ILLYRIAN POLICY OF ROME IN THE LATE REPUBLIC AND EARLY PRINCIPATE

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Abstract

This thesis examines the development of Roman Illyrian policy, from the late Republican hegemony over the region to the establishment of permanent imperial frontiers on the Danube and the beginning of the process that would integrate Illyricum (the area between the Adriatic Sea and the River Danube) into the Roman Empire. This thesis has two principal aims. Firstly, on the regional, ‘microscopic’, level it defines and explains the development of Roman policy in Illyricum. Secondly, on the global, ‘macroscopic’, level it examines some of the mechanisms of Roman policy-making, and fits Illyrian policy into the wider picture of Roman foreign and later provincial policy. Ultimately, the thesis recognizes and explains the reasons for a major change in Roman strategic interests from the Eastern Adriatic coast to the interior of the western Balkans in the late Republic and early Empire. Despite the problems of deficient sources, this thesis observes Roman Illyrian policy as essentially a political interaction between Rome and the entire regional geopolitical system of Illyricum, rather than defining it through Roman interactions with individual polities inside the system, or as part of the system.
Declaration

This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being available for loan and photocopying.

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Acknowledgments

It was a long and dangerous voyage from snow and mud of the turbulent *civitas Daesitiatum* to perpetual calmness of the *terra Australis*. And, as it was not enough, I dared to prolong the voyage in a different direction, by internal quest in time for something so vague and undetectable as Roman Illyrian policy. It was an amazing experience to follow thoughts of so many excellent scholars and even add something of my own to the scholarship. Nowadays no scholarly work is possible without scholarly collaboration. Firstly, it is my duty and pleasure to thank my supervisors, Dr. R. F. Newbold and Dr. A. G. Geddes whose support and help were crucial in the making and polishing of this thesis. My thesis would certainly have taken much more time without the Australian Postgraduate Award, and thanks to the Research Abroad scholarship given by the University of Adelaide, I was able to undertake research in the modern-day Illyricum. My stay and lecture given in Iader is entirely due to Dr. Smiljan Gluščević from the Archaeological Museum and Prof. Slobodan Čače from the Ancient History department. I would also like to thank Dr. Siniša Bilić-Dujmušić for giving me access to his Masters thesis. The time spent with Prof. Čače was an amazing scholarly experience immeasurable by any standard. My stay in the *civitas Daesitiatum* could not have been possible without my mother Ljubica and the grandparents. I would like to thank to Prof. Zdravko Marić, Mr. Adnan Busulandžič and the staff of the library of the Zemaljski Museum for all their help in my research. Also, I would like to acknowledge all the help and resources I received in the National and University library in the *civitas Varcianorum*. The comments of Prof. T. S. Burns from the Emory University, who kindly shared his time and experience with me during his stay in Adelaide, are much appreciated. The support I received in the department from the start of my study to the completion of this thesis is simply difficult to forget.

Finally the support and help from Aska and the arrival of Ariel are the real foundation stones on which this thesis rests.

N.B. Code of practice Part II, Section 2.3.4 (f) of the University of Adelaide requires me to acknowledge that this thesis in its final draft was edited by a professional editor, Mr. Phil Thomas.
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dis manibus Nenadi Ostoiici optimi
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1. **Introduction, approaches, review of sources and secondary literature**

1.1 **Introduction**

The conquest of Illyricum in the general context of Roman expansion has been examined previously, as has Roman interaction with Illyricum from the perspective of Dalmatian or Pannonian provincial history. However, no modern study devoted solely to Roman Illyrian policy in this transitional period has yet been attempted. This thesis will examine the development of Roman Illyrian policy, from the late Republican hegemony over the region to the establishment of permanent imperial frontiers on the River Danube and the beginning of the process that would integrate Illyricum into the Empire. Illyricum is both a good but also an atypical example of Roman policy because of its peculiar cultural and geographic position between the Hellenistic world and continental, ‘barbarian’ Europe, and its strategic significance as one of the gateways into Northern Italy. This thesis has two principal aims. Firstly, on the regional, ‘microscopic’, level it will define and explain the development of Roman policy in Illyricum. Secondly, on the global, ‘macroscopic’, level it will examine some of the mechanisms of Roman policy-making, and fit Illyrian policy into the wider picture of Roman foreign and later provincial policy. Ultimately, this thesis will explain the reasons for a major change in Roman strategic interests from the eastern Adriatic coast to the interior of the western Balkans in the late Republic and early Empire. Although there are problems regarding deficient sources, we will see Roman Illyrian policy as essentially a political interaction between Rome and the regional geo-political system of Illyricum (Chapter 1.4.2).

The consequences of the conquest of these lands are visible to any historian. The efforts of Roman generals in the first centuries BC/AD enabled Rome to extend its influence across the Danube and to control huge areas of the Pannonian basin.

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2 The term ‘Illyrian policy’ can be questioned, as this thesis deals with the territory embraced by the later Roman provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia. In our opinion Illyricum represented a regional geo-
Chapter 1: Introduction

This achievement created a significant buffer zone between the imperial frontier and the Italian homeland, and gave Rome the military and economic advantages of controlling the Danube. Illyricum, although an underdeveloped and relatively poor area compared with, for example, Gaul or the Eastern provinces, provided soldiers for the legions, metals for Roman workshops such as gold, silver, and iron, and gave the Empire a land link, from Italy to Macedonia. Security of navigation in the eastern Adriatic waters was one of the first important strategic aims achieved by Roman Illyrian policy. This strengthened maritime links between North Italy and the continental hinterland with its rich eastern markets, and extended the so-called eastern maritime route all the way to the mouth of the Adriatic.

1.2 Rome and Illyricum (a short story)

Illyricum was named after the group of ethnically related peoples who lived on the Adriatic coast, south of the lake of Scodra. Greeks came first into close or more frequent contact with the natives of Illyricum, but their conception of Ἰλλυρίς differed from Roman Illyricum. It encompassed only the peoples who lived on the borders of Macedonia and Epirus. For a couple of centuries before and after the Roman conquest in the late first century BC, the concept of Illyricum expanded towards the west and north. Finally, it encompassed all native peoples from the Adriatic to the Danube, the later Roman provinces of Dalmatia, Pannonia and

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3 Syme and Wilkes placed strong emphasis on the significance of the conquest for geo-strategic purposes such as the link between the Eastern and Western provinces; Syme (1934b); Wilkes (1965a) 13-14; (1969) 46-47; (1996b) 547-548. On the other hand, Roddaz (1984) 484, is deeply suspicious of this idea while Gruen (1996) 172 sees the geo-strategic significance of the land-link between northern Italy and the Balkans-Danube area.

4 Jurišić (2000) 47-51. Favourable natural characteristics enabled the eastern coast to continue its role as the main naval traffic corridor through the Adriatic, while the western, Italian, coast was used only for local navigation until the modern age; Kozlič (2000). See Škergo (1999) 211-223 for the synthesis of previous works on maritime links in the Eastern Adriatic.

5 See Rendić-Miočević (1980) 15 n.3 for different spellings of the words Illyricum and Illyrii in the Latin sources.

6 Pliny, *HN* 3.144; Pompon. 2.3.55 *Illyrii proprie dicti*; their possible location: Hammond (1966) 241; Alföldy (1965a) 49-50. Suić and Katičić question the existence of a separate people of Illyrii. For them *Illyrii proprie dicti* are peoples inhabiting the heartland of the Illyrian kingdom, the southern Adriatic coast between Epidaurus and Lissos; Katičić (1964a); (1965a); Suić (1976d); Pająkowski (1980) 91 ff. (between Lissos and Neretva). Therefore "Illyrii improprae dicti sind eben alle Stamme denen historisch oder aber auch nur verwaltungstechnisch die gleiche Benennung zu kommt."; Katičić (1964a) 95. Papazoglu (1989) 46-47 objected to locating *Illyrii proprie dicti* so far north and argued that they were located close to the Macedonian border in later-day Epirus. Most probably the form ‘Ilyricum’ derived from regnum Illyricum analogous to Noricum from regnum Noricum; Šašel-Kos (2000) 284.
Moesia, regardless of their ethnic and cultural differences. The term Illyricum was applied indiscriminately, not only to the ethnic Illyrians like the Ardiaei, but also to the Celts who remained there after the fourth century BC migrations, and to the Venetian Liburni or the northern natives akin to Illyrians, known as the Pannonii. Accordingly, following this evolution and extension of what was called Illyricum, Rome developed an Illyrian policy, which extended its range from the south Adriatic coast and its immediate hinterland to the whole area between the Adriatic and the Danube.

It is a historical curiosity that such a vast territory just across the sea from Italy remained almost untouched by Roman expansionism until the end of the first century BC. Geography is certainly one reason for the delayed conquest, as rough terrain discouraged the plans of any would-be conqueror to expand from the eastern Adriatic coast further into the continent. A long-term policy of conquest required primarily a change in the Roman attitude to strategic thinking, which developed after the so-called Roman Revolution reshaped the very essence of the res publica, placing the whole power of the Roman military machine into the hands of a single person. After that change, the conquest of areas inside the European continent depended on a carefully planned military campaign executed in several stages. It also returned Roman geo-strategical priorities to where they felt most comfortable – into continental settings – and brought to an end two centuries of the chronic uneasiness of sea-centered warfare.

Regardless of the developing Roman concept of Illyricum as a separate geopolitical entity, the geographic proximity of northwest Illyricum to northern Italy, and southeast Illyricum to Epirus, Macedonia and Greece in the late Republic, often linked together their destinies, especially in the first stages of Roman Illyrian policy. The political patchwork of Illyricum was a very important factor in the formation of this policy. However, even in the more advanced political organizations that developed in Illyricum, such as the Illyrian kingdom, ethne was a dominant factor.

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7 Strabo, 7.5.1 (C 313) τὰ Ἰλλυρικά; App. Ill. 1, 6; Pliny, NH 3.139 nunc totum uno nomine Illyricum vocatur generatim.
8 App. Ill. 3; Suić (1955) 136-149; Alföldy (1965a) 33 ff.; Hammond (1966) 241; Wilkes (1969) 153 ff.; Suić (1976d) etc. Cabanes (1988) 17-20 who considers Illyricum to be a geo-political concept that shrinks through time, is rightly criticized by Papazoglu (1989) 32-34. See Chapter 2.5 for the political and ethnic geography of Illyricum.
and a key element of statehood,\(^9\) as it had been in Gaul or Germany. Romans therefore dealt with individual polities and their political and ethnic interests, which made their Illyrian policy heterogeneous and sometimes difficult to follow and understand.

Roman foreign policy touched the Illyrians for the first time in the 3\(^{rd}\) century BC in the south Adriatic where the Illyrian kingdom of the Ardiaei made piracy a kind of state enterprise.\(^10\) This endemic Ardiaean piracy interrupted the Adriatic trade of Rome's allies, and the Romans attempted to put it under control in the First and Second Illyrian war 229 and 219 BC. By the late 3\(^{rd}\) and early 2\(^{nd}\) century BC, Ardiaean kings collaborated with Rome, but the last king, Genthius, opted for Macedonia and it is no wonder that his kingdom shared the fate of Macedonia, conquered and divided into three formally independent parts by the "dictate of Scodra" in 167 BC.\(^11\) Even so, after this event the Romans did not make any annexations, but controlled the area through their allies - the Greek-led Issaean commonwealth and friendly Illyrian peoples such as the Daorsi or Liburni. Through the 2\(^{nd}\) and 1\(^{st}\) centuries BC there were no continuous large-scale involvements of the Roman army in Illyricum, but the Romans did engage occasionally in several conflicts, especially with the warlike Delmatae in the central Adriatic hinterland.

The Roman Republican attention was limited to the Adriatic coast and its immediate hinterland. Romans had no reason to risk large-scale military involvement in the dangerous terrain of the Dinaric Alps because military losses could easily outweigh any possible gains in booty and tribute. Another reason was the mutual rivalry between the families of the Republican oligarchy, and lack of cooperation between the governors of different provinces. This thesis will question the prevailing definition of Illyricum as an area which Republican generals used to earn their triumphs rather easily and where the Roman position gradually weakened (Chapter 3.1). It will try to prove that, at this stage, Romans reacted only when their interests were threatened, or to ensure easy communications or to create essentially defensive buffer zones of friendly states in the north Adriatic basin. Although lacking abundant

\(^9\) Cabañes (1988), see below p. 48.
\(^{10}\) See Chapter 1.6.1 for primary and 1.6.2 for secondary sources. Chapters 3 – 8 deal with these Roman – Illyrian interactions at greater length.
written and material sources, it is possible to recognize the origin of the elements of what was later to become a unified policy in Roman dealings with Illyricum.

When Caesar administered Illyricum (59 – 50 BC), and during his later civil wars with Pompey and the Pompeians, a coherent Roman Republican policy gradually broke down throughout the Mediterranean. The Roman position weakened in Illyricum, but it was as a consequence of Roman internal problems and changed circumstances in Illyricum after the Issaean commonwealth lost its political significance. However, as we will attempt to show in Chapters 4 and 5, Caesar’s administration and the civil wars of the 40s and 30s were the period when Republican policy was transformed and a different policy began to appear, followed by the establishment of a proto-provincial administrative structure in coastal Illyricum. Italian migration and the establishment of a basic administrative organization through the municipia and colonies was a key element of this changed policy, which aimed at the final incorporation of the eastern Adriatic coast into the Roman state. Octavian’s expedition should be seen as the last stage in this transformation. He successfully pacified the dangerous Iapodes and Delmatae, and thus created the necessary environment for the establishment of Illyricum as a separate province under senatorial administration in 27 BC.

The conquest of Illyricum has been celebrated by modern scholarship as one of the most solid and enduring achievements of Augustus, and obviously his policy will be crucial in this research. The successor of Iulius Caesar made contact with the area three times in both of his political incarnations: directly through his expedition as Octavian in 35 – 33 BC; and through his legati in the Augustan Bellum Pannonicum of 13 – 9 BC; and the Pannonian rebellion, Bellum Batonianum in AD 6 – 9. We can recognize two different phases of Illyrian policy in these early years of the Principate. Initially a senatorial province, Illyricum was limited to the Adriatic coast and there were no visible political or strategic attempts to expand Roman power further inland. However, from 16 BC a generally aggressive Roman policy developed in Europe, resulting in the conquest of the Alps, Germany as far as the river Elbe and also leading to the conquest of Illyricum as far as the Danube. The main element of Augustan Illyrian policy was to break with the Republican tradition

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of keeping control only over the Adriatic coast, and it resulted ultimately in the expansion of Roman power behind the Dinaric Alps into the Pannonian basin. However, before Illyricum was fully incorporated into the Empire, Rome was compelled to deal with a dangerous uprising of the Pannonii, known as the *Bellum Batonianum*, which lasted from AD 6 – 9.

The aftermath of the *Bellum Batonianum* is quite poorly covered by the written sources, so it will be necessary in the eighth chapter to rely heavily on epigraphic and archaeological evidence in order to determine more accurately how the successors of Augustus pursued their Illyrian policy. In this period Illyricum was divided into provinces Pannonia and Dalmatia, and Illyrian policy was transformed from foreign into provincial policy. With the pacification of the area and the cessation of armed struggle with the native population, Roman policy put more emphasis on administrative matters and on using the new provinces for the economic benefit of the Empire. It seems that the evolution of the Illyrian policy was completed in the reign of the last Iulio-Claudians, Claudius and Nero, when Illyricum effectively ceased to be regarded as a temporary boundary and the Empire established a more permanent frontier on the Danube, which would last without much change until the fourth century AD.

### 1.3 Methodology

The examination of Roman Illyrian policy requires a balanced and heterogeneous methodological approach. New methodological avenues must be explored, as the most important modern works on ancient Illyricum by G. Alföldy, J. Wilkes, A. Mócsy, J. Šašel, etc. were mostly written in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then some new approaches have appeared and prevailing scholarly opinion has found other foci. An especially significant methodological problem in previous scholarship appears to be exaggerating the influence of individual men on history. Some crucial periods of Roman Illyrian policy have been explained almost exclusively by the personal influence and activity of Roman heavyweights like Caesar or Octavian/Augustus. There are other methodological traps waiting for the historian dealing with such limited sources, such as unconscious assumptions, oversimplifications and stereotypes (ancient and modern alike). In order to

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13 E.g. the assumptions that Caesar created *conventus* in Illyricum and that Octavian directed his expedition 35-33 BC in Illyricum for purely personal reasons, see Chapter 4 and 5.
understand fully the Illyrian policy of Rome we should take into account as much as possible the political motives of both sides, the Romans and the peoples of Illyricum themselves. Roman policy was not just shaped by the Romans, but was also influenced by changes in the situation in Illyricum, often by the actions of the locals. The Romans were not always arrogant, greedy and bloodthirsty conquerors, and the locals were neither consistently innocent victims nor freedom fighters, as in some modern stereotypes, nor, to go to the other extreme, pirate and savages, as the ancients usually saw them.

An examination of Roman Illyrian policy needs a new approach; an understanding of ancient Realpolitik, free of Roman propaganda, as well as an understanding of the political aims and aspirations of local peoples. In order to understand the situation in Illyricum better, it is necessary to change the way local proto-state formations are viewed. Previous scholarship has never made a clear distinction between the Iron Age cultures in Illyricum as determined by archaeology, and the political proto-institutions in Illyricum as they appear in classical sources. However, it seems more and more important to explain political matters in Illyricum by also taking into account the organization and activities of those native political proto-institutions, or at least their basic shapes in so far as they can be salvaged from the obscurity of our sources.

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14 This thesis prefers the term ‘peoples of Illyricum’, rather than ‘Illyrians’, and so emphasizes the ethnic diversity that existed there before the Roman conquest, see Chapter 2.5.2.
15 It seems appropriate to quote Momigliano (1960) on this “To give a good account of the origins of a war one must know something about geography and about ethnography, one must have lived with the people of the other side.” Our sources never bothered with these issues too much and modern scholarship has recognised Roman Illyrian policy only through the acts and aims of Rome. Only recently, in the groundbreaking works of Slobodan Čače, is modern scholarship starting to take into account the political organization and political aspiration of local proto-state formations. See bibliography under Čače.
16 Dell (1969) is useful on some ancient (and modern) stereotypes of Illyrian piracy, see below p. 18. Examples of modern stereotypes will be discussed throughout the thesis.
17 In ancient times as today, state interests and political necessity, the raison d’état, makes the backbone of any foreign policy; Waltz (1979) 117.
18 There is an emerging view amongst the social archaeologists that different archaeological cultures do not always reflect different ethnicity and vice versa; see the contributions of Graves-Brown and Jones, Hides, Díaz-Andreu, Jones and Bursche in Graves-Brown et al. (1996); Jones (1997) 106-127, esp. 119 ff; Hall (1997).
19 Proto-state seems an appropriate definition of native social and political institutions in Illyricum in the 2nd and 1st century BC. Anthropological taxonomy such as band, chiefdom, tribe or state creates unnecessary confusion; Webb (1975). The native political institutions such as Illyrian kingdom either completed, or were very close to completing a process of forming state institutions in the time span of this thesis like the Liburni, Iapodes, Delmatae, possibly even Pannonii (see below p. 48). For the term ‘tribe’ in an ethnic sense, see Chapter 2.5.2 n. 83.
20 Papazoglu (1967) and especially Čače (1979).
Chapter 1: Introduction

Chronic poverty of source material, a fact (“a continuing curse” as Moses Finley called it once),\(^\text{21}\) which will be stressed many times in the thesis, requires us to take into account every possible piece of evidence, whether we decide to use it or to discard as historical rubbish. Lack of source material compels us to give cautious but resolute precedence to the slow ticking clock of the Braudelian *histoire sociale* over the eye-catching historical disturbances that emerge in the swift passage of the *histoire événementielle*.\(^\text{22}\) Unfortunately, our written sources were primarily concerned with military matters, so that any analysis of Illyrian policy depends heavily on our knowledge of Roman military operations in the area. The sources deal with appearance but not substance. They mention individual wars or campaigns, but not the reasons for them and their place in Roman policy. They assume war to be a natural and inevitable social phenomenon.\(^\text{23}\) However, in determining what Illyrian policy was, we need to keep asking why things happened. We have to explore the changing interests of Rome, and the changing general circumstances in and around the geo-political system of Illyricum. For that reason this thesis will not be limited to military matters.

The lack of literary sources, the lack of even a report of military operations, in some periods, such as the post-Augustan period, necessitates other approaches to the topic, whenever we have the opportunity. Some more modern methodological approaches must also be considered, as they cannot and sometimes should not be applied selectively. It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply some modern methodological approaches such as those of Millar and Campbell, i.e. to disregard secondary literature based on epigraphy and archaeology and rely on the primary written sources when those primary sources are so scattered and incomplete.\(^\text{24}\) A look into other contemporary economic and social matters such as trade, coin minting,

\(^{21}\) Finley (1985b) 10.

\(^{22}\) Braudel (1966) 16-17. ‘Social history’ is the history of decades and centuries, (also called the conjuncture; Braudel (1980) 29 ff.) placed by Braudel between the history of the events and *la longue durée*.

\(^{23}\) Momigliano (1960) 13-27.

Cf. Harris (1979) esp. 54-104; Finley (1985b) 70-87; Rosenstein (1999); Campbell (2002) 1-20 (just to mention some) who look into the significant reasons (mainly of an economic nature) behind the phenomenon and the origin of war in antiquity, and especially in the Roman Republic and the empire.

\(^{24}\) Cf. the manifesto of this approach in Millar (1977) xii; Campbell (1984) viii. Campbell (2002) 6 n. 33 and 158 n. 15 is a splendid example of primary sources used out of their context (Octavian did not conquer the whole of Illyricum in 33 BC, and Caesar did not have plans for Illyricum in 50 BC), see Chapter 5.5 and below p. 95.
mining and the early Roman colonization of the area, when available, will be as important as military matters in the determination of Roman policy in Illyricum.

1.4.1 The Illyrian policy of Rome in the context of world-system analysis: Policy as an interaction between systems

In order to understand such an obscure and complex matter as Illyrian policy a sensible theoretical approach is a necessity. This thesis will try to examine it from two points of view that have not been used previously in this context. Instead of considering the Roman interaction with individual polities in Illyricum, Illyrian policy will be seen as the interaction of two systems: firstly the social and political system that was Rome and its empire; and secondly the geo-political system that Romans saw and recognized as Illyricum. The interaction of Rome and Illyricum will therefore be seen as one of the many cultural interactions between the core (centre) and semi-periphery of the Mediterranean world, resulting in the gradual development of core areas in Illyricum, which in time created their own peripheries.

Immanuel Wallerstein pioneered the view of world history as the history of a succession of large social units – world-systems – that finally integrated into the single world-system after AD 1500. The view applies the hierarchy of centre and periphery to the network of international economic and political relationships regarding territorial division of labour on areas of the core and the periphery and their mutual interaction as the exclusive factors of historical change. Various interpretations emphasized different aspects of Wallerstein’s work, but it is surprising that historians rarely turned their attention to his notion of historical systems. Wallerstein recognized a system - not individual states or polities - as the fundamental unit of historical analysis. The world-system can be defined as “... all of the economic, political, social and cultural relations”, and interactions inside the system or between different systems recognized as an integration of different aspects of social interaction such as ecology/economy, power/politics and culture/ideology. According to Wallerstein, before the single world-system was established, there were three types of world-systems determined by a hierarchical division of labour and

25 Chase-Dunn/Grimes (1995) 389, elaborating original ideas of Wallerstein. There is small confusion in terminology as the term ‘World-system’ for some scholars does not always imply a system on the world scale, see Wallerstein (1993).
26 Frank (1994).
organized on political basis as redistributive ‘world-empires’ or on economic basis as the capitalist ‘world-economies’, as well as stateless, reciprocal ‘mini-systems’ isolated from the rest of the world.\(^\text{27}\)

The development of Wallerstein’s approach was always heavily influenced by the significance of economic relations as key factors within the system. However, his emphasis on the role of economy and the division of labour does not always give satisfactory results when too rigidly applied to the pre-capitalist world, and especially if it attempts to see the classical world as an integrated economic system where peripheries were exploited by the core.\(^\text{28}\) Chase-Dunn and Hall have widened the world-system concept, acknowledging that the importance of different types of inter-societal interaction (cultural, political, trade, etc.) varies in different systems. They have introduced a so-called ‘nested networks’ theoretical model that returns economic factors back to equal footing with other types of interaction.\(^\text{29}\)

As said before, centre – periphery antagonism and interaction is one of the pillars upon which Wallerstein’s thesis rests, but the whole concept is much older. It is originally a western spatial concept that divides space into a central dominating area and periphery that is subjected to the centre. The concept is very useful because it can be used in different contexts, especially suiting social, geographical and political, as well as cultural and economic contexts. This is particularly the case since the earlier intellectual emphasis on the significance of the centre gave way to research into the peripheries.\(^\text{30}\)


\(\text{28}\) Waltz (1978) 38 pointed out that international economic theory, such as Wallerstein’s, cannot be regarded at the same time as the theory of international politics; cf. also criticisms of Ragin/Chirot (1984); Millett (1990a) 36-40; Melko (1994); Dietler (1995) esp. 94-95. Wallerstein himself admits that the economy plays a secondary role to politics in the functioning of his pre-capitalistic world-empires; Wallerstein (1974) 15; cf. Finley (1985a) 150-176; Woolf (1990) 47 ff. seeing the economy as a matter of secondary importance in the politics of the ancient world. Some scholars applied the somewhat rigidly economic aspects of Wallerstein to pre-modern societies Ekholm/Friedman (1982); Gills/Frank (1993a); (1993b).

