SENSUAL EXTENSIONS
JOY, PAIN AND MUSIC-MAKING IN A POLICE BAND
SENSUAL EXTENSIONS
JOY, PAIN AND MUSIC-MAKING IN A POLICE BAND

Simone J. Dennis

A Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Anthropology
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Adelaide University
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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation does not contain any material that has previously been submitted or accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in a University or other tertiary institution. To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation does not contain any material previously published or written by any other person, except where due reference has been made in the text. I consent to this thesis being made publicly available for loan and photocopying when deposited in the University Library if accepted for the award of the degree.

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When I first came to the Anthropology Department of Adelaide University to begin my PhD, I was not an anthropologist, and I did not really believe that I could learn how to be one. A great many people tolerated my extremely self-indulgent insecurity in this regard, and helped me to move beyond it. Each of these persons contributed to my growth as an anthropologist in their own special way.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is based on 18 months ethnographic fieldwork, carried out among the members of the South Australia Police Band, and with officers of the South Australian Police department. Band members are not operational police officers; they are professional fulltime musicians, who form a musical public relations unit of the larger department.

The department believes that the public perception of police is that police are 'unfeeling' and 'state oriented'. Officers are routinely subject to an insulting public discourse, in which they are cast as 'robots' and insensate 'cogs in the government's rip-off wheel'. Through what the department characterises as the 'emotionful language' of music, police band members, who appear identical to operational police officers, are used to demonstrate the emotionful capacities of officers, in an attempt to distance them from the state and position them closer to 'human beings' via popular and romantic musics of particular emotional genres. These affective acoustics are interspersed with musical and visual images that summon up themes of state power and police disconnection to audience members, and thus the musical offerings of the police band are seemingly contradictory musicscapes. In these seeming affective contradictions lies the power of the police to appropriate emotions that listeners feel during police band performances, in the name of maintaining current forms of policing.

While emotions that listeners experience are open to police appropriation, I argue that those that band members experience in performance are not, and this is because band members feel in performing music a different register or order of emotion than do audience members. The main point of departure of this thesis is from the work of John Blacking (1985) who argued that musicians and listeners will experience similar feelings as they produce and listen to music. I submit that while emotional experience is for both musicians and listeners sensual-corporeal experience, these experiences are markedly different, depending on whether one is producing music or listening to it. Using the critical contributions that Michel Serres (1998) has offered to Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, I explore the ways in which band members sensually incorporate instruments into their own bodies to become 'instrumentalised', and the particular order of emotion that they feel when they do so. This order of emotion, that I have termed 'meta-emotion', is characterised by band members as a kind of seraphic joy, that is experienced only in performances, and is absent in rehearsals, which are characterised in terms of hellish pain. Despite the presence of pain in rehearsals, band members characterise them as emotionally devoid, and do not experience 'instrumentalisation'. In rehearsal, unlike performance, instruments remain located well outside the band member's heavily self-surveilled skin. I argue in this thesis that the difference between rehearsal and performance experiences, and the difference between listener and performer experiences of emotion are intertwined with processes of sensual incorporation.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about music-making. More specifically, it is about the ways in which the members of the South Australian Police Band make music. If I had visited Sidomulyo village in East Java to study the uniquely East Javanese performance form of *Ludruk*, as was my original intention insofar as postgraduate research was concerned, I probably would have begun my dissertation by describing some of the contexts in which the *Ludruk* occurred. Most ethnographically based works tend to follow this formula, which allows the reader to find his or her bearings. I begin this thesis no differently: I begin by orienting the reader to the context in which the police band is located, this being the institution known as the South Australia Police (SAPOL).

As I explain later in the thesis, police band members are fundamentally different from SAPOL police officers, although both officers and band members wear the same police uniform, and are organised according to the same rank and pay structures. Police officers are 'operational', in the sense that they do all of the things that one might consider ordinary police work — such as walking the beat, arresting people, attending the scene of a crime, and so forth — the police band members play music, and play music only. They play music from their positionedness in the broader SAPOL context.

This provision of this institutional context occurs in a tried and true chronological order, but, speaking topically, it might well have occurred at the end. I might have, for example, discussed the ways in which the members of the police band make their music, followed by a description of the ways in which the police institution attempts to appropriate this music-making activity to achieve its own ends. While the police institution does indeed attempt to appropriate the band's musical activity for its own ends, this thesis is not really about the police institution or its activity in relation to the band. Had the police band been surrounded by another kind of organisation or institution, the core of this thesis would have remained essentially unchanged and, in this sense, the police context which surrounds it is little more than incidental. The context material describes the reasons for the existence of the police band in the police view, while the core material of the thesis is concerned with describing what it is that
police band members do, and what they do most of all is, in their own words, is experience something that they call "the feel".

A THREAD OF EMOTION

Leaving aside for the moment the specifics of 'the feel', police band musicians and the police institution to which they 'belong' are related in the thesis by a thread of emotion. According to their own descriptions, police officers, “try to not be emotional or show how you feel” in order to “be impartial and detached from community members”. Performing music is a highly emotional experience for police band musicians and, they believe, for audience members. However, police band members insist that their own and audience members' emotional experiences of performance are very different from one another. The core of the thesis deals with the emotionful performing lives of police band members. In the view of the police department the police band exists because it helps to present police officers as emotional and, therefore, in the police view, as 'human', to a public that, again in the police view, understands cops as subhuman or even inhuman.

Insofar as members of the band are concerned, the ethnographic data strongly suggests that emotional experience is intertwined with experiences of sensual embodiment of action and objects, or 'the world'. In essence, I argue that band members become emotionally expressive in periods of unreflected upon, sensual experiences of instrument playing, during which time their own bodies and those of their musical instruments become inextricably intertwined. During these experiences, which are performance, and not rehearsal, experiences, band members come to embody instruments and their sounds, and, equally, instruments and their sounds come to embody band members. Conversely, when band members purposefully become self-reflexively involved in constructing their sensual perceptions of instrument objects, and regard their own and instrument bodies as separate and impervious ones unable to penetrate one another, as they do in rehearsals, they say the music they produce is devoid of emotional expression that audience members might pick up on. Band members also say that they themselves do not experience music emotionally during rehearsal times. Thus, emotional experience, for band members, will be shown to be firmly tied to experiences of embodied musicality, which includes embodied instrumentality and embodied sonority.
Emotional expression in police work, according to the officers of the SAPOL is considered damaging to the integrity and professionalism of the entire department. In departmental text and talk, emotion itself is consistently conflated with irrationality, bias, and subjectivity and, according to officers, expressing particular emotions on the job can compromise the rights of all citizens to “unbiased”, “equal”, or “impartial” police treatment. In most cases, the expression of emotion on the job is considered ‘unprofessional’. The restriction, indeed the policing, of emotional expression is connected with neutrality, objectivity, facts, thinking, order and professionalism in the police view, and professionalism itself is largely defined in departmental text and talk in terms of the absence of emotional expression.

The restriction of emotional expression is an organised process; cops undergo rigorous training at the police academy to learn the techniques of emotional inexpressiveness to produce a body that is ostensibly unemotional. This practice involves police officers becoming highly self-aware of the movements and practices of their own bodies in relation to the social body of the policed community. For police officers, the act of becoming ostensibly unemotional involves embodying a disconnectedness from the social body. Cops disconnect in order to fulfil an obligation of neutrality or impartiality, upon which policing at SAPOL is currently based. This conception of impartiality insists that cops display no emotional connectedness to any member of the community, be it love, hate, or otherwise, for the sake of ‘blind justice’.

The ethnographic information, collected from operational officers doing ‘on the street’ or patrol policing, and from band members as they rehearsed and performed in Adelaide, in small country towns, and interstate, provides an opportunity for the conception of emotion to be expanded to include aspects of emotion that Lutz and White identified in 1986 as lacking in social science explanations, namely, the phenomenological and communicative aspects (1986:429). Katz (1999) and Lyon and Barbalet (1994) currently argue that most concepts of emotion still do not cover the phenomenological and communicative aspects of emotion well enough, because the bodily basis of emotion has not yet been fully explored. I take from Katz’s work notions of emotion as centrally and fundamentally connected to the embodiment of conduct, and from Lyon and Barbalet the notion that emotion is “precisely the experience of embodied sociality” (1994:314). On the one hand, for police officers,
‘unemotionality’, or at least its appearance on the job, is achieved when they embody unsociality, via a series of highly reflected upon bodily practices that serve to separate officers from the body of the community. Band members, on the other hand, become emotional when they incorporate instruments and their sounds into their own bodies and are themselves incorporated into instrument bodies and sounds. I hope to bring music into this emotional and unemotional, social and unsocial, terrain in a particular way, one that recognises that the communicative aspects of musical production have not yet been satisfactorily examined phenomenologically.

PHENOMENOLOGY

I pause here to make clear what I mean when I use the term ‘phenomenology’. The phenomenology I am using is more closely aligned with Merleau-Pontian phenomenology than it is with that practiced by Husserl [1910 (1965), Heidegger ([1927] 1962) and Sartre [1943] (1956). I group the phenomenology of these three theorists together and contrast it with that practiced by Merleau-Ponty [1945] (1962) on the grounds of an omission that Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre all made in their phenomenological works that, at least in part, Merleau-Ponty addressed. As Weiss (1999:41) has argued from a feminist perspective, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre failed to do justice to consciousness as always already embodied, while Merleau-Ponty, in contrast, attempted to provide the first systematic phenomenological investigation of the body as the ground for all perception. This has been referred to by some as Merleau-Ponty’s “radicalisation of phenomenology” (see for example Campbell, 2000:113).

In some ways, though, Merleau-Ponty too failed to recognise that consciousness is already embodied, because he did not acknowledge that sex, gender, race, class and so on influence how consciousness is experienced (see Weiss, 1999:41). In this thesis I too have failed to acknowledge the impact that sex, gender, race and class have on how consciousness is experienced. This is something I aspire to do in later writing, utilising the works of Young (1990), Butler (1989) and Grosz (1993, 1994), all of which employ and critique phenomenological methodologies. In this thesis, I do, however, want to recognise that consciousness is always, already, embodied.
In order to do so, I follow Merleau-Ponty in that I take the body to be the ground for all perception, and in that I take the sensuous life of the body to be at the heart of thought (a position which allowed Merleau-Ponty to eliminate the dichotomy between mind and body in his 1962 work, *Phenomenology of Perception*). But my approach in this thesis is not entirely Merleau-Pontian. I have moved from a strictly Merleau-Pontian approach towards the work of French theoretician Michel Serres, and most particularly his 1998 work *Les Cinq Sens* (The Five Senses). In this work, Serres takes his point of departure from Merleau-Pontian and Heideggerian phenomenology. Serres finds the work of these two theoreticians repellent, almost revolting, for what he takes to be their “bodilessness” (see Serres, 1995:131-132). Serres takes offence at Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in particular, because, he says, it consists of “lots of phenomenology and no sensation” (1995:132). Serres is of this mind because he believes Merleau-Ponty to have taken for phenomena to be studied not the experience of the body in the world at all, but instead *language* which describes the experience of bodily sensation. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception* [1945] (1962) opens with the words, “At the outset of the study of perception, we find in language the notion of sensation”.

It may seem as though Serres’s accusations with regard to Merleau-Ponty’s work are unfounded; this was certainly my own impression when I read *Les Cinq Sens* for the first time. However, when one considers Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the senses, one is forced to at least consider being less dismissive of Serres’s words. When Merleau-Ponty describes sensual life in all of his phenomenological work, he does so with reference to a kind of zone of indeterminacy, in the sense that he honours the idea that in attending carefully to one phenomenon other phenomena will escape one’s attention. It is probably fair to say that insofar as descriptions of sensual life are concerned, in Merleau-Ponty’s work, one sense is inspected and described at a time, at the expense of the others, which escape his close attention. In order to describe this one sense, Merleau-Ponty must render it still in that he must take it out of a lived context in which it is inextricably intertwined with all of the other senses. He does this for the benefit of language; the sense is held still, out of its place, so that it can be described. This is what Serres means when he says that Merleau-Pontian phenomenology is conducted entirely “via language” (1995:132).
By placing the sensual life of the body, and not its description in language, as I have presented it above, at the centre of inquiry, Serres has attracted criticism from even his most dedicated proponents. Steven Connor, for example, describes *Les Cinq Sens* as, if not entirely revolutionary, then at least a departure from respectable philosophy (Connor, 1999:2).

The approach that Serres takes to describe the sensual life of the body, and to avoid describing descriptions of its sensual life in language, is a little confusing and, indeed, it can hardly be any other way; if Serres wishes to write about hearing, for example, he cannot do so without writing about taste and smell and so on. Serres’s utter horror at the thought of Condillac’s famous statue being deprived in turn of every sense but one for the purposes of the clear description of each means that he is left struggling in vain to describe something which defies organisation into any kind of order. As readers of every kind of theory, we expect to be presented with one idea at a time, in some kind of logical order. As Serres indubitably knows, the sensual life of the body does not proceed in this way, but the language pertaining to it, that is, language in which one sense at a time is carefully described, can. But, if Serres cannot even describe the phenomena in which he is interested in a clear way, how can he proceed to develop a conclusion about the processes through which people go in order to apprehend the world?

Serres believes that the consequences of discussing each of the senses in turn, thereby trapping them in language in the ways I have described above, has an unbearable consequence, and that is that our conceptual structures will bear no resemblance to the life of the body: if we were to examine the senses one at a time, in order to be able to describe them in language, then we would no longer be describing the life of the body. We would instead be describing the life of a being that lived only one sense at a time. Serres firmly believes that we should not seek to describe the structures and processes of everyday sensual life of experience in a way that bears no resemblance to experience itself. This, as I have said, means that Serres’s language is as messy and uncontainable as the sensual life of the body itself.

The clumsiness of the language, however, does not mean that Serres’s work is lacking in intellectual rigour, and it does not mean that his work is not phenomenological, although I doubt that he himself would classify himself as a phenomenologist; his 1995
conversations with Bruno Latour certainly suggest that he prefers not to be categorised at all, and that he wants to play truant from any ‘school’ of thought or any discipline. I take his work to be phenomenological because it seeks to attain a phenomenological goal, namely, to study human experience and to study the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience. Both Serres and Merleau-Ponty are wholly concerned with the study of (an embodied) consciousness and the manner in which people apprehend the world and its objects; Serres merely wants to make sure that his theoretical tools are in the service of lived experience. Phenomenologist or not, at the very least, Serres’s work presents Merleau-Pontian phenomenology with an interesting problem.

So what do I mean by phenomenology? I adopt Merleau-Ponty’s ‘radicalisation’ of Husserl’s phenomenology and insist that the body is the ground for all perception, and I follow Serres’s attempt to reduce the degree to which we place the sensual life of the body in the service of language, in our attempts to render it comprehensible. I do not believe that the sensual life of the body can be adequately described or analysed through the careful isolation of each of its sense-parts; now touch, now vision, now hearing, now smell, now taste. If my work suffers from a similar kind of affliction of clumsiness as Serres’s does, then I ask the reader to think about the last time that he or she proceeded to taste food without simultaneously smelling, seeing, and/or touching it, even hearing it. What I am attempting to do in this thesis is describe the processes of the sensual life of the police band musicians, without taking one tiny bit of sensual life at a time, in turn. If I did, then I would not be talking about processes of the sensual life of the body—I would be describing the processes through which Condillac’s statue might proceed. I seek to avoid doing such a thing, for this statue had the remarkably inhuman capacity to live only one sense at a time; a thought that fills Serres, and me, with the horror of subtraction, or abstraction, of analysis itself.

This is not an ethnomusicological thesis!

My primary goal in this thesis is to explore the idea that band members are active in organising their perceptions of not only musical sounds, but also musical instrument bodies, smells, tastes and touches during rehearsal and performance periods, and to demonstrate that rehearsal perceptions of these sensual experiences of musical production are vastly different from those that band members experience during
performance. Because these are my primary goals, I have not nurtured this thesis on specifically ethnomusicological milk. As Berger notes in the introduction to his paper entitled *The Practice Of Perception: Multi-Functionality and Time in the Musical Experiences of a Heavy Metal Drummer* (2000), while ethnomusicology as a discipline:

excels in constructing detailed studies of musical experience that show how perception, meaning and aesthetics are culturally specific...the systems of perception they posit are presented as descriptions of “the native’s perspective,” an idea that is problematic in a number of ways (2000:124).

This idea is problematic in my work, as it is in Berger’s, because the notion of native perspective:

leads the scholar toward a search for underlying cognitive machinery that produces experiences, thus obscuring the active role that musicians and listeners play in constituting their perceptions” (Berger, 2000:124).

Because I take an approach in this thesis that focuses on the ways in which band members in particular actively organise musical perception, the phenomenological approach that I have outlined above which allows me to explore this activity, is taken at the expense of a specifically ethnomusicological one.

Another problem involved in the ethnomusicological exploration of perception as I have described it above is the way in which such an approach leaves invisible the “the complex differentiation of perception among the various participants in any given event” (Berger, 2000:124). Exploring the differentiation of perception is important in the sections of this thesis in which I explore the ways in which performing musicians and listening audience members experience music, and it is important in those areas where I examine the ways in which rehearsal perceptions of music are vastly different from performance ones for police band members.

EMOTION

I turn now to a broad overview of the emotion literature. Contributions to knowledge with specific regard to emotion have issued forth from many disciplines including psychology (Averill, 1982; Izard, 1977; Mandler, 1984, contributors to Plutchik & Kellerman, eds. 1980, contributors to Russell, Fernandez-Dols, Manstead & Wellencamp, eds. 1995, contributors to Kitayama & Markus, eds. 1994), sociology
(Hochschild, 1983; Kemper, 1981; Katz, 1999), philosophy (Rorty, 1980; Solomon, 1976), history (Stone, 1977), feminist studies (Smith-Rosenberg, 1975), and linguistics (Weirzbicka, 1994; Kovecses, 1985; Parrott, 1995; Smith & Tkel-Sbal, 1995; Frijda, Markham, Sato & Wiers, 1995) as well as anthropology. Due to the sheer volume of contributors from these areas, this literature review will focus on those contributions made specifically by anthropologists.

The field of emotion is still fairly new to anthropological inquiry. Lutz and White (1986:405) note that emotions were originally considered in the discipline in terms of a psychobiological framework, belonging in the domain of the natural and biological human experience, and therefore not reachable with anthropological tools. Current anthropological interest in the emotions is sustained by quite different conceptions of emotion, in which the social, communicative and cultural investigations of aspects of emotion are primary.

In 1986, Lutz and White completed a thorough overview of anthropological treatments of emotion. In this comprehensive review of emotion literature of the 1980s, Lutz and White identify several dichotomies. I draw primarily on this work in the following discussion, for the following reason. Lutz and White recommended in their review that issues at the heart of the dichotomies that they identified should be worked on from perspectives that centralised the body as well as the social-communicative aspects of emotion. Despite these recommendations, most current theoreticians continue to cite these recommended perspectives as largely and dangerously absent from anthropological work on emotion (see Besnier, 1995; Kitayama & Markus, 1994, Jenkins & Valiente, 1994, Lyon & Barbalet, 1994, and, for the most scathing attack on anthropological work on emotions, Katz, 1999). Lutz and White’s review remains currently important, because anthropology in general continues to ignore the central importance of the body in work on emotion. The dichotomies that Lutz and White identify are namely materialism and idealism (which is related to nature/culture, mind/body, structure/agency dichotomies) positivism and interpretivism, universalism and relativism, individual and culture, and romanticism and realism (1986:4056).

Materialist conceptions of emotion have taken the biologically constituted evidence of emotion – facial muscle movements, raised blood pressure and so forth, as material for investigation. This has yielded psychodynamic and evolutionary anthropological
literature, such as that made famous by Ekman (1980a, 1980b) and includes contributions by scholars such as Lindholm (e.g., 1982). Scholars such as Lutz (1982), and M. Rosaldo (1983, 1984) following Solomon (1976) have moved away from the analysis of emotions as material things that are influenced by cultural forces, to focus on the notion that emotions are equally or more about ideas. The consequence of this, as noted by Lyon and Barbalet (1994), is that the body is very often ignored or sidelined in these kinds of accounts; this can perhaps be understood as a kind of guard against reductionism. Lutz and White note in their review that very often the relationship between body and emotion is taken to be metaphoric “with cultural ramifications” (see Strathern, 1975, Holland & Kipnis, 1995). The strength of these accounts is in the linkage made in them between emotion, power and social structure. This link is made with the central theme running through this set of works, that “emotional judgements are seen to require social validation or negotiation for their realisation” (Lutz and White, 1986:407). As Lyon and Barbalet imply, however, the absence of the body in these accounts significantly weakens the connections between power, social structure and emotion:

Accounts in which social relations are the basis of emotion…in which particular configurations of practical power or status, for example, are associated with particular patterns of emotional expression, [the very concern of the aforementioned ‘ideal’ theorists] offer a very different appreciation of the bodily dimension of emotion [as opposed to those who would connect it peripherally]. In this latter perspective bodily processes are centrally implicated in emotion, as the social-relational formation of emotion is a relation of embodied agents (Lyon and Barbalet, 1994:58; see also de Riviera, 1977; de Rivera & Grinkas, 1986 Kemper, 1978, Scheff, 1988).

Feminist theories have also dealt with the notion of power as related to emotion. According to Jenkins and Valiente (1994:163) feminist theorists are typically engaged in:

deconstructing the ideology inherent in symbolic representations of emotion within dichotomous realms of the devalued natural, dangerous, and female, on the one hand, and the more esteemed cultural, controlled and male, on the other (see Haraway, 1991; Ortner, 1976, M. Rosaldo, 1984, Lutz, 1988, 1990).

Kleinman (1980), Levy and M. Rosaldo (1983), and Needham (1981), among others, can be understood to contribute work around a mind-body dichotomy which Lutz and White argue is typified by a “two layers” approach (1986:407). This categorisation
refers to the tendency of these scholars to distinguish between ‘natural’ or ‘bodily’ emotion, and ‘cultural’ or ‘second order’ emotion. These kinds of distinctions resonate strongly with those made with regard to the positioning of individual and society with regard to emotion in, for example, those accounts which distinguish emotion from sentiment. In these accounts the term ‘emotion’ refers to an individual’s private, unarticulated, culturally unmotivated feelings, and ‘sentiment’ refers to socially articulated symbols and behavioural expectations (see for example Fajans, 1983). This long standing dualism, in which the mind is related to culture, and the body to the natural or biological, again causes trouble; unwilling to take emotions back to the body as a result of their psychobiological history, anthropological examination has seemed to observe the outmoded notion that the closer we move to the body, the farther away we are from culture (Jenkins & Valiente, 1994:164).

As Lutz and White noted in their review, positivism “is purported to be on the wane in anthropology” (1986:407) and currently, positivism in emotion research still appears to be the domain of psychology (as alluded to by Besnier, 1995: 561). As Lutz and White also note, interpretivism has impacted on anthropological investigations of emotion primarily in terms of an emphasis on the language of emotion (for example, Briggs, 1970, Crapanzano, 1980). As Katz (1999:4) notes, this approach can move dangerously close to taking representations of emotion for the objects of study, rather than concentrating on lived, and in particular, bodily, experience. This concentration can oftentimes mean that the body again becomes peripheral in investigating the lived experience of emotion, which, as noted, can weaken the lines of inquiry (see Lyon & Barbalet, 1994, Lyon, 1995, Coulter, 1989). The danger is especially high in accounts that specifically analyse talk within anthropology (Russell, 1991, Wellencamp, 1995, Holland & Kipnis, 1995), and especially those accounts conducted within the discipline of linguistics (see for example, Smith & Smith, 1995, Frijda, Markham, Sato & Wiers, 1995). As Jenkins and Valiente observe, although it is possible to get to the ideas of intentionality and agency in creating experience by means of:

analyses of mental representations such as language and ethnopsychological knowledge, the cultural creation of intersubjective realms of social space via the body has often eluded the anthropological gaze (1995:164).

The tension between universalism and relativism, thriving at the time of Lutz and White’s review, continues presently (Weirzbicka, 1995). Besnier (1995:560) notes that
while the tension between universalism and relativism has been presented as a particularly dominant dichotomy in the anthropological investigation of emotion, “most scholars stand on considerably more moderate grounds somewhere between these caricatural extremes”. The reason, perhaps, for the continuation of the dichotomy presently is that, as Besnier suggests, “successful ethnography demonstrates that, to make sense of each [relative] piece of the puzzle, one must consider how it fits with the rest of the [universal] puzzle” (1995:560). Because this is a constantly negotiated process very often accompanied by heated debate, says Besnier, extremes ostensibly remain, and could be over represented — heated debates are always more interesting than moderate positionings, especially to those scholars who stand outside anthropology. Jenkins and Valiente (1994:163) argue that the gap is closing in on this dichotomy, when they suggest, “previous universalist-individualist accounts of emotion are now construed by many as but one ethnopsychological creation myth” (see Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990, Kleinman & Good, 1985, White & Kirkpatrick, 1985).

If romanticism and rationalism, the fifth and final dichotomy that Lutz and White identify in their review, does not remain central in the wider anthropological treatment of emotions, then it is certainly central in current police understandings of emotion in downtown Adelaide. Here, the former understanding of emotion is strongly bound up with notions of a basic or defining ‘humanness’, and with overcoming the ‘roboticising’ effect that police officers often say is brought to bear on the individual officer as a member of the larger police organization. Emotion is also associated in the police view with irrationality. In the existing romantic treatments of emotion, (Lutz and White nominate Kemper 1978, R. Rosaldo 1984, and Solomon, 1976, as providers of characteristic examples), emotion is:

implicitly evaluated positively as an aspect of “natural humanity”; it is (or can be) the site of uncorrupted, pure or honest perception in contrast with civilisation’s artificial rationality. The ability to feel defines the human and creates the meaningfulness in individual and social life [on the other hand] for the rationalist who makes use of the general Western equation of irrationality with emotion, the emotions are, if not the symptoms of the animal in the human, (e.g., Freeman, 1983) at least disordering and problematic; they are “vague and irrational” (Huntington & Metcalf, 1979:34) Lutz & White (1986:409).

In the conclusion to their article, Lutz and White note the relative neglect of phenomenological and communicative aspects of emotion, which, at the time of their
The 1986 review, seemed set to be remedied by scholars in the process of reconceptualizing conceptions of emotion so that it would be inclusive of these very aspects. In more recent publications, however, (see many contributors to Csordas (ed), 1994, for example), analysts continue to note the reluctance of many to return to the body, even as the notion that emotion is a universal, psychobiological event for individuals fades into anthropological insignificance. Jenkins and Valiente (1994:164), for example, write against the "common" conceptualisation of the body as a tabula rasa upon which cultural codes are inscribed. Katz (1999:4) laments the ways in which anthropologists continue to avoid the challenge of understanding emotional experience in and through the body due to the sustained interest in analysing text, symbol, material object and talk as representations of emotion. Lyon and Barbalet (1994:48) argue for a body that is intercommunicative and active, and one that is so through emotion, and argue that the role of emotion in activity and communication is essential, because "emotion is precisely the experience of embodied sociality". The investigations of emotion undertaken in this thesis are located within what Jenkins and Valiente have called the very "recent interest" in notions of the body as a generative source of culture and experience, and equally within the discourse of sociopolitical dimensions of emotion.

In the current work I aspire to similar goals; specifically, to integrate feeling in both experience of the world and action in it; to understand the body not merely as sociopolitically inscribed, but as equally the seat of agency and intentionality through emotion. In this endeavour, this work follows, among others, those works completed by Katz (1999), Lyon and Barbalet (1994), Good and Good (1988), Jenkins (1991) and Jenkins and Valiente (1994).

In this thesis, I draw extensively on the work of Lyon and Barbalet (1994) to explore emotional experience. I draw on these theoreticians because they argue that emotion connects. I am particularly interested in this because band members describe their connections with instruments and with each other in performance as emotional, while they regard what they experience as their disconnection from instruments in rehearsal as unemotional. Police officers recognise emotion as endowed with qualities that connect people to people. In police work, which requires that cops do not connect with those they police for the sake of ensuring neutrality, and therefore equality, before the law, emotional expressions are buried beneath ostensibly unemotional police skins. While the thesis focuses primarily on the band members' emotionful experiences of
performance and, in particular, on the kinds of connections that are entailed in it, I also explore the ways in which cops experience emotion as connecting. Below, I review the (mostly sociological) work that has been produced on police and emotions, and move from there to progressively develop a conception of emotion that is specific to band members. I do not believe, however, that the only way in which persons can connect is emotionally; there is no reason why connections cannot be forged cognitively, for example. Within the confines of this thesis, emotion of a particular performative kind is central in the ways in which band members experience themselves as connected with instruments and with each other.

POLICE AND EMOTION

The way that police officers use emotional expression has been dealt with most thoroughly as a specific topic in its own right in a number of recent sociological studies which have at their collective theoretical basis the notion of ‘emotional labour’ developed by Hochschild (1983) in the seminal text The Managed Heart (see for example, Brown & Grover, 1998; Hunt, 1984; Manning, 1997; Pogrebin & Poole, 1995; Stenross & Kleinman, 1989). There also exist accounts in which configurations of practical power are associated with patterns of emotional expression (see for example de Rivera 1977; Kemper, 1978; Scheff, 1988). These can be viewed as informative potential contributors to a specific police-emotion inquiry, but they are not well represented in current literature on policing.

The definition of emotional labour developed by Hochschild describes the labour that requires one to “induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” (Hochschild, 1983:7). In keeping with the idea that almost every profession requires workers to suppress or induce emotional expressions, the concept of emotional labour has been applied to employees in almost every employment situation, and especially to those of the service industry including fast-food workers (Leidner, 1993; Paules, 1996), airline stewards (Hochschild, 1983), nurses (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; O’Brien, 1994), as well as police. Susan Ehrlich-Martin’s most recent sociological contribution, an article entitled ‘Police Force or Police Service? Gender and Emotional Labour’ (1999) typifies and draws upon many of these essentially interactionist studies, in which police officers are understood as artful and creative inducers and suppressors of their own emotions for the sake of
impression management. In Ehrlich-Martin’s contribution, incidences of suppression and induction themselves revolve around a central point of the gender of both officer and citizen.

The sight of an ostensibly unemotional police officer is in Ehrlich-Martin’s study responsible for the continued impression made on the public of police impartiality and professionalism; the restriction of emotional expression is understood to be a physical sign that represents to citizens the idea that officers will not allow any circumstances to effect their ability to be impartial. The idea that ostensibly unemotional officers give off impressions of neutrality and impartiality is vigorously practiced at SAPOL, as the ethnographic chapter on police in this thesis reveals in no uncertain terms. Equally though, at SAPOL, as Ehrlich-Martin also notes in her own study, officers often use emotional expressions selectively as physical display modes which they know will impact on citizen behaviour in particular and predictable ways. The officer who uses angry or threatening expressions, for example, might frighten a potentially unruly citizen back into law-abiding behaviour. At SAPOL, these emotional expressions are in fact not considered emotional expressions, but are, instead, treated as highly reflected upon, highly considered, and logically thought-out, as opposed to unplanned and personally felt, display modes which can be used in predictable ways in policing and which bear no relationship to the officer’s personal feelings.

The highly reflected-upon restriction or suppression of emotional expression that police officers practice on the job, that theoreticians following Hochschild would term ‘emotional labour’, also serves to protect police officers themselves. Ehrlich-Martin argues, for example, that an act of emotional labour, specifically, the suppression of the racially motivated ‘hate’ emotion directed by Los Angeles Police Department officers toward African-American motorist Rodney King, would have continued to ensure good, professional policing. Ehrlich-Martin also notes that officers not only engage in emotional labour by suppressing their own feelings, but also actively work to suppress the emotions of citizens when citizens are angry, frightened, or even when they are too joyful, in order to preserve law and order. Ehrlich-Martin goes on to argue that it is the very strict suppression of almost every emotional expression that sets police officers apart from other ‘emotional labourers’ in other professions, and indeed from policed citizens. She argues specifically that a kind of police family is formed:
Cops tend to be suspicious of and isolated from the public, which fears them and which they view as hostile. This situation has resulted in a close and cohesive occupational culture. The informal norms of this work culture... include a norm of emotional self-management. An officer who displays too much anger, sympathy or other emotion... will not be accepted as a "regular cop" or viewed as someone able to withstand the pressures of police work (1999:115; see also Skolnick, 1966, Pogrebin & Poole, 1995).

The problem in this very interactionist kind of account is that police officers are left to present a self to members of the public that is somehow separate from the embodiment of their conduct. Ehrlich-Martin speaks of the places and times in which police do not have to manage their emotions as much, i.e., in the coffee room at the stationhouse, as a kind of slightly more formal Goffmanesque “backstage”, which is highly typical of accounts informed by Hochschild’s work, itself heavily influenced by Goffman (1959), and very peripherally informed by substantive ethnographic fieldwork. In these accounts, ‘feelings’ or emotions have no bodily basis; feeling is not related to action, but instead to impression: in Ehrlich-Martin’s account, the officer’s body is cast as a neon sign of his or her personal, inner emotional, or more commonly, unemotional, state that can give others clues about the position of an other in an emergent sequence of social interaction. As Lyon and Barbalet (1994) note of Hochschild’s (1983) account and those that proceed with similar theoretical structures, more emphasis is placed on the culturally given cognitive structures “in terms of which social relations are supposedly given their meaning”, than on social and bodily relationships as located at the basis of emotional experiences (Lyon and Barbalet, 1994:58).

Without a conception of emotion as embodied and social or relational, it is difficult to move beyond a highly interactionist description of impression management to explain police experiences of emotion and its inexpression. As will be shown in the course of this thesis, the police separation from the community is not simply a matter of impression management, but is best understood using a conception of emotion that is embodied and social-relational. It is entirely probable that police officers reflect on the emotional expressions they suppress or induce on the job, as Ehrlich-Martin’s account argues, and that they consider what impact these will have on policed citizens, but simply describing these as impression management strategies, as interactionist accounts do, fails to recognise that what cops are doing when they self-consciously hold their own bodies tightly in their own gazes is disconnecting themselves from others, from community, in fundamental ways. Employing a conception of emotion as embodied
sociality allows us to see that what cops are doing in their highly reflected upon physical practices is attempting to embody disconnectedness from the social body and that this experience is what cops refer to as professional police behaviour.

While I take up much of Lyon and Barbalet’s understanding of emotion as connecting, I do not begin from the theoretical position that they advance in their work; rather, I begin with the ethnography. The definition of emotion that I use in this thesis is one shaped by the ethnographic circumstances in which the experience occurs and, in this case, those circumstances are such that it is necessary for band members to include instruments as parts of their own bodies in order for them to experience a specific performance related emotion called ‘the feel’. I build from these circumstances, utilising appropriate phenomenologically based works on the way, to develop the conception of emotion utilised in this work. This conception of emotion serves to describe what the band members take to be their unique experience of emotion — performing music, not on instruments, but as instruments. Since producing music not on but as instruments is so centrally important to the emotional experiences of band members, I turn now to a sketch of where music fits in all of this, and continue to develop a specific conception of emotion for understanding the performing lives of police band musicians.

MUSIC AND EMOTION

There are a great many works dealing with music and emotion. The investigation of what emotion or emotional expressiveness has to do with music or vice versa is hardly a new topic; the connection of emotion with music is one that has long been made in both popular and academic understandings of music (see Swain, 1997). Scholarly research on the subject has taken place across many disciplines including philosophy (Maus, 1991) musicology (Langer, 1948; Meyer, 1956; Jackendoff, 1991; Kastner & Crowder, 1990; Kerman, 1965; Narmour, 1991) ethnomusicology1 (Blacking, 1987, Lomax, 1968, Feld, 1996, Henderson, 1996, Kippen, 1988, Stokes, 1994, Leppert, 1993), music history (Newcomb, 1984, 1987) psychology (many contributors in Feder, Karmel &

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1 During the course of preparing this thesis I felt unsure about the precise difference between ethnomusicology and the anthropology of music in the current moment. I emailed Bruno Nettl, who said that in his opinion, depending on the beginning definition of ethnomusicology, the difference is too small to be worthy of worry (Nettl, pers. email com, 2001). It may be that the ethnomusicologists I have listed here consider themselves anthropologists and vice versa — I am unsure of the precise nature of the difference.
Pollock's edited volume entitled *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music* (1993) including Trietler, Goldberg, Epstein, Rose and Noy), aesthetics (Hanslick, [1854] 1957; Herzog, 1995, Ridley, 1995) and has even been informed occasionally by figures prominent in the field of neurophysiology (i.e. Clynes, 1974, 1977, Marin, 1989). This subject has also been extensively addressed by anthropologists including Merriam (1963), Qureshi (2000), Keil (1987) and Seeger (1987).

The investigations made by these scholars are divisible into many different specific research questions, many of which revolve around the investigation of the constitution and communication of musical meaning. A great many analysts have devoted themselves to investigating the communicative aspect of musical meaning in terms of the similarity (or difference) of music to natural language. The idea that music communicates with precision the thoughts or feelings of its composer led Cooke, for example, to develop a dictionary of sorts in *The Language of Music*, in which he concluded that “music is, properly speaking, a language of the emotions” (1959:33). Swain notes that the notion that music has meaning has driven the perceived relationship between music and language “more than any other single idea” in the history of the analogy between music and language. Swain further notes that the question to be decided when considering whether or not music is like a language is largely concerned with whether or not music is “expressive of” emotions, or whether it is merely self-referential. Adherents to the latter position, including nineteenth century aesthetic theorists such as Hanslick, and twentieth century figures such as Stravinsky, would hold that, for example, there is nothing natural or logical about the association of minor modes and sadness, nor major modes and happiness. These associations, as Swain notes, are “merely conventional aspects of our particular culture, popular myths maintained by the incognoscenti” (1997:47). Stravinsky himself argued that:

[m]usic is, by its very nature, essentially powerless to express anything at all, whether a feeling, an attitude of mind, a psychological mode, a phenomenon of nature, etc... Expression has never been an inherent property of music (1936:42).

At the other end of the scale is the notion that music does signify something besides itself. Kivy (1980), for example, argues that both the conventional associations and the abstract facts of a piece contribute to a connection of the musical piece with emotion. Langer (1948, 1953), “a believer in the emotional content of music” and Meyer (1956), also “a believer”, do not go so far as Kivy in their ‘belief’ (Swain, 1997:44). Meyer
notes specifically that musical sounds elicit emotions solely on the basis of perceived tonal and rhythmic contrasts (1956:22), and Langer, who does not regard musical structure as consistent with the structure of a natural language, but does not dismiss it as entirely meaningless, criticises Hanslick's position for its aesthetic import, noting in particular that he is:

[s]uddenly faced with the dichotomy: significant or meaningless. And while they [aestheticians following Hanslick] fiercely repudiate the proposition that music is a semantic, they cannot assert that it is meaningless (1953:27).

It is important that Langer points out that aestheticians repudiate any semantic property of music, and any form of meaning it might hold at the same time, because, while there is certainly no logical relationship between the musical sound of a major scale and happiness, or a minor scale and sadness, the same might be said of language itself: for example, there is no logical relationship between the word 'cat' and its referent in the world (see Swain, 1997:45). Langer, however, argues that music is unlike a language but does have some kind of emotional content. More specifically, she argues that "music never communicates anything ...specific...[in terms of specific emotions], but rather is a constantly moving picture of a single all-embracing Emotion" (1953: 27). This does not mean, however, that what is communicated as emotion is vague or nebulous; Langer also notes that "music can reveal the nature of feelings with a detail and truth than language cannot approach" (1948:191).

Blacking (1985; reprinted with alterations in Byron, 1995:152) argues that the position taken by Langer on the precision of non-verbal communication is possible because:

[m]any sequences of body movement are not entirely neutral, in that they have physiological consequences and evoke a specific range of somatic states, feelings, and corresponding thoughts ...moreover... a decision to perform music can lead people to share emotion through the link of their common participation in sequences of movement and its relation to what Manfred Clynes calls "essentic forms".

Scholars such as Manfred Clynes (1974) have argued for a biological basis for sharing emotion through music. Clynes suggests that there are biologically determined expressive movements that are programmed into people, which he called 'essentic forms'. The programmed presence of essential forms in people satisfactorily explained for Clynes why when people feel anger they express it "in definite angry ways and not
in other ways”, enabling him to conclude that “emotional gestures have precise representations in the brain” (1974:55). Musicians, argues Clynes, can therefore generate an emotional state by repeatedly producing its typical expression.

Blacking, following Clynes, similarly argues that, “the collective movements of musical performance can generate collective feelings and collective thought, which is the basis of cultural communication” (1985; reprinted with alterations in Byron, 1995:152). That Blacking, an ethnomusicologist trained in the Social Anthropology department of Cambridge, displays a marked interest in the work of Clynes may seem surprising because of the common irreconcilability between strictly biological and anthropological viewpoints; Clynes does suggest, after all, that emotions are part of the human biogrammar, while Blacking’s anthropological contemporaries during his time at Cambridge were discussing and emphasising the social constructedness of emotions at the expense of their biological hard-wiredness (see for example, Hallowell, 1955, Wallace, 1958, H. Geertz, 1959). It is worth noting that Blacking felt that Merriam’s important text The Anthropology of Music (1963), treated music as if it were learned social behaviour, a criticism he repeated with regard to emotion as conceptualised by Clifford Geertz (1975). Blacking, more interested in emotion as a hard-wired part of the human biogrammar, takes interest in Clynes’ study because “he [Clynes] is concerned with measuring the expression of fantasized emotions, which are of course, cultural products” (1987:78). With cultural products and Clynes’s essentic forms equally in mind, Blacking develops a conception of emotion, which he applied equally to music:

Emotions are structured inner movements of the body that acquire and are given meaning in the contexts of real or imagined social situations. Like music, emotions are forms of bodily motion that are assigned meanings and so become expressions of feelings (Blacking, 1987:79).

Taking this position allowed Blacking to argue for a resonance between biology and culture, and specifically allowed him to argue for a resonance between emotional and musical structures, which he considered were each experienced as bodily motions with similarly assigned culturally specific meanings. Blacking develops this notion of resonance with particular reference to the work of Ferguson in this area. Ferguson (1960) deals directly with the question of how the structure of emotional experience is related to the structure of music, arguing specifically that two fundamental elements of musical expression, tone stress and ideal motion, can “portray, respectively, two of the
three elemental factors of emotional experience-nervous tension and motor impulse”. If these are understood to be similar to our consciousness of objective experience, they “may form the groundwork of an intelligible expression” of that consciousness (1960:87).

Ferguson includes, but does not assign as much importance to, a third factor of emotional experience in addition to nervous tension and motor impulse, namely, “the awareness of an exciting stimulus”. Blacking regards this as the most important of the three, noting that we become aware that a stimulus is exciting only because of cultural experience, and that, therefore, the expressive powers of music are a function of its role in society. Citing Fischer, Blacking drives home the point, that musical “content-that is to say, in the last instance, the social element-is the decisive style-forming factor in art” (Fischer, 1963:152). Having established that culturally experienced people become stimulated by musical productions, Blacking goes on to argue that:

[m]usic can be profoundly moving by means of the resonances that people can establish between the tone-stress and the ideal motion of music and the nervous tension and motor impulse of their bodies (Blacking, 1985; reprinted with alterations in Byron, 1995:176).

On several occasions throughout “The Study of ‘Music’ as Cultural System and Human Capability” (1984), Blacking cites Geertz’s famous line, that “art and the equipment to grasp it are made in the same shop”. (1976:1497). Here Blacking brings his formulation of musical-emotional resonance to bear on the relationship between performers and listeners, arguing that particular emotions are experienced by listeners during musical performances as a result of the resonance between music and motor impulse. In particular he notes that:

[a]n intuitive grasp of music is possible because performers and listeners possess the same innate musical competence …as creators of music. When someone uses those very personal (but “universal”) human modes of thought and action to create new arrangements of culturally familiar musical symbols, there is a very good chance that some other human beings, in re-creating their sense as they hear them...will feel in their bodies what others felt in creating them (1984; reprinted with minor alterations in Byron, 1995:240).

This body-feeling is responsible for inducing a particular emotion-feeling (see Blacking, 1985), which is replicated in musical expression.
I note here that Blacking’s use of the word ‘create’ in the above quote may seem to refer specifically to those who write music. As such, Blacking may be arguing that it is composers and listeners who share the same body feeling and emotional feeling. However, I argue that Blacking’s position unavoidably includes musicians as people who feel the same body and emotional feelings as listeners. According to Blacking, both music and emotion are forms of bodily motion that are assigned meanings and so become expressions of feelings (Blacking, 1987:79). In physically producing music, musicians engage in bodily motions which are, he argues, affectively meaningful: Blacking argues that listeners know particular musics to be particularly meaningful because listeners recreate bodily motions that are affectively meaningful when they listen. According to Blacking’s understanding, musicians do not have to recreate bodily feelings, since they are engaged in carrying them out in the production of music. Indeed, Blacking himself notes that, “a decision to perform music can lead people to share emotion through the link of their common participation in sequences of movement” (1985; reprinted with alterations in Byron, 1995:152, my emphasis). Musicians then, must feel emotionally in line with their bodily-musical actions. Musicians, in Blacking’s work, necessarily feel what listeners feel.

It is at this point that I pause to locate the position from which I work in this thesis insofar as emotion is concerned. I stop here to do so, because I take my point of departure from Blacking’s position outlined immediately above. Weirzbicka (1995:17) has noted that “the literature on “emotions” often takes the concept [of emotion] for granted”. She warns that if we began studies of emotion by explaining rigorously what is meant by the term:

we might give our inquiry, from the start, a level of conceptual rigour which is often missing in the literature on emotions, but we would also subject ourselves to arbitrary restrictions. It is [therefore] more fruitful to start somewhere, and then to proceed, through conceptual and empirical work in the area around the starting point” (1995:17).

Following Weirzbicka, I offer a conception of emotion that is informed by the ethnographic circumstances in which ‘emotional’ experiences of police band musicians are located. This conception of emotion is one that pivots on embodiment and, in particular, the embodiment of one’s instrument. This embodiment of instrument, which occurs through the extension of the band member’s senses into instrument, is at the
basis of the experience that band members call “the feel”. Band members describe ‘the feel’ as highly emotional experience which occurs only in the performance, as opposed to the rehearsal, of music. The experience of ‘the feel’ is, I submit, a particular performative kind of emotion. As will become evident during the course of this thesis, ‘the feel’ is not unique to police band musicians; during the course of writing this thesis, an American musician interviewed on a popular radio arts program described, in almost exactly the same terms, that which police band members had described to me as ‘the feel’. In short, the musician on the radio talked about turning into his trumpet while he was performing, and about what a highly emotional experience that was for him. In short, police band members use the term ‘emotional’ to describe their embodied connection with instruments during performance. It is to this connection that I refer when I speak of emotion in this thesis in both the cases of band members and police officers. Where the former joyfully celebrate the making of connection between instrument and self, fellow band member and self and audience member and self, the latter do all that they can to prevent connections between cop and civilian from being made by physically preventing what they take to be connecting emotional expressions from appearing on the police body.

