Situating Masculinities in Global Politics

Dr Chris Beasley
School of History and Politics
University of Adelaide

and

Dr Juanita Elias
School of History and Politics
University of Adelaide

Refereed paper presented to the
Second Oceanic Conference on International Studies
University of Melbourne
5-7 July 2006
OCIS Conference Melbourne 2006

Situating Masculinities in Global Politics
Chris Beasley and Juanita Elias

Abstract:
This paper looks at the distinctive ways in which critical studies of men and masculinity and critical feminist scholarship have sought to bring the concept of ‘globalisation’ into their research. A key concern of the paper is to outline these two inter-related, yet competing perspectives employ understandings of globalisation as a gendered process.

In discussing the critical masculinities studies literature associated with writers such as Michael Kimmel and R. W. Connell, we argue that this research often approaches the process of globalisation in macro-structural terms; stressing the reification of hegemonically masculine values and identities in modern capitalist society. In this sense globalisation is viewed in terms of the entrenchment of masculinised processes of ‘business-globalisation’ that corresponds with the interests of elite men—what Connell has labelled ‘transnational business masculinity’. Although the idea of hegemonic masculinity is often presented as a context within which competing and alternative gendered identities emerge – in this sense, gender identities are tied to notions of a ‘global gender order’ in which certain types of masculinity are dominant.

By contrast a feminist body of literature that has emerged within studies of political economy, social anthropology and sociology has engaged more critically with notions of gendered identities in international politics—highlighting how gendered forms of inequality are cross cut with other forms of inequality (in particular those based upon race and ethnicity). More recently, this literature has started to problematise the very category of gender highlighting how the gendered impacts of globalisation manifest themselves in terms of the re-shaping of and challenging of established gender identities. Our analysis therefore raises concerns about the use of fixed categories such as ‘hegemonic masculinity’. In this sense, whilst there is some importance in dealing with concepts of elite or hegemonic masculine identities in thinking about globalisation – this should not be at the expense of a more theoretically nuanced understanding of the gendered impacts of globalisation. Essentially we wish to demonstrate that whilst there is a clear analytical usefulness in dealing with ideas of hegemonic masculinity; at the same time, this should not be at the expense of developments within feminist theory.

Introduction
Masculinity Studies writers can be credited with bringing to attention not just how gender is part and parcel of social life and social organisation, but in addition how masculinity in particular is implicated in all aspects of sociality. As Kimmel points out, masculinity is almost invariably invisible in shaping social relations, its ever-present specificity and significance shrouded in its constitution as the universal, the axiomatic, the neutral. Masculinity, he notes, assumes the banality of the unstated norm—not requiring comment, let alone explanation. Its invisibility bespeaks its
privilege. ‘One of the principal ingredients of men’s power and privilege’ then becomes men’s indiscernible status as men:

The very processes that confer privilege to one group and not to another are often invisible to those upon whom that privilege is conferred...men have come to think of themselves as genderless, in part because they can afford the luxury of ignoring the centrality of gender ... And the invisibility of gender to those privileged by it reproduces the inequalities that are circumscribed by gender.

Thus rendering gender and masculinity visible offers a challenge to existing power relations and their continuing reiteration.

In similar fashion, Masculinity Studies writers—like Kimmel and Connell amongst others—have drawn attention to how globalisation and global politics are not gender-free and largely privilege forms of masculinity in an emerging world gender order. It is at this point that we want to acknowledge both the considerable contribution of Masculinity Studies writers to gender analysis at a local, national level, and the opportunities their work enables at the level of the global in highlighting the ways in which supposedly gender-neutral global processes are linked to the politics of masculinity. While ‘most theories of globalization have little or nothing to say about gender’, Masculinity Studies writers make visible the gendered character, for example, of the rhetorically gender-neutral neo-liberal market agenda in global politics, diplomacy, institutions and economics.

However, as Connell points out, existing analyses of masculinities in many regions and countries cannot be simply be added together to produce a ‘global understanding of masculinities’. In an ever more globalised world local analyses are no longer sufficient. Rather, a grasp of large-scale social processes and global relationships is necessary to understand ‘masculinities on a world scale’. Given the increasing interactions between the global and local, this scale of analysis also becomes relevant to gender issues at the local level.

---

2 Jim McKay et al., ‘“Gentlemen, The Lunchbox has landed”’, in Kimmel et al., Handbook, p.270.
5 ibid, Masculinities, 2nd edition , p. xxi.
6 ibid, pp. 254-5.
7 ibid, pp. xx-xxi.
Nevertheless, Masculinity Studies writings on global matters are as yet in their infancy. According to Connell, ‘there are still only a handful of studies of masculinity formation in transnational arenas’,\(^9\) despite the critical importance of this work. Similarly, in the ‘Introduction’ to the *Handbook of Studies on Men & Masculinities*, Kimmel et al. state that research in this field on a world scale is very uneven and ‘still mainly a First World enterprise’.\(^{10}\) We acknowledge that at this point that such writings can scarcely be subjected to an overly nitpicking interrogation. All the same, precisely because we agree that the investigation of gender and masculinities in global politics is indeed of great significance, we suggest that perhaps this is the moment to pause and look somewhat more closely at the theoretical and terminological tools presently employed by Masculinity Studies writers. We are encouraged in this endeavour by Connell’s own view that it is timely to reassess these tools,\(^{11}\) given that the most commonly used emerged well over twenty years ago, and both theoretical and empirical materials on masculinities have developed since that time. Moreover, it is even more likely that tools originally generated in response to local agendas may require some rethinking to deal with the growing body of literature on the global gender order.