\(\text{29}\) Chase-Dunn/Hall (1993) 858-860, present the Roman empire as a system based on interrelated but spatially dispersed networks of bulk goods, political/military interactions and prestige goods. This approach enabled Wallerstein’s theory, which initially excluded stateless societies (Wallerstein (1984) 148-150), to include proto-state formations, such as those in pre-Roman Illyricum, in the world-system framework.

\(\text{30}\) Strassoldo (1980). ‘Centrism’ in world-systems theory is strongly criticised by Dietler (1995) as biased by the Graeco-Roman and modern European colonial point of view. Unfortunately, there is no space here to argue with this interesting, but in some ways too exclusive opinion. Certainly, grafting Mediterranean culture onto indigenous cultures in Europe gave different initial results, but in the case
World-systems theory has been modified in various ways to suit the circumstances of the pre-modern world, and also incorporated in theories that are concerned with establishing a centre-periphery model in ancient world. In classical history and archaeology, the world-system theory and the concepts of core and periphery are becoming more familiar issues. Some works explore the functioning and interaction of the regional systems in Continental Europe, mainly in the sphere of exchange and trade between core and periphery, as well as analysing the process of the transformation of periphery into a new core which in turn creates new peripheries. When dealing with the political aspects of world-system theory and the centre-periphery model, some scholars analyse the functioning of the Roman Republic and Empire as a political and economic macro-system composed of a centre and different layers surrounding it.

1.4.2 The Illyrian policy of Rome in the context of world-system analysis: Working hypothesis

This thesis assumes that the ancient Mediterranean world in the period under discussion, existed as a complex multi-societal system (macro-system) on all levels of social interaction (Figure 1.1). In its geo-political aspect, the Mediterranean functioned as a network of regional systems, as Braudel pointed out: “The plural always outweighs the singular. There are ten, twenty or a hundred Mediterraneans, each one subdivided in turn”. Regional systems are in many ways artificial because they are human-made and human-perceived, so the nature and the extent of those regional systems changes throughout the history. As stated above, two levels of the interaction will be discussed - political interaction and cultural interaction.
Firstly, on a political level regional systems are composed of different entities or units. In time, some of these smaller units became powerful enough to dominate their region and even impose their hegemony outside their regional system, and even to become Wallerstein’s ‘world-empires’. Some units can belong to two or more systems and can shift from one system to another, or even create a system of their own. Secondly, this thesis also assumes that some parts of the Mediterranean macro-system can be defined as core and some as periphery according to their degree of inclusion in the broad cultural values that characterize the macro-system, like urbanization, political system, mode of production, ideology/religion. It will see core and periphery as broad cultural categories, rather than defining them solely in terms of military power, economy or trade. Regional systems are not necessarily unified, and their individual units can be included in different degrees in the broad cultural values. Therefore, this study will examine Roman Illyrian policy in the light of two different but overlapping inter-societal networks that existed in the Mediterranean macro-system one based on broad cultural values with a developed hierarchy of core and periphery; and the other a geo-political network of power.

The argument here is that Roman policy-makers recognized and sometimes even created the existence of regional political systems and dealt with them in two overlapping ways. They formed a general, broad political approach towards the area, but also were compelled to interact with the political units inside the system in order to adjust and fine tune a generally planned regional policy (Figure 1.3, Chapter 2.2). In order to examine the interaction between geo-political systems it is important to determine the state of the systems in interaction. A geo-political system may be either in stable / working (minor wars, unchanged or slightly changed political situation in any given period) or unstable / transitional state (major wars, changed political situation, political and economic instability). Instability occurs for internal structure; Woolf (1990) 48. Those cells or regional systems also represented self-integrated economies after becoming part of the Roman imperial world; cf. Woolf, (1992).

35 Gills and Frank see historical change through hegemonic transitions inside a world system and assert the view that hegemony is a pattern of world history; Gills (1993); Gill/Frank (1993a).

36 Woolf (1990) 54-55 points out the significant categories of world-symbols and symbolic power as elements of cultural integration.

37 Roman perception of regional systems was in many ways affected by their own ’conceptual geography’, such as, for example, Cisalpina; Purcell (1990), or Gaul; Timpe (1965) 209-211; Goudineau (1996) 467; Woolf (1998) 48-54 (Gaul an artificial spatial concept made by Roman power
and/or external reasons and lasts until a new stability is found by means of a new political framework imposed internally or externally.

Rome – Illyricum is a clear example of a ‘world-empire’ – a regional system relationship in a geo-political aspect,\(^\text{38}\) and core – periphery, or rather a semi-periphery,\(^\text{39}\) in a cultural aspect. Thesis argues that Rome, as one of Wallerstein’s archetypal ‘world-empires’, influences the regional systems by imposing a political, and in more advanced stages of expansion, a constitutional framework on the regional system in order to suit its own interests. The imposition of a political framework can be achieved through aggressive (major wars of conquest) or passive (diplomatic) means, like creating a network of clients/allies, minor wars and the pacification of hostile neighbours. However, this is not a one-sided relationship, as units inside the regional system react to changes in the political/constitutional framework and may also influence the stability of the whole regional system. The specific geographical setting, in which the Mediterranean macro-system existed, with the sea as its central structural axis, visibly affected all policy-making in the ancient world. The geo-strategic emphasis of Roman interests is also part of the relationship and it can be recognized as maritime (interest in the coastal belt and the immediate hinterland) and continental.

Illyricum was a heterogeneous system, consisting of different ethnic and proto-state social groups. Thus, Rome was compelled to deal with many different small political and ethnic units inside Illyricum in various ways in order to make lasting political frameworks favourable to its interests. This element of the policy we can define as an ethnic policy. Certainly, there were other factors such as dealing with the individuals and native elites, but inadequate evidence prevents a more sophisticated elaboration of that aspect of ethnic policy. It does not seem that Roman

\(^{38}\) Wallerstein’s original approach is that ‘world-empire’ swallows smaller systems in periods of expansion and creates them in periods of contractions; Wallerstein (1987) 317-318.

ethnic policy in Illyricum was very different from the much more familiar _divide et impera_ in Gaul.\textsuperscript{40}

**FIGURE 1** _The foreign policy of Rome in the context of world-system analysis_

**FIGURE 1.1** _The Mediterranean world as a network of interacting regional geo-political systems_

**FIGURE 1.2** _The nature of interaction between the systems_

1.5 The stages in the Roman-Illyrian relationship (the development of a political/constitutional framework)

This thesis will try to follow and to explain the development of changes of Rome’s relationship with Illyricum between 167 BC and AD 68. The choice of these starting and finishing points is determined by their significance, because these years were decisive in the relationship. 167 BC has special significance because that year marked the end of complex native pre-Roman state institutions⁴¹ in Illyricum such as the Ardiaean (Illyrian)⁴² or Histrian kingdoms, and enabled the Romans to develop a consistent and unified Illyrian policy. AD 68 is arbitrarily picked because the end of the Iulio-Claudian dynasty coincides with the development of Danubian limes and the end of Illyrian policy as such (Chapter 8).

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⁴² It depends whether one supports the argument of Hammond (1966) or Papazoglu (1965), see Chapter 2.5.2.
The evolution of Roman relations with Illyricum can be divided into chronological phases. Marin Zaninović spoke of four basic phases in the Roman penetration in Dalmatia. They are appropriate to Pannonia in the first three periods, i.e. they can be applied to the whole region of Illyricum in the time span we have chosen:

1. The rise and fall of the Illyrian (and Histrian) kingdom (229 – 167 BC)
2. The conquest and formation of the province of Illyricum (158 – 33 BC)
3. The period from the rebellion to the final departure of the legions (AD 6 – 90)
4. The time when Dalmatia was garrisoned only with auxiliaries (AD 94 – 245).  

J. Wilkes did not define phases in Roman Dalmatian (Illyrian) policy specifically, but from the organization of chapters in his *Dalmatia* we can recognize the following chronological phases:

1. As above
2. The late Republican era (167 – 59 BC)
3. Caesar and the Civil War (59 – 39 BC)
4. Augustus and Illyricum (35 BC – AD 9)
5. The Iulio-Claudians in Illyricum (AD 10 – 68).  

While Zaninović’s division is a rather rough overview, Wilkes makes a more sophisticated division taking into account (but not defining) the development of the political/constitutional framework imposed by Rome. We propose some additions and corrections to the division of Wilkes, and for convenience organize chapters according to this amended division. The reason for the division will be to emphasize the evolution of the political and constitutional position of Illyricum in relation to Rome, and throughout the thesis we will try to see how the change of the framework affected the regional system. Certainly, this division (and use of abstract terms such

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43 Zaninović (1976b) 169-170. Suić (1976d) 185 and ff. divided the phases of Roman policy into the old (*acquisto vecchio*), new (*acquisto nuovo*) and newest (*acquisto novissimo*) corresponding with ‘proper’ Illyricum (i.e. the most southern part of Illyrian kingdom), Illyricum after 168 BC and the Great Illyricum of Appian and Pliny (=our fifth phase). The greatest weakness of his division is the assumption that the Romans immediately acquired land and established the administration of the province after the division of the Illyrian kingdom, see Chapter 3.2.

as ‘Coastal’ or ‘Lesser’ Illyricum) should be handled with care, as every division of
history into historical periods is an essentially artificial invention of the modern
historian. Historical transitions nearly always take a long time and clear divisions in
history are rare. This new scheme, therefore, is as follows:

1. As above
2. The late Republican or Bifocal period (167 – 60 BC)
3. The period of the proto-province (Coastal Illyricum) (59 – 33 BC)
   3a. The establishment and strengthening of coastal Illyricum (59 – 44 BC)
   3b. The pacification of the interior (44 – 33 BC)
4. Illyricum as a senatorial province (Lesser Illyricum) (33 – 11 BC)
5. The imperial province (Greater Illyricum) (11 BC – c. AD 10)
6. The two Illyricums (c. AD 10 – 68).

The initial or first period is easy to recognize, and it is part of a wider
Macedonian and North Italian policy, concerned partly with the Illyrian and the
Histrian kingdoms and the elimination of piracy in the Adriatic but without
permanent military commitment across the Adriatic. 167 BC witnessed the end of
the Ardiaean kingdom, which used to be a focal point throughout the initial stages of
Roman policy. After that event, Roman Illyrian policy is then characterized by a
bifocal approach, focusing its attention on the south and north Adriatic as separate
zones of operations, but still avoiding permanent military commitment and the
administrative organization of the province. The proconsulship of Caesar is taken as
the start of the transition, and it is marked by the formation and defence of a unified
zone of operations or as a proto-province on the Adriatic coast and the pacification
of its immediate hinterland. In this period, the encouragement of Italian migration
and the formation of colonies and municipia on the eastern Adriatic coast shows a
change of attitude and the increased strategic need to include Illyricum into the
Roman world. The success of Octavian’s expedition in 35 – 33 BC finally enabled

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45 It is uncertain when the division of Illyricum actually took place, see Chapter 8.2.
46 The first phase of Roman Illyrian policy dealt only with isolated parts of Illyricum such as the
Illyrian and Histrian kingdoms, which existed in totally different geo-political contexts, so it is
doubtful whether we can describe it as a phase in Illyrian policy. For that reason (as well as for lack of
space) it is not discussed at greater length here, see Chapter 3.2.
the establishment of an administrative, senatorial province of Illyricum, limited to the coastal belt and the immediate hinterland.

A general change of policy and an aggressive expansion into Europe in the last 10 years of the 1st century BC increased the military and political domination of Rome all the way to the Drava and the Danube. The Bellum Pannonicum brought about the formation of the imperial province Illyricum (or ‘Greater’ Illyricum as it is called above), in 11 BC in order to more easily coordinate military operations in the middle Danube region. ‘Greater’ Illyricum, encompassing the lands from the Adriatic to the Danube, proved difficult to administer as a single province, and after a series of strategic errors, an uprising in AD 6 – 9 marked the final failure of the policy and resulted in the division of ‘Greater’ Illyricum into two parts, the future provinces Dalmatia and Pannonia. This phase finishes roughly with the reigns of Claudius and Nero. AD 68 is an approximate date but it seems to be the period when the transformation of Pannonia into a permanent imperial frontier province was completed, and Dalmatia was fully incorporated into the administrative system of the empire; it became part of its inner core. More time was required for the start of Romanization. The term ‘Illyrian policy’ starts to lose its original meaning, and is replaced with a Danubian frontier policy to the north and a provincial policy applied in Dalmatia and Pannonia.

1.6 Themes and approaches: Illyricum in Roman historiography

The history of Illyricum remains a comparatively neglected area in the modern study of Roman history. There are some valid reasons for that, as the scarcity of ancient sources often reduces the interest of modern scholars. Ancient historians, geographers, philosophers and poets were never really interested in this rough and isolated country on the fringes of the Hellenic and Roman world. In fact, from the start, Illyricum provided an example of barbarian ‘otherness’ in Hellenic intellectual thought. Illyricum was contrasted with Hellenic civilization, as the barbarian negative of Greece. Romans maintained the same attitude, giving only secondary attention to the conquest of Illyricum when compared with the achievement made by

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47 Wallace (1998) 213-216 and ff. Still, the situation was not always so black and white. Hellenized Illyrians from the fringes of Hellenic world (Ἰλλυρίς) were regarded by the Greeks as half-barbarian but a still relevant part of an international community; Rendić-Miočević (1981) 11 ff.
their conquest of Gaul or Germany. Nothing substantially changed throughout Imperial times. The words of Cassius Dio still convey to the modern reader a note of contempt mixed with the horror and desperation felt by an intellectual from the classical era placed in these remote and barbarian parts of the world by the hands of cruel Fortune. Modern scholarship is still pretty much uninterested in this field, (with the exception of J. J. Wilkes’ or G. Alföldy’s magna opera), despite significant archaeological developments in the last 60 years. In vain R. Syme complained three decades ago that his work in this field failed to attract either praise or censure, or even a bare mention. Illyricum and its ancient inhabitants are today still represented by little more than brief footnotes in general works of ancient history.

Is it worth examining the Illyrian policy of Rome, and should we consider Illyrian policy as something separate from, say, the larger Balkan or Central European policy of Rome? Modern scholarship is skeptical about any notion of an Illyrian policy, and regards it as at best chaotic and inconsistent. In general, there is still an uncomfortable divide in modern scholarship between the centralist, Tacitean style of imperial history of the core and the highly localized history of the provinces at the periphery. This is how A. Mócsy recognized this problem in 1974:

“ A daunting gap separates the study of central Roman imperial history from local, often highly developed archaeological research. This gap may be bridged only by the use of a method which explores every aspect, period by period and in accordance with historical principles.”

Research on Illyrian policy may be a case study for understanding the wider context of Roman expansion in central and northern Europe in the early principate.

48 Dio, 49.36.2-4. See Salmon (1988) for the Roman attitude towards the peoples of Illyricum. Still Vell. Pat. 2.110.5, gives a much more optimistic view of Pannonian culture in his period (see Mócsy’s, perhaps too harsh criticism, of this statement; Mócsy (1983)).
49 Syme (1971) 24; Wilkes (1992) 4. A large corpus of Albanian and ex-Yugoslav scholarship remains unavailable (although things have got better in recent decades) and is generally unknown to the world community of scholars, except through the works of G. Alföldy, J. Wilkes, or N. G. L. Hammond.
51 Mócsy (1974) xix.
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The nature of Roman Illyrian policy divides scholars. The major problem seems to be in their different assessments of the economic significance of Illyricum for Rome. Some scholars, particularly scholars from the former Yugoslav area, see it as an act of continuing Roman aggression and the expression of Roman imperialism, which was looking for additional tribute, new markets for Italian traders and rich sources of iron ore.\(^2\) The other view of Roman Illyrian policy sees it as primarily dictated by the strategic interests of Rome. Major argument for this view is at odds with the previous one, which holds that Illyricum had no attraction for Romans on account of its minor economic significance, and that economic factors played a secondary role in the policy.\(^3\) These conflicting views on the basic purpose of Illyrian policy can be placed in the wider context of scholarly debate between ‘the expansionists’ and the defenders of the hegemonistic view of Roman Republican and early imperial foreign policy and strategy, which is discussed in Chapter 2.3.

Certainly, it is not possible to explore Illyrian policy in isolation from the policies regarding other provinces, especially when taking into account the inadequate sources. For this reason Chapter 2 will deal with Roman foreign policy in general, especially the changes that occurred from the Late Republic to the Early Principate. An important question is whether there was any Illyrian policy in the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\)–1\(^{\text{st}}\) century BC, and if there was, what are the reasons for any change in the early Principate. Romans often based their foreign policy on day-to-day changes in the situation rather than following some previously determined policy. Still, one would be mistaken to argue that Roman foreign policy was a chaotic chain of unconnected events. Naturally, these changes of policy did not exist isolated from the contemporary socio-political disturbances or from the fundamental change in the Roman political system and society that inaugurated the Principate. They were part of the general process of social transformation: the disappearance of the oligarchic Republic and the gradual establishment of an autocratic regime.

\(^2\) E.g. Bojanovski (1988) 36-54, but generally the same opinion is sometimes expressed for the Republican policy; cf. Harris (1979) 54-104. Pašalić (1975) 21-26 sees Roman Illyrian policy through the eyes of Marxist theory, defining the ancient economy primarily as a slave-owning economic and social system. We should not forget Polybius’ remark that the crossing of the Adriatic was the start of Roman imperialism; Polyb. 2.2.1-3.

\(^3\) Zippel (1877) 4; Gabričević (1988/89) discussing the causes of the First Illyrian war.
Roman foreign policy was not so Rome-centered as it might seem at first sight. Indeed, foreign (and provincial) policy was made in Rome by the Senate and later by the Princeps, but it was also modified on the spot by local governors and commanders, when slow communications pressed local governors to make urgent decisions without waiting for advice from Rome.\textsuperscript{54} However, this thesis will try to show that the Roman conquest of Illyricum was not a matter undertaken only for the ultimate protection of Northern Italy or as a strategic necessity for Roman expansion or a mere sideshow to the conquest of Germany and the middle Danube.\textsuperscript{55} The conquest and annexation of this region was independently influenced by unique imperialistic motives, such as the acquisition of rich metal deposits,\textsuperscript{56} manpower and tribute-paying subjects, and it was also influenced by regional geo-strategic requirements that had to take into account the heterogeneous ethnic character of the area.

1.7.1 Literature review: primary sources

What are the primary sources available to the modern scholar attempting to do research into the Rome’s Illyrian policy? Key sources are the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} century AD Greek historians, Appian of Alexandria and Cassius Dio, as well as the Italian Velleius Paterculus, who was not only a contemporary of many of the events, but also an eyewitness to the Pannonian rebellion in AD 6 – 9.

The Illyrike of Appian is the only surviving specialized monograph that deals with the history of Illyricum focusing on Rome’s wars with the peoples of Illyricum. It begins with the first Illyrian war in 229 BC and concludes with Octavian’s expedition in 35 – 33 BC.\textsuperscript{57} That the Illyricum topic was not attractive to classical historians such as Appian himself bears witness, who admitted to having a problem in locating material for his Illyrike.\textsuperscript{58} Appian supplied many essential details about early Roman encounters with Illyricum in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC, so that he is

\textsuperscript{54} Foreign policy in the Republic: Badian (1958a); (1968); Harris (1979); Sherwin-White (1984) 1-17; Eckstein (1987); in the principate: Millar (1983); Mattern (1999) 1-23; transition from the Republic to the Principate: Millar (1984a); Raafflaub/Tober (1990); imperial provincial policy and administration: Millar (1977) 375-455; Bowman (1996); Hanson (1997), see below pp. 30 ff.
\textsuperscript{55} Syme (1971) first recognised and fully acknowledged the importance of this conquest for the Roman state.
\textsuperscript{56} See Mitchell (1983) 95-97.
\textsuperscript{57} Unfortunately, it has not attracted significant attention from modern scholars. Key works are Dobiáš (1930) and Marasco (1993).
\textsuperscript{58} App. Ill. 6, 14, 29.
(together with Polybius and Livy) a major source for the history of Illyricum. Appian preferred a geographical and ethnological rather than a chronological approach, and he has been criticized by modern scholars for his limitations, unevenness and omissions, especially for the period between the mid-second century BC and the campaigns of Augustus. In the part of the book dealing with the campaign of Octavian, he relied exclusively on the now lost autobiography of Augustus who was an eyewitness, but an eyewitness who had no personal or political interest in publishing objective history. The first princeps was apparently interested in clearing his name from accusations of cruelty and treachery during the Civil War. In the passages of the Autobiography concerned with his expedition in Illyricum, he described only his own deeds, and left unmentioned the efforts of others. Appian was not particularly critical in his assessment of Roman Republican foreign policy, and he describes every Roman interaction with Illyricum as bellum iustum, regardless of the real causes and motives for these wars.

The other important source is the Roman history of Cassius Dio. His work covers not only the campaigns of Octavian but the Danubian campaigns of Crassus in 29 – 28 BC and the Illyrian rebellion, all of which are treated in some detail, while the Bellum Pannonicum is mentioned sporadically only in the context of the general history of the Empire. Dio had the advantage of knowing the area, being governor there in the early third century AD. However, he is not always aware that he often applies the terminology of his own age to the first century BC/AD. It is unclear which sources Dio actually used for his accounts of the reign of Augustus, including the conquest of Illyricum. For Octavian’s campaigns (books 49 – 50) his account is generally not so far from that of Appian who follows Augustus. However, some details are obviously different from that of Appian, which suggests the possibility

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59 Wilkes (1969) 34 n.2; Marasco (1993) 485. As Marasco pointed out, Appian was accustomed to dealing with large unitary Hellenistic kingdoms, so that he was confused by the political patchwork of Illyrian peoples.

60 App. Ill. 15; on Augustus’ autobiography; Charlesworth (1934) 868; Yavetz (1984) 1-8; Mellar (1999) 177-179.

61 Marasco (1993) 487-489, arguing that Appian’s writing was influenced by the foreign policy of his age, which dealt with the defence of empire and did not understand expansion, see Chapter 2.2-3 and especially Chapter 3.

62 See general works of Millar (1964); Harrington (1970); Šašel-Kos (1986) (an extremely important examination of Dio’s treatment of Illyricum).

63 Legatus Augusti in Dalmatia, 49.36.4; and Pannonia Superior 80.1.3.

64 Dio, 49.37.6; Syme (1971) 131-132; Šašel-Kos (1997a) 191-192 (Dio calls Segestica Siscia, while Appian, who is not so well acquainted with the area keeps the old name).

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that Dio was using some other source(s). His sources for the Bellum Pannonicum and the Pannonian rebellion are impossible to determine as yet, but it appears that he had a good source on the Pannonian revolt, which resulted in a rather full treatment of the events. Dio rarely goes into details, but he can give a general idea of the order of the events, especially in regard to the rebellion in AD 6-9, and of course he is a useful check on other sources. Modern scholars have criticized Dio as too general, annalistic and dry, and often making obvious geographical errors.

An important source is the eyewitness account of Velleius Paterculus, who was Tiberius’ legatus Augusti in Illyricum during the great rebellion of AD 6 – 9. In his history he is dealing with the rebellion only, and he promises to deliver a more detailed account of native peoples in Illyricum later, but that work is unfortunately either lost or, more probably, was never done. Velleius is often the only source for certain events, so that it is necessary to take his account into consideration. Unfortunately, the historical credibility of his work is often seriously undermined by his amateur approach, his lack of objectivity and a lack of recognition of matters of historical importance. Still, despite the generally negative attitude of modern scholarship towards him, it is possible to see positive qualities in Velleius’ work, especially his non-Tacitean lack of cynicism and positive enthusiasm for Tiberius’ personality and rule.