Now, to the point of my departure from Blacking’s work, insofar as police band members, the main focus of this thesis, are concerned. An important quality of ‘the feel’ is its restrictedness to the performers or its unavailability to audience members. Band members believe that both they and their audience members experience ‘emotion’ during the musical performances that the police band members give, but they reject the idea that these experiences are of the same kind. Taking my cue from Weirzbicka, I turn now to develop a definition of emotion in relation to the ethnographic circumstances in which I find it present. It is in opposition to Blacking’s idea, that audiences will feel what musicians felt in creating music, that I locate the musical side of the current study. The problem with treating emotions as biologically hard-wired is that there is not much room to develop accounts involving embodiment and incorporation through lived experiences of emotion. Neuro-physical experiences of emotion notwithstanding, in this ethnographic context, band members and audiences experience the emotional effects of music in very different ways. This is because, at least for the members of the police band, the emotional effects of the music change in direct relation to the sensual, corporeal experiences that band members have during musical production. In short,
when band members incorporate and embody elements of musical instruments and musical sounds, as they do in performances, they experience the music ‘emotionally’. When they regard instruments and instrument sounds as objects which are positioned wholly external to their own bounded bodies\(^2\), as is the case during rehearsals, musical sounds are experienced dispassionately, and are considered devoid of emotional content or, in other words, ‘the feel’. There is no ‘feel’ for band members in rehearsals, where band members feel sensually-corporeally disconnected from their instruments.

I agree wholeheartedly with Blacking that the expression of angry music in loud, aggressive thumps to the drum body and vigorous breath-yells into the trumpet instrument produce sounds that culturally tuned-in audience members recognise as being the same kinds of bodily motions that one might do in anger. I also agree that these musical performances can generate collective feelings in audience members. But the actions that band members make against instrument bodies to produce angry sounds do not generate the same feelings in band members. While they might go through the physical motions of anger, and while these motions of anger might well be recognised as such by audience members, band members do not feel anger in making them. Something else happens to band members; they embody musicality or, in other words, they experience what they call ‘the feel’.

Emotion, as I noted in my introductory remarks, is inextricably tangled up with embodiment, and emotional experiences of music are, for band members, precisely the experiences of embodied musicality. Band members, in performances, phenomenologically speaking, turn into humanised saxophones and trumpetised players; conditions in which their bodies come to be constructed of elements of trumpets and saxes, as well as elements of human flesh, and in which their trumpets and their saxes become part human. During rehearsal periods, in contrast, instruments and their sounds are thought to be located externally to the body, and the points at which band members intersect with them is the focus of highly directed self-conscious attention. It is exclusively in experiences of embodied musicality — which includes

\(^2\) The idea that musical instrument sounds, and bodies for that matter, are located entirely externally to the bodies of band members is one that band members believe wholeheartedly; however, musical sounds and, for that matter, parts of the instrument body, unavoidably infuse the neurophysical body. I argue later in this work that in surveilling their bodily boundaries, band members to some extent are able to locate instruments externally and separately to their own bodies, but this, of course, is not entirely or fully possible as long as band members continue to touch their instruments and hear their sounds.
embodied instrumentality and embodied sonority — that band members experience music emotionally, or in other words experience ‘the feel’. During rehearsals, when instrument objects and sounds are disembodied, *music has no feeling for band members and does not make them feel.*

Audience members, on the other hand, will *not* necessarily feel unemotional when they hear rehearsal music and emotional when they hear performance music in the ways that band members consistently do. During my fieldwork, audience members were often present during band rehearsal periods and often commented on how the rehearsal music made them feel. Band members, meanwhile, consistently insisted that the production had been devoid of emotional content; and for them, indeed, it had been. This is because what band members feel emotionally depends very much on what they feel corporeally and sensually in the creation of music. Further, that which band members and audience members experience emotionally in the production of performance music can be, and in my fieldwork experience, usually is, poles apart. Band members can, for instance, feel elated and joyful when they have played a piece of sad music that has reduced audience members to tears, as occurred during a band performance of *My Heart Will Go On,* which made a female concert-goer seated near me weep.

The idea that musical producers and audience members feel similarly in their bodies has been dealt with by Katz in a peripheral way, in fact, in the endnotes of his most recent publication, *How Emotions Work* (1999). There he draws cursory attention to the idea that:

> [i]f the emotional response to music is through a resonance of the structure of emotional experience and the structure of music, then the audience response will not necessarily reflect the same emotion as is contained in the music, as understood by the composer and performers...[theoreticians do not recognise that this notion] does not look closely enough at the structure of comportment in playing (1999:369).

While Katz does not himself deal directly with this idea, he flags it in relation to a broader discussion of emotion in which he looks briefly at psychoanalytic analysis of Bela Bartok’s *A Tale About A Little Fly* undertaken by Treitler (1993) in which it is assumed that ‘our’ understanding of the music, regardless of whether one is musician or listener, will be the same. Katz notes that the problem with the analysis of resonance in this way is that it is not recognised therein that musicians who are playing the music
have an entirely different relationship to music because of the structure of comportment in playing. This structure of comportment makes the structure of music a fundamentally differently positioned and experienced structure for musicians than it is for audience members. In his study Treitler calls attention:

first to the musical features of the beginning that might resonate with our experience of flies: perhaps the clash of black note against white note figures between the right and left hands, resulting in a generally chromatic sonority, reminds us of the buzzing of flies. Or perhaps...that clashing irritates us in a way that resonates with our irritation at flies...or...the way that the hands must be on top of one another and the fingers clustered to play this passage, reminds us of the swarming of flies...the latter two have more to do with the way we feel-emotionally and kinaesthetically- about flies than about the way we would describe them objectively (1993:47).

Note that Treitler gathers together some of the musical features that resonate with ‘our’ experience of flies that are relevant to listeners, and some that are relevant to players; a listener, perhaps, would not be aware of the compression in measures 1-11 of the piece that necessitates the clustering of the fingers, but the irritating clashing and the chromatic sonority might well be appreciated by both. This may seem a superficial problem of specific musical production knowledge, but what is important here is that musicians have corporeal relationships with instruments that audience members in fact do not. In the case at hand, the different corporeal relationship that band members have with instruments fundamentally alters their emotional experiences of music, and indeed whether they have emotional experiences of the musical sounds they are creating at all.

POWER

In the police ‘context’ part of the thesis, as opposed to the ‘main’ parts in which I discuss the emotional performing lives of police band members, I take up themes relating emotional experience and expression to power. As I explain more fully in the first of the following ethnographic chapters, and especially in chapter six, the police department uses music, and more precisely what they understand to be the emotional qualities of music, to overcome what they regard as the public perception that police have no feelings. According to police, and according to my own inquiries of members of the public, this is a public perception that the senior officers in the department believe is damaging to the police and to successful policing in South Australia. This police project merges notions of police power and authority with emotion in very
particular ways. As Lila Abu-Lughod has argued, "discourses on emotion or emotional discourses are implicated in the play of power" (1990:28). As Henderson (1996:449) has argued, there is no reason for limiting the definition of discourse to the purely textual or visual; discourse can equally be regarded as sonically constituted. In the case at hand, emotionful musical discourses are thoroughly implicated in the play of police power.

As noted at the beginning of this introductory chapter, a central theme in this thesis, and the specific subject of the sixth chapter, concerns the merger of emotion and power in the medium of music and musical bodies, including police bodies, musician bodies and instrument bodies. As I discuss in more detail in the following chapter, during performances, police band members present themselves to members of the public as police officers, not least because they wear full police uniforms while they perform. Through these representative bodies, police seek to present a visual image of police authority along with an audible message, contained in the played music, of emotionality. The combined visual image and audible musical message yield, in the police understanding, the cop with a heart. This heart rests just beneath the ostensibly unemotional skin of the officer. The police image, bound up as it is with impartiality, cannot be moulded into an emotionally expressive shape without the loss of impartiality that is central in the police mind to police authority. It can, however, emit audible evidences of its soul or heart or 'inner' emotional life without corrupting the dark blue skin of the police body. The presentation of visual body and audible soul merges, the department hopes, warmly human emotions with police authority, in order to influence public opinion away from the idea that police are unfeeling insensate robots.

I take up two themes in the investigation of the power vested in the police project. The first of these is not evidently argued in this thesis; rather, it underpins the arguments I make about the construction of the social body. The first theme of investigation enquires after the nature of the power that the police department has over the bodies of band members. Frank (1990: 132) has argued that "feminism as a praxis has taught us to look first for the effects of politics in what is done to bodies". In demanding that band members, who are in fact not operational police officers, follow all deportment and grooming rules applying to operational police, the police
department has fully effected the bodies of band members by ordering their non-police bodies into exact replicas of inexpressive police bodies. Band bodies, however, are not passive in the face of this subordinating force, because bodies are not, in the lived experiences of band members, located externally to the force that impresses upon their bodies a particular police design. Band members, rather, experience themselves in and as their bodies, specifically, as embodying the musical experience they are living and presenting to audiences. As Lyon and Barbalet note, the capacity to "collectively and individually contribute to the making of the social world comes precisely from the person's lived experience of embodiment" (1994:54). In this experience, band bodies participate in the construction of the police image rather than passively receiving what is imposed upon their bodies by the police department. Emotion is central in this image-building process because it is in emotional experience that band members experience themselves in and as their bodies. The police department, and conductor\(^3\), who also exerts power over band member bodies, cannot utterly subject band bodies to power because band bodies are not passive objects but are instead actively embodying of the world through emotion.

This has wider implications for the ways in which we might understand police power. In Foucault's conception of disciplinary power, for example, which is exercised from within the social body, as opposed to sovereign power, which is enforced from above, bodies are changed through social processes because "power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives" (1980:39). As O'Farrell notes:

one of the objectives of disciplinary power was to ensure that every individual conformed to a certain 'norm' or idea of normality, to become uniform, therefore manageable for the purposes of power. The judges of normality are everywhere in this system (1989:105).

One such judge is the police institution, which decides normality on the basis of legal, non-criminal behaviour:

\(^3\) I do not discuss the role of the band's conductor at length here, at his request.
All the individualising [abnormal, unmanageable for the purposes of power] mechanisms of our civilisation, Foucault says, have come to be concentrated at the margins of society, and when the sane, normal, and law-abiding adult is individualised, it is always in reference to those secret elements of madness, disease, criminality and childishness he bears within him (O’Farrell, 1989:105).

The notion of disciplinary power regards bodies as fully subjected to forces in which they have no formative role. The notion that the body is active in making social order through the facilitating role of emotion offers a way in which to include the person as an active agent in the creation of the social world rather than as a subject body which entirely passively receives the mould that the judges of normality impose.

In this part of the thesis, I also examine in detail a second power-play, when I look closely at the ways in which musical instruments embody particular acoustic identities and social memories. This theme, unlike the first, forms an evident part of the thesis. As Qureshi explains:

A social and art-historical discourse of meaning invests instruments with explicit historicity so that they become material repositories of past meanings, and their visual representations serve to define sonority through historically situated social practices and aesthetic codes...the historicized relationship between an instrument’s affective, embodied and social meanings and the discursive representations of such meanings is what endows an instrument with a standard musical identity. Once trombone, horn and harp have their embodied meanings widely circulated...this discourse itself becomes a tool of control, shaped and disseminated by a dominant class (2000:811).

Taking discourse as, in this case, essentially audible — as musical narrative — discourse has indeed become a tool of police power which is directed specifically at musical consumers, the police band’s audience members. Here, following ideas contained in Abu-Lughod’s work on emotion discourse and power (1990), I tease out the ways in which emotional musical discourse is implicated in the wielding of police power, to which, indubitably, citizens are subject, but not entirely, absolutely or passively so.

While I have discussed Foucauldian approaches to understanding power above, I do not run the ethnography through a Foucauldian analysis. My departure from Foucault is not a fundamental one in the sense that I do not dismiss the idea that bodies are
subject to social power, but in another way, the departure is fundamental. The main reason for not using a Foucauldian theoretical basis in this thesis is that leaves little room for thinking about embodied social agents (see Lyon and Barbalet, 1994:50). I explain this in detail in the next chapter and in chapter two.

THESIS STRUCTURE

In this thesis, I first provide a sense of the policing context in which the police band belongs. Here, I explore the reasons for the police band’s continuing role in the police department, which is, in short, to show members of the community that police officers are ‘emotional’ and caring, and therefore ‘human’, beings. This is considered by the police department to be central in maintaining police-public relations. Then, I delve deep into the sensual, corporeal and emotional worlds of the police band members. This constitutes the major part of the thesis in terms of importance. I then move out from these worlds to explore the ways in which the musical performances given by the police band musicians incorporate or integrate the power of police. While the members of the band insist that they are musicians, and while none of the band members see themselves as police, they are required to integrate music with policing; this, after all, is why they are employed in the police department.

The first ethnographic chapter of this thesis introduces the people, places and major themes of inquiry contained in this thesis. The people are the police officers of the SAPOL, and the members of the SAPOL band. The ethnographic work was conducted mostly in the central city buildings of the police department and in the band rooms. Time was also spent in the homes of band members conducting ethnographic interviews, and in towns and cities, both in Adelaide and in other major metropolitan cities where the band members performed music and marching displays. The major themes include those of emotion, embodiment and power via musical means.

The second chapter explores the idea that police officers, in their distinctly self-reflexive physical practices, achieve for themselves the experience of embodied unsociality or embodied disconnectedness from others in the community, which they
describe as the experiences of unemotionality, disconnectedness, impartiality and of professionalism.

In the third chapter, I present an ethnography of rehearsal, which I explore and analyse using the aforementioned phenomenological works. Specifically, I look at the ways in which band members construct their corporeal-sensual and emotional experiences of instruments and their sounds during rehearsal periods. In the fourth chapter, I present an ethnography of performance, and here I pay particular attention to the ways in which the bodies of band members undergo corporeal-sensual and emotional metamorphosis into performing bodies which consist no longer exclusively of human flesh, but which in performance are partly constituted of saxophone, trumpet, and of flute. In the fifth chapter, I explore rehearsal ‘pain’ and performance ‘joy’, adopting Serres’s notion of the ‘seraphic joy’ of sensual extension to do so. I also pay particular attention to the idea that experiences of corporeally and sensually experienced performance joy make the band members’ experiences of what they call ‘the emotion of performing music’ very different to the ‘emotional’ experiences of audience members hearing the same music.

The sixth chapter explores the ways in which the police department appropriates the kinds of emotions that listeners experience for the specific purposes of power. In this chapter, I argue that a series of seeming, but not actual, sonic, visual and affective contradictions allows the police department to successfully reanimate subhuman law enforcement bodies into human bodies via their apparent capacity for emotion of particular kinds. The seventh chapter draws together these themes and ideas in conclusion.

NOTES ON METHODOLOGY AND MYSELF
During my period of participant observation at the police band, I participated in a range of activities which sometimes made me far more participant than observer, and which sometimes made me far more observer than participant. During rehearsals I initially sat perched on a plastic chair to the side of the rehearsal area scribbling furiously in my notebook while band members, who are all represented with pseudonyms in this thesis, eyed me suspiciously. During band breaks they would flip through the pages of my notebook to “make sure” that I hadn’t missed anything of
importance. Unable to decipher my shorthand, they would ask me about what I had written and give me directions about what I should notice for next time. Later, as the band members became used to me taking up my perch whenever they took the rehearsal stand, I took photographs and made detailed drawings of players as they manipulated their instruments, and made maps and diagrams of the spaces they occupied. During performances, I took my seat with other audience members, armed with notebook and sketchpad.

After I had spent eight months with the band members, they were invited to participate in the Centenary Tattoo celebrations of the Tasmania Police. During the final performance at the Tattoo, some of the band members decided that I ought to have some experience of performing if I was to write about it with any degree of accuracy. I am not a musician, and I know very little about playing, or even holding, an instrument, and even less about how to march. Nevertheless, I found myself outfitted in a ceremonial police uniform complete with a pith helmet, which had to be stuffed with toilet paper when it was discovered that I had a smaller head than anyone in the band. A clarinet was thrust into my shaking hands and I marched into my first ever experience of stage fright in front of six thousand screaming Tasmanian fans. The videotape, recorded by the band member who gave up his spot so that I might march, features many close ups of a deathly pale woman fingerling the keys of a clarinet with apparently focussed dedication, even when her mouth is not actually attached to the instrument, and even during the speeches delivered by senior members of the Tasmania Police department and the Premier. A tiny triangle of peach toilet tissue peeking out under the rim of the pith helmet gives her a jaunty, informal look, which results in merciless teasing from other band members.

When band members realised that I was prepared to risk public humiliation, if not caused by forgetting the marching steps, then definitely by the slow and unstoppable unravelling of peach toilet tissue, I acquired a new position in the band. I was suddenly and irreversibly understood as someone who was dedicated to my project and dedicated to understanding the band members that it revolved around. The band members understood about being dedicated to their work, and they understood risking public humiliation — for as many commented, once music is performed to a live audience, a mistake cannot be rewound and replayed — and they understood that my
efforts to understand what life looked like, sounded like, felt like, from their perspective, was, in their words, "genuine". I was, finally, part of the band, and I even acquired a position in it- solo anthropologist. When the band members came up with this name for me, I knew that I belonged.

As solo anthropologist, I came equipped with my own instruments; the band members had their clarinets, their saxes, their flutes, and I had my notebook, my camcorder and my camera. I recorded by camera and camcorder most of all in rehearsals and I also made most of the drawings of band members during rehearsal periods. I did these things in rehearsals rather than during performances because band members felt more comfortable, not least because the videotapes that they have made of their performances are sold to finance other activities. Taping during performances might have encouraged audience members to follow suit next time they attended a performance, which might well have impacted on sales. Further, videotaping is often done during rehearsals of marching so that band members can check their movements and overall formation with more accuracy than they can while they are marching. The presence of a camcorder in other rehearsal contexts did not seem to be regarded as unusual or off-putting for any band members, and many suggested good spots to film from that were within the rehearsal space itself. Many photographs and sections of videotape show the rehearsing band from the perspective of one of the trumpeters, or one of the percussionists.

When I viewed all of these visual data together I found a pattern emerged: all of these recordings showed band members looking down at their bodies and their instruments. Some photographs and drawings show band members in quite ungainly positions, peering down over their noses, or hunching over their instruments in order to see their fingers. Video recordings of marching band rehearsals show band members staring fixedly at the feet and legs of those in front of and beside them, and then staring just as intensely at their own. Band members explained that they had been measuring the amount of space between them, which at early rehearsal stages was not yet "second nature" to them. The thread running through visual data, that close and self-surveilling attention was being paid to bodies in rehearsal periods, continued throughout written fieldnotes, and has become a central idea in this thesis.
I paid close attention to the bodies of band members as band members themselves were engaged in paying close attention to their own bodies, and they paid close attention to mine. As my own body changed dramatically as a result of anorexia, from which I suffered throughout fieldwork, band members’ classifications and understandings of it also changed. As the bone structure of my body revealed itself as a set of pointed rods that threatened to puncture my skin, and as my face became sunken and sharp, and as the healthy pinkness of my skin faded to almost translucent, I found that the initial description of my body made by band members, as a body most suited to playing clarinet or saxophone, shifted to a body that would be most suitable for flute playing. The otherwise painful and damaging experience of anorexia was initially responsible for alerting me to the way that band members understood bodies and their relationship to instruments, which is also a central theme in this work.

Besides doing intensive participant observation, that swung pendulum-like from almost full observation to almost full participation, making maps and diagrams, making drawings and taking photographs and video recordings, I also took genealogies and did semi-structured taped interviews with about three quarters of the band membership. In taking genealogies I found that, for example, a piano could marry a cello and produce a baby flute, who, these genealogies suggest, will probably grow up to marry a clarinet; the band musicians tended to come from musical families. Although I do not draw on this data in any specific way in the thesis, the genealogies proved immensely useful because it allowed the band members to get to know me, and for me to get to know them. They also gave me a sense of the trajectories of the individual members to the point of their membership in the police band. Band members also used genealogy-taking times to tell stories about members of their families and to tell stories about each other, which added to my understanding of group dynamics and in some cases explained particular events that occurred when band members interacted with each other.

The semi-structured interviews with band members were useful in a more specific way, and these interviews are used in particular in chapters three and five. The interviews were conducted mostly in band members’ homes, where they invariably played music that was especially meaningful to them. The interviews demonstrated clearly that band members emotionally experienced music in very different ways as
listeners than they did as performers. In some cases the same songs that band members found saddening as listeners made them feel joyous as performers, and band members also talked at length about the difference between rehearsal and performance experiences of musical production in response to specific questions I asked in these interviews.

As previously discussed during this chapter, I also spent fieldwork time with operational officers of the wider police department. My first foray into the department outside of the band branch involved visiting the police historical society, which is located in the same compound as the band barracks. The collection of material is guarded by an elderly ex-officer with a high suspicion of researchers, especially ones wishing to know about the role that the larger department understands that the police band plays in the department. Since the police band has been considered redundant as a public relations tool at various times throughout its long history, and because this is a very sensitive topic among senior officers of the department, I was denied access to documents outlining the band’s usefulness from a departmental perspective. These documents were in fact contained in other publicly available forms, but the experience alerted me to the possibility that officers of the larger department might find particular questions threatening or hostile. In order to make an initial entrance into the department, I wrote a letter to the officers in charge of local police stations, including the police headquarters, to explain that I wanted to locate the police band in the wider police context in which it belonged, and to ask them about setting time aside to answer questions about policing. Despite having filled in various forms clearing me to undertake research, and being cleared by the departmental computer system, which declared that I was neither ‘a prostitute’ nor ‘a criminal’, and despite being introduced to some senior officers as a researcher at police band performances including the annual Police Ball, it was in fact the case that officers of the wider department had not been aware that I had been doing research within one of its branches. By the time I had received telephone calls from senior officers acting on the order of the Police Commissioner to explore the nature and scope of my research, I had already spoken with operational officers about their on the job experiences, assuming all the while that I had the prior consent of the police department to do so. The panel of officers placed in charge of investigating my involvement in the department did not feel that I should approach operational officers
because “they might not know the right thing to say”. I abided by this decision, and did not approach operational officers again.

After some time had passed, however, some operational officers approached me with information that they wanted to give. After I had made the officers aware of the panel’s discomfort with this idea, many withdrew. Later, one of the officers on the panel approached me directly and expressed his desire to talk about life as an operational officer, and to pass on what other operational officers aware of the research project had wished to express to me. Much of the data on police included herein is sourced from semi-structured interviews with this senior officer and texts provided by him to me, which he considered of central importance. This officer also provided me with access to the police library where I collected many texts, which I have analysed and presented throughout the chapters on policing. These texts are publicly available ones, most of which appear on the internet, although access to training and other specific texts requires the permission of a senior officer.

Overall then, the research for this thesis was carried out using the ensemble of research practices and tools that social anthropologists most usually rely on: participant observation, interviews, genealogies, maps, drawings, diagrams, photographs, videotape, and so on. The primary research tool was, of course, myself: I soaked up and filtered what I saw and heard and wrote, and I found that I had to undergo constant reflection about the place I had, most especially the place my body had, in the view of the band members. Now, when I take first-year anthropology students for tutorial sessions, I seek to teach them something that I knew before fieldwork but didn’t really know until after it: that all ethnography is partial, that no anthropologist can ever produce the one definitive account of any group, and that the researcher’s own personal biography, even the researcher’s own body, influences to a great degree what that researcher produces as ethnography. As anthropologists, we are indeed the primary tools of our research, and our research relies just as much on our own selves as it does on what our informants are willing to reveal to us. This means that all the ethnographies we produce reflect ourselves as much as they reflect the degree to which we have been allowed to live into the lives of our informants. This particular ethnography is a rich slice of the lives of some very willing informants that has been soaked up and filtered through and written down by me.
CHAPTER ONE
PEOPLE AND PLACES: THE COPS 'DOWNTOWN'
AND THE MUSOS IN THE BANDROOM

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is intended as a general introduction to the people that were involved in this fieldwork, namely the members of the South Australia Police Band and operational police officers of the South Australia Police Department (SAPOL). The members of the police band are distinct from regular or operational officers in almost every way, from their professional activity to their classification within the SAPOL. The nature of and reasons for these many differences will be examined fully during the course of this chapter. I note the division of the SAPOL officers into ‘band members’ and ‘operational officers’ here at the outset in order to provide a framework to describe the way in which my fieldwork progressed. As will become apparent during the course of this chapter, band members are professionally separated from regular officers in a great many ways, but they are also dealt with separately here for the reason that I originally encountered band members as a discrete police group.

Permission to conduct fieldwork with band members was granted from senior staff within the band unit, which, along with the Mounted Cadre, is housed in what at one time were police barracks. These barracks are located several kilometres from the main metropolitan police headquarters. The police band belongs to the Community Programs Support Branch (CPSB) of the police department, which in turn belongs to the larger Operations Support Service, and is overseen by a Commanding Officer, who is located at the headquarters building. While the Commanding Officer in charge of the band supervises band activities, and while the band always adheres to guidelines set down for it by the department, senior band staff make all of the day to day decisions regarding band business; a category into which my request to do fieldwork among band members evidently fell.

The Drum Major (who is also a Senior Sergeant), having approved my request, advised the band’s Commanding Officer of my presence at the bandrooms and my intentions to engage in ethnographic fieldwork there. When it became clear that merely describing
the structure of the larger SAPOL organization, of which the band is a part, could not satisfactorily provide a context for discussing the band and its activities, I was advised, by senior band officers, that I should contact other branches of the department. During the course of providing an adequate context in which to locate the police band, very important linkages between police officers and band members were found with the result that the working lives of some members of the SAPOL form integral parts of the ethnographic storyline that runs through this thesis.

THE COPS: PEOPLE AND PLACES

Of the eighteen months I spent doing fieldwork, only six months were specifically devoted to police officers working as operational police officers of the SAPOL. The relatively short amount of time I spent with officers reflects the primary focus of fieldwork: understanding life inside the police band. The six months I did spend with officers allowed me to contextualise the band in the broader environment of the SAPOL and, in particular, it allowed me to understand that the police band serves to soften the ostensibly unemotional image that police officers learn how to produce as employees of the department.

The police department’s official position on my research, as handed down by the Police Commissioner, was that I could have “restricted access” to the department’s officers and materials. I was not, for example, granted permission to speak with officers directly about their work experiences at the department, nor was I permitted to conduct any general written-response surveys on this or any other subject. I could not tag along with on-duty officers due to the restrictions it would place on them as they went about their duties, and because of any danger that might arise in the course of a normal police workday. I was not allowed access to the department’s paper records, or any other written material that was not publicly available, except by permission of the Senior Sergeant who was given the task of supervising me during my time there.

I was free, however, to access any publicly available data on policing. The impressive stack of papers I accumulated by the end of the fieldwork period included Position Information Documents (PID), which describe in detail the job specifications for each position within the SAPOL, educational material from the Academy, including centrally important texts on dealing with members of the public, written accounts of
officers on handling emotion on the job in difficult circumstances including during murder investigations and car smashes, as well as in the course of everyday work or ‘taskings’, application packages for entry to the SAPOL, including forms for medical and psychological assessment, and ‘before’ photographs of a ‘typical’ crop of potential recruits of mixed genders and ethnicities dressed in a variety of colourful costumes followed by ‘after’ photographs of the same fresh-faced crop in police uniforms.

The paper information also included Police Journal articles on personnel selection criteria, information documents about policing in general for public consumption, Youth policy documents, and Mission and Corporate Goal statements from two decades ago until the present time. Of these items, I was directed most specifically by senior departmental members to the current Mission and Corporate Goals statement, accessible on the SAPOL website, and I was given the opportunity to put questions about these public documents to a specially selected panel of officers that senior members of the department aware of my research deemed exemplary.

I was, of course, prepared to follow these guidelines set down by the department, and indeed I did not on any occasion approach an officer for an opinion about anything to do with policing. What I was not prepared for was the contact that many officers sought to make with me, to speak at length about precisely the topics that I was not allowed to approach officers about: what it was like to be a cop working within SAPOL. Having sought advice from the department, whose official position is that officers cannot be forbidden to share their experiences, I have chosen to include much of this data in the thesis.

The contact from SAPOL officers came to me in several ways. First, although I had not requested it, I was presented with an opportunity to access the learning material to which police recruits training at the Police Academy are exposed during their twenty-six week intensive training course. This permission was given by the senior member of staff supervising me, who thought an anthropological analysis of the material might yield conclusions supporting his own opinion, that the educational material to which recruits are exposed is “too focussed on law enforcement” or ‘reactive’ policing, and not on proactive policing (which are terms that I define in the final section of this chapter). To come to a conclusion about the merits of the educational program for police recruits in terms of its level of support for proactivity would indubitably have
made this thesis most interesting and very relevant to those working at the management level of the department. Within the confines of this thesis, though, I touch only lightly on the proactive/reactive debate that rages in most Australian police departments (Cartner, pers. comm. 2000\textsuperscript{1}) and where I do so, I do not directly analyse material in such a way that it could be used as an academic conclusion that might support the debate as it impacts on training in either a proactive or reactive direction. Rather, I refer to the proactive/reactive debate as a context in which the officers who spoke to me located themselves.

Second, a great deal of the contact I had with officers was via lengthy telephone conversations, where anonymity, a central concern for many of my informants — I use this term purposefully to invoke both the anthropological and popular police connotations attached — could, for the most part, be preserved. More often than not, telephone contact was initiated, and maintained, by officers who wanted to air grievances about the department and its policies. Some of this information proved fruitful and informative, while other calls were redirected to other officers whom I knew to be equipped to assist with particular grievances. The volume and nature of grievance calls is consistent with the understanding that many senior officers held about general police morale, which is currently said to be at low ebb due to a combination of several factors. These include an ongoing process of departmental review, which is accused by many officers of ceaselessly and ruthlessly finding ways to streamline operations to fall in line with cuts in government spending, and a perceived negative public opinion of police in general. The latter factor is related to the former by officers who generally believe that members of the public cannot reconcile the reactive (or law enforcement) policing they experience with the proactive (or police service) that is publicly advertised, and release their frustrations onto the police officers with whom they come into contact. As indicated above, public perceptions of police officers, and police perceptions of the public perceptions of police officers, are of central importance in this thesis in that they provide a context for the public relations work currently undertaken by the police band.

\textsuperscript{1} Geoff Cartner is an ex-police officer turned anthropologist who spoke publicly at the 2000 Australian Anthropological Conference held at the University of Western Australia, and privately to me at the same venue, about this debate and his understanding of it as both anthropologist and ex-officer.
A third contact came from a representative of a group of departmental officers working 'downtown' in the central Adelaide city precinct. The primary duty of these officers is to form the interface between departmental policies and programs on paper and the actual practice of policies and programs on the streets. In this capacity, these officers collected a great deal of information from "cops on the streets" when these officers reported back on the problems or issues associated with the implementation of a program or policy on the ground. This information flowing back to the department was replete with details about the nitty gritty of police work. In describing a problem with a piece of policy or programming, for example, 'on the street cops' almost always contextualised the problem or the issue in what they themselves described as "street reality". In one of the meeting rooms of the programs branch of the central police station, over tea and sweet biscuits, the programs officers in the department recounted many a "street reality", bringing into the police station a street-world that I was not permitted to access in person. So detailed were the retellings of these stories, and so elaborated and clarified were they with the personal experiences of the programs officers that the tea would often be cold before the completion of the first account. It was through the informed seeing of the eyes of these few programs officers that I saw on the street policing during the six months of fieldwork time I spent with SAPOL's 'regular' police.

MUSOS: PEOPLE AND PLACES

For twelve of my eighteen fieldwork months, I was located at the band barracks with the thirty-six fulltime members of what is affectionately known by its local Adelaide fan base, calculated by the Friends of the Band at approximately 3000, as 'The Band On The Beat'. The moniker and an accompanying logo depicting the silhouettes of six officers in ceremonial uniforms striding along playing an array of instruments are emblazoned across band merchandise, including CD recordings of the band's many different styles of music, video recordings of its interstate and overseas performances that feature rehearsal scenes and candid, behind-the-scenes shots, as well as pens, coffee mugs, caps, clothes, calendars and brooches. The merchandise always sells steadily and is heavily advertised by the Friends Of The Band, who, along with kindergarten children, high school students, senior citizens, graduating cadets of the Police Academy, the inmates of detention centres, members of the local business community, and South Australians going about their daily business in the central mall, shopping
centre, or even in the local hospital, are regular audience members. Audiences assembling to witness the performances of the police band vary in size from an international television audience numbering several million, to a small corporate party; from a packed high school auditorium holding hundreds of students, to the Edinburgh Castle arena in Scotland which accommodated thousands, including The Queen and other members of the Royal family, on the Band’s most recent tour there, where they are nothing short of superstars. The band’s primary task, to publicly promote the SAPOL, is undertaken in an environment in which gala concerts and balls, “boring rehearsals” and the correct way to address a senior officer combine with international travel, hundreds of screaming teenagers, and “the performance buzz” to create what band members experience as everyday working life.

To share this everyday working life, I travelled to as many of the worksites as possible with the funds made available by the University of Adelaide for this project, which extended on several occasions to inter and intra state travel to a great many of the performance venues played by the band. While a portion of the ethnographic data comes from these trips, and while the fieldwork conducted with band members borders on being multi-sited due to the lengthy periods of time spent in some locations, the bulk of the ethnographic material was gathered among band members in what is sometimes affectionately, and sometimes resentfully, known by members as a second home: the police bandrooms.

The bandrooms, located just outside the square mile that contains the Adelaide CBD, are ‘home’ from eight in the morning until around four in the afternoon, and are sometimes ‘home’ on weekends and later on in the evenings as well. The building in which band members spend their work time when they are not out performing is particularly cold in winter and unbearably hot in summer. Band members often relate particular ailments to the poor physical condition of the building that fails to protect them from extremes of heat or cold. These include ‘stuck lip’, in which a lip sticks to the mouth-piece of an instrument as the result of cold weather, ‘stiff chops’, which refers to stiffness in the muscles of the jaw and lower face caused by cold temperatures as well as by extended periods of playing, and ‘sweat slip’, in which sweaty fingers disallow sufficient purchase on the instrument surface. About halfway through 1999, an opportunity to move to an alternative site with more space and central heating arose,
but SAPOL advised the band that funds were unavailable. Band members very often point to the state of their ‘second’ home, as well as the state of their instruments, to make statements about what they believe is SAPOL’s financial neglect of the band.

Perceived financial neglect occurs in a context of what band members feel to be the maximum utilisation of the band by SAPOL; the band members currently play more than 300 gigs annually, and at least half of these are directly related to ‘core police business’. Core police business includes providing music for Neighbourhood Watch, School Watch and Safety House promotions, Business Watch and Rural Watch promotions, the School Beat programs for kindergarten and lower primary students, the Stars and Stripes program for upper and high school students, as well as playing at public meetings held by the Security Advice Unit, at State Emergency Services street parades, police graduations, police church services and Remembrance Day services, police balls and dinners, police funerals, at the Crime Prevention Convention, at Country Police liaison Day concerts, and at any other function or gathering for which musical support is required. The band also performs at state and private functions, as well as for charities and sporting clubs. The performances range from light classical works to the theme from Playschool, from floorshows based on the works of Sinatra and Tina Turner to trumpet fanfares; from marching displays to the latest pop tunes — upon which the marching displays are often based — as well movie and television music themes and Rock, Dixieland, Latin, Jazz, Blues Symphonic and Brass Band music.

The members of the band currently produce such a diverse range of music that it is not possible to state with any degree of finality what kind of musical style the band membership typically or characteristically produces. While not all of the band members are involved in the Rock Band or the Dixieland Band, which are formed by about 10 members each, the entire band membership comes together to form the Concert Band and the Parade or Marching Band. During my fieldwork, the band

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2 ‘Playschool’ is a popular preschool television program shown every weekday morning on the Australian Broadcasting Cooperation station.

3 The Concert Band consists of thirty-four musicians and the conductor, and regularly performs in hospitals, schools, nursing and retirement homes as well as for clubs and charity organizations. The band also plays a variety of venues, such as the Town Halls of most metropolitan -council areas, and at many venues in outlying rural areas during their annual Country Tours. A diverse range of music is performed by band members when in Concert Band formation, and the offerings made, including
members played a great many concerts and were preparing to march at the centenary celebrations of the Tasmania Police, as well as at the 50th Anniversary of the Edinburgh Tattoo. Consequently, I had access to a great number of rehearsals and performances, on which the bulk of the musical ethnography is based.

Concerts and parades have been performance mainstays throughout the band’s long history in South Australia. Steven Lawler, an ex-band member who has written part of the history of the police band in his Postgraduate Diploma in Musicology thesis, divides the history of the police band into five distinct periods. These periods are “band formation”, from 1884 to 1926, “recession”, from 1926 until 1945, “band reformation”, from 1945 until 1947, a period in which the band became a fulltime branch and public relations unit from 1957 until 1974, and a contemporary period characterised by a change in instrumentation and an expansion in its public relations role from 1974 until the present (1994:135). The interested reader should consult Lawler (1994) for the best historical information; however, a few points are worth noting here.

Traditional military music, light popular classics, early jazz and swing and pop/rock tunes, indicate the band unit’s extensive repertoire of styles. Concert band performances given in the metropolitan area are well attended by senior citizens and young families with children, who often add vocal accompaniment to the songs that they know. In remote areas, the performances tend to attract large numbers of residents, because, as one concertgoer noted in such a place, “we don’t get much out here in the way of entertainment”.

The Parade Band members perform both innovative marching displays and floorshows. Marching Displays involve all band members - the thirty-four musicians, the conductor and the Drum Major - and the Parade Band is internationally recognised, as a result of its appearances in Edinburgh and London, as one of the finest marching bands in the world. The Parade Band is shown equal regard by its home crowd as it leads the annual Christmas Parade, a tradition now in its thirtieth year. The Parade Band’s international and interstate marching displays, in common with its Concert Band performances, hint at the large range of styles regularly performed by band members. At a recent performance at the Tasmania Police Centenary Tattoo, for example, where other parade bands gave staunchly traditional performances, the Police Parade Band members marched themselves into the shape of a spaceship, complete with smoke trailing from the ‘turbo boosters’ (otherwise known as sousaphones), while playing the theme to Star Wars, as well as incorporating a Mexican Wave to the craze-tune “Macarena”, playing a top ten hit song, “The Cup Of Life”, and giving a rendition of the sixties surf hit, “Wipe-Out”. The floorshow band, consisting of twenty musicians and the Drum Major, also marches to the latest hit songs, weaving between diners at various dinner functions before taking the stage to perform a choreographed floorshow based on popular tunes.
The police band was formed in 1884, making it the first police band in Australia. At its inception the band partly comprised a Brass Band with a membership of fourteen (all male) volunteers issuing from the ranks of the Metropolitan Foot Police, which had itself been established in South Australia in 18384, making it the first police force established in Australia and one of the oldest in the world; the first, the London Metropolitan Police, was created by Sir Robert Peel only nine years earlier.

Performances were always given by band members outfitted in the full police uniforms issued to them as officers of the department, a practice that continues presently. Unlike the contemporary situation, however, all of the members of the band were, at its inception, officially considered police officers first and foremost, and their role as musicians was conditional on the consistent fulfilment of their police duties. That police band musicians adhered to this condition set down by the department is evidenced by the significant number of honourable mentions garnered by band members in the line of police duty:

A.M. Findlay (Trombonist)...received a mention for his part in carrying out the provisions of the “Lottery and Gaming Act”; W.J. Goldsworthy (Tubist) was mentioned for his part in the successful apprehension of Quinn and Colbert for the murder of Ah Wong...and W. Renfrey (Tenor Horn) for the smart apprehension of a burglar stealing from the Hindmarsh Hotel (Lawler, 1994:78).

Currently employed members of the police band are officially considered to be unqualified non-operational police, and without exception consider themselves musicians first and foremost, and police officers a distant second; for most band members, their employment status as police officers is almost incidental, or is simply regarded as a necessary condition of the job, according to one band member, “like having to join a union”.

The fact that band members do not consider themselves police officers runs counter to the image that band members and police officers alike believe members of the public have of the band: that it is made up of operational police officers who have joined a departmentally endorsed activity group. That members of the public are largely under what band members call this “insulting delusion” is regularly confirmed for band members when citizens approach them when the band members are in public for

4 South Australia itself was settled by Europeans only two years earlier, in 1836.
performance purposes. While they are in the mall, at a shopping centre, in the park or in any of the other public places in which they regularly perform, members of the public often approach band members to ask for street directions, to report traffic problems, offences, the loss of property, or to hand in found articles. Because band members have received no practical police training, they are sometimes not qualified to assist members of the public, and in these cases they explain their inoperational status and the nature of their association with the department. Members of the public are almost always surprised to learn that band members are not involved in other areas of policing, and are usually astonished to hear that band members concentrate solely on rehearsing and performing music. Members of the public very often unwittingly insult band members by expressing their disbelief at the idea that band members are paid for “sitting around playing music all day”, or for articulating the misconception that this job might be “fun”, or even worse, “easy”.

Most band members did not choose the words “fun” or “easy” to describe their individual trajectories to their currently held positions in the police band. The majority of currently employed band members hold various tertiary qualifications in music. University trained band members, who usually hold a Bachelor of Music degree, generally consider their technical skills more finely honed, while “road-trained” or “life experienced” members feel that their musical production reflects their

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5 Far from having merely an amateur interest in playing music, the band members are professional musicians, and the police band is a full-time unit. Band members work from 8 a.m. until 4 p.m. from Monday until Friday, and are very often required to work nights and weekends, for which they receive time off. A typical day involves the giving of more than one performance, which itself involves performing highly skilled work over periods of several hours. Each piece of performance work is supported by hours of rehearsals and individual practice work, as well as instrument maintenance, paperwork, the loading and unloading instruments and equipment into trucks, and the setting up and packing up of the performance area, as well as travelling to and from performance venues. A typical entry on the band’s daily schedule sheet issued to every band member reads “Tuesday 16 Feb, 1998. Shift: 1700. 1730, Bus. St Joseph’s Family Care Centre, St. Bernadette’s school Grounds. Play 1900-2030, outside. Take sconces, chairs and PA.” This one and one half hour performance relied for its success on the travel and support work undertaken prior to the performance, which took place over the one and one half hours from 5:30 pm until 7:00 pm, and during the previous day. The previous day's work schedule reads: “Monday 15 Feb, 1998. Shift: 0800. 0845: Rehearsal, Concert Band for St. Joseph’s. 1000: PASA visit. 1300: Bus for Tas. Tattoo rehearsal. 1500: load [truck] for 16/2.” A further two and one quarter hours were spent preparing for the concert on this day, giving a total of three and three quarter hours spent in support work and travel for a performance taking up less than half of this time. When the band members are preparing for a major performance, the time spent in rehearsal and other preparation is significantly more than double the performance time; for example, the rehearsals for the Tasmania Tattoo performance noted on the schedule for February 16 above occurred over several months, and were preceded by more months of work by the Drum Major, who devised the complicated march design, while the performance itself lasted for approximately eight minutes.
greater exposure to “hands on” music. The difference in training and education between band members is only one of many; the thirty-six members together represent socioeconomic, religious, ethnic, gender, age, and lifestyle diversity. Some members devote their performances to God, others play for their own glorification, some come from privileged backgrounds, others were at one time or another financially impoverished; some are well into their fifties, others barely into their twenties. Most, like Ben, dream of bigger and better musical things, while only a few others, like Gary, believe they have hit the musical jackpot with their membership in the police band.

Despite the collective self-classification to the contrary, band members are regarded by the department as police officers, although they are not considered operational officers because they are untrained in ‘General Duties’ police work. General duties police work is that undertaken by ‘general duties’ and ‘patrol’ officers who, according to the Patrol Member Position Information Document, act to “assist the preservation of law and order and the prevention and detection of crime within the Division”. As noted, the police band belongs to the Community Programs Support Branch (CPSB) of the department, which in turn belongs to the larger Operations Support Service. The band’s performances, as well as those of the Youth and Schools programs, the Neighbourhood and schools programs, and the Juvenile Justice programs, are managed and evaluated from a corporate perspective by the CPSB. The band unit itself is organised according to precisely the same rank structure as other units in the department. The band unit comprises one Senior Sergeant, two Sergeants, eight senior constables and twenty-five constables. The rank of ‘constable’ is acquired upon completion of a twelve month trial period, during which time new band members are classified as probationary constables, as are new operational police officers during their first year of operational work in the department.

Promotion from the foundation rank of constable is decided by an analysis of the applicant’s musical and administrative skills. Ideally, each kind of skill is considered in

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6 A job in the police band is one of only two fulltime musical ‘gigs’ in the state of South Australia; the other is the Adelaide Symphony Orchestra. According to band members, the Orchestra is notoriously difficult to enter, and once a musician has gained employment there, they are reluctant to leave. This means that few vacancies ever come up, but some band members are able to fill in for Orchestra members on leave. For reasons that I will not go into here, band members believe the Orchestra ‘gig’ to be more musically satisfying, but entry into the Orchestra is difficult; one must wait for a vacancy, and pass a rigorous entrance test. It is usually the case that band members stay put, because the fulltime job prospects within the state are so limited.
the context of the position; for example, musical skill is not as important as administrative skill in the position of Librarian or Storeperson, but is fundamentally important in the position of Director of Music. Many band members feel that only cursory attention is paid to the musical skill of an applicant in the promotions process, and that the vast majority of promotions are based on departmental politics, which was an idea present during the earliest stage of the band’s history, when members felt that musically less able players were promoted ahead of more qualified players (see Lawler, 1994). The fact that players must move through police ranks in order to be located near the top of the musical hierarchy is also widely regarded by band members as an organisational flaw which theoretically and sometimes actually allows seniority and years-of-service records to come before musical ability.

Perhaps the most consistent theme running throughout four of the five periods of history that Lawler identifies is one in which the barometric quality of the band is central. Lawler suggests that, from its earliest formation, the performances of the police band have been associated in the public mind, or at least in the public press, with the state of the police department more generally (1994: 85, 118). Public comment in the local press about early performances, which were inclusive of Fantasia, Galop, Intermezzo, Lancer, March, Polka, Quadrille, Selection and Waltz musical genres, reveals that the band was held not only in high esteem by police officers during its early years, but that it also inspired in members of the public a certain esteem for the larger police force of which it was a part. In the band’s first ceremonial marching engagement in 1885, for example, the quality of the police band’s musical rendering, combined with its “well-drilled discipline” in marching, was noted by the Town Clerk, who conveyed to the Police Commissioner in a letter of appreciation for the performance that:

    The City Council [members] feel that the force as now directed establishes every confidence and the safety of citizens and their property is as far as lays in your hands assured (cited in Lawler, 1994:85).

The barometric quality which the press assigned the police band was recognised by the Commissioner of Police, Brigadier McKinna, who, in 1957 made it a ‘branch’ of the police department for the purposes of public relation (Lawler, 1994:136). From 1958, when it was made a full-time unit, the band’s public relations duties, which consisted of the giving of performances for members of the community in various contexts, such as at fairs and other community events, and in public access concerts,
increased until community liaison activities overtook the original police/government ceremonial duties of the band. This remains the case in the present day; while the band members continue to perform at police and state funerals, Academy graduations, Police Balls and functions, as well as at various state and federal functions, events and parades, the bulk of their work is focused on public relations activities for the department, community policing activities, and on musical entertainment of various styles for paying corporate and private groups. The capacity of the police band to cast both flattering (and, at times, unflattering) lights on the larger department, first recognised by Commissioner McKinna in 1957, has been more fully developed by the department in the present day. As a result, the band is currently primarily deployed as a public relations unit, and it is the hope of the department that community members will form positive opinions about the police department when it is presented to them via the police band.