We suggest that by focussing upon the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’—a term almost ubiquitously used in Masculinity Studies in writings about both local and global arenas—we can offer some useful directions for situating the as yet relatively undeveloped analysis of gender and masculinities in global politics.

**Existing Problems in the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’**

Hearn has drawn attention to Connell’s early development and ongoing usage of the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (first proposed in Connell \([1979] 1983\))—a term which is now virtually omnipresent in Masculinity Studies literature,\(^{12}\) as well as being very widely employed in Feminist and Sexuality writings attending to masculinity. Because this terminology has unparalleled usage and occupies a uniquely privileged positioning in the study of men and masculinities within local gender orders, it is clearly a crucial term for situating masculinities per se. In addition, it is viewed by Connell and the vast majority of Masculinity Studies writers as framing analysis of masculinities in a global context.

The term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ was most importantly a means to recognizing that ‘all masculinities are not created equal’\(^{13}\) and was intended to counter sharply oppositional conceptions of binary gender power and unitary categorical notions of gender identity. The term invoked a framing that drew attention to the diversity within masculinities, to multiple masculinities. Masculinity in this reading is not all of a piece, nor about power externalised. Rather masculinity is de-massified as masculinities and these are not equal. Hegemonic masculinity holds an authoritative positioning over other masculinities and will ‘dominate other

---


\(^{13}\)Kimmel, ‘Integrating men’.
types in any particular historical and social context’. 14 However, at this point, as a number of writers within Masculinity Studies have indicated, the term becomes more slippery. Flood has noted, for example, that Connell’s own usage of the term slides between several meanings. 15 In short, we suggest that these may be summarised as a slippage between its meaning as a political mechanism tied to the word ‘hegemony’, as a descriptive word referring to dominant (most powerful and/or most widespread), 16 and as an empirical reference specifically to actual groups of men.

The first meaning of hegemonic masculinity as a political mechanism relates to Connell’s employment of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s usage of ‘hegemony’, meaning cultural/moral leadership to ensure popular or mass consent to particular forms of rule. Gramsci’s concern was to challenge economic reductionist and merely coercive accounts of power by asserting the importance of leadership, its educative role in gaining consent and constructing alliances. Power in this account is more subtle, more multi-faceted than mere coercion. Thus hegemony at a local and global level is not necessarily to be equated with economic or military dominance. 17 In this version of hegemonic masculinity as political mechanism, Connell’s account is instructive: hegemony

refers to the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life ... Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women. 18 (emphasis added)

Here the cultural leadership that is crucial to hegemonic masculinity is crucially concerned with the political agenda of sustaining hierarchically organised power relations between men and women. This, above all, is its meaning, its raison d’être and leitmotif. Yet when Connell and other Masculinity Studies writers outline how this political task is to be achieved, they locate the hegemonic masculine as always in necessary association with subaltern masculinities. 19 In the process further characterising elements appear. Connell distinguishes hegemonic masculinity from complicit, marginalised and subordinated masculinities. 20 It is at this point that certain difficulties appear in the term hegemonic masculinity.

On the one hand, hegemonic masculinity is a currently accepted ‘strategy’, a leadership positioning, a configuration of practice generating consent and alliances—a political mechanism, as noted above—and is not, Connell insists, a ‘fixed character
type’. In similar fashion he asserts that subaltern masculinities are also not character types, with a set content, but rather are historically and socially variable. However, in Connell’s work and in most Masculinity Studies writings, hegemonic masculinity is given certain characteristics by its association with the accounts of subaltern masculinities. Partly this occurs because while hegemonic masculinity is more likely to maintain—at least in its depiction in local western settings—its supposed definition as a political strategy of gender hierarchy, the subaltern masculinities are almost invariably presented as groups of actual men.

The slippage in the term hegemonic masculinity from its meaning as about the political mechanism of legitimation to a merely dominant ideal or even more narrowly to dominant men is still more evident when Connell argues that its tenets are misogyny, heterosexuality and homophobia. Here the term is once again given specific characteristics that relate to—function as the negative mirror of—the array of subaltern masculinities. Only the first of these characteristics, misogyny, would appear inevitably implicated in his account of the term as the legitimating mechanism of gendered hierarchy. The specification of heterosexuality and homophobia—which is tied to his account of ‘subordinated masculinities’—is at least in Connell’s usage of hegemonic masculinity in local western settings inclined to give it a more fixed set of characteristics than its politically-based definition around the gendered power of men as against women would warrant. Such a specification also assumes a linkage between heterosexuality and gendered power that appears oftentimes as fixed rather than contextual.

In both cases there is slide from political strategy into existing socially dominant ideals/forms of masculinity and/or actual men. In this slippage, hegemonic masculinity as political mechanism becomes existing pre- eminent types of men.