Important additional sources are Pliny the Elder and the geographer Strabo. Pliny preserved a description of the Roman administrative organization of the Dalmatian province from the late 1st century BC, or 1st century AD. He uses at least three different sources for his description of the administrative provincial organization of Dalmatia. The oldest is the late Republican administrative structure described by M. Terentius Varro (the antiquarian), the formula provinciae and the inventory of three judiciary conventus, possibly compiled after the division of

67 Millar (1964) 91.
69 Vell. Pat. 2.111.4 (legate); 2.106.2-3 (promised work on Pannonians and Dalmatians).
71 Woodman (1977); Craus/Woodman (1997) 82-84.
Illyricum (Chapter 8.2), and finally the list of conquered Illyrian peoples as given in Augustus’ autobiography.\textsuperscript{72} Besides these, Pliny used the description of the coast from the unidentified \textit{periplus} from the second century BC, possibly the very same one used by Strabo.\textsuperscript{73}

Strabo of Amasia provides useful geographical information about Illyricum from his own era (1\textsuperscript{st} century BC and AD).\textsuperscript{74} Strabo’s sources for Dalmatia are much more complex and chronologically more multi-layered than Pliny’s. He uses Greek sources from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC, such as Polybius, Posidonius and an unidentified \textit{periplus} from at least 100 BC, very possibly by Arthemidorus, but it is also possible that he combined a couple of different \textit{periploi} in his description of the eastern Adriatic coast. He also relied on much earlier material such as that of Theopompus. In Strabo’s account it is possible to recognize works of his contemporaries, such as Augustus’ autobiography, or sources as recent as the Pannonian rebellion.\textsuperscript{75}

There are also some useful although sometimes confusing bits and pieces in the epitomes of Livy covering the period to 9 BC, as well as Suetonius’ \textit{Lives} of Caesar, Augustus and Tiberius. Polybius is the chief source for the first phase of Illyrian policy. In this thesis, his report on the first Roman war with the Delmatae will be very important. Caesar mentions Illyricum a few times in the \textit{Gallic} and \textit{Civil Wars}, giving a good report on the fighting in the civil war in Illyricum. There are also works of compilers from the later period, such as Florus, Rufus Festus, Eutropius and Orosius, who mainly draw on the other sources, without adding much new knowledge. Unfortunately, many of the mid- and later Republican period sources for Illyrian history are based on the epitomes and fragments and it is necessary to exercise the utmost caution when dealing with them.\textsuperscript{76} Some important works are lost. Asinius Pollio’s history would be very valuable in providing another view of the civil wars, as he wrote a history focusing on the period between 60 BC

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.122-152; Čače (2001); Alföldy (1961) 60-61; (1965a) 36-37, 70-71 for the sources of Pliny. See the critical view of Pliny’s terminology in Vittinghoff (1977) 24-30.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Čače (2001) argues that Pliny also used a pre-Augustan and still unidentified \textit{periplus} dated after the end of the Civil war.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Strabo, 7.5. See Marković (1985); Baladić (1989) 113-127; Kožišić (1990a) 221 f.; Dzino (2007) for general comments on Strabo, 7.5 and Čače (1994/95); Šašel-Kos (2002a) for the regional aspects of Strabo’s account of Illyricum.
\item \textsuperscript{75} See Baladić (1989) 13-41 for Strabo’s sources for his book 7.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Brunt (1980) is a marvellous piece of work which emphasises all the dangers of using epitomes and historical fragments as sources.
\end{itemize}
and (opinions differ) either the battle of Philippi or possibly Actium.\textsuperscript{77} The history of Posidonius continued where Polybius stopped and it would have provided useful insights into the obscure second century BC. It is very possible that Posidonius wrote about the expedition of Metellus Deltamicus in 118 BC.\textsuperscript{78} Amongst the lost works that discussed Illyricum, Strabo’s history should be included as well as Augustus’ autobiography.

In addition to written sources numismatics, epigraphy and the results of archaeological excavations can supply further information. To remedy the lack of material throughout most of the period (especially in the Adriatic hinterland), numismatics is not so informative here as it can be in some other parts of the classical world. The shortage of coins and coin hoards in itself can suggest some conclusions. Still, on some particular topics numismatics provides significant help such as in reconstructing the political map of southern Illyricum after the division of the Illyrian kingdom in 167 BC. Furthermore, individual coin finds and the distribution of coin hoards give some helpful hints about Italian and Greek trade and trade routes with Pannonia, and economic relations between Greek cities in the Adriatic and Italy and the Adriatic hinterland.

The epigraphic evidence from the Republican period is very slight and gives no real insight into Roman relations with Illyricum.\textsuperscript{79} The frequency and importance of inscriptions increases after Augustus. Except for some places in the \textit{Res Gestae} of Augustus and a couple of military inscriptions there is really nothing significant from the Augustan era that can be used to determine Roman policy. However, for the reigns of Augustus’ successors, the inscriptions and other finds of archaeology are often the only way for the historian to understand the establishment of military strongholds, a network of military roads and early Roman colonization of the interior. Prosopography, both native and foreign names (Italians and others who settled in Illyricum) is one of the most significant tools for any study of social history in Illyricum.\textsuperscript{80} An important source of information for provincial administration in

\textsuperscript{77} André (1949) 47-51; Badian (1958b) 161-162; Morgan (2000) 54 n. 18 – Philippi; Gabba (1956) 242-243, 248-249 and Pelling (1979) 84 n. 73 – Actium. See André (1949) 41-66 on the \textit{History} of Asinius Pollio.

\textsuperscript{78} Kidd (1988) 318-320 (F 70).

\textsuperscript{79} The inscription from Salona is a rare exception, see Chapter 4.2.

\textsuperscript{80} Alföldy (1965a).
Dalmatia is the inscriptions dealing with boundary settlements between different native communities.\textsuperscript{81} Part of volume III of the \textit{CIL}, thanks to the work of Th. Mommsen, covers the inscriptions from Illyricum, and there are important local collections of inscriptions from the territories of the former Yugoslavia and Hungary. Moreover, a large amount of recent work has been done in this field, which improves our basic knowledge of the population and economy of Roman Illyricum.\textsuperscript{82}

Archaeology is almost the only tool for research into the different native Iron-Age cultural groups. It helps us to understand their geography and cultural characteristics before they became part of the Mediterranean world.\textsuperscript{83} The most important for this topic will be the archaeological excavations of urban centers on the Dalmatian coast and Roman military camps in Illyricum and their early development, as well as some economic matters such as patterns of trade in the region. Changes in archaeological theory and interpretation, such as the development of the ‘new archaeology’ have not often been applied to the study of ancient Illyricum, and even archaeological discoveries in last 20-30 years are not too often used in correcting previous opinions.\textsuperscript{84}

\textbf{1.7.2 Literature review: modern works}

The thesis will deal with two not so different areas of historiography: Illyrian studies, and the study of Roman foreign and provincial policy in the late Republic and early Principate. Because of the scarcity of written classical sources, Illyrian studies from their humble beginnings have heavily depended on archaeology. Local antiquarians, Austrian enthusiasts and other Western travelers who wandered in these troublesome and remote areas in the 19th century were the first to carry out Illyrian studies. Serious archaeological, historical and philological work only really began after 1945. These led to important results, especially regarding the material and spiritual culture of the Illyrians, as well as their language(s), onomastics and ethnogenesis. Greek and Roman sites were excavated, especially cities and military

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Wilkes (1969) 456-459.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Wilkes (1977) 744-760; (1996b) n.1 (overview of the epigraphic evidence).
  \item \textsuperscript{83} Benac (1987a) is a good synthesis on this topic. Cf. also Benac (1964a); (1975); Čović (1976). New archaeology is still in its infancy in modern-day Illyricum, but more and more significant works have appeared in the previous decade such as: Chapman et al. (1996).
  \item \textsuperscript{84} “New” archaeology: Binford/Binford (1968); Renfrew/Bahn (1991) 405-434. There are pioneering works using the ‘new archaeology’ approach in Dalmatia; Čače (1982); Chapman et al. (1996); Kirigin (1998).
\end{itemize}
sites, and important work was done on the Roman economy, road building, epigraphy, cults and provincial art as well.\textsuperscript{85} Civil war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s slowed the process but in spite of that, important new excavations in Dalmatia have been done, enabling more reliable evidence for the more thorough reconstruction of the economy and society of Roman Dalmatia and its regions.\textsuperscript{86}

Because modern Roman historiography outside the former Yugoslavia and Albania has never really considered Illyricum as an important area, there are not many works that go beyond the basic reconstruction of events from the ancient sources. It is difficult, however, to find any area of Roman history which was not treated in the work of Theodore Mommsen, who dedicated some space to Illyricum in his Roman history. Mommsen was in fact the first scholar to understand that the policy of Augustus in the Balkan Peninsula, the Danube and Germany had some degree of basic geo-strategic unity.\textsuperscript{87} Scholars in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century followed in Mommsen’s footsteps trying to reconstruct the order of events and geography of the Roman conquest of Illyricum.\textsuperscript{88} R. Syme did important work in determining and assessing the scope and purpose of Octavian’s/Augustus’ conquest of Illyricum. He apparently won a tough debate with scholars who overestimated the scope of Octavian’s campaigns during 35 – 33 BC and the territorial extent of his conquest.\textsuperscript{89} More recently, his work was expanded and developed by J. J. Wilkes, whose works could be regarded without exaggeration as the essential comprehensive modern study of Dalmatian and Illyrian history and culture, with contributions to the field of the Roman army and epigraphy in Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{90} G. Alföldy did comprehensive work on the population of Pannonia and Dalmatia, and he had a significant influence upon Wilkes.\textsuperscript{91} The historiography of Pannonia was improved in the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century

\textsuperscript{85} Wilkes (1992) 3-13; Stipčević (1989) 7-14 give excellent overviews of the historical development of Illyrian studies up to the early 1990s. There have been some comprehensive publishing projects in the former Yugoslavia such as Benac (1987a) or Čović (1988), covering prehistoric and proto-historic archaeology in Illyricum, and its parts.

\textsuperscript{86} Chapman et al. (1996).

\textsuperscript{87} Mommsen (1882) 7-8 and ff.

\textsuperscript{88} Zippel (1877) is the first significant, and still influential, comprehensive work on the history of Illyricum and the Roman conquest. Cf. bibliography of Charlesworth (1934) 903-904, and Syme (1934b) 938-940 for an overview of older literature on Illyricum. This thesis will mainly rely on the more recent literature, but some older works such as Zippel (1877); Kromayer (1899); Veith (1914), or the opus of Syme, Vulić and Patsch are sometimes impossible to avoid.

\textsuperscript{89} Syme (1933a) (the review of Swoboda (1932)); Schmitthenner (1958), contra: Swoboda (1932); Vulić (1934); Miltner (1937); Josifović (1956). Cf. Schmitthenner (1958) n.1 for full overview of the polemic.

\textsuperscript{90} Wilkes (1969); (1992); see also bibliography under Wilkes.

\textsuperscript{91} Alföldy (1965a) as the most significant work, see also bibliography under Alföldy, G.
due primarily to the fundamental works of the Hungarian scholars G. Alföldy and A. Mócsy, and more recently E., Tóth, J. Fitz and T. Nagy. There is also a large corpus of work by former Yugoslav scholars who have painstakingly assembled many pieces of the Pannonian and Dalmatian archaeological and historical puzzle.\(^{92}\)

There are many specialized studies in this field. Roman relations with Illyricum after the third Illyrian war up to Caesar’s pro-consulship did not attract much attention until recent times, because of the inadequate sources.\(^{93}\) Caesar’s command in Illyricum and the civil war fighting in Illyricum have attracted more significant attention from modern scholars (mostly because of Caesar).\(^{94}\) A significant body of work exists especially on Octavian’s expedition in 35 – 33 BC, mostly written before 1960.\(^ {95}\) The Pannonian war of 13 – 9 BC was neglected by modern historiography because of incomplete and very inadequate primary sources,\(^ {96}\) but the Pannonian rebellion, \textit{Bellum Batonianum}, in AD 6 – 9 at least attracted some attention because of its significance in slowing down aggressive Roman expansion in Central Europe. But no significant discussion has been written in the last decades.\(^ {97}\) The Iulio-Claudian period after Augustus is one of the least understood in the history of Illyricum. Archaeology has helped to reconstruct the position of military camps and the placement of legions in this period as well as the building of military roads linking the Adriatic coast with the legions on the Danube.\(^ {98}\) Nevertheless, the lack of literary sources really limits the scope of any intensive research into the general and

\(^{92}\) Alföldy (1936); Mócsy (1962); (1974); Lengyel/Radan (1980). See also comprehensive bibliography in Čović (1988). The post World War II generation of Croatian and Slovenian scholars (D. Rendić-Miočević, M. Suić, M. Zaninović, J. Šašel, P. Petru, etc.) was succeeded by S. Čače, B. Kirigin, M. Šašel-Kos, P. Kos. Unfortunately there are yet no internationally significant successors to the work of M. and D. Garašanin and F. Papazoglu in Serbia & Montenegro (some developments in archaeology appear, Zotović (2002)) nor any continuation of the talented generation of archaeologists (A. Benac, I. Bojanovski, B. Čović, Z. Marić) grouped around the Centre for Balkanological Studies in Sarajevo before the civil wars in the 1990s.

\(^{93}\) Skefich (1967) 1-41; Morgan (1971); (1973); (1974); Čače (1991).


\(^{95}\) Kromayer (1898); Dobiáš (1921); Swoboda (1932); Vulić (1907); (1926) 39-54; (1934); Josifović (1956); Schmitthenner (1958); Mirković (1968); Malevany (1977); Šašel-Kos (1997b). Very recently the PhD thesis of S. Bilić-Dujmušić dealing with the Octavian’s campaigns was accepted at the University of Zadar so we should expect new publications on the topic.

\(^{96}\) Wilkes (1965b); Gruen (1996) 174-175.

\(^{97}\) Vulić (1911) 200-247; (1926) 55-72; Rau (1925); Pašalić (1956); Köstermann (1953); Dyson (1971) 250-253.

\(^{98}\) Mócsy (1974) 40-79 (Pannonia and Upper Moesia); Wilkes (1969) 78-152, 442-480; (1966b) 553 ff.; (Dalmatia); Bojanovski (1974) (the roads in Dalmatia); Jagenteufel (1958) (the governors of Dalmatia); Dobó (1968) (the governors of Pannonia).
particular elements of Illyrian policy in this period. A more comprehensive exploration of the economy, urbanization and population of Roman Illyricum was not attempted by modern scholars until the 1950s and 1960s. It is proceeding despite all obstacles.99

99 Wilkes (1977); Kurilić (1994/95); (1999) (Population of Roman Dalmatia and Liburnia); Pašalić (1967); Šašel (1974c); Zaninović (1977); Šketro (1991); (1999) (economy of Roman Dalmatia); Suić (1976b) (cities and urbanization on eastern Adriatic coast); Pašalić (1954); Dušanić (1977); Bojanovski (1982) (Mining in Illyricum and the Danubian provinces); Fitz (1980) (economy of Pannonia).
2. Illyricum in Roman foreign policy: historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography

“La géographie à ce jeu, cesse d’être un but en soi pour devenir un moyen. Elle aide à retrouver les plus lentes des réalités structurales, à organiser une mise en perspective selon la ligne de fuite de la plus longue durée”

Braudel (1966) 21

2.1 Introduction

Roman - Illyrian political interaction could not exist in isolation from the rest of the ancient world, so before examining Illyrian policy in itself, it is necessary to outline the different historical, political and geographical contexts in which it existed. This chapter will outline both systems and their surroundings and discuss existing modern views on the nature of Roman Republican and Imperial policy and its dealing with frontiers, as well as attempting to determine those instruments. The position of Illyricum in the political geography of the 2nd century BC Mediterranean world will be briefly touched upon, and an outline of Republican interaction with the other regional geo-political systems in order to recognize the peculiarities and commonplaces of Illyrian policy. Also, this chapter will briefly recount the ethnic and political geography of Illyricum, its peoples and their political organization as it was in the 2nd century BC. The purpose of this chapter is to provide sufficient (in the given circumstances) insight into the ‘rules of the game’ and introduce the main units that constituted Roman-Illyrian interaction.

2.2 Roman foreign policy: Who made it, how and why was it made, and where did it stop?

It may be asked: was there any Roman policy at all? Roman strategy and policy-making has come under renewed scrutiny recently, focusing on whether the Romans could develop consistent policy and engage in strategic thinking, or if their
imperialism was piecemeal, uncoordinated and reactive.\textsuperscript{1} Certainly, Roman policy-making should not be seen through the eyes of modern foreign policy advisers, or research centres for regional or global politics. Neither can we claim to understand their decision-making mechanisms, as too many pieces are missing from the picture (except on rare occasions) such as the records of Senate debates or private letters that would help reveal the views of individuals and debates amongst the people involved in the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{2} However, it would be a major error to disregard completely the existence of a broader Roman foreign and provincial policy, in either the Republic or Principate. If policy is the ability of the rulers to use all political tools and resources in the best interests of their state and in to preserve that state,\textsuperscript{3} then Roman foreign policy undoubtedly existed. The economic, political and private interests of Roman rulers, and of those who had influence over them and sought eventual benefits, such as new resources or the security of the res publica, drove policy and, on occasions, transformed it.

The ways in which Romans implemented their foreign policy during the Republic are well known, yet some important questions still remain unanswered by modern scholarship. Especially unclear remains the attempt to define and explain fully the driving forces that were behind the policy, and to assess the ability of the Romans to plan and implement a cohesive foreign policy. It would be difficult to maintain the view that the Romans were fully conscious of the consequences of their policy-planning, at least to the extent suggested by Harris,\textsuperscript{4} but it is also impossible to believe that the Roman Senate put up with chaotic day-to-day mood-swings in their foreign dealings, or that commanders in the field had complete freedom of

\textsuperscript{1} Mann (1979); Whittaker (1994) esp. 62-70; Isaac (1992) 2-6; Campbell (2002) 16-21 criticizing the fundamentals of Luttwak (1976), concentrating their criticism on imperial frontier policy. See the strong criticism of Whittaker and Isaac by Wheeler (1993a) and (1993b) and basic support for the thesis of Luttwak in Ferrill (1991), and the overview of the debate in Whittaker (1996) where he still opposes the idea of the ‘Grand Strategy’ but admits that the Romans were capable of limited strategic planning esp. 28-31, 38-39.

There is nothing to disagree with that revised opinion that the Romans were able to develop elementary strategic thinking and regional policy-making as it would be impossible to acquire and manage a Mediterranean empire without those abilities. This thesis will show that Romans used a combination of both: general strategy and a peripheral, piecemeal approach in their interactions with Illyricum.

\textsuperscript{2} Finley (1978) 2-3 suggesting a ‘behavioural’ approach to research into ancient politics, consisting of examining the action-consequence-subsequent action pattern of the events, as the decision-making process remains obscure.

\textsuperscript{3} Kennedy (1991b) 5. Modern political theory regards foreign policy as a realm of anarchy that compels individual politics to use all available resources in order to survive; Waltz (1978) 102 ff.

\textsuperscript{4} Harris (1979), criticised for that view in particular by North (1981) 6-8.
action. It is also difficult to accept that either the individual pursuit of glory or commercial interests alone could be decisive factors in driving the common policy of the Senate.\(^5\) Scholarship must be content with a broad explanation that a complex mixture of influences, factors and interests drove the policy.\(^6\) When this thesis begins (168 – c. 70 BC) the Roman Senate had an almost unquestioned control over matters of state, including foreign policy. Internal division and civil struggle in Rome intensified after the Gracchi but rarely affected the consensus of the elite in Roman foreign policy.\(^7\) This is how Sherwin-White summarizes the essence of Roman foreign decision-making in the 2\(^{nd}\) century BC:

“The foreign policy of the Roman state in the century before the Social War was regularly determined by the Roman Senate within the limits that the Republican system imposed... Hence it is legitimate to speak of senatorial policy, not in the sense that there was a uniform body of opinion within the Senate, but that senatorial decrees about foreign policy represent the view of the majority, and transcend the political ambitions of individuals or factions.”\(^8\)

The Republican political system was beginning to collapse in the late 2\(^{nd}\) century BC and, regardless of the Sullan reforms, it was doomed to evolve into something different. Great military commands for Pompey and Caesar in the 60s and 50s BC, and subsequent decades of civil unrest, affected the very nature of the Roman political system. Possibly not the best but certainly the most efficient solution to the crisis was, apparently, the Principate. Collective decision-making was

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\(^5\) We certainly should not forget influential groups in the Senate, who for their own interests, pursued continuity in Roman politics towards particular areas, (cf. Bandelli (1981) 17 ff.), but only as one of the factors determining the policy.

\(^6\) Cobban (1935) 42 ff (old-fashioned but still sharp in this respect) “... factors of slight import in themselves, but decisive in their cumulative effect...”

\(^7\) There was a struggle of factions, but not a struggle of views on foreign policy; Finley (1978) 5; Sherwin-White (1984) 14-15.

\(^8\) Sherwin-White (1984) 2-15, quotations from 2 and 14, see also Dyson (1985) 277-278. It is possible to argue the extent of Senate policy making, but not to question it generally. Richardson (1986) 119-180; Eckstein (1987); Lintott (1993) 44-45, 53-54 make a strong point in favour of the important role of local commanders, but that does not diminish the general importance of policies created by the Senate. Bloemers (1988); Willems (1989) 37 go one step further, seeing Roman expansion as peripheral imperialism not controlled by the core and caused entirely by factors in the periphery that gave a dominant role to generals in the field. Millar (1984c) 3-6; Gabba (1984a) point to the role of the \textit{populus Romanus} in creating foreign policy and support for the expansionism – again without seriously challenging the supremacy of the Senate in foreign affairs.
abolished in favor of individual power-holding. Politics moved from the Forum to behind the closed doors of the imperial palace.\(^9\) The basic feature of the policy-making in the Principate could be recognized in its increased emphasis on the person of the emperor. The \textit{princeps} and his inner circle of family, friends and advisers became gradually the axis around which all the policy-making of the empire rotated.\(^10\)

The apparent reluctance of Roman policy-makers to expand their territory in the second century BC, after the elimination of all the other significant political powers in the Mediterranean, has triggered fierce debates amongst scholars.\(^11\) A good deal of modern scholarship has been concerned to define the nature of Roman Republican foreign policy as either one of two theoretical frameworks depicted as ‘defensive’ or ‘aggressive’ imperialism. Proponents of ‘aggressive imperialism’ argue that force of tradition, individual prestige and thirst for military glory drove the Roman nobility into aggressive wars. Other important driving forces behind this model of ‘aggressive imperialism’ are said to be the economic interest of the ruling class, rising trade opportunities and the need to exploit new provinces, as well as the Roman perception of threat, whether it was real or not.\(^12\) On the other hand, proponents of ‘defensive imperialism’, argue that the Roman Republican elite was generally opposed to expansion. Any expansion, in this view, was undertaken mainly for security reasons and in defence of Roman interests.\(^13\) Diplomatic control of conquered states was preferred to direct territorial annexation. Fear of the consequences of Roman expansion, such as financial burdens, inadequate administrative machinery or the increased influence of an successful \textit{imperator}, as well as the lack of potential recruits for the legions before the military reform of C.

\(^9\) Dio, 53.19.
\(^10\) Millar (1982). Cf. also Millar (1977) giving important insight into the role of the emperor.
\(^11\) The debate is so famous that itself attracts scholarly attention. See the overviews in Frézouls (1983); Linderski (1984); Hermon (1989).
\(^13\) Badian (1968) 16-21 puts strong arguments against economic imperialism in general, Millar (1984b) 15-18; Gruen (1984a); Finley (1985a) 153 ff. arguing that trade opportunities were not driving Roman imperialism, and Gabričević (1988/89) plausibly argues that economic factors were not the causes of the 1st Illyrian war.

\(^{13}\) E.g. Cic. \textit{Prov. Cons.} 13, 32 \textit{Semper illas} (the Gauls) \textit{nostri imperatores refutandas potius bello quam lacesendas putaverunt.}
Marius, led to a ‘defensive imperialism’.\textsuperscript{14} The change towards more aggressive expansionism is, in this view, visible only after Sulla. Individual generals rather than a group now determined foreign policy.

This split in modern opinion reflects the dual nature of Roman Republican political practice. On one hand, there is the traditional military nature of \textit{imperium} and the assignment of a \textit{provincia} as a military command; and on the other is a need for proper administration and exploitation of the vast territories left under unchecked Roman domination.\textsuperscript{15} The debate is also influenced by Polybius’ ambiguous view of the Roman politics of his age. He represents the Roman eastern expansion as a preconceived plan of conquest, while recognizing that there was virgin territory available for new conquests. However, there is no agreement about whether Polybius applied Greek political theory to Roman political practice, and thus misrepresented the real political situation, or whether he gave an accurate view of the Romans and their political aims at that time.\textsuperscript{16}

Augustan foreign policy is not free of this controversy either, although the context is essentially different. It too has attracted a lot of scholarly debate as to whether its essence was defensive or expansionist. The old-fashioned supporters of a defensive policy argue that Augustus’ expansion in the Alpine area, the Balkans and Germany was actually just a search for stable and easily defensible northern borders of the empire, borders which were ultimately found on the banks of great rivers: the Danube and the Rhine. According to this view, Augustus practiced ‘defensive imperialism’ making pre-emptive conquests of Illyricum and Germany in order to create a huge buffer zone between the imperial frontiers and the Italian heartland of the empire. On the other hand, the ‘expansionists’ argue that Augustus had in mind nothing less than world domination, or at least the extension of Roman rule to the shores of Ocean. This policy was in practice abandoned only after the defeat of

\textsuperscript{14} Stevenson (1951) 437-452; Badian (1968) 29-43; Sherwin-White (1980); (1984) 9-10, elaborating old views of Mommsen. Roman Republican expansion was hegemonic rather than territorial; Luttwak (1976) 49. See Brunt (1987) 71 ff., for lack of potential recruits in the Italian population. This point of view is still able to survive criticism, due to the inadequacy of alternative explanations for Roman reluctance to exploit areas conquered in the first half of 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC; Sherwin-White (1980) 178-179; North (1981) 2-3.