While most early reviews appearing in the local press testified to the popularity and quality of the band, and, by association, to the force itself, its members also drew unfavourable public comment. These comments were not only directly critical of the band, but also sullied the reputation of the larger police force. One such case was the result of a strategy implemented by band members in response to the shortage of players in the band. This shortage was caused by the retirements from the force of the band’s original players from 1916 onwards. The retiring members were irreplaceable, since no one of any significant talent was available from within the ranks of the Foot Police to fill their vacated positions. Several strategies were pursued, including providing musical training for enthusiastic police officers with no previous musical experience at a purpose-established band school located at the city watch house

7, but a more immediately effective remedy was required while those people were being trained. Filling the vacancies with suitably qualified civilian players worked as a

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7 In an attempt to address these problems, the next Commissioner, Brigadier General Leane, proposed that a band school be set up so that police could be trained to be musicians. In this way, members of the public could rest easy that members of the Police Band were actually police, and not citizens playing at being police. Instead, police officers were to play at being musicians: for example, Harold Gerber, an enthusiastic young officer, applied for musical training within the department, and was instantly accepted despite the fact that he had never before in his life played a musical instrument. In 1924, however, a civilian was appointed to the position of Bandmaster following the resignation of Bandmaster J. A. Findlay. No police officer was deemed musically qualified to take over his position. The appointment of William Symonds was subject to two conditions: one, that he was not displacing an officer in taking up the appointment, and two, that he met with the Commissioner, who would assess his suitability to being in the employ of the police force. These conditions still stand presently.
successful bandaid solution until an incident that occurred in 1918. Two anonymous letter-writers to The Daily Herald newspaper complained that the band unit was employing citizens and passing them off “as policemen without being authorized members of the force”. This raised questions about the authenticity and legality of the entire police force, which was roundly criticised in the local press. The Herald quoted lengthy sections of the Police Act that officers were legally required to follow with an accompanying criticism based on the apparent non-compliance of police officers themselves to the section of the Act that stated that:

A person is liable to heavy penalty for passing himself off as a policeman without being an authorised member of the force (The Daily Herald, 24/7/1918).

The incident was considered serious enough to warrant an internal investigation, and the practice of outfitting non-police players in police uniforms ceased as a result.

Musicians masquerading as police officers did not cause any further problems for the department until 1974, when the instrumentation of the band was changed from brass to military, bringing it into line with other Australian military bands. This enabled band members to perform a more diverse range of musics, and so appeal to wider audiences. The change in instrumentation required the addition of flutes, oboes, clarinets, bass clarinets, saxophones, trumpets, French horns, bassoons, electric and bass guitars and an acoustic bass to the existing Brass line-up. Musicians had to be sourced externally to fill the new positions, due to a lack of suitably qualified personnel within the department. This presented a problem for the department, which was bound by the Police Act to provide only sworn police officers with uniforms. Accordingly, the police department required all incoming band staff to become sworn officers and to undertake police training, qualifying them for particular policing duties. Since 1974, however, the police-training requirement has become increasingly redundant, mainly because working time is increasingly accounted for by specific rehearsal and performance commitments and tasks related to these core activities, such as travelling to and from performances in remote areas, setting up and packing up performance spaces, rehearsing, instrument maintenance, and so on, as the band members go about giving in excess of 300 performances annually.

Currently employed band members undergo no police training whatsoever. Of the thirty six members currently employed, only two have had previous operational
experience; Shaun, a percussionist now in his fifties, was an operational officer for some time thirty years ago, and Ernest, the Drum Major, who is about the same age, has undertaken training qualifying him to conduct Random Breath Tests (RBTs) on motorists, which he does during busy holiday periods to earn extra money. Ernest and Norman, (a trumpet player), as well as Roland, (the band’s Musical Arranger) and George, (the Director of Music), all served in the Navy together in musical postings as younger men. Two currently employed band members, Gilbert (one of the two tubists) and Elle (a French Horn player) are also members of the Adelaide Branch of the Australian Army Band. None, besides these members, have any police or military training. For band members, arresting someone is unthinkable, carrying a firearm or other weapon of any kind is preposterous, and for most, even operating a police radio is a baffling task:

A small number of band members and myself were in the Police Band mini bus, travelling to a kindergarten for an afternoon performance. A large white van, travelling well over the speed limit, pulled alongside the minibus and the driver pulled out a book with a pornographic cover, and, with a maniacal grin, pointed at the book and then at himself. He leaned out of the van and proceeded to make many complicated and obscene hand and finger signals at the bus. He started to swerve and speed up, almost running the minibus off the road. Inside the bus, Thomas instructed everyone to “look away- he just wants our attention, so let’s not give it to him”. Alana told Thomas to get on the radio “to call the traffic police”. Thomas picked up the radio, pressed a few buttons, waited, pressed a few more, and then hung up the radio in frustration. He said, “It’s no good. I don’t know how to work it. Does anyone here?” Nobody did. Thomas picked up the radio again and spoke into it: “Hello, Mum? There’s some guy chasing us down the road, what do we do?” Everyone in the bus broke into laughter, and we watched the white van speed off down the road (Fieldnotes).

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STORYLINE

There are many stories I might have told from the unwieldy mass of fieldnotes collected during fieldwork, but the one that I have chosen to tell here is a story about the everyday lives of band members. For the most part, I tell this story in chapters three, four and five. This story about the rich musical lives of band members is contextualised by a wider story, one about how police in general understand they are perceived by members of the public, how they feel this perception impacts on police work, and how the management level of the SAPOL has undertaken to manipulate and change the image that they believe members of the public have about police.
In a letter published in the internally circulated *Police Journal* (January 2000:6-7), Superintendent Fred Trueman, who is highly respected within the department, especially by general duties and patrol officers who have the most public contact, has argued that members of the public have little regard for police because, in the public mind, officers do not seem to provide services to members of the public, and do not seem to care about them. Rather, Trueman suggests, police attention seems to members of the public to be invariably to be directed toward responding to crimes, because that is all that can currently be afforded on the tight policing budget under which he states the SAPOL currently operates. In the letter, Trueman points to a gap that exists between this caring, service-oriented policing that is advertised on the department's website and in its current Mission Statement as standard policing practice, and the "law enforcement response policing" that is "actually" going on. By 'police services', Trueman means 'proactive policing', and law enforcement or traditional policing here refers to 'reactive' policing. These terms have been in constant use in police departments across Australia since G.E Fitzgerald handed down his findings on police corruption in Queensland in 1989, in which he concluded that a proactive police service is less conducive to corruption than is a reactively oriented department (see Fitzgerald, 1989).

The undervaluing of police insofar as the public is concerned, at least according to general opinion in the police department currently, has occurred because SAPOL police practicing reactive policing. As one officer put it, cops “don’t come across as caring about people”, because they direct “less service to so-called ‘good’ people, and more ‘force’ to “people doing the wrong thing”. Employees of the department talked about a “whole new generation” of insults, which they considered the direct results of their inability to provide services as opposed to ‘force’ to a public that demands the former. This new generation of insults takes up an existing theme of sub-humanliness, in which police are already known as ‘pigs’, but the new insults are composed of different, inanimate, elements: cops are now, in what they themselves take to be public opinion, “robots”. As “robocops”, “revenue robots”, and “cogs in the government’s rip-off wheel”, police are, they believe, known to members of the public as mechanised non-humans. I argue in chapter six that this public understanding of police is a particularly metonymic one, because members of the public understand cops in terms of one aspect of policing: the law enforcement aspect.
In order to understand the position that the police band has in the larger department as a public relations unit, it is necessary to first understand the particular tension that exists between an advertised ‘community’, ‘service-oriented’ or ‘proactive’ policing and a practised ‘traditional’, or reactive, policing. ‘Traditional’, or reactive, policing is that style of policing that applies a law enforcement response to illegal acts that have already occurred or which appear imminent\(^8\). A law enforcement response is one that applies the body of law to an offence act that has occurred, or, in situations in which officers perceive an imminent threat to order, the would-be offender is threatened with such a law enforcement response by the police officer. In the analyses of some other scholars (for example, Cartner, 2000; Ehrlich-Martin, 1999), terms such as law enforcement or traditional policing or police force, which are all used interchangeably with the term ‘reactive’, are understood to apply strictly to those occasions upon which an officer responds to an offence event \textit{after} it has occurred. At SAPOL, however, a law enforcement response is understood to be any response to a crime or potential crime event in which an officer actually invokes or threatens to invoke a law enforcement action (i.e., arrest or the \textit{threat} of arrest). A law enforcement or traditional style of policing, therefore, can be used by an officer to restore order that has been disrupted, for example, by arresting a criminal perpetrator and removing him or her from the scene, and can also be used to maintain order under threat of disruption, for example, by threatening to arrest a would-be perpetrator unless the person ceases a particular activity.

A law enforcement response is also and equally characterised by the way in which police attention is focussed on the crime event that has or is likely to occur, and not on the underlying reasons for its occurrence or likely occurrence. Police officers often talk about law enforcement or traditional policing as “dealing with effects, not

\(^8\) Traditional policing is also discussed in the aforementioned policy and other documents, as well as by operational officers themselves, under the labels of reactive policing, authoritarian policing, paramilitary policing, law enforcement policing, event-response policing, and crime fighting policing. These terms are used in the documents to describe policing before the department’s adoption of a community policing orientation impacted on policing at the department and are also used to describe those areas that remain centred on law enforcement as opposed to crime prevention (for example, most of those units contained under the branch title of the Criminal Investigations Branch (C.I.B), and those units which contain specific law enforcement tasks or elements (for example, Patrol Officers, who are the “front line troops” of the Police department and conduct foot and vehicular patrols ‘on the beat’. They are responsible for maintaining order, preventing crime, as well as for detecting and responding to crime (Information Document, Information Services, SAPOL, 1990).
causes” because, where a crime event has occurred and has been dealt with in a law enforcement fashion, that crime event attracts a classification of ‘crime cleared’, indicating that no further police work is required on the event or on the circumstances surrounding it. The only other police action that may be carried out is victim support, which is done by specialist officers within the department.

Proactive policing, known as ‘Community Policing’ at SAPOL, on the other hand, revolves around the prevention of offence events by addressing the underlying issues connected to the occurrence of crime events. Police officers, together with community members, seek to extend and defend an existing state of community order before it is threatened by criminal disruption by conducting crime prevention programs and activities before crimes occur or reoccur. If a crime event has already occurred, a law enforcement response is used in conjunction with a response that attempts to identify the underlying reasons for the occurrence. Relevant community groups are involved in the process of identifying the causes of offences, and finding ways to prevent their reoccurrence in the future. Community policing is described in the 2000 SAPOL Mission statement as:

[A] philosophy that brings together police, service delivery agencies, businesses, local authorities and the community to work together on resolving crime and safety issues.

Community policing is routinely implemented by 16 full-time community liaison officers stationed in local service areas and is operationalised exclusively in the form of programs, of which there are currently approximately 46, including the Neighbourhood Watch program, the Schools program, the Security Advice program, and many Youth programs, including the ‘Blue Light’ discos and camps for young people. Other programs for youth include the Youth Support Group program, which was disbanded in 1995, Operation Bother, which was a short program designed to prevent re-offence undertaken by police involved with the apprehension of young drivers involved in high speed chases, but was abandoned due to a lack of funding, and Operation Cog, which lasted for twelve months and dealt with the problem of car theft among Indigenous youth in Adelaide’s northern suburbs. The Operation staff considered the Operation Cog to be very successful, but it was nevertheless discontinued, again due to funding problems. All community policing programs are
administered by the Operations Support Service, under the Community Programs Support Branch, which coordinates and manages the delivery of core programs to the community. Community liaison officers, who do not do other kinds of police work, implement the programs in their local service areas and draw on operational officers to staff the programs; for example, operational officers might be asked to visit a local school as part of the Schools Program, or might be asked to assist with running a Blue Light disco some evenings.

It is widely acknowledged by analysts commenting on many Australian Police departments (Cartner, pers.comm. 2000, Bingham, 1996, Palmer, 1999) and by those looking exclusively at South Australian Police experiences (for example, Prior, 1997:76-7) that 'community' or 'proactive' policing is rhetorically supported but practically absent from police departments. All of the publicly accessible information about SAPOL heavily emphasises the department's commitment to community policing, but none of the operational officers with whom I had contact during fieldwork agreed that community policing took place "on the street". Cartner (2000) argues that the primary reason for absence of community policing practice is structural. Power, he argues, is heavily concentrated at the top of the police department structure in terms of decision-making, while 'beat cops' have little power to make decisions in their jobs and must comply with standard responses to crime. Community policing practices, however, require that police officers have enough decision-making power to be able to call in other kinds of resources present in the wider community, and that police officers have the power to decide how they will police a situation from a range of possible treatment options. Implementing community policing, Cartner argues, would necessitate the restructuring and redistribution of power in police departments that are already highly resilient to structural changes of any kind (Cartner, 2000; see also Guyot,1979; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986:211).

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9 This Winston Churchill Memorial Fellowship funded report analyses the implementation of community policing at SAPOL compared with the implementation experiences of Canada and the U.S.A., and argues that SAPOL has not embraced the underlying philosophy of community policing, and has implemented only particular programs, which are often not sufficiently funded. This report argues that community policing practices are not routinely carried out by SAPOL officers.
The inability or unwillingness of police departments to implement practices that would accompany strong rhetorical commitments to the community policing philosophy is also the result of a current funding crisis in policing and, in fact, in the wider public service. It is this situation that Trueman criticises in his letter to the *Police Journal*, in which he argues that the general reduction of the size and scope, and therefore cost, of the public, but most especially police, service has resulted in the emphasising of economic efficiency. This, says Trueman, has been at the expense of "police services" and policing contributing to "public good", rather than simply dealing with 'the public bad'. Here Trueman implies that the cost of police services that contribute to the public good or, in other words, proactive policing, is not economically efficient. The costs of implementing proactive community programs are as immediately apparent as those involved with 'reactive' policing programs, but their benefits are far more vague, more difficult to statistically validate, and typically occur as future, rather than immediate effects; embarking on a program of counselling for a young person who has committed a crime, for example, may be a long term project which requires inputs of particular kinds before it yields perceivable results, and there are no guarantees that the person will not reoffend.

Reactive policing, however, generates an immediately tangible set of products, which evidence its efficiency at dealing with crime. The greatest of all of these products is, of course, arrest, which is usually accompanied by a 'crime cleared' classification, if the arrest proves an appropriate or correct one. This classification indicates, in the department’s statistical data, that a particular crime problem has been solved in the most immediate and clear-cut way possible. Incarceration and court costs are potential future costs that governments bear as a result of arrests, but these costs do not precede the tangible arrest product, as opposed to community program costs, which require many inputs before a tangible benefit is perceivable, and in which these benefits are not guaranteed. Governments under economic pressure are faced with a decision to choose between the immediate and easily identifiable costs and diffuse and vague future benefits of community policing programs on the one hand, and the clear-cut benefits and deferred costs of reactive policing’s primary product of arrest, on the other. According to Trueman’s letter to the *Journal*, the choice has been easy:
Australian governments of all persuasions have deceived the public into believing that they can enjoy the same, or better, police services by paying less tax and by generating "efficiencies"...in the process,...notions of the public good and public service have been undermined by a narrow emphasis on economic efficiency although the public now understands its public services have not been maintained or improved (2000:6-7).

Trueman discusses the ways in which this situation has impacted on officers, who generally believe that members of the public understand that the police department cannot provide services (i.e., be proactive), but can only provide a police force to deal with criminals (i.e., be reactive). Further, according to Trueman, officers think that members of the public cannot reconcile the reactive law enforcement policing they experience with the proactive police services that are advertised. In general, officers feel that they are taking the rap for reactive under funding and proactive over advertising, and are therefore classifying themselves as "victims", of both the government, and of public opinion:

[as police] we do not believe that we are valued by contemporary government because it values us against market criteria which are alien to a policing tradition based upon civics...we do not believe that we are valued by society generally, because...it [society] is feeling vulnerable due to a general decline in public services — including policing (2000:7).

As I mentioned above, one way in which officers perceive that they are undervalued is through the variety of insults that they hear from members of the public, which cast them as insensate robots. The development of these kinds of insults has occurred perhaps not only as a result of the fact that cops are delivering reactive policing, but, as many police believe, also as a result of the mode of its delivery. This delivery mode is known in the police department as "impartiality". Officers within the department define impartiality as the quality or condition of being "unbiased", "objective", "non-aligned" and "neutral". An officer's 'impartiality' is considered to be the public's insurance of the officer's ability to reactively apply the law without bias, which in turn ties in to the department's pledge, that all people are treated equally (without bias, neutrally) before the law. Impartiality is most often defined by cops, however, as the absence of emotional expression, and emotional states of any kind are considered by cops to embody all of the qualities and characteristics that run counter to impartiality — they are biased, subjective, aligned and partial or inclined in particular directions. Moreover, the advertisement or demonstration of a cop's
Impartiality is achieved through the disguising of emotional expression, which is prevent by cops from appearing on the police body. Most of all, as I explain in chapter two, emotions are understood by cops to connect them with members of the policed community in such a way that a guarantee of equal treatment of all before the law is compromised. But, as police explained to me, if emotions are not expressed physically, their corruptive capacities can be limited. As one cop said, “a person doesn’t know how angry you are if you don’t show them”.

The inability of an officer to control his or her feelings in any given policing situation is recognised in *Basic Psychology for Police Officers* (1997), the training manual currently used at the police academy, as ‘costly’, and officers are advised that “you cannot afford to let your personal feelings...interfere with the way you react”. The expression of feelings during the delivery of reactive policing practices — most often this refers to the *physical* form in which they might find expression — cannot be afforded because they have the capacity to corrupt an ideally impartial law-enforcement response. Police officers are accordingly required to present their bodies as emotionally inexpressive objects, in spite of how they may feel “inside”. It is noted in the training text that police officers are often exposed to situations that are “personally upsetting”, or that they may have “an emotional bias for or against people or situations”, but police officers are advised to vigilantly “guard against exhibiting” these feelings ‘with’ their bodies. Bodies and emotions are thus separated during the course of police work in particular ways, which I describe in chapter two. Cops are also (and equally) taught to separate ‘mind’ or ‘thought’ from ‘emotion’ or ‘feeling’; emotion, in the course of policing training, is negatively presented as ‘irrational’ and opposed to ‘thought’, while ‘thought’ is related to dealing with facts and evidence: a cop should “think” about the facts of a case, and should “avoid” allowing his or her personal feelings to “muddy” the inherent facts of any given policing situation. Control and the lack thereof, especially physical control and uncontrol, are also attributed to unemotional and emotional conditions of the officer respectively.

The impartial delivery mode of reactive police services to the community, in most officers’ opinions, has contributed greatly to the public conception of cops as not only generally uncaring, anti-service pro-force people, but also as detached and unfeeling people or, rather, non-people: said one officer, “because we have to be impartial, that
makes us seem less human, I suppose, because we can’t respond to situations like normal people do”. Police officers in general spoke about the ways in which they thought they might be considered in the eyes of the public. Many officers agreed that the emotionally inexpressive ways in which they had been trained to respond to any given event or person made them look “as though we haven’t any feelings”. The insults that are hurled at cops with no evident feelings are insults about a lack of human qualities; in what police take to be the public mind, a connection seems to have been forged between a lack of ostensible feeling and sub or non-humanness. Police officers of the SAPOL know that behaving impartially or without expressing feelings will attract a label of non-humanness; SAPOL cops get called robots “all the time”.

Community policing, on the other hand, does not rely on the principle of neutral or impartial or objective applications of the law to all people, but instead favours police activities which have been adjusted to the particular circumstances and characteristics of groups or even individual people (see Prior, 1997). The idea that the law is adjustable or malleable to particular individual circumstances is inextricably bound up in current reactively oriented police thinking with bias, subjectivity and, by very strong association, with emotion and particularly with the personal emotional state of the officer and the recipient of the police attention. Taking into consideration “the emotional state of an offender, and the reasons, therefore, for why a crime might have been committed”, as one might in the delivery of community policing services, according to one of its departmental advocates, or taking into consideration “how young people feel about things in order to help them”, and taking time to “show young people that cops are people with feelings and indeed interests and hobbies, just like them”, are ideas that have no place in reactive policing practice. The expression of feelings on the behalf of the officer, the recognition of the emotional states of particular individuals, and the involvement of qualities that are considered to be related to or characteristic of emotional states do not present the utterly corruptive threat to community policing practice that they do to reactive policing practices, and consequently, ‘community cops’ are less rigidly constrained by what is trained into the vast majority of SAPOL cops as “professional, that is, unemotional” demeanour and practice (Ehrlich-Martin, 1999:112). The inexpression of emotions, which are negatively sanctioned at all departmental levels, combined with the departmental
inability to supply ‘caring’ kinds of public good-oriented police services leaves cops in both seemingly uncaring and unemotional positions vis-a-vis members of the public.

Unemotional behaviour is the basis of police professionalism and authority. For a police officer to appear unemotional, he or she must be well in control — in physical control — of his or her emotions, in order that the emotions are not expressed on the police body. Because police associate ‘emotions’ with ‘partiality’, the emotionless police body is understood by cops to be an ‘impartial’ or neutral one. Police who are evidently unemotional are police who are in control and, in the police understanding, are ‘neutral’. ‘Neutrality’, then, is heavily underscored by notions of control, which means that police ‘neutrality’ is not really ‘neutral’ at all, but is instead invested with the capacity of police to control not only the irrational in the officer, but also the irrational in those who are policed. This is one way in which cops act as Foucauldian ‘judges of normality’; cops could, from a Foucauldian perspective, turn a normalising gaze on themselves and, even in simply parading this body before members of the public, on others. Police officers themselves certainly subscribe to this idea: cops hang out in places which are known for trouble, for example — there is nothing like a police presence for making people behave in line with the law.

I pause here to note that this would mean that both the bodies of police and the bodies of citizens would be little more than texts upon which police power could be inscribed, and I argue in chapter two that police agents are embodied agents. There, I do not deny that police officers engage in administering police gazes to themselves and to others, but the surveillance under which cops place their own bodies is not eye-seeing, as Foucault’s surveillance absolutely is, but is instead multi-sensual and embodied. The focus I take in chapter two assigns far more importance to embodied agency than Foucault’s (1979,1980) work allows.

Despite the fact that unemotional, neutral policing is considered to be the basis of professionalism and authority inside the department, this kind of policing — reactive policing — is something from which the department actively attempts to distance itself in its current publicly distributed rhetoric. In its electronic and paper statements, a particular language is used, which relegates reactivity to the recent past and which
sets up proactivity as the current policy base for all police activities. As Trueman notes in the *Journal*, the public perception of police as unfeeling and uncaring is a matter of ongoing concern for the department, not least because cops feel undervalued by this public perception, which then impacts on their ability to work effectively within the department and with members of the public who, according to one officer “actively hate cops”. This impact on cops, Trueman argues, “perverts our perceptions, inhibits our organisational communication and disempowers us at a personal and organisational level” (2000:7). Further, Carlene Wilson (1993), a researcher at the Australasian Centre for Policing Research, which is located in Adelaide, found in a study carried out in 1991 that police officers working at SAPOL felt that they were publicly undervalued, and that there was a resultant decrease in work commitment. Citing these findings, a senior research officer at SAPOL, Dr. Karen Beck, noted in the *Police Journal* that:

The decrease in commitment resulted from exposure to police work particularly where their [police] interaction with the community was not as positive as they had expected (1999:13).

Low public opinion of police, then, impacts on the commitment that police officers have to police work; a situation which is of the greatest concern to the police department according to many of its senior figures.

To sum up the preceding sections, the police department practices reactive policing while advertising a proactive model to members of the public. According to Trueman, reactive policing is favoured because it fits best into the current climate of economic rationalism. The practice of reactive policing is ‘uncaring’ in the sense that cops have to concentrate resources on reacting to crime events and potential crime events, rather than on services to the wider community and crime prevention. The mode of delivery of reactive policing also casts cops as ‘unfeeling’ because cops maintain an ‘impartial’ stance in relation to citizens. Police have experienced a public backlash in response to reactive policing, which, they say, is expressed via insults of a particular kind. These insults highlight the relationship of police to government, and include comments such as the one made to me by a friend, Jenny, who had been pulled over for speeding. She said:
There’s no way cops pull you over because they’re interested in your safety, or because they care about people. They have a quota — they have to pull a certain number of cars over. It’s all about raising money, revenue, for the government. They’re basically arseholes who don’t give a shit about me or anyone else. They’re part of a big government rip off.

This common, or what the cops call public, opinion has great impact on the level of commitment that officers have to the police department, and is therefore of great concern to the department.

One method of dealing with the negative publicity that police feel themselves subjected to has involved the police band as a public relations unit. The department uses what was in the 1980’s, according to the then Police Commissioner Beck, one of its “most effective and vital [public relations] arm[s]” to promote both departmental ‘caring’ for its public, and the humanly ‘emotional’ characters of its members. To promote the former idea, the band unit has been recently deployed to perform at most of the community policing (proactive) policing events that occur in order to attract a wider audience to these kinds of events. It is also required to play in a great many public places, to promote the idea that police are present, in a pleasant way, in places where no crime or potential crime is occurring. To promote the latter, band members play a wide variety of musics, from classical numbers to the latest pop tunes. Music, the police department understands, is “the language of emotion”. The department feels that in playing music, in speaking the emotional language of music, the band unit is able reanimate sub or even non-human police robots. The idea that the emotional quality of music is able to do this is based on a police and public understanding of emotion that is related metonymically to humanness, an idea I discuss in detail in chapter six. Band members are able to emotionally reanimate robotic police bodies via music not least because they themselves are presented to members of the public as regular cops who just happen to be able to play musical instruments.

As noted above, the 36 police band members are in fact not operational officers. Band members are classified by the department as ‘sworn officers’ which means that they are employees of the department untrained and unqualified to carry out ‘regular’ policing duties, but must nevertheless abide by the department’s codes of conduct and
deportment. One of the most important codes of conduct concerns bodily deportment. As I mentioned briefly above, the police body is presented to members of the public as an essentially inexpressive, unemotional body, which, police officers believe, evidences the impartiality of the officers. The officer who controls his or her emotions and successfully prevents them from achieving evident bodily life physically demonstrates his or her impartiality or disconnectedness from the community. I will discuss this idea further in the course of the thesis; suffice to note here that band members are also required by the department to present these kinds of impartial bodies to members of the public. Band members are subject to precisely the same rules of bodily conduct as are operational officers, and are required to wear standard issue ‘general duties’ police uniforms for the bulk of their work, and ‘ceremonial duties’ uniforms for marching and other Parade work. The general duties uniform varies in no obvious way from the general duties uniform worn by operational officers, but does include a small embroidered label located on the jacket which indicates that the wearer belongs to the band unit. This label is apparently not visible or noticeable to members of the public, who frequently mistake band members for operational police. Greta, a clarinettist, explained:

When you’re out in public, especially in the mall, and you’re going to play, it’s the uniform that the people see, that’s the very first thing. And always, you get asked, even if you’re carrying sound equipment, or a chair or a music stand, people will ask you directions somewhere- because you’re wearing a uniform. Or, [they tell us that] something’s happened – [and ask] “why aren’t you doing something about it “My car’s been stolen”, they say!! But they have eyes, they can see that you’re currently employed doing another job, and you’re shortly going to sit down and perform. But often people are surprised that we do what we do. I suppose it’s because we look exactly like cops: to the people walking down the street, we are cops!

As the pictures below clearly demonstrate, it is no surprise that the band members are often mistaken for operational or ‘real’ cops. The first drawing shows two of the department’s patrol officers, and the second depicts band members during a performance in Rundle Mall in downtown Adelaide.
This compulsorily donned police skin, and the rules and regulations about professional, that is, unemotional, police conduct, contains and, more importantly, from a visual perspective, constrains, what is described in the Position Information Documents (PID) supplied to band members as “the artistic temperament inherent in all musicians”. According to officers whom I asked to define the term, an artistic temperament is one containing “highly strung”, “volatile” “excitable”, “difficult”, “moody” and unpredictable” qualities. A person with ‘artistic temperament’ is, according to these officers, one who might be “emotional”, and “out of control, not rational”. If the artistic temperaments of band musicians are physically restrained beneath tight-fitting navy blue skins, they are released in musical productions in
which, according to the PID, band members “give pleasure in playing all types of music to the public”, and which band members, according to themselves, “move people emotionally” as a result of their positionedness in a highly emotionful, if ostensibly police-like, musical production unit. The band membership must, according to the PID, simultaneously:

[1] create in the public mind an image of police efficiency by the manner of [bodily] deportment and bearing in the presentation of musical performances ...

and [2] give pleasure in playing all types of music to members of the public.

The former requirement is fulfilled in the correct, impartial, unemotional bodily demeanour of band musicians; the latter is fulfilled when, according to band members, they ‘give pleasure’ to listeners by “playing music that moves people”. The emotional language of music, and the emotional, artistic, irrational nature that is attributed to “all musicians” by the police department audibly evidences the existence of a soul that resides in the ostensibly impartial police body. This soul, which is more usually and deliberately lodged in inaccessible places within the reactive cop, is played out in music for all the world to hear, while all the world looks at what appears to be a police body. This performance, about cops with hearts, has to be seen and heard to be believed. In this manner, impartial, unemotional, professional, inexpressive reactive police officers are audibly shown to in fact have souls, hearts, feelings. These are stowed away beneath the containing skin of the police uniform and beneath the unbendingly correct bodily demeanours of the performing ‘police’ band members. The message contained in this musical performance is that cops, as impartial as they might appear, are actually warmly human men and women. The police image of professional inexpressiveness remains uncorrupted in the performance, for the musical soul moves from within to without of the police body, piercing no holes in its navy blue skin on the way. The ‘police officers’ in the band that people see and hear perfectly represent the department’s proactive advertising, present in its Youth Policy and in the 2000 Mission and Corporate Goal Statement. This officer is both:
a legitimate authority [that audiences see during performances]... and someone who can communicate and personally get to know members of the community in which they are serving [that audiences hear during performances] (SAPOL Youth Policy, 2000:6)

As I have noted above, the notion of personal communication is considered to draw on the officer’s emotional resources, while legitimate authority is strongly bound up with notions of reactive law enforcement (see Cartner, 2000).

Where, according to the police understanding of police band performances, the police body remains a visually complete, bounded and uncorrupted entity, distinct and separate from the musically articulated audibly evidenced emotional inside of the officer, for band members the expression of emotion in music involves band members embodying sounds, as well as having themselves embodied in sounds:

that’s my heart, in that sound, floating up high. It takes me up and we all fly, bare-arsed to the wind, when we play. I can look down and see myself, with that itchy collar on- that’s not me! I’m up here, in the sound.

As I argue in chapter five, the ‘emotional experiences’ that band members have while performing music are of a fundamentally different kind than audience members might experience. Emotional experience during the performance of music for band members involves, and is dependent on, the incorporation of the musical instrument into the band member’s own sensual and corporeal being. Band members are equally embodied by instrument objects during performances: band members are, in their own experiences, present on stage as trumpetised players, and humanised saxophones, sonicised players, and humanised sounds. For band members, producing emotional music is all about embodiment. When cops produce the ‘unemotional’ bodies that evidence their impartiality, the production of these bodies is all about the careful embodying of unsociality.

The role of embodiment in emotional experience is one central theme followed in this thesis. Another is the involvement of music and emotion with power and dominance, in which I investigate the ways in which musical and emotional themes of the performances are implicated in operations of police power and dominance, and the ways in which musical (and emotional) instruments and instrument sounds come to be
instruments of power. Bodies, instruments, uniforms, cops, musicians, are all herein involved not as dichotomous categories but as inextricably intertwined elements which are played out in very particular ways in musics saturated with powerful emotion and emotionful power.
CHAPTER TWO
EMBODIED DISCONNECTION: COPS, EMOTION AND THE SOCIAL BODY

INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I explore the notion that SAPOL cops talk about and write about in their training manuals: the attempt to produce a visual image of unemotionality. The discussion and exploration of this idea, a central one at SAPOL, provides the context for the major task of this thesis, which is to discuss the ways in which emotion is involved in the musical lives of police band members. As I noted in the previous chapters, the primary task of the police band is to reanimate unemotional, uncaring, subhuman cops via the demonstration of a musically audible emotional ‘soul’.

I begin this chapter by introducing the concepts of the social body and embodied sociality as developed by Lyon and Barbalet (1994). The central idea upon which these concepts rest is that the body in society ought to be conceptualised not as an individually biologically bounded unit, but should instead be theoretically extended from this to incorporate its social relations, which are included in one’s own lived experience of the body in society. Lyon and Barbalet further argue that emotion, “which is embodied and social”, facilitates the connection between bodies that together form the social body, in which each individual body is constructed in the ongoing interplay with other bodies (1994:55; see also Katz, 1999:341).

In this chapter, I present the idea that cops, in self-consciously surveilling their own individual bodies in the course of physically presenting an ostensibly unemotional body, proceed to take themselves out what Lyon and Barbalet have termed the social body, or the body of the community. As cops prevent emotions from achieving evident, visible life in bodily expression, they proceed to embody a disconnection from the community. This disconnection is facilitated by the limiting of what Lyon and Barbalet regard as a connector of bodies in social life: emotion.
When Alfred North Whitehead wrote in 1925 that, “if we are fussily exact, we cannot define where a body begins and where external nature ends” ([1925] 1960) because “the body is part of the external world, continuous with it”, he might just as easily have written that if we are fussily exact we cannot define where one body begins and another ends, because the ‘lived’ or experienced social body is one constructed in the continual interplay of conduct with others. The interplay is such that people involved in it do not usually experience their bodies as bounded external objects of their possession that they manipulate into particular images at particular times to display to others. Rather, as Lyon and Barbalet argue, “persons experience themselves simultaneously in and as their bodies”, and when they experience themselves ‘as’ their bodies, the experience involves the bodies of others with whom they have any kind of social relationship (1994:55).

In their 1994 contribution to a volume edited by Csordas entitled *Society’s Body*, Lyon and Barbalet discuss the notion of the social body. Lyon and Barbalet begin their discussion with the idea that the individual body is not a discrete, bounded physicality but is more accurately described when all of its social relations are included in its definition. This concept begins with the idea that the body should not be conceived of in its individual, biologically bounded (or, perhaps more correctly, impervious, form) but should instead be extended to include its social relations. The authors cite Collins (1981: 995) who argues that, for those who participate in it, “social order must be necessarily physical and local”, and that the physical world includes in it “everyone’s own body”. Lyon and Barbalet continue this idea, suggesting that “by extension, social order pertains to the other bodies which are in some relation with one’s own” (1994:56).

Lyon and Barbalet show that it is possible to characterise particular social institutions or groupings in terms of the bodily relations which they entail and occasion. Using examples of factory work (following Marx, [1867] (1979:173,340) and family structure (following Collins, 1981:995), social institutions are understood as particular kinds of relations between particular dispositions of bodies. Citing Collins, they note that:

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1. This lived body is one that Merleau-Ponty [1945] (1962) once called upon us to describe as “the body of spirit” or as “a metamorphosis of life”.
The most repetitive behaviours that make up the family structure are the facts that... the same men and women sleep in the same beds and touch the same bodies, that the same children are kissed, spanked and fed".. In this way it is possible to characterise different social institutions in terms of the distinct engagement of aspects of bodily disposition which pertain to them (1994:56).

Bodies in social relationships are thus conceptualised as the ‘social body’. The social body is “a complex of differentiated and simultaneous relationships between distinct aspects of individual bodies” (1994:56). These bodily relations between bodies or parts of them can be understood as the basis of the foundation and reproduction of, for example, families or factories².

Katz (1999:314) has dealt specifically with the notion of the social body in his phenomenologically informed discussion of the body in social life, and in particular, he uses the term to denote the body of ‘the community’—the community being constituted of many bodies together in a variety of social spaces. Katz argues that the lived body in social life is not routinely experienced as biologically impervious, but is instead a body that is experienced and unselfconsciously constructed “in the ongoing interplay of conduct with others”. Bodies are thus constructed because, as Merleau-Ponty argued most eloquently throughout The Visible and the Invisible [1964] (1968), people do not routinely notice the points at which they end and at which others begin: these parts of themselves are only to be known in the other’s view of the self. As Katz notes, people are preoccupied with that which is seen, heard or expressed, and are not ‘normally’ or routinely preoccupied with their own idiosyncratic practices of constructing their own seeing, hearing or expressing, which would require a self-reflexive turn to the body as it acts. For knowledge of the points at which one’s own body ends and the ‘world’ begins, for knowledge of the practice of seeing, hearing and expressing, individuals are dependent on designations about the self from others (Merleau-Ponty, [1964] 1968:143). Knowledge of one’s own action, in other words, is on the content or subject of the seen, heard, touched; not on how what is seen is heard or touched through the use of one’s own perceptual seeing, hearing, touching tools. The how routinely stays behind self-awareness, as we unproblematically talk, walk, sing, dance, without watching our own bodies produce these activities. To put this idea simply, people do not experience their own bodies as impervious, acting units, but

² This obviously moves the body away from its Foucauldian positionedness as entirely subject to domination, and positions it instead as constructive of the social world without denying that the body is very often subject to social power.
rather, construct their own bodies in an ongoing and routinely unnoticed engagement with the world — not a world that exists at the edges of their bodies, of their seeing, hearing and touching, but which exists as part of their own bodies. Polanyi expressed these ideas especially succinctly in his writings of 1962 and 1966 when he argued that each of our effective actions requires that we disattend our individual bounded bodies as they act, focussing away from the points at which they intersect with ‘the world’, because in order to dwell habitually and competently in the world, we must inhabit that which we engage with. As Katz notes of Polanyi’s work, for example,

In order to write one must lose self-conscious attention to oneself by engaging in a kind of drawing...Polanyi noted that if in moving over a glossy patch of the paper, the pen skips, the slippage is experienced at the tip of the pen. The writer dwells in the pen (1999:41, emphasis in original).

Intertwinement with the other and the world is the basis on which we experience our bodies and engage in routine bodily action in the world.

The idea that the body in social life cannot be characterised as an individual unit is, of course, quite thoroughly integrated outside of purely phenomenological theories of the body in society. Theoreticians such as William James ([1890] 1950), Alfred Schutz ([1932] 1967) and G.H Mead (1934) all proposed in their analyses of social life that the ‘routine’ or ‘normal’ or ‘usual’ experiences of social interaction are characterised by an intertwinement of self and other that is so thick and entangled and so unreflected upon, that, as Katz has suggested, it might be called “natural” (or ‘the natural attitude’). Katz notes that in ‘routine’ or ‘normal’ or ‘usual’ interactions between people;

There is no gap between taking the standpoint of others and responding. There is no time out from life, no regular or universally available occasion for “perceiving” others’ view of oneself, much less weighing the consequences of alternative action and only then responding. One’s perception of others and one’s response are of a piece; each is naturally hidden in the other (1999:316; see also James, [1890] 1950).

That idea that there is no gap, no time for a separation of the self from the other, is a variation on the same theme that Merleau-Ponty advanced in his phenomenological work: that the person is, in the natural attitude, inseparable from the objects and people
by which the self is surrounded: each person is, in lived experience, part of each other person, just as each pen-object is part of each writer who takes hold of it.

Lyon and Barbalet’s specific contribution to the notion of the social body is in the role that they assign to emotion in the construction of the social body. Emotion in this work is considered to be:

precisely the means whereby human bodies achieve a social ontology...the idea that the body is active in the making of the social world is given force and meaning through the idea that active bodies are also emotional bodies; that emotion is embodied (1994:56-57).

In the case at hand, it is possible to follow Lyon and Barbalet in conceptualising ‘the policed community’ as a kind of social body or, rather, as the sum total of very many kinds of social bodies which cops encounter every day on the job. The bunch of school kids that cops move out of the shopping Mall, the family that a police officer visits during a trauma, particular ethnic groupings that police are issued specific information on how to deal with, all of these and many other groupings of bodies that cops police on a daily basis, can be considered distinct social bodies. These social bodies involve “differentiated and simultaneous relationships between distinct aspects of individual bodies, which together constitute the social body, “depending on the social relationship or institution in question” (Lyon and Barbalet, 1994:55). The “differentiated and simultaneous relations between distinct aspects of individual bodies” are very often the very criteria by which police officers identify particular groups — the most recent SAPOL Youth Policy, for example, notes that young people have specifically physical ways of being together and of physically being in space which, according to police experience, articulates to many fearful elderly people a common purpose, design or order of this particular social body that spells trouble.

All of these relations between bodies are, according to Lyon and Barbalet’s reasoning, activated by emotion:

Emotion activates distinct dispositions, postures and movements which are not only attitudinal but also physical, involving the way in which individual bodies together with others articulate a common purpose, design or order. The role of emotion in this is essential for...emotion is precisely the experience of embodied sociality (1994:48).
What Lyon and Barbalet mean by this last statement is that emotion entails social or relational experience as well as bodily experience, in which the body is experienced as an agent rather than being wholly subject to external force. Lyon and Barbalet emphasise that the body is experienced as such because “it is through emotions that people’s activity has practical direction and force” (1994:57). Emotion, is here considered embodied in the sense that persons do not experience their bodies as their possessions but instead as themselves when they engage in practically directed activity driven by emotion; persons are not, in other words, wholly subject, but are instead constituting of, the world through their emotion-directed practical, forceful activity. Further, emotion is ‘relational’, meaning that persons do not experience their bodies as biologically impervious, but instead they porously include those other bodies to which they are relating. As practically and forcefully directing activity in the world, and as simultaneously experiencing themselves as inclusive of other person’s bodies, the person is “implicated in social [and bodily] agency through the facilitating role of emotions” (1994:57, my emphasis; for similar conclusions from other disciplines, see also Emde, 1984; Plutchik, 1984; Pribram, 1984; Reynolds, 1981).

While Lyon and Barbalet do appear to adamantly insist that agency and the experience of ‘the natural attitude’, or membership in the larger social body, is uniquely and exclusively emotional, there is no reason for why other kinds of experience could not link bodies with other bodies, nor is there any reason to believe that other kinds of experience cannot forcefully direct practical activity in the world. In this sense, Lyon and Barbalet’s work is perhaps a little blinkered; however, the basic understanding they espouse remains valid, especially if we consider emotion as one connector of social bodies among a multiply of others, including cognition³.

If we accept Lyon and Barbalet’s notion of the social body, and the facilitating role of emotions in constructing this body (where emotion is one facilitator among others), it is possible to come to some understandings of what SAPOL officers are doing in their everyday work, which involves “not showing your emotions” and equally involves “distancing yourself, or even cutting yourself off from the community”. Lyon and Barbalet argue that emotion connects persons with other persons (is social), and that

³ I do not intend to run an argument about the connecting capacities of cognition herein; I only suggest cognition as a likely contender, so as to move away from the idea that emotion exclusively connects bodies with the social world.
emotion is physical (in the sense that it is embodied, and in particular, that connections with other people are embodied through emotion). Cops, I argue, attempt to disconnect themselves from other persons by removing the visible emotional expressions from their bodies. They do so because connection between cops and members of the public corrupts a notion of impartiality that is central to policing as it is practiced in South Australia.

POLICE AND EMOTION: EMOTION AS OBSERVABLE AND PHYSICAL

One of the key ideas advanced by Lyon and Barbalet is the idea that emotions are physical as well as "attitudinal". An agent's practical direction in the world, in this writing, is not only informed and facilitated by emotion, but is expressive of emotion. It is of interest that the Latin *emovere* (*emotus*) from which the English 'emotion' derives means, "to move out": the 'inner' emotion that informs action is also evident, physically, as it moves out in this action. So-called 'inner' emotion is also informed, as Lyon and Barbalet note, by 'outer' experience (1994:57). 'Inner' and 'outer' emotional experience should not be viewed as two separate processes, but instead are seamlessly joined in an ongoing and fluid experience. The rather obvious idea, that emotions are expressed or are outgoing from the 'inner' self in bodily actions — smiling, shouting, grimacing, frowning — is particularly central in interactionist theories and has been overemphasised in interactionist sociology and psychological analyses of emotion. Especially in the case of sociology, the body is treated as a surface that can be read off by others located externally to it. Here, emotional expressions are neon signs or signals that indicate clearly to the observing external other the place of the person in an emerging sequence of social action.

Physical emotional expression is regarded in precisely the same way by SAPOL cops. For example, in a training text entitled *Basic Psychology for Police Officers*, (1997; from hereon referred to as the training text), which forms a major part of the 26-week training program that all new police recruits follow, cops are instructed on how they should read a suspect's physical emotional expressions in order to make informed conclusions about the place of that person in the interaction they are having with cops in the interview room. Officers are advised to "be aware of non verbal clues" that might aid in assessing the story given to police by an interviewee. These clues might be able to 'tell' a police officer "how a person is really or truly feeling". Some of the signs that
police officers are advised to look for to assess an interviewee’s story are physical indicators of the person’s emotional state, in this case, “anxiety”. According to the training text, Observable bodily signs of feeling anxious include:

(a) Dryness of mouth- the frequent licking of lips, excessive swallowing (look for Adam’s apple movement), and frequent requests for drinking of water. (b) Excessive sweating- particularly in hands or perhaps under the nose. (c) Restlessness- frequent changes of position, fidgeting, gripping arms of chair, chewing fingernails avoiding the gaze of the eyes of the interviewer (d) unusually pallid or ruddy complexion or changes in complexion (1997:10).

All of these bodily actions are considered to be emotional — anxious — actions.

Police proceed to read this informative and clue-laden body to come to conclusions about guilt or innocence, which they can then compare to the person’s verbal narrative. The fact that body movements and actions driven by anxiousness (sweats or thirsts) are relatively beyond the control of the sweaty, thirsty person in comparison to the control he or she might have over the construction of a verbal narrative makes these anxious movements richly endowed with information that can be easily read off the suspect’s body by the trained officer. This accounts for the direction of police attention on bobbing Adam’s apples, on hands busily wringing themselves, on fingers twitching or tugging at the arm of the chair, on chewed fingernails, and on the place just under the nose where prickles of sweat bead up like tiny particles of truth. The emotional body, in this case, the anxious body, can, in a bead of sweat, a twitching finger or a swiftly bobbing Adam’s apple, betray its owner, who, very often in police experience, is busy constructing an alternative verbal narrative of the position or state that he or she wants police to believe he or she is in. The success story behind the lie detector is one based on tapping in to the biological emotional ‘truth’ of the bodily matter behind the narrative, which, in the case of sweat, is relatively behind or beyond the control of the narrating person. For police then, the emotional body of the suspect is, in either massive ways (where a suspect is obviously angry, frightened, and so on) or in tiny ways (in a bead of sweat) the body of information, the body of truth, and the body of evidence.

Reading physical emotional signs is also a technique that is used by cops to assess the internal feeling states of other cops. This is especially practised by senior officers in
charge of sections of the police department that routinely deal with particularly distressing police situations. In an article contained in the January 1999 *Police Journal*, for example, Senior Constable Neville Logan told the author of the article, Brett Williams, about his ability to know how his subordinate staff were “really feeling” about working in Major Crash section. These staff members are regularly required to attend horrific road accidents involving dead and dying victims. Logan "recognises the signs which tell the true stories of investigator’s emotions”, states Williams, who lists materially present bodily demeanours, including talk, and the physical expression of anger in the workplace, as tell-tale signs that Logan looks for in the bodies of his staff (Williams, 1999:8). For cops then, in suspect and in police bodies, emotions are regarded as inner feelings that become observable and physical, allowing cops to know the state of a suspect or another cop in any given situation or interaction.

POLICE AND EMOTION: EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION AS EVIDENCE OF CONNECTIONS THAT BIAS AND CORRUPT

Most significantly, for the arguments advanced in the course of this thesis, are the ways in which police officers seek to control the physical evidences of their own emotions in the presence of members of the public. Cops do so because emotional expression is considered in this police department (and in others, as Ehrlich-Martin (1999) argues) as biasing and corrupting to police work. This idea has its roots in what cops at SAPOL consider the fundamental underlying principle of all policing: that the law is applied equally to all people. This is known as the principle of impartiality, or of ‘blind’ justice, and requires, according to the training text, that cops maintain an “objective” or “impartial” or “neutral” or “emotionally detached” or “emotionally disconnected” view of the people that they are required to police. Emotional expressions damage this ‘impartiality principle’ because emotional expressions indicate, articulate, or make known the cop’s connectedness to a person.