The danger here is three-fold. Firstly, as Flood notes, it is politically deterministic and defeatist to equate that the most dominant (in the sense either of most powerful or most widespread) ideals/forms of masculinity are necessarily the same as those which work to guarantee men’s authority over women. Dominant forms of masculinity, for example, may not always, at all times, legitimate men’s power and those that do legitimate it may not always be socially celebrated or common. Connell himself has acknowledged this slide in his work between

21 ibid, pp. 76, 77, 81.
22 Other less commonly used sub-terminologies employed by Connell and others—such as Kimmel, Gerami and and Cheng—include ‘exemplary’, ‘protest’, ‘hyper’ and ‘subaltern’, as well as ‘hypo’ and counterhegemonic masculinities. With the exception of the first perhaps, all slide between referring to normative social practices/ideals (similar to Connell’s favoured definition of hegemonic masculinity) and describing groups of actual men. In short, the array of terms employed in Masculinity Studies often implicitly refer to very different ‘registers’, and yet are typically employed as if they are all commensurable. Connell, Masculinities, 2nd edition; Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its Mal(e)contents’; Shahin Gerami, in Kimmel et al., Handbook; Cliff Cheng, ‘Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity: Introduction’, The Journal of Men’s Studies 7 (3) (Spring 1999).
24 As can be seen in note 46, this fixity is undermined in Connell’s own analysis of hegemonic masculinity in the global context.
25 Flood, ‘Between Men and Masculinity’.
patriarchal legitimating strategy and merely dominant.\textsuperscript{26} He cautions that hegemonic masculinity may actually describe the position of a minority of men,\textsuperscript{27} and has recently re-emphasised that he does intend the term to be defined by its political strategic function in legitimating patriarchy.\textsuperscript{28} Nevertheless, the problem of a slide towards a usage that refers to dominant types of men reoccurs in his work on the global context, as we will discuss shortly. This raises a second issue. The understanding of hegemonic as simply socially dominant opens up a further slippage in which hegemonic is often understood even more fixedly as actual particular groups of men. As Flood points out, actual men may or may not conform to cultural ideals concerning masculinity, even when these are associated with power or are pervasive.\textsuperscript{29}

Such a focus on actually existing groups of men generates a third related problem concerning the association of hegemonic masculinity with types of men in the sense of actual men exhibiting a list of specific characteristics. The social malleability of hegemonic practice is lost in equating gendered power with assumed fixed personality types, as Connell is well aware. Yet this is a common inclination in many Masculinity Studies writings.\textsuperscript{30} In all these accounts hegemonic masculinity becomes a certain kind of masculinity that refuses being in any way like women, is ‘success’ oriented, exudes self-reliant authority, is forceful and willing to take risks. As Clatterbaugh argues, such models prohibit asking which traits might be crucial to masculinity (and hence to hegemonic masculinity) and which are incidental.\textsuperscript{31}

Usage of the term to refer to dominant actual men and their characteristics is no doubt understandable pedagogically and in the context of political activism, in that it gives gendered power a human face, a visceral reality, and makes the term more accessible and less abstract. However, the cascading slide from hegemonic masculinity as the mechanism of patriarchal legitimation towards socially dominant (powerful and/or widespread) types of men, towards actual men, and finally towards a cluster list of generalised personality traits, is not a question merely of sloppy usage, theoretical confusion, or theoretical underdevelopment. In all fairness, it must be said that these are not entirely discrete definitional entities. Connell’s definition of hegemonic masculinity reveals this difficulty at the heart of his employment of the word, hegemonic:

\begin{quote}
The concept of ‘hegemony’ ... refers to the \textit{cultural dynamic} by which a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life. At any given time, one form of masculinity rather than others is culturally exalted. ... This is not to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{26} see also Patricia Y. Martin, ‘Why can’t a Man be more like a Woman? Reflections on Connell’s \textit{Masculinities}, Gender & Society 12 (1998), p. 473.
\textsuperscript{29} Flood, ‘Between Men and Masculinity’.
\textsuperscript{31} Kenneth Clatterbaugh, ‘What is problematic about Masculinities?’, \textit{Men and Masculinities} 1(July 1998), p. 33.
say that the most visible bearers of hegemonic masculinity are always the most powerful people. ... Nevertheless, hegemony is likely to be established only if there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective if not individual.\textsuperscript{32}

Here is a clear instance of the way in which what is first described as cultural ideal with a political function becomes linked through its ‘likely’ requirement of dominance in the form of ‘institutional power’ to both its individual and collective ‘bearers’. All the same, the slide to dominant types of men/actual men—even if understandable and related to an attempt to give embodied materiality to the political mechanism of a legitimating cultural ideal—has problematic consequences. For example, to put Connell’s conception of hegemonic masculinity as political mechanism to work, it is important to be able to disentangle hegemonic from merely dominant types/actual men or particular personality traits. It is important to be able to perceive that a senior manager in the major accounting firm KPMG Australia\textsuperscript{33} and his mates may represent a dominant masculinity in that he wields a widely accepted institutional power and may even perhaps have particular personality traits associated with that dominance, but may not necessarily be the politically legitimating cultural ideal (that is, a mobilising ideal–that most often has institutional clout) invoked by the term hegemonic masculinity.

