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This comprehensive volume appears at a time when many bemoan the decline of ethical and moral standards. Paul Lawrence Farber, the Distinguished Professor of the History of Science at Oregon State University, points out in his book that the roots of this crisis of values reach back to the mid-nineteenth century, the time when science undermined the religious view of the world amongst the learned public, while being unable to substitute a code of conduct as strong and coherent as that based on metaphysics.

The book opens with the review of the contributions to ethics made by Charles Darwin. These consisted of showing plausibly the evolutionary origin of human moral sentiment and of establishing its adaptive value. Darwin’s argument was simple: humans evolved like other animals through natural selection. This included mental evolution that produced higher faculties including moral sensibilities. Morally correct actions were those contributing to the ‘general good’ of the community. An approach to ethics from the perspective of natural history had an intellectual appeal to rational minds. Among these were two Cambridge graduates: William Kingdon Clifford and Leslie Stephen. Clifford argued that social efficiency was a measure of right and wrong. Stephen was influenced by the utilitarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill, although he did not agree with all its tenets. He was searching for a rational justification of existing morality rather than trying to establish a new system. Stephen related individual behaviour to social context and thus considered morality a result of group selection.

A significant place in the book is given to the work of Herbert Spencer, perhaps the best known of ‘evolutionary ethicists’. Spencer produced the vision of progressive social evolution leading to the Utopian industrial society based on mutual aid rather than on competition. Unlike Darwin, who simply sought explanations for the origin of moral sentiment, Spencer was trying to establish evolutionary justification for social idealism and in this way to construct ‘strictly scientific morality’.

The search for evolutionary ethics in the second half of the 19th century was criticized by philosophers and even by evolutionary scientists. Prominent among them were Thomas Henry Huxley and Alfred Russel Wallace. Huxley maintained that humans, although a product of evolutionary forces, were reaching beyond the constant struggle and change in nature to produce stability and permanence. This could be presented as a conflict between humans and nature, between primitive instincts and cultural ideas. Wallace, like Huxley, saw the duality of humans and nature. He even stated that with human mental advance natural selection ceased to operate on the human body. Wallace’s firm belief in spiritualism contributed to his opinion that natural selection cannot account for human moral and mental faculties. The views of
the two evolutionists reflected the general opinion of contemporary philosophers: that ethics and morality are higher human phenomena that cannot be produced by natural evolution.

The lines of thought that emerged in the 19th century continued to be pursued with some modifications throughout the 20th century. Julian Huxley, the grandson of Thomas Henry, provides the best example. This architect of modern evolutionary synthesis, like his grandfather, saw a discontinuity between animal evolution and human conduct, the departure of culture beyond simple biological development. Other architects of the modern synthesis – George Gaylord Simpson and Theodosius Dobzhansky – similarly maintained that there was no possibility of deriving ethical standards from evolutionary history.

Edward O. Wilson’s 1975 book Sociobiology opened the last chapter in the reappraisal of evolutionary ethics. It stressed the genetic basis of social behaviour. Yet again, however, the nature/humanity dualism raised its head. Although most sociobiologists state that there is an evolutionary continuity between animals and humans, they also believe that culture is largely a specifically human property. Even Richard Dawkins admits that genes and ‘memes’ (cultural units) may act in opposition to each other.

At the threshold of the 21st century there is still no answer as to what we can base our ethical and moral codes on. Science, so triumphant in many other areas, has failed to provide firm answers to the central question of how we should conduct ourselves with respect to each other and to the world. This failure leads to environmental destruction, to continuing military conflicts and to increasing crime rates. It seems that the reason for this dismal state of affairs is the current focus of scientific activities on intellectually easy, and financially profitable, achievements in medicine and technology and neglect of the intellectually demanding issue of the understanding of ourselves.

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Infant and child mortality in low-income countries remains terribly high, with an estimated 12·4 million deaths occurring among children less than 5 years old each year. The majority of these deaths are due to acute respiratory infections, diarrhoeal diseases, measles, malaria and malnutrition and, until recently, it was widely held by international agencies such as WHO and UNICEF that the single most effective way to prevent these deaths was through the deployment of disease-specific control programmes (such as the administration of vitamin A capsules, immunization programmes etc).

This supplement represents a major shift in the outlook of staff employed by these international agencies. It acknowledges the limits of many selective biomedical interventions and suggests that deaths among infants and children could be further