4 The reader may have noticed that while Lyon and Barbalet understand emotions as constructive of social life, the cops regard it as disruptive of both police work and social life. I do not think that this means that Lyon and Barbalet’s understanding of emotion is inappropriate for trying to explore the police understanding of emotion, though. As will become clear as this chapter proceeds, Lyon and Barbalet argue that emotion connects persons with other persons, and that emotion is physical. Cops, I argue, attempt to disconnect themselves from other persons by removing the visible emotional expressions from their bodies. They do so because connection between cops and members of the public corrupts a notion of impartiality that is central to policing as it is practiced in South Australia.
or people that he or she is expected to police independently of his or her emotional closeness to, or distance from. As Fineman notes on the subject:

Many professional workers...are paid for their skill in emotion management. They are paid to look...controlled, cool...and so forth with clients or patients...Benign detachment disguises, and defends against, any private feelings of pain, despair, fear, attraction, revulsion or love; feelings that would interfere with the professional relationship (1993:19).

Emotional connectedness can indeed interfere with the impartiality principle, or what cops see as the basis of their professional relationships. If an officer’s mother contravenes a speed limit, for example, love might interfere with the issuing of a ticket, and, since the officer can’t guarantee that he or she will love the next speeding motorist as much as his or her mother, he or she cannot guarantee that the law will be applied equally to both motorists. If the mother-love remains unexpressed, however, no damage is done, and each motorist receives the same treatment. It is important to note the difference here between emotional experience, which is allowed on the police job, and emotional expression, which is not: the authors of the training text are happy to concede that officers, due to the oftentimes distressing or “emotion-inducing” nature of the work they are expected to perform, will at times experience strong emotional responses to people and situations they are required to police. It warns, however, that:

[as a police officer] you cannot afford to let personal feelings of anger, depression or general anxiety [etc] interfere with the way you react to other people and situations (1997:4).

Accordingly, cops are advised in the text to carefully erase all physical evidences of their emotional states by carefully:

[guard[ing] against exhibiting certain [emotional] responses...when tasked to operational situations (1997:3).

Accordingly, in the training text, officers are taught how to produce a police image based on the inexpression of emotion, an image which is termed “professional” in the training text, and are not instructed in how to limit emotional experience itself. Most officers agreed that on many occasions policing people and situations “certainly arouses strong feelings in you”, so appearing unemotional or being emotionally inexpressive, despite one’s “strong feelings” is “all you can do”; officers agreed in general that at times it could be “pretty hard” to prevent themselves from experiencing “strong
feelings” on the job. They agreed, however, that the matter of real importance in any policing situation was to prevent these strong feelings from being revealed on the police body. Whether or not an officer experienced strong feelings on the job was not necessarily the point; what was important on the job was the officer’s ability not to show them. Emotional inexpressiveness (not showing feelings) could, in practical policing situations, amount to ostensibly and practically the same as unemotionality (not having feelings). In each case, officers felt that personal feelings would not interfere with the public’s perception of impartial policing, because the outward demeanour of the police officers would be the same in either case. Thus, in the police view, emotion could not impact on the case at hand because its expression would be prevented.

In her sociological work, Ehrlich-Martin (1999) discusses the biasing impact that an emotionally expressed connectedness between officer and citizen makes on the impartial application of the law. Specifically, Ehrlich-Martin notes that the physical expression of the emotion ‘hate’ connected police officers to African American motorist Rodney King, a motorist who was brutally assaulted after being hauled from his car by several Los Angeles patrol officers. This connection, argues Ehrlich-Martin, prevented police officers from applying the law impartially to King. Arguing that the prevention of the expression of emotion forms the basis of police professionalism, Ehrlich-Martin suggests that when the officers involved in the assault allowed their deep emotions of racist hate to be physically expressed, the principle of the equal application of the law to all policed citizens was violently corrupted. She argues that the impartial application of the law might have been made by the hating officers if those officers had “remained professional” and had not allowed their hate to be physically expressed (1999:112). SAPOL cops offered examples of the ways in which the physical articulation or expression of emotions connecting officers to citizens could impact on the impartial delivery of police services to all people which are similar to Ehrlich-Martin’s cited example above. One officer offered the following example:

Just say that I had to go to a house to attend a case of domestic violence, and when I get there, some guy has smacked his wife or kid around. Now, any normal bloke coming in to that situation would belt the shit out of that bastard who did it, or would at least get upset, maybe go a bit crazy. But cops can’t do that, y’see; you can’t get personally involved in shit like that at all. But you feel like doing it,
so bad sometimes.... Let’s face it, if I did what I wanted to do, he’d be on the ground, that bloke, but you can’t always do what you feel. That’s not to say I don’t have very strong feelings about D.V., [domestic violence] cos I do, but to anyone watching me [police that situation], I don’t feel a thing. You can’t just do what you feel like doing in any case because that’s personal, me meting out my own personal justice, but...everyone’s equal before the law, they have the same rights, no matter how little they deserve them (Fieldnotes).

Other examples were offered by SAPOL cops. The officer who has an alcoholic father won’t “go easy” or “especially hard” on someone contravening the law in some way related to alcohol as a result of his or her own emotional connectedness to that person, but instead will prevent their feelings from achieving bodily life for the sake of professional impartiality. Cops from particular ethnic backgrounds felt they could guarantee that they would not favour “our own” just because of their strong emotional ties with ‘their own’, but would, again, assume an impartial physical position despite their ‘internal’ emotional trauma or distress. One officer assured me that if he happened to pull his mother over for speeding, then she, like everyone else, would receive a speeding ticket, in spite of the fact that “I love my Mum!” The ticket would be issued without the physical signs of his mother-love, even as it might well up inside him. To love your mother, to feel that you belong to a particular group, to hate a motorist on the basis of his blackness is not necessarily damaging to police work, but to express these feelings on the job invariably is because it is in expression that the cop’s emotions connect with and impact on others. When they remain hidden, the cop’s emotions remain unknown, and are unable to impact on the situation that is being policed. In other words, the connection of cop to policed person is not made or at least made known: the connection of cop to mother remains unarticulated, unexpressed. The importance that police place on the absence of emotional expressions in disconnecting themselves from love connections with mothers, hate connections with motorists and cultural connections with ‘our own’ speaks volumes about the validity of Lyon and Barbalet’s thesis: that emotions facilitate the connection between bodies that together form the social body.

The training text is also crammed with examples of the biased nature of emotional connectedness to people and events that is allowed to find physical expression. It warns, for example, that the officer having a bad day might police a given situation according to his own personal feelings and might not police it in accordance with what various police training text suggest are the inherent facts of the situation. A police
officer who has in the past been exposed to particular situations that he or she is then called upon to police might police those situations according to his or her emotional memories or scarring, thus bringing a “biased” view to bear on the situation he or she attends. Officers connected to previously experienced situations or to other people in the recent past of their ‘bad day’ are considered “prejudiced”; a term which is defined in the text as “emotional bias”. The training text reiterates that feelings that connect the officer with community members makes the officer “emotionally biased” and allows the officer to go into a situation with “distorted” judgement. Officers are not advised in the training text to ‘unfeel’ these emotions, but are instead advised not to bring them to bear on, or in other words, be expressed in, the police work at hand, for example:

The emotions generated by a particular tasking can carry over to the next tasking or series of taskings. This can distort your judgement and reactions to people. For example, ensure that angry feelings caused by insults thrown at you in a hotel disturbance are not taken out [expressed] on a traffic violator later the same night (1997:10).

POLICE BODIES THAT ADVERTISE THE ABSENCE OF IRRATIONAL, SUBJECTIVE AND PARTIAL EMOTION

Cops are required to remove physical evidences of internal emotional states are removed even in routine patrol policing that is not necessarily particularly distressing or “emotion inducing” in the same way that working in the Major Crash section of the department might be. The removal of physical evidences of emotion is necessary in routine patrol policing, according to members of the department, in order to advertise to members of the public the impartial internal state of the officer, as well as to ensure, as outlined above, that evidence of connectedness does not impact on the ability of the cop to apply the law impartially. Police bodies moving through social spaces are, then, required to be walking, talking advertising billboards of police impartiality.

The association of impartiality with unemotionality draws on what Hochschild suggests are common or popular understandings of emotion as an irrational, perception-distorting experience that renders a person unable to ‘think’ straight, and unable to ‘be objective’ (1983:30). To be objective, says the Random House Dictionary, is to be “free from personal feelings”, suggesting that emotional
experience prevents a person from seeing the world as it ‘really’ is, and allows them only to see it through the distorting lenses of love, hate, anger, fear, and so on. As Hochschild notes, this idea assumes that there is one ‘reality’ that can only be apprehended in the absence of feeling, rather than allowing for the idea that the world is made real by one’s own emotional, audible, visible, and other perceptions of it. This thought/feeling or mind/emotion split is not only made in the dictionary (and therefore commonly), but is also explicitly present in the police training text, which opposes ‘fact’ with ‘feeling’; for example, cops are advised to police on the basis of the “facts” they find, “and not on what you feel” (1997:10).

This is not only a common public and police understanding of emotion, but has also been anthropologically made; perhaps the most famous contributor to this idea is Levi-Strauss, who argued that emotions indicate “an impotence of the mind” (1963). More recent contributors to the anthropology of emotion, such as Freeman (1983) for example, have argued along the line that emotions are symptoms of the animal in the human, and that, at least, they are disordering and problematic, and Huntington and Metcalf (1979:34) consider emotions “vague and irrational”. In the police view, the commonly made distinction between feelings and facts ensures that the citizen audience to whom cops display their unemotion are well equipped to read evident unemotion as rational and objective, as well as impartial, or, according to the *Random House Dictionary*, as “free from personal feelings”

In the police understanding, when the physical expression of unemotion is presented to the informed citizen readership of the police body, citizens read unemotion as an outer impartiality that is indicative of the cop’s inner impartiality: cops actively seek to influence public perceptions of the police, as the training manual clearly indicates in its insistence that police officers at all times “remember” the professional images that “enhance the public image of the police profession”. The practice of presenting a particular body for reading to an informed readership in order to influence perceptions of that presented body is certainly not unique to the police department. Hochschild (1983) Stenross and Kleinman (1989) Wharton (1993) and Sutton (1991) to name but a few, all draw attention in their work to the ways in which employees of particular organizations physically advertise appropriate or desired emotional expressions in order to influence the perceptions that customers, clients or superiors
have of them. One SAPOL officer likened the experience of physically expressing impartiality, or any indeed any ‘internal’ emotional state, to any public relations position:

It’s like any kind of work with people. Sometimes you feel like not being calm and objective and impartial. Sometimes you do feel like kicking people fair in the head. I take a deep breath and put on the act when I feel like that. Even people who work at Maccas have to put on a smile when they don’t feel like going to work. It’s nothing new, but it does take a lot of effort to do, to really watch yourself. I really do have to work at presenting myself correctly, because it’s sometimes so far away from the person I really am when I’m not on duty (Fieldnotes).

EMOTIONAL EXPRESSIONS THAT ARE NOT CORRUPTIVELY CONNECTING: EMOTIONAL EXPRESSIONS THAT ARE NOT ‘EMOTIONAL’

The idea that police advertise impartiality in the form of the physical inexpression of emotion in order to influence its citizen ‘clients’ is dealt with in the training text when it advises that police officers can employ particular physical expressions of emotion in order to influence citizens in predictable and directed ways. The text advises that the department endorses the expression of “assertiveness, calmness and interestedness”, but does not, in any policing circumstance, endorse the expression of “personal likes and dislikes”, “emotional carryover [from one job to the next or from personal life to “the job”]”, “personal upset”, “prejudice [defined elsewhere within the text as “emotional bias”]”, “cynicism, anger, depression, general anxiety”, love, hate, or, in short, any personal feeling or emotional experience of the officer. The willy-nilly or unreflected upon expression of personal feelings is taken to be ‘emotional’, and therefore biasing and corruptive of police impartiality, but the expression of specific feelings that are selectively, purposefully and self-consciously displayed, in order to elicit the desired responses from citizens, are not.

The difference between these two kinds of expressions is based on the division of uncontrolled emotional expression and thought-out or purposeful expression into ‘thought’ and ‘felt’ categories respectively. Purposefully displaying an emotional expression in order to gain the desired response from the citizen is a highly reflected upon, highly considered or thought-out undertaking, as opposed to an unreflected upon, felt expression of personal feeling. The officer does not necessarily have to feel
particular emotions in order to express them in pursuit of the desired citizen response. The officer does, however, have to consider the end-goal of expressing particular feelings (i.e., receiving a desired citizen response) and in this case emotional expression is both rationally goal directed and highly considered or thought: the expression is directed towards a ‘rational’ police goal that has already been ‘thought’ out. The training text explains, for example, that present in the range of options for dealing with ‘difficult’ or recalcitrant members of the public is the physical expression of “more” assertiveness than usual, which has the ‘predictable’ result of threatening the difficult person back into an obedient position vis-à-vis the officer. The officer should, however, never engage in the unthought or uncontrolled or irrational expression of “more” assertiveness than usual, because, according to the training text, “this often antagonizes others and can contribute to an outbreak of violence”.

Similar instructions are attached to other advice pertaining to the production of the police image via the emotionally inexpressive body in the training text, which I discuss in a section below. Each one of these instructions explains how the police officer might adjust his or her bodily display a little in a particular direction, depending on the nature of the response given by the citizen to it, and depending on what the officer desires of the citizen’s response. An officer is expected for the most part, for example, to remain correctly uniformed, but may express a little more informality, a little less authoritarianism, by removing his or her hat, depending on what the police officer receives and desires as a response. Cops are also advised all the way through the text that their ability to present their bodies in particular ways to suit particular kinds of circumstances will be the key to their success as officers. In a situation in which people seem fearful, for example, police are advised to present an image of gentleness; where a person is threatening or angry, a cop can choose to display more assertiveness on his or her body, by placing the hands on the hips and attempting to appear larger and broader than he or she really is. Alternatively, a cop can choose to calm an angry or distressed person by controlling his or her facial expression into an image of calmness, by moderating his or her voice, and by checking to see that none of his or her bodily demeanour suggests anger or threat to the agitated person. All of these can be considered ‘thought’ or considered
expressions that belong well within a police image of professionalism, and are not considered in the training text ‘emotional’ expressions.

To conclude the preceding sections, it is clear that in the SAPOL context, emotional expressions are associated in the police view with irrationality, bias and corruption in police work. Emotions are irrational, biasing and corrupting because, through feelings of love, hate, despair, fear, attraction, revulsion or anger, they connect the officer to the people they police, which in turn violates the underlying impartiality principle upon which the department claims that policing rests. Officers are free to love and hate as they will, but the physical evidences of this connection must be hidden, if impartial application of the law is to be made: officers can claim to love their mothers on the inside, but this claim to love is only damaging to impartiality when it is brought to bear on a police situation in expression. The ostensibly unemotional police body advertises the physical and external condition of impartiality to informed citizen consumers, who, police assume, take the external body to be indicative of the officer’s inner feelings or, more accurately, the lack thereof. Further, the officer is able to, selectively, rationally and thoughtfully, as opposed to indiscriminately, irrationally and feelingfully, display emotional expressions on the body in order to influence citizen ‘clients’ in particular and predictable, and above all, highly objectively ‘thought’ as opposed to personally ‘felt’ ways.

SOCIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONIST APPROACHES

The idea that cops use their bodies in manipulative ways to elicit compliant citizen behaviour is the conclusion of a recent batch of sociological investigations of police, of which Ehrlich-Martin’s is typical. Ehrlich-Martin explains that:

As an interactional sequence unfolds [between citizen and officer] the [police] actor receives feedback from the target [citizen] person. In addition, the [police] actor is affected by transaction-defining cues from the target person... these, in turn, are affected by feedback from the target person (1999:114, see also Rafaeli and Sutton, 1989).

These approaches to accounting for police behaviour are based on a version of social interaction that looks very similar to that advanced by Blumer (1969) in his brokering of G.H.Mead’s thought to American academics. Blumer described the interactional nature of the social act as a process in which people weigh alternative lines of action as
they anticipate alternative responses from others. Despite the fact that Blumer's is a fundamentally inaccurate portrayal of both Mead's insights and of social life in that it is based on a model of most deliberative thought, police officers actively attempt to behave in such a way. According to the descriptions of ideal police behaviour supplied in the training text, and according to police talk, the police 'actor' attempts to operates as though he or she has time out from social life to consider and speculate all of the probable responses of the other, and then to act accordingly, armed with this impossibly complete consideration factored in to his or her own social action. Even though the pace of social interaction disallows for such a deliberative model, this is precisely what cops attempt to do when interacting with members of the public. While I do not suggest in any way that cops fully achieve it, cops do indeed attempt to engage in interaction with citizen others that is highly deliberative and which provides them with time out from the interaction to consider, speculate, then act or, in the language used in the training text, to "assess and predict" the responses of the citizen, "then to control" the citizen by making a physical display of a particular emotional state which will elicit from the citizen the desired response. Cops are trained to carefully evaluate the citizen other when considering how their selected emotional expressions will impact on the other, then predict the response, then respond to this response, and so forth.

I am not supporting a moderate form of interactionist sociology here. I am suggesting instead that we cannot understand what cops are doing if we apply Ehrlich-Martin's Blumer-inspired model. I think Ehrlich-Martin's account may describe what it is that cops believe themselves to be doing, in the sense that cops seem to believe themselves to be armed with a complete picture of social interaction. In her uncritical acceptance of what cops believe themselves to be doing, Ehrlich-Martin seems to have forgotten that such a picture of social interaction is impossibly complete. It is also perhaps because interactionist sociology of the variety that Ehrlich-Martin produces is so overwhelmingly rationalistic in its view of the body, so keen to understand the body as a possession manipulated to give off indications about the self or about one's place in an emerging sequence of social action, that the unusualness of what police are attempting to do with their bodies in producing and exhibiting the police image goes entirely unrecognised in interactionist accounts.
In contrast, I argue that this behaviour is highly irregular and, further, that it is impossible to achieve, because one’s ‘routine’ experiences of social interaction are, as I noted earlier, thickly intertwined and thoroughly involved with the other. If we accept that there is usually or routinely such a natural intertwining of self and other in social interaction, then cops are only attempting to extricate and disentangle themselves from it when they attempt to place themselves and citizen others on opposite sides of an interactive sequence, acting, then waiting for a response from the citizen, then designing a response to the citizen action that is deliberated and considered in terms of the response goal. Further, and again in contrast to Ehrlich-Martin’s account, this is not merely an idea that exists in the cop’s mind about citizens: this is a disentanglement that is physically done, or at least cops physically attempt to do it — for, as Katz notes, a full disentanglement from the other would be impossible to achieve (1999:314). This disentanglement is attempted by cops when they go about producing the police image with their bodies. In the production of such a body, which I turn now to examine, cops try hard to disentangle themselves from a ‘natural’ intertwinment with others by routinely noticing the points at which their own bodies move in the world, which has the effect of rendering police bodies impartial in the sense that these bodies are no longer part of the community in which the bodies of unbounded individuals are routinely produced.

ERASING EVIDENCES OF EMOTION FROM THE POLICE BODY: ERASING CONNECTEDNESS VIA HIGHLY REFLECTED-UPON BEING IN THE WORLD

Precisely how a police officer can create an impartial, professional, ‘unemotional’ body is the subject of much of the training text (1997, 10-25). All of the skills for creating a physical presentation of impartiality set down in the text are collected under the single heading of ‘The Police Image’. These skills are included here as typically practised skills owing to the fact that most ‘on the street’ or patrol officers reported observing these learned behaviours routinely on the job. Specific instructions are set down in the training text with regard to how a police officer is expected to manipulate his or her body in order that it reflects ‘the police image’. The instructions are divided into sections including “grooming”, “speech”, “physical action”, “facial expression”, “hand action”, “body stance”, “physical proximity” and “general attitude".
In the grooming section, police are advised that “there will be ample opportunities for you to be scrutinised [by members of the public]”, and that these scrutinising members of the public will be busy “forming impressions of your competence from the cleanliness and neatness of your dress and grooming”. When police officers speak, they are advised to be “unbiased” in their talk by avoiding the expression of their personal feelings surrounding any situation. What the officer says should not sound “indecisive”- for “offenders and suspects will be looking for evidence of indecision on your part”, and even ‘non-offending’ people “will react to what you say”. What is not verbalised can also be of importance; officers are told in the training text that pauses can pressure an interviewee into making a response. Officers are advised to use pausing to elicit the desired response from the citizen being interviewed. Officers are advised to “take care” when ‘displaying’ facial expressions: these are to “avoid conveying emotions of disinterest, boredom, contempt and anger, etc”. The training text also warns that if the top section of the face is covered, by either the standard issue police headgear or sunglasses, an officer will indubitably be perceived by members of the public as “rude” and “threatening”. Eye contact, officers are reminded, can be “threatening” too; accordingly, they are advised to carefully watch for a response from the person enduring this gaze, and then to act on a response that indicates that the person is uncomfortable by then breaking off the eye contact. An officer’s hands, insists the text, ought to be properly regarded as useful display tools, which should be consciously “used” to reinforce what he or she is saying, “or alternatively, the hands should be kept in neutral positions”. ‘Neutral’ here refers to a highly reflected-upon neutrality, during which the hands should be checked to ensure that they are not fidgeting or showing signs of boredom or nervousness, and during which an officer should always know what both his or her left and right hands are doing. The hands of the officer must be carefully neutral, lest, in the midst of a heated piece of social interaction, they produce of their own accord an action, or assume a position, counter to the police image of impartiality that might impact on the response of a citizen toward an officer. Such unreflected upon action, officers are advised, can contribute to outbreaks of violence, unnecessarily complicating the officer’s tasking. With regard to body stance, police officers are warned that if they slouch they run the risk of being perceived:
as an unconcerned sloppy person. Hence the person with whom you are interacting may feel less confident in you and less inclined to show you respect (1997:12).

Police officers should also not stand “too close” to members of the public, and are instead advised to “give them plenty of room”. If this is not done, a person is sure to “feel threatened”, which in turn, officers are advised, makes completing a tasking much harder.

Throughout the course of the text, recruits are warned to “be careful”, “be aware” and “be objective” about the ways in which they are presenting their bodies to citizens. Phrases like these liberally pepper the text, serving to turn the officer’s self-conscious attentions to regions of the body that are more usually tacitly engaged in unreflected upon being in the social world. Cop bodies producing the police image are clearly bodies more or less kept within the officer’s self-conscious attentions. Cops have to “watch” their stance, “monitor” the distance between self and citizen other, “check” the position of their arms and legs, making sure they are not crossed or akimbo, except where this is appropriate for assuming a “more assertive demeanour than usual”. Cops are asked to “ensure” that they are not swaying, to “be careful” to ensure that their speech does not contain bias, anger or other emotion in its tone, volume and quality; “adjust” the positions of their hats and sunglasses, “check” for correct exposure of faces, and must “be careful” about displaying their feelings on any part of their bodies. Cops have to place their hands in carefully neutral positions, even when an encounter with a citizen might instil in those hands a mighty, yet, in routine social experience, largely unreflected upon, drive to curl into tight fists. Even as a citizen’s hand might unself-consciously, stealthily curl itself into a tight fist, even as people in public routinely and tacitly maintain socially acceptable measures of distance between one another, even as one forgets or does not self-consciously notice one’s hands as they furtively plant themselves upon the hips, making the arms indignantly or threateningly akimbo, the cop makes his or her hands ‘neutral’, actively monitors the distance maintained between self and other, and surveils his or her body, lest it become threatening without his or her knowledge. Even as one, in a completely unreflected upon way, hugs one’s arms to the chest, folding them over the heart for protection in a moment of fear or apprehension, even as one’s voice might, beyond the easy control or even the knowledge of the speaker, squeak with outrage, raise in
anger, quaver in fear or break with grief, tension or sadness, cops are required to *always* keep these more usually tacitly engaged movements and actions of body well within their fields of self-vision — as I explain below, I use the term ‘vision’ in a very particular way. As ‘normal’ hands, legs, hips, voices quietly and unproblematically, even necessarily\(^5\), slip behind the brightly lit arena of self-consciousness in ‘normal’ experiences of social interaction, cops permit no such slippage. The body, or at least significant regions of it, is grasped and apprehended with great firmness, by the highly self-conscious cop.

According to many officers, the fact that ‘private feelings’ were experienced in deep and powerful ways by cops while on the job often helped to bring regions of the body used to create a publicly observable display further into self-conscious attention. Some described the ways in which the bodily production of the police image provided a focus for them during difficult taskings, in which personal feelings longed to find physically expressive form. Testimonies like, “I really wanted to belt him, but I concentrated on not showing it”, and “I focussed on sounding calm, even though I was privately seething”, indicate the degree to which bodies are monitored so that aggressive, seething feelings are never expressively physicalised to the extent of the officer’s personal satisfaction. Here, regions of the body that might usually be unreflexively transformed in emotional expression are watched, held in check. In an article published by Brett Williams in the January 1999 edition of *Police Journal* entitled ‘Deathly Investigations’, for example, the author, having interviewed four of the investigators of the Major Crash section of the department, concluded that none of the investigators could afford to “indulge” in their personal feelings about the horror of the scenes they were forced to confront, but instead had to move composedly through crash scenes in which dismembered limbs might be scattered, and routinely maintain an appropriately sympathetic and professional demeanour when delivering notices of death to relatives. All of the investigators of the section agreed in the article that these were “always very hard” things to do when, faced with such tragedy, one’s first response “would be to express personal feelings” (1999a:9). The same author notes in the April 1999 edition, in an article about investigators working in the department’s Child and Family Investigation units, that in common with all

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\(^5\) The work of Polanyi (1962, 1966) is important here: in order to competently act, we must routinely ignore the points at which the ‘edges’ or ‘ends’ of ourselves meet with the world.
Detectives, the Detectives in this unit "[physically] reveal little of their personal feelings about the horror with which they're constantly confronted...[they concede, however, that] ...the experience "can be- and is-traumatic". Williams concludes that "emotions invariably run high" in such a traumatic job, but the Detectives do not display this (Williams, 1999b:11). Andy Dunn, who runs a regular column in the Journal notes in his contribution in January 1999 that cops "risk more than their bodies" on the job, "they risk their hearts" also. He notes that while cops endure "relentless emotional trauma" and are constantly "consumed" by emotional strain, the fact that they are not "obvious" about this is testament to their "professionalism" (1999:18). This professionalism is in part a professionalism of appropriate expression and appearances, which itself aids cops, as one explained, in "staying in control". Said another:

it's kind of a survival tool- if you watch yourself, and you don't let how you feel show, you'd be surprised about how that actually helps you to stay calm. That goes for all police jobs- of course you feel emotional strain- cops are only people. They just don't show it.

To make sure they don't show it, cops watch their bodies, keeping them under police surveillance that they carry out on themselves.

**ACHIEVING FULLY EMBODIED DISCONNECTEDNESS OR UNSOCIALITY VIA NON-VISUAL SURVEILLANCE**

Taking a phenomenological view of police self-surveillance means, in this case, looking at the effects of the turns of the cop's attention to his or her own body. Officers regularly turn their attention to regions of the police body that might more 'normally' be tacitly employed to maintain routine social conduct, that might more 'usually' be a relatively othered view of the self. Cops, of course, can never have full visibility of themselves in social interaction with citizen others; the cop's head, like anyone else's, is always most securely hidden from the view of the cop him or herself. It is clear, however, that cops 'see' much more of themselves than do 'normally' interacting people, who, as Polanyi (1962) notes, routinely keep the points at which they intersect with the world out of or behind self conscious attention. Cops constantly and consistently concentrate on their hands, the movement of their fingers, the stance of the body, the top half of the face, their proximity to people, their own voices, in ways that
‘ordinary’ people routinely, unproblematically, unconsciously do not: as Merleau-Ponty [1964] (1968) notes, in ‘ordinary’ social interaction these things are routinely backgrounded.

It is fundamentally important to note that the surveillance that cops carry out on themselves is not simply visual — in fact, it is hardly visual at all. Most of the time, cops cannot see what it is that they are trying to keep within their self-conscious attentions: no one can visually surveil their voice, watch their hearing with the eyes, see their faces to make sure that their expressions are unemotional. Instead, cops ‘watch’ their bodies through other senses. Cops keep their voices under surveillance via ‘watchful’ hearing; they ‘see’, but do not visually see, their faces as they keep their expressions emotionless, they may not look down to see if their hands are coiled fists and may instead ‘watch’ them through touch: cops may know if their hands are scrunched up in anger through the touch of their fingernails digging into their palms. Thus, cops ‘watch’ their bodies, keeping them under a multi-sensory surveillance which is certainly not exclusively visual. It is for this reason that Foucauldian notions of surveillance are not useful in understanding what cops are doing in keeping their bodies within self-attention to achieve what I will term embodied disconnectedness. Where Foucault’s notion of surveillance is based exclusively on ‘eye-seeing’, the surveillance that cops are carrying out on themselves is multi-sensual and embodied.

By engaging in surveilling the self as it acts in the world, in keeping the bodily actions that are normally backgrounded within self-conscious attention, the police officer effectively extricates him or herself from the collectivity in which bodies are ‘normally’ constructed. In this collectivity or social body, each individual body routinely, tacitly, extends out to incorporate parts of the other: the lived body in social life is not routinely experienced as biologically impervious, but is instead a body that is experienced and unselfconsciously constructed “in the ongoing interplay of conduct with others” (Katz 1999:314). There are no ordinarily or normally or routinely noticed boundaries separating out each distinct unit of person from each other unit of person, but, in self-consciously reflecting on their own facial expressions, hand movements and voice qualities, cops bring into their own self-‘vision’ what is routinely, unselfconsciously left out in, for example, the lived experience of the construction of the social body of the family. The parental hand that smacks the child’s bottom is not watched as it makes
contact, the parent does not watch his or her hand as it makes contact with the child’s forehead as it strokes soothingly across the skin. Neither does the person in conversation with another routinely check that an appropriate distance is maintained between their conversing bodies, nor does he or she wait for a response from her talking partner before calculating a response of her own from a range of possible options.

Instead, as Katz notes, one’s perception of others and one’s response to others are of a piece; each is naturally hidden in the other (1999:316). Bodies, in routine social interaction are not self-surveilled bodies but are bodies largely unreflected upon, and it is this tacit corporeal engagement through which the social body is constructed — in the ongoing upon interplay of unreflected upon conduct with others. When cops say “we’re not like other people”, “we’re different from normal people”, “cops are detached”, “cops are objective, and “police are impartial”, they are commenting on the corporeal logic of their bodily productions that achieve for them impartiality, or the state of not being part of the collectivity in which the social body is constructed. This is the corporeal experience of disentanglement from what is more usually a tacit involvement with the other, this is the corporeal experience of impartiality, of not being part of social collectivity. We might refer to this fully embodied self-surveillance as embodied disconnectedness from the social body.

In order to achieve what Lyon and Barbalet might wish to call embodied disconnectedness, or even embodied unsociality, cops seek to rein in what they have recognised as the facilitator of embodied sociality: emotion. In police practice, the bodily expression and bodily action of emotion is ceased, and this bodily practice of unemotion becomes the facilitator of embodied unsociality or disconnectedness. Emotional expression in the police context, as I outlined in a previous section of this chapter, is understood to connect police officers with people. Through mother-love, through hatred for the motorist, as Ehrlich-Martin (1999) has discussed, through rage and anger for the child abuser and wife beater, through all of these emotions, police officers can become connected to citizen others, when, as most of us do unreflexively and habitually, they allow their emotions to direct their physical bodies in activity in the social world. To allow emotions to direct practical activity in the social world is, in the police context, to position others in relation to the self, to connect them with the self, which stands precisely in opposition to the underlying principle of policing:
impartiality. In disallowing emotions to reach out through physical activity by carefully and self consciously surveilling the edges of the police body, cops achieve impartiality because the connecting element of emotion is pulled back, and because the officer’s body is no longer ‘made’ so much in the ongoing interplay with others, but is instead constructed in relatively bounded, self-surveilled, disconnected isolation from others.

Cops are taught to pull their emotionally expressing bodies out of such sociality or collectivity or community or connectedness in the ways I have described in this chapter in order to construct a police image of, “impartiality”. The physical expression of emotion is here considered to be connecting cops to community or social body. It is through the limitation of the connecting factor of emotion that the police body achieves separation from the social or community body. The use of the word ‘impartial’ to describe the absence of emotional expression on the police body is important here, because it is through the absence of emotional expression, which articulates and expresses connection, that police become impartial toward, or in other words not part of, or disconnected from, the social body. Cops show with their bodies, quite purposefully, that they have no emotional connection to any of the parts of the community they police and, with Lyon and Barbalet’s reasoning in mind, it should be no surprise that this connection is cut off corporeally: unemotionality is thought to be achieved by cops when cops pull their bodies out of social relations with others in the ways I have described. Unemotionality and the officer’s embodied separation from “the community” are inextricably linked together: the body that performs unemotionality is also the body that has been separated from “the community”. This is the sense in which police bodies are unemotional: they are, insofar as they are able to be, made impartial or apart from the shared experience of embodied sociality, which is given force and direction by emotion. If emotion is precisely the experience of embodied sociality, then police seek to make their bodies emotionally inexpressive in order to achieve a break from the social body for the sake of impartiality.

Although the police department considers the police image of unemotionality to be of the utmost importance because it advertises police neutrality and impartiality — the very foundations of policing, according to the department — it has recently come to the department’s attention that members of the community find this image problematic. Specifically, the police department understands that members of the public read this
body as unemotional and uncaring, as well as unemotional and impartial. As I outlined in previous chapters, disconnection from people, known within the department as impartiality, has negatively impacted on policing, but the department has chosen to stick with the model of policing that it can afford: reactive policing. In fact, this is not really a choice at all, but is instead a result of the economically rational environment in which policing is now located. Instead of attempting to change that which they cannot really change, the department turns, as I now do, to the police band, which strives to audibly demonstrate, via musical means, the emotional ‘cop with a heart’.
CHAPTER THREE
REHEARSAL: THE RECIPE FOR ‘SAD’

INTRODUCTION
In chapters three, four and five I take for the ethnographic material to be examined the rehearsals and performances of the police band. This material is viewed through a lens of enquiry that focuses in on the ways in which band members corporeally and sensually experience their instruments. In this chapter and in chapters four and five I argue that band members only experience ‘emotion’ or ‘the feel’ as a result of sensually including their instruments in their experiences of their own bodies. The sensual extension of players into instruments, and the extension of instruments into players bodies, an experience which yields ‘instrumentalised’ persons, occurs only during performances. Following Weirzbicka’s (1995) advice, that concepts of emotion should be developed with reference to the context in which they occur, I work with a concept of emotion in these chapters that is based on performative experiences of sensual extension — what band members call ‘the feel’. Each of these three chapters, then, has the same focus — each explores sensual corporeal and emotional experience. I apply this focus to rehearsal experience in chapter three, to performance experience in chapter four, and to rehearsal experiences of ‘pain’ and performance experiences of ‘joy’ in chapter five.

The members of the police band rehearse with what they call monotonous regularity. A morning or afternoon portion of each working day, usually some three to four hours, is spent in rehearsal. By far the most common rehearsal is for Concert Band, which performs very regularly and involves all of the players. Rehearsals, for the most part, are all about tongues. And fingers. And hands, and feet, and respiration. A great deal of the players’ self conscious attentions are directed toward the manner in which these body parts or functions meet with instrument objects to “buzz” them, “blow” them, to hit, bang, tongue, lip, and breath into, them. If these touches administered to the instrument body sound almost erotically sensuous experiences, they are not, at least in the lived experience of the rehearsing band member; if anything, instruments are antiseptically and dispassionately regarded.
During a rehearsal period the conductor constantly instructs players to address their attentions to the points at which their own bodies end and instrument objects begin. This ‘skin-to-skin’ relationship between player and instrument is the focus of each player’s attention during rehearsal because this is the point at which players manipulate the instrument to produce what they refer to as “technically correct musical sounds”. The player, in keeping this contact under extreme scrutiny, can proceed, under the authoritative guidance of the conductor, to identify incorrect touches, pressures, and so on. During rehearsals, instrument objects are experienced by players as located externally to players; they are objects, bodies, which exist at the edges of, and immediately follow, a player’s tongue, lip, finger, palm, and breath. Player’s bodies and instrument bodies exist side by side, but do not invade each other during rehearsal sessions, as they do, in particularly seductively sensual ways, during performance sessions. During performance sessions, finger and saxophone key slip seamlessly into one another, to the point at which the beginning of one and the end of the other is, for players, wholly indeterminable.

Music itself is not considered ‘the language of emotion’ during rehearsal periods, but is spoken of and practised instead as a kind of grammar of emotion that consists of all of the correct ingredients for the construction of sad or happy or angry music, but does not itself contain sadness, happiness or anger. Players refer to this grammar of emotion as “the recipe for sad”, or, “the recipe for happy”, in the case of particular emotional states, and as “the technical production” as a general term. Players feel that they are not able to communicate the affective content of musical pieces to audience members during rehearsal periods, and describe rehearsals as devoid of emotional content. They describe them in this way not only because the recipe for sad does not achieve a form in which it is edible or consumable by audience members, however. In performance experience, band members understand that audiences consume fully edible musical food, but when band members say that performing music is for them highly emotional, they do not refer to the consumption of the same affective musical food that audience members are presented with. For band members, the emotional experience of performance — what they call ‘the feel’ — occurs when they come to inhabit the bodies of their musical instruments, and when their musical instruments come to inhabit them. This, for band members, is an experience of joy.
Further, while rehearsal experiences are “devoid of emotional experience” in the sense that, according to band members, audiences can’t eat affective musical food, rehearsal experiences do involve pain for players. This emotional pain comes from the separation from musical instruments that band members endure during rehearsals. I do not explore experiences of rehearsal pain or performance joy at any length in this third chapter; I flag them here to orient the reader to the larger project I undertake throughout chapters three, four, and five, which all deal with the sensual, corporeal and emotional experiences that police band members have when they rehearse and perform music.

During the technical production, which occurs during rehearsal times, the played musical score is no more than a collection of sounds of varying dynamic, tuning, timing, pitch and other values, which are adjusted in particular directions during the course of the rehearsal. According to band members, rehearsals are in fact not about playing music at all, but are instead about producing correct and discrete fragments of musical sound. Band members say that they hear, bit by tiny bit, correctly or incorrectly played tunings, pitches, dynamics, and so on, in their own individual instrumental contribution to the rehearsal. Band members say that they cannot hear ‘the music’, during rehearsals at all; rather they hear only tiny discrete pieces of it at a time. Rehearsal periods, in short, are periods in which band members regard the musical sounds they are making as devoid of any emotional content besides pain, and they do not expect the musical sounds of a rehearsal to be able to communicate any emotion besides the band members’ own rehearsally-induced pain.

During this chapter and those that follow, I analyse performances and rehearsals as separate and distinctive moments, but in the course of a normal work day, rehearsal and performance experiences flow into one another; in fact, rehearsal moments can occur during specific on-stage performance times, and performance moments can occur during rehearsal times. Rehearsals, in this current context, are any musical occasions during which band members pay self-conscious attention to their manipulations of instrument bodies for the purposes of producing correct sounds. This is in fact precisely the same definition of rehearsal that band members themselves use. Rehearsals can occur just prior to a performance as band members tune up on the
stage, they can occur in the bandrooms during set periods of time, all of the band members can participate, or small groups or individual players can engage in rehearsal practise.

Performances are any musical occasions during which band members cease paying self-conscious attentions to instrument manipulation. It is important to note that ‘performances’ or at least ‘performance moments’ can in fact occur during rehearsal periods, and often do, when, by the end of a set-down rehearsal time, players have mastered a piece and have ceased to pay self-conscious attention to their own bodies as they interact with instruments. When this happens, band members discuss the playing they did of a piece as a performance rather than as a rehearsal, saying that the playing was “the real thing that time”, or “it was a proper go”. The particular characteristics of a performance as opposed to rehearsal are discussed in what follows in this chapter and in chapters four and five, and it is to these characteristics that band members refer when they term a playing “a real thing”, or “a proper go”, rather than “a rehearsal” when a particular kind of playing occurs during specifically set-aside rehearsal time.

Equally, rehearsals can occur during performances. Playings with rehearsal characteristics occur when band members are forced during performances to pay self-conscious attention to their interactions with instruments. These ‘rehearsal’ incidents occur during performances when, for example, players are forced to pay attention to timing when the acoustics of a performance place are strange and cause musical sounds to reverberate, or when a piece is under-rehearsed.
Band members describe rehearsals as occasions on which they produce exclusively "technical music". Technical music, according to band members, refers to the sounds which band members make when they are engaged in the playing of music "precisely as written: pushing the appropriate buttons, blowing at the level that is indicated... just playing it [the written music] precisely". The written music provides players with a technical prescription or set of instructions for its precise conversion into musical sound. Although they acknowledge that the technical and expressionful are necessarily related, and that the technical elements of production necessarily, logically, occur in performance time and place also, the process of making the technical music goes thoroughly unnoticed in performance contexts, in which "you don’t think about how you physically make the music, you simply make it".

Band members described the technical prescription or the written music as analogous to a recipe: as a recipe provides instructions for the precise construction of a particular dish, so too does the technical music provide instructions for the precise construction of audible musical renderings. The written technical prescription or recipe for the audible musical food consists of both the musical notes, which occur in accordance with the key (the arrangement of musical tones bearing a fixed relation to the basic note of the scale in question), and the qualities impacting on each note or collection of notes; including the timing (the arrangement of the rhythmic beats into equal measures included between successive bars), the tempo (the rate of speed at which a musical composition is ideally rendered) the tuning (the common agreement in pitch), the dynamics (the loudness or softness value assigned each note) and the pitch (the elevation or depression of a note depending on the number of vibrations per second). All of these and other technical elements are organised, by composers and arrangers, into particular ways to produce particular kinds of musics; the technical components are in this sense the building blocks of musical life. Each kind or genre of music has its own technical conventions, which exist in relation to the rules of composition and musical form present in Classical music. For example, Jazz music is characterised by syncopation, which modifies the rhythm away from Classical convention, but particular technical conventions
nevertheless apply to the Jazz style. The specifically Jazz notion of playing ‘behind the time’, for example, is governed by particular technical conventions regarding how far behind the time a note should occur. The particular ways in which musics are technically organised make possible their categorisation into recognised styles of music.

The technical components of a piece of music are also organised by composers and arrangers to give a piece a particular quality of feeling; for example, a piece might be said to have a sad feel, a happy feel, a spirited feel. Police band players say for example that a piece of music can be “sad sounding in a technical sense”, by which they mean that a composer or arranger has organised the timing, tuning, dynamics and so forth into a specific form “that everyone recognises as sad”. Notes that are written as sustained, dynamically muted, and which are organised in repetitive loop patterning in a minor key at slow tempo, for example, are said to be key technical ingredients in what players refer to as “the recipe for sad music”. These ‘recipes for feeling’ identifiable in all written musical pieces, are known as “the technical feel” of any given music.

Band members say that a player can concentrate on reproducing the written music audibly — that a player can strive to follow, as closely as he or she is able, all of the technical conventions of the music as written. This is, according to players:

a purely academic experience…it’s a skill, a craft. It’s an academic skill, the craft of playing your instrument that you have learned…you have learned how to read and understand music at the technical level, and you have learned how to make the required sounds on your instrument of choice. All well-trained musicians are capable of producing technically correct sounds (Fieldnotes).

According to players, the nearness of an attempt to audibly reproduce the written music precisely can be determined in part by measuring the aforementioned technical elements against recognised technical musical conventions using various devices. During individual practice time, for example, band members often tested their individual attempts to make audibly precise the written music with metronomes and tuning devices.
Players understand that the technical elements organised in particular ways to yield particular musical styles, which in turn are said to have particular “feeling qualities”, can be produced almost exactly as written by a player depending on the level of skill that a player possesses in several areas. But players also know that “any and all players will not exactly produce a piece of music as its original composer once did”, even if a player is remarkably skilled. This inexactness, they told me, occurs for two reasons. First, the technically correct rendering made by one player is not precisely the same as that given by another owing to the specific qualities and characteristics of each individual player’s body and instrument. Everyone, for example, “has a different mouth”, and “every instrument is slightly different from another”, which means that no two sounds will ever be precisely the same.

Second, conductors are variably skilled in their knowledge of technical correctness. Conductors are also entitled to make small variations to written music and when they do, these are considered by players to be part of the technical prescription that they must follow, and all such changes are indeed written down by players so that they materially form part of the written musical prescription to which they are referring in the rehearsal. The conductor is considered to be the authority on technical correctness, and his interpretation of the music is the one that band members will regard as the technically correct interpretation of the music.

Making the technical music, then, involves giving a technically correct rendition of any given piece that a conductor modified and/or interpreted. If the written music is a recipe, then the conductor is the head chef, who directs his kitchen staff in the precise construction of the musical dish. One player described the rehearsal experience in these terms:

All that good conductors are interested in is whether you can play the note exactly as it is written. Well, not exactly, but as close as ever they can get, given everyone’s slightly different efforts depending on their instrument, and just themselves, really. But it does get pretty close to being all the same because the conductor is the boss... he tells you what to do, and everyone just does it. The way something is played depends on the conductor, you don’t get away with any technical mistakes, everything is technically right, and modified only by

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1 George is the band’s conductor and, in accordance with his wishes, I limit my comments about his role in the band.
what the conductor decides. The outer limits of the interpretation are ideally set by the conductor, who himself interprets the written music, and then “edits out” those interpretations not consistent with his own (Fieldnotes).

The technical musical prescriptions are the focus of rehearsal periods, which consist of a set sequence of events\(^2\). When all of the band members come together to rehearse a piece for the first time, and after the band members have tuned their instruments and have ‘warmed up’ their fingers and mouths for playing, the conductor requests that the piece be played through by everyone. The conductor listens carefully to the playing, and, upon recognising the deviance of a played note from its technical prescription according to the score, to which the conductor constantly refers, he calls a halt to playing and the nature of the deviation is communicated to band members. Correction of the note is then attempted by recourse to the technical prescription made for the note in question in the score. The conductor describes what was played compared with “what is written” on the score. The conductor might also ask a particular player what is written in his or her individual part and then check to make sure it conforms with what is written in the full score, to make sure that the score information that each refers to is the same. The faulted version of the music is usually then sung, or quasi-sung by the conductor, and then the desired version of the music is sung or quasi-sung for the purposes of illustration:

it’s supposed to go dah dah dah daaaah dah da dah”, [emphasising the part that band members did not play well, which will then be compared with the faulted version that the band members offered to the conductor] “and you guys went dah dah dah dah daaaah da dah (Fieldnotes).

In some cases, the conductor and players have conflicting versions of the parts, and it is then the conductor’s call to decide which version is the correct one. More commonly, a player has made a technical mistake that the conductor has noticed. When the conductor identifies a mistake, he communicates to players that a deviation from the written music has occurred. If the source of the deviation is immediately known, the player or players producing the faulted music will be informed. The

\(^2\) The following descriptions of rehearsal draw on fieldnotes taken during some three hundred Concert band rehearsals which were held over periods of approximately three hours each.
informed players either acknowledge the faulted playing, or communicate to the conductor that there is conflicting information in their written parts of the music.

Sometimes, the conductor will know that the timing, tuning or other technical prescription has not been precisely followed in the playing, but he may not immediately know the exact instrumental source of the deviation. If the source of the fault is not immediately known, which is more usually the case, the conductor will request that the faulted part be played again. After an initial playing, the conductor may ask specific sections of the full concert band (i.e., the horn section, the wind section) to play the faulted part in isolation until the faulting player or players are identified, or individual players might be asked to play the faulted part if the conductor can immediately identify the player. If the conductor cannot isolate the fault using this method, each section, or, in rare cases, each individual player, might be asked to play the part in question. In either case, the passage will be scrutinised note by note until the faulted note or, more properly, the faulted quality of a note, is identified.