\textsuperscript{15} Hermon (1983) 178-179 sees the problem in the ambiguity of the terms \textit{imperium} and \textit{provincia} and their different relationship through different stages of their historical development.

\textsuperscript{16} Wallbank (1963); Harris (1979) 107-117; Derow (1979); North (1981) 5-6; Richardson (1979b).
Varus in the Teutoburg Forest and the exhausting pacification of the Pannonian rebellion in AD 6 – 9, but it still remained very much alive in the minds of Augustus’ successors.  

Roman foreign policy was closely connected with the Roman understanding of borders. In general in Republican foreign policy the borders were undefined. While borders in the eastern part of the Empire followed the old borders of conquered kingdoms and states, in the West they tended to be in a fluid state, especially the frontiers bordering barbarian gentes. Different treaties with Rome bound different peoples and it was impossible to draw a line between the domain of the res publica and the lands of barbarians who did not originate in the classical world. The expansion of Roman direct control very often depended on gradual military pacification (but not necessarily occupation) of troublesome neighbouring peoples who were, to varying degrees, culturally and economically incorporated into the classical world, even before the actual Roman conquest.

After the fall of the Republic, the treatment of the imperial frontiers changed radically, although the change of attitude began earlier, and possibly, it was an inevitable and unavoidable process. In Republican times the Roman border was defined vaguely through the power of the Roman sword, while the Empire saw the development of a more precisely defined limes separating the Empire from the outside world. It was foreign to Roman political thinking of the 3rd and 2nd century BC to distinguish a provincia as a strictly defined administrative area separate from a military zone of operations. In that context the nature of the Republican provincia changed from being a military command limited to some territory, to an organized

17 The proponents of ‘defensive expansionism’: Syme (1934b) 351-354; Adcock (1934) 596-602; Alfoldy (1952b).


19 Willems (1983) 105-107; (1989) 33-35 regards hegemonic control (which he calls ‘imperialism’) and direct occupation (he describes as ‘colonialism’) as temporary phenomena in the case of an expanding empire, which inevitably lead to the integration of individual regions into the empire.

20 Cic. Pis. 16, 38 as contrasted with RG 30.1, or Tac. Agric. 41.2.
provincial administration of the Principate, especially after Augustus.\(^{21}\) The Augustan Principate also carried out a massive program of expanding Roman political influence especially in Central Europe, affecting in every way the ambiguous position in which Illyricum stood in the Late Republic.

### 2.3 The instruments of Roman foreign policy

The essence of Roman foreign policy in the late Republic and early Principate remains controversial for the modern observer, held in the balance between political theory and practice, propaganda and historical reality. The complexity of its real nature is concealed by means of the repetition of ancient catchwords, and sometimes over-simplified modern explanations. On the other hand, the instruments of Roman foreign policy are always simple to see and recognize. If we oversimplify them, we can talk in terms of sticks and carrots. The brute force of the Roman legions, the opening of doors for political integration into the Res publica and the desire for wider social integration into a globalized society of the classical Mediterranean world were powerful instruments of Roman policy.

We can divide the instruments of Roman policy into two equally important groups: the instruments of integration and the instruments of power.\(^{22}\) The instruments of power, and we primarily think here of the Roman armed forces, neutralised dangerous and warlike opponents and ultimately acquired new provinces for the state and secured them.\(^{23}\) The instruments of integration are much more heterogeneous. They enabled Rome to keep areas under control without committing occupation forces to the area, helped newly conquered territories to become integral parts of the empire; they then became catalysts for the integration of the neighbouring peoples going further from the Mediterranean core.\(^{24}\) It is true that the instruments of integration worked slowly and sometimes were deliberately slowed


\(^{22}\) Debellare superbos, parcere subiectis and win over the ambitious with Roman citizenship; Wallbank (1972) 163.

\(^{23}\) Luttwak (1976) 195-200 distinguishes between the force and the power defining them as a force and the threat of force, the dynamic and the passive aspect, mutually opposite. We understand the instruments of power as both of these, essentially military, aspects.

\(^{24}\) Whitaker (1997) 144-148 defines a city as the instrument of power. Without discussing this matter in depth, this thesis understands Roman cultural imperialism to be the instrument of integration.

\(^{25}\) Haselgrove (1984) 16-17; (1987) presenting Gaul as an important example of how peripheries were transformed into secondary centres, creating in turn new peripheries.
down if, as occasionally happened, they diminished the economic gains of Rome and Italy. In the long run, however, they inevitably produced results and strengthened the cohesion of the Empire.\textsuperscript{25}

A strong and efficient army was an important pillar of the Res publica and an even more important political instrument of Roman foreign policy. It started as a citizen militia but in time was transformed into the most formidable military machine of antiquity.\textsuperscript{26} Whether the Romans applied any long-term strategy to military affairs of the Empire is a matter of dispute and author is not trying to engage in the discussion.\textsuperscript{27} However in Illyricum, as we will see, it appears that there was some limited strategic planning on a regional level. The conquest of Illyricum was not possible before the Augustan period, which witnessed the rise of the “new purpose army” and its capability for complex military operations in continental Europe.\textsuperscript{28} One of the most significant reasons for the delayed conquest of Illyricum was the nature of the terrain, which gave too many advantages to the defending army and required too many casualties from the attacking army. Unfortunately, nothing is known about Illyrian armies; guerrilla warfare and primitive military strategy too often and are too easily assumed.\textsuperscript{29} The description of say, Delmataean or Pannonian tactics suggests that they were capable of fighting Romans in open battle, conducting offensive actions, and also offering a very stubborn defense and employing strong detachments of cavalry.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{25} Miles (1990) 638-645 points that the assimilation of local elites and provincial communities prevented their alienation and the development of potentially threatening ethnic divisions in the empire, unlike European colonial policy in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} century. See also Brunt (1974a). For example Alföldy (1965b) describing the provincial policy of Tiberius as deliberatively obstructive towards the expansion of Roman citizenship in the provinces for the purpose of economically benefiting Italy, or Carandini (1989) who argues that expansion of the Empire in the long run destroyed the wine industry in Italy.

\textsuperscript{26} These are just some of the numerous works on the Roman army and its social role in the period we are concerned with: Brunt (1987); Raaflaub (1980); Keppie (1984b); Patterson (1993); Peddie (1994); Goldsworthy (1996).

\textsuperscript{27} For the controversy about the thesis of Luttwak, see Chapter 2.1 n. 1.

\textsuperscript{28} Cf. Syme (1933c) for the making of and Wilkes (1965a) for the use of the “new purpose army” of Augustan principate, see Chapter 6.3.

\textsuperscript{29} Malevanyi (1963) 160; Köstermann (1953) 353 ff. A closer examination of Illyrian military strategy would require much more space than we have here. It is difficult to say whether amongst the peoples of Illyricum there existed a specific and differentiated warrior-class, and, if it existed, what was its extent. See Wilkes (1992) 235-236.

\textsuperscript{30} Frontin. Str. 2.1.15 (the Pannonii fighting in open battle); for the offensive capabilities of the Delmataean alliance, see Chapter 4.4; Pannonian cavalry, Vell. Pat. 2.110.3.
The fine art of diplomacy was an important and complex instrument of Roman foreign policy, especially in Republican times and it was a necessary supplement to both the elements of force and the elements of integration. The diplomatic manoeuvres of the Romans are difficult to discern in Illyricum. Except for the communities of Adriatic Greeks whose diplomatic activities are reasonably well attested, we do not have evidence for diplomatic conduct with the natives. Some of them certainly were sent on embassies to Rome, or to the magistrate in charge such as the Daorsi in 156 BC or the Liburni in 50 BC. The Ardiaei were more sophisticated in diplomatic matters, trying to postpone or even prevent Roman intervention in 135 BC. The Delmatae developed their skills after the diplomatic ‘blunder’ of 156 BC, so that when they sued for peace from Caesar in 44 BC, they employed a much more diplomatic tone (the individual examples are discussed throughout this thesis).

Policy was also to a large extent executed through political friends and allies of the Romans: independent communities (free cities or peoples) and so-called client-kings took care of local security and upheld Roman interests in regional systems, and were slowly incorporated into the Roman state. Parts of the Hellenized Illyrian kingdom and Greek settlements in the southeast Adriatic were included in this complex net of relationships with Rome, concluding different kinds of treaties with Rome in the period of initial Roman trans-Adriatic expansion (229 – 168 BC). The nature of their relationship with each other is still not completely clear. One school of thought accepts that the client-patron relationship, developed in early Roman history as a relation between individuals, was in some aspects carried over into the conduct of Roman foreign policy in Republican times. According to this view, Rome regarded her friends – amici, and allies – socii, essentially as clients of the state. The client-patron relationship between senatorial families and the provincial elites was considered to be an essential part of this system. However, this view has been recently challenged as being essentially a metaphor on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Instead it is suggested that the Roman state did not regard foreign states,

31 Grüen (1984b) 13-95 gives a comprehensive overview of Republican instruments of diplomacy.
32 Polyb. 2.11.5-12; 2.12.2-3; CIG II 1837b; Hammond/Wallbank (1988) 602, 607-608; Sherk (1969) 139-142 (no. 24).
33 Hammond/Wallbank (1988) 602-610 (App. 5) no. 1, 16.
and especially kings, as *clientela* in any formal or systematic way. After c. 150 BC there is no sign of an equal relationship with the majority of foreign states in the Mediterranean world and Rome was established as the only relevant political power. As a result of this transformation, Roman law dealing with foreigners and its relationships with *externae gentes*, such as the inhabitants of Illyricum, changed and became simplified. In essence almost all previous allies and friends of Rome became subordinate to the will of the Republic, retaining only nominal independence.

The granting of Roman citizenship and the municipalization of the provincial communities were essential for the successful integration of other communities into the imperial system. It might have been deliberate policy or even the result of a whole cultural revolution happening in the whole empire; in any way it certainly needed to be accepted by natives, and especially native elites in order to function properly. In the period under discussion, enfranchisement and colonization concentrated mainly on the coastal areas of Illyricum, which were for much longer exposed to the cultural influences of Graeco-Roman civilization, and thus more ready to be integrated into the global Mediterranean cultural system (Chapter 6.2). The colonization of the interior, especially the plains of Pannonia, started in the last phase of Roman Illyrian policy, during the reign of Augustus’ successors, but we do not know from the evidence of any more significant enfranchisement of the natives in the interior before Flavian times (Chapter 8.3).

### 2.4 The place of Illyricum in the Mediterranean political landscape

The geographical position of Illyricum lay conspicuously between two major parts of the Mediterranean: the Hellenistic East and the barbaric West. Long ago Badian recognized and defined the two different faces of the Republican approach to

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36 Badian (1958a) 113-114; Sherwin-White (1973) 182-189; Lica (2000) 25-34; Matthaei (1907). See also Timpe (1972) for legal forms of Roman foreign policy in Caesar’s time. Whether allies and friends became clients or not is questionable, but no doubt a large number of them were placed in a *de facto* subordinate position.
37 Millett (1990b) 65-101, summarized 99-101; also the (1990a) sees Romanization as a process happening without deliberate Roman action. It was possibly even a kind of a cultural revolution happening in the 1st century AD in the whole empire; Wallace-Hadrill (1989b); Nicolet (1991); Woolf, (1995); (1998) 60-76, 240-249. On the other hand, Hanson (1997) recently returns to the idea of Romanization as a deliberate Roman policy, on the example of Roman Britain.
foreign policy, which arose from this somewhat simplistic geographical division. The eastern approach towards the Hellenistic world and North Africa appears to be based on some general principles. It was hegemonic, indirect rule, based on informal treaties with allies, vulnerable to the constant threat of Roman military action, yet without a permanent garrison of Roman occupation troops. Direct annexation was deliberately avoided. On the other hand, it is not really possible to speak of unified common principles in the western policy of the later Republic. The approach towards regional systems such as Spain, Gaul, North Italy and bordering areas, was much more heterogeneous than the high level diplomacy used in the East. Sometimes the Republic was willing to impose direct rule in the west through brutal and thorough elimination of resistance. On other occasions it left large pacified areas untouched and ruled it through friends and allies, even when these areas were strategically crucial, like Transalpine Gaul. At first sight it is easy to recognize that policy was primarily shaped by imperialism and individual triumph-hunting. Yet, closer and more thorough investigation reveals a general stability in the Republican west, no migratory pressure from outside after the Celtic settlement on the fringes of North Italy, and no pressure for colonization from within Italy. Therefore there were no pressing reasons for Romans to extend their influence much outside the familiar Mediterranean zone. Basically, Romans did not care too much about the externae gentes if they were not a threat to their interests. As Dyson noted:

“Most changes in the western frontiers were either a Roman response to alterations in inherited arrangements or the logical extension of an initially modest commitment.”

Roman policy makers treated the Illyrian kingdom and Macedonia as essentially one large geo-political unit (Chapter 3.2). The first time a Roman

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38 Badian (1952) 125 ff. esp. 139-140; (1968) 4 ff.; Richardson (1986) 179-180.
40 It is not possible any more to see annexation as the dominant method of republican imperialism, in either the West or the East; Richardson (1986) 178-180; Ebel (1976) 41-95; Dyson (1985) summarized 270-281.
41 Badian (1968) 4 ff.; Harris (1979) 131-162.
43 However, despite all the prejudice, Roman attitudes towards externae gentes was never so exclusive and isolationist as Greek attitudes, especially as the Empire expanded; Saddington (1969); Wallbank (1972) 156-159.
44 Dyson (1985) 270.
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magistrate was entrusted with imperium for Illyricum was when the Illyrian kingdom was destroyed in the 3rd Illyrian war.\textsuperscript{45} The settlement in 167 BC was applied to Macedonia and a year later Illyricum in a more or less similar way. They were both declared free and forced to divide into several semi-independent republics. However, because of its political instability Macedonia became a permanent base for Roman legions in 151 BC and a provincia in 148 BC, and thus differed from Illyricum where no permanent garrisons can be detected.\textsuperscript{46} Troubles on the northern borders of Macedonia with the Scordisci, Thracians and Dardani required a permanent Roman military presence. Some modern scholars regard the Roman presence in Macedonia in this period as being limited to defence and not extending to the full administration of the province.\textsuperscript{47} They argue that pressure from the northern borders made Roman policy in Macedonia different from their eastern policy elsewhere, for the simple reason that the strategic link between Italy and Asia Minor was too important for Romans to remain under a possible threat without a good defence. The breakthrough which was achieved by several able governors in the 70s BC led to more lasting pacification and opened the doors to an aggressive advance towards the Danube.\textsuperscript{48}

An unexpected prize from the Punic wars, Spain was gradually and slowly pacified through a series of wars in the mid 2nd century BC by the Republican armies in two distinct phases. The first phase finished with the Gracchan settlement in 178 BC and was aggressive in its nature and appearance. The second phase, beginning in the 150s, fits more into the defensive pattern of Roman imperialism. The Roman presence in Spain was under threat by natives. Still, Spain was not properly pacified before Augustus, partly because of the unrest caused by Roman internal civil strife in the 80s – 70s and 40s. Sometimes painfully, but overall very patiently, Romans built up their position there, slowly pushing the boundary of their control towards the Atlantic coast. Spain was, as Richardson pointed out, an example of ‘peripheral

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Livy, 44.21.4, Roman magistrates who operated against Illyrian kings held imperium for Macedonia; Papazoglu (1976) 202.
\item For the Illyrian settlement in 167 BC, see Chapter 3.2. Sherwin-White (1973) 175-181 discusses and defines the Roman declaration of freedom in the Greek world as a political device, which in fact regulated the status of populi deditii.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
imperialism’ where the personal initiative and freedom in decision-making of individual Roman commanders in the field played a very important role.\textsuperscript{49}

Gaul was treated differently from Spain in many ways. Strategically important as a land link with troublesome Spain, it was controlled through the Greek colony of Massilia. The Senate did not try to impose direct rule there, and even when it was necessary to create the province of Transalpine Gaul in the 120s, there was no attempt to impose rule away from the coast or to penetrate deeper into continental Gaul until Caesar’s proconsulship in 59 – 50 BC. Romans intervened mainly in response to requests from Massilia and they used Massilian supremacy to maintain their influence until the Civil War, when Massilians in 49 BC opted for the losing side – Pompey. However, Massilia was not able to satisfy Roman expectations alone, so in order to maintain the security of this strategic coastal strip, the Senate arranged more elaborate diplomatic links with leaders of the Gauls in the hinterland and accepted some \textit{civitates} such as the Aedui or Arverni into an alliance.\textsuperscript{50}

North Italy was by its geographic position, strategically the weakest and most exposed portion of the Italian homeland. The early 2\textsuperscript{nd} century brought an expansion of Roman and Italian colonies in North Italy, and culminated in the foundation of Aquileia and the pacification of its neighbors, particularly the Histrian kingdom, and later the Carni and Taurisci. Aquileia served as a regional centre of Roman influence, military, economic and political. Initially, it had a defensive role, which acted to prevent potential threats from the North, as well as to take control over a potentially dangerous strengthening of foreign influences amongst the Gallic peoples settled in the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{51} On the other hand, the position of Aquileia at first was too weak and needed to deal with neighboring peoples to create security arrangements on a wider scale, and to intervene when it was necessary, as happened in Histria in the 181 – 177 BC campaigns. Throughout the whole 2\textsuperscript{nd} century, Romans exercised their rule there with the help of client peoples and allied kingdoms such as Noricum. Short

\textsuperscript{49} Richardson (1986) 177-178; Dyson (1985) 174 ff.
\textsuperscript{51} Šašel (1976) 73-76 showed the importance of Gallic settlement for the development of Roman policy in North Italy and the eastern Alps. Still, “\textit{minacce reali}”, for Roman North Italy were not to came from the Gauls, but from a potential hostile force from the hinterland who could use them against Rome; Šašel (1976) 76; Calderini (1972) 11-12 and more recently Twyman (1992), seeing the Celtic strategic threat as an important influence on the whole of Roman policy.
military involvements, almost police actions, strengthened their influence in the Alpine regions. An important trade route with Pannonia stretched from Aquileia, Tergeste and the Ocra pass where the significant Celtic *portorium*, Nauportus, was positioned. The troubles with the Cimbri and Teutones in the late 2nd century BC showed the vulnerability of Italy from the north. Regardless of internal purposes, the formation of the province of Cisalpine Gaul in the late 2nd – early 1st century BC (after the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones) signified a permanent Roman commitment to keep this area under tight control, thus preventing all possible threats from the north or at least minimizing them.

The end of the Republic brought changes to all previous policy. A monetary crisis and increased pressure on the treasury resulting from civil struggle in the 80s, as well as the loss of tribute from the east during the Mithridatic war, forced Roman policy-makers to adopt another approach to the provinces. The *Regnum Sullanum* is widely recognized to be a key moment, triggering a change towards the establishment of direct rule in both parts of the Roman world and a more efficient exploitation of provincial resources.

2.5 The geography and ethnography of pre-Roman Illyricum

Physical geography divided Illyricum into three zones: a narrow Adriatic coast-belt that together with the Italian coast was a distinctive geographical unit; in fact it is difficult to argue with Braudel’s understanding that “L’Adriatique est peut-être la plus cohérente des régions de la mer.” Because of its privileged position, this zone remained strongly linked with the rest of Mediterranean world. In the

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54 See Šašel-Kos (2000) 281 n.16-20 for influential modern opinions expressed on the date of the formation of Cisalpine Gaul.
56 Braudel (1966) 113-122, the quotation is from 113. Bertrand (1987) argues that the Adriatic was in fact the area that divided rather than connected Italy and the ‘Outre-Mer’ that started in Illyricum and Greece. His point of view is based entirely on interpretation of literary sources, rather than the maritime and archaeological facts concerning the Adriatic; see Brusić (1970); Škogor (1999) 211-223.
hinterland begins the intermediary zone of the Dinaric Alps, a physical obstacle standing between the Mediterranean and the continent, but remaining very open and receptive to the influences radiating from the coastal belt. Finally, there were the Pannonian plains, opening towards continental Europe but also linked with Italy via the Ocra pass and with the Black Sea and southeastern Balkans through the valleys of the Danube and Morava. It is therefore not a new conclusion that geography in many ways dictated the economic development and a degree of cultural development in the native peoples before their political and economic inclusion in the classical world. Whom did Romans encounter in Illyricum? The three main ethnic groups were: the mixture of ethnically close but also very heterogeneous peoples known as the Illyrians; the Celtic peoples of the Boii, Taurisci and Scordisci; and the Greeks in their Adriatic colonies. This is an extremely brief and abbreviated overview of political forces existing in Illyricum of that time.

2.5.1 The Greeks and Celts in Illyricum

Economic and political power in the Eastern Adriatic before the Roman arrival lay with Greek settlements on the Adriatic islands, such as the Issaean commonwealth or Pharos. The Issaean commonwealth was the most significant of them all, and it became a reliable Roman ally in the 3rd century BC, asking for protection against Ardiaean political pretensions in the central Adriatic and in turn supporting Roman interests and supplying ships for Roman wars in the East. It was regarded as an amicus but it still remains unclear if it ever concluded any formal foedus with Rome. The Greeks generally supported Roman expansion over the Adriatic because their trade had an interest in the destruction of Ardiaean piracy and...
the Illyrian kingdom, which also threatened Issaean hegemony in the central Adriatic and even its political independence.\textsuperscript{62} There are many similarities between the συμπολιτεία of Issa and that of Massilia in Gaul, including their ultimate destiny.\textsuperscript{63} Both Greek colonies were faithful Roman allies for whose protection Rome intervened.\textsuperscript{64} Both were left with some independence in charge of a narrow coastal strip with a hostile hinterland, and both opted for the losing side in the civil war and so lost their hegemony and independence.\textsuperscript{65} Massilia, however, was much stronger and more influential than Issa ever was.

The Issaeans never seriously penetrated the hinterland, which was inhabited by various native peoples. Issa was founded primarily as a trade settlement and a political outpost of Syracuse, but when the need for stronger agricultural production arose, it expanded on the mainland and founded its colonies Epetion\textsuperscript{66} and Tragurion in the mid-3\textsuperscript{rd} century BC, or even earlier.\textsuperscript{67} Thus they were coming into conflict with the Delmataean alliance, which was expanding towards the coast. The strategic and political insecurity of these colonies is confirmed by traces of the strong walls built around Epetion.\textsuperscript{68} However, the largest and the most significant city in Illyricum became a small port-of-trade, the emporium of Salona, founded between Epetion and Tragurion as a trading post for Issaean exchange with the natives.\textsuperscript{69} The Issaean commonwealth was not an exclusive ethnically Greek entity. Some native coastal communities such as the Hyllaei, Nestoi or Bulinoi\textsuperscript{70} were either part of it or

\textsuperscript{63} Cf. the comparisons made by Suić (1996) 292-293.
\textsuperscript{64} Kuntić-Makvić (2002) 147-150 suggest that written sources (including Polybius, for example) in a real historical ‘conspiracy’ hide all traces of a negative side in Roman-Greek Adriatic relations, overemphasizing the Roman role as Greek protector. She quotes the examples of Pharos in 217 BC and Issa. Issa in 49 BC did not rebel against Rome but actually opted for one side in the civil war. The Greeks in the Adriatic were too weak and had too much in common with the Romans so that their political friendship was the only possible relationship in the circumstances.
\textsuperscript{65} Suić (1959/60) 149-150; (1996) 275-276 n.22 is right to acknowledge that regardless of the side taken in the Civil War the Issaean κοινόν was doomed to disappear because of outside factors. However, he sees these factors only locally (the rise of Italian settlement in the eastern Adriatic), omitting to acknowledge the main global reason – the completion of the Roman ‘Revolution’ and the destruction of the Republic.
\textsuperscript{66} Maršić (1996/97), has recently questioned whether Epetion was Greek colony, or in fact a native settlement. It is interesting to note that Polybius, the earliest source that mentions Epetion and Tragurion, calls them cities in league with Issa, Polyb. 32.9.1-2, and Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) notes only Tragurion as a settlement of Issa.
\textsuperscript{67} Gabričević (1973) 166-167. Zininović (1976a) 304 puts their foundations much later, in the first half of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC. For dating the foundation of Epetion and Tragurion, cf. the overview of influential opinions in Faber (1983) 18-21.
\textsuperscript{68} Faber (1983) 21 ff.
\textsuperscript{69} See Chapter 3.2 n. 44 for the origins of Salona.
\textsuperscript{70} See primary sources on the Hyllaei in Katičić (1970) 116-118.
joined with Issa in alliance against the common enemy from the hinterland – the Delmatae. They are often assumed to be part of the Delmatae; Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) Δαλματεών παραλία. However, although culturally close to the Delmatae (Zaninović (1966) 33 ff.), these natives were not politically and culturally part of the Delmataean community, being by geography much more exposed to Greek influences; Čače (1998) 80-81; (2001) 99-100. They became part of the Delmataean alliance at times of civil war after the Issaean commonwealth was dissolved, see Chapter 4.4.