\textbf{Problems as the term goes global}\n
The problems that seem to haunt the term hegemonic masculinity in local western settings are not surprisingly magnified on the larger stage of the global. Here the question of whether the term involves a discussion of an authoritative cultural ideal mobilising patriarchal legitimation, dominant ideal/types of men, dominant actual men or their characteristic traits becomes very evident. Connell has in recent times articulated usage of the term into the global arena as part of the project of globalization. He discusses the globalization of gender, the constitution of a global gender order as an aspect of a ‘larger reality: global society’. In this way, Connell and other Masculinity Studies provide a laudable contribution to the globalization literature. Gender and masculinity are made visible in the contemporary world, made relevant to current preoccupations with international relations, notions of human rights, terrorism, migration, global markets and flows of capital, postcolonial debates, global communications and cultural forms including religious practices, and global inequalities, amongst a multitude of other pressing topics. This is no mean feat, even though analysis of masculinities in transnational arenas, as noted earlier, is ‘still rare’.\textsuperscript{34}

Nevertheless, Connell’s way of entering the still undeveloped field of situating masculinities—and specifically hegemonic masculinity—in global politics reveals unresolved difficulties in the latter term all the more starkly. Connell, Hearn and Kimmel assert in concert that ‘the most obviously important’ issue in the future of the field researching masculinity in the setting of globalization ‘is the relation of masculinities to those emerging dominant powers in the global capitalist economy, the

\textsuperscript{32} Connell, \textit{Masculinities}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{33} \url{www.kpmg.com.au} (20 March 2006)
\textsuperscript{34} R. W. Connell, ‘Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities’, in Kimmel et al., \textit{Handbook}, p. 85. We would note, in this context, that terms like gender or masculinity do not make their way into books like Griffiths and O’Callaghan, \textit{International Relations: The Key Concepts}.  

transnational corporations’. Connell’s particular contribution to this field, which appears largely accepted by Masculinity Studies writers, is that globalization in creating a world gender order involves the re-articulation of national hegemonic masculinities into the global arena. Specifically he refers here to ‘transnational business masculinity’, which he describes as definitively taking the leading role as the emergent gendered world order, an order associated with the dominant institutions of the world economy and the globalization of the neo-liberal market agenda. The leading role of transnational business masculinity re-articulates older and more locally based bourgeois managerial hegemonic masculinities. In this account transnational business masculinity is asserted to have ‘achieved a position of hegemony’, to occupy the position of

*a hegemonic masculinity on a world scale—that is to say, a dominant form of masculinity that embodies, organizes, and legitimates men’s domination in the world gender order as a whole.*

As is the case with the account of local western hegemonic forms, however, the political legitimating meaning of hegemonic masculinity quickly slides towards its meaning as the ‘dominant’ masculinity and how an actual group of men ‘embodies’ this dominant positioning, including how this group exhibits particular personality traits. Connell asserts that ‘world politics is now more and more organised around the needs of the transnational capital’, placing ‘strategic power in the hands of particular groups of men—managers and entrepreneurs’—who self-consciously manage their bodies and emotions as well as money, and are increasingly detached from older loyalties to nation, business organisation, family and marital partners. These men are, in his account, dispositionally highly atomistic—competitive and largely distanced from social or personal commitments. They embody a neo-liberal version of an emphasized traditional masculinity, without any requirement to direct bodily strength.

Apart from the difficulties outlined earlier regarding the shifting usages of hegemonic masculinity—in particular the potential political and other problems associated with equating hegemony with dominant and actual types of men—Connell’s account of the hegemonic status of ‘transnational business masculinity’

---

36 Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its Mal(e)contents’; p. 415
38 Interestingly, here Connell makes plain, by employing Altman’s analysis, that hegemonic masculinity in the global gender order is not necessarily marked by homophobia, nor does this global form necessarily have the same sexual relation to women. Given that homophobia and heterosexuality marked by gender hierarchy are taken as central to his earlier (local/national/western) account of hegemonic masculinity (as is also the case for most Masculinity Studies writers—for example, Plummer), it is odd that this presumably highly important shift does not produce a discussion which might involve some reconsideration of the term integrating earlier and more recent global accounts. At the very least the global analysis suggests that Connell (and others) might need to rethink earlier assumptions about the fit between Gender and Sexuality as axes of social structuring. At most, the shift suggests a substantial rethinking of hegemonic masculinity as precisely about upholding gender hierarchy. Dennis Altman, *Global Sex*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Connell, *Masculinities*, 2nd edition, pp. 78-9; Connell and Wood, ‘Globalization and Business Masculinities’, p. 359; Plummer, ‘Male Sexualities’.
reveals further issues in the term. It is in the first instance not clear why Connell is so adamant that business masculinity occupies world hegemonic status in a globalizing world, and why he regards other potential contenders—he draws attention to military and political masculinities—as of less significance in this legitimating and mobilising role. There seems at minimum here a limited engagement with the burgeoning and highly fractious literature on globalization. For instance, Connell does not engage with those writers who question the very notion of economic globalization. Nor does he contend with those writers who might dispute this focus and by contrast propose multiple, uneven and contradictory globalizations. Mann provides an example of the latter view, suggesting that unprecedented hegemony is more characteristic of contemporary military power than economic relations.

Whatever the force of different perspectives on globalization, the point is that it is not straightforward to perceive it in the way that Connell does, and hence no simple matter to claim that transnational business masculinity, a masculinity organised in relation to economics, is the hegemonic form on a world scale, legitimating men’s dominance in the global gender order as a whole. Given this, why does Connell make the claim? Connell, in his global and macro historical moments, is inclined to presume that masculinity (a gender category) is to be understood by its constitution through class relations. Though Kate Hughes’ summary of Connell’s perspective is not intended to make this point, it supports this interpretation. She says Connell

provides an interesting analysis of the ways in which globalization is exported a version of patriarchy ... to cultures whose economies have come to be vulnerable to such [transnational executives] and to such corporations.