The conductor then gives advice to the faulting player or players about how the note should be played correctly. The passage in which the technical incorrectness was initially noted is then replayed, to ensure that the problem has been fixed. The conductor then stops the music, and pronounces the passage correct, or instructs band members in what other adjustments should be made to achieve correctness. The ‘playing through’ of musical pieces during rehearsal sessions is stopped extremely frequently, usually every few bars, and when it is stopped, the conductor draws attention to a problem involving the technical music that more often than not applies to single notes or parts of single notes.

In the case of rehearsals for smaller band formations (for example, the wind quintet, the saxophone quartet, the Big Band) senior band members leading these smaller bands assumed the same role as the conductor of the concert band did during concert band rehearsals. Each small band leader participated in the activities I have described above in precisely the same way as the concert band conductor, concentrating on

\[\text{For example, the dynamic, or the tuning, may be identified.}\]
noticing deviances from the written music made by players in each of their own specific bands.

Both small and concert band rehearsals are declared ‘over’, sometimes quite abruptly, when the conductor is satisfied with the technical quality of the music; rehearsals are held in order to identify and repair technical problems, and when no more can be identified, the rehearsal session is considered complete. Usually, the piece that has just been scrutinised in a rehearsal session, usually down to the qualities present or missing in single notes, will not be played again until the time at which it is scheduled to be performed.

Technical problems with the played versions of music are corrected in very particular ways. When the problem is identified, for example, as a note held too long, or for not long enough, a note played too loudly or too softly, an incorrect note, or as a section rushed or played too slowly, the conductor, in almost every instance, seeks to correct faulted playing by drawing attention to the relationship of the musician’s body to his or her instrument, and more specifically, he draws attention to the point of intersection between a player's body and the surface of the instrument. In the more than 300 rehearsals I attended during fieldwork, all of the corrections to played music were carried out in this way.

From the beginning to the sometimes-abrupt cessation of the rehearsal session, the conductor constantly draws attention to the point at which the band members’ bodies end and their instruments begin. Every time a faulted version of the music is given audible life, the conductor, without exception, draws the faulting player’s attention to the point at which his or her body intersects with the ‘skin’ of the instrument. During rehearsals the conductor constantly requests all band members to “listen to yourselves”, to “watch your fingering”, to “be careful when and how you are breathing”, and to “focus on how that tongue is moving on the mouthpiece”. In the course of correcting identified technical faults in the musical production, band members are routinely requested to check how their “tonguing”, “fingering” “sliding”, “striking” and “breathing” or “blowing” impacts on the instrument object, by noticing the intersection
of their personal physical actions with instrument object. When correcting an identified fault, the conductor directs specific requests to players producing the faulted playing. For example, the conductor might ask a player whether his or her mouth is still in contact with his instrument and is still blowing air through it after the note is supposed to have ceased, or whether he or she has begun to make sound by physically manipulating his instrument before/after a particular note is supposed to have begun or ended, or whether the player has worked out his or her breathing appropriately for the unhampered production of the notes. The following excerpt from my fieldnotes illustrates a typical rehearsal instance in which the conductor draws attention to the way in which the player’s body is interacting with the surface of the instrument:

The conductor specifically asked William to notice if his “tonguing” was correct. The conductor and William then engaged in an extended discussion over the course of several minutes in which William described in exhaustive detail the position of his tongue on the mouthpiece, and his technique when it moved away from and back against the mouthpiece, (or, in other words, his “tonguing”). The conductor then issued precise instructions about how William was to change the position of his tongue as it hit the instrument’s surface so that it would produce the correct sound. Instructive phrases included “try to pull it back as soon as it touches the mouthpiece”, “try holding it stiffer as it hits”, “try moving it faster away from the mouthpiece”, and so on. After five or so minutes of intensive discussion about William’s tongue insofar as it interacted with his mouthpiece, a decision about the correct technique was arrived at, and the rehearsal involving the full band could again proceed. The same kind of interaction took place between the conductor and various other players with almost wearisome regularity, on the conductor’s identification of a faulted played version of the written music (Fieldnotes).

Respiration is also routinely marked out by the conductor as a focus for a player’s self-conscious attentions when the volume of playing is considered faulted:

George [the conductor] asks the French horns to “come out a lot more, blow that line out harder. To everyone else he says that “it’s only mezzo forte, so don’t blow it so hard. Blow it softer. I want you to listen to the horn line that comes through. At the meno mosse, the 3rd bar of the meno mosse, trumpets... it’ll need to be blown out. Blow it out hard... [then] “watch for that rest [in bar 19]”. “That note is being carried every time, you’re blowing it too long. Stop breathing!! Come off. Everyone be aware of where you are coming off, I mean really watch it this time. Concentrate on stopping your breath at the mouthpiece — don’t let it go through” (Fieldnotes, my emphasis).

A little later in the same rehearsal:
The conductor stops the music, then addresses Gilbert and Lester, [the two tubists] and tells them that they both took a breath at the same time “in a hold” [a passage in the music that calls for a sustained note] and it “caused a gap”. Lester asks how long they are expected to play without breathing, and George tells them to not to breathe at the same time. A staggered breathing routine is then worked out, and Gilbert and Lester mark down on their sheet music the points at which they will breathe during the hold according to the conductor’s instruction. Gilbert is to breathe immediately before the hold, and Lester is to go into the hold from the previous note and is not to breathe until the first beat of the next bar. Both players are asked to notice their respiration habits as physical playing techniques and each is requested to notice the point at which their respective breaths are made, to ensure that the other knows when he should take his breath (Fieldnotes).

During a different rehearsal:

The members of the woodwind section meet to discuss which members will breathe in which musical location, so that all of the clarinet or saxophone line-up do not take a breath together, creating a “breath-gap” in the music. This is a complex project; each individual player has to be assigned a breath location within the musical terrain, and each has to remember to “be aware of when other people are going to breathe to make sure you don’t breath at the same time as they are” (Fieldnotes).

All of the above examples require players to direct their self-conscious attentions to the point at which their own bodies end and their instrument bodies begin. William, for example, was required to pay focussed attention to the exact point at which his tongue met with the mouthpiece of his instrument for a considerable period of time. Gilbert and Lester had to pay strict attention to the precise point in time at which they would allow their respirations to flow into the bodies of their instruments. Rehearsals are in other words characterised by the constant pleadings of the conductor for band members to pay close attention to the ways in which their bodies meet the bodies of their instruments, and are very regularly punctuated by cessations of playing so that particular attention can be paid to the ways in which specific faulted notes are being produced because of the faulted ways in which bodies are meeting and touching instrument bodies. Even when not specifically asked to notice the physical manipulations made on instruments, most band members described their initial rehearsal experiences as ones in which the physical relationship with one’s instrument
was "worked out", therefore demanding that close attention be paid to one's meeting with instrument. As Erin, a clarinettist, explained:

This is the time where you work out certain things, physical things, like how long certain notes should be played, phrasing, where to breathe...yeah, all that sort of stuff...how hard to blow and things for the dynamics, all of that. The whole time you are just trying to get the piece in your fingers, so you can get familiar with it. You have to be very focussed on what you are doing, and you can't just take it for granted. That leads to familiarising mistakes. If you watch it in rehearsal, you don't play in mistakes that you have to unlearn afterwards. So, that's why we have to pay attention to the tiniest things, like how your mouth sits on the mouthpiece (Fieldnotes).

Directing the players to notice the points at which their bodies intersect with instrument object is the primary activity in which the conductor engages in all rehearsals; as I have said, rehearsal playing is stopped every few minutes in order that the conductor can ask a particular band member, or the whole band, to "make sure you don't start your breath into your instrument until the trumpets have finished", or "what exactly are you doing with your tongue on that second note of bar 57?" Upon his direction, band members direct their self-conscious attentions to the points where particular parts of their bodies intersect with their instruments: the player's self-conscious attention is fully directed toward the point at which he or she finishes as a discrete and whole body, and where the instrument body begins as a body external to the boundary of the player's body.

As band members come to notice the points at which they end and at which instrument bodies begin, their directed self-attentions serve to place them as player subjects and their instruments as objects on opposite sides of a thick ontological divide that is maintained throughout the rehearsal period. The instrument in this case occurs next to or alongside or up against a player's body, and the player's body collides with it, moves against it, in bangs, strums, breaths and blows, light touches, heavy touches, tonguings, and lippings. Marking respiration and bringing respiratory activity, more usually a fundamentally and routinely unreflected upon activity into self-conscious attention, for example, marks the point at which the person begins and ends in relation to the instrument's body. As Katz notes on the more usual tacitness of respiratory behaviour:
No other ongoing bodily process so clearly and yet so invisibly challenges analytical or folk-cultural perspectives that would distinguish subjects, on the one hand, and their environments on the other...we cannot see a point in the respiratory cycle where the person ends and his or her surroundings begin (1999:340).

Band members describe this direction of their attentions to the points of the instruments with which they are intersecting, this separation from instrument object, as a "weird" and "strange" experience: "I can’t think of another time when I would pay that much attention to what my tongue is doing", laughed William, after we had discussed a rehearsal in which he had to pay his attention to his tongue touching the mouthpiece of his instrument for an extended period of time. Other band members, at other times, also described rehearsal periods as strange or weird, because they involved taking notice of fingers, lips, palms, even breaths, as these body parts and actions intersected with instruments. Performance times, however, are not experienced by band members as unusual periods of music making, but are instead experienced as far more “normal” or usual music making periods.

I suggest that rehearsal music making is considered strange and weird not because it is something that band members rarely do — they rehearse just as much, if not more, than they perform, and not because anything particularly strange or weird happens musically in rehearsals, but because performances are experienced by what Langer has called “habitual” bodies, while during rehearsal sessions, bodies are brought sharply into what he calls “present” bodily experience (1989:32)4.

Present bodies invite reflection and allow a person to discover their activity “in shaping the world as it is discovered through our perception” (Compton, 2001:4), while habitual bodies are unreflected upon bodies. David Abram describes habitual bodily being in terms of unrecognised reciprocity between person and world. Reciprocity is:

[The ongoing interchange between my body and the entities that surround it...a sort of silent conversation that I carry on with things, a continuous dialogue that

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4 I acknowledge here that Heidegger (1927) (1962) writes specifically about the very same kinds of experiences that I am talking about here; I refer in particular to his concept of ‘readiness to hand’, and the ways in which he uses familiarity and strangeness in his work. I have not drawn on Heidegger in this thesis, however, since I am specifically interested in Merdeau-Pontian phenomenology, his radicalisation of phenomenology, and where Sertes can take us from there.
unfolds far below my verbal awareness...an impoverished duet between my animal and the fluid, breathing landscape that it inhabits (1996:52-53).

Katz (1999) has described the ‘silent conversation’ or ‘impoverished duet’ that drivers carry on with their cars as they motor along. Katz argues that a driver becomes part of a car as he or she drives it, not routinely taking note of the point at which their foot ends and the accelerator pedal begins, so that the driver becomes something of an automobilised person (1999:41). What Katz means by this is that in the everyday experience of driving, the driver does not experience interaction with the car as a subject driver operating a distinctive car object; the two become inextricably intertwined as the manipulations made to machine occur below the self-conscious attention of the driver. Katz argues that the driver comes to inhabit what Langer has described as a ‘present body’ in those moments when he or she is forced to take notice of the points at which he or she is intersecting with the body of the car; during those moments, for example, when the driver must quickly brake to avoid a hazard. These moments, argues Katz, serve to yank drivers out of a previously taken for granted intertwinement with the body of the car.

Compton (2001) describes the invitation to reflection that gives rise to the present body when he tells of his twisted ankle. Compton describes a hypothetical situation in which he casts himself as a man hurrying to a meeting for which he is rather late. Trying to get to his meeting as soon as he can, Compton is apt “not to notice the details of those things around me. Instead of appearing to me clearly the things in my environment remain indistinct and undifferentiated from their background” (2001:4). Unreflexively engaged in this habitual walking project, Compton suddenly twists his ankle:

It now occurs to me that I cannot walk to my meeting in my habitual way as my ankle is swollen and tender. I find myself moving at a slower pace, painfully aware of my injury. The cracks and unevenness of the sidewalk do not interest me in the same way as before, for, if anything, they interest me much more. I quite literally do not experience the sidewalk, or the rest of the world for that matter, in the same way (2001:4).

Similarly, when band members rehearse, the terrains of instrument bodies interest them much more than they do during their more habitual performance experiences.
During my fieldwork with the police band members I found that during performances, band members carry on impoverished duets with instruments (although I shouldn’t think they’d like it if I said that they were carrying on impoverished duets — they only carry on the highest quality, most satisfying duets!), they inhabit habitual bodies that exist prior to reflection, they become part of instruments in the same way that a driver becomes part of a car so that they become, following Katz, trumpetised, saxohphonised, wholly instrumentalised people. This involves a habitual and routine crossing of the thick ontological rehearsal divide between object instruments and subject players that I describe in detail in the next chapter. In rehearsals, though, the manipulations that band members make at the point at which they meet instruments do not go unnoticed; instead, they are thoroughly noticed.

The invitation to reflection that ushers in band members’ present bodies during rehearsals is initially issued in the conductor’s authoritative commands to notice the points of intersection between instrument and band member. Band members then take up this invitation by obediently noticing the intersection points between themselves and instruments to which the conductor is directing their attention. Band members find this surveilling of their own bodily activity “weird” and “strange” because this is not a surveillance that ordinarily or ‘habitually’ takes place in everyday being in the world. Merleau-Ponty (1964) (1968) and Polanyi (1962, 1966) for example, argued that the individual must keep invisible or behind him or herself the points at which body intersects with the world. Polanyi argued that the points of intersection with any used object are not only routinely, but necessarily left outside of our self-conscious attention, in order for a person to engage in any activity — speaking, writing, playing an instrument — in a competent manner. As Katz notes of Polanyi’s illustration of this point:

In Polanyi’s language, each of our effective actions requires that we disattend our body as we act, focussing away from the point at which our body intersects with the world....in order to speak with an unbroken sense of natural coherence, one must engage unselfconsciously in a kind of singing that maintains a heard but unnoticed continuity of sound as the vehicle for enunciating individual words....in writing, for example, if you watch how your pen creates the form of each letter, you soon lose your train of thought and stop writing. In speaking, if you persist in attending to how you express the sounds you utter, your speech quickly loses coherence (1999:314).
In other words, for example, in the case of speech, paying attention to the point at which sound moves out of the body and into the world will not only sound weird, “it will undermine the speaker’s ability to speak anything but the enunciation project itself” (1999:41). The competent speaker must disattend the formation of his or her own speech and instead, speak through it.

Merleau-Ponty also pointed to the ways in which persons keep their points of intersection with the world well outside their self-conscious attentions in all conduct when he argued that actions in the world, such as seeing, hearing and so on, are in part visible not to the self but to the other. People see themselves not in what they can see of their own embodied action, but instead in what they see of others’ comportment:

As soon as we see other seers, we no longer have before us only the plate glass of the things with that feeble reflection, that phantom of ourselves they evoke by designating a place among themselves whence we see them: henceforth, through other eyes, we are for ourselves fully visible; that lacuna where...our back lie[s] is filled, filled still by the visible (Merleau-Ponty, [1964] 1968:143)

In other words, persons do not see their own vision seeing, or hear their own hearing hearing; they disattend the points at which their hearing and vision senses intersect with a sight or a sound in the world, and see or hear right through this intersection point to be preoccupied instead with seeing and listening.

The above examples point to the *habitualness*, and indeed the necessity, of disattending the points at which one intersects with a world that is ontologically or theoretically, but not experientially or practically, located externally to the person, and they point to the necessity of dwelling in objects in order to use them competently.

It is to precisely these points of intersection that band members are regularly required to direct their self-conscious attentions; they watch themselves interacting with the instrument body by doing things like visually examining the positions of their fingers on the instrument surface, and they ‘visualise’ the touches they make to instrument bodies that they can’t actually see, such as the ones they make with their tongues, and their finger-touches they can’t physically bend over to look at without compromising their ability to play correctly in other ways. Doing so is “weird” and “strange”
precisely because noticing the points at which one intersects with the world, or inhabiting a present body, is a very unroutine, unusual, and ‘strange’ way of being in the world.

As is evident in the remarks of Merleau-Ponty, Katz and Polanyi cited above, being presently embodied or in other words directing self-conscious attention to the points at which one intersects with the world, renders a person’s writing, speaking, hearing and seeing action incompetent. When band members direct self-conscious attention to the points at which they intersect with instrument objects, they too, in particular ways, or, more accurately, senses, become similarly incompetent.

I have said that band members, under the conductor’s authoritative guidance, subject their playing bodies to a kind of surveillance; a surveillance that is made at the intersection between their own bodies and the bodies of their instruments — for during rehearsals, band members are specifically interested in the ways in which their mouths, fingers, lips and palms interact with the instrument surface, because it is at this point that they search for error, for fault, and it is at this point that they seek to remedy errors, as will become clear as this thesis proceeds. As they engage in this self-surveillance, band members also place their own hearing under self-surveillance, and they do so in order to listen for the musical result of the highly reflected-upon touch they are making to the instrument’s body. As they watch their fingers pressing down on the instrument body, or as they ‘watch’ their tongues moving against the instrument mouthpiece, they simultaneously listen for the translation of that touch into audible sound. I elaborate on this in the fifth chapter, where I explain that each of these sounds is placed under hearing surveillance so that band members can examine each of their audibly translated touches to the instrument body for evidence of the instrument’s pain — pain that band members understand that they themselves have inflicted on their instruments.

As band members place their audibly translated touches under hearing surveillance, they say that they are unable to ‘hear’ the musical sounds that their instruments utter as a meaningful musical sentence. Instead, band members say that one note, or only one part of a note is:
all we can hear in rehearsals, you can’t hear, like the whole musical piece, you only listen for how it sounds, bit by tiny bit, and sometimes, you can only hear part of a single note, of that’s what we’re focussing on (Fieldnotes).

As they create musical sounds with their instruments, band members attend to the expression, to the shaping, of the musical words they produce, and as they attend to listening focusedly to these discrete sound shapes, they simultaneously and consequently disattend to listening to coherent strings of musical sounds that each of their musical shapes produces. The particular way in which band members shape rehearsal sounds is akin to the way in which Polanyi’s writer shapes the form of each discrete letter on a page, causing the writer to ‘lose his train of thought’. Similarly, band members, fixedly creating discrete shapes on the rehearsal ‘paper’ lose their train of musical thought, and are wholly unable to hear larger strings of musical words. Band members don’t hear strings of musical words during rehearsals, they hear tiny component ‘letter’ parts of them.

Rehearsal hearing seems to be of a similar kind to Serres’s “third” kind of hearing. Serres discusses ‘third’ hearing as a hearing that is astonished. He says:

[T]hings cry out. Often deaf to alien emissions, hearing is astonished by that which cries out without a name in no language (1998:141).

Instruments certainly produce alien noises during rehearsals that band members are not habitually used to hearing, and by this I mean that while instrument noises are not themselves alien, their tiny, minute component parts are, in the same way that talk is usual and routine, but listening to the letter shapes and forms of which it is minutely and mainly constituted renders conversation down to individually articulated words, or even to spelled out w,o,r,d,s. Hearing is usually deaf to the alien emissions or routine conversation, and it cries out in astonishment when it hears these tiny alien sounds. An example may assist at this point. Read out loud the following writing, precisely as it appears on the page, with a noticeable space between each letter: b r e a k i n g whole musical conversations into their individual words or even letters is a routine rehearsal exercise — in fact it characterises rehearsals — and this exercise renders an otherwise musically coherent sentence meaningless. It reduces it down to single crotchets, quavers, minim, rests, or even to parts of these
component parts. These component parts, or parts of these component parts, are, according to band members, “all we can hear in rehearsals”.

During rehearsals, band members disjoin routinely conjoined things. Attention is routinely focussed down to the smallest component ‘word’ part of the musical sentence: “we’re now looking at the minim in bar 50”, says the conductor with monotonous regularity. Attention is just as, or even more, regularly focussed down to a part of that minim: “let’s look at the dynamic at the end of the minim”, he’ll say. In this way, the span of the lived present is regularly reduced to a tiny, thin temporality in which one minim, one crotchet, one quaver exists, or part of these musical letters exists.

Husserl’s phenomenological understandings of time can be applied to the ways in which sounds are heard in rehearsal contexts. In The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness [1905] (1964) Husserl argues that the present is not a thin ‘now’ moment that moves consistently and forever forward, separating what is past from what will be future; “on the contrary”, notes Berger of Husserl’s basic insight:

> We live in the thickness of a living present in which the as yet-unfulfilled expectations of the near future and the just-past certainties of the recent past form an undivided whole...the anticipated near future and lived recent past exist simultaneously and constitute the lived reality of present experience (2000:126).

In Husserl’s terminology, experiences of the recent past that are incessantly experienced in the present are referred to as retentions, and anticipations of the near future existant in the lived present are called protensions (see Berger, 2000:126). Berger explains this work well, and so I will quote him at length here:

> As I read or hear one word, I am also simultaneously aware of the previous words spoken and have anticipations of the words to come...if we did not retain and portend...we could only be aware of the present word; complex sentence-level concepts would be an impossibility, because it is the experienced conjunction of words that is responsible for the lived meaning of sentences...It is only when each new word is conjoined with the retentions of the previous word and all are conjoined in the thickness of the lived and
experienced present that the meaning of the whole sentence emerges (2000:126-127).

Such conjoining only occurs for band members during performances. During rehearsals, band members listen to the weird, alien emissions, the tiniest bits that make up the sensical, routine, normal, whole. The strangeness, the *weirdness* of doing so speaks volumes about the livedness of time perception that Husserl wanted to capture in his phenomenological work, but band members speak the letters and words that appear in front of them on the musical transcript as exactly as they can; attending to the tiny, to the minute, to the things that we don’t even realise that we live, to that which must be ignored of we are to speak with what feels like competence, or coherence.

What band members don’t hear as coherent, others do. If someone comes to listen to a rehearsal, for example, they can still hear the music that band members are playing — they can hear whole musical sentences, even as band members themselves cannot. How can this be understood? How is it possible that what to band members sounds like tiny component parts of music sounds to audience members like music? Katz has said that if one becomes self-conscious about one’s own speech to the point of performing it precisely as it would appear on a paper transcript, with a noticeable space between each letter, “not only will it sound weird, it will undermine the speaker’s ability to speak anything but the enunciation project itself” (1994: 41). Even when they are playing three or four bars without stopping (which is usually as far as a rehearsal gets without the conductor stopping it) band members are still hearing it part by tiny part, but to me, these rehearsal playings sounded just like the corresponding performance bars.

These playings sounded different to band members than they did to me because band members concentrate so fixedly on ‘speaking’ or ‘shaping’ and on hearing, discrete musical sounds. It is the fact that band members attend to the making of sound shapes in this way that renders them different in rehearsal than they are in performance in band members’ perceptions. Even though band members themselves attend to the creation of musical shapes with their instrument ‘pens’, their musical ‘writings’ or ‘drawings’ are nevertheless comprehensible to the outsider; the band members’
writings or drawings are incomprehensible only to themselves. Musical sound-shapes, in other words, are the same in performance as they are in rehearsal. As I pointed out earlier, both Merleau-Ponty [1964] (1968) and Polanyi (1966) insisted that the individual’s daily actions of living in the world — in this case, musical ‘speech’ and hearing — must in part remain behind the self, must remain invisible to the self, must remain outside of reflexive self-awareness. When band members come to speak and hear the tiny component parts that make up the whole of their musical speech and hearing, that in a sense attend to the making of their own speech and to the hearing of their own hearing — they hear all of the tiny alien noises that habitual hearing consists of and they speak all of those tiny component ‘letter’ parts that habitual speaking consists of. These alien noises must remain behind the self, one must hear through one’s own hearing, speak past one’s own speaking for habitual hearing and speaking to make coherent sense at all. Nothing is really different in terms of the musical production in rehearsal and performance playings of the music in the sense that the rehearsal and performance sounds are not different sounds, and the players make these sounds by performing the same kinds of manipulations on instrument bodies. What does change, however, is the band members’ perceptions of these sounds, and these perceptions change according to the focus of the band members’ self-conscious attentions, which are engaged in self-surveillance of instrument-player body boundaries during rehearsals.

When they stop subjecting the manipulations on instrument body to their own surveillance, rehearsals move into a different phase and are marked as a different kind of process in the language that band members and the conductor use to describe them. The change of phase occurs when the conductor is satisfied that the rehearsal playing is technically correct. The conductor will usually say, “lets do it for real now”, or “this is a proper run through this time”. When this happens, band members talk about the playing experience in the same way that they talk about performance experience: they can hear the music as a coherent whole, they start to become habitually instrumentalised persons, a process I describe in the next chapter, and they begin to feel a release from the ‘rehearsal pain’ that I describe in chapter five.

A markedly different set of corporeal interactions with instruments occurs during performance periods. During performances, band members describe their corporeal
involvement with instruments in terms of inextricable intertwinenment, saying that the instrument “becomes part of me”, or that he or she is “part of the sound” or “part of the instrument”. These kinds of descriptions are not applied to rehearsal experiences of playing. Band members described the ways that, during performances, instruments came to constitute parts of their own bodies, and parts of their own bodies came to constitute instrument bodies. The ideas that most band members had about performances were typified in the following comment made by Erol, one of the band’s saxophonists:

When I perform, and this is the same for everyone, when you perform, you totally forget about thinking about pressing the keys down, or blowing through the mouthpiece, or any shit like that at all. The saxophone is part of me. It’s as though my fingers are made of the keys...and it’s like the saxophone starts in my throat, or down in my guts, or in my heart. You don’t go out there and fucking think about it, for fuck’s sake, you just fucking do it. You are your instrument out there [on stage]. You don’t think about your fingers pressing the keys. Your instrument is an extension of your arm...a good player doesn’t think about where his arm ends and his instrument begins. Saxes start in your throat; actually, below that, in your lungs: that’s where you breathe from, so that’s where it begins, but I can’t say exactly where (Fieldnotes).

Players very often talked about the ways in which the edges of their bodies, their fingertips, tongues, palms, feet, lips, disappeared from each of their self-conscious views during performances, and about the ways in which their instruments came to be, during performances, invasive of their own viscera. Instruments and their players are in performance corporeally intertwined; instruments not only invade the guts, heart, lungs or throat, for “an instrument is an extension of your arm”. A player’s fingers are indistinguishable from the wood or brass of the instrument’s body: they are part drum, or are part flute. A flute does not begin at the end of a player’s mouth, but begins below and beyond this point, at some unspecified point in the lungs, where the breath that sustains the instrument’s noisy life was first taken and expelled. As Katz suggests, the point at which the breath becomes part of the player and the point at which it ceases to be is also wholly indeterminable, except in rehearsal cases, where habitually unreflected upon breaths are stopped in their tracks by the bright surveillance lights that band members point at themselves. Player’s comments on the performance mode, including “the saxophone is an extension of my fingers”, and “the
"instrument starts in my lungs" are comments made about the sensual experience of performing which is ordinary and routine and habitual, and applies as much to playing a saxophone in performance as it does to my own typing of these words: each occasions and necessitates indirect consciousness for the playing or writing to make coherent senses to the player or the writer. This is a theme I will elaborate over the next two chapters.

If rehearsal periods are characterised by the fact that players are self-conscious of their physical contact with instruments, they are also and equally characterised by the lack of emotional input from players, and the lack of emotional output in the musical products of rehearsals according to players. Rehearsals are all about producing what band members call “the technical sound” in a physical sense, and equally, in an emotional sense. The technical elements of a piece that mark it as “sad”, for example, are not, according to players, capable of making a listener “feel emotional”. Rather, they indicate a potential for sadness, in the same way, as one band member put it, that a recipe indicates the potential for chocolate cake. The potential is not realised, the recipe is not ‘made’, the music will not be sad for those who hear it, according to band members, simply because it has been played according to the technical prescription given in the score. Band members found the notion that a rehearsal piece might contain ‘emotion’ laughable. Where a performed piece can “move someone emotionally when they hear it”, a rehearsal rendition of the same music “won’t work”, “doesn’t come alive”, “can’t live”, “is flat”, “falls flat”, flatlines”, “has no guts”, “has no strength”, “has no life”, “is cold”, and [finally] “dies” insofar as its emotional content is concerned. “Playing music that can move someone emotionally” is considered by band members to be “the whole point of music”; the point is, according to one band member, that it “touches someone else”:

That is, for a little while, we stop the clock for the listener. It segregates your life into a moment when you are living without thinking of time, and without the past and the future, and what it is you’re planning to on and everything. And if you bury yourself in a concert, you stop being aware of who you are and what race you are and what parentage you’re got, and what language and various other problems. I think the whole point of music exists because it is very much inspired, from our hearts… if you create something which is inspired it will have to anyone who is willing to notice it a great attraction (Fieldnotes).
Greta, a clarinettist and saxophonist in the band, wrote in a note to me:

I believe that the music we make when we perform should move the listener. Music is about emotion, and that is what our task as musicians is, and should be (Fieldnotes).

Band members were adamant about the distinction between the emotional qualities of performed pieces and their absence in rehearsal pieces, even when a rehearsal and a performance of the same piece sounded exactly the same to me. Band members said that they could not ‘hear’ the sad, happy, angry emotional qualities in the music being rehearsed because they were not concentrating on the content, but on the form of the musical production as they spoke and heard the music. As they concentrate on form — tiny component parts of the larger, meaningful, feelingful musical sentences, band members lose their train of feeling.

For the casual observer, nothing changes between rehearsal and performance musical productions, but for band members, there is a fundamental change. Their heard perceptions of the music change when they cease paying self-conscious attention to the physical touches that produce each of the minute musical components of the feelingful sentence, and when they stop listening for the translation of these touches in tiny sounds. It is because players themselves cannot hear the meaningful, feelingful content of entire musical sentences that they cannot fathom how others would hear it. When players attend to how they create the sound-forms of the musical notes with instruments by concentrating on the points at which they intersect with instruments to create sound forms, as indeed they do in rehearsal, they soon lose their train of feeling. If they persist in attending to how they express the musical sounds they make with their instruments, the musical sounds quickly lose affective coherence for the player.

This affective experience, however, is a markedly different one for players than it is for audiences because of the sensual corporeal engagement with instruments that band members have that audience members as listeners and viewers do not; something I discuss at length in the fifth chapter. Here I note that in performance experience, band members understand that audiences can hear this emotional content, but when band members say that performing music is for them highly emotional, it is not to the
sad, happy or angry emotional content of the music that they refer. Band members do not feel happy or sad or angry in line with the music. They feel instead a kind of ‘meta-emotion’, a kind of specifically performance related emotion that comes from turning into an instrument, from becoming an instrumentalised person that cannot be specified, or in band members’ understandings, trivialised, into specific emotion categories of sad or happy. This happens when band members cease paying self-conscious attention to the points at which they intersect with instrument. Only then can band members experience ‘the feel’, only then can band members turn into trumpets, only then can band members come to experience the meta-emotion that Serres has described in other contexts as ‘joy’. For band members, the emotional experience of performance — what they call ‘the feel’ occurs when they come to inhabit the bodies of their musical instruments, and when their musical instruments come to inhabit them. Emotional experience during performance, for band members, is an experience of joy or elation or ecstasy that arises from sensual extension, from self-exceeding, which is essentially what band members do during performance when they stop recognising the ends of their own bodies and the beginnings of instrument bodies. This sensual embodiment of their instrument objects and sounds is for band members ‘emotional’ experience, and it is emotional experience that is specifically performance-related, restricted to performers as opposed to the audience members, and is utterly joyful. I explore the ‘meta-emotion’ of performance joy (otherwise know as ‘the feel’) during the course of the following chapters.

Instruments are also treated very differently during rehearsal and performance periods. During the production of ‘the feel’, instruments are understood to stand as corporeally involved devices that form a direct chute or tube from the player’s heart direct the audience’s collective ear, and instruments guide and channel the player him or herself “out into the air”. During performances, instruments are spoken of as lovers, but more commonly, as parts of the player’s own body, specifically, those ‘internal’ parts of the body where emotion is often considered to reside: “my heart is in the sax”, “I just played what was inside my guts through the instrument”, “this sound comes from the inside of me, and out through my instrument — and that’s a part of me too”. Instruments are also imagined as parts of one’s soul, or one’s self: “that’s my soul, sliding down the tube”, “I put my soul [often times substituted for ‘self’] through the instrument and out into the air”. Instruments, during performance
times, are wholly indistinguishable from the player’s soul, and from the player’s body, which are also indistinguishable from each other. During rehearsals, in stark contrast, instruments are spoken about and handled as objects which have not permeated skin or soul. The notion that instruments did not constitute soul or self during performance was rejected outright by all but one of the band members, whose response drew icy criticism from the rest, who branded him a fine technician, but not a musician. To be called a musician, said one band member, “[the music] has got to get under your skin and into your soul. Anyone who’s competent can make sounds, but that ain’t music”.

Band members, then, during rehearsals, attempt to make their musical conduct fully visible to themselves, by way of disembodying it: instrument objects, in rehearsals, are no longer incorporated into bodies, but are held at objective distance away from them in order that form, not contact, can be worked on. This occurs in much the same way as one might go about improving one’s penmanship in the case of writing, or in improving elocutionary technique in the case of speaking. In each case, meaningful content is relegated to the dark spaces that technical form more usually occupies, behind the bright lights of self-conscious awareness. The ways in which band members talk about rehearsal experiences reflects this idea. It is of great significance, for example, that band members describe playing instruments in rehearsal periods as times during which they are preparing their instruments to get their instruments “under the fingers”, and that when a rehearsal has ended the instrument is said to have been successfully brought under the fingers”. ‘Under the fingers’ is a phrase used by band members to describe the unreflected upon playing of music, in which:

It’s like your fingers have their own brain — you actually don’t have to concentrate on putting them in the right spot, they kind of find their own way, and know what to do all by themselves. You don’t even see them doing it (Fieldnotes, my emphasis).

Sudnow (1978) has also described the manner in which the pianist’s hands contain unreflected upon kinds of knowledge — as do the proficient typists’ fingers, as do the driver’s hands and feet as they manipulate pedals and the steering wheel and gears as they drive, preoccupied with more pressing matters (Katz, 1994:41). The instrument encountered during rehearsal time is in no way ‘under’ the players’ fingers in the
sense that the fingers traverse the instrument body equipped with their own map or knowledge of its terrain; the instrument body in rehearsal, is located firmly, heavily and certainly next to and external to the player’s fingers, which are guided over the instrument body in the full glare of the player’s self-conscious attention. Something quite different is occurring when players say their instruments are “under the fingers”, which they invariably are in time for performance events. Performance events, in contrast to rehearsal events, occasion a kind of metaphysical merger between instrument and player in the sense that the points at which these two discrete parts are joined that are so much the focus of the self-conscious attentions during rehearsals are absolutely not noticed by the player. Instruments are ‘under the fingers’ during performances in the sense that, in the performing player’s lived experience, the instrument ‘naturally’ and unproblematically continues where the ends of the fingers (or tongues or palms) finish; instruments here continue and complete the player’s phenomenological body. The points at which the instrument and player meet are not seen by the player, but may be seen by others.

In rehearsal experience, the emotional, the joyful, experience of playing music is diminished and even lost for the band members, as is the recognition of the musical content as sad, happy, or angry; band members do not expect that audience members will be able to hear sadness, happiness or anger in the music during rehearsals. The band members experience an inability to hear the emotional content of the music as they withdraw and extract their bodies form the joyful intertwinement with instruments that is experienced during performances. This withdrawal, as I argue in the fifth chapter, is incredibly painful for band members. In performance, the process of producing technically correct sound forms is disattended as these actions return to the place beyond self-awareness, and the act of playing an instrument is suddenly joyful. In performance, players become part saxophone, part flute, part clarinet, part drum. The instruments that produce performance musics are now part finger, part foot, part tongue, part flesh. The end of a smooth, satiny clarinet body cannot be located by the player in performance, for this body and the player’s body blend seamlessly into one another, unproblematically crossing the ontological divide between subject and object that players, at the direction of the conductor, construct and enforce during rehearsal. Equally, they are part player heart, part player ‘soul’, and players say that parts of their souls are carried off in the sounds that their
instruments produce. Rather than simply musical sounds produced by recourse to various techniques applied to the instrument, these sounds are affectively full; they are heavily emotionalised acoustics. No attention is here given to how these sounds are corporeally produced, and the playing is fully—feelingfully, joyfully—coherent to players. Further, players believe that audience members can hear the emotion in the music—the happiness, the sadness, the anger, but not the joy. Not the joy, because joyful emotional experience and sensual corporeal experience are here firmly and tightly bound up together: emotion and the senses travel out from the body to become part of instrument together, in tandem; band members here become humanised trumpets, and trombonised players. This is an experience of embodied musicality which audience members do not have access to as listeners and viewers.

I now turn to the crossing of the rehearsal divide that separates instruments from players; a crossing which marks the end of pain and the beginning of joy.
CHAPTER FOUR
AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PERFORMANCE:
BECOMING AN INSTRUMENTALISED PERSON IN THE POLICE BAND

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I present and analyse performance periods. I have run the work of Michel Serres through the ethnography; in particular I draw on his 1998 work Les Cinq Sens, and the following chapter is the result. Serres’s point of departure in Les Cinq Sens is from Merleau-Ponty:

When I was young, I laughed a lot at Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception*. He opens it with these words: “At the outset of the study of the study of perception, we find in language the notion of sensation”. Isn’t this an exemplary introduction? A collection of examples in the same vein, so austere and meagre, inspire the descriptions that follow. From his window the author sees some tree, always in bloom; he huddles over his desk; now and again a red blotch appears—it’s a quote. What you can decipher in this book is a nice ethnology of city dwellers, who are hypertecnicalised, intellectualised, chained to their library chairs, and tragically stripped of any tangible experience. Lots of phenomenology and no sensation – everything via language... My book *Les Cinq Sens* cries out at the empire of signs. (Serres with Latour, 1995:131-2).

I said in the definition of phenomenology given in the introductory chapter that I, like Serres, would endeavour to describe the senses not one at a time, but as they occurred in the band members’ lived experiences: intertwined with one another. In this chapter, I have dealt with each sense in a separate section but, as I note in each of these, it is impossible for me to describe each sense in isolation. In each section, therefore, I have detailed the ways in which the sense I have privileged for the purpose of discussion is intertwined with each of the others in playing experience.

I argue in this chapter that the end of the surveillance of the body/instrument intersection that marks the end of rehearsals ushers in an entirely different experience of music for band members. Further, I want to argue that the absence of bodily/instrument surveillance is the key factor in the band members’ experiences of hearing music as a coherent whole, of turning into an instrument, and of becoming a whole band, as opposed to 36 individually rehearsing members. Although I leave a detailed discussion of the notion of performance joy until the next chapter, the end of rehearsal surveillance of the body is also centrally involved in the joy that band members say they experience
in playing outside of rehearsals. The end of rehearsal surveillance marks the point at which band members can hear the music, it marks the point at which they turn into instrumentalised people, it marks the end of a period that band members experience as pain and entrapment, it marks their formation into a whole band, and their entry into a period of seraphic pleasure or joy. These are the experiences of performance.

In this chapter and in chapter five, I draw on ethnography that contains the metaphors that band members used most to describe performing music, namely, making love and consuming food. I too use metaphors to describe music-making. The metaphors that band members used to describe their playing experiences, and that I use to describe their descriptions, have something in common. That is, the metaphors that band members use and that I use seek to articulate an underlying corporeal logic: each describes an unreflected upon, sensual corporeality of performing music. Each describes the merging of subject player and object instrument, a merging that occurs after players and their instruments have crossed a divide separating instrument object from player subject that is imposed during rehearsal periods. Something, though, makes the band members' metaphors so much more appropriate than the ones I have used to illuminate particular points — and these include driving, typing, and writing with a pen. As will become apparent during this chapter and the next one, the definitive thing about the metaphors that band members use is that they are penetrative. When one consumes food, or makes love, the boundaries of the body are crossed, and matter circulates around and about inside these boundaries. For band members, during performance experiences, instrument objects and instrument sounds penetrate them and become part of their own lived corporeality. For band members, metaphors of eating and making love are metaphors for not only being thoroughly intertwined with instrument objects (which as I argue in this chapter is an intertwinement effected by sensual extension) but also for emotional experience — that particularly performative emotional experience called ‘the feel’.

1 Other musicians have used similar metaphors to describe the experience of playing. Violinist Isaac Stern, for example, once said that playing the violin must be like making love — all or nothing.
Some orienting notes

In an “extension” of Abram’s (1996) ecological philosophy in the casino atmosphere, Felicia Campbell argues that the gambler enters an altered state in entering the seductive casino space, which “calls to him”. The gambler experiences “the slipping of ordinary perceptual boundaries and [moves] into the intensity of another reality”. This ‘other’ reality is one in which perceptual boundaries of time and linear space, and concepts of orderly linear timetables and traditional geography, are altered. Objects or, rather, the parts of objects that can be sensually apprehended — for no object is fully comprehended — seductively invite gamblers to focus their senses upon them (2000:119). These necessarily partial sensual perceptions of objects are characterised by the concept of reciprocity according to Abram, as I noted in the previous chapter:

[perception is] this reciprocity, the ongoing interchange between my body and the entities that surround it...[it is] an impoverished duet between my animal and the fluid, breathing landscape that it inhabits (1996:52-53).

Reciprocity between object and person, a give and take between person and environment or, in this case, particular kinds of communications between player and instrument, allows a person to create and to access spaces and times, whole realms of ‘other’ experience, which stand in stark contrast to the world outside the casino and, in this case, the rehearsal times, spaces and experiences that band members leave behind when they perform. Time, for example, is experienced in an entirely different way in the performance realm than in rehearsal experiences. Band members know that for audiences, clock time often slinks off, slouches in a corner and allows years to go by. It allows lifecycles to freewheel, it lets years happen in seconds, and it rushes headlong backwards as much as it lurches unexpectedly forwards. Band members themselves don’t recognise the structured, authoritative time that marches relentlessly forward counting off the beats in the bar, terrifying the notes into their proper places, as it does in rehearsals: 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4. This kind of rehearsal time constraint is heard by band members one beat at a time, rendering musical sentences to nonsense. Band members cannot hear a whole piece of music during rehearsals, only this note, then this note, then this note, occurring one after another in a continually occurring present temporality
which is preceded by nothing and followed by nothing. This kind of time is a beat-counting marcher that strides boldly and commandingly across the foreground of the player's experience of the played music, one step at a time.

In performances, however, musical sentences make sense to players, and notes are heard in relation to one another, in a meaningful sentence, as each recently past note and each near-future note is held and conjoined in a thick, lived musical present. Time never counts itself out loud to the attentive player, 1,2,3,4; 1,2,3,4 in performances. Spaces, too, lose the highly stable qualities that they possess during rehearsals. Ceilings peel back to allow players room for musical flight. "No one", said one band member, has their feet on the ground during performance, and no one is counting.

Performance and rehearsal periods are equal, yet markedly different, realities. As I argued in the previous chapter, performance times, however, are not experienced by band members as unusual periods of music making, but are instead experienced as far more 'normal' or usual music making periods. I have argued that this is the case because performances are experienced by what Langer (1989:32) has called "habitual" bodies, while during rehearsal sessions, bodies are brought sharply into what he calls "present" bodily experience; an experience which invites phenomenological reflection and allows a person to discover their activity in shaping the world as it is discovered through perception (see also Compton, 2001:4). Rehearsal and performance music makings are both periods during which band members have attuned or synchronised relations with instrument objects, and they are visual, physical, olfactory, kinaesthetic, auditory and tactile syntheses, bound together in a fusion of quasi-synaesthetic\(^2\)

\(^2\) According to the Macquarie Dictionary, synaesthesia is a sensation produced in one physical sense when a stimulus is applied to another sense, as when the hearing of a certain sound induces the visualisation of a certain colour. As a synaesthete myself, and having been part of a recent Monash University study into synaesthetic experience which allowed me access to the experiences of other synaesthetes, I have found that for myself and for many others, synaesthesia is best explained as experience in which the senses are "crossed over each other" or are "interwoven with each other". It is not unusual for me, or for other synaesthetic acquaintances of mine, to complain about the smell of someone's voice, or to exclaim upon the pleasing colour of a spoken or written word. I use this term within the confines of this thesis to refer to the sensually-crossed or interwoven experiences that band members have during rehearsals and performances in which one sense carries out the activity usually associated with another sense; i.e., band members often hear or see through touch sense. I use the term 'quasi-synaesthetic' to reflect the slight difference in band member experience as compared with the dictionary definition of synaesthesia, and to reflect that only about 2% of the entire population are considered 'true' synaesthetes. Having said this, I believe that all persons may be capable of synaesthetic experience to some degree -- musicians, for example, talk about the colour of sound, and common ways of articulating about everyday occurrences, such as meeting a person we might classify as 'cold', or finding the sound of a voice a particularly 'warm', may be more than simply metaphoric expressions relating two otherwise unrelated experiences.
experience. While experiences of instruments and their sounds are best characterised as ones in which the senses join together in complex knots — and I discuss the ways in which this is so for rehearsal in the next chapter — rehearsal and performance experiences are very different ones in other ways. In the case of rehearsals, band members are acutely aware of their role in constructing objects. In the performance case, players are not reflexively or in other words presently aware of the activity with which they perceive, and this makes for a vastly different set of experiences, including altered temporal experience and changed experiences of space.

**Performance Experience**

As I describe in the next chapter, band members have what they call “intense” performance experiences. These are experiences that Erol could only describe as “the most fucking amazing feeling in the world”, what Greta could only describe as “as good as great sex”, what Hamlin called “an overwhelming sense of love, a spiritual experience”, what Erin described as “being close to God”, and what many others described as “the greatest buzz that there is”. These are very different descriptions of playing than are rehearsal descriptions, and they describe performance and rehearsal experiences that to my ears sounded alike. I initially could not fathom what it was that made the performance and rehearsal experiences of playing music so dramatically different for band members. I was even more confused when band members began to talk about the ways in which they ‘became’ part of their instruments during performance. One day, when I was talking with the band’s vocalist, she said that she considered her voice to be her instrument. As I asked her in what ways her ‘voice instrument’ might be different to the ‘real instruments’ that other band members played on, Tina, a clarinet player, joined our conversation. Tina said:

Actually, when I perform, I kind of forget that I even have an instrument to play on, because it’s so much a part of me. It’s really a lot like singing, because when you sing you don’t have an instrument as such, you are the instrument. It’s not that different when you actually have an instrument, because you don’t see yourself as having an instrument *thing to play*, you just play it as if it’s your own voice (Fieldnotes).
“My sax”, said Erol, “is a living, breathing part of my own body. It’s inside of me, and the sounds it makes come from the inside of me. When you listen to me playing, I am the saxophone, it’s my own self I’m playing”.

When I heard these and many other band members say these things, I longed, just for a moment, to clear up the whole matter by fervently lurking in the wings as band members performed, camcorder in hand, hoping to catch a glimpse of the metal of the trumpet slowly creeping up the player’s fingers, or of the tuba turning to finger at the player’s Midas-like touch. In the next moment, I came to realise that what band members said sounded strange because they were articulating something so taken for granted, so routinely unreflected upon, so usually experienced, that it is hardly ever articulated outside the bounds of phenomenological work, except, of course, in metaphor. When players say that instruments become part of them and they become parts of instruments during performances, they are merely commenting on the sensual corporeal logic they encounter, as their fingers and tongues proceed beyond the point at which the tuba begins in the same way that the car driver’s foot routinely extends past the accelerator pedal and down onto the road. Band members don’t feel in performance the points at which their tongues and fingers meet instrument, but feel themselves extended into instrument.