Pharos is the other significant Greek settlement, economically based much more on agriculture than on trade. It regained autonomy from Rome after the Illyrian wars, and remained an important ally and logistic base for Roman military interventions in this area until the end of the Republic.

The Celtic peoples - the Boii, Scordisci and Taurisci - arrived late in Ilyricum as part of the Celtic migrations in the 4th century BC, and they settled in its north-western and north-eastern parts. The Taurisci inhabited a strategically important area in the Eastern Alps, and controlled the trade route from north-east Italy to Pannonia via their settlement and the portorium Nauportus. At the same time they threatened the security of North Italy, and made frequent raids in that direction. The Taurisci did not establish a monarchy like their neighbors in Noricum. Scholars agree that it was an alliance of several Celtic peoples, referred to by our sources under the name Taurisci. They were economically sophisticated, controlled important mining resources such as iron and gold, and minted their own currency in the 1st century BC, the so-called East Norican coinage. They represented the most significant political force in the eastern Alpine area. North of Taurisci the Transdanubian plains were also inhabited by the Celts. The most important were the Boii, whose power was crushed by the Dacian king Burebista in the 60s BC, or some time later.

The Scordisci inhabited an area around the mouth of the rivers Sava and Drava, but their power stretched much further south, as they were able to threaten

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71 They are often assumed to be part of the Delmatae; Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) Δαλματέων παραλία. However, although culturally close to the Delmatae (Zaninović (1966) 33 ff.), these natives were not politically and culturally part of the Delmataean community, being by geography much more exposed to Greek influences; Čače (1998) 80-81; (2001) 99-100. They became part of the Delmataean alliance at times of civil war after the Issaean commonwealth was dissolved, see Chapter 4.4.
72 Named after the leading people of the alliance; Fluss (1934); Petru (1968); Božić (1987). Nauportus as initially the Tauriscan portorium Strabo, 7.5.2 (C 314) Ταυρίσκων κατοικίαν; Šašel (1966).
73 The gold mines of the Taurisci are mentioned by Polybius in Strabo, 4.6.12 (C 208) (=Polyb. 34.3.10-14), but archaeology does not confirm his statement; Božić (1987) 889. Šašel-Kos (1998) 216-219 assumes that gold deposits were discovered in the river Drava.
74 Still, it was only a locally used currency; Kos (1985) 20 ff. esp. 23-24.
75 For the population of pre-Roman northern Pannonia; see Mócsy (1962) 527 ff; (1974) 53-73; Petres, (1976). Also, cf. below p. 79.
76 The most significant works on the Scordisci are: Todorović (1974); Papazoglou (1978) 271-389; Popović (1987).
seriously the security of Macedonia and Greece many times. They were not a purely Celtic people. Illyrian and Thracian ethnic elements are visible but the Celtic element seems to be the most significant. They appear in the sources only after the Celtic movements in 3rd century had finished, and the sources divide them into the Great and Small Scordisci.\(^79\) It is not known how far their dominion stretched and what was the nature of their dominion over the Pannonii in the valley of the Sava. However, it is certain that the Scordisci played an important political role in the affairs of Pannonia before the rise of the Dacian kingdom and the Roman political extension to Pannonia (Chapter 3.4). Some communities in the north-east of the province of Dalmatia (the middle course of the Drina and Western Morava valley) were grouped into a *civitas*, the Dindari, by the imperial administration and possibly represent part of the dissolved Scordiscan alliance.\(^80\)

\[2.5.2 \quad \textit{The Illyrian peoples}\]

The Greeks ruled the sea and the islands, but they were a tiny minority compared with the native population on the mainland. Excluding some remnants of the Celts passing through the Balkan Peninsula in the 4th century BC, such as the Scordisci and Taurisci, the Adriatic hinterland and the wider Balkan area, including the territory of the later province of Moesia, were inhabited by peoples known under commonly as ‘Illyrians’. Their ethnogenesis remains one of the most fascinating and still unsolved archaeological and historical problems in this area.\(^81\) Archaeology recognizes the native Iron Age cultures of Illyricum in three areas: the Southeast Alpine area with western Pannonia; the Adriatic-West Balkan area, and the Central Danubian area.\(^82\) Scholars divide the native non-Celtic population of pre-Roman Illyricum into five or six distinctive groups based on shared cultural and ethnic

\(^{79}\) Strabo, 7.5.12 (C 318).

\(^{80}\) Archaeology and epigraphic material confirm strong Celtic influence in this area; Alföldy (1964a) 96-98, 103; (1964b) 109, 123-127; (1965a) 54-56; Wilkes (1969) 171-172. The view is contested by Katičić (1965b) 63-69 and Papazoglu (1978) 171-178.

\(^{81}\) Benac (1964b); (1987b) 754 ff.; Garašanin (1988b); cf overview in English by Wilkes (1992) 38-40.

\(^{82}\) The Southeast alpine area consists of: Carniola (Dolensko), St. Lucia, Notransko, Ljubljana, Marjanec-Kaptol and Donja Dolina-Sanski Most group. Celtic movements heavily affected and disrupted the development of these groups.

Adriatic-West Balkan area: Histrian, Liburnian, Iapodean, Central-Dalmatian and Central-Bosnian group.

Central Danubian: Dalj, Bosut and Srijem group; Benac (1987a); Wilkes (1992) 40 ff.
characteristics: the south Illyrians, the Delmatae, the Liburni, the Histri, the Iapodes, the Pannonii and, possibly, the so-called east Dalmatian group.\textsuperscript{83}

Politically, the organization of those native ethnic groups in Illyricum was deeply rooted in its ethnic and kinship structure, rather than in the development of the more sophisticated institutions of the \textit{polis} or kingdom. The only exception is the Illyrian kingdom, which underwent significant social transformation in the 4\textsuperscript{th} – 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC, influenced by the impact of the Hellenic and Hellenistic world. The southern Illyrians were “\textit{une société complexe et en voie de transformation}” in the words of Cabanes.\textsuperscript{84} This transformation also extended to other communities on the coast, so that the Histri and particularly the Liburni developed an urbanized society and political proto-institutions of their own. The intensity of this transition affected the process of social stratification and hierarchical settlement patterns in the hinterland as well, so that the Iapodes and Delmatae and to a lesser extent the Pannonii, formed strong proto-state formations in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} – 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC.\textsuperscript{85} The nature of those formations was in essence a common ethnic and cultural background, but the alliances were also between heterogeneous groups of individual communities. In some instances, the composition of those formations did not correspond with the ethnic ones, so there were single communities standing outside their ethnic proto-state formations, or different proto-state formations were formed inside a single ethnos.\textsuperscript{86} In a way, we can say that the peoples of ancient Illyricum shaped their

\textsuperscript{83} Major factors in determining those ethnic groups are archaeology and onomastics; cf. Kati\'\v{c}i\'\v{c} (1964b) 15-30; (1965b); Alföldy (1965a) 17 ff. esp. 40-67; Wilkes (1969) 157 ff.; \v{C}ovi\'{c} (1976). Kati\'\v{c}i\'\v{c} (1964b) argues the existence of a common Dalmatian-Pannonian group, including the central-Dalmatian, East Dalmatian and Pannonian sub-areas. The so-called East Dalmatian group including the Pirustae and Glintidiones are listed as a separate ethno-geographic group by Wilkes (1969) 171-176; cf. Alföldy (1965a) 56-60. See Kati\'\v{c}i\'\v{c} (1965b) 63-69 who places this group inside the Dalmatian-Pannonian complex. They show influences from the Celts, Delmatae and the southern Illyrians, and Strabo, 7.5.3 (C 314), groups them amongst the Pannonii. This thesis will not discuss them separately. This thesis will avoid use of the term ‘tribe’ in the ethnic sense as it gives a vague and outdated impression of ethnic identity. Modern anthropology has distanced itself from applying the term to contemporary ‘tribal’ societies preferring instead the term ‘ethnic groups’; Chapman/McDonald/Tonkin (1989) 11-17; Leach (1989); Banks (1996) 11 ff.

\textsuperscript{84} Cabanes (1988) 191. The intrigues of \textit{πολιδυνάστας} (Polyb. 5. 4. 3) confirm the presence and survival of tribal institutions in the Illyrian kingdom. However, the urbanization of tribal centres was already influencing the development of more sophisticated political institutions in southern Illyria and the Illyrian kingdom; cf. Papa\v{z}oglu (1989) 35-37, 48-53.

\textsuperscript{85} Contacts with the Mediterranean world played a crucial role in the development of more centralized and hierarchical social structures in Continental Europe; cf. Nash (1978) 459 ff. (Central Gaul); Haselgrove (1984) 17 ff. (Britain); (1987) (Gaul).

\textsuperscript{86} Good examples (discussed throughout) are the coastal Hyllaei, Nestoi or Bulinoi, who although ethnically akin to the Delmatae joined the alliance very late. The Daorsi supported Rome against the Ardiaean kingdom. The Liburnian \textit{civitates} supported both sides in the civil war. The Iapodes divided
ethnic identities through the instruments of political institutions. Together with the development of proto-political institutions in the late Iron Age Illyricum, its population also developed ‘political ethnicity’.  

**FIGURE 2 Pre-Roman social and political institutions in Illyricum and the hierarchical settlement pattern**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terminology</th>
<th>The principle of homogenization</th>
<th>The centre of homogenization</th>
<th>Roman administrative terminology</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnos</td>
<td>Cultural/ethnic</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>Iapodes, Delmatae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political institutions</td>
<td>Political/ethnic</td>
<td>Gradina of the leading civitas</td>
<td>Civitas (except southeast Illyricum and Liburnia)</td>
<td>Transalpine Iapodes, Delmataean alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civitas</td>
<td>Political/territorial</td>
<td>Gradina as oppidum</td>
<td>Civitas (southeast Illyricum and Liburnia)</td>
<td>Arupini (Cisalpine Iapodes), Dalmion (Delmatae)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagus</td>
<td>Kinship/territorial</td>
<td>Gradina as castellum</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicus</td>
<td>Kinship</td>
<td>Rural settlements</td>
<td>Decuria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

into two different alliances: Cisalpine and Transalpine, and the Pannonii had different political entities such as the Breuci, Mezaei and Daesitiae etc. Examples of a single people splitting into two political entities are known from Gaul; Nash (1976) 111.

Certainly this concept needs more elaboration, something that needs to be explored in a separate work. The term ‘political ethnicity’ was originally developed by anthropologist Abner Cohen who studied the contemporary urban population of Nigeria; Hauser (1969) 3-4, 27, 198 ff. It is interesting to note that Roman ethnicity was also significantly affected by political factors; cf. Woolf (2001) 317-318.

This figure is relying in some details on Suić (1976b) 47 ff. esp. 74 (= Suić (1975c), esp. 30 and (1976c), both in French) and his study of development and classification of native types of settlement in Illyricum. The comparison with oppida in Gaul is obvious but this will be dealt with on some other occasion.

Čače (1979) 47-48 calls this category narod (people) defining it as a politically homogenised ethnos or part of one. Alföldy (1965a) 168-169 calls it der Stamm (the tribe), although in some instances he applies the term to the whole ethnos such as the Pannonii; (1965a) 168.

Building of gradine (hill-forts, castelgleri) characterises all the peoples from the area. For the gradine in general, see individual contributions in Benac (1975) 9-222. Gradine had several purposes, as a refugium, a fort and a settlement; Drechler-Bižić (1975) 73; Suić (1975c); (1976b) 63-81.

There is no good English translation of civitas as the smallest unit of political autonomy centred in the oppidum except perhaps ‘municipality’. Croatian općina (as in Gabričević (1955); Čače (1994/95) 111-112 n. 28), or župa look like appropriate terms for civitas in Illyricum. Alföldy (1965a) 167-169 uses term die Sippe (the clan), but the term ‘clan’ would be much more applicable lower down the scale, in the category of pagus or vicus. The same tendency is seen in Stipčević (1989) 128 who equates civitas with fratria.

The pagus was a social sub-unit of the civitas in Gaul; cf. Sordi (1953); Wightman (1985) 24-25; 53-56 for Belgic Gaul. It does not seem that the situation was much different in Illyricum; cf. Frontin. Str. 2.5.28.
The South-eastern Illyrian communities\(^93\) were under stronger Hellenistic influences, more engaged in maritime trade, culturally, politically and economically more advanced than the peoples in the hinterland, and they enjoyed the highest level of urbanization in pre-Roman Illyricum apart from Liburnia.\(^94\) The nature of the Illyrian kingdom is disputed as some scholars, such as Hammond, see it as the dominion of the most powerful people over the others, and Papazoglu sees it as a strongly centralized kingdom with an unbroken tradition from the 4\(^{th}\) century BC.\(^95\) Some of the stronger and culturally more developed south Illyrian peoples, such as the Daors or Taulantii, had an interest in alliance with Rome and in escaping the dominion of the Ardiaei (thus indirectly supporting the view of Hammond). Their power was ultimately shaken in 167 BC. The interest of the newly developed *polis* in south Illyricum clashed with the needs of the centralized Hellenistic monarchy,\(^97\) and resulted in the destruction of the later.

The Delmatae were politically and militarily the most significant native people in the mountains of the mid-Adriatic hinterland and the most formidable opponent of the Romans.\(^98\) They show a very distinctive ethnic and cultural character, displaying characteristics of both Illyrians and Pannonii.\(^99\) Their economy was pastoral and depended on the small quantity of usable land in the rocky Dinaric

\(^93\) The Ardiaei, Daorsi (rather than Daorsii as suggested by some authorities; cf. Marić (1973) 110-111) Pleraei, Narensii, Taulantii, etc., so called political Illyria; Cabanes (1988) 20. For the location of individual south Illyrian peoples, see Wilkes (1969) 18 fig. 3; Pająkowski (1980) 114 ff; Benac (1987b).


\(^95\) Hammond, 1966 considers the Illyrian kingdom in the late 3\(^{rd}\) century BC to be actually the kingdom of the Ardiaeans rather than a kingdom of Illyrians. Contra Papazoglu (1965); (1967) 15-17 who sees it as continuous state-formation from the 4\(^{th}\) century BC. Hammond’s opinion seems to be more accepted; cf. Carlier (1987); Cabanes (1988) 87 ff., but Papazoglu responded vigorously defending her argument; Papazoglu (1988) 183 ff.; (1989) 37-46.

\(^96\) Hecateus wrongly regarded the south-Illyrian Daorsi as Thracians, Fr. 130; Marić (1973), esp. 115 ff.; Bojanovski (1988) 93-94. Some authorities repeat his error e.g. Alföldy (1965a) 47; Wilkes (1969) 156 n.3.


\(^98\) The most significant work on the history, material and spiritual culture of the Delmatae is Zaninović (1966); (1967); cf. also Rendić-Miočević (1955); Ćović (1976) 239-267; (1987).

\(^99\) Older historiography regarded them as Illyrians; Alföldy (1965a) 44-45. However, onomastic research (Katić (1964b) 18-21, 28-29; Marić (1996) 77-79) finds important links between the Delmatae and the Panonii. Cf. also Zaninović (1966) 58-59 n. 86 and a general overview in Benac (1987b) 779-781.
Alps. They were trying to expand towards the Adriatic but came into conflict there with the Issaean commonwealth. The Delmatae, who first recognized the supreme power of the Illyrian kingdom, gained full independence some time before its destruction and tried to fill the vacuum of power after the Illyrian kingdom was destroyed. It seems from the historical sources and archaeological evidence that the *civitas* of Dalmion, located in the plains surrounding modern-day Tomislavgrad (Duvanjsko polje), was initially the political core of the alliance. The Delmatean alliance expanded and absorbed the smaller, ethnically akin communities surrounding Dalmion and, in time, the name of the alliance was applied to the smaller (and weaker) neighboring *civitates*, although they had not been linked with the Delmatae in the past. Difficult terrain and a sophisticated system of hill-forts – *gradine* – made the Delmatae a very difficult military target for all Roman offensive operations.

The Iapodes are the next important cultural group. The Iapodes lived in territory similar to that of the Delmatae, bordering the Iulian Alps and the Istrien peninsula in the mountains behind the Liburnian coast (modern Lika). After the 5th century BC they expanded towards the valley of the river Una acquiring arable land there and easier access to metals. Strabo wrote that they had a significant Celtic heritage, but onomastic arguments are inconclusive. As it is impossible to find more than a few Celtic names amongst them, so modern scholarship mainly disregards Strabo’s report. Some archaeologists suggest strong ethnic and cultural similarity between the Iapodean cultural group and the Pannonii, especially amongst those

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100 Čače (1994/95) 107, 114-120. The exact position of Dalmion as well as later Roman Delminium (they were different cities; Patsch (1904) 171-172 and ff.) is unknown. See Bojanovski (1988) 216-231 for an overview of the approaches to the problem of locating Dalmion and Delminium. Benac (1985) 190-194 summarised the archaeological evidence (the number of *gradine* and permanent settlements) and confirmed the dominance of Duvanjsko polje over the other areas in Delmataean territory. See also Benac (1975b).

101 Zaninović (1966) 80-82; Čović (1987) 443 n.2, 476-477; Čače (1994/95) 118-120. The nature of the Delmataean alliance is disputed. Papazoglu (1967) 21-22 argued that the Delmatae united only in times of war, retaining full independence of individual communities in times of peace. On the other hand, Čače (1979) 101 ff. esp. 105-116 cautiously (for the lack of sources) sees the alliance as a more permanent political formation dominated by the *principes* of individual *civitates*, at first dominated by Delmion, but after its destruction in 155 BC, based on more decentralised foundations.

102 The *gradine* of the Delmatae; Benac (1975b); (1985).


104 Čović (1976) 133-168. Marić (1975) esp. 42 argues that the Iapodes only very late (early 1st BC) expanded across the Una towards Raetinium (modern Bihać) which became an important centre in the Roman period.
Iapodes who inhabited the valley of the Una.\textsuperscript{105} This corresponds with the division given by the sources, which distinguish between the two political organizations existing amongst the Iapodes: the Cisalpine and Transalpine alliances.\textsuperscript{106} The political organization of the Iapodean alliances is not entirely clear, but from the available sources both state institutions of the Iapodes seem to be a much looser formation than the Delmatae were; the Cisalpine Iapodes were led, or at least dominated, by the \textit{civitas} of Arupini and the Transalpine by Metulum.\textsuperscript{107}

The Liburni\textsuperscript{108} were ethnically closer to the Veneti of North Italy than to the Illyrians. They were part of the common Attestine or Este culture, strongly linked culturally and economically with northern Italy.\textsuperscript{109} The Liburni inhabited the north-east Adriatic coast and the islands between the rivers Titius and Tedanius.\textsuperscript{110} They were engaged in more intensive maritime trade with the Greeks, Picenum and Sicily as well as with their neighbours, especially the Iapodes and Delmatae. The Liburni appear to be the most urbanized people in Illyricum before the Roman conquest, apart from the peoples from the south-eastern coast.\textsuperscript{111} There was no easily detectable common political unit amongst them. Most probably the Liburni created some kind of loose alliance or confederation similar to the Etruscan league between individual \textit{civitates}, but we have no valid source, which might enable us to discuss

\textsuperscript{105} Katičić (1965b) 55-63; Marić (1971) 77-78; Rendić-Miočević (1975b). The links with the Panonnii: Marić (1971) 75 ff.; (2002). Historic Iapodes were a complex mixture of "... der Alteingesessenen und westpannonischen Zuwanderer gewesen die vielleicht irgendwelche Verwandtschaft mit den Liburnern und Histriern aufwies und die wegen des Ursprungs des substrats in der ferneren Vorgeschichte gewisse Verwandtschaft mit den Illyriern hatte."; Marić (1971) 78. Kurtz (1967) remains alone in his argument that the Iapodes represented a Celtic-Illlyrian ethnic symbiosis.

\textsuperscript{106} Ιάποδες οἱ ἐντὸς Ἀλπεων and Ιάποδες οἱ πέραν Ἀλπεων; App. III. 16, 17, 21. It is not clear when this division amongst the Iapodes took place, but it is certain that it happened before 200 BC; Čače (1979) 67.

\textsuperscript{107} Alföldy (1965a) 168; Papazoglu (1967) 21-22, contra Čače (1979) 55-81, conflicting views on whether the Iapodean alliances were of a permanent nature or not. Čače’s view that the existence of the council-chamber \textit{βουλευτήριον} (App. III. 21) in Metulum suggests the more complex and permanent nature of Iapodean alliances.


\textsuperscript{109} The Liburni as the part of Veneti: Alföldy (1964a) 66-75, 102; (1965a) 42-43; Katičić (1964b) 24-25. Contra Untermann (1970), opposed to the idea that Liburni belong to the Veneto-Histrian onomastic group. The Liburni and Picenum: Suić (1953).

\textsuperscript{110} River Titius (Krka) was not the exact border of Liburni, as some Liburnian communities are located across the river; Čače (1989) esp. 61 ff. Cf. Suić (1960/61) 190 ff. Contra Zaninović (1966) 41-42; (1968) 124 n.21.

\textsuperscript{111} The differentiation of the local élite and the development of the monetary economy (in the late 3\textsuperscript{rd} century BC) in Liburnia is obvious after the 4\textsuperscript{th} century BC, causing rapid social change and urbanization; Batović (1974); Čače (1985) 614-619. The Italian expansion of Rome, especially in Picenum, put the Liburni in strong and intensive trade and cultural contact with Romans; Čače (1985) 252-254.
the nature of their confederation, nor is there any possibility of dating its foundation.\footnote{112 Čače (1982); (1985); Batović (1987); Suć (1981) 107-109 comparing the Liburni with the Etruscan confederation. The Liburnian alliance fought the Greeks in 4\textsuperscript{th} century (Diod. Sic. 15.14.2; \textit{CIG} II 1837c), so some authorities date its foundation in the late 5\textsuperscript{th} early 4\textsuperscript{th} century BC; Čače (1987/88) 81. Perhaps they can be compared with the \textit{κοινόν} of the Illyrian Byllioni bordering Epirus, see Anamali (1975); Ceka (1984) on the Byllioni.}

The Histri inhabited the Istrian peninsula stretching to the neighboring Triestine Gulf and bordering the Iapodes in the hinterland of Tarsatica. Their language was also close to that of the Veneti and Carni, although Appian and Strabo wrongly call them Illyrians. Their geographical position enabled them to have more intensive trade contacts with central and south Italy, and cultural exchange with the Mediterranean world through those contacts. Thus, it is no surprise that the Histri were relatively quickly and successfully Romanized, and Histria was included in Italy as early as the Augustan era.\footnote{113 For reasons of clarity, this thesis will refer to the Pannonian ethnos as the Pannonii, and the Pannonii north of Sava as Pannonians. The Delmatae as a particular people will be distinguished from Dalmatians describing the inhabitants of the province of Dalmatia south of the Sava. App. \textit{Ill.} 14 (Παίονες); \textit{RG} 30.1 \textit{gentes Pannoniorum}; Strabo, 7.5.10 (C 317) (Παννόνιοι) use ethnic terms. However, some sources like Cassius Dio introduce this confusion, referring to the Pannonians and Dalmatians as inhabitants of these Roman provinces, rather than as ethnic or tribal groups. See also Vulić (1933) 84-86; Alfoldy (1965a) 50-51.}

In the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century BC Histrian tribes united under the leadership of \textit{principes} from the most significant pre-Roman \textit{civitas} of Nesactium, and formed the Histrian kingdom.\footnote{114 Bandelli (1981) 15 argues that Romans initiated the foundation of the Histrian kingdom after the 1\textsuperscript{st} Histrian war in 221 BC, contra Čače (1988/89). Cf. Čače (1979) 81-101 on the nature of the Histrian kingdom.}

\footnote{115 For reasons of clarity, this thesis will refer to the Pannonian ethnos as the Pannonii, and the Pannonii north of Sava as Pannonians. The Delmatae as a particular people will be distinguished from Dalmatians describing the inhabitants of the province of Dalmatia south of the Sava. App. \textit{Ill.} 14 (Παίονες); \textit{RG} 30.1 \textit{gentes Pannoniorum}; Strabo, 7.5.10 (C 317) (Παννόνιοι) use ethnic terms. However, some sources like Cassius Dio introduce this confusion, referring to the Pannonians and Dalmatians as inhabitants of these Roman provinces, rather than as ethnic or tribal groups. See also Vulić (1933) 84-86; Alfoldy (1965a) 50-51.} They were peoples ethnically akin to Illyrians, but at the same time


\footnote{117 Pašalić (1967) 124; Wilkes (1992) 223.}
archaeology and onomastic researches show many differences between them. Whether the Pannonii belonged or did not belong to the Illyrian peoples remains in dispute.\footnote{Marić (1964b) 178 ff. sees the Panonnii as Late Bronze age arrivals in Illyricum (the Urnfielders) because archaeological evidence places the Urnfielders in areas inhabited by the historical Pannonii. Onomastics supports these differences; Katičić (1964b) 17, 20; (1965b) 69-73 links the central-Dalmatian onomastic group with the Pannonii. Contra Zličić (1978) 356.} There were also Celtic influences on these peoples.\footnote{Marić (1963). Celtic influences can be recognized in the minting of copies of Hellenistic coins by the Mezaei; Basler (1973), although he does not see Celtic influences here (1973) 269.} Their names are very similar to those of the Delmatae, so that, according to Katičić, they made up a joint Pannonian-Dalmatian onomastic group.\footnote{Katičić (1964b) 18-21, 28-29; (1965b) 69-73. Alföldy (1964a) 92 ff. separates the Delmatae and Pannonii as ethnically different. Mócsy (1967) doubts the existence of a separate Pannonian language.} In the historical record they arrive relatively late as a politically amorphous mass,\footnote{App. III. 22; Mócsy (1974) 21.} and only during the Pannonian rebellion of AD 6 – 9 do they appear as a relatively coherent and organized political and ethnic structure.\footnote{The unity of Pannonii, including the Delmatae in the AD 6-9 uprising, and their isolation from the rest of Illyricum (no other ethnic group joins the uprising, Chapter 7.4) suggests their ethnic coherence in the 1st century BC/AD and gives an important argument in favour of Katičić’s and Marić’s theory.} Archaeology shows that the Central-Bosnian archaeological group, corresponding with the historical Pannonii, had a strong internal cultural unity and a couple of well-organized political centers.\footnote{Čović (1987).}

Having briefly overviewed the circumstances in which Roman Illyrian policy existed it is time to start with an examination of the policy itself.
Chapter 3: The realm of bifocality

3. The Illyrian Policy of Rome 167 – 60 BC: Illyricum - the realm of bifocality

Tune igitur demens, nec te mea cura moratur?
an tibi sum gelida vilior Illyria
Propertius, Elegies 1.8.1-2

3.1 Introduction

The relationship between Illyricum and Rome, especially the legal position and status of Illyricum in the later Roman Republic is not entirely clear due to inadequate sources. It is often assumed by modern scholarship that Illyricum was either a province with ‘vague boundaries’, being outside a provincial zone as an independent protectorate or administered from other provinces. J. Wilkes is the only modern scholar who has attempted to define Roman Republican policy in Illyricum after 167 BC more comprehensively. He denied the existence of any meaningful Roman Republican policy in this period, after the potentially dangerous Macedonian kingdom had been destroyed. Illyricum is represented as a strategic backwater where Romans fought only to train armies and provide triumphs for the imperatores, a place from which Romans were actually in retreat in the 2nd and early 1st century BC. As Wilkes noted:

“The causes and motives of the different ventures by Roman commanders into the area are instructive in their variety, combining one basic element: events within Illyria had usually nothing to do with the projects undertaken.”

