the ontology, or the ‘science of Being’.

\textsuperscript{172} Arendt puts it thus: “The answer is: ‘Synthesis of a manifold . . . is what first gives rise to knowledge . . . [t]he concept of the elements for knowledge, and unifies them into a certain content’; this synthesis ‘is the mere result of the faculty of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should never have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.’” Quoted from Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 81 with Kant’s words from Critique of Pure Reason, B103.
concealed in the depths of the human soul”, and interpreted by Arendt as “we have a kind of “intuition” of something that is never present”.173 Yet elsewhere she also reflects the uncertainty of the philosophical tradition in pinning this function down with rational confidence when she calls it a kind of ‘witchcraft’. The magnitude of this synthesis especially in terms of a humanistic and transcendental reference point is stated by Arendt when she develops the potential of this process in terms of communicability. The image is a schema given to sensibility and understanding and it is the basis for all our communications, because without this aspect nothing could be shared.174 Particulars can be shared because they reside in the mind, all minds (or, soul, as Arendt explains in parenthesis).

The implications of this focal point in her examination of Kantian philosophy emerges when she defines the two judgements at work in the Third Critique. In the Critique of Judgement, determinate judgements subsume the particular by the concept. Reflective judgements “derive” the rule from the particular. In the schema, one actually “perceives” some “universal” in the particular.”175 This ability occurs in the act of recognition itself, or by recognising a table as a table. The schema as such has changed its definition from the Critique of Pure Reason to Judgement. It is now regarded as the example that leads and guides us allowing the judgement to achieve “exemplary validity”. That is “the example of rightly chosen”.176 The schema of the Critique of Pure Reason is now the “go-cart [Gängelband] of judgement”.177 Arendt summarises her conclusion thus: “The example is the particular that contains in itself, or is supposed to contain, a concept or a general rule.”178 She follows this by explicitly using an example herself, asking the questioning, “how... is one able to judge, to evaluate, an act as courageous?”. The answer in the context of Achilles, and therefore as a Greek one would have in “the depths of one’s mind”.179

This example highlights, however, a problem in her analysis. Using the very Hegelian example of Napoleon Bonaparte is conditions the validity of achieving an exemplary validity as being used by “the heirs to this particular historical tradition.” Yet she leaves some room for the achievement of exemplary validity of the rational identity of the person, not just the cultural identity of the person. She follows this by saying that “most concepts in the historical and political sciences are of this

173 Kant’s Lectures on Political Philosophy, p. 81.
174 ibid., p. 83.
175 ibid.
176 ibid., p. 84.
177 ibid. With quotes references for Kant. In her Kant 1964 lecture she is aware of the type of ‘right’ imitation she is advocating when she says “‘Following’ is not ‘imitation’ in terms of examples, or the “go-cart of judgement” (Critique of Pure Reason, B174)” (032293).
178 Kant’s Lectures on Political Philosophy, p. 84. [my italics]
179 ibid.
restricted nature” as they derive from a specific historical event. Arendt clearly states here the role of the imagination. The imagination is the essence of foundation, the principle that needs to be uncovered from a particular. In terms of politics it is the meaning of the historical event. This is reinforced when on the next page Arendt quotes Kant saying imagination is “one of the original sources . . . of all experience” and stands prior to all other faculties of the mind. Further on Arendt quotes Kant as saying the synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience. This foundational faculty provides the particular that can be a universal.

(iii) The Trinity: The Understanding Heart, Remembrance, and Gemüt

This is Arendt’s reading of Kant’s political philosophy. Arendt sees more in the Third Critique than merely a discussion of taste. In fact, she sees it as the most political of his works; politics as human plurality is seen in Kant’s context of taste. Humanity is seen as mutually dependent rather than simply being subsumed under universal laws. Kant sees aesthetic judgement as requiring to be intersubjectively valid. For Kant, a judgement of aesthetic taste is between the subjective element of sensory judgements and the objective element of cognition. It is in her discussion of the mind that Arendt uses the work of Jefferson to illustrate the principles of action. The definition of power is again referred to as the conjunction of I-can and to-be-able-to, or Arendt’s conception of freedom. The principles inspiring action are defined as Montesquieu’s “energetic principles” and political freedom defined through his statement that it “can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will.” A couple of pages later she again refers to these definitions suggesting that Montesquieu is right in saying that each community does have different and particular principles. The foundation occurs when individuals become a “We”. This tends to happen when freedom is the activator of action. She seeks these ‘human rules and laws’ to guide action but not by looking at the tradition as it can no longer provide a suitable framework. However, instead of looking to the future, whether it is founded on the dangerous notion of progress or not, she still wishes to look to the past. This involves her technique of return and