As I suggested in the previous chapter, nothing really changes in terms of the physical production of music between rehearsals and performances, but what does change is band members’ sensual experiences of the music they are producing. More specifically, band members’ sensual experiences change between rehearsal and performance experiences; their experiences of musical sound, musical tastes, musical smells, and musical touches are all significantly different during rehearsal periods than they are in performance. The difference between the sensual experiences of rehearsal and the sensual experiences of performance is based on the ways in which band members direct self-attention to their bodies during rehearsals and abandon this practice during

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3 It seems that members of the police band are not the only ones to describe performance playing in these terms. On Radio National’s Arts Today program on October 12, 2001, a guest musician on the program talked about the ways in which, while on stage, he felt like a giant trumpet.

4 For example, Katz (1999) argues that metaphorical descriptions of being ‘cut off’ while driving reveal that the tacit embodiment of one’s car, or one’s car body, is what has been amputated.
performances. During performances, band members become inextricably sensually, corporeally intertwined with their instruments, so that their instruments come to complete the phenomenological bodies of band members. This sensual embodiment of musical conduct is the basis for the emotional — joyful — experience of performance playing.

While I argue that band members come to embody instruments and that instruments come to embody band members, I do not wish to suggest in making this argument that band members and instruments form a solid, definite, bounded instrumentalised person. Rather, following Serres, I wish to draw attention to the ways in which the bodies of band members become sites of non-sitedness. In performance contexts, band members extend themselves, their hearing, taste, olfactory and touch senses, out into instrument sounds, tastes, smells, and into the instrument bodies that they touch. Following Serres, I argue that the senses only become senses in the act of sensing, and that this act necessarily involves the movement of the senses beyond the site of the body and into that which is heard, tasted, smelt, and touched.

I have purposefully excluded vision from this list because, as I will explain during the course of this chapter, vision is the sense that band members use in rehearsals to surveil the actions of their own bodies as their bodies intersect with instruments, and it is the sense they use to limit and prohibit sensual experience out past the edges of the body. Here, vision ‘watches’ touches to instrument bodies, and ‘watches’ the consequent sounds that these touches produce. In this visually based surveillance of the body, band members hear their own hearing, attend to the mechanics of making speech and to the mechanics of hearing their own hearing — band members do not hear ‘past’ their hearing or speak past their hearing; instead of doing their hearing and speaking transparently, they hear the tiny component parts that make up habitual hearing — they hear, in other words, what is routinely and necessarily ignored in everyday habitual hearing. This means that hearing sense is stopped in its tracks by a ‘visual’ surveillance, and I speak of vision here not just as eye-seeing; I use it instead to refer to ‘watching’ hearing as it intersects with the instrument noise, and to the ‘watching’ of the tongue as it hits the mouthpiece, a watching that is done not with the eyes, but is instead accomplished through ‘watching’ or surveilling touches that band members cannot physically see. This surveillance prevents the senses from moving out beyond
the site of the body and instead traps them and holds them still at the point at which
they intersect with the instrument world.

I turn now to an examination of the senses in turn, but, as I explain throughout, the
senses defy organisation into neat distinct categories, and necessarily overlap one
another. The metaphors of space I included in the introductory remarks of this chapter,
in which band members float around in performance, and in which they are pinned
down and surveilled in rehearsal, provide context for the examination of the senses that
follows. These metaphors also provide context for the arguments advanced in the next
chapter, in which band members speak of a rehearsal hell of surveillance and a
performance heaven of freedom. These are spatial metaphors of embodiment that
convey a sense of the difference between performance and rehearsal experiences. In the
performance, band members’ senses extend beyond the site of the body, allowing the
body to exceed its site to inhabit that which is sensed. During rehearsals, the senses are
held more or less inside the body site. The metaphors of space that band members use
articulate a sensual corporeal logic of, in performance, sensual extension, and in
rehearsal, sensual contraction. Band members do, in other words, inhabit spaces beyond
the site of the body during performance, owing to the habitual capacity of the senses to
move out beyond the site of the body. Band members do inhabit a restricted space, the
space taken up by their own bodies, in rehearsal, during which the habitual capacity of
the senses to extend is held in check by the band members’ own surveillance of the
sensing body.

hearing
I argued in the previous chapter that band members always say that they cannot hear
music during rehearsals; they say instead that they can hear it only one discrete
musical sound at a time. In performance, however, band members speak musical
sentences with coherence, and have no trouble at all hearing the entire musical piece
as a series of meaningful sentences. It is not enough to say that raw, inchoate discrete
musical sounds, the building blocks of musical life or conversation, are now noises
transformed into music by an ear that now, in performance, hears them run together
and turns natural into cultural, alien into human, sound parts into words, and words

5 A Foucauldian take on this ethnography is not useful because his surveillance is 'eye-seeing' and not sensual or embodied
at all. I thank my colleague Megan Warn for pointing this out to me.
into conversation, as the habitual body takes over the present body. Hearing sense is made a sense only in the act of hearing, in travelling out of the body to inhabit noisy things, and travelling back to the body to deposit noise. Hearing travels out from the body to dwell in sound, and sound is incorporated into the hearer. Hearing, as Serres notes, constantly negotiates between raw sound and information, which is a transformation:

effected by the senses, or by the work of sensation, which, in turning raw stimulus into sensory information, also makes sense of the [hearing] sense (see Connor, 1999:4).

Hearing in effect, as Serres insists, is a naked faculty; a sense waiting for a project. In rehearsals, hearing certainly has a project, but it is astonished — it hears weird things in routine conversation, component parts that render musical conversation nonsensical. But in performance, hearing has a different kind of project, in which it settles down in noisy things and becomes itself. Here, it is not astonished, but instead, it is deafened — by itself! Connor (1999:6) describes this hearing as "autistic acoustics", suggesting that in performance, band members do their hearing transparently: hearing hears right through itself, being preoccupied instead with what is heard, not with the project of hearing, the project of hearing being focussed on the tiny, the alien, on that to which hearing must be deaf if we are to hear habitually, or in an everyday way, at all.

In rehearsal, hearing hears its own alien processes, it pays self-conscious attention to its own feedback loop, which has meant that hearing has, in a sense, stayed inside the body; here is a sense examining its own processes of sensing. Now, in performance, though, it is deaf to them; it has passed right through itself, and band members are doing their performance hearing transparently. Hearing now pays attention to that which is heard: it is a recently naked faculty that is now a sense with a project, a project which means that it must exceed itself in order to become itself. Hearing ceases to be located in the sited body; it exceeds the site of the body, and travels out from the body to dwell in what is heard. Players unproblematically say of performance hearing, "I am in the sounds", "that's me floating around in the notes". Their hearing is up there, floating around, dwelling in a noisy thing, and they are part sound, in the driver becomes part car as the driver's touch sense incorporates the
steering wheel into the body, at the same time as the touch sense exceeds the body site and travels out into the car and beyond to touch the road. Habitual hearing exceeds its own body site at the same time as it encompass the sounds and skins them up inside the player, making noise indiscreet from the self.

When hearing is understood in this way, the shattering of rehearsal geographies that I mentioned earlier in this chapter can be understood. When band members ‘skin up’ sound, when their hearing travels out from their bodies to dwell in instrument noise, the places where band members can exist change dramatically. Sound floats around in the air in rehearsals and in performances, but in rehearsals band members are highly aware of their own intersections with sounds that are suddenly outside of their own bodies. Attention snaps to the point at which person and sound disconnect as habitual hearing is replaced by present, alien hearing. Band members no longer hear with a natural competence, they hear weirdly, and are unable to complete any other hearing but the listening project itself. When band members skin this float factor up inside their bodies during performance, however, they can fly. Band members exist where their instrument sounds go and their talk about the places they go in performance might just as easily issue from the mouth of an astral traveller: “I float up in the air in the sound!!”, “That’s me in the notes, going directly to the audience ears”. Band members lift off from their rehearsally located positions next to instrument bodies and inside their own hearing, and float wherever their hearing-sense, extended through instrument sound, takes them. During rehearsals, band members “come down” from the air, like deflated balloons, and come to rest inside hearing and next to the instrument body, until both are next filled with airy sound.

touch
Even though I have just talked about hearing, I must say that I cannot really talk about the senses in playing experience one by one as if they each belonged within neat categories of touch, sound, vision and so forth. For touch is heavily implicated in the way that players’ hearing extends itself beyond itself. Touch cannot be separated from hearing sense, because it is touch to instrument body that produces sound. Like, and indeed at the same performance moment as hearing sense, touch sense reaches out to dwell in that which is touched.
Nor can touch be considered independently of ‘vision’. In rehearsal, touch is highly reflected upon, highly surveilled, watched. Players concentrate on how a tongue feels when it hits a mouthpiece, or how it feels when it buzzes against a mouthpiece. Band members watch their touches where they can, they peer down at the instrument to see their fingers traversing its surface to check technique, and when they can’t see their bodies moving against instrument bodies, they watch their bodies through touch. For example, the conductor will often ask a band member to “visualise” his or her tongue as she or he feels it hit the mouthpiece, and then to “visualise” it in the way the conductor visualises that it should be hitting. Here, skin is the boundary line, the border, between two bodies, one instrument, one human, that meet and touch, and for band members in rehearsal, the skin line maintains an impermeable integrity while it remains under constant and high visual surveillance, through eye-seeing and touch-seeing, as the fingers are watched with the eyes and the tongue and the finger that cannot be seen with the eye is watched through touch.

When touch to instrument body is not surveilled, as it is not during performance, band members come to inhabit instruments. During rehearsal times, no idea could be more ridiculous to band members than the idea that they come to inhabit their instruments. But, during performances, a player who doesn’t feel as though his or her instrument is part of their own body is “just not a musician — he or she would be a technician”. Players talk about their saxophones start, at no precise location, somewhere down in their guts, and how their trumpets start down in their lungs when they are performing. “My sax”, said Erol, “is a living, breathing part of my own body. It’s inside of me, and the sounds it makes come from the inside of me. When you listen to me playing, I am the saxophone, it’s my own self I’m playing”. “Is it like that in rehearsal, too?” I asked him. “No fucking way!” He exclaimed. He said:

How can it be? Playing an instrument in rehearsal and playing in performance is like the difference between practicing your lovemaking technique on a mannequin and actually getting caught up in the moment of making love to a woman. You aren’t two separate people, you’re one person. Anyone who is up there on stage practicing fucking a mannequin just has no fucking place in this band (Fieldnotes).
Hands, fingers, tongues, that are stopped in their tracks by the high rehearsal surveillance that patrols the dual skin boundary between instrument body and player body, subject and object, during performance skitter through the boundary, unobserved by the bright surveillance lights that are no longer pointed at the self. Here there is no divide between what is self and what is not self, between what is subject and what is object in the world. In performance experiences, bodies are, as Serres suggests, not experienced as subject organs or flesh parts that exist in distinctive separateness from objects. Asking, “what is a hand?” Serres answers himself:

It is not an organ, it is a faculty, a capacity for doing, for becoming a claw or paw, weapon, or compendium. It is a naked faculty. A faculty is not special, it is never specific, it is the possibility of doing something in general...our hands are that nakedness I find in gymnastics, that pure faculty, cleared up by exercise, by the asceticism of un-differentiation [1982] (1995:34-5).

Similarly, a band member’s hand or a tongue or a finger is no longer hand, tongue or finger when it habitually takes hold of or presses up against instrument; neither is the instrument simply, purely instrument:

The hand is no longer a hand when it has taken hold of the hammer, it is the hammer itself, it is no longer a hammer, it flies transparent, between the hammer and the nail, it disappears and dissolves, my own hand has long since taken flight in writing. The hand and thought, like one’s tongue, disappear in their determinations (Serres, [1982] 1982:34-35).

This is not to say that hands, fingers, tongues have no projects during rehearsals, only to say that the projects are weird; the projects are noticed. This makes rehearsal playing weird in the same way that writing with a pen would be weird if the writer attended to the shaping of each mark on the page instead of disattending the making of shapes to write meaningful strings of letters and words.

During performances, as Connor has argued in other contexts, “the body becomes itself...the body is the site of the non-site” (1999:8). Here, the body becomes trumpetised, saxophonised, flautised, trombonised, wholly instrumentalised as touch exceeds itself, as it travels outbound from the site of the body, and as it incorporates what is touched inside the self. As touch moves outbound, it inbounds the instrument
it touches: the instrument becomes *personalised* as it takes up the player, as its skin is invaded by probing fingers, mouths and tongues and breaths, and is its own skin stretches to accommodate the player who has come to dwell inside it. The player and the instrument are thus wrapped together as their own skins contain them, cover them over. These skins have no joining points, no seams; they are not stitched together, but are folded over and over each other, inseparable, like layer upon layer of wet tissue. Players unproblematically remark that they are part of instruments just as much as they remark that their instruments are part of them. When players say that instruments become part of them and they become parts of instruments during performances, they are, as I have said, merely commenting on the sensual corporeal logic they encounter, as they cross a rehearsally constructed and maintained divide between instrument objects and player subjects: a crossing that is routinely, habitually, ordinarily made in all kinds of everyday being in the world.

Band members describe performing music as the act of “giving out your self or your soul in sound”. This ‘soul’ is given out only in performance, and travels out of the player through the instrument, as the player becomes part of the instrument. The player becomes part of the instrument though touch to the instrument body, but only when touch to the instrument body is not subject to surveillance. Serres has recognised the relationship between soul and touch. “The soul”, argues Connor, citing Serres’s answer to the parody of the Cartesian question, “where is the soul?”, with which he begins his 1998 work *Le Cinq Sens*,

is located...in the contingencies of the body itself, and with its environment. The soul of the pilot of a ship extends coenesthetically into the whole of his vessel, just as the driver parking a car feels his fingertips extending all the way to his front bumper, and the amputee continues to occupy the empty space of their severed limb” (see Connor, 1999:2).

For Serres, the skin and touch signify a way of being amidst rather than standing before or in front of the world, and part of being amidst the world rather than before it is the continual routine ignoring of the points of intersection between the self and the world. Sudnow, in his 1978 work, *Ways Of The Hand*, for example, has marvelled at the way that his fingers punch out words on his typewriter keyboard or produce notes
on his piano keyboard without his assistance, and far beyond, or behind, his self-awareness. Should Sudnow watch his fingers as they typed or played, should the lover shine the bright light of self awareness down onto the necessary machinations of love-making, then typewriting, piano playing and sexual interaction would be vulnerable to breakdown. Lovers, typists and pianists are thus necessarily blind.

sight
Players are left metaphorically blind by the merger of two skins, instrument and human, that occurs during performances. During rehearsals, though, band members attempt to hold instruments in a condition of visual arrest: they subject their fingers, which perform pressing operations and manipulations on still instrument bodies, to high surveillance, they visualise their tongues and lips as they stab and buzz against the instrument mouthpiece, thus subjecting the parts of their bodies that they can’t actually see to a quasi-visual or touch-seen surveillance. This is unusual, or at least not habitual; as Serres argues, in traditional philosophy, the bearer of the look, or the viewer, remains motionless; the bearer:

sits down to look, through a window at the blossoming tree: a statue posed on affirmations and theses (1998:405).

Serres suggests instead that “we see things rarely in a condition of arrest”, and that viewing is not so much about looking and seeing objects as it is with voyaging or visiting them (1998:405): “The term “visit” and the verb “to visit” mean at first looking and seeing; “they add to it the idea of itinerary- the one who visits, goes to see” (1998: 334). This notion of vision, as Connor notes, is “vision on the move” (1999:8). This suggests that the body goes out of itself through sense, and comes to visit or dwell in what, in this case, is seen. Vision “surpasses its own position, [as the body] goes out from its role” (Serres, 1998:408-9). The player’s body goes out of its role in performance, but not through vision; band members are blinded, both in sight vision and in touch vision: all the surveillance equipment is shut off, and blindness is indeed necessary in order for band members to become their instruments: trumpets and their men depend on the cover of darkness, the absence of bright self-surveillance light, in order to become each other. As soon as the observant player starts to notice that his hands touch the trumpet body, the union is over, and it’s back to separate
lives. Turning their vision-sight and their touch-sight away, band members go blind while their bodies and instrument bodies take advantage of the darkness and join together like the bodies of two surreptitious lovers.

This metaphor of lovers goes further because band members do understand the bodies of their instruments as the bodies of lovers, and they often refer to them as familiar or long-time lovers. A lover knows intimately the terrain, the grooves, hillocks, valleys and rivers of his or her partner’s body, just as band members know intimately the bodies of their instrument lovers. Players assured me that if I were to confiscate every player’s personal instrument and place it with one hundred others which had been used for a similar period of time by their owners, each player would still be able to choose his or her own instrument from the line-up, blindfolded. Each would be able to do this, the players explained, because each player made uniquely individual marks on the body of the instrument during the course of playing it. These worn patches and grooves made by each player’s fingers would feel foreign to another, they tightness of looseness of keys would be remembered in fingers, the cradle groove created on the mouth piece created by years of individually administered mouth pressure would be remembered by each uniquely individual mouth. The marks that a player makes on his or her instrument’s body are marks that are not known visibly: I know every inch of my saxophone. I could tell you if it was mine or not with my eyes shut”. When a player takes up the instrument for performance, his or her fingers, mouth, tongue, nestle into the grooves. When a player rehearses, these familiar terrains are made strange and unfamiliar, in the same way that an often and unreflexively viewed street terrain is transformed from something onto which the feet habitually tread tacitly down to a jungle of cracks, lines and rocks that spring painfully up to the visual notice of the man with the twisted ankle, as he examines them for dangers to his injured limb. As the hand or the tongue touches the lover’s intimately known body, that hand or tongue becomes part of the other body that it touches. The touch, and not the sight, of familiar skins here brings about intermingling of the two touching bodies. Says Serres:

I do not like to speak of the place where my body exists as a milieu, preferring rather to say that things mingle among themselves… I mingle with the world that mingles itself in me. The skin intervenes in the things of the world and brings about their mingling (1998:97).
I do not think it is problematic that band members refer to the process of becoming instrumentalised, of becoming thoroughly sensually intertwined with their instruments, as akin to making love with a long time partner, and simultaneously refer to the process as one in which they ‘become’ themselves. As Erol noted of performance experience, “that’s me in the sounds”, “my sax is part of my own body, my own self”. As he also said, playing the sax in performance is a bit like making love to a woman. This, I submit, is not a case of mixed metaphors, for both describe the sensual corporeal logic of intertwinement. In both cases, should Erol watch the machinations of making love or intersecting with instrument, he would not be able to complete his phenomenological playing self, and his musical lovemaking would be vulnerable to breakdown. Whether he makes love or becomes himself in instrument playing is not the point; the point is that Erol articulates an unreflected upon, taken for granted sensual corporeal involvement with the world that is necessary for making both love and music. As Merleau-Ponty argues, ways of thinking about action in the world (cognito) and ways of doing or being in the world (practico) are inseparable; our views of the world are inextricably tied up with our embodiment of the world. As Merleau-Ponty puts it:

Our body, to the extent that it moves itself about, that is, to the extent that it is inseparable from a view of the world and is that view itself brought into existence, is the condition of possibility, not only of the geometrical synthesis, but of all expressive operations and all acquired views which constitute the cultural world ([1945]1962:388).

Our descriptions of the world, then, are tied up with our embodiment of it; when Erol describes making love and playing an instrument as becoming one with a partner and with an instrument respectively, these descriptions are based on his lived experience, just below his self-conscious awareness, of becoming corporeally and sensually one with a lover and with an instrument.

**taste and smell**

As players go blind and proceed to make loving musical unions with their instruments, their senses of musical smell and taste, absent during rehearsal, return heightened. In Serres’s work, odour is
The work of transformation, or transubstantiation, which Serres prefers to read through the action of cooking rather than alchemy, therefore not as refinement or purification, but as the work of combination or alloying substance (Connor, 1999:9).

Band members talk about the ways that musical instrument voices smell, and the ways that they taste. Taste and smell are not discussed as if they are ‘straight’ senses, but are sometimes infused with the way sounds look or feel tactiley, and are sometimes crossed over into one another: trumpet sounds, for example, are said to taste “like melted gold or platinum”. Flautists know that flute sounds are, as Lanier once said, “half song, half odour... as if a rose might somehow be a throat” (1877). Trumpeters know that trumpet sounds are strong, certain, arrogant, glorious, proud, clear, and yellow, and saxophone sounds ‘taste’ “like melted honey”.

These are olfactory and taste metaphors that band members use/describe experiences that are wholly absent during rehearsal experiences. During rehearsals, band members do not need to smell and taste the music in order to prepare technically correct musical dishes; here, sight and hearing are far more important, they are far more surveilling, and far less penetrative.

I move now, momentarily, from metaphors of melted honey to my own metaphors of food, in order to describe the difference between the kinds of emotional experiences of music that band members have and the kinds of emotional experiences of music that audience members have. Although I have said that the band members are kitchen staff to the conductor’s head chef, these kitchen staff are wholly wrapped up in the words of the musical recipe, and they are not involved with experiencing the musical ingredients as musical foods to be tasted and smelled as they are added. The precise construction of the musical dish is a technical construction, not an unreflexively experienced construction, and the musical dish may be seen, and may be heard, piece by tiny piece, but it is not heard, smelled, felt or tasted until performance time, during which band members feast on the musical food — food, which I have argued above, is not seen at all. The ingredients of the musical dish are for band members experienced in terms of their constitution, and band members add to a musical cake (which is for the audience
to eat) its constitutive component parts; the wheat flour of the timing, the emulsifier of the dynamics, the antioxidants of the tuning, the sugar of the key. The entire mixture never proceeds beyond lists of component ingredients of each part, and lists of musical ingredients for the whole dish, during rehearsal periods. The decadent musical cake that is advertised in drippingly edible terms on the cake box as a miserably sad musical cake, or a upliftingly happy one, that audience members consume, is for band members no more that flour, eggs, sugar, butter and cocoa, and the component parts of each of these ingredients.

Band members, for their part, eat a much more decadent cake. Having been denied their ‘natural’ urge to satisfy their (sensual) appetites, they gorge themselves on musical chocolate cake, inhale its rich freshly baked aroma, feel its rich creamy texture invade the insides of their bodies, and hear in the music the deep sighs of sensual hunger being satisfied. Band members don’t see the musical cake, for they eat it with their eyes closed, in ecstasy, in satisfaction, in sensual extension. Band members don’t taste the same miserably sad or uplifting musical cake that audience members do, for band members are experiencing in performance the taste of the senses being released from tightly reined in self surveillance; they experience sensual extension into the musical tasted, felt, heard, smelled – but not seen — chocolate cake of joy. This is so much more than happy, so much more than sad. This emotion is a meta-emotion; a joy of release, of sensual extension, that moves far beyond a single, nameable emotional state of sadness or happiness and into the realms of what band members have called “the best buzz ever”, and “as good as great sex”.

Serres’s work is again useful here. Serres refers to the Last Supper (among other banquets) in the ‘Tables’ section, dealing with taste and smell in Le Cinq Sens. Two bodies, or, rather, two sides of one body, emerge from the banquet. On the one hand is the body of the Assumption, “the body raised up in language”, which, as the result of linguistic petrifcation, is reduced to the condition of a statue or robot, and is no longer able to taste or smell; says Serres, “when it is saturated by the word, the body loses its antique graces”. On the other, and set against this linguistic body, is the body consumed at the Last Supper. This body circulates in the form of bread and wine, and is never
fixed but is, as Connor notes, "a mobile transubstantiation" (1999:8). The anosmia of the statue set against the transubstantiating body of Christ makes a nice metaphor for rehearsal and performance experiences, which are characterised by metaphorically anosmic bodies in the former case and by fully transformed bodies in the latter. In the case of band members, the rehearsal body is similarly musically linguistically petrified: this is the musical body raised up into language, this is the body grasped and made still, statue-like, rendered separate and beside, not within, the object world, the instruments, that are touched, seen, heard. This body is the subject to the objects of the instrument world. This body is one trapped under surveillance, watched, monitored. It is trapped as it follows the musical words on a page, and it has no more living fluency than a spoken enunciation project. This is a body made slave to the written sheet music that band members call the musical recipe. Rehearsal fingers don't dip in to taste the musical ingredients as they are added, for they are frozen rigidly to the instrument's side, unable to penetrate, unable to evade surveillance, unable to infiltrate. This is so because band members are keeping their senses under surveillance at the points at which they encounter instruments and their noises; the senses are kept, help, trapped, within the body site, and they are not allowed to extend to become their habitual selves. In performance, though, senses skitter outbound to become themselves. This transforms band members from sensually petrified statues into fleshy instruments, body instruments, living, habitual, trumpetised people, people wholly out of their body sites to become performing bodies. And, as I argue in the next chapter, the transformation is joyful.

BECOMING A BAND

This kind of sensual extension is important to band members not only in becoming performers, but also in making the whole band body. Band members say that in performances they play not as individual contributors to an entire musical piece, as they do in rehearsals, but instead as one single band body. I want to argue here that the formation of the single band body relies on every single band member releasing his or her own body from the surveillance of the intersection that they recognise at the edges of themselves and at the beginning of another player's body. The conductor's instruction to band members to recognise the intersection of their own and instrument bodies has not only the effect of making band members painfully aware of their own
edges in relation to instrument, but also ensures that they know their edges in relation to other band members. Nowhere is this more evident than in the rehearsal practice of marking respiration, and I draw here on the same pieces of ethnography I used in chapter three to demonstrate in that chapter the breaking of an intertwinement with instrument that is achieved through marking respiration:

The conductor stops the music, then addresses Gilbert and Lester, [the two tubists] and tells them that they both took a breath at the same time “in a hold” [a passage in the music that calls for a sustained note] and it “caused a gap”. Lester asks how long they are expected to play without breathing, and George tells them to not to breathe at the same time. A staggered breathing routine is then worked out, and Gilbert and Lester mark down on their sheet music the points at which they will breathe during the hold according to the conductor’s instruction. Gilbert is to breathe immediately before the hold, and Lester is to go into the hold from the previous note and is not to breathe until the first beat of the next bar. Both players are asked to notice their respiration habits as physical playing techniques and each is requested to notice the point at which their respective breaths are made, to ensure that the other knows when he should take his breath (Fieldnotes).

During a different rehearsal:

The members of the woodwind section meet to discuss which members will breathe in which musical location, so that all of the clarinet or saxophone line-up do not take a breath together, creating a “breath-gap” in the music. This is a complex project; each individual player has to be assigned a breath location within the musical terrain, and each has to remember to “be aware of when other people are going to breathe to make sure you don’t breathe at the same time as they are” (Fieldnotes).

In this chapter, I note of this rehearsal practice that marking respiration not only constitutes marking a break from the environment in which the person is necessarily involved. Marking it in relation to another’s respiration marks a point at which one person intersects with another; in the case above, the marked respiration highlights the point at which one person will stop acting and another will begin. Marking and keeping in self-conscious attention those taken for granted bodily practices, such as respiration, takes a body out of the collectivity in which it is more usually produced in the sense that bodies aware of their own respiration in relation to others are distinctly bounded bodies that border one another, but are not involved in one another’s construction.
Noticing the amount of space between persons is a more important rehearsal activity for marching band rehearsals. During my fieldwork, the band members were invited to give a marching display in Hobart, Tasmania, at the centenary celebrations of the Tasmania Police. The Drum Major drew up detailed plans in which all band members were represented as numbers on sheets of graph paper. A new sheet of graph paper showed the positions to which each numbered band member would move at each stage of the graph. Using this method, and hundreds of pieces of graph paper, the Drum Major was able to show each position that each band member would have to move into to form the final shape of a spaceship, which would be ‘marched’ into to the theme from *Star Wars*. When the Drum Major had completed his plans on paper, the band members were each issued a numbered bib and proceeded to practice moving into the various graph-lines, which were replaced by positions marked in chalk on the horse exercise ground adjacent to the bandrooms. After each band member had mastered the movements from position to position to achieve the various formations that the Drum Major had planned, and after each band member had mastered them again while playing the correct music on his or her instrument, band members concentrated on making their bodies move as one single body.

Of particular importance were the positions and movements of feet and legs in relation to other people and the amount of space between each person marching. In the early stages of rehearsal, the Drum Major went about bringing in to the self-conscious attentions of each band member the positions and movements of their feet and the standard distance that they were failing to maintain between themselves as they moved from graph position to graph position. The Drum Major insisted that each band member pay particular attention to each of his or her feet in relation to the footfalls of those marching close by. Band members were instructed to coordinate their footfalls with those of others so that they occurred at precisely the same moment. Band members were also instructed to pay particular attention to the amount of space between each of their bodies, so that each body was precisely the same distance away from the next.

For many months, these activities were highly reflected upon activities; no band member was allowed by the Drum Major to ‘forget’ the position of his or her feet or his or her position in space vis a vis each other band member. Similarly, in rehearsal
experience, each band member for the entire rehearsal is ‘not allowed’ by the conductor to forget his or her own breathing vis a vis other, lest ‘breath holes’ appear in the musical production.

‘Breath holes’, out of step footfalls and the failure to maintain a prescribed, exact amount of space between self and other are each the products of unreflected upon breathing, walking and being together in space. While band members were concentrating on breathing, walking and spacing, they did not believe that the band was yet a band; rather, they believed that each individual band member was contributing his or her own contribution to the entire performance piece under rehearsal. The band was formed, in their understanding, when each member stopped contributing his or her individual part and when all instead performed “as one body”.

To the outside observer, ‘one’ band body is formed of many discrete individual bodies when each body moves in its space in almost-perfect unison with each other body; one can see well, for example, that each set of feet move as though they were all attached to one single string manipulated by a skilled puppeteer. While the band members still focus on the movements of their own feet, and while they focus on the feet of others to guide the movements of their own feet, the band is not understood to be a single body moving in unison, although from an outsider’s perspective it may well be. Watching one’s own feet as they move and watching the feet of others to guide one’s own foot movement each indicate a withdrawal from one’s incorporation of the world; in the former case, the attention to footfalls draws attention to a region of the body that was before rehearsal and is during performance tacitly employed to maintain routine conduct. The band is made into a single body when, as one band member put it:

you don’t think about where you are going to put your feet anymore, or how far someone is away from you in feet and inches. Everyone moves at the same moment- it’s quite mind-blowing actually, as if you were being directed by some kind of higher force.

Descriptions like ‘higher force’ point to the almost Pentecostal zeal with which band members move from being individual players to being a band, and it is the shared nature of the transformation that is of most importance. The band body is constructed in the unreflexive interplay of conduct with others, a condition which is achieved
when attention is no longer paid to each individual’s own bodily behaviour as that bodily behaviour is carried out. As theorists such as Katz (1999), Collins (1981) and Lyon and Barbalet (1994) have argued, individual bodies are in everyday life, extended to include their social relations. Collins has said that for participants in social life, “social order must be necessarily physical and local”, and that the physical world includes “everyone’s own body” (1981:995). Lyon and Barbalet add to this, noting that, “by extension, social order pertains to the other bodies which are in some relation with one’s own”. Katz argues that the collective or social body is one “constructed in the ongoing interplay of conduct with others” (Katz, 1999:341). This ongoing interplay of conduct with others is an unreflected upon interplay, in which one does not routinely reflexively examine one’s breath so that it will not make a breath-hole in an everyday conversation, and in which one does not ensure that one’s feet fall in precise step with another’s by self-consciously monitoring walking. Band members, in performing, in not self-consciously reflecting on where they end and where others begin, come to include and be included in the bodily being of others — where there is not an expectation that one will have to wait until the other has released his breath until one can draw one’s own. For participants in performance, the body is not one’s own possession, but is part of a larger collective body which is itself made in the ongoing unreflected upon habitual interplay of conduct with others6.

Forming the single band body is also a necessary condition for experiencing the bodily joy of sensual extension that I will discuss in the next chapter because the sensual extension out of the body site that the experience of joy is contingent upon relies on the effacement of the individual body; that is, the experience of joy is conditional on the individual player not noticing his or her body as in acts in the world. Bodily joy, as Serres argues, is the result of the body travelling out from its site, or is, in Katz’s language, entirely backgrounded or invisible, or is, in Merleau-Ponty’s language, effaced, or is in Polanyi’s language, disattended. The band body is similarly constructed as a result of the outbound travel, the backgrounding, the invisibility, the effacement, the disattendance, the absence of individual contributing bodies, but that is not all. The erasure of the individual is a consequence of the sensual

6 Perhaps I should be a little more reluctant to characterise the band members’ activities with very everyday, unreflected upon walking and talking, since band members do practice routinely practice that which is routinely unpractised for most of us: walking, breathing, and so forth. It is perhaps the case that this practicing makes a difference.
extension that band members experience into one another; just as a player disattends his or her trumpet and consequently turns into one, so too do band members extend into one another. It is then, and only then, that band bodies achieve a social ontology through which the band is created.

Instrumentalised people are made in the ongoing unreflected upon interaction with instrument bodies, the whole band is made in ongoing unreflected upon interaction with other band members’ bodies. These habitual conditions occur in the absence of subject-object distinctions between persons and instruments and between persons and persons. The habitual conditions of instrumentalisation and of collectivisation are conditions in which the body moves out of its site through sensual extension — the body is the site of the non-site — as band bodies move sensually out to inhabit trumpets and each other. When band members talk about the joy of experience, it is to the joy of sensual extension that they refer. Nothing is so close to God, so like orgasm, so “fucking unbelievable” than turning into an instrument, an instrument which is a component part of one giant, orgasmic, heavenly instrument called the performing South Australian Police Band.
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I tell of the screams, yelps, shrieks and wails that instrument bodies emit during rehearsals, and of their aches, their pains, their hurt, injured bodies. Players use metaphors of screaming, shrieking instruments during rehearsals, during which time instruments often scream out their pain to the players who have hurt them. Players, guilty of assault, experience a pain that comes from the knowledge that they have inflicted pain on the bodies of their beloveds. It is through both inflicting and experiencing pain that band members acquire musical knowledge or wisdom. Specifically, it is through the instrument’s articulated pain that band members recognise their faulted touches to instrument bodies. I tell also of the amazing buzz, the orgasmic, the heavenly, joy that comes from being one with one’s instrument during performances.

Rehearsals, as I have said throughout, are experiences that the band members describe as devoid of emotion, in terms both of the music produced carrying some emotional quality that audience members might pick up on, and in terms of their own experience of the musical production. What then, is the rehearsal pain I have described above if not emotion? It is very important that band members describe painful rehearsals as emotionless, and further, it provides real insight into the definition of emotion that band members use. Band members understand that ‘emotion’ is an experience that occurs only in performance, under the circumstances of sensual extension. During rehearsals, the senses are surveilled, and sensual extension does not ensue. Thus, for band members, rehearsals are emotionless because they do not involve sensual extension, even though they involve a good deal of pain. Emotional experience then, for band members, is a very specific experience that occurs during sensual extension. This occurs during performances, when band members cease vigilant surveillance of the boundary between self and instrument.

Performances are emotionful experiences, during which band members say that that they are “all feeling”, and that they have “forgotten all that technical shit”. Performance music is also said to have ‘feel’, and has capacity to emotionally “move
people” who are listening to it. In this section of the chapter, I extend one of the preliminary arguments I made in the previous chapter: that the emotions that audience members and band members feel are not necessarily the same. Here I begin from the position that for band members, ‘emotional’ experience during performance comes from a particular kind of sensual corporeal condition that is achieved in performance, which audience members, as non-players, do not have access to.

**SOME NOTES ON CONCEPTIONS OF PAIN AND JOY: NIETZSCHE AND SERRES**

Nietzsche (1967, [1887] 1974) and Serres (1998) have respectively described the notions of ‘pain’ and ‘joy’ which each argues are part of the unreflected upon experience of everyday living. Here, I give a brief description of where the arguments made in this chapter fit in relation to the positions of these two theoreticians. In short, I argue here that Nietzsche’s concept of pain is close to what Serres would describe as joy, and that Nietzsche’s pain bears no resemblance to what band members describe as rehearsal pain. I have written about Nietzsche’s concept of pain here because it serves to describe what rehearsal pain is not, thus helping to define what it is.

I argue in this chapter that band members’ rehearsal pain and performance joy are related respectively to the reigning-in of sensuous experience to the points at which the senses intersect with the world, and to sensuous extension or the escaping of the senses from the site of the body. I argue here that if performance is, as band members say, “heavenly; then rehearsals are hellish; but in order for band members to enter performance heaven, they must first proceed through rehearsal hell. This is because rehearsals are periods in which band members learn, through the direction of attention to the acting self, the activities of music production that they will later ‘forget’, or rather, that will later proceed below the self-conscious attentions of players during performances.

Nietzsche has argued, “the path to one’s heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one’s hell” [1887] (1974:269). In the case at hand, performance might be considered a player’s heaven, and rehearsals might be considered a kind of hell, but certainly not a voluptuous one. The word ‘voluptuous’ is very important in Nietzsche’s concept of ‘hell’, because it gives an insight into what he meant by the term. Nietzsche’s concept of ‘hell’ is informed by his notion of pain or suffering. He
argued that pain, or suffering, is necessary and inevitable. Nietzsche argued that pain and suffering are experiences of living, of life itself. Pained or suffered experience is an experience of ‘voluptuousness’, a term which, according to the Macquarie Dictionary, refers to sensuous fulfilment or sensual enjoyment — enjoyment or fulfilment of the senses. There is evidence to suggest that Nietzsche envisaged ‘voluptuous suffering’ as an experience that is based on the sensuous experience of the world that occurs in everyday being in and through the world. He argued, for example, that suffering is “primal and eternal, the sole ground of the world”, that entire existence rests “on a hidden substratum of suffering” and that pain and suffering occur in the initial physicality of life (1967:45). These descriptions hint at the unreflected upon nature of experiences of pain and suffering, a hint made stronger when he argued that our “profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone” (1974:269). These descriptions suggest that experiences of pain and suffering are experiences of being in the world as one unreflexively, unselfconsciously, routinely, corporeally and sensually engages with it. The process of suffering that Nietzsche envisaged, I submit, is one that routinely occurs underneath, below, reflexive self-awareness. Nietzsche’s conception of pain, then, is almost the opposite to what band members describe as pain, for band members’ pain ensues when band members are all too reflexive during rehearsal periods.

Nietzsche also argued that it is through experiences of pain and suffering that we gain knowledge or wisdom: in short, we learn through pain. Again, this can be understood to refer to a kind of unreflected upon knowledge or wisdom, for Nietzsche argued that as soon as one tries to articulate experiences of pain in language, as soon as one condenses feeling into images, as soon as one attempts to make clear or understandable the world, as soon as one removes pained experience from its initial physicality, wisdom or knowledge can no longer be experienced. As Hawke argues of Nietzsche’s position on wisdom:

One could speak of the fact that Nietzsche did not want to veil life’s sufferings...but to say this in language cannot bring any wisdom unless one has EXPERIENCED suffering. The language cannot give you the experience. It is a secondary experience, removed from all initial physicality. I can describe feeling/dancing/music through prose or poetry, but that brings no wisdom to the reader...let me live it...Feel it. Play it. Dance it, Scream it (1996:3, emphasis in original).
Nietzsche’s wisdom, then, is one experienced in the midst of pain — the midst of unreflected upon living. Band members’ pain, in stark contrast, is experienced in the midst of highly reflected upon rehearsal practice.

I will argue in this chapter that rehearsals are both experiences of hellish pain and experiences of pain that lead to wisdom or knowledge, but they are not voluptuously hellish in the sense that unreflected upon experiences of the world do not there occur. Rehearsals are periods in which voluptuousness — sensuous fulfilment — is entirely absent; what is present instead is a tight reigning in of the senses so that they cannot fulfil what Serres (1998) intimates are their natural longing to extend beyond the body site.

I also argue that rehearsals involve a learning through a pain that is, in Hawke’s terms, ‘secondary’ and removed from unreflected upon initial physicality. Like Nietzsche, Serres also speaks of language as a kind of secondary experience; like Nietzsche, he argues that when experience is translated into language, we can no longer capture lived experience. Where Nietzsche argued that the unreflected upon living of everyday life is an experience of suffering or pain, however, Serres argues that the unreflected upon living of everyday life is a kind of joy. Serres understands that when the senses skitter out of the body site, they allow a person to experience the simple, unreflected upon joy of being sensually extended into the world — an experience which he argues accounts for the human fascination with the trampoline, and for the exhilarating rough and tumble of the rugby match. Language, says Serres, in seeking to pin down sensual corporeal lived action, to render it understandable, to capture it, renders the body statue-like, unable to move, unable to experience. To pin down or trap sensuous experience in language is to linguistically petrify the body, it is to reduce it to the condition of a non-sensing statue or robot. For both of these theorists, everyday life is rendered still and frozen by language, which cannot communicate the experience of living in the world. I argue herein that rehearsals linguistically petrify the body in the sense that the body is rendered still by self-surveillance. This is what band members refer to as rehearsal ‘pain’.
Rehearsals can be understood to be a kind of language in the sense that players participating in them seek to describe to themselves the actions that they make in the world. This renders the senses trapped within the body site, unable to escape into the freedom of unreflected upon instrument playing. According to the theories developed by both Nietzsche and Serres, band members are attempting to render still lived experience of the world. This, as I explain during the course of this chapter, is at the root of the pain that band members experience during rehearsals. I argue in this chapter that sensual unfulfilment is the source of the rehearsing band member’s pain or suffering: his or her pain comes from the act of keeping the senses within the body-site. Rehearsal periods are not experiences of unreflected upon suffering or pain suffered in the course of being in the world, but are instead secondary experiences, in the sense that band members seek to describe, to know, their intersections with instruments. In this sense, rehearsals are a kind of description of everyday habitual living, removed, by highly self-conscious awareness of action, from habitual lived experience. Rehearsal pain, then, is closer to Nietzsche’s concept of the secondary experience of language than it is to his conception of pain, and it is closer to Serres’s image of Condillac’s statue than it is to his conception of unreflected upon being in the world.

The rehearsal pain that I describe in this chapter is close to Compton’s use of pain, which itself is based on David Abram’s (1996) insights into sensuous experience and perception. This pain is one that ushers in the present body. As I describe later in the chapter, Compton (2001) argues that the present body, that body that invites reflection and makes us see our activity in shaping the world, is ushered in during experiences of pain, loss, injury or incapacity. Rehearsals are just such situations, for band members experience their own bodies as injured and incapacitated bodies when they hold in their self-conscious attentions their touches and their hearings of musical instrument sounds. During rehearsals, band members learn through pain. Keeping the points at which their bodies intersect with instrument well inside their self-conscious attentions, in, in other words, preventing their senses from skittering out beyond the body site in which self-surveillance traps them, involves for band members the recognition of their bodies as pained or incapacitated. In making this recognition, band members are able to acquire wisdom about their actions in relation to the instrument world. Band members, for example, learn correct techniques of
musical production in and through surveilling their touches to instrument bodies, and in and through surveilling the musical sounds that these touches produce. During rehearsals, these touches are known by band members to be made by their own incapacitated or injured body parts, which are also capable of injuring and incapacitating instrument sounds. Band members learn correct touches to instruments by directing self-conscious attention to those touches, and they learn about correct touches to instrument bodies by surveilling the sounds that touch produces. Band members listen note by note, touch by touch, to the cries of the instrument; these cries, yelps, shrieks and squeals tell band members about their injuring touches. If instruments cry, shriek, moan or wail, band members know that their own injuring touches to instrument bodies produced the instrument’s pain.

REHEARSAL PAIN AND PERFORMANCE JOY

As I sat, perched in my plastic chair off to the side of the rehearsal area one afternoon early in my fieldwork, I noticed that when the conductor called a halt to the music, he often made comments to players about the noises that their instruments were making. During the rehearsal session that I was observing, the conductor said to Helen, “your clarinet is squealing”. He told Phillipa that her instrument sounded as though it was “in great pain- can’t you hear it shrieking?”, and he commented that one of the drum kits sounded as though it might have a headache, and that it was also giving him a headache. The conductor called a halt to rehearsal playing when he heard these squeals and shrieks that indicated the pain of the instrument. Throughout my fieldwork, I also noticed that, after he had exclaimed that an instrument seemed to be in pain, the conductor drew attention to the band member’s faulted touch to the instrument’s body, and as he did so, he would often ask players whether they couldn’t also hear the shrieks and squeals that their instruments were emitting. Then, he would issue instructions to band members about the ways in which they should touch their instruments in order to make instruments produce less ‘pained’ sounds.

These kinds of comments were ones that the conductor made very often during rehearsal periods, and the particular order in which he made them is, I submit, important to an understanding of the ways in which band members come to inhabit ‘present bodies’ during rehearsals. During rehearsal sessions, the conductor repeatedly draws attention to the player’s body as it intersects with instrument body,
as I explained in the previous chapters. The conductor routinely says things like, “your tongue is the problem, it’s too stiff and hard”, or “Don’t blow so hard. I feel like telling you to suck rather than blow, because it’s so hard”. In telling players things like this, technically incorrect contact with the instrument by a player’s body part is constructed as a fault or incapacity of that body part. As the conductor instructs the players to note the points at which their bodies meet with instrument he does so by asking band members to recognise that their bodies are incapacitated or injured — he asks band members to recognise that their tongues are injured in the sense that they are not ‘well’ or in a fit form to produce the right sounds in their current hard, ready-to-stab forms. He asks them to recognise that their breaths rale abnormally, rendering their respiratory murmurs harsh and rattly, like one beset by pulmonary disease. Breaths here do not have the capacity to produce the right sounds in their current harsh forms. In this sense, tongues and breaths are incapacitated; they are not good, not fit, not well enough, for technically correct musical production.

In requiring players to notice their actions against instrument bodies as injured or incapacitated actions, the conductor invites players to engage in reflection. The conductor here, with commanding authoritative words, makes players aware of their injured bodies, their sharp, stabbing, incapacitated tongues, their harsh, heavy ill breathing, and in so doing lays the foundations for present experiences of instrument playing. Compton (2001:4) argues that the kind of invitation to reflexivity that ushers in the present body is issued in situations of bodily impingement or incapacity or loss or pain or injury, and rehearsals are just such situations. Players effectively respond to the conductor’s news by becoming suddenly and painfully aware of their injuries and incapacities, and it occurs to them that they can no longer play the instrument in the ways they habitually do, when their uninjured tongues and their healthy backgrounded breaths unreflexively engage with familiar instrument bodies. This recognition ushers in the present body, because to make touches to instrument bodies capacitous and correct, band members are required to hold these touches under self-surveillance, a surveillance which allows band members to discover their activity in shaping the world as it is discovered through their perception (Compton, 2001:4). It is of interest that Levy (1984:401-2) notes that the talk surrounding a pained or incapacitated part of the body indicates that that part of the body has come into the possession of the self and is fully owned by the self. “My ankle hurts”, for instance, indicates that the ankle
is ‘mine’. In the same way, in rehearsal periods, the pained finger, the incapacitated tongue becomes the player’s own possession, and is no longer part of the instrument objects that the player’s body more usually, habitually, incorporates.

Band members come to notice the point at which their bodies intersect with instruments, or in other words come to inhabit present bodies, not only through recognising their touches to instrument bodies as touches made by incapacitated, injured, tongues and breaths, which they seek to make capacitous and correct, well and unpained. Band members also of know their incapacitous injured bodies through the sounds that their instruments make. As I suggested in the last chapter, it is not possible to speak of touch to instrument bodies independently of sound and hearing. Skin to skin contact between player and instrument and musical sounds are mutually implicated here; the faulted contact with instrument, caused by an injured or incapacitated body part, produces faulted sounds, and not only faulted sounds; injured, pained, hurt sounds. If conductors get players to notice incapacitated tongues, then instruments also cry out as a result of having been injured by an incapacitated tongue, and it is in fact through these pained instrument cries that conductors recognise a faulted touch administered by an injured tongue: the injured tongue also injures the instrument. Conductors listen for instrument moans, instrument cries, yelps from the trumpets, screams from the flutes, squeaks from the clarinets and evidences of aches and pains in the drum and tuba bodies, and these very words are employed by band members to describe the audible results of faulted touches, made by injured or incapacitated parts of their own bodies.