While gender in this approach certainly gives particular characteristics to globalising capitalism, it seems to be carried along by and within host class relations—a comparatively passive and responsive sub-structure. Such a perspective seems curiously at odds with Connell’s overriding conception of gender as a shaping force in local and global social relations. Moreover, Connell’s framework—with its tension between gender as riding on the coat-tails of class and gender as active socially constituting—is frequently replicated in Masculinity Studies writings, even in the work of those who are less wedded to an economic focus in research on the politics of masculinity on a world scale. Yet the crucial feature of the term hegemonic masculinity is precisely that it enables the Gramscian conception of power

---

40 Even Connell’s own critique of globalisation literature as the view from the metropole, a projection from ‘the centre’, involving erasure of the non-metropolitan world seems only somewhat integrated into his analysis of hegemonic masculinity, which for the most part appears schematic and from the vantage point of considering the spread of that which he associates with the hegemonic. North Atlantic, white, class-privileged, heterosexual men remain centre stage in the analysis. The non-metropolitan and those cast as peripheral tend to remain in the shadows. R. W. Connell, ‘The Northern Theory of Globalization’, paper delivered at the Sociology Seminar Series, Flinders University, South Australia, 7/10/2005; see also Beasley, Gender & Sexuality, p. 215; Newton, ‘White Guys’.
42 The analysis of Connell’s linkage between gender and class is developed further in Beasley, Gender & Sexuality, see for example, pp. 226-8.
44 For example, Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its Mal(e)contents’; pp. 414-17.
as more multi-faceted than mere coercion, including economic coercion, and that it
not supposedly to be equated with economic or military dominance. Connell’s term
has the great advantage that encourages a creative and subtle understanding of power
as constitutive, as always associated with the mobilisation of consent and implicit
embodied identities. However, Connell, along with many other Masculinity Studies
writers, tends to fall back into more limited, even economistic readings of hegemony
when dealing with the global.

We are not suggesting that the leading contender for the position of hegemonic
masculinity on a world scale is not transnational business masculinity, nor are we
necessarily disputing that the other contenders are military and political. Our point
here is simply to stress that the term does not actually enable these judgements at
present and Connell’s argument is insufficiently tied to demonstrating how such
masculinities have achieved a hegemonic role specifically in relation to the gender
order, rather than merely as a handmaiden to the ‘current stage of capitalism’ or a
dimension of globalising western institutions.

Broadly speaking, it is not clear how one would assess whether any particular
version of masculinity has an over-arching legitimating function. Connell’s highly
influential, even pervasive account of hegemonic masculinity is shown perhaps more
clearly in his work on the global gender order to rest on some relatively undefined
bases. There is very little information in his work on the question of analysing the
crucial matter of how the legitimation of gendered power occurs and thus how to
assess which masculinity is the hegemonic one. It is not self-evident overall how to
judge which masculinity (or masculinities) might be deemed hegemonic over all
others. Rather Connell, and indeed Masculinity Studies writers generally, rely heavily
on filling out their accounts of hegemonic masculinity by specification of content, by
specifying types of men. At the very least this silence regarding how to demonstrate
the legitimating/mobilizing role that constitutes hegemonic authority as against a
reliance on demonstrating the content of masculinities said to have a legitimating role,
may partly explain why the term is often interchangeably used to refer to the leader
masculinity (as Connell does) and to refer to several hegemonic masculinities relating
to sub-societal communities or dimensions of society—that is, to several dominant
masculinities in particular and more limited contexts (as occurs in Kimmel’s work
concerning various international reassertions of hegemonic masculine entitlement in
right-wing militias in the USA and Scandinavia and in Islamist terrorist groupings).

What to do?
This discussion of the term hegemonic masculinity suggests that situating
masculinities in global politics is no simple matter, and that usage of the term in
Masculinity Studies writings may require further analysis. While we intend to
develop this analysis further in forthcoming work, at this point we would simply point
out that current approaches in Masculinity Studies have multiplied the term
‘masculinity’ but have tended to retain the notion of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as a
singular monolith, which is insufficiently specified even to do justice the existing
range of Masculinity Studies writings.

45 Connell, ‘Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities’, p. 73
Like Connell we believe, it is timely to reconsider the concept. Our view is that the term still has much to offer. However, we suggest that it is not enough to say that it needs work but is still essential, as Connell does. Rather the usage of the term in the global arena shows up earlier limits of term all the more clearly.

The reconsideration of hegemonic masculinity may well be assisted by not only greater integration of the insights of a range of Masculinity Studies writings, but additionally a closer attention to the insights of related feminist work. While the rhetoric of a close engagement between Masculinity and Feminist scholarship is regularly enunciated, contra such statements much Masculinity Studies work is at something of a distance from current debates in Feminist thinking. If the rethinking we have tentatively outlined was undertaken in concert with recent feminist analyses, this distance might well be overcome and at the same time lead to a more developed understanding of hegemonic masculinity in global politics that could be employed in gender studies (feminist and masculinity studies) and beyond. In this concluding discussion section of the paper, therefore, we move away from the analysis of hegemonic masculinities presented in the men and masculinities literature. Instead the paper focuses-in on how we might move to develop a gendered understanding of globalization that recognises both the strengths and limitations of discussions of hegemonic masculinity. Importantly, in this section we are not suggesting that notions of hegemonic masculinity curtail a focus on the ‘feminine’ in global politics. Rather, we suggest that a more thorough engagement with a feminist literature in which globalized notions of ‘gender’ are shown to intersect with other forms of social identity in localized spaces of the global political economy adds considerable value to discussions of the relationship between masculinity and globalization.