This chapter will argue against the prevailing orthodoxy depicting Roman Republican Illyrian policy as essentially ad hoc, undefined and unconnected with the political situation in the field. While agreeing with Wilkes that there was no unified

1 In a slightly changed version the chapter is published as Dzino (2005).
single Illyrian policy (although some common elements existed), this chapter will show that there was an Illyrian policy between the Illyrian wars and Caesar’s pro-consulship and that it was essentially bifocal.\textsuperscript{4} It focused on two different but interrelated zones in the Eastern Adriatic so that two contrasting Roman approaches to foreign policy emerged: expansionism and hegemonism overlapped and complemented each other. Illyricum stood outside the Roman state; it was not a province and it was not administered from other provinces, but Romans intervened there when their or allied interests were threatened. Also, this chapter will try to shake the prevailing opinion that Illyricum was a mere training ground for the Republican armies and try to demonstrate that Republican armies reacted only in response to existing or potential regional crises.

The attention of Rome shifted across the Adriatic relatively late in the late third century BC, as a byproduct of Rome’s two different policies: Macedonian policy in the south and expansion into North Italy. As a consequence and continuation of this initial approach in new circumstances after the fall of the Illyrian and the Histrian kingdom, military operations in the late Republic were performed in two different but interrelated zones in the Eastern Adriatic. The South-Adriatic zone comprised the southern Adriatic coast from the border of Epirus up to the border between the Delmatae and Liburni on the river Titius (Krka) with the immediate hinterland, corresponding to Pliny’s \textit{Liburniae finis et initium Dalmatiae},\textsuperscript{5} including the independent Issaean συμπολιτεία in the Central Adriatic. The north Adriatic sector was initially Histrian territory, but later included the Liburni, Cisalpine Iapodes and Taurisci. These two interrelated operational zones slowly merged into a single one in the early to mid-first century BC.

\subsection*{3.2 Prelude: the making of bifocality}

The seeds of bifocality were sown in the initial phase of Roman Illyrian policy focused on the Ardiaean kingdom in the southeast and the Histrian kingdom in the northwest. Roman policy in this phase was relatively inconsistent and conducted

\textsuperscript{4} Bandelli (1983) 174-175 argues that 167 BC marked the end of bifocal policy and the start of a policy aiming to transform the eastern Adriatic coast into a unified political unit.

\textsuperscript{5} Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.141; Ptol. \textit{Geog.} 2.16. This understanding of the term Dalmatia reflects an earlier source in Pliny, the \textit{periplus} from mid-1\textsuperscript{st} century BC; Čače (2001) 93-94. This notice also reflects the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century political situation when the river Titius (Krka) marked the division between these two zones of operation.
Chapter 3: The realm of bifocality

at a distance whenever possible, but it was still based on some general principles, such as keeping the Adriatic safe from piracy and the imposition of similar political solutions on both sides of the Eastern Adriatic.\(^6\) The most obvious reasons for the beginning of Roman interest in the southeastern Adriatic were the rising influence of the Ardiaean kingdom and their endemic piracy in the southern Adriatic and Ionian Sea. This piracy interfered in the trade of Rome’s Italian and Greek allies who demanded protection from Rome, but a seemingly even more important factor was the possible influence of the Ardiaean kingdom on the general strategic situation in Macedonia and Greece. In three encounters, in 229, 220 and 168 BC, Romans permanently established their influence, but not their military presence, on the other side of the southern Adriatic.\(^7\) In 167 BC the Illyrians were ‘liberated’, the Ardiaean kingdom was dissolved and divided in a similar manner to the division of Macedonia, and Roman hegemony\(^8\) was established through the imposition of tribute on the defeated Illyrians.\(^9\) This success was strategically very important because once they established permanent rule in Macedonia in 148 BC the Romans built the Via Egnatia in the 130s, thus connecting Italy through Epirus and Macedonia with Asia Minor for military purposes.\(^10\)

In 167 BC the Ardiaean kingdom was divided into three parts according to Livy.\(^11\) The first part covered the coast between the cities of Lissus and Scodra. The second comprised the Labeatae around the Lake of Scodra, and the third the Olciniati, Acruiviati and Rhizoniti in the Gulf of Boka Kotorska and modern day

\(^6\) Wilkes (1969) 13-28; Gruen (1984b) 435-436. Roman policy towards the Illyrian kingdom is outside the scope of this thesis. However, we would like to note that it does not seem inconsistent, especially taking into account the continuing Roman view of a political solution for the kingdom in its division from 229 to 167 BC. According to Bandelli (1981) 18 and Čač (1988/89) 12-13, 16 (with some differences in details) in this phase the Romans applied similar political solutions in their dealings with the Illyrian and Histrian kingdoms, looking after strong and reliable partners, and removing extreme warlike elements.

\(^7\) See Zippel (1877) 43-98; Wilkes (1969) 13-28; Gruen (1984b) 360-436; Holleaux (1928); May (1946); Badian (1952); Cabanes (1988) 255-334; Petzold (1970); Gabričević (1974); Domić-Kunić (1994).

\(^8\) The word ‘protectorate’ is a reflection of early 20th century politics; Cabanes (1988) 278. Hegemony seems as much better description.


\(^10\) For the dating of the Via Egnatia, see Kallet-Marx (1995) 347-349. It was a continuance of the Via Appia that terminated at Brundisium; Rougé (1987) 256.

\(^11\) See the analysis of Livy’s sources for this event in Weber (1998) 296, and detailed analysis of the manuscript in Weber (1983) 113-144.
Montenegrin coast. As reward for supporting Rome the Daorsi, Taulantii and Pirustae of Dassaretia were exempted from tribute and remained independent state units.\textsuperscript{12} H. Ceka suggests a possible division based on coinage minted after 167 BC. According to this explanation, three Illyrian republics minted coins with the inscriptions ΛΙΣΣΙΤΑΝ, ΛΑΒΙΑΤΑΝ and ΔΑΟΡΣΩΝ. They corresponded to the three republics given above in the same order, with the addition of the free cities Apollonia, Dyrrachium and the people of Amantines.\textsuperscript{13} Perhaps we can cautiously agree with the idea of Garašanin that the Daorsi constituted an independent (fourth) unit and the historically unknown King Ballaios was a ruler of the third part, which also included Pharos.\textsuperscript{14} Parts of the dissolved Illyrian kingdom south of Lissus were possibly annexed to the province of Macedonia in 148 - 147 BC.\textsuperscript{15} Romans did not establish a province in Illyricum in 167 BC, as they did not in Macedonia in 168 BC.\textsuperscript{16} The main upholders of Roman interests in the area were the faithful allies, the Issaean commonwealth\textsuperscript{17} and the Illyrian \textit{civitates} who deserted king Genthius, such

\textsuperscript{12} Livy, 45.26.13-15 ; Zippel (1877) 96-98 ; Papazoglu (1965) 172-176; Wilkes (1969) 26-28; Suić, (1976) 186-188. The text in Livy is corrupt, so the problem of determining the area of the first part is unsolvable; Papazoglu (1976) 202 n.28. The argument of Weber (1983) 208-210 that the part in question represents inland of Illyricum because Livy wanted to create the appearance of organized Roman expansion, is strange.

Weber (1989) 81-93 plausibly argues that the \textit{Dassaretarum Pirustae} is an error of Livy and not accurate information for the 2nd century BC. Even if there were such people as the Pirustae of Dassaretia, they should not be confused with the Pirustae of Velleius Paterculus; Wilkes (1969) 173; Weber (1989) 92.

\textsuperscript{13} Ceka (1972) 103-120 (Dyrrachium and Apollonia), 127-131 (the Amantines); (1976) 290-293.

\textsuperscript{14} Garašanin (1974) 25-27 (Wilkes (1969) 29 is not too far from that idea). Ballaios in not mentioned by the sources but coinage with his name was minted in Rhizon and Pharos, and found in different places including several locations in Italy, cf. Rendić-Miočević (1964); (1976) 191-194; Marić (1979) 185-195; Marović (1976) 231-244; (1988); Visona (1985). Popović (1987) 95-96 sees the authority of Rome behind the success of Ballaios’ currency; cf. also Wilkes (1969) 29.

Ceka (1972) 162-165 argued that he was the Illyrian negotiator Bellus mentioned in Livy, 44.31.9. Zaninović (1973) 200-203 is alone in putting his rule around 3rd Illyrian war or a couple years later on Pharos.

\textsuperscript{15} The area south of Lissos; Ceka (1972) 134, 149-150.

\textsuperscript{16} That opinion is still sometimes accepted; Alfoldy (1965a) 25-26 (leaving the question open until Caesar as the latest date); Suić (1976d) 185-192; Weber (1989) 70; Domić-Kunić (1994) 221-222. There was no governor appointed for Illyricum, nor any Roman army positioned there. The \textit{provincia Illyricum} entrusted to Anicius was nothing but a command, and \textit{formula dicta} by Anicius in Scodra was a peace settlement, not a \textit{formula provinciae}. Cf. Papazoglu (1976) 202 n. 27.

\textsuperscript{17} Visona (1985) 121 n. 9 suggests that Issa was in financial difficulties after the Illyrian wars. However, that conclusion is doubtful. It is hardly possible that after the elimination of the Illyrian menace (and an extremely brief conflict with Genthius), which threatened Issa and her interests directly, anything but an economic boom could happen in the mid-Adriatic. Contemporary monetary emissions of Ballaios’ coinage may be a reflection of the political and economic stability of his reign; Rendić-Miočević (1976) 194. They also suggest the stability of the whole area.

It is difficult to accept the view of Domić-Kunić (1994) 220-223 that Genthius took possession of Issa, and accept Issenses in Livy, 45.26.13 as Issians, instead correcting the word into Lissenses; cf. Weber (1983) 121-124, 146-152; (1989) 69 who makes the same error. Issa was a Roman ally independent of the Illyrian kingdom and there is no reason for Livy to place it with other parts of the dissolved kingdom; Novak (1952) 37-38; Wilkes (1969) 27 n. 4.
as the Daorsi or Taulantii. The position and role of King Ballaios in the post-Genthius order in Illyria is uncertain, but it is reasonable to assume that he was an upholder of Roman interests. Anicius’ ‘dictate of Scodra’ declared freedom to the Illyrians but ceded to the Republic full control of the south Adriatic with minimal commitment of material and military resources.\footnote{Sherwin-White (1973) 177 “The Roman declaration of freedom thus preserved the rights of conquest, without involving Rome in the encumbrance of provincial government.” See Sherwin-White (1973) 175-181 and Gruen (1984b) 145-157 on the political effects and aims behind the Roman declaration of freedom.}

In the north, the security of an important Italian colony and port, Aquileia, established in 178 BC, as well as the general security of northern Italy before the Aquileian foundation seems to be of key strategic importance for the Romans.\footnote{Livy, 43.1.5-7, 9; Toynbee (1965) 284.} In dealing with hostile peoples such as the Carni, the Taurisci and the peoples who constituted the Regnum Noricum, Roman diplomacy needed to make arrangements in order to secure the position of Aquileia. The Veneto-Illyrian Histrian kingdom created the greatest problems for the expansion of Roman influence and only after its gradual pacification finished in 177 BC was Aquileia secured. It is highly possible that after this victory the Romans removed the Histri from the area between Timava and Formio, and settled the Carni there, thus establishing a protective buffer zone between the Histri and Aquileia.\footnote{Starac (1999) 10-11; (1999) 9, map 2.} It is not clear what the final political arrangement with the Histri was after their defeat, but it may well be that the Roman administration divided them into separate tribute-paying tribes, thus weakening their power.\footnote{Cf. Petru (1977) 476-477 maps 1-2.} Perhaps these Histrian tribes were for a brief period regarded as an independent autonomous area,\footnote{Starac (1999) 18 “samostalna upravna oblast” but there is no firm proof for that. Šašel (1996) 26 is precise in his statement that there was no Roman occupation of Histria in 177 BC and that Romans avoided all unnecessary struggle with the Histri in trying to incorporate them peacefully.} and later (most certainly after Tuditanus’ expedition in 129 BC) they were incorporated into Cisalpine Gaul.\footnote{Šašel-Kos (2000) 286-288 insists on the special status of Histria as neither part of Illyricum or of Cisalpina, but it seems more likely that Tuditanus linked the Histri more closely with the Cisalpina, see Chapter 3.4. According to the straightforward logic of Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 25-26, if Histria had any special status then by the lex Vatinia Caesar would receive imperium over it as well, so we must assume that it was part of either Cisalpina or Illyricum and had no special status whatsoever. Starac (1993/94) 12, 19; (1999) 18-19 ff., 55 is wrong in placing Histria in the province of Illyricum before Caesar. Even if for the sake of argument we accept that there was a province of Illyricum in the 2nd century BC, as Zippel (1877) 189 suggested, it was established only in the southern Adriatic and it did not cover Histria.}
3.3 The South and Central Adriatic

In the early 150s the Delmataean alliance, newly established in the hinterland of the Dalmatian coast under the leadership of the *civitas* of Dalmion,²⁴ attacked the possessions of Roman allies and personally insulted the Roman emissaries sent to investigate the allies’ complaints. After the initial failures of the cos. C. Marcius Figulus in 156 BC, in the following year the cos. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica destroyed the resistance of the Delmatae and burned Dalmion, directing his attack from the valley of Naron (Neretva).²⁵ This Roman reaction was clearly initiated by an attack by the Delmatae on the mainland agricultural colonies of Issa: Epetion and Tragurion, and on the territory of the Daorsi east of the river Neretva.²⁶ Polybius was utterly contemptuous in assessing the reasons for this war. He described it as a useful opportunity to keep Roman armies fit in times of general peace.²⁷ As an additional reason, he also mentioned the need for a re-affirmation of the Roman position in the Mid-Adriatic basin after a decade of neglect from 167 BC.²⁸ The Delmatae were formidable opponents and their alliance gained much influence after the fall of the Illyrian kingdom so that they threatened the new order of 167 BC with collapse. The

²⁴Δάλµιον destroyed by Nasica 155 BC was not the same city as Delminium in the Roman era; Čače (1994/95) 107, 114-120, see Chapter 2.5.2. Čače also assumes that the Delmataean alliance was a recent political formation, named after the leading tribe settled in Delmion (1994/95) 118-120, cf. an early stage of that idea in Čače (1979) 133-135. This would explain why the Delmatae first appear in the historical records only in events from the 2nd century BC.

²⁵Polyb. 32.9; 13; App. Ill. 11; Livy, Per. 47; Flor. 2.25; Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315); Frontin. Str. 3.6.2. Zaninović (1966) 39-40 is wrong in assuming that Salona was in the hands of the Delmatae even in 156 BC. He supports that with the fact that Figulus attacked from Narona not Salona. But logistic support from Narona and Daorsi gives a much better position for attack than if he had attacked from isolated Greek settlements.

²⁶Livy, *Per.* 47 *cum quibus bello confligendi causa fuit, quod Illyrios socios socios populi R., vastaverant*; Polyb. 32.9; Scullard (1951) 228-229 is clearly wrong in considering these raids to be piracy because the Delmatae never engaged in piracy as did the Ardiaei, nor were they distinguished seamen like the Liburni. We should assume that this represented their ‘push to the Adriatic’, which filled the political vacuum after the disappearance of Ardiaean kingdom, rather than any large-scale migration towards the sea; Zaninović (1966) 38; (1967) 19-20; Gruen (1984b) 431. For Epetion and Tragurion, see Chapter 2.5.1.

²⁷The theory that peace was in fact negative if it went on for a long time was nothing unusual in ancient historiography; Woodman (1977) 157. Polybius was directly involved in these events, lobbying for south-Italian Locre to be freed from the obligation to send ships for the Dalmatian war; Pol. 12.5.1-3, so it is possible that he was personally not supportive of this intervention.

²⁸Polyb. 32.13.4-9. Polybius, 32.13.6 is referring to 60 years of neglect, but war in 168 BC, although waged in the south Adriatic, certainly strengthened the Roman position in the mid-Adriatic and cannot be regarded as neglect of the area. Some scholars, are perhaps too quick to dismiss the complaints of Roman allies as a direct cause of this war; Wallbank (1979) 535; Harris (1979) 233-234. These complaints C. Fannius and other *legati* discussed with the Delmatae (Polyb. 32.13.1), and only after their mission failed, did the Senate decide to use the occasion for strategic reasons including the pacification of the Delmatae; Polyb. 32.13.4 ff.. Cf. similar scepticism for this judgement of Polybius; Wilkes (1969) 30-31; Gruen (1984b) 430-431.
reaction was relatively swift and efficient, and the army fully confirmed Roman
hegemony over the central Adriatic for some time. The complete destruction of
Dalmion caused large internal perturbations inside the Delmataean alliance; Dalmion
lost its leadership of the alliance, and in the subsequent period the alliance was
reorganized on a more decentralized basis.\(^{29}\) In this war the valley of Neretva for the
first time appears as an important base for the Roman army.\(^{30}\) It is possible to see this
period as a \textit{terminus post quem} increased settlement and infiltration of Italians made
the small Greek emporium of Narona an important foothold for Roman penetration
in Illyricum.\(^{31}\)

The next political crisis happened in 135 BC when cos. Ser. Fulvius Flaccus
was dispatched with 10,000 soldiers and 600 cavalry against the Ardiaei and the
Pleraei who had attacked Roman Illyria, despite the diplomatic attempts of the
Ardiaei to postpone or even prevent the intervention.\(^{32}\) What the ‘Ρωμαίους
’Ιλλυρίδα of Appian was has not been answered properly by modern scholarship.\(^{33}\)
This crisis seems to have been triggered by the continuation of the piratical raids of
the Ardiaei, who were attracted by the increased trade of Italian and Roman
tradesmen, recently settled more numerous in Narona, as well the trade interests of
Issa and the Daors in this area.\(^{34}\) There is a problem in locating the homeland of the
Ardiaei and their lands in 135 BC. Regardless of Strabo who located them on the
right bank of Neretva,\(^{35}\) it seems much more plausible to put them in the vicinity of

\(^{29}\) Čače (1979) 114-116. This is a speculative, but highly possible theory.
\(^{30}\) App. \textit{Ill.} 11.
\(^{31}\) Narona (and Salona) perfectly fit into Polanyi’s port-of-trade concept, as gateway communities. A
gateway community is understood to be a settlement, which controls points of contact between
different social, economic and ecological systems; Polanyi (1963). See Horden/Purcell (2000) 391-400
for more modern treatment of the subject.
Narona as a Roman foothold is a concept developed in Zaninović (1980). The apparent lack (but not
complete absence; Patsh (1907) 97-101 – coinage, 107-108 figs. 57-59 – the artefacts) of Hellenistic
inscriptions and archaeological remains in Narona makes the problem of its foundation and founders
problematic; Cambi (1980) 130-134; Gabričević (1980). Recent archaeological finds confirm its
Hellenistic origins; Marin (2002) 418-421.
\(^{32}\) App. \textit{Ill.} 10; Livy, \textit{Per.} 56 \textit{Fulvius Flaccus consul Vardeaos in Illyrico subegit}.
\(^{33}\) Papazoglu (1976) 203 argues that it was the coast belt between Neretva and Lissos that recognized
Roman suzerainty.
\(^{34}\) Novak (1952) 39; Wilkes (1969) 245-247 (Issaean interests behind the intervention).
Cf. \textit{CIL} 1\(^{2}\) 2288-93 Republican inscriptions from Narona. Italian and Roman traders in the Illyrian
kingdom are attested as early as Genthius’ reign 180-168 BC; Livy, 40.42.4. Cf. Škegro (1991) 61-63;
(1999) 144-150, 174-175, 229-231 for Republican (Italian and Greek) olive oil and especially the
wine trade in Narona. See Gabričević (1980); Katić (2002) 430-432 on the Greek and Daorsian trade
in the valley of Naron.
\(^{35}\) Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315). Some scholars still support this view; cf. Alföldy (1965a) 46-47; Zaninović
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the Rhizonic Gulf, so as to control the coast southeast of Neretva and the peninsula of Pelješac together with the Pleræi. The position of the Pleræi and Ardiaei was such that from Pelješac they easily controlled all the navigation going to Narona, especially if the view, discussed above, is right that Pharos was joined in the same state unit with the Ardiaei. This crisis might have been the result of changed circumstances in the Ardiaean state unit (the death of Ballaios?) but as there are no valid historical sources to confirm this, we should not speculate too much on the situation.