Players, told of their mistreatment, their abuse of the instrument bodies that are wholly dependent on them for their musical lives, adjust their touches, rein their pained and pain inflicting hands and fingers in, discipline their hurt and hurting tongues that flick too hard on the mouth piece, causing the instrument to squeak with pain, and place them under the surveillance of their own self-conscious gazes. Their own injured, guilty hands, not themselves well enough to be trusted to treat the instrument well, are watched, disciplined, surveilled. As I have said, hands can be watched, but tongues are watched through touch, as players ‘watch’ how their tongues hit the mouthpiece by paying particular attention to the movement that their tongues are making on the mouthpiece. Players, however, via the conductor, know the
instrument’s pain audibly, and through sound are able to trace injurious touches to instruments inflicted by their own injured bodies. Having been made aware of ‘injured’ sounds by the conductor, players come to place these sounds under their surveillance, as I described in the previous chapter. Touch, in this way, is filtered, known, through hearing sense: players know about their touches to instrument bodies via the information that sound gives. Players are instructed by the conductor to notice their touches to instrument bodies, but they are also instructed to simultaneously notice the instrument’s pleading voice as it begs for the player to stop hitting it, to allow it to shout, or to reduce its loud, pained noise to the satisfied moans of one well-treated. The screams of pain that an instrument makes in discordant notes, or the pleadings it makes in sound to be touched more firmly occur to players at the same time that they feel their fingers pushing down on the keys that make instruments speak to them. This is akin to the medical practitioner’s press on the patient’s stomach, as she listens for the patient’s response at the same time that she feels the rigidity of the abdomen wall as it curls up in pain at the touch-pressure. Both medical practitioner and player are tuned in, touch and sound-wise, to the body they manipulate as they enquire, “Does it hurt you when I do this?”

Rehearsals are also described in terms of pain by players when they talk about the rehearsal processes of surveillance. The rehearsing body is held writhing and twisting in the grip of self-conscious rehearsal surveillance by band members themselves, but band members themselves have trouble keeping their bodies under rehearsal surveillance. It is troublesome for them to do so because the body seeks always to free itself; it seeks always to return to its habitual engagement with the world — an engagement characterised by sensual corporeal extension into the objects of the world by which it is surrounded, and in which it is usually thoroughly implicated. Band bodies sought to escape from the rehearsal surveillance that kept it imprisoned in its own site. During marching band rehearsals, for example, every time the band members marched along while practicing marching displays without paying attention to their feet, or in other words, when their footfalls fell habitually onto the ground, the Drum Major would redirect flagging self-attentions back on to feet. This occurred in precisely the same way that rehearsal experiences progressed, in which the conductor continually guided band members to redirect waning self-attention, which was
threatening to become or had already become backgrounded or invisible to the rehearsing band member, back on to bodily activities in relation to instrument. The conductor and the Drum Major had to keep redirecting self-conscious attention continually, because band member’s bodies kept falling back into habitual being. As the conductor and Drum Major redirected attentions, they would cause band members to see their habitual practice as injury or incapacity, thereby forcing band members into present bodily being. Said the Drum Major one day at marching band rehearsal to one band member:

Come on, you’re not just walking along, here! You’re dragging your feet along like you’ve broken ‘em! (Fieldnotes).

This continual redirection of flagging attention back onto the body, now seen as incapacitated, was described by band members as “the painful shit” of rehearsal.

This kind of rehearsal experience is so painful because the routine, sensual, habitual existence of the body is based on not being caught, trapped, pinned down, surveilled. A body pinned down is located in its own site, which it is loathe to be: as Serres notes all the way through *Les Cinq Sens*:

The body is the work of transforming mere sensitiveness into sense and sensibility both: the body is its work of transformation. There is no chance of getting back to the body since it is the nature of the human body to be self-organising, and therefore self-surpassing (Connor, 1999:10).

The band member’s rehearsing body is a body that Serres might describe as one dominated by the word, and one which produces musical words only when laid still and bare and contained under heavy, bright surveillance that ensures that the musical words, or, more accurately, the musical letters, are enunciated correctly. It is one that Nietzsche might describe as removed from the experience of playing music, for it is a body that is trapped in the process of distinguishing lived experience of playing from the correct enunciation of the musical language that band members speak unreflexively in performance experience. As Serres notes of the power of the word to render still the body:
Once words come to dominate flesh and matter, which were previously innocent, all we have left is to dream of the paradisaical times in which the body was free and could run and enjoy sensations at leisure. If a revolt is to come, it will have to come from the five senses! (1995:71).

Band members describe rehearsals as ‘painful’ experiences and, I argue, they do so for the reasons I have described above. But band members also experience a kind of emotional pain that is related to the knowledge that they have ‘hurt’ their instruments. During rehearsal sessions, as I have said, the conductor draws attention to incapacitated bodily actions and the pained cries to instruments, both of which the players then keep within their self-conscious attentions during rehearsals. During my observations of rehearsal sessions, I noticed that when the conductor engages in these kinds of communications to band members, band members often made pained expressions with their faces:

When George told Helen of the clarinet’s squeaks of pain, and as he told her to adjust her breathing to make the clarinet sing without this pain, Helen screwed up her face in a tight cringe. She bowed her head and lowered her eyes, and shook her head at her own incompetence. [I asked her about it later, and she said]: “I hate screwing up. I feel like an idiot. I feel awful about myself during rehearsals, because it’s a time when every little tiny mistake you make is brought home to you, and you just don’t come out of it feeling good about yourself (Fieldnotes).

Helen’s descriptions of her feelings during rehearsal time were common to a great many of the band members. This anger, embarrassment or shame that comes from making a mistake can be understood as a kind of emotional pain that comes from having inflicted pain on the body of the instrument. The pain that band members inflict on instrument bodies forces band members to recognise their own bodies as incapacitated, which is, for these professional band members a painful admission; these are players who are by their own descriptions, “dedicated to music — it’s in my blood, it’s who I am, it’s what I was born to do”. Recognising one’s own incapacity to do what one was born to do is a kind of recognition that brings with it the pain of frustration, the suffering of embarrassment, the anguish of shame, the misery of failure, the pain of a horrid, unwanted knowledge of one’s own no-good, disease ridden body.
Further, band members feel another kind of pain that is related to the constant self-surveilling of the rehearsing body. As I noted above, the rehearsing senses are senses pinned down, which they are loathe to be, and band members loathe the process of trapping down their senses. When the conductor presides over rehearsals, he constantly invites band members to be reflexive; he constantly nudges them into present experiences of their sensing bodies. As I have noted above, the rehearsing senses are senses pinned down, which they are loathe to be, and band members loathe the process of trapping down their senses. The experience of keeping the body under constant self-conscious attention becomes so painfully annoying at times that band members requested breaks so they could “calm down” from their states of high agitation. After a cup of tea and a biscuit, band members would return to the rehearsal area, ready to begin again the “fucking annoying” process of calling their sensing bodies into self-conscious attention.

By contrast, the act of performing music is a joyous experience that band members describe as “the best buzz, ever”, an experience that brings them “close to God”, becomes “almost orgasmic”, an experience during which band members have “the most fucking amazing feeling in the world”, an experience of “an overwhelming sense of love”. Band members describe performance as “indescribable, almost. It’s like nothing else on earth — it’s just so amazing”. Band members in general describe the difference between rehearsal and performance experiences in terms of “the feel”, which is absent during rehearsals and present during performances. As I became increasingly interested in the difference between orgasmic, heavenly buzzing performances and painful, shitty, horrible, annoying rehearsals during my fieldwork, band members began to attempt to assist me in what they called my ‘quest’ for understanding. On the band bus one afternoon, as we were returning from a local kindergarten at which some of the band members had given a performance, I brought up the rehearsals and performances as a topic for discussion. As band members began to talk about the differences between rehearsal and performance playing, one of the
band members, Phil, turned to another, Liam, and said, “I dunno, it’s all about the feel”. Other band members nodded and smiled to each other, and agreed, “yes, it’s about the feel!!”. Anticipating my next question, several of the band members asked in unison with me, “what’s ‘the feel’?” Phil tried to explain:

Well, it’s almost something that you can’t really put into words; you can’t quite capture the experience in words. The feel is all about that special, amazing thing that happens during performances, that makes music music. It’s when you feel like there’s nothing else in the world except the music, as you’re playing it. It’s that thing when all the little crappy technical things don’t even enter your head, and you’re just there and the music is everything. It’s a bit like being in love with someone, and they fill up the whole world for you when you’re with them (Fieldnotes).

Liam added:

It’s the buzz of performance. Yeah, it’s like that whole ahhh [he throws his hands up in the air and flails them wildly from side to side, wriggling his hands and fanning his fingers] that thing. Whatever words you want to use to describe that thing I just did, that’s the feel. I’d be interested to see what you wrote, because I think you just have to experience it, to know what we’re talking about here (Fieldnotes).

The difficulty that band members had in describing ‘the feel’ in words speaks volumes about the experience that both Nietzsche and Serres argue is lost in language that attempts to pin down experience. Band members experience ‘the feel’ of performance precisely in the act of escaping from the articulations of performance experience that they must endure during rehearsals; they escape to the paradisaical time in which the body is free and can run and enjoy sensations at leisure, as Serres argues it will, once flesh and matter are freed from the domination of the word. Serres, in his work, is of course, is talking about sensual bodily joy that comes from the freedom of words, of language, and the freedom of sensual extension that he introduces in Angels (1995) and that underpins the entirety of Les Cinq Sens (1998). Performance bodies are bodies free from all of the pains I have described above. The performing body is free, free of the shackles of musical words and their production, and can run, becoming itself even as it moves out of itself, out of boundedness and into trumpety freedom, into transformation out of still, restrained site in which it is held, still, in rehearsal. The performing body is so free, so extended out beyond its site.
through sense, that it is almost no longer in its site at all. This habitual, extended, performing body:

[s]urpasses its own position, goes out from its role or word... The body goes out from the body in all senses (dans tous les sens), the sensible knots up this knot, the sensible in which the body never persists in the same plane or content but plunges and lives in a perpetual exchange, turbulence, whirlwind circumstance. The body exceeds the body, the I surpasses the I, identity delivers itself from belonging at every instant, I sense therefore I pass, chameleon, in a variegated multiplicity, become halfcaste, quarteroon, mulatto, octoroon, hybrid (Serres, 1998:408-9).

Similarly, band members' bodies surpass themselves, sensing, therefore passing, in variegated multiplicity, to become hybridised; saxophonised people, trumpetised people, flautised people, instrumentalised people. Here in performance experiences of music is the revolt that Serres speaks of in Angels; this is 'the revolt that has come from the senses, a revolt against surveillance, a revolt against words, and revolt against self-attention that is achieved when bodies sing and pay no attention to the component actions that together constitute singing, when they touch instrument bodies that produce instrument songs without attending to the point at which touch occurs, and when bodies turn into instruments as they habitually, routinely, usually do. This is a revolt that has come as the senses slip unnoticed under the surveillance floodlights that are suddenly switched off during performances. Band members are free in performance, free from the musical grammar that they attend to as their bodies enunciate enunciation projects in rehearsal. This is the joy of freedom, granted in performance to a body held writhing and twisting in the grip of self-conscious rehearsal attentions, a body laid bare under gleaming surveillance lights, a body whose very nature, whose own routine existence is based on not being caught, trapped, pinned down, surveilled.

Band members themselves comment on ways in which the joy of playing is realised by the falling away of the “painful” processes that the body goes through in order to correctly enunciate musical 'words' or letters or grammars:
[in performance] you don’t think about the type of mouth-shape you’ll use, the fingering... the message from your brain to your fingers that you have to monitor in rehearsals, it’s without all those things, you get rid of all that fucking boring, painful shit (Fieldnotes).

The painful shit removed, the rehearsal enunciation project behind it, the trap opened, the performing body moves out into joy, into “the best buzz, ever”, comes close to God, becomes almost orgasmic, becomes untroubled by pain, experiences the “the most fucking amazing feeling in the world”.

PERFORMANCE JOY AND THE COMMUNICATED EMOTIONAL CONTENT OF MUSIC

As I suggested in the previous chapters, this escape made by the suddenly unsurveilled senses as they slip out of the body site that has been their prison in rehearsals makes no audible difference to the music to the outside listener hearing rehearsal and performance renditions of the same musical piece. Nothing changes except band members’ sensual perceptions of their corporeal engagements with instruments. The listener does not hear the escape, cannot hear the difference between the trumpetised player’s playing and the playing produced by the surveilled sensing body. If the writer watches the marks he makes on the paper, keeping his action in the world well under his attention, he can form the marks on the page even as they make no coherent sense to him as meaningful strings of letters and words. The same piece of paper, filled with letter shapes, however, if passed to a reader, can make coherent sense. My own little boy, who is currently engaged in writing his own name on paper, constructs his name, ‘Keaka’, on the paper by making sticks and round balls. He makes these shapes under my direction, attending to the making of circles and the construction of long lines. The resultant word makes no meaningful sense to him- it’s just a collection of sticks and circles. Handed to his proud father later, however, the collection of sticks and balls “that I did for you, Dad- it’s lots of balls and sticks”, is meaningful as his son’s name. Similarly, band members make tiny parts of musical words that make no sense to them as meaningful strings of music— they are the sticks and balls, the letter shapes, of musical words. Played to me,
however, these letter shapes make coherent sense. Further, this is so for band members when they engage in habitual listening of *rehearsal* music.

About mid-way through my fieldwork, the band members recorded the film theme piece *Titanic* for their annually released band CD. In the recording studio, into which I was invited on the condition that I make no noise with the pages of my ever-present notebook, the conductor ordered a complete run-through of *Titanic*, which was to be followed by a series of corrections to any faulted passages that the conductor should pick up during the run-through. This occurred in the manner of any rehearsal I had witnessed; players were asked to notice the points at which their fingers, tongues, lips and hands met their instruments, and were required by the conductor to keep these points in their self-conscious attentions in order to adjust the volume of produced sounds, the timing of sounds, the tune of sounds, and other qualities of sounds produced in order to make them, in the conductor’s opinion, technically correct.

After these run-through and correction phases were complete, the conductor suggested that they record a version on the CD so that the recording technician and the band members could be satisfied that the equipment worked, and that the musical sounds were being picked up satisfactorily. The band members recorded their ‘rehearsal version’, during which, in accordance with the conductor’s express direction — that they should “really pay attention to the parts we’ve already looked at so far” — the band members “really watched ourselves”. The recording equipment was duly checked after the version had been recorded. The band members talked amongst themselves and to me while the technician played the version to himself in the booth. Band members agreed that the version was “fairly shitty”, and most agreed that it was very difficult to “hear” how the piece sounded because, as the conductor had asked, they had all been concentrating so hard on the production of their own discrete musical pieces of the musical whole.

When the technician played some of the recording back to band members, the conductor offered his opinion on the version to the band members, who assembled out front of the booth “to listen to the technical stuff”. The conductor pronounced the version “pretty good, from a technical perspective”, and then told the band members that the time had come to “put some heart into it”. He communicated to me that each
band member had made his or her contribution to the piece technically well, and that was exactly how it sounded on the recording. “It needs more than that now”, he told me. “It has to go from being technically right to being a piece of music that moves the listener”. Band members and conductor agreed that from an “emotional” viewpoint, the recording was “shit”. When the band members took up their positions in the sound proof room to record the “real thing”, the conductor’s instructions to them were of quite a different character. “I want this part to be able to make people cry when they hear it. This is a sad, sad, story, so forget all that technical shit for now and play it with real feeling. This is the real thing, here, so let’s give it some feel. Put all that other shit behind you”. The recording was duly made and, when the technician indicated that he had turned off the recording equipment, the band members and conductor assembled to hear the version. After it had been played back, the conductor pronounced it “pretty good; I suppose there are some small technical mistakes in it, but what it lacks in technical perfection it more than makes up for in feeling. It’s good!” Later, when the band members were listening to the recording again, several band members commented on the feelingful nature of the recorded music. Just then the recording technician said, “Oh. Hang on, that’s the first one you did. Just a sec, I’ll put the second one on”. Had this first version not been the “shitty” one, without feeling? How could the two versions be confused by musicians who had so strongly offered opinions about the vast difference between the two versions?

I sought out Roland, the band’s musical arranger, for further information, because Roland had told me in an interview I conducted with him very early in my fieldwork that he listened to a great deal of music as part of his arranging work. Roland told me during this interview that as an arranger, he was required to create and maintain knowledge of currently popular musics from which he could select pieces to arrange for the police band. Roland also told me that he liked to listen to a wide variety of musics for pleasure at home, and he had said that these two experiences were very “different” from one another. I had not followed this comment up in any detail during the interview, so I asked him to explain to me what he head meant by his comment after the band members and I had arrived back at the bandrooms after the day of recording. Roland explained that when he listens to a piece with a view to arranging it for the band, he listens “beyond” the content of the music and focuses on the technical form so that he can get a sense of how the musical grammar works. During
these listening experiences, Roland “can’t hear” the “meaning” of the piece, and does not have “an emotional response to it” for this reason. When his listening is instead focused on the meaning or “emotional content” rather than on technical form, Roland “becomes emotional” as a result. When I asked them, most other band members expressed that this is a common experience, and that when they are trying to learn particular pieces of music, the don’t respond emotionally to content, which is sacrificed for the sake of listening focusedly to technical form. Elizabeth explained that:

I love to listen to Celine Dion music, and we had to rehearse one of her songs (My Heart Will Go On) for the Titanic thing we recorded. It’s weird, but I definitely didn’t even hear it like I normally would when I listen to it in the car. I played it on the way home, and then I listened to it just like you would, but when I played it in rehearsal, it’s just little bits, you know (Fieldnotes).

Band members, in other words, could hear the music as a meaningful string of musical words and sentences as they began to habitually hear the music that they had produced with very present bodies during the rehearsal rendition. When band members no longer paid attention to hearing as it heard, the music they had produced became comprehensible. While I, as an audience member, and while band members as habitual listeners, could hear meaningful strings of musical words and sentences in the rehearsal rendition of Titanic, band members absolutely could not hear them while they were presently engaged in playing the rehearsal rendition. The only time that they could hear musical strings while playing the piece was when they abandoned their present playing bodies and began to inhabit habitual ones. These habitual bodies they inhabited as listeners, however, were different to the ones they inhabited as performers of music, in that performing bodies engage in a habitual sensual extension that includes more than just habitual hearing.

Elizabeth explained that her feelings in performing (as opposed to rehearsing) Titanic on the recording were different again from the feelings she experienced when listening to it on the way home in the car. Elizabeth said:

Oh, it’s weird, I know, to say it, but when I listen to Celine just like, listening to it, it usually makes me feel a bit melancholy, or a bit up, depending on which song it is, but in performing it, I don’t feel anything like that at all really. I’m
more into playing as an experience than listening, if that makes any sense. I feel really up...whether it's a sad song of Celine's that I'm playing or not. That's just the performance buzz (Fieldnotes).

The movement into the habitual body, as I have argued throughout, involves the extension of the senses into the instrument, which, as I have also argued, involves incorporating the instrument into the player's body so that the player becomes instrumentalised. It is this instrumentalising of the player that makes experiences of performance music for players vastly different from experiences of performance music that audience members might have, and it is this instrumentalising that makes Elizabeth's comment make sense — as she, herself, makes her senses by unreflexively engaging in the world; as Serres notes, senses only become senses in the act of sensing. But this is about so much more than hearing. What Elizabeth's comment illustrates clearly and specifically is that for band members embodied musicality is about multiple sensual extension into instrument and not simply about habitually hearing instrument sounds. During the recording of the “good” version, band members took up their instruments and sensually intertwined with them, slipping into trumpet bodies and melting into saxes, because they did not police body-instrument boundaries. During the production of the “shitty” version, band members did police boundaries. When they came to listen to the two versions later, they heard them as habitually as I did: as though the two versions were essentially the same. I did not, however, experience a 'buzz' while band members were recording the ‘good’ version. What changed for band members between habitually listening to both the performance and rehearsal versions of Titanic and performing Titanic were their lived sensual experiences of playing, during which they became, through unreflected upon touch, smell, taste, and hearing, wholly instrumentalised persons. As non-performing habitual listeners of music, then, nothing changes for band members between rehearsal and performance recorded versions, but as producers of music, a great deal changes between rehearsal and performance versions. Embodied musicality is not about simply hearing music habitually. It is about the extension of a multiply of intertwined senses.

The idea that for band members the senses extend out into instrument to yield the fully instrumentalised person is central to understanding why band members insist
that they and audience members feel different registers of emotion during police band performances. While players come to hear meaningful strings of musical words when they play during performance, and while they also hear the sadness, happiness, anger-the emotional content of the music, and believe that audience members also hear this content during performances, the happy, sad, angry emotions of the performance music are, according to band members, "absolutely not" what band members feel as they perform, something I will elaborate below. The idea that performers feel that which they express in performance — the idea that they feel happy if that is what they are expressing — has been an incredibly powerful idea in sociological analyses of the everyday 'performances' of working life. These kinds of analyses are informed by the work of theoreticians drawing on Hochschild's concept of emotional labour (1983). These scholars have argued over the last two decades that workers in service industries 'manage' their emotions in order to produce appropriate effect or image. For example, the bill collector, Hochschild argues, suppresses his or 'real' her feelings of goodwill, kindness, or sympathy for a debtor, and instead induces his or her equally 'real' suspicion, mistrust, and even anger, in order to produce a fearsome image to make the debtor feel frightened or pressured enough to pay (1983:144-145). These latter feelings, Hochschild argues, come to be what the person expressing them is 'really' feeling (1983:45).

Hochschild bases this idea on Stanislavski's disparagement of 'surface' acting. Stanislavski, the founder of 'Method' acting, describes surface acting, favoured by his rival, Coquelin, as "technical" in a passage that reminded me of the distinctive way that band members talk about the production of technical rehearsal music and the ways in which it could not make them or audience members 'feel' anything:

This type of art [of the Coquelin school]...its form is more interesting that its content...it acts more on your sense of sound and sight than on your soul...but delicate and deep human emotions are not subject to such technique. They call for natural emotions at the very moment in which they appear before you in the flesh. They call for the direct cooperation of nature itself (Stanislavski, 1965:22).

Stanislavski is suggesting, then, that in order to move audience members, method actors must really feel the emotions he or she is trying to convey: the acting of
emotions comes out of living them, on stage. Actors, says Stanislavski, accomplish this when they work on 'emotion memory':

[all feelings are the result of something that has gone before. Of the thing [feeling] that goes before [that the actor wishes to act], you should think as you can. As for the result, it will produce itself (1965:57).

Hochschild explains that, according to Stanislavski, the actor must:

remember experiences emotively. But to remember experiences emotively, he or she must first experience them in that way too, perhaps with an eye to using the feelings later (1983:41).

This, however, is not all, for the emotion memory is by itself not enough:

The memory...must seem real now. The actor must believe that a imagined happening is really happening now. To do this, the actor makes up an "as if", a supposition. He actively suspends the usual reality testing, as a child does at play, and allows a make-believe situation to seem real...the furnishings of the physical stage...are used to support the actor's if. Their purpose is not to influence the audience...but to help convince the person doing deep acting that the if events are really happening (1983:42, emphasis in text).

In contrast, band members, by their own descriptions, do not feel sadness, happiness, anger, those feelings that "the composer wanted musicians to communicate to audiences when he wrote the piece" as they perform these pieces. Band members did not feel sad when they heard themselves playing their own sad music; they did not rely on emotion memory, recalling lived sad experiences to themselves in order to then play that sadness in to the music — and they laughed at me when I suggested that they might. Band members instead feel what I will call 'meta-emotion'; a feeling that comes not from feeling ‘sad, ‘happy’ or ‘angry’ in line with musical movements and associated feelings, as Blacking (1984, 1987) might argue, but one instead issuing from the process of the sensual extension of self into instrument. As noted in the review of the literature presented in the introductory chapter, Katz has paid cursory attention to the idea that players and listeners will not necessarily experience the same emotions as a result of hearing the music that players produce. In a footnote in his most recent publication, he notes that:

the audience’s response will not necessarily reflect the same emotion as is contained in the music, as understood by the composer and
As noted in the review of relevant literature in the introductory chapter, Blacking looks closely at the structure of comportment in playing, and concludes, as does Treitler, that motor impulse connects emotional experience to musical experience. On several occasions throughout “The Study of 'Music' as Cultural system and Human Capability” (1984), Blacking cites Geertz’s famous line, that “art and the equipment to grasp it are made in the same shop” (1976:1497). Following Manfred Clynes, Blacking describes the relationship between performers and listeners with specific regard to the emotional experience of listening to music, which is experienced owing to the resonance between music and motor impulse. In particular he notes:

“[e]motions are structured inner movements of the body that acquire and are given meaning...Like music, emotions are forms of bodily motion that are assigned meanings and so become expressions of feelings” (1987:79).

Thus, “the collective movements of musical performance can generate collective feelings and collective thought” (1987:152).

While the expression of angry music in loud, aggressive thumps to the drum body and vigorous breath-yells into the trumpet instrument produce sounds that audience members recognise as being the same kinds of bodily motions that one might do in anger, and that these musical performances can generate collective feelings in audience members, the actions that band members make against instrument bodies to produce angry sounds do not generate the same feelings in band members. While they might go through the physical motions of anger, and while these motions of anger might be recognised as such by audience members, band members do not feel anger in making them. Blacking, however, argued that:

[a]n intuitive grasp of music is possible because performers and listeners possess the same innate musical competence ...as creators of music. When someone uses those very personal (but “universal”) human modes of thought and action to create new arrangements of culturally familiar musical symbols, there is a very good chance that some other human beings, in re-creating their sense as they hear them...will feel in their bodies what others felt in creating them (1987:152).
Katz’s concern that researchers do not look closely enough at the structure of comportment in playing, and the band members’ understanding that their emotional experience is very different from the emotional experience of audience members as they listen to played music leads me to look closely at what performer and audience bodies are doing as they experience music. Looking closely at bodies might provide clues to the differences between the emotional experiences of band members and audience members.

For most evenings of the three month period I dedicated to interviewing band members, I sat in band members’ homes and listened to them talk about performing and listening to music. After we had eaten a meal together, I asked each band member a series of questions about their emotional responses to music. Almost all band members answered these questions by demonstration — that is, by choosing particular recordings from their always-extensive collections to play to me that made them feel particular emotions. I was invited to sit and watch and listen as the person experienced particular emotions as a result of listening to the chosen recording. As the music played, the listener explained to me the feelings that he or she was experiencing. In one interview, Erol played a piece that I recognised from the band’s play list several weeks earlier. Settling back in his chair with a glass of wine, Erol closed his eyes and talked about the deeply personal meaning the piece held for him, and the ways it made him feel. He said that hearing the piece made him feel “very sad”, because it reminded him of a deceased friend with whom he had enjoyed a particularly close relationship. He also said that the piece was a particularly sad piece of music in its technical constitution, as it was organised into a slow tempo, was played in a minor key, and was “soft”, “melancholy” and “makes people want to cry”. After the interview, I purchased the recording and played the piece to about 20 friends and relatives — all non-musicians, whom I asked for descriptions. All told me that the piece made them feel “sad”, or that it was a “sad” piece. I asked Erol if it made him feel sad to play the piece when he was required to perform it with the police band. Erol opened his eyes and told me that, actually, it wasn’t. When I asked him why, he said:
Because performance is a buzz. I mean, I know, logically, that it’s a sad one, and it does make me feel sad when I hear it when I’m sitting around here in the lounge room, but, fuck, it’s a buzz to perform. I don’t know anyone who sits around getting all maudlin when we have to play it. It’s quite the opposite-you get turned on, you get high. You don’t get sad...you’re elated. It’s that whole feel thing we were telling you about (Interview notes).

Roughly three quarters of the entire band membership agreed to participate in interviews, and of these members all agreed that playing sad music did not require or generate feelings of sadness in themselves. Band members knew that audience members would probably feel sad during renditions of sad songs, and they knew that this was because audience members would recognise the minor key, the slow, soft playing that characterises sad music. As Blacking (1987) has suggested, the mournful whimpering cries of sad song music are very like the mourning whimpering cries of the sad body; instrument and body both might softly, slowly, cry out the sounds of sad. But band members who produce these sad sounds do not cry out sadly, for they are not sad; they are close to heaven, they are experiencing the best buzz ever, they are engaged in sensual musical orgasm, they are deeply involved in sense of overwhelming love. These are the highly emotional experiences that band members say occurs during performance: these are ‘the feel’. This ‘feel’ is the experience of what Serres has called bodily joy, or ecstasy (1998:455). This is the experience of self-extension, self-exceeding, which is to be found in the playing of instrument, the turning of oneself into a trumpet. "Here", notes Connor, “the body becomes itself in playing with, or transforming itself” (1999:9), and the transformation, for band members, is ecstatic, joyful, seraphic. The ecstasy, the elation, the joy, is essentially a sensual joy that comes when the senses are free from their rehearsal sitedness in the body.

This is a joy, or meta-emotion, that my own listening body cannot experience. There is a crucial difference between my situation as a listener, and that of the performing band member, even though we both hear the same music being played. The difference lies in the notion that in order to play, band members must embody, and be embodied by, their instruments, which is an embodying and embodiment that I do not have to make as a listener. I may see the sax, but I do not feel it, touch it, taste it,
smell it, hear it, as part of my own body as band members do, and they do because instruments are the sensual vehicles of the players’ musical actions. I will not fall from heaven to the pits of rehearsal hell if I listen intently to the production of a single note, as band members will; I will not feel myself painfully ripped out of my habitual world if I look to the point at which the band member’s finger is intersecting with his trumpet, as he will, and I will not come close to heaven, experience something like orgasm, or have the best buzz ever when I listen to the band’s rendition of a song I hate, as they will. While I listen to the music and my hearing sense goes out to dwell in musical noise, thusly making sense of my hearing sense, the sounds I hear will never be extensions of me in the same way that they are extensions of the band member’s own selves, because they are not related to my own touch — I am not a saxophone. I am not, in short, instrumentalised; I do not dwell in the sax in order to listen to it, as Erol does in order to play it.

I return again to the ‘shitty’ and ‘good’ versions of Titanic. As players produced the ‘good’ version, their bodies and instrument bodies merged together as players’ senses extended out from the body site and into a trumpet, into a sax. As they produced the ‘shitty’ one, bodies and instruments remained painfully separated from one another as borders and boundaries were policed. But band members didn’t do anything musically different in each of these cases: they still played the same tune, in the same time, in the same key, with the same dynamics. As listeners, as persons no longer experiencing embodied musicality, nothing changes for band members between the two recorded versions. What changes about the music between rehearsal and performance, between ‘shitty’ and ‘good’ version is not the music itself, but the band members’ sensual experiences of it — and not simply their hearing of it, but their multi-sensual experiences of it.

Serres is not the only theoretician to employ the line of thinking that I have taken up here, about what happens to the body when it takes up instrument object, listens to sound, or writes with a pen. Katz (1999), following Merleau-Ponty [1964] (1968) and Polanyi (1962) writes of a body that is largely effaced, absent or invisible in routine or lived experience. Another way of saying that the performing body is no longer in its
site, for so sensually-extended is it in playing, is that performing bodies are to the performers almost invisible in the sense that the prominence of the band member’s body in playing the instrument, in the band member’s own experience, decreases as he or she moves from rehearsal to performance, and at the same time from surveillance to freedom, from misery to joy, from technical language to the unreflected upon sensually-extended life of the body. No longer pained, the performing body rushes headlong into trumpety freedom, into performative emotion or into ‘the feel’, into a place far beyond mere sadness, happiness or anger that I might hear in the music. This music might take me back someplace, back to sometime, but it won’t, can’t, take me where the instrumentalised people go: to heaven. Clearly, I am not a saxophone.
CHAPTER SIX
SOME LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WILL NOW SING:

'MY HEART WILL GO ON'

INTRODUCTION (METONYMS AND CONTRADICTIONS)
In the three preceding chapters, I have explored one order of emotion involved in musical production, namely the meta-emotion, or ‘the feel’, that police band members experience during performance. In this chapter, I focus on the kinds of feelings that music stirs in listeners who are not otherwise occupied with becoming instrumentalised. In so doing, I begin from the point of departure of this thesis from the work of John Blacking (1985) who argued that audiences will feel what musicians felt in creating music. Specifically Blacking argued that, “a decision to perform music can lead people to share emotion through the link of their common participation in sequences of movement” (1985; reprinted with alterations in Byron, 1995:152, my emphasis).

I have argued that band members feel a specifically performance related meta-emotion that they call ‘the feel’ when they perform music, and I have argued that listeners will not feel this same order of meta-emotion because they do not embody musicality when they listen: audience members, in other words, do not turn into saxophones when they listen to saxophone sounds. This does not mean, however, that ‘audience’ emotion and ‘performer’ emotion have nothing in common. Indeed, band members expect that listeners will feel an emotion in the performed music that band members themselves know to be therein present; while band members do not feel sad or angry or happy ‘in line’ with the music they are producing, they do understand that angry, sad, or happy is what they are attempting to communicate to listeners. Further, band members are able to hear this affective content when they abandon present rehearsal bodies and inhabit habitual performance bodies. But listener emotion and what I am calling meta-emotion have something fundamental in common: they are both embodied sensual experiences.

Where band members embody instruments and other performers as a result of sensually extending into these bodies to become emotional in performance, audience
members sensually extend themselves into performed sonics to become emotional during performances of music. As I noted in the previous chapter, audience members disattend to the process of hearing their own hearing as they listen and in this sense incorporate musical sounds inside their own bodies, as hearing sense extends from the body to dwell in that which is heard. That which is heard is culturally meaningful, and activates feeling: sad, happy, angry. Hearing sense becomes itself in hearing these sounds, but it becomes a sense of a particular register: a sad sense, a happy sense, an angry sense. The sensing of sound is at the same moment the sensing of feeling. Sad sound has come to dwell inside the self, just as surely as the self out through sense to dwell in that which is heard sadly. This is not simply a relationship between a sensing individual and a piece of culturally meaningful music: whole groups of people simultaneously travel out from the site of the body through hearing to dwell in sad sounds, and sad sounds come back in through a saddened hearing to dwell inside bodies. As Qureshi notes:

In an instant, the sound of music can create bonds of shared responses that are as deep and intimate as they are broad and universal (2000:810).

Further, the experience becomes public and shared as a result of simultaneous culturally meaningful sensing. In this way, listeners form a sensual and feelingful community. Band members do not incorporate sadness inside themselves through culturally meaningful hearing sense, because the sensual focus for band members is on the instrument object, not on its sonic production. Audience members come precisely to focus their hearing sense on music: they come to listen. Band members come to play. The difference, then, between meta-emotion and listener emotion is not sensual embodiment itself, but that which is embodied.

I also explore ‘audience emotion’ in a particular way in this chapter. I argue that the order of emotion that listeners feel while listening to the band members play music is one that the police seek to appropriate for the specific purposes of power. As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, the police department seeks to merge ostensibly unemotional cops with what it takes to be the emotionful language of music in order to yield the ‘human’ cop with a heart. This musical advertising lulls people into subscribing to the relations of law enforcement power at the same time as it lulls them into humming along with police band music.
I note that it is clear that 'emotion' is being used in metonymic relation to 'humanness' here. If police believe they are being 'reanimated', from subhuman robots to humans, via a demonstration of their capacity for emotion, then emotion is being understood as a primary, central, or defining quality of humanness. As the police to whom I spoke said, it is an evident lack of emotion, in combination with the fact that the majority of police contact with people occurs over drink-driving or speeding, that makes members of the public cast police officers as state-driven robots. Existing as it does in an environment of economic rationalism, the police department is not in a position to alter the kinds of contact it has with members of the public. It can, and does, however, try to reanimate police by demonstrating that cops have what is taken by cops and, according to them, by members of the public, to be the defining quality of humanness: emotion. In this sense, 'listener emotion' is appropriated by police to create a particular image of police in the public mind.

Music is not only used by cops to indicate their capacity for emotion to audience members. Music is also used to indicate a distance from the state, which regulates policing to the extent that, according to Trueeman (2000:7), it has forced the police to enforce the law at the expense of engaging with people when the law has not been transgressed. I pause here to note that in the public mind, 'law enforcement policing' stands in metonymic relation to the 'whole of policing'. Here, law enforcement police are known as robocops, who appear to members of the public as unemotional, non-human revenue collectors at the side of the car, issuing tickets for speeding or drink-driving. Because this may well be the only time most members of the public have contact with the cops, this is taken by them to be the primary, and possibly sole, function of police, despite the fact that police do much more than issue traffic violators with tickets. In this metonymic view, cops are thoroughly connected to state power, and specifically to the power of the state to collect revenue. Theorists such as Cole (1999) have articulated the specific link between state power, law-enforcement

1 If the order of emotion that listeners feel is open to appropriation by police, then the order of emotion that band members feel in performance is not. As I have argued throughout the preceding chapters, audience members in general (including audience members who are police) do not have a sense that band members are busily turning into trumpets, or that they are moving into heavenly orgasmic joy as they play the theme from Titanic. This kind of meta-emotion is one that constitutes a kind of resistance in the sense that this order of emotion cannot be appropriated by police in the same way that 'listener-emotion' can be, and is, in police band performances.
police and the internal direction of power, arguing that the role of the police is to
serve government by protecting its interests, and, in capitalist societies specifically by
keeping control of the enemy within. Loader (1997:3) has argued that the power of
the police is in effect the power of the government applied practically to members of
the community. According to police, members of the public are aware of the
government’s practical application of police to their hip pockets. In the opinions of
many members of the Adelaide community, the police officer him or herself
constitutes a ‘tool of control’ wielded by the state for the express purposes of raising
revenue. Thus, the police and the state are together represented in one police body,
which appears at the side of the car to issue a speeding ticket. It is from this image
that police seek to distance themselves via police band performances.

The understanding that cops say members of the public have of the police, as located
close to or part of the state, and the apparent ‘unemotionality’ of police that officers
say members of the public recognise, are bound up together. The capacity for
emotions of a particular kind are used to cast police as ‘human’ in the public mind,
and emotions associated with falling in love, or feeling pain from lost or unrequited
love, are routinely used to cast police as human. In the view of band members, these
emotions contrast with the emotions that state-serving law enforcement police might
induce in people: according to many band members, these would be, “fear, anxiety
and stress”. A musically demonstrated capacity for ‘romantic’ emotion, then, often
serves to cast police both as human and as distanced from the state and its interests in
raising revenue.

The police department uses the police band to distance itself from the state, and to
make its employees appear more emotional by making use of a series of seeming, but
not actual, contradictions. These contradictions occur in performances between
ostensibly ‘different’ kinds of musical, affective, sonic and visual images that are each
invested with what Terdiman (1985) has called ‘material memories’. Visible police
bodies, visible instrument bodies and their sounds, and particular genres of music

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2 Cole argues that the rise of paramilitary policing in Britain can be understood as a response to the
disorder prevalent in the lower classes, which had the potential to threaten the stability of the capitalist
system.

3 These emotions are induced by police bodies which are apparently devoid of emotion, but
emotionless bodies are still capable of inducing emotions in others.
constitute material memories of both state power and ‘unemotional’ law enforcement policing. The police band musicians intersperse seemingly contradictory popular musical, affective, sonic and visual images with these authoritative material memories to create multiply meaningful and extremely powerful musicscapes. These musicscapes are designed to recontextualise unemotional state-serving robots into humans. I argue that audience members generally accept this recontextualisation because they misrecognise the seeming contradictions that police band members present them with as real contradictions. These seeming contradictions, made between seemingly different sonic and visual images are, I submit, not contradictions at all, but are instead continuations of a theme of power.
In a 2000 contribution to *American Ethnologist*, Qureshi notes that instruments have meaning through cultural knowledge that is:

permeated with physicality and affect: embodied knowledge. To one enculturated in Western music, the sound of a trombone may send shivers of awe of divine power, a horn sound may evoke the coolness and mystery of forests or a harp the erotic, feminised glitter of high society (2000:810).

Similarly, particular instrument sounds evoke particular feelings, which I discuss in relation to particular instruments below. As I have argued in various places in the preceding chapters, the emotional experiences that police band members have during performances cannot be described in terms of the emotion that they attempt to communicate via music to audience members. While they know these emotional contents to be present in the music they communicate, band members do not feel sadness, happiness, anger, and so forth — nor indeed coolness, mystery, or glitter, as they play during performances — they are too close to heaven, too involved in musical orgasm, too instrumentalised, altogether too interested in becoming themselves via the corporeal-sensual incorporation of the instrument. But band members do say that they believe that audience members feel the emotion of the music — its happiness, its sadness, its glitter, its coolness, its mystery — audience members get to eat the affective cake that is made from the musical recipe, while band members get to eat quite a different dish, constructed of sublime and almost holy ingredients. Or, in other words, audiences feel emotion and band members feel what I have previously described as meta-emotion, or ‘the feel’.

Police band members recognise that audience members attach meanings in common to specific musical instruments, and band members themselves, being also ones enculturated in Western music, also make similar meanings of each of their instrument sounds when they are listeners, as I argued in the previous chapter. Band members who play the French horn, for example, know that French horn sounds are melancholy, haunting, clear and “like cool water flowing”, flautists know that flute sounds are, as Aristotle noted (in *Politics* Book viii, chapter 6, section 5) “too exciting” as well as being, as Lanier once said, “half song, half odour... as if a rose
might somehow be a throat”. Trumpeters ‘know’ that trumpet sounds “typically” arouse emotional responses in people that revolve around their strong, certain, arrogant, glorious, proud, clear, golden and pure sonic qualities. Saxophonists know that their sax sounds are affectively lustier, more evocative, less angelic or heavenly and “more human” than those of the trumpet, and, as a result of their more human sonority are, “better able to arouse feelings in people”. Saxophones, according to their players, produce notes so similar to the human voice that, “you can’t help but know what they are saying to you — they talk to you”, and saxophone sounds ‘taste’ “like melted honey”, while trumpet sounds taste “more like melted gold”. This is not to say, however, that the “certain, arrogant, strong, and clear and hard as ice” feelings that the trumpet sounds embody cannot, as trumpeters insisted, be softened “into pink”, and that they cannot produce sounds “as soft as an old, old blanket”. These rather synaesthetic descriptions of the affective properties of sounds produced by particular instruments, or the ways in which an instrument’s sounds can make a person feel, are ones that band members believe are understood by audience members. Indeed, they believe that these qualities of sound are necessarily understood by audience members, “or they wouldn’t be able to get what the music means”.

The idea that audience members as individuals and as a whole group are able to understand the meaning of the music they are hearing by knowing what particular instrument sounds affectively mean speaks of both the highly personal and the social nature of musical experience; at the same time that musical sounds arouse particular emotions in the individual, they also, as Qureshi puts it, “activate links with others who feel” (2000:811). Whole audiences are together able to understand that a passage played by a French hornist in a piece of music they all understand to be ‘sad’ is particularly haunting or poignant. This is, of course, an idea that has been successfully exploited by Hollywood filmmakers for a very long time; one can know simply by listening to the sound track to the film Titanic which musical parts accompany the particularly sad or poignant moments of the screenplay. Qureshi notes that:

If musical sound has the potential to “speak” socially as well as individually, then its sounds may turn out to be potent icons of social practice as well as of personal experience. Music becomes as much a political tool as it is a language of feelings. Feelingful habits [or, in other words, ‘the rules to feel music by” (see Feld, 1996:99)]…as performative, embodied practices...
memories here through the medium of sound (2000:811; see also Stoller, 1994:636-637,639).

Musical instrument sounds embody particular affective identities, as noted above in the case of the trombone and the horn, but these acoustic identities are not entirely fixed: musical instrument sounds can embody and arouse more than one or many feeling-meanings. As the band’s trumpet players knew, trumpet sounds might most typically articulate cultural meanings of glory, excitement, aggression, and of loud, sure and golden divine voice, but trumpet sounds might just as surely blanket a listener softly up in lullaby or gentle ballad. Flutes too can emit blood-curdling shrieks just as readily as they can unleash song-odour from their rose-throats. This at least dual capacity of instrument sound has had a long history, which, according to band members, persists presently: trumpeters know that they often have to draw on the instrument’s capacity for lullaby, and they know just as well that people expect trumpets to be “in your face”. In terms of history, Lucian, for example, notes in Charles Burney’s A General History of Music (1776) that:

Harmonides, a young flute player and scholar of Timotheus, at his first public performance, in order to *elevate* and *surprise*, began his solo with so violent a blast, that he *breathed his last breath into his flute* and died upon the spot (emphasis in original).

In *Trivia Book ii* (1716), on the other hand, John Gay described flute sounds in far less exciting and elevating terms:

Soft as the breath of distant flutes at hours  
When silent evening closes up the flowers.

John Dryden, in his *Song for St Cecilia’s Day* (1687) is of similar mind:

The soft complaining flute  
In dying notes discovers  
The woes of hopeless lovers  
Whose dirge is whisper’d by the warbling lute.

These are the kinds of feelings that audience members might understand as being present in the musical sounds that the band members generate. These sounds, and the
physical instruments from which they issue are sonic and visual repositories of cultural memories.

POWER-LADEN ‘MATERIAL MEMORIES’

Instruments are dually meaningful not only in the sense that they embody particular acoustic affectivities, but in the sense that they are also bodies or physical objects which, via discourse, retain specific cultural-social memories (as indeed, via discourse, do human police bodies). Qureshi argues that the primary or dominant affectivities embodied in musical sound are institutionalised and are inscribed as history (2000:811). Connerton (1989) notes that there is an inherent conservatism in affective memories, which is sustained by what Qureshi, following Connerton, has called “habitual practice” (2000:811). After Terdiman (1985:20), Qureshi argues that this ‘inherent conservatism’ is embodied in “materials memory”, Terdiman’s term that denotes “the conservatism of things that literally embody the past in the present” (Qureshi, 2000:811).

Musical instruments are invested with specific cultural-social memories via a particular musical discourse. The Fanfare trumpet is a particularly good example of the dual capacity of instruments to hold such memories in their object bodies and their acoustic sounds; both Fanfare sounds and the Fanfare trumpet object evoke powerful feelings associated with the proclamation of events or things glorious, celebratory or momentous. Leppert (1993) and Winternitz (1967) have argued that both social and art-historical discourses of meaning invest instrument objects with explicit historicity so that, according to Qureshi, they become:

material repositories of past meanings, and their visual representations serve to define sonority through historically situated social practices and aesthetic codes....In Western art music discourse, the historicized relationship between an instrument’s affective, embodied, and social meanings and the discursive representations of such meanings is what endows an instrument with a standard musical identity. Once trombone, horn and harp have their embodied meanings widely circulated...this discourse itself becomes a tool of control, shaped and disseminated by a dominant class (2000:811).

The affective cultural memories ‘keyed’ through the performance of musical sound via instrument bodies (and police bodies, which are also repositories of cultural
meaning-memory) is not entirely constant or fixed. This fluidity is evidenced by the different pasts that music is able to connect to the present when it is played. These different cultural memories, as Qureshi argues, can be traced back to varying “social constituencies” and “generations” (2000:811). Different cultural memories are also keyed by different kinds of musics and different kinds of band instrumentation. Anderson (1983) has argued that the control of this ‘fluidity’ factor has been an important and pressing activity of nation-states and national movements, and Qureshi argues specifically that, “when a nation’s past becomes hegemonically and discursively defined, it also involves a politically required suppression of oppositional or minority pasts” (2000:811). These ideas are in the same vein as that articulated by Plato in *The Republic*, Book iii (c. 380 BC):

Musical innovation is full of danger to the state, for when modes of music change, the laws of the state always change with them.