**Gendering Globalization, Rethinking Hegemonic Masculinity**

As we have argued already, Connell raises some important issues in looking to the relationship between a hegemonic masculinity and globalization. Ideas of hegemonic masculinity provide a useful way of conceptualising the privileging of certain sets of gendered values in mainstream understandings of globalization. It is also clearly the case that feminist scholarship within international politics (including both studies of international security and international political economy) have sought to employ notions of hegemonic masculinity. Our focus is not on how feminist scholarship in

---

49 We find ourselves in agreement for example with Vicki Robinson’s assertion that no entente cordiale between Feminist and Masculinity Studies writings can be necessarily assumed. Vicki Robinson, Review of Connell’s *The Men and the Boys*, *Feminist Theory* 3 (1) (April 2002), pp. 125-7; see also C. Beasley, ‘What happens when Women’s Studies becomes Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies?’, paper delivered at the Centre for Research and Teaching on Women, Magill University, Montreal, Canada, 3 November 2005.
50 See for example, Charlottw Hooper, *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations and Gender Politics* (University of Columbia Press 2001); Jane Parpart and Marysia Zalewski (eds), *The Man Question in International Relations* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1998); Annica Kronsell “Gendered
IR and IPE has sought to incorporate notions of hegemonic masculinity (although this is, of course, an important issue). Rather, we aim to examine how notions of hegemonic masculinity might be brought into, and even reformulated by, engagements with feminist studies of globalization.

In doing so, we point to the limitations of viewing globalization through a ‘lens’ of hegemonic masculinity. This is precisely because of the point that we have already raised in this paper – the problem of how to get from the identification of a ‘hegemonic’ masculinity in certain globalized zones of international politics (e.g. the multinational corporation) to a specific theory of the relationship between this hegemonic masculinity and processes associated with globalization.

It should be pointed out that one argument that we find problematic in Connell’s work is the rejection of ‘discursive approaches’. Connell argues in the introduction to the latest edition of Masculinities for example that ‘discursive approaches have significant limits. They give no grip on issues about economic inequality and the state.”\(^5\) And yet this is a problematic position given the turn within International Political Economy (IPE) towards approaches that stress the discursive production of globalization in the everyday practice of international politics. Weldes for example in analysing the discursive construction of globalization suggests that:

> Analysing globalisation as a discourse allows us to ask what exactly this discourse does. This is important because discourses are deeply political, producing significant material and ideational effects. Put simply, the representations that most people entertain about globalisation – what they think globalisation is and how it works – affects how they act. It is this effect that can render globalisation discourse a self-fulfilling prophecy\(^5\)

What is significant is that this critical globalization literature is specifically focussed on how discourses of globalization have shaped state policy-making. Creating ‘logics of no alternative’\(^5\) and ‘imagined economies’ of globalization\(^5\). Furthermore, the state remains centrally important to recent IPE scholarship on globalization. The important point here is that discourses are viewed as having both ideational and material effects. Of course, as Waylen has recently argued\(^5\), gender is overwhelmingly absent from much of this recent critical globalization literature. Yet, it is important to develop these notions of the relationship between discourse and practice in globalization studies by incorporating a gender perspective. . An appreciation of the interrelationship between both discourse and practice is common to feminist scholarship in both economics and international politics. As Barker argues there has emerged an ‘interpretative approach to feminist economics and feminist

### Notes


\(^5\) Angus Cameron and Ronan Palan, *The Imagined Economies of Globalization*, Sage 2004

political economy’ which ‘at a minimum, entail a commitment to the notion that the material and the discursive are not radically separate’\textsuperscript{56}. In this sense, notions of hegemonic masculinity are very useful because they help us to develop ways of seeing how constructions of masculinity are built into the institutions and structures of the global political economy. However, as we suggest here – a focus on hegemonic masculinities in thinking about globalization is, in itself, insufficient – and, in fact, it is through thinking through the discursive processes whereby neoliberal globalization is produced and reproduced (in the way that critical globalization scholarship has forced us to do) that some of the shortcomings of the masculinities literature on globalization are exposed.

First, the emphasis on the multinational firm as an agent of globalization seen in both the liberal ‘first wave’ globalization scholarship and in the masculinities studies approach. By contrast, we would suggest that it is perhaps more useful to focus on the discourses and ideas that have enabled the multinational firm to be seen as the primary agent of neoliberal globalization. This is perhaps less of a criticism of the masculinities studies literature – indeed, we would suggest that an investigation into the emergence of discourses that have enabled MNCs an effective free reign in certain parts of the world is one area that could tell us an interesting story about the emergence of Connell’s ‘Transnational Business Masculinities’. The MNC can be viewed as an important site for the production of ideas relating to hegemonic masculinity – but we first need to identify how and why the firm is understood as so central to the current phase of (economic) globalization. This requires that we investigate globalization as a discourse (one that is rooted in notions of the innate rationality and progressive nature of the market economy\textsuperscript{57}) and not just a straight forward economic phenomenon. By contrast, DeGoede’s work sets about doing precisely this. Her focus is on the emergence of gendered discourses in the seventeenth century that sought to construct the realm of global finance in terms of its ‘innate’ rationality (rather than as an ‘irrational’ realm of gambling)\textsuperscript{58}. DeGoede employs the metaphor ‘mastering lady credit’ to describe these processes (i.e. the irrational and ‘feminine’ is reconstructed as a rational realm of international business practice). Parallels can be drawn therefore with the work of scholars such as Ling and Han who have identified how the fall-out from the 1997 Asian financial crisis has been associated with a ‘feminization’ of ‘irrational’ Asian business practice (‘crony capitalism’) and the need for the opening up of Asian markets to rational (read hegemonically masculine) global business interests\textsuperscript{59}.