It was a successful reaction of the Roman army to the threat from the continent that resulted in the complete elimination of the Ardiaei from history. The Romans resettled the Ardiaei away from the coast into the continent (eastern Hercegovina) where they were forced to cultivate soil instead of making their living from piracy, as they had been used to do in the past. It was a unique example of resettlement in Roman Republican times in Illyricum and there are no other occasions when it was used there before the end of the Republic. There are some echoes of Roman conduct in Transalpine Gaul a decade later for different strategic reasons, and in Pompey’s settlement of Cilician pirates in 67 BC. The event shows Rome’s continuing commitment to the policy of guarding the trading (and other) interests of their allies and the security of navigation in the Eastern Adriatic, to which

36 Papazoglu (1963) corrected previous authorities on the location of the Ardiaei, which placed them in the Rhizonic gulf (Boka Kotorska); cf. Garašanin/Garašanin (1967) 90-93; Garašanin (1974) 11-16; Marić (1989). There is also the compromise theory of Lučić (1966) who agreed with the location of the Ardiaei in the southeast before 167 BC, but he suggested that they then moved to the coast west of Neretva. For the location of the Pleræi: Alfoldy (1965a) 47; Garašanin/Garašanin (1967) 93. Cf. older bibliography cited in Zaninović (1970) 494 n. 12.
37 If the Pharian inscription is correctly dated by Robert to c. 150-133 BC. Robert (1935) 505-506 dates the inscription *CIG* II 1837b restoring Roman privileges to Pharos in the second third of 2nd century BC. Thus it can be considered in the context of 168 or 135 BC. Some doubts on this dating were recently cast by Derow who puts it back to 219 BC; Derow (1991) 266-267. The Romans made Pharians *amici* after the defeat of an unknown Illyrian ruler in 135 BC (whether Ballaios or an unknown ruler with initials *∆ΙΜ*). Cf. Zaninović (1988a) 38. For *∆ΙΜ* coinage see Rendić-Miočević (1965) 84-85.
38 Novak (1952) 39; Garašanin (1974) 16.
39 Strabo, 7.5.6 (C 315). There is a possibility that this re-settlement of the Ardiaei happened in 167 after the defeat of Genthius, so that this could be a rebellion against this measure. Still, the settlement of 167 was duly mentioned in Livy, 45.26, and it is difficult to suppose that he did not know about it. Appian is silent, but he already admits to having difficulties in locating sources for the end of the war in 135 BC; App. *Ill.* 10. The Ardiaei are still attested in the early principate, but only as a shadow of a once powerful people; Pliny, *HN* 3.142.
40 Strabo, 4.1.5 (C 180) C. Sextius Calvinus drove Gauls off the shore in 124 BC, but not for piracy. Pompey resettled Cilician pirates on the mainland for exactly the same reasons as Flaccus resettled the
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Ardiaean piracy had been a serious threat in the past. Thus Rome secured the southern and central Adriatic coast for some time, especially the coastal area south from Narona and Narona itself, and its faithful allies were certainly rewarded with pieces of Ardiaean land.\textsuperscript{41} Possibly after this war, Pharos was separated from the Ardiaei as an independent state entity, and the Romans restored all the privileges Pharos had previously enjoyed.\textsuperscript{42}

In 118 BC cos. L. Caecilius Metellus attacked the Delmatae, celebrated a triumph and afterwards assumed the honorific name Deltmaticus. According to Appian there was no apparent reason for this campaign except Metellus’ desire for a triumph at any cost.\textsuperscript{43} The negative bias of Appian’s source is even more visible in his statement that there was actually no real campaign and that Deltmaticus was accepted as a friend in Salona,\textsuperscript{44} where he spent the winter amongst the Delmatae and afterwards returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph.\textsuperscript{45} It is difficult to believe that even a Metellus in the 110s could achieve a triumph without a campaign, or that the problematic and warlike Delmatae would accept him so warmly. Again, a lack of source material makes certain conclusions impossible. The expansionist policy of the Delmatae aimed at establishing their control over the Issaean controlled part of the coast seems the most probable cause of tensions, following the pattern of the events in 156 BC. On the other hand, the campaign was certainly not particularly difficult and apparently there was no need for long sieges of the numerous Delmatean inland

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\textsuperscript{41} Zaninović (1966) 43 thought that the Daorsi received Ardiaean territory after they were expelled. Regardless of his error in positioning the Ardiaei west of Neretva, it would be reasonable to assume that the Daorsi received pieces of Ardiaean or Pleraean land southeast of Neretva; cf. Bojanovski (1988) 93, 100-101; Marić (1989) 59 describing the coast around modern-day Slano as Daorsian in the later period.

\textsuperscript{42} See this section n. 37. The finds of Roman republican coinage increase rapidly from the period 140-132 BC; Bonačić (1990).

\textsuperscript{43} App. Ill. 11; Livy, Per. 62; Eutr. 4.23.2. The source Appian used was undoubtedly hostile to Metellus; cf. Dobiáš (1930) 161-162, 281; Marasco (1993) 478; Wilkes (1969) 33-34, 34 n.1. Perhaps it was Posidonius of Apameia, because his attitude towards Roman expansionism after 148 BC was very critical; Strassburger (1965) 46-47.

\textsuperscript{44} Later Roman Salona (or Salonae) was a product of the amalgamation of several settlements, Greek, Roman and native; Cambi (1989a) 37-41; cf. Rendić-Miočević (1975a) 29-30. In this period our sources refer to the Greek-founded coastal emporium Σάλων, which belonged to the Issaean commonwealth. Cf. Clairmont (1975) 2, and recent archaeological evidence from the Manastirine locality in Marin (2002) 415-416. We cannot completely exclude the possibility however that neighbouring native settlements were not originally part of the Issaean commonwealth either.

\textsuperscript{45} Clairmont (1975) 6 takes “wintering amongst the Delmatae” literally: if Metellus wintered in Salona, he was in fact wintering amongst the Delmatae because Salona was facing the Delmataean-controlled hinterland.
hill-forts as there had been in 156 – 155 BC. Appian’s source, which mentions a friendly reception in Salona for the future Dalmaticus, is correct as Romans were allies coming to relieve the citizens of Salona from Dalmatean pressure.\(^{46}\) His route to Salona is unknown and the most plausible suggestion seems to be that he sailed directly from Ancona,\(^{47}\) possibly via the friendly islands of Issa and Pharos. The trans-Adriatic transport route seems the most logical one in all Roman interventions in the southern sector, as opposed to north Adriatic operations, which used Aquileia and Cisalpine Gaul as bases. The consequences of Dalmaticus’ campaign include the absence of troubles in Dalmatia in the following decades and the increase of Greek and Italian trade-connected settlement at some points on the coast such as Salona or Narona.\(^{48}\)

In 78 BC C. Cosconius was sent with pro-consular \textit{imperium} against the Dalmatae.\(^{49}\) There is not much in the sources about this expedition, except that he recaptured Salona and defeated the enemy in two years of campaigning.\(^{50}\) There seems to be an attempt by the Dalmataean alliance to exploit Rome’s internal instability, which was sparked by the civil war between Sulla and the Marians. This follows the pattern of the other contemporary conflicts, facing Sulla’s successors in 78 BC, such as Lepidus’ rebellion, the Sertorian insurrection in Spain, the war in Thrace, or the rise of endemic piracy in the Mediterranean. Another reason for the rebellion could be the imposition of new taxation on allies in this period, as mentioned by Appian, which was extended to tribute-paying peoples such as the Dalmatae.\(^{51}\) This caused serious trouble to the entire Roman Illyrian and Eastern Adriatic policy. For the first time the Dalmatae penetrated the coastal heartland of

\(^{46}\) Morgan (1971) 292 n. 26 rightly points out that Salona (in fact the Issaean commonwealth) asked the Romans for help.

\(^{47}\) See Brusić (1980) 555 figs. 1-2; Kozličić (1990a) 155-158 fig.4; (1990b) 54; on sea routes across the Adriatic. Morgan (1971) 275 ff., dismissed views that Dalmaticus travelled by the Dalmatian coast from Aquileia or that he reached Salona through the overland route from Segestica.

\(^{48}\) Zippel (1877) 189 followed by Malevany (1975) thought that Dalmaticus’ expedition resulted in “Illyrien zuerst als eigene Provinz organisirt ist.” There is nothing in the sources to support this opinion.

\(^{49}\) It was a rather unusual grant of \textit{imperium} for the period; Brennan (2000) 424-425, giving the impression of pressing necessity. Cosconius proved himself a very capable commander in the Social War, sources in Broughton (1952) 36, 39 n. 21; (1986) 77.

\(^{50}\) Eutr. 6.4; Orosius, 5.23.23; cf. Cic. Clu. 97. Syme (1999) 167-169 argues that Cosconius received only \textit{imperium} without a province. Contra Broughton (1952) 86.

\(^{51}\) App. B Civ. 1.102; Sall. Hist., 2.44.6-7 (references from Sallust Hist. are from the McGushin, not the older Maurenbrecher edition); Orosius, 5.23.1.
the Issaean commonwealth, and showed up the Issaean inability to resist pressure from the Delmatae.

Some scholars support the opinion that Salona was for the first time permanently captured by Cosconius from the Delmatae, who at some point in the late 2nd century overran the Issaean colonies Tragurion and Epetion, mentioned in connection with the 156 – 155 war against the Delmatae, and located close to Salona.\(^{52}\) There is nothing in the sources to suggest the need for Roman action in this area between the expedition of Metellus Delmaticus in 118 – 117 BC, which checked the aggressive designs of the Delmatae for a while, and the campaign of Cosconius. We should allow the possibility that the Delmatae took control of Salona in the period between 85 and 78 BC.\(^{53}\) It is difficult to believe that the Romans would allow an offensive act of the Delmatae, such as an attack (not to mention full conquest) on the coastal heartland of the Issaean commonwealth – a key Roman ally in the whole region, to pass unpunished for long.

Nevertheless, the success of Cosconius was in many ways far-reaching for the destiny of Illyricum.\(^{54}\) He did not establish the province\(^{55}\) but his success finalised the opening of the whole coast to Roman influence. It encouraged the settlement of Italian traders in the areas of Salona, and enabled the Romans to pursue a new stage in Illyrian policy – a unified ‘coastal’ Illyricum in the time of Caesar.

\(^{52}\) Wilkes (1969) 33-35, 220; Zaninović (1977) 777-778; Alföldy (1965a) 99-100 arguing that the Delmatae conquered Salona before 100 BC. Zaninović (1966) 30 dates the Delmataean occupation of Salona in 78 BC. It is not possible to determine whether Epetion and Tragurion were also overrun by the Delmatae.

\(^{53}\) There is an unclear (and possibly wrong) connection between Sulla and the Delmatae in 85 BC; Eutr. 5.7.1, as well as the unsuccessful transport of Roman troops into Liburnia in 84, discussed below. The evidence from Orosius, 5.23.1 suggests that the trouble in Dalmatia was not prolonged.

\(^{54}\) Čače (1989) 87 n.75, although we disagree that the victory of Cosconius was so decisive, or that the Delmataean alliance was seriously affected, since in 50 BC they continue with an offensive, this time towards the Liburni; App. Ill. 12, see below p. 82.

\(^{55}\) There is an argument that Cosconius established the province, because his alleged legate Terentius Varro (the antiquarian) refers to the 89 civitates seeking justice in Narona; Pliny, *HN* 3.142; Cichorius (1922) 191-192; Šašel (1970/71) 301 (Varro as a legate of Cosconius); Wilkes (1969) 485 (the establishment of the province). This argument stands on shaky ground. Varro is attested in Spain with Pompey in 76-75 BC (Varro, *Rust.* 3. 12. 7; Cichorius (1922) 193-194), and his knowledge of Illyricum refers to Liburnia where he had been the quaestor of Cinna in 85-84 BC; *Rust.* 3. 10. 8-10; Badian (1962) 60. Varro’s remark is a description of the administrative structure of Illyricum under Caesar in the 50s, or even as late as 35-27 BC, as Bojanovski (1988) 47 said.
3.4 The North Adriatic

In the 120 – 110s a stronger Roman political and military interest can be detected on the northern Adriatic coast and its hinterland. In 129 BC the consul C. Sempronius Tuditanus campaigned in the wider north Adriatic area. The campaign was centered on the Cisalpine Iapodes, but Tuditanus celebrated a triumph over the Taurisci, Histri and Carni. Tuditanus and his legate Ti. (Latinius) Pandusa engaged the enemy and, after encountering initial difficulties, with the help of D. Iunius Brutus overcame them. The campaign was conducted on at least two fronts so that Tuditanus was able to return victorious to Italy, after only a couple of months, despite his initial setback. We can assume that Pandusa fought the Taurisci and Tuditanus and Brutus engaged the Iapodes, because the epitomator of Livy connects Tuditanus and Brutus with the Iapodes. It is doubtful whether Tuditanus actually fought the Liburni on his way. A more likely reconstruction is that the expansion of the Cisalpine Iapodi towards the sea threatened the Liburni who sided with Tuditanus for that reason.

The sources give us no direct reason for this campaign. The Iapodean or Tauriscan threat to the security of North Italian trade with the Eastern Alps and the Sava valley and Pannonia could be seen as an important reason for the expedition of Tuditanus to secure Roman interests there. The expulsion of Italian traders from the Tauriscan gold mines could also be a direct reason for this war. Following Appian, some scholars have suggested that Tuditanus departed on the campaign in an effort to

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56 Livy, Per. 59; App. Ill. 10; B Civ. 1.19; Pliny, HN 3.129 Tuditanus qui domuit Histros; CIL I² 652. The inscription CIL I² 652 mentions only the Taurisci and C[arnosque], but not the Liburni (the Histri are confirmed by Pliny). The campaign focused on the Cisalpine Iapodes as the chief threat Čače (1983) 270-271; (1991) 63-65, although the Taurisci also might appear as worthwhile opponents.
57 Morgan (1973) 31-32. Appian records Pandusa, Livy mentions Brutus. Brutus was the legate and Pandusa was either pro-praetor in Cisalpine Gaul (Zippel (1877) 136-137; Morgan (1971) 298-299; (1973) 32; Broughton (1986) 117), or the other legate of Tuditanus; Brennan (2000) 217-218. Münzer’s idea that Pandusa was pro-praetor in Macedonia was refuted initially by Wilkes (1969) 32-33.
58 Morgan (1973) 39-40 argues that he did, in order to fight Liburnian piracy, connecting it with the tough Roman stand on Ardiaean piracy in 135 BC (Alföldy (1974) 34 even regards the Liburni as primary targets of Tuditanus together with the Iapodes). Morgan also thinks that the alleged Liburnian campaign was an entirely distinct operation from the Iapodean. This was effectively refuted by Čače (1985) 270-271; (1991) 59, supported by Cerva (1996), who challenged the stereotype of Liburnian piracy in that era. Cf. also Dell (1967) on stereotypes of Adriatic piracy in general.
60 Polyb. apud Strabo, 4.6.12 (C 208) (=Polyb. 34.10.10-14); Šašel (1974/75) 147-148. Alföldy (1974) 34, n. 43 refutes the view that this war was connected with the ‘gold affair’. Cf. Strabo, 4.6.10 (C 207) for a trade route with Pannonia via Nauportus, and Šašel (1966) 203 for the importance of Nauportus for Roman interests.
avoid domestic political troubles in Rome.\textsuperscript{61} Nothing in Appian suggests that the campaign was conducted solely for Tuditanus’ political reasons. There is no reason to believe that some other general would not have been appointed if Tuditanus wanted to stay at Rome. Moreover, the fact that he left Rome in the midst of a domestic crisis and returned back so fast, suggests the seriousness of the situation in the northwest Adriatic.\textsuperscript{62}

The results of the campaign are not immediately apparent, but the fact that the Romans were able to launch successful campaigns into the Adriatic hinterland only a decade later, suggests lasting results from Tuditanus’ campaign. His campaign resulted in the conquest of the Histri and the Carni,\textsuperscript{63} the removal of the Cisalpine Iapodes from the coast, and it also brought the Liburni into the Roman sphere of interest on a more permanent basis. After this campaign the Liburni gained privileges from Rome and possibly were even allowed to annex the Iapodean coast or its larger part.\textsuperscript{64} The success of Tuditanus opened the whole east Adriatic coast to Rome and secured the already existing important trade links of Aquileia and north Italy with Noricum, Pannonia and Salona.\textsuperscript{65} The expedition of Tuditanus, or less possibly, the later war waged by M. Aemilius Scaurus against the Taurisci in 115 BC,\textsuperscript{66} resulted in significant political changes in the Eastern Alps. Part of Tauriscan territory the

\textsuperscript{61} App. B Civ. 1.19; Last (1951) 42. Accordingly, we can assume that the sources of Appian knew more about the reasons for this campaign and the campaign against Segestani in 119 BC; Marasco (1993) 487-488.
\textsuperscript{62} Skefich (1967) 15-16 also assumes aggressive designs of the Iapodes.
\textsuperscript{63} Čače (1979) 69-70 (also Starac (1999) 10) suggested on the basis of Cic. Balb. 14, 32 (naming the Iapodes – we do not know which ones, probably the Cisalpine – but not the Histri and Carni amongst Roman foederati) that these peoples were fully conquered after this campaign and become peregrini. Tuditanus had no time to fight all those peoples on the list despite the help of his legati, so we assume that the major aim of his campaign was the Iapodes and Taurisci and that the campaign against the Carni and Histri was nothing but straightforward annexation without significant resistance. Contra Morgan (1971) 298-299 suggesting that Pandusa started the war against the Histri a year before from Cisalpine Gaul, and fought them without success.
\textsuperscript{64} Those immunities were the exemption from liturgies; Čače (1985) 329-330 n. 50, and the status of peregrini; Medini (1974) 28. Tarsatica and Senia on the Iapodean Riviera are not mentioned amongst the privileged Liburnian communities, so it is also possible that they kept their independence; Čače (1985) 277-278.
\textsuperscript{65} Čače (1991) 67. The Central Adriatic coast at this time was still potentially, threatened by the Delmatae. There are more and more proofs of significant Italian trade with Pannonia and the Eastern Alps from the 5th-4th century BC. The artefacts and Late Republican coinage found in Pannonia suggests the existence of a western trade route Aquileia-Nauportus-Segestica-valley of the Sava and further towards the lower Danube; Strabo, 7.5.2 (C 314); Marić (1964a) 47, 49; Šašel (1977); Parović-Pešikan (1982/83); Popović (1987) 105-113 fig. 30; Katić (2002) 428-429.
\textsuperscript{66} CIL I, p. 49; Aur. Vic. De vir. Ill. 72.7. The triumph de Galleis Carneis suggest that either C[arnosque] from the eulogium of Tuditanus is the wrong reconstruction, or more likely, that the Taurisci and Carni openly resented the ‘new order’ of 129 BC.
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Hinterland of Tergeste all the way to the Emona basin, including the important portorium Nauportus, were taken from them and either annexed by the Roman res publica (afterwards included in Cisalpine Gaul) or, less certainly, given to the Norican kingdom as a reward for support. An indirect result of this annexation was the foundation of a late Republican Roman trade settlement (vicus) in Nauportus in the early-mid 1st century BC, pre-dating Caesar’s administration of Cisalpine Gaul.

In 119 BC, the cos. Lucius Aurelius Cotta and his legate L. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus attacked the Segestani who lived on the continent with its principal city Segesta (later Siscia - Sisak near Zagreb). It is strange that this important breakthrough into the Adriatic hinterland was not given more recognition by the sources. It is possible, however, that Appian used a source heavily biased against the Metellii, and this is even more apparent in his account of Metellus’ campaign in 118 BC. Appian hints at the initial success of Cotta and Metellus, but in another place in his Illyrike it appears obvious that they could not force the Segestani to pay tribute even after a couple of years. This campaign seems to have been a strategic continuation of Tuditanus’ campaign in 129 BC, which aimed to use a local

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67 Šašel (1976) 416, 422, 426-427; (1985) 547-555 describes this as Roman annexation after Tuditanus’ campaign, while Šašel-Kos (1986) 159 places the event in the wider late 2nd – early 1st century BC context, leaving both possibilities open. See also Šašel-Kos (1995) 230-231; (1997a) 30-31 (preferring Roman annexation), esp. n. 56, with an overview of archaeological evidence supporting the idea of Roman extension in this direction. The recent discovery of a late Republican/early Principate boundary stone between Aquileia and Emona near Bevke (13 km southwest of modern Ljubljana) confirms that the territory of Aquileia stretched deeply into the hinterland; Šašel-Kos (2002b). Finds of Republican coins in this area also supports this possibility; Kos (1986) 25-31 as well as finds of Roman slingshots in the area dated late 2nd and early 1st century BC; Horvat (1993).


69 Morgan (1971) very convincingly showed that Appian mixed up two different sources and that Metellus Deltamicus was not involved in both campaigns, 119 and 117 BC; contra: Last (1951) 108; Wilkes (1969) 33-34; Broughton (1951) 525. The idea of Diadematus as Cotta’s subordinate is her conjecture. Brennan (2000) 371 suggest that Diadematus was sent as a praetor to ‘Illyria’ (?) a year before and later continued to serve under Cotta, because “it would be odd for Diadematus, in the year when his brother was consul, to serve as legatus under that man’s consular colleague.”; cf. Broughton (1986) 38. There is no reason to make these already complicated matters more complex without more hard evidence. In this period Romans used consul for emergency interventions, there are only 5 special praetorian provinciae overseas attested from 165 to 82 BC (three in the Carthaginian crisis 149-146 BC when consuls were engaged in Africa. M. Antonius (cos. 99 BC) 102 BC and the one under question for T. Pandusa in 130); Brennan (2000) 215-221, 371.

70 App. III. 10.

71 Wilkes (1969) 33-34 n.2, presuming that Deltamicus was present in both campaigns against the Segestani and the Delmatae. Regardless of which of the two Metelli were in Segesta, if Appian’s source was biased against Metelli, it would probably be biased against other conservative senatorial families such as the Cottae.

72 App. III. 10, 22. Illyrike is a frustrating source and is not always to be believed. Appian is notorious for using inadequate sources; cf. his account of the 135 BC war where he does not bother to consult
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...crisis, unknown to us, to complete the establishment of a new political order in the southern Alps. The expansion of Cisalpina in 129 BC required a protective layer of satellite states, which is exactly what this campaign aimed at. If Romans had wanted a significant and permanent advance towards the Sava, they could have attacked the Transalpine Iapodes as well, just as Octavian did in 35 BC. It would have been quite impossible to penetrate so deeply into the Adriatic hinterland if the Liburni or the Iapodes were not pacified in the rear of Cotta’s army and logistical support had not been received from North Italy via Nauportus. The expedition of Aemilus Scaurus against the Carni and Taurisci in 115 BC finalized Roman operations in the eastern Alpine area for a while. It strengthened their position and enabled a much more efficient defense of northern Italy against possible attack from that side. 74

Appian introduces another puzzle into the history of Roman encounters with Illyricum. He states clearly that the Romans twice attacked the land of the Segestani before Octavian did in 35 BC, and that the expedition of a certain Cornelius against the Pannonians, amongst whom the Segestani were classed by ancient sources, finished so disastrously that no Roman commander attempted to attack them for a long time. 75 When did the Romans attack Segestica on the other occasion, and who was the unhappy Cornelius? Mócsy made an interesting assumption that the Segestani were actually a part of a larger tribal alliance dominated in that period by the Celtic Scordisci. 77 The prevailing opinion amongst scholars is that the Cornelius in question was either Cn. Cornelius Dollabella (cos. 159) or L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus (cos. 156 BC) who unsuccessfully attempted to take Segestica. 78 There is

Livy or Strabo (or Strabo’s source) who all knew the final result and the consequences of Flaccus’ campaign, see Chapter 3.3 n. 39.

73 Skefich (1967) 17-19 sees the Segestani as a clear and present danger to Roman interests (though connecting this campaign with the campaign of Metellus).

74 Morgan (1971) 300-301 concludes that Roman control of the area was beginning to collapse in the 110s BC. All the archaeo logical evidence given before contradicts this conclusion. If the Roman position in the eastern Alps was so weak, why did the Cimbri not use it for their own advantage in 113 BC after the victory at Noreia?

75 App. Ill. 12.


78 Zippel (1877) 133-135; Scullard (1951) 228-229; Mócsy (1962) 537-538; Šašel-Kos (1990) 157 n.102; (1997a) 29. There is nothing in the sources to support this conjecture; Broughton (1951) 447; Münzer (1901) 1386-1387. Morgan (1974) suggested that the Cornelius in question was P. Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 138) and that he was defeated on the Macedonian borders by the Scordisci, in their more natural setting, but that idea is contested by Šašel-Kos (1997a) 29 as being based on hypothetical premises.
indeed an interesting connection between the raids of the Scordisci in Macedonia and Roman engagement in the eastern Adriatic coast in 155 BC.\textsuperscript{79} It is still difficult to believe, however, that the power of the Scordisci reached as far towards the northwest as Segestica, nor is there credible evidence of an supposed alliance of the Delmatae and Scordisci in 156 and 119, as suggested by Zippel, bearing in mind especially that all their raids were concentrated further south against Macedonia.\textsuperscript{80}

In 84 BC the consuls, Cinna and Carbo, planned to transfer soldiers from Ancona into Liburnia in order to have a base against the approaching army of Sulla.\textsuperscript{81} It has been widely suggested that the \textit{populares} planned to make a short-term campaign in Illyricum in order to train newly conscripted soldiers there for the war with Sulla, rather than to take the field in what was a strategically meaningless area.\textsuperscript{82} No other troubles are reported in Illyricum and if this reconstruction is true (which we doubt) it could be a Roman response to the fall of Salona to the Delmatae. It is plain, regardless of the view taken, that the \textit{populares} could not plan to transport an army into hostile territory so that it is almost certain on this occasion that the Liburnians were at least on friendly terms with Rome, continuing their \textit{amicitia} established in 129 BC. One more campaign against the Iapodes can be detected but on very vague evidence, based on a fragment from Sallust’s \textit{Histories}.\textsuperscript{83} It has been suggested that this was part of, or the continuation of, Cosconius’ campaign against the Delmatae in 78 – 76 BC, which spread to the Iapodes,\textsuperscript{84} but lack of other evidence leaves this argument without decisive support.