180 Ibid., p. 82 and then p. 83.
181 See ibid., p. 27.
182 Williams, p. 199. This is Arendt’s own translation of “La liberté philosophique consiste dans l’exercice de sa volonté, ou du moins 1’esprit doit parler dans tous les systèmes dans l’opinion où l’on est que l’on exerce sa volonté. La liberté politique consiste dans la sûreté, ou du moins dans l’opinion que l’on a de sa sûreté.”
183 Ibid., p. 201. She gives examples and says that these are inadequate because of the tradition that defines them.
184 Ibid., p. 203.
recovery she was first introduced to in her dissertation studies, and the thought of Augustine. She also provides a warning to those who simply seek to capture a section of the past and use it in the present. She says that there is a *political principle* contained within the technique of recovery and encapsulated enigmatically by Cato's phrase, *Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*185 Understanding the correct conceptions of temporality, the individual and the community in the context of her trinity is essential to comprehending Arendt's thought and especially when determining how her acting individual was to guide their actions in the world shared with their neighbour.

Exploring Arendt’s thought from its beginnings in her dissertation on Augustine through to her final unfinished work on Kant provides an insight into her own thinking, its dynamics and therefore potential trajectory. When Arendt sought to uncover the original experiences of the primitive Christians by examining the thought of Augustine she focused on three elements: *kairos, phronesis,* and *eudaimonia.* These elements were part of the Greek tradition of thought but they represented experiences that were part of the foundational Christian experiences as part of the Roman Empire. It seems a considerable distance from this exploration to the thought of Kant; especially when Kant is synonymous with a rigid formal investigation of the boundaries of human reasoning. But Arendt turned to the *Critique of Judgement* and the final if unstable product of these investigations. This enables Arendt to finally assemble her own trinity. She finally turns from Augustine to Kant in her search for a contemporary trinity of the mind and the world. This trinity brings about a harmonisation of the self and the world thus providing an individual’s illumination as they seek guidance for their actions in the world.

This brings about a proposal as to how Arendt would have conceived the difficult task of conveying a directive without compromising the autonomy of the individual. A variant of Augustine’s theory of illumination, rather than the Heideggerian sense of disclosure, could have been Arendt’s chosen framework for exploring this potential. The communication of the product of this illumination is a variant on Augustine’s ethics of inspiration. Given Arendt’s temporal dimension, the harmony of the acting individual-in-the-world would reveal the political principle that was the essence of this foundational world and this principle would lead to the right inspiration and imitation through the return to the source. The individual would remain an individual with universal, non-dictatorial guide for that particular moment of decision.

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185 "The victorious cause pleased the gods, but the defeated one pleases Cato", as Arendt interprets the phrase.
From this examination it would seem that Arendt had developed a trinity that would have fitted the individual into the temporal world that was their condition and reconciled them to their world of the inbetween. Augustine’s trinity of understanding, love and memory that been developed by Arendt mirroring Heidegger’s care, or the trinity of comprehension, mood and discourse. Arendt maintained the role of the neighbour in her thoughts and the commonality of collectivity through the man-made world constructed to provide permanence in the transience of the natural world defined by time. The generation of this non-material world brought a source into focus through the act of foundation. Using this together with the spirit of Augustine’s concept of love enabled Arendt to locate a fundamental order in the scheme of life that generated a reference point for the free, acting individual. This foundational moment had a perpetual existence in the kariological moment of the decision-making individual that could always become the future, therefore providing the individual with a guide. This moment was known when it was right – a reconciliation between the individual and the world in the temporal dimension of the past possibility. The actual key to Arendt’s thought is the notion of essence. She derives an essence that the tradition would reject because of its indeterminable nature. Yet within the world conceived by Arendt this essence provides the comfort modernity has denied the individual. The grand scheme that Arendt set under way in her own foundation in the thought of Augustine and the influence of Heidegger, the mentor of Jaspers and finally the confrontation with Kant leads to a desire to establish the individual in the world, and subsequently reject the antiworldliness of thought in her century – the twentieth century.
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