Second, in thinking through how hegemonic masculinities are produced – we also need to open up space for thinking about the production of femininities.

\textsuperscript{56} Barker, 2005, ‘full reference needed’ p2194. This ‘interpretive approach’ can also be seen in the work of a number of feminist political economists including Suzanne Begaron, \textit{Fragments of Development: Nation, Gender and the Space of Modernity} (2004); V. Spike Peterson, \textit{A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy}; Shirin Rai, \textit{Gender and the Political Economy of Development} (2002); Juanita Elias \textit{Fashioning Inequality} (2004).

\textsuperscript{57} Fred Block, \textit{Post-Industrial Possibilities: A Critique of Economic Discourse} (University of California Press, 1990)

\textsuperscript{58} Marieke De Goede, \textit{Virtue, Fortune and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance}. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005

\textsuperscript{59}Jingwoo Han and LMH Ling, Authoritarianism and the hypermasculinized state: Hybridity, Patriarchy and Capitalism in Korea”, \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1998), pp. 53-78
Importantly, we suggest that this is not a straight forward process. Because, whilst we will argue later in this paper that the production of transnational business masculinities are intimately linked to ideas concerning docile and nimble fingered ‘productive femininity’ – this is not the whole picture. The performance of these gendered discourses is mediated by other forms of social identity – specifically race, religion, ethnicity and nationality (although this is by no means an exhaustive list).

Third, a strength of critical globalization scholarship in IPE is that it points to how globalisation is not a singular, universal or uniform process. Much of the early globalisation literature viewed globalisation as ‘the developing outcome of some historical process’⁶⁰. The problem with viewing globalising as a uniform and all encompassing process is highlighted by Germain who argues that views of globalisation as inevitable and as something that gradually pervades every aspects of human activity are misguided⁶¹. By contrast, Germain calls for a ‘historical perspective’ whereby we examine how globalisation comes to be set within multiple contexts throughout history. Thus we need to consider how globalization is not a straightforward top-down process, but is located in everyday practice. We could also say that this is part of the problem with a focus on hegemonic masculinities - that whilst of course it is important to look at global processes/structures and reveal how they are gendered, what is perhaps more interesting and important is to investigate the relationship between the local and the global and to think through how everyday practices and relationships are reconfigured (or not). Such an approach is quite different to those that seemingly map gendered ideologies of hegemonic masculinity onto specific male bodies. Rather, the focus in this section of the article is to articulate the complex dynamics through which privileged notions of masculinity are mediated and transformed in local spaces and in relation to femininities.

Gendering the political economy of globalization

Building a gendered political economy perspective that takes masculinities seriously requires the following: (1) That we create space for thinking about how the state mediates relationships between localized and globalized ‘gender cultures’ and (2) To more thoroughly investigate the relationship between ‘transnational business masculinities’ – in particular the idea that MNCs embody these characteristics – and processes of ‘feminization’ that have been identified in the feminist literature as a key feature of globalization.

(re) locating states in discussions of masculinity and globalization

We cannot even begin to think about how global masculinities ‘touch down’ in national spaces without a focus on this key institution. It goes without saying that Connell’s early work incorporates a specific focus on the state – and as we saw in the quotation from the latest edition of Masculinities, Connell clearly recognises the state

as a significant institution. However, it should also be noted that in his writings on globalization, Connell to a certain extent buys into arguments concerning the ‘decline of the state’ in the face of (economic) globalization. Hence:

*Globalization is best understood as centering on a set of linked economic changes characteristic of the current stage of capitalism. The main changes are the expansion of worldwide markets, the restructuring of local economies under pressure of the world economy, and the creation of new economic institutions.*

Where the state is discussed, the argument is made that the corrosive influence of global capitalism is undermining the power of states to implement welfare-oriented policies that may have positive effects in terms of gender equity. In this sense, the rather benign (Western European) state is being undermined by an aggressive masculinist capitalism. Two criticisms can be raised here. First, such a view fails to recognise the role that states themselves have played in constructing the current phase of global capitalism (after all it was state policies that created the deregulation of finance and investment that enables transnational flows of finance and industrial capital). Second, such a perspective obscures the extent to which states and practices of ‘nation-building’ are themselves deeply gendered. We should pay particular attention to Rai’s ‘caution against nostalgia for the centralized nation-state among critics of globalization’.

Scholars such as Lily Ling and Aiwa Ong provide very interesting ways into thinking about the role of the state within a gendered political economy framework that takes masculinities seriously. Importantly these writings focus on the role of the state in non-Western contexts and this also is very important because it highlights why we need to think more carefully about the relationship between so-called ‘transnational business masculinities’ (framed around essentially Western even imperialist masculine elite identities) and alternative gender identities. What these examples serve to illustrate is that the relationship between global capitalist production and localized gendered labour regimes is effectively mediated by the state. This is particularly the case in the ‘developmental states’ of East and Southeast Asia. But even in states that have adopted a more neoliberal style of economic development (including those Asian states that have undergone a fundamental shift towards neoliberal economic management since the 1997 financial crisis), the state remains a crucial institution in the gender politics of global restructuring.