\textsuperscript{79} Obseq. 16 \textit{Dalmatae Scordisci superati} (155 BC).
\textsuperscript{80} Morgan (1971) 276 n.17; Zippel (1877) 131-132 is still being followed by some authorities like Barkócz (1980) 86; Suić (1981) 135-136. Papazoglu (1978) 248-255 suggested only the alliance between the Segestani and Scordisci, and Mócsy (1962) 528 believed that the Scordisci ruled over the Segestani.
\textsuperscript{81} App. B Civ. 1.77-78.
\textsuperscript{82} Badian (1962) 58-59; Wilkes (1969) 35; contra Baldson (1965) 232 and Seager (1982) 184 assuming that Cinna and Carbo wanted to spare Italian soil from fighting. Šašel-Kos (1990) 157 argued (without much proof from the sources) that the \textit{populares} counted on the support of Italians settled there and the client-system which had been developed meanwhile.
\textsuperscript{83} Sall. \textit{Hist.} 2.38 … \textit{primam modo in Iapydiam ingressus}.
\textsuperscript{84} Adcock (1951) 715-716; Broughton (1952) 86-87; McGushin (1992) I.203; Contra: Zippel (1877) 179; Skefich (1967) 26-27; Wilkes (1969) 35 n. 6 naming an otherwise unknown P. Licinius mentioned by Frontinus \textit{Str.} 2.5.28 as Roman commander against the Iapodes, which is a much more plausible suggestion, taking into account that no Roman commander appointed against the Delmatae operated so far to the northwest.
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One more Roman interaction with Illyricum is suggested in the sources, and surprisingly not many modern authors take it into account. Cicero briefly mentioned Illyricum in the context of Pompey’s sweeping the sea of pirates in 67 BC.\textsuperscript{85} Unfortunately, we can only guess what happened from the context and presume from Cicero that some squadrons under the command of Pompey patrolled and fortified coastal cities, as he does not mention any significant combat. Perhaps that was the time when Pompey established important connections through his legati, especially on Issa, and made clients who would support him later in the Civil War.\textsuperscript{86}

3.5 Republican policy in Illyricum before Caesar

As argued in the previous chapter, the two most significant general aspects of later Roman Republican imperialism were a generally more aggressive policy in the west and hegemonic supremacy over the more politically sophisticated states in the Hellenistic East. The treatment of southeast Illyricum shows characteristics of the eastern approach. The imposition of a new kind of political settlement on Macedonia and the former Illyrian kingdom in 167 BC enabled the Romans to exercise control without involving large military resources in the establishment of direct trans-Adriatic rule.\textsuperscript{87} The southern coast was divided in a manner similar to Macedonia and left under the control of Rome’s allies, the Issaean commonwealth and friendly native civitates like the Daorsi. From the available evidence it is obvious that Roman Republican armies were sent across the Adriatic to defend the interests of Roman allies in 155, 135 and 78 BC in the south-central Adriatic. The consequences of Roman actions in the central-southern sectors included permanent removal of the troublesome Ardiaei and a check on the aggressive designs of the Delmatae, which resulted in their temporary removal from the coast as a political and military force in the war of 78 – 76 BC.\textsuperscript{88} There were no further preventive actions in the Adriatic hinterland in this sector and Roman armies limited themselves to dealing with immediate danger to their (and allied) interests and showed interest in establishing direct control.

\textsuperscript{85} Cic. Leg. Mun. 35 … missis (naves) item in oram Illyrici maris, noted only by Skefich (1967) 27. Starac (2000) 18 notes that Pompey’s imperium under the lex Gabinia included Illyricum as well, but she does not mention this brief note of Cicero.

\textsuperscript{86} Čače (1985) 287-289.

\textsuperscript{87} Sherwin-White (1973) 174-181, esp. 179-181; contra Harris (1979).

\textsuperscript{88} Zarinović (1967) 20.
In the northwest, the strategic importance of Aquileia for the wider issue of North Italian security dictated the necessity of defence in depth far beyond the Roman frontiers, and the Romans took a more aggressive approach. This resulted in both short and long-term pacification of the neighboring tribes and direct annexations of critical zones.  

Profits from the important trade route with Pannonia perhaps influenced a more aggressive Roman policy in the northern sector. This was an easier and shorter link, which opened new markets to Italian merchants and enabled them to be more competitive in their struggle with the Greek and South Illyrian trade with the valleys of the Sava and the Danube. Romans were visibly more decisive in this sector, making expeditions in the hinterland against the Cisalpine Iapodes, the Carni, Taurisci and Segestani, trying to build a ring of allied satellite states who could protect northern Italy from this side. This was a tactic that worked in ordinary situations but gave no lasting security to North Italy on the exceptional occasions when there were sudden large movements of northern peoples, such as the Cimbri and the Teutoni. Northwest Illyricum was part of these wider North Italian strategic schemes. All that the Romans needed at this time in the northwest sector was peace and security on the frontiers of North Italy and increased economic prosperity there, which the Republic achieved with these military operations.

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89 Cf. Šašel (1976) 77. Perhaps the term ‘buffer-zone’ is misleading. According to Braund (1984) 93 ff. esp. 95 friendly kings and other state entities regarded as socii populi Romani on Roman frontiers, played the role of intermediary between Romans and peoples outside their influence, rather than performed only the protective task of providing a buffer zone.  

90 This is only a speculation as we cannot determine the influence of trade on contemporary Roman politics, nor can we fully assess the extent or volume of Italian-Pannonian trade in this period. However, available evidence suggests this interpretation.  

91 Cf. Popović (1987) 96-115. It is difficult to agree with him that Roman trade followed Roman conquest; (1987) 125. In fact Roman trade preceded and initiated political expansion. Also, there is no reason to believe that Rome directly stood behind the success of the Apollonian and Dyrachian drachma. It is certain that there was no need to supplement an already established currency with the Roman denarius (1987) 98-99. Apollonia and Dyrachium managed their trade with the hinterland for a while, (Malevany (1963) 164; Mano (1976)) producing their drachmae until the Roman civil war (Ceka (1972) 103 ff., 179-180) keeping between themselves “... un accord économique tacite qui réglait la question du monnayage des drachmes”; Ceka (1972) 179, 97-103.  

92 This looks as a clear example of Luttwak’s Republican/Iulio-Claudian strategic system; Luttwak (1976) 20-40. Šašel-Kos (2000) 286-288 does not see Histria as strategically important for the defence of northern Italy, and was not annexed until the 1st century BC. The strategic importance of Histria should be considered in the maritime context – the fight against piracy and the control of the sinus Adriaticus.  

93 Actually the Boii, Scordisci and Taurisci defeated the Cimbri, Strabo, 7.2.2 (C 293), proving that the system worked even in extraordinary situations. Danger for Rome was checked outside Italy, and the Romans had the opportunity to fight the battle outside the Italian mainland in Noricum.  

94 Šašel (1996) 28 “Sve što je Rim tada trebao bio je mir na sjevernim granicama i jačanje gospodarstva u pograničnom pojasu, a to je vajnim operacijama bilo osigurano.”
Romans did not keep garrisons in Illyricum at this time and, if examples of these in the 50s were not a recent innovation, it would be reasonable to conclude that local Roman allies such as Issa, or the Liburni, were in charge of everyday security (Chapter 4.2). The Romans did not pursue exclusive pro-Greek or pro-native policies in this period. They chose the most suitable allies who were interested in the expansion of trade, well-urbanized and more or less integrated into the Mediterranean system. The first obvious choice was the long-standing ally, the Issaean commonwealth. The economic and political power of Issa and its significance for Italian trade interests was indeed an important factor in Roman policy, but Romans did not hesitate to include natives such as the Liburni or Daorsi in the circle of their allies and friends as well. The role of the Liburni as regional upholders of Roman interests was very significant, not only for the functioning of the North Adriatic policy, but also for whole Adriatic policy, as it enabled a land-link with the Issaean commonwealth and the southern Adriatic. The main troublemakers, the Dalmataean alliance, were a strong and well-organized military and political force, which attempted to assert itself as a regional power in the vacuum that appeared after the dissolution of the Ardiaean kingdom. There they clashed with the interests of the Issaean commonwealth, so that Rome was forced to intervene three times in this period in order to preserve the position of its ally and the whole ‘order of Scodra’.

Nothing in the sources suggests the existence of a separate province of Illyricum until at least 59 BC. Roman magistrates operating in this sector received special provinciae while in office, and were not based in Cisalpine Gaul or Macedonia. In emergency situations, the magistrates were entrusted with special

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95 Issa was the regional economic leader in Dalmatia, Pharos and Korkyra followed; see Derow (1973) 125-126; Zaninović (1977) 770-771, 774-776; Dukat/Mirnik (1976) 182-184; Crawford (1985) 220-221, App. 50. The coins of central Adriatic Greeks had limited internal use, because their trade with the Illyrian hinterland was based mainly (but not exclusively) on exchange; Popović (1987) 87-91; Zaninović (1976a) 307. After 200 BC, Italian exports to Issa significantly increased, (Bonačić-Mandinić/Visona (2002) 327-330) so we can assume that interest in trade additionally influenced the Senate to support Issaean interests.

96 The Daorsi also maintained intensive trade with the Hellenistic world and minted their own coins; Dukat/Mirnik (1976) 184; Marić (1976) and Hellenistic influences and developed trade in Liburnia are archaeologically well attested; Batović (1974). For native urbanization, see Suić (1976b) 63-81.


imperium for Illyricum,\textsuperscript{99} but there is no evidence that they conducted any administrative tasks there.\textsuperscript{100} The argument of Brunt\textsuperscript{101} that all consuls who operated in Illyricum used Cisalpine Gaul as a base is applicable only to the campaigns of 129 and 119 BC, conducted in the North Adriatic sector, while for other campaigns direct sea transport from Italy via the friendly island of Issa is much more likely.\textsuperscript{102} There are a couple of valid reasons why Romans did not wish to occupy completely and administer Illyricum, and the most important of them seems to be the fact that occupation would be fruitless and too expensive.\textsuperscript{103}

There is no strong evidence to suggest that the principal motivation behind Roman policy was the pursuit of military glory. If Illyricum was a hunting ground for triumphs, as has been suggested, it seems reasonable to ask why the Romans were so passive in Illyricum in the Late Republic. Morgan properly characterized these actions as ‘police’ actions, taking into account their briefness and efficiency.\textsuperscript{104} Romans had only seven, possibly eight, documented encounters with the two parts of Illyricum for 109 years between 168 and 60 BC, and only once in the sources is it suggested, but not proven, in the case of Metellus Dalmaticus that a Roman imperator earned an easy triumph. Illyricum does not show the pattern of the other areas where Romans were militarily involved in this period, such as the pattern in Spain or periodically in Gaul. Political contacts are rare, military involvement was caused mainly by requests of the allies, and their extent is limited to either the north or south-central sector, never along the whole coast.

Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that there was no distinct unified Roman Republican Illyrian policy before 59 BC. Initially, the Romans saw Illyricum not as a single system but as a part of the regional systems North Italy and Macedonia and accordingly applied their policy for these areas onto the neighboring

\textsuperscript{99} Wilkes (1969) 36 noted that all the magistrates acting in Illyricum in this period, except Cosconius, were consuls in office. It was usual practice to send consuls in office to deal with emergency situations; Rich (1993) 50-53; Brennan (2000) 215-221, 371. This is significant as it proves that Illyrium was not a province, and it also makes clear that Roman involvement in Illyricum was only in an emergency.

\textsuperscript{100} Syme (1999) 164-173; Wilkes (1969) 37-38 also does not rule out that possibility. Illyricum as an attachment to Cisalpine Gaul is suggested by the sources for the year 59 BC. Cf. Plut. \textit{Caes.} 14.6-7 ... προσθείς τὸ Ἰλλυρικόν; Suet. \textit{Iul.} 22.1 \textit{Galliam Cisalpinam Illyrico adiecto}, see Chapter 4.2 n. 6.

\textsuperscript{101} Brunt (1987) 566-568.

\textsuperscript{102} It was the main trans-Adriatic route from Neolithic times; Brusić (1970) 555 and figs. 1, 2.


\textsuperscript{104} Morgan (1971) 293; “\textit{spedizioni punitive}” Šašel (1976) 77-82.
parts of what would in the future be Illyricum. Roman allies who were not strong enough to be rivals to Roman domination themselves and who were interested in general peace and security in the Adriatic area for the expansion of trade were left in charge as Roman regional sheriffs. The Romans used force to intervene on more difficult occasions but the political situation did not present Rome with any significant problem at all, judging by the few interventions attested in the sources. The focal point of political disturbances was control over the gateway communities of Salona and Narona. Illyricum was a stable system in this period. The political frameworks imposed on its south and northwest did not create opposition but enabled the system to function without more significant political turbulences.

The central geographical position of the Issaean συμπολεία in the eastern Adriatic certainly influenced the development of this unusual bifocal Republican politics in Illyricum, and its friendly policy and allied status made development of a unified coastal Illyricum in the late Republic unnecessary. The north witnessed generally a more aggressive Roman approach because it was potentially the weakest spot in the defense of North Italy and the Italian homeland. In addition Aquileian trade interests demanded peace and Roman domination in this area.

It does not seem from the evidence that Roman influence in Illyricum diminished; in fact, it seems that Roman influence increased in the 2nd and first half of the 1st century BC. There was no danger to Roman interests from peoples in the hinterland, and the rather rare engagements indicate stability in the area as well as increased settlement of Italians and Roman citizens. On the other hand, it is obvious that at this time the Romans were not interested in entering the Balkans and did not want to risk fighting in difficult terrain. The political concerns of Rome were based on very broad principles here, and except for the security of Aquileia or the interests of Roman allies, Illyricum was really outside the immediate political concerns of Rome. Its geographical proximity to Italy required that the area should be kept under control, and that is what we see from the Roman record in Illyricum.

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105 See Chapter 3.3 n. 31.
106 Schmitthenner (1958) 220 “... wie es die Art der römischen Politik immer gewesen war nur die gefährlichen Löcher verstopft nie eine umfassende direkte Einbeziehung des Balkans in den römischen Machtraum angestrebt.”
Romans did not send generals to hunt for triumphs, but sent armies only when the political situation demanded military action.
4. **Change on the Horizon: Caesar in Illyricum and the Civil War 59 – 44 BC**

4.1 **Introduction**

This chapter will discuss Roman policy towards Illyricum in those decisive years when the Roman Republic was in the final stages of its collapse during Caesar’s pro-consulship, 59 – 50 BC, and the civil war that followed. The earlier bifocal approach discussed in Chapter 3, which divided the area into a northern and southern sector, was abandoned during Caesar’s pro-consulship, or less probably, a short time before then, and Rome imposed a new political/constitutional framework on the regional system of Illyricum. Illyricum was still not a separate province at this time; perhaps the undefined and vague term *proto-province* would best describe the ambivalent position of Illyricum in this phase. This thesis will examine reasons for the changed political framework and its effect on Illyricum. This political framework, termed ‘coastal’ Illyricum, lasted from 59 to 33 BC and can be roughly divided into two chronological sub-phases from 59 to 44 BC and from 44 to 33 BC. They are discussed in this chapter and the next.

Illyricum’s strategic importance for Rome suddenly, perhaps unexpectedly, increased, especially in view of the rising power of the Dacian empire, its political influence in Pannonia, and its presence in the Black Sea area. Illyricum was also a significant battlefield during the civil war in 49 – 45 BC. The civil war brought general insecurity to the Mediterranean world, and this is reflected in the weakening of the Roman position for a short time in Illyricum. The succession of Roman generals in the 40s who attempted to pacify the area, especially the ambitious and aggressive Delmataean alliance, failed to achieve lasting success. A threat to the influence of the Romans also came from the Transalpine Iapodes, who used the opportunity to threaten North Italy with the two raids in and 36 BC.¹

¹ Yet, there are valid grounds for questioning the scale of the alleged instability in Illyricum in this period; cf. Schmitthenner (1958) 224.
Chapter 4: Change on the Horizon

For this period our sources are much more abundant than for the mid- to late Republican period. Caesar and Hirtius are contemporaries (and agents) of the events and without doubt our best sources for the period. A couple of brief notes from Caesar’s *Gallic* and *Civil Wars* provide some insight into the political situation in Illyricum as well as the conduct of Roman magistrates there. Some useful contemporary information may also be deduced from Cicero’s written correspondence with Vatinius who fought the Delmatae near Narona in the mid-40s. Later sources, like Dio, Appian and Plutarch, unfortunately make many obvious errors and provide an often confused chronology of the events, so they are not especially reliable for the period of the civil war.\(^2\) Lucan’s poem also provides some information, and there is even some epigraphic evidence from this period, such as the inscription from Salona.

### 4.2 Illyricum as a proto-province: strategic and military matters

In 59 BC C. Iulius Caesar was appointed pro-consul of Cisalpine Gaul and in addition he received command over Illyricum by means of the *lex Vatini de imperio Caesaris*.\(^3\) The ultimate significance of this fact for the destiny of the Republic overshadows another important thing – the state of affairs in Illyricum, which becomes clearer in this period thanks to more abundant sources, focused on Caesar. The law of Vatinius raises two major problems. The first concerns the political motives behind Caesar’s command over Illyricum and the second concerns the constitutional position of Illyricum in 59 BC. Some authors think that Illyricum was already a province just before Caesar’s pro-consulship in the late 60s,\(^4\) and others

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\(^{2}\) Marasco (1997) 313 ff. Marasco is directly contradicting Pelling (1979) 84-85 esp. n. 73. Pelling argues that these authors directly followed Asinius Pollio. As it is hardly possible to believe that Pollio would make so many errors, Marasco’s argument seems more convincing.

\(^{3}\) Sources: Broughton (1952) 190; Skefich (1967) 139-142. Caesar additionally received command over Transalpine Gaul after Metellus Celer died before departing to his province. See Gelzer (1928); Baldson (1939) and Skefich (1967) 64-101, 143-190 for the chronology, the political background, the purpose and older literature on the subject of this law.

\(^{4}\) Broughton (1952) 183, 191; Shackleton-Bailey (1977) I.353; Brennan (2000) 424-425, 493-494. Cic. *Fam.* 13.41-42 asked the pro-consul L. Culceolus to press the Illyrian Byllinoi to pay back a loan to L. Lucceius. This letter is dated before 58 BC (Shackleton-Bailey (1977) I.353; contra McDermott (1969) 239-240 dating it in 48 BC) and Culceolus is assumed to be governor of Illyricum as he cannot be placed in either Macedonia or Cisalpine Gaul in that time. There is a slight problem to this argument, however. The Bulliones lived southeast of Apollonia and Apollonia is attested as part of Macedonian province in 50 BC; Cic. *Pis.* 86, 96; Papazoglu (1976) 204. Thus, the whole argument about Illyricum being a province before Caesar is invalid, as Culceolus was governor of Macedonia, regardless of when this letter is dated; Skefich (1967) 28-29.
think it became *de facto* a province with the passage of the *lex Vatinia* in 59 BC.\(^5\)

The sources reporting Caesar’s appointment differ in their details but no source suggests that Illyricum was in any way separate from the administration of Cisalpine Gaul as a different province; it was only an attachment to his *imperium* over Cisalpine Gaul.\(^6\) In fact, the only contemporary source we have on this matter, Cicero, in his speech *De provinciis consularibus* in 56 BC, refers only to the *Galliae duae* under Caesar’s command, and clearly understands Illyricum to be part of the Cisalpine *provincia*.\(^7\) The reason for the attachment of the command of Illyricum to the administration of Cisalpine Gaul is not stated by the sources. It seems to be of a preventive nature, to enable the provincial governor freedom of action if there was need for operations in north-western Illyricum. The rising power of the Dacians under King Burebista in Pannonia, or fear of the Helvetii, which both potentially threatened the security of North Italy, could be considered serious enough to attach Illyricum to the Cisalpina.\(^8\) On the other hand, some scholars argue that Illyricum (or at least the northwest zone as defined in Chapter 3.4) was routinely attached to Cisalpina during this period, so there was nothing extraordinary in Caesar’s appointment.\(^9\)

The rise of the Dacian state and the military successes of Burebista in northern Pannonia might cause some political turbulence on the northern frontiers of Illyricum in the first years of Caesar’s *imperium*. Burebista’s army, helped by the Scordisci, defeated the alliance of the Boii and Taurisci led by Cristasirus, which had

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\(^6\) Plut. *Caes.* 14.10: Illyricum added; *Pomp.* 48.3: two Gauls and Illyricum; *Cato Min* 33.3: rule over Illyricum and two Gauls; *App. B Civ.* 2.13: two Gauls, no mention of Illyricum; Dio, 38.8.5: Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul; Suet. *Iul.* 22.1: Illyricum added to the Gauls; Vell. *Pat.* 2.44.5: two Gauls. Only Orosius, 6.7.1 explicitly states that Illyricum was an independent province in 59 BC. Cf. Papazoglou (1976) 205 n.38.

\(^7\) Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 2, 3; 15, 36.

\(^8\) Gelzer (1968) 86-87 and 87 n.1; Strabo, 7.3.11 (C 304) (Burebista); Baldson (1939) 183 (the Helvetii), but the view is seriously undermined by Timpe (1965), see Chapter 4.2 n. 16.

\(^9\) Wilkes (1969) 37-38; Freber (1993) 168-169. Wilkes also rightly denied the possibility that Caesar planned to make a conquest of Illyricum before rising unrest in Gaul prevented him from doing so. There is no evidence for that claim. Skefich (1967) esp. 70 ff., (cf. Sherwin-White (1957) 36-39) who bases his whole thesis upon the premise that, before he got the *imperium* over Transalpine Gaul, Caesar initially planned to focus upon campaigning in Illyricum. His point is not convincing enough as it speculates too much without evidence and ultimately fails to explain Caesar’s obvious lack of interest in Illyricum.
been hastily forged in the wake of the Dacian danger in c. 60 BC.\textsuperscript{10} It is possible that the Norican kingdom, or some of its \textit{reguli} used this opportunity and, with the blessing of the Romans, annexed those Taurisian communities who were living on their southern borders. For that reason Pliny ambiguously called them \textit{quondam Taurisci appellati nunc Norici}.\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless, the Dacians presented only a potential and very remote danger to Roman interests in Illyricum in 59 BC.\textsuperscript{12} Burebista’s power did not extend to Pannonia or Central Europe.\textsuperscript{13} His attention was visibly focused on Thrace and the Black sea region, so that any suggestion that he was stirring up trouble in Dalmatia lacks credibility, as there is no evidence for it.\textsuperscript{14} Caesar’s appointment to Cisalpine Gaul was more a matter of domestic politics than of immediate threat to the Roman frontiers.\textsuperscript{15} However, the migration of the Helvetii and military success of the Dacians (if 60 BC is the precise date) caused at least some political instability in western Pannonia and the eastern Alps. The consequence of this instability was that the Boii besieged Noreia, the capital of Noricum, in 58 BC as the allies of the Helvetii, according to Caesar.\textsuperscript{16}

Caesar mentions Illyricum only twice in the \textit{Gallic Wars}. In the winter of 57–56 BC he intended to go there personally \textit{quod eas quoque nationes adire et regiones cognoscere volebat}, but the suddenly worsening situation in Gaul prevented

\textsuperscript{10} Strabo, 5.1.6 (C 213), 7.3.11 (C 304), 7.5.2 (C 313); Crișan (1978) 113-122. This event is usually dated to 60 BC, but the chronology of Burebista’s rule was recently questioned, and this battle dated even after the death of Caesar by some authors; see Dobesch (1994); Lica (2000) 65 ff. esp. 68-70.

\textsuperscript{11} Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.133; Strabo, 4.6.9 (C 206); Šašel (1976) 79; Kos (1986) 21 dating the annexation in the mid-1st century BC. Šašel-Kos (1998) 212-216, esp. 215 is essentially in general agreement with this view but dates this annexation to the late 2nd century BC. See also Šašel-Kos (1986) 159; (1995) 230-231; (1997a) 30-31. The other approaches to the problem of the Norican Taurisci in Alföldy (1966); Petru (1968) 362-364; (1977) 482-486.

\textsuperscript{12} Timpe (1965) 193-194.

\textsuperscript{13} Crișan (1978) 143-146.

\textsuperscript{14} It would be very rash to see the troubles with the Delmatae in 50-48 BC as starting with the Dacians (as Condurachi, quoted and accepted by Dacoviciu (1977) 905 n. 54 and Freber (1993) 169-170 n. 845). Burebista’s policy perhaps had more things in common with the policy of Mithridates VI; Condurachi (1978); Crișan (1978) 122-131. This particular view has been questioned by Lica (2000) 82, but Burebista’s political focus on Pontus remains an unquestioned fact.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Gelzer (1968) 87; Cary (1951) 519; Timpe (1965) 192 ff.

\textsuperscript{16} Caesar, \textit{B Gall.} 1.5.4. Whether Burebista defeated the Boii and Taurisci in 60 BC or later remains an open question, but it seems that the political situation in the wider Alpine region was unstable when Caesar received \textit{imperium} over Illyricum. Timpe (1965) makes out strong argument against this view. He argues that Caesar himself invented the perception of the threat (cf. Gardner (1983)) and carried the Gallic war entirely on his own initiative, and that the situation on Roman frontiers was nothing out of the ordinary in 59 BC.
him from reaching his destination. In 54 BC he was forced to take countermeasures against the troublesome Pirustae who were