Plato precedes his note on musical innovation above with, “music and rhythm find their way into the secret places of the soul”, a phrase which speaks of the emotive power of music. In attaching it to his second notation, his argument and the position articulated by Qureshi indicate in no uncertain terms that the power of music to emotionally stir ultimately serves the interests of power. Abu-Lughod spells out this idea: “emotional discourses are implicated in the play of power and the operation of historically changing systems of social hierarchy” (1990:28). With these ideas, and particular chunks of ethnography in mind, it is possible to come to an understanding of how the music performed by the police band serves the interests of the South Australia Police institution.
THREE KINDS OF MATERIALITY: POLICE BODIES, INSTRUMENT BODIES AND SOUNDS, AND MUSICAL GENRES

police bodies as material memories

The particularly metonymic understanding that members of the public have of police as state-wielded tools is invested in the police body. This body can be understood as a present material repository of past military meanings, which also relates police to the power of the state to exert force. This investment of meaning in the police body is one that has a long history that can be read through the police uniform.

The SAPOL is a distinctive dress of a standardized style, material and colour, which serves to identify all of the members of the police to members of the public. This uniform is connected with state power through its military history or, in other words, with the ability of the state to direct power toward its external enemies. The official SAPOL website notes that Governor Gawler, who held office during the 1880s, adopted the uniform of the 6th Dragoon Carbineers, with which his close friend Major Sir William Ponsonby had served until his death in action. Gawler had also seen active military service at Waterloo, and originally adopted the Carbineers uniform for the Mounted Police. The adoption of this military uniform continued throughout the police force, the members of which wore navy blue trousers with broad double white stripes down the outer sides, elastic sided black boots (which were fitted with "military spurs" in the case of the Mounted Police), and a navy blue tunic complete with silver shoulder knots, silver buttons, and a patent leather belt. A double peaked cap completed the ensemble. Commissioner Peterswald introduced the spiked helmet for summer wear in 1884.

More has stayed the same than has changed about this uniform; police doing on the street or patrol policing continue to wear what officers call the "long blues" - the long blue trousers once adopted from the Carbineers, and while patrol police have traded their tunics for long sleeved navy blue jumpers and jackets, senior officers continue to wear tunic-style jackets complete with shiny silver buttons. The police band members also wear this modern uniform, but don tunics, navy blue double-white striped trousers and spiked helmets for ceremonial and Tattoo marching displays.
The police uniform is a material memory in that members of the public may invest historical military meaning in the uniform based on their knowledge of the uniform’s military history, thanks to the police website information and other advertisements of it made by the police historical society. It is also a material memory made when the police band march, military style, in public parades, such as the South Australia Day parade and ANZAC and Remembrance Day parades, in uniforms that are by their presence there associated as much with the military units that also march as they are with police.

Part of the material history of the state to direct power externally is wrapped around the ostensibly unemotional bodies of the police officers that members of the public know to direct state force internally, most specifically in the form of revenue collection, in the present. As I argued in chapter two, a central part of the construction of police bodies as state bodies is the physical production of evidence of unemotionality. This unemotionality serves to distance police from the body of the policed community. This distanced position is necessarily occupied by cops in the paradigm of law enforcement policing, because it allows cops to enforce the law no matter who is transgressing it, and more specifically, it allows cops to issue speeding tickets to their lead-footed mothers, if need be. It is to these ostensibly unemotional bodies that members of the public apply an insulting discourse, in which cops are located far from members of the public and close to or as the state, as ‘cogs in the government’s rip off wheel’. In this sense, unemotional police bodies wrapped in dark blue military skins constitute what Terdiman (1985:20) would call a ‘material memory’: uniformed police embody a military past in their currently presented bodies, and they continue to exercise what members of the public take to be the power of the state. Instead of being directed outwardly, as military force is, police power, in the view of members of the public, is state power directed inwardly, and more specifically, at the hip pocket.

I pause here to note that band bodies appear to members of the public as police bodies. The members of the police band appear in public as ordinary or operational members of the police department, wearing almost precisely the same police uniform that immediately makes a body recognisable to members of the public as a
specifically state affiliated law enforcing body. Band members often complain that they “have to act like cops when we’re in public”, and their lament refers to the rules and regulations which surround their deportment and grooming obligations. Before the band members performed at the Tasmania Police Centenary Tattoo in Hobart in 1999, a meeting in the band rooms presided over by the Drum Major reviewed the rules and regulations that would apply to band members during their stay at the Tasmania Police Academy in which they would be accommodated. The Tasmania Police Academy forwarded its Disciplinary Code to the Drum Major, who read out its contents to band members. These included a section on “proper conduct”, which stated that all visiting police personnel must:

behave in a manner acceptable to the maintenance of proper conduct... The term “proper conduct” means standards of behaviour, performance, dress, language and temperance acceptable to a police training environment. Failure to comply may mean the immediate removal of the individual. If the person(s) involved is/are a sworn member [which police band members are] further disciplinary action may be taken (Tasmania Police:1999).

When the Drum Major had finished relating the contents of the Disciplinary Code, band members remarked that they would have to behave at the Academy just as they would in public in Adelaide, where they must at all times remain in police uniform, must engage in conduct befitting an officer, and where they must not express “personal” feelings in public. They must, in other words appear, in bodily demeanour and grooming, as unemotional law enforcement police officers at all times.

**material memories: sonic and visual**

If uniformed police bodies are saturated with state power in the present, then so too are some of the musics ‘they’, or rather, their police band representatives, presently and publicly produce. In what follows, I argue that the military musics that the police band plays currently once accompanied and sonically embodied state force. Further, the instrument bodies on which military music is and was produced are receptacles of particularly powerful memories of state force. The police band members play on the same instruments that were once played by military band units accompanying active units in war, and they play the music that these bands once played. The police band’s renditions of military music articulate the power of the state to exert force, and they also serve to merge police with the state: military music is, after all, the music of state
triumph over externally located enemies. As I argue later in the chapter, audience members make the connection between state music and police, conflating this military music of the state with police force by calling military music ‘police music’.

The Concert band, one of the most frequently formed musical units that band members make, is categorised as a military band. Within it are instruments classified as ‘military’ for their very long association with armed operational units. This instrumentation retains particular meanings, or is a collective repository of ‘materials memory’, which remembers to present audiences, in sound and in a mass of instrument and police bodies, which are themselves still partially militarily uniformed, themes of state power.

Military music has a long history of affiliation to the state, and can be traced back in Great Britain to the days of King Richard, who reigned from 1188 until 1199, and from the Middle Ages in the Germanic States (Lawler, 1994:9,14). During Richard’s reign, military music, in the forms of calls and fanfares, was used to herald both danger and the imminent arrival of distinguished or important persons. During the Middle Ages and Renaissance, minstrels (professional musicians) who were organised in professional guilds, began to experiment with varying combinations of wind instruments and in so doing provided music for the entertainment of the European ruling classes (nobility and royal courts) (Lawler, 1994:9). At the end of the Renaissance period, musicians accompanied cavalry and infantry regiments, an association which continued to grow until music became inextricably intertwined with service to, and the glory and power of, the state in battle, a link articulated in Shakespeare’s *Othello* (1604):

> Farewell the plumed troops, and the big wars  
> That makes ambition virtue! O farewell!  
> Farewell the neighing steed and the shrill trump,  
> The spirit-stirring drum, th’ ear-piercing fife,  
> The royal banner, and all quality,  
> Pride, pomp and circumstance, of glorious war! (Act III, scene iii)

Most regiments employed their own accompanying bands, and to standardise musical scholarship within the forces a Military School of Music was established in 1857 at
Kneller Hall (Lawler, 1994:11). During the British colonial occupations of America and Canada, British Regimental Bands performed musical pieces glorifying the colonial power in the colonised townships, as well as “giving concerts for the “esprit de corps” of their colleagues” (Lawler, 1994:11). Civilian town bands in Great Britain, called “Waits” until the end of the seventeenth century, were also associated with state interests and glorification, through their deployment at all celebratory and civic occasions (Lawler, 1994:10).

By the nineteenth century, Military band instrumentation included flute, oboe, clarinet, bass clarinet, saxophone, French horn, trumpet, trombone, euphonium, bassoon, tuba, string bass and percussion instruments. The current Military, or Concert, band formed by the members of the police band follows this same instrumentation, with the occasional additions of electric guitar and electric piano. Lawler argues that the Prussian and British Brass and Military band traditions were transplanted to South Australia by the colonising power via Germanic migrants to the ‘free colony’ in the late nineteenth century, and flourished in a climate of “war scare” and the threat of invasion in the late 1800’s:

The proliferation of the brass band genre [a term inclusive in this case of both Military and Brass band formations owing to their similarity in South Australia during this period] occurred in the mid 1880s and can be attributed indirectly to the following international incidents: the Fall of Khartum and the murder of General Gordon, c. 26th January 1885, British and Russian intervention in Afghanistan, c. 3rd March 1885; The American Government supplying cruisers to Russia, and finally to an intelligence report submitted to the government that a Russian man-of-war was cruising toward the colonies. All of these events had a tremendous impact on Australians whose fears prompted debates in all capital areas regarding the defence of the colonies (Lawler, 1994:24).

These fears of invasion saw the establishment of two separate military reserve forces, the Volunteer Military Force and the Rifle Volunteer Force, each of which had their own band corps. In this climate, a great many ‘civilian’ military bands also formed, which Lawler divides into five classifications, namely Military Service bands (including the Kapunda military Band and the Eastern Suburban Rifle Company Band), institutional bands (including the South Australian Police Band and the Fire Brigade Band), municipal bands, (including the Thebarton, Hindmarsh and Glenelg Brass Bands) religious bands (including the Salvation Army Band and the Norwood
Mission Band) and miscellaneous bands, including ‘family’ bands such as the Henschke and Schilling Brass Bands. All of these bands formed as a result of an overflow of “militaristic fervour”, itself the result of threats to the colonies. The proliferation of military bands articulates a strong operational or practical allegiance to the colonial state and its protection and defence, which was itself articulated in military musics which testified to the strength of the state and its glorious capacity to triumph over its externally located, and apparently advancing, enemies (Lawler, 1994:25).

These very old themes of state power and triumph over enemies contained in military musics are very present ones, not least because current military units continue to be represented in public displays by military band units playing military musics — one need only attend an ANZAC Day parade, the opening of the State Parliament, the opening of public buildings, or the unveiling of monuments or memorials, a State Emergency Services or Fire Services parade, a police cadet graduation ceremony, or one of many other celebratory events occurring locally or nationally to see and hear military or police bands performing ‘traditional’ military musical fare such as Scotland the Brave, 79th Farewell to Gibraltar, and Salute to Heroes.

As noted, one of the bands formed in the climate of ‘militaristic fervour’ of state defence and protection was the Band of the South Australia Police, in 1884. Lawler notes that the proliferation of brass and military bands in South Australia occurred alongside military and affiliated units that supported colonial governments in their power to repel outside threats. The police band continues to musically perform the power of the state by presently performing military music with military instrumentation while appearing in uniforms, which have retained their military past in the present. These things speak sonically and visually of the power of the state in current performances. Following Bourdieu (1984) Qureshi notes that instrument bodies play a role of “distinction” “that is at once socially overt and aesthetically veiled by the priority given to their [sonically] music-related features” (2000:811). Qureshi also notes that instrument object bodies are also invested with:
explicit historicity so that they become material repositories of past meanings, and their visual representations serve to define sonority through historically situated practices (2000:811).

Being historically situated in the context of the operational practices of military units, military instrument bodies are invested with explicit military historicity, which continues to define their specifically military sounds in the present. This is because military bodies are still highly visible in the community, in marching bands that perform regularly in the local and national events mentioned previously, and in the police military (concert) band, which gives hundreds of public performances annually. The uniformed police band itself literally carries instruments commonly visually and sonically associated with military past into the present when they play on these instruments in full police uniform, itself a visual symbol of police-state power.

But the military instruments of the police band are certainly not always understood to be invested with specifically military power; I suggest here that the bodies which take up these instruments have a lot to do with the kinds of memories that the instruments are understood to embody. The affective cultural memories ‘keyed’ through the performance of musical sound via instrument bodies are affected by the police bodies with which they are associated. These bodies are also repositories of cultural meaning-memory, which provides a context in which the meaning of the instrument body is largely defined: a shiny trumpet has entirely different connotations when it is held by Dizzy Gillespie in a smoky lounge and when it is held by Sergeant Smith marching his way briskly down the main street of Adelaide. Thus, the material memory of state power embodied by cops provides a context in which the material memories of instruments can be read.

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4 I am not suggesting here that one of these images is about domination and that one is about resistance; as Anderson (1983) notes, the State is quick to suppress oppositional instrument embodiments, sometimes by banning, but most often via a process of recontextualisation. Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998:19) drawing on Adorno (1990) argue that popular music that may be offered up as musical resistance to the State (as Rock’n’Roll once was) is actually in the service of the State in the sense that it has taken advantage of the potential of this music to ‘speak’ to the masses in a variety of ways.
SEEMING CONTRADICTIONS

Band members do not produce exclusively military music when they give concert band performances. Sandwiched in between the Second Suite for Military Band (Holst) and Fantasia on British Sea Songs (Hayden Wood) at the Lord Mayor’s Concert in February 1999, for example, were the highly romantic and popular love songs, For Once in My Life (Stevie Wonder) and True Love (Streisand). A regular inclusion in the annual Christmas Concert is Happy Christmas/War is Over by John Lennon, which advocates the erosion of power relationships between old and young, and between black and white. At the 1999 Gladstone Ball, Troop-Pageantry Scotia (arr. R.A.Y Mitchell) and musics organised into Military Two-Step style shared musical space with Hey Look Me Over (perf. Peggy Lee). A recent concert which occurred as part of the 2001 subscription series, entitled ‘A Night At the Proms’ included Men of Harlech (Robert Farnon arrangement), Fantasia on British Sea Songs (Henry J. Wood), Moorside March (Holst) as well as Bridge Over Troubled Water, (Simon and Garfunkel) and a medley of Beatles tunes. Other performances have included the popular and romantic songs My Heart Will Go On, (perf. Celine Dion) the ‘theme’ song of the hugely popular and successful screen version of Titanic, The Greatest Love Of All (perf. Whitney Houston), and songs from the popular movie Sister Act starring Whoopi Goldberg including My Guy (Mary Wells; perf. version Delores and the Sisters) and I Will Follow Him (perf. version Delores and the Sisters). These popular musics occur side by side with military band musics within concert band performances to create a contrastive and dually meaningful musicscape.

Concert Band audience members, in my observations, are quick to categorise ‘police musics’ and ‘popular musics’ into contrastive categories. Many first-time concertgoers expressed surprise that the police would play “that kind of [popular] music”. One woman, sitting in front of me at a police band concert whispered to her friend, “You wouldn’t think that the cops would even know this song!” ‘This song’ was the popular romantic tune, ‘My Heart Will Go On’. Her companion agreed that, “No, you would not! I thought they’d just play police music”. I apologised to the women for overhearing and interrupting their conversation, and enquired about what the term ‘police music’ might refer to. The woman who had used this term replied, “oh, you know, brass bandy kind of things, like that song Britannia”, which the band
had performed earlier. ‘My Heart Will Go On’, however, was categorised by the women as a “really emotional song”. ‘Police music’ and the romantic love song ‘My Heart Will Go On’ exist here as affectively contrasting musical items.

Many concert-goers with whom I spoke separated specifically ‘police’ music from ‘popular’ music. This was particularly the case with popular romantic tunes. A great many, even the majority, of the popular songs that the police concert band performs are ‘romantic’ in style. Romantic tunes are those consisting of short, simple melodies of highly sentimental character, articulating themes of the longing, loss, and fulfilment of romantic love. Popular romantic tunes that articulate these themes seem to contain vastly different affective matter from both military music themes, which articulate via military instrument bodies the defeat of enemy others through the use of force. But one does not have to work particularly hard to think of many romantic tunes that employ the terms of force: hearts are often won and lost — even conquered, and love is often a battlefield. In this sense, there is no real sentimental contradiction between military and popular romantic musics, yet the basis of the contradiction that audience members recognise is affective.

The idea that sonic and visual discourses of state-police power (invested in military musics, military instrumentation and police bodies) are interspersed with popular and specifically romantic musics is one recognised by both band members and audience members as a contradictory association. In the recognition of a contradiction between military and romantic music, emotions, and in particular romantic or ‘love –emotions’ (in popular romantic music) and the apparent lack of them (in military music and quasi-military police bodies) is conflated with the lack of authority and its presence. Hamlin, a member of the police band, explained, making the same conflation in his explanation:

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5 Many people also expressed surprise to see concert or military band instruments ‘playing’ popular romantic tunes. This, I submit, is not because the instruments are ones which would not play them on a commercial recording: clarinets, drums, flutes, French horns, trumpets are not at all unusual musical presences in popular romantic songs. Rather, these instruments are instruments that are held by military and paramilitary bodies as they march in ANZAC Day and Remembrance Day parades, police cadet graduations, and events celebrating the power of the state. These are instruments that are invested with a specific military historicity that people remember when these instruments are in close proximity to a police or military body. These instrument bodies are understood to embody a particularly military materials memory, and audience members are thusly surprised to see instruments playing romantic songs.
I think the uniformed officer and the songs we play sometimes, it's absolutely at loggerheads with each other. Audience members know this, without a doubt. In a sense, it's what the whole success of the performance relies on. The uniform is representing authority, and it's the most sobering concept. You do this, or you get thrown in prison type of thing, at the worst-case scenario, right, and that's our job, to hold up the law, as coppers. And that kind of [popular] music of course is appealing because what could be intimidating is brought down to a level of, to joy and pleasure, and when you see that figure in a uniform, which is always cause for anxiety and stress since you were as young as you can remember, and turned into something where you laugh and you listen to and you have pleasure, given to you from the same figure. And it's very strong, and a fabulous demonstration of how advanced our society is, in a way. The power that can give and take away is also the power that is allowing entertainment....OK, you can go away privately and sing My Heart Will Go On wearing anything you want, but what we've got here is the most, the strongest contingent in the establishment is the police department, cos it's the most obvious. It's not as strong as the decisions made by politicians, but it feels much stronger because its presence is felt around every corner, that's the police department, and they uphold the police, they're policing, they're enforcing the law, that's what they do, and I think it's brilliant in our society that we have got the strongest symbolic representation of authority singing My Heart Will Go On (Fieldnotes).

In other words, affective themes of love, loss and romantic fulfilment stand in apparent contrast to the visibly unemotional, law enforcement police body that produces them in sound: no tears well up in its eyes for love lost. Yet the horn emits sounds that tell of the wrenched heart of that ostensibly emotionless figure, and the flute that the apparently emotionless figure plays “in dying notes discovers / the woes of helpless lovers” (Dryden, 1687). Within concert band performances state-affiliated bodies, both human and instrument, exist in contrast with the musical sounds contained in popular romantic songs — heart-break sounds, falling in love sounds — romantic song odour from the rose-throats of flutes.

I will argue shortly that this contradiction is in fact not a contradiction at all. Whether or not it is real or only a seeming contradictions is immaterial insofar as its effectiveness is concerned: the ‘contradiction’ works. It works to cast ostensibly unemotional and state-affiliated robots as human beings. The ethnographic information I have collected leads me to believe that audiences come to embrace police as both human and distanced from the state in a ways that they may not have prior to the performance. I was most convinced by this after I had attended a number
of police band performances given in local Adelaide High Schools. These performances are given by a group of nine band members known as ‘The Rock Patrol’. The Rock Patrol makes weekly visits to local secondary schools and plays a selection of currently popular rock and pop tunes to students and teachers assembled in the school gymnasium, interspersed with short lectures given by police band members on the danger and illegality of using drugs and underage drinking. This format, I suggest, is similar to the interspersing of military musics with popular ones in Concert band performances, which articulate a lack of emotion and its presence respectively.

The anti-drug/anti-alcohol lectures given during Rock Patrol performances specifically articulate the position of authoritative police on drug and alcohol offences, while the popular rock and pop tunes are understood by the many high school students I spoke with as “my drinking song”, “songs to get stoned to”, and “music of the young people”. These are songs to which these students have particularly emotional relationships: these are songs that, in their own opinions, articulate their own life experiences and world-views. These are songs that, in the words of one student, “say what it’s like to be me”, and in the words of another, “they express how young people feel about being young”. These songs are not only emotionally meaningful to young people, they are also meaningful in the sense that they articulate a resistance to authority.

While the band members performed one currently popular tune, one year ten student approached his teacher, who I was standing next to, and said “You wouldn’t understand this music, would ya?” The teacher replied that she did not recognise the song, and the student said, “This is young people’s music. Olds don’t get it, cos you’re part of the system. We screw with your system!!” Laughing and whooping, arms raised above his head, the student ran back to his friends and began to dance. This comment suggests that rock and pop musics are considered by many of these students to contain elements of anti-authority, which places the lectures that detail police authority over drug and alcohol consumption in seeming, but not actual, affective and authoritative contradiction with Rock Patrol musical items.
In the dozens of performances I attended, a particular chain of events occurred. The Rock Patrol members, including both female and male vocalists, a lead guitarist, a bass guitarist, a keyboard player, a saxophonist, a trumpet player, a percussionist/drummer and a sound engineer, arrive at the school while students attend classes, to set up. The students then file into the hall and sit on the gym floor. Despite the usual instructions of teachers to students that they should wait for the performance to begin in silence the students usually exchange remarks about the presence of “the pigs”6 in their school gymnasium. Some inevitably threaten to “dob” their friends in over the alcohol, drug or graffiti offences that they know their friends have recently engaged in. Some “recognise” in the band line-up “the pig who arrested my dad once”, and there many imitations of pig sounds are made, which draws laughter from other students and threats from the teachers. Usually, the band launches into its first number as soon as all the students are seated. The first couple of songs typically draw some mild applause, led by the teachers. As the performance progresses, the applause becomes louder and is spontaneous, rather than teacher-led. By the time the performance is half-way through, many students are dancing, and by its end, a mosh-pit has been established at the edge of the stage, and students ‘slam-dance’ and crowd-surf as they might at any other rock or pop band performance. At the end of the performance, students who, at the beginning of the performance, regarded the “pigs” with lively suspicion, ‘recognised’ the law enforcement officers who had arrested members of their families in the band line-up, and who knew that these “cops” would take action against graffittists, drug-takers and drunks, if they only knew who among these students were offenders, lined up with sheets of paper to get the band members’ autographs, and to ask them about their favourite rock bands and musicians. When I asked one of the many students who had categorised police band members as “filthy pigs” before the performance, about why he wanted to get their autographs, he replied, “I did not know that pigs could be cool. But, fuck me, they can be”.

6 I noticed during my fieldwork that secondary school students did not refer to the police as ‘revenue robots’ and the like, but used the term ‘pig’ quite frequently. I think this is because most of these students are too young to experience police as revenue collectors who are stationed at the side of the road, extracting money from speedsters and drink-drivers. The high school students nevertheless categorise police as subhuman.
This is precisely the kind of recognition, or, rather, *misrecognition*, that the police department wishes members of the public to make about police through police band performances, for it locates police in ‘cool’ places that ‘pigs’ could not inhabit before. A similar kind of misrecognition is evidently made by audience members during Concert band performances. As I argue below, popular music of the Whitney Houston and Celine Dion variety, when played in close proximity to the military sounds of the *Military Two-Step*, for example, makes a specific kind of surface contradiction that is recognisable to police band audiences. I suggest, in other words, that these popular and largely romantic tunes stand in apparent contradiction with military sounds and law enforcement bodies when viewed and heard by police band audiences.

The merging of competing or dissimilar musics has attracted the attention of theoreticians who are specifically interested in the unequal power relations underlying such a union. Qureshi argues, for example, that local, subaltern or subcultural musical practices, which often stand in opposition to the state and its interests in defining the nation, are co-opted and discursively redefined within the parameters of the dominant musical narrative (2000:811; see also Anderson, 1983). In the case at hand, however, the romantic and popular musics which *apparently* stand in contrast with state affiliated military band musics and impartial police bodies are not at all contrasting. Whatever contradiction audience members, and, apparently, police band members, recognise between popular and military music and bodies, or between rock music and police bodies giving lectures, is *not at all contradictory* insofar as police power is concerned — and it is thoroughly, inextricably concerned with both romantic and rock popular musics.

As Abercrombie and Longhurst note of Adorno’s critiques of “industrialised and “commodified” popular musics, the listener is “corrupted by immersion, and is made vulnerable and “open to the domination of the industrialised, capitalist system” (1998:19; see also Adorno, 1990). This, however, is not often recognised by those who listen to popular musics, and this lack of recognition is used in police band performances. Police capitalise on the public recognition of popular music as music that is distanced from or exists in contradiction to state power owing to its emotional properties. These contradictions rely, in the case of Concert Band music, on audience members’ categorisation of popular musics as affectively disassociated from military
or ‘police music’ that articulates the power of the state. In the case of the Rock Patrol performances, the contradiction that students recognise between anti-drug lecture and popular rock tune is one that relies on their categorisation of lectures as authoritative police directives, and rock and pop music as emotionally meaningful music that contains themes of anti-authority.

When they play popular music, police are understood by audience members to articulate their own emotions and their own distance from the state: here, cops become less pig, more cool, less military, more the kind of people who would know a Celine Dion song. These are the kinds of people who would not be expected to know such a song, and would, before the performance, be expected to produce ‘police music’. The knowledge of police that some women had before going to a concert band performance, “You wouldn’t think that the cops would even know this song!”, is transformed into a knowledge of police in which police do know that song, can sing it, and can make people feel what the police are apparently feeling in playing it. The knowledge that high school students had of police prior to a Rock band performance, in which cops arrest people, is transformed into a knowledge in which cops are ‘cool’. Here, Blacking’s (1985) argument, that audience members will feel in hearing music what musicians felt in producing it, is at the bottom of a police appropriation of emotion: police rely on audience members believing that the ‘cops’ playing the heart-wrenching story of two lovers expressing their undying commitment to one another, even as their ship sinks, feel the same emotions that they are communicating in the music. The cops are ‘cool’ to young high school students at the end of a performance not because they played the music, but because they felt it. Band members, of course, did not feel it — they were altogether too busy turning into trumpets; something that most audience members are not aware of. In showing that they really feel these emotions, cops cast themselves as human, not so law-enforcing, not so close to the state — ‘cool’. As police officers said, the whole point of police band performances is to create this image in the public mind so that people would be more accepting of police, and more specifically, more accepting of law enforcement police. Thus, the emotional properties of music, and the apparent emotional capacities of those who articulate and communicate it, are appropriated in the interests of maintaining law enforcement power.
Thus far, I have discussed the apparent, but not actual, contradictions between romantic and popular musical sounds and visual images of police, and between popular and romantic musical sounds and military musical sounds. Yet another apparent contradiction occurs, however, between the kinds of bodies that are presented as police bodies during each musical part of the whole performance. Just as police officers, in the training manual, are advised to “soften up your authoritarian image by removing your hat”, band members soften up their ostensibly authoritarian police images by engaging in performance gags in individual pieces of a performance. During these gags, the image of impartiality which limits the expression of emotion, dissolves into images of emotional expressiveness.

Shaun, a percussionist, pulls his face into strange and hilarious grimaces when he is required to play demanding drum routines and, when he is rewarded for doing so by shortling audiences, his grimaces become all the more exaggerated. During the musical recent concert band show, ‘A Night at the Proms’, Sam, on this occasion a bassoon soloist, performed Lucy Long. At various places during the solo, which the whole concert band accompanied, Sam indicated to the conductor that he had to do up his shoelace, or take an urgent call on his mobile telephone from his mother, who requested that he purchase toilet paper on his way home from the gig. As the conductor expressed his ‘anger’ at the repeated interruptions of the solo, Sam conveyed to the audience his nervous anxiety at the conductor’s angry attention, and his annoyance with both his mother and his shoelace. Each time Sam set down his bassoon to attend to these ‘unexpected’ matters, one of the band members would take the opportunity to make off with parts of his instrument. Each time this occurred, Sam expressed his surprise at its disappearance, his increasing anxiety over the conductor’s increasing anger, and his own anger at the band members who were stealing his bassoon parts, by waving a tightly curled fist at the offending members.

Sam continued to perform the solo on his reduced bassoon and, as its sounds became increasingly ridiculous, and as he expressed his increasing anger at these sounds, the audience members, who had been giggling mildly, responded with increasingly loud and unrestrained laughter. Finally, when Sam’s instrument had completely disappeared, Roland, the musical arranger, presented him with a burlap bag containing a trombone, which the band’s bus driver had obligingly run over and
flattened before the gig. Sam burst into ‘tears’ at this presentation, and then joined in with the laughter of the band members, bowing good-naturedly to them. When the house had finally quietened, the band played the solemn and traditional military pieces, Jerusalem, Men of Harlech, Fantasia on British Sea Songs, and Pomp and Circumstance Number 1.

This, again, is a seeming, but not actual, contradiction. In engaging in the emotional expressions of anxiety, nervousness, anger, depression and finally laughter, ostensibly police bodies seemingly break through the unemotional police skin that operational officers work to maintain in their daily operational practice. As I argued in chapter two, cops produce such bodies in order to construct a police image of “impartiality”. Cops show with their bodies, quite purposefully, that they have no emotional connection to any of the parts of the community they police. In certain performance moments though, emotions that are routinely operationally bound up inside dark blue police skins appear to break through in very unpolice-like ways. These band members seek here to demonstrate the ‘humanness’ of police by expressing their ‘human’ capacity for emotion. One band member, Roland, explained:

Our job is to soften up that harsh police image, to make people see that police can laugh and carry on and express themselves, just like any other person can (Fieldnotes).

However, Sam’s forlorn expressions at the progressive loss of his bassoon and Shaun’s funny grimaces as he tapped out increasingly complex rhythmic patterns were purposefully performed emotional expressions, and as such they were powerful ones. When the antics of the police band members make audiences laugh, as Sam’s and Shaun’s most certainly did, the audience members engage in laughter at the behest of the police comic performing the funny antics. As Katz (1999) notes of comics in general, funny antics make audience members tremble in accordance with the comic’s every whim, “even against [the audience’s] manifestly resisting will (“no, stop, I can’t take it!”), a power that Katz describes as the power to ‘virtually rape’ (1999:333). Here, police adorn themselves with evidence of emotional capacity, which contradicts or is popularly understood to be at odds with their operationally unemotional bodies. However, in terms of power, the performance of emotionality is consistent with the enforcement of law because it is used in performances to exert a
force over the bodies of audience members that makes these bodies quake, albeit with laughter, in accordance with the will of the police.

Band members here hold the power to make audience members respond in particularly emotional ways to them, and in this sense too, emotion of the kind that listeners and viewers experience is appropriated by the department. The interspersing of comedic elements with military music occurs regularly, which means that band members hold the power to organise the order in which ‘military’ and ‘funny’ items will occur, which in turn gives police band members the power to organise the order of emotional experiences they will communicate and that audience members will most likely have. This order is important because the power of police band performances to alter the view that people have of police is based on the apparently contradictory nature of the sonic and visual images being produced. An image of police as members of the public are thought to see police is produced in military music. This is immediately followed by a ‘contradictory’ piece, which presents a different image. Police do not seek here to replace one image with another, but seek instead to invest the former image with the affective qualities of the latter, which yields an image of law enforcement police who are emotional: human.

When ‘police’ bodies produce rock music, romantic love songs and funny antics during performances, the police body that is usually endowed with state power undergoes a process of intensive revaluation or recontextualisation, into humanness, via a demonstration of its emotional capacity. As Seremetakis argues, the revaluing of meaning endowed objects, or, in this case, bodies, is a political process (1994:135). In the case at hand, police band members, ostensibly police, seek to revalue the meaning endowed objects of their own bodies. The question is, does the recontextualisation of police bodies from state affiliated law enforcing bodies that exist in the street to bodies capable of feeling teen anxt or undying love actually work? Many band members reported that when they go into both high schools and kindergartens, where they perform popular children’s television musics such as the theme from Playschool and Thomas the Tank Engine, they are questioned about their presence at the school, and specifically whether they are there to make arrests or to make threats. Kindergarten children very often ask band members whether or not they are going to arrest them, and enquire of individual members whether they might be
“the policeman who is going to take me away if I’m naughty…that’s what my mum said will happen”. Band members always try to reassure students that they are there to play music and “have fun”, and privately acknowledge that the reputation of law enforcement officers has preceded its musical representatives. What generally occurs, however, is a very successful recontextualisation of police bodies. The clearest examples of this are rock band gigs. High school students typically articulate the success of the recontextualisation when they say to police band members after a gig: “I thought youse would suck, being pigs, but youse were cool”. These comments are directed to bodies that more usually speak as repositories of specifically law enforcement memories, which, via rock musical tongue, are unexpectedly revealed as “cool”. These recontextualised bodies, while ‘cool’ remain thoroughly powerful. The visibly outer skin of the police body is not corrupted or damaged by the speaking of “cool” rock music words, and indeed remains visibly “pig”, but the outer pig is suddenly less thoroughly pig, and is underneath its blue skin more like a human being. Humanness is here detected because ‘the pig’ communicates a feelingful musical language; a musical language of rock or pop already emotionally meaningful to the young people hearing it.

All of these seeming contradictions, between popular and romantic and state affiliated military musical sounds, between romantic and popular musical sounds and ostensibly powerful and authoritarian police and instrument bodies, and between bodily produced images of police efficiency and the police larrikinism, form the basis of the success of police band performances in creating in the public mind an image of law enforcement power and simultaneously a image of police as non-threatening, communicative, ‘cool’ everyday people who can inspire enjoyable or pleasurable emotional responses in people, and feel the emotion of the music they perform. But the redefinition of cop bodies via the everyday, affective or cool sounds they emit, and the funny antics they are able to express in performance moments is not a movement of cops to emotionally expressive involvement in everyday life worlds any more than the rhetorical commitment to community policing itself is. This ‘recontextualisation’ of police bodies is ultimately political, and ultimately powerful.

As I have said, using seeming contradictions as state power purposes is very effective, but I do not want to suggest that it works every single time the band members employ
it. Ironically, it is sometimes the cops themselves that shatter the carefully constructed visual and sonic images of the police that are created by the police band. If many apparent, but not actual, power or authority contradictions lie within the musical performances of the police band itself, and if the outcome is that members of the public go away from performances with an inkling that cops are less robotic or 'pig' than they thought, then the ultimate contradiction must be the one in which the police image is contradicted by the cops themselves. Said one of the band’s flautists:

There was one job we did when we played to the children in a rehabilitation environment, who had committed crimes, and we had 2 coppers, who were listening to us as well, and we went through our thing, about, y’know, music, how much fun it is, and gave our little message, and they were laughing and smiling and comfortable too. But then after we had finished that - and the feeling in the room was quite positive - 2 coppers stood up and said “now guys, we want you to know that we can be your friends, like the band has just shown you, but we can also be your worst nightmare” and that was what he said. And he was this guy who was overweight, and he had this gun and a baton, and the energy in the room just changed in an instant. What we had achieved in 45 minutes for police-community relations had just been completely destroyed… they would remember that, “hey, those guys were good”, but generally, they would go, “yeah, cops are arseholes”. Because what he said was an arsehole of a thing to say. And ah, that’s the sort of reason, that’s the sort of thing that people get out of a police officer in general, they get a very negative way in which the police can uphold the law, and I don’t like that myself, but that is the kind of thing that can go on. We still try…
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have attempted to tell one ethnographic story; one of the many that I might have told from the masses of ethnographic data I collected during 18 months of fieldwork with the police officers and the police band members of the SAPOL. This story is one which began with a description of a problem, a problem that the police department has, that is born of what officers in the department believe is the public perception of police. I have argued in chapter six that this the public opinion of police is one that is based on a metonymic understanding of police, in which the entirety of policing is characterised by one of its component parts: law enforcement policing.

In the opinions of many officers, members of the public believe cops do not care for people, but instead act to fine or apprehend those who contravene the law. According to many officers, “people think we deal with the public bad, but we don’t do much in the way of public good”. The focus of ‘catching baddies’ at the expense of ‘assisting goodies’ is thought by many operational cops and some managerial staff to not only ignore the notion of public good, but to damage it. As I noted in chapter two, ignoring notions of public good is good for saving money; catching speeding drivers raises money in a way that teaching elderly people how to check for strangers at the door before opening it does not. “Some members of the public”, noticed one officer, “think that we’re just part of a revenue raising conspiracy when we book motorists”. One of the ‘some’ who do is my friend Jennifer, who insists that the cops have quotas to meet when they take up positions at the side of the road to pull over speeding or alcohol influenced drivers. These are the kinds of comments that cops say they hear every single day.

Notions of public good underpin the concept of ‘community policing’ that most officers believe to be rhetorically, but not practically, existent in the department. Instead of community or proactive policing, SAPOL cops are bound to the performance of law enforcement policing. This kind of policing requires that cops disguise the emotional attachments they might have to members of the community for the sake of protecting each person’s right to impartial police treatment. I have argued that cops disconnect from members of the community by keeping what they take to be a connector of
persons in check. This connecting element is emotion. Through a surveillance that is multi-sensory, cops ‘watch’ their bodies for signs of the emotion that would evidently connect them to members of the community. In surveilling their bodies, police rein in the expression of emotion and its connecting qualities. It is of interest that Lyon and Barbalet argue that emotion links the body with the social world because emotion activates distinct dispositions, postures and movements, which:

are not only attitudinal but also physical, involving the way in which individual bodies together with others articulate a common purpose, design, or order... emotion is precisely the experience of embodied sociality” (1994:48).

Emotion, then, is at the crux of the unreflected upon process of being part of the social or community body, which the cops proceed to remove themselves from as they reflect upon their bodies to ultimately embody, via the absence of emotional expression, unsociality or disconnectedness.

The ‘disconnectedness’ of the police from the policed community that forms the mode of delivery for law enforcement policing is understood by cops to compound their already less-than-satisfactory image in the eyes of the public; not only are cops reluctant to do public good, they are also evidently unfeeling. While cops are keen to change this image, mostly because it impacts on police morale, and, consequently, on the commitment with which officers carry out their work, they are not at liberty to introduce the kind of public good or proactive policing that many believe would turn their image around. This, as I have explained, is not an option because law enforcement policing is a far more statistically demonstrable success, and is, in the short term, cheaper to run; proactive or community policing activities generally involve great financial input before any results occur, and the results generally occur over the long term. The police department is by its own admission financially impoverished, and cannot afford to implement such a system. Thus, it is left with a problem: how to counter the image crisis without actually changing anything about the way in which policing is practically done?

Enter the police band. The police band members serve to reanimate subhuman police officers by making evident emotions present beneath disconnected dark blue skins. This reanimation is achieved because cops and members of the public understand emotion to
be a defining characteristic of humanness: emotion here exists in metonymic relation to humanness. Band members, who look just like cops, speak to members of the public in what the police department describes as ‘the language of emotion’: music.

Emotionful language, musical and otherwise, is spoken in a number of ways — sonically, in particular pieces of romantic and rock musics, and visually, in cop bodies that are sometimes larrikinish and which sometimes seem to be expressive of emotion. These emotionful languages are not spoken constantly, and are routinely interspersed with sonic and visual images, which audience members take to be devoid of emotion and full of state power. Police band bodies, for example, appear in one performance moment as state affiliated military bodies, and appear in the next laughing and crying over a smashed-up bassoon. In one performance moment, ostensibly unemotional police band bodies perform Troop Pageantry, and in the next, the same bodies perform a haunting rendition of My Heart Will Go On. In one performance moment, police bodies embody material memories of state force, and in the next, they seem to communicate, and indeed, *seem to feel*, emotions of love, longing, and sadness. I have argued that audience members categorise police bodies and military musics as state-affiliated, powerful, and emotionless, and they categorise popular romantic and rock musics as emotionful and distanced from the state. The police department capitalises on these audience categorisations of affective difference, arranging seemingly opposing musics and images side by side throughout the performance. Similarly, emotionally expressive police bodies are displayed in one performance moment, only to be replaced in the next with an ostensibly unemotional body. These seemingly contradictory images are in fact not contradictory, however, insofar as the relations of power are concerned: the police department intersperses seemingly contradictory images to make law enforcement police officers seem endowed with emotional capacity in order to maintain law enforcement power.

I have argued in chapter six that police band members seem emotional to audience members because audience members believe cops to be *really feeling* the emotions of the music they communicate. This is the basis of John Blacking’s (1985) argument, in which he put forth his position, that listeners and musicians will feel in their bodies the same feelings, which will then translate into particular emotions in any given cultural context. As I have said, this thesis takes its point of departure from this argument. For
band members, the emotional effects of the music change in direct relation to the sensual, corporeal experiences that band members have during musical production. In short, when band members incorporate and embody elements of musical instruments and musical sounds, as they habitually do in performances, they experience the music as a joyful, heavenly, buzzing, loving experience that is best described in Serres's terminology as the experience of sensual extension. Band members feel in performing music what I have termed 'meta-emotion', an emotion that is not nameable as happy, sad, or angry, but which is an all-encompassing feeling of ecstasy that only band members engaged in performing music feel. I have argued that listeners will not feel that which musicians feel in the production of music, because the production of music for band members involves sensually extending into one's own instrument. However much music may sweep a listener away to another time or to another place as it evokes situated experiences (what Stokes (1994:7) has called the construction of place) it cannot transform the listener into a saxophone, a trumpet or a flute. For this sensual extension to occur, a person must take up an instrument and forget to notice the points at which fingers encounter instrument body, where breath intersects with mouthpiece, where hearing intersects with that sound. A person must, in other words, wholly sensually embody an instrument. Audience members may well be sensually extended into their seats, they may well disattend to hearing as it encounters musical sounds, but they are not in positions to become saxophones, trumpets or flutes because they do not wholly, sensually, embody instruments. Band members, of course, do: and to do so, the points of their sensual encounters fall way behind their self conscious awarenesses.

In one way, from an audience perspective, a visual way, the difference between audience members listening to music and band members performing it is akin to the difference between watching a love scene at the movies and making love. In the former case, one is visually presented with two bodies thoroughly intertwined, and in the latter, one experiences intertwinemnt. I have argued in this thesis that this latter kind of intertwinemnt is one that cannot be watched by its participants for, if it were, the whole act of making love would be vulnerable to breakdown, just as piano playing or typing would be. In any and all of these cases, intertwinemnt of hands and pianos, fingers and keyboards, and bodies and bodies occurs in the absence of visual (and other sensory) surveillance. Intertwinement depends wholly on crossing a divide between
subject and object, and this is a divide crossed when boundaries between them are wholly ignored.

On stage then, are 36 instrumentalised humans, all of them orgasmically close to heaven, not because that is the emotional content of the music they play, but because leaving the body site to become instrumentalised is like leaving the body site to make love with a cherished, loved partner. Seated in rows before them are listeners and viewers listening to and watching musical lovemaking without even recognising it as such: audience members can listen to words about love, they can watch as a finger strokes a sax key, but they cannot themselves make instrumentalised love.

Metaphors of lovemaking are consistently used by band members to describe the process of becoming instrumentalised, as are metaphors of creating and cooking food. As I have argued in this thesis, these metaphors are apt indeed because they describe particularly penetrative experiences, in which matter moves into the body and circulates inside it. Similarly, band members take up instruments and in a sense, or rather, in many senses all at once, consume them, take them inside their bodies to become instrumentalised persons.

Of all the chapters of this thesis, the ones concerning descriptions of sensual bodily joy, experienced when the senses exceed the body site in order to ‘become’ themselves, were the most difficult to write. There is good reason for this difficulty; as both Serres (1998) and Nietzsche (1968, [1887] 1974) suggest, when one attempts to capture lived everyday experience in language, the realness, the livedness of the experience is lost. In order to really know the experience of sensual extension, the experience of, in this case, becoming instrumentalised, one must experience it. I have attempted in this thesis to adopt Serres’s method of describing that which description at least partly destroys. The approach that Serres takes to describe the sensual life of the body is one in which he avoids describing descriptions of its sensual life in language; something which he accuses Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists of doing. Serres is repelled and disgusted by Merleau-Pontian phenomenology because, in his view, this phenomenology holds one sense still at a time in order to describe it in language, something which takes a sense out of it its lived context in which it exists bound up with all of the other senses. As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, Serres’s work is
perhaps more than a little confusing: if Serres wishes to write about hearing, for example, he cannot do so without writing about taste and smell and so on. In this regard, Serres’s writing of the experience of the body attempts to mirror lived bodily experience itself: Serres tries not to isolate one sense for the purposes of description. As I also noted in my introductory remarks, Serres’s utter horror at the thought of Condillac’s famous statue being deprived in turn of every sense but one for the purposes of the clear description of each means that he is left struggling in vain to describe something which defies organisation into any kind of order.

And so too was I, as I attempted in this thesis to capture the lived sensual experiences of band members as they turn into instrumentalised people. I have tried, perhaps in vain, to capture the multi-sensory experience of becoming instrumentalised, rather than discussing what happens to each sense in turn, because I believe, as Serres does, that if I had examined the senses one at a time, in order to be able to describe them in language, I would no longer be describing the sensual life of instrumentalised bodies. I would instead be describing the processes through which Condillac’s statue might proceed. I have avoided doing this, for, as I said in the introduction to this thesis, Condillac’s statue, which has the neat, but inhuman capacity to live only one sense at a time, fills me, and Serres too, with the horror of subtraction, or abstraction, of analysis itself. Experiences close to heaven, experiences of orgasmic joy, are not reducible to the life of a single-sensing statue.

When band members attempt to locate themselves and their instrument partners on opposite sides of a subject-object divide, as they do in rehearsals, the orgasmic, close-to-God experience of performance is lost. Here, band members pay close attention to the boundaries that separate them in order to work on technically correct touch, which in turn produces technically correct musical sounds. The close attention to that which separates instruments from players is paid by players to the points at which intersection between them occurs, and it is at this point that players realise with horror and grief that they are hurting the bodies of their beloved instruments with their own injured and incapacitated breaths and tongues, and these hurt instrument bodies call out in protest. These horrific experiences of injury and of injuring usher in experiences of the present body, a body that band members are loathe to inhabit, a body that if not for the conductor, who rips band members’ self conscious attentions back to player-instrument
intersections, would joyfully skitter out of the prison of the band member’s body, under the bright surveillance beam and out into trumpety freedom.

This trumpety freedom, this joy, this meta-emotion is not open to appropriation by the police department, as ‘listener emotion’ is, because audience members, including police audience members, are not generally aware of its existence. In this sense, the meta-emotion that band members feel in performing music is a kind of resistance: band members, while being used by the department to maintain a particular kind of law enforcement power, are not themselves subject to the power of the police department to harness and appropriate the emotionful power of music. Band members, then, are not only free of pain in performance, they are also free of the cops: band members inhabit a plane well beyond the reach of the power of the cops to appropriate emotion.

As I have noted, this ethnographic story, which I now bring to a close, is only one of many that I might have told. This story is a story cops, and of their disconnection from the body of the community, achieved via an embodiment of emotional disconnection; it is a story of the power of the department to appropriate a particular order of emotion for the purposes of power, and it is about the misrecognition of the appropriation of emotion by members of the public who are open to the department’s emotional domination. Most of all though, it is a story of heaven and hell, of joy and pain, and of instrumentalised people and personalised instruments. This is a story about the members of the heavenly, orgasmic, close to God band, the band of the South Australia Police.
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