The idea that gender relations and identities are fundamental to how states operate can be viewed as challenging the rather under-socialized accounts of the state that characterize the bulk of ‘first wave’ or mainstream globalization scholarship (whereby the state is set up as simply responding to pressure from external economic forces and actors that are challenging the power and authority of states). In contrast to this idea Ong has introduced a model of ‘graduated sovereignty’ whereby the shifting relations between market, state and society are manifested in government policies that act to re-shape the relationship between specific populations of people and the global

---

63 ibid pp. 83-84
market economy. The differential treatment of segments of the population takes place at the same time as the development of a ‘state-transnational network’ (which includes the ceding of certain aspects of sovereignty to certain multinational corporations operating in export processing zones). In this sense, the state is undergoing a process of transformation, but a transformation that is deeply rooted and embedded in the local socio-political context.

An alternative, and perhaps more overtly gendered, conceptualisation of the relationship between global capital and the state has been provided by Ling who has sought to demonstrate how states in East Asia have promoted a particular vision of economic development which involved authoritarian, patriarchal-Confucian states pursuing economic development strategies that both confronted and incorporated elements of the dominant western-centric neoliberal development paradigm. Ling discusses the notion of hypermasculinity (first utilized by Ashis Nandy in relation to British colonial power relations) to convey the glorification of aggression, competition, accumulation and power that are a hallmark of these states. Asian states are viewed as pursuing hypermasculine developmentalism as a reaction to an aggressive, competitive form of globalization. Hypermasculinized developmentalism in Asia can also be understood, therefore, as something that emerges out of the desire to construct engagement with global capitalism around notions of nation-building and national identity (a theme also found in Moon’s work on South Korea’s ‘militarized modernity’). The model of hypermasculine developmentalism is a useful way of thinking about how global and local forces play out in the reconstitution of gender relations in specific national contexts. Crucially Ling’s work is not about how subaltern groups of actual men play a role in the defining of a hegemonic masculinity (the critique that we levelled against Connell earlier in the paper). Rather, the emphasis is on how notions of masculinity are embedded in the discourses and counter-discourses of global restructuring.

Transnational Business Masculinities and the discourse of ‘productive femininities’

Developing an understanding of globalization in which we can meaningfully discuss hegemonic masculinity also requires that we focus more carefully on the whole concept of ‘transnational business masculinity’. In what follows we suggest that whilst there is a certain utility in this concept – what we need to bring into discussions of global ‘business’ masculinities is how these masculine identities relate to the highly ‘feminized’ nature of globalisation. When we look at globalization in terms of ‘everyday practice’ we are confronted by the fact that successive waves of globalization have relied heavily upon women’s paid and unpaid labour. This is a key finding of feminist IPE and the globalization turn in masculinities studies risks

---

overlooking these findings because they seem to be more concerned with investigating elite masculine identities.

We would suggest however, that links can be made between feminist IPE and the men and masculinities globalization scholarship. This lies in identifying how an essentially ‘hegemonically masculine’ approach to international business management is predicated on idealized notions of productive and nimble fingered workers is one of the key gendered discourses of globalization. Studies of the relationship between economic globalization and the emergence of new forms of hegemonic masculinity have tended to focus on the perpetuation of managerial cultures through, for example the media, global ‘management speak’ and the lifestyles of global managers. What is missing from this literature is an investigation into the relationship between highly masculinized global business/capitalism and the highly feminized forms of employment that underpin contemporary global economic restructuring. The MNC, and the forms of management practice that are identifiable within these global firms, need to be recognized as a principle site for the production of ideas relating to gender roles at the global level. Most importantly, we can also point to the role of the firm in the production of gender identities centred around notions of the ‘docile’ factory ‘girl’ or ‘flexible femininity’. As Salzinger notes in her research into feminized factory employment from Mexico, manager’s understandings of feminine employment and female characteristics are contributing to the ideological hegemony of powerful discourses concerning the docile and dexterous female factory worker.

Powerful and also globalized discourses of productive/flexible femininities as well as transnational business masculinity can be viewed as helping to underpin the practice of contemporary global capitalism. Yet what is really interesting to look at is how these globalized discourses touch down in national/local spaces. It is for this precise reason that we need to make sure that the state remains central to our analysis of the relationship between the global and the local in the politics of global restructuring. Furthermore, gender identities do not exist in isolation – as we have already argued they intersect with other forms of social identity, identities that like gender are often embedded in local societies through specific state policies. And yet, a focus on these globalized discourses, provides an important entry point into investigating the gender politics of globalization.

---

72 Connell and Wood op cit.
The strength of much feminist scholarship is that it often begins with a focus on the everyday experience of marginalized groups of women (think Enloe’s work here\textsuperscript{75}) and builds outward from there. Using concepts of hegemonic masculinity is very useful but scholars need to go further than simply looking at how transnational business elites ‘embody’ a transnational business masculinity\textsuperscript{76} — we need to move beyond the focus on masculinities alone and place this analysis within a broader understanding of the global political economy of gender (or ‘gendered political economy’\textsuperscript{77}).

\textsuperscript{75} Cynthia Enloe, \textit{Bananas, Beaches and Bases}, 1989
\textsuperscript{76} Connell and Wood \textit{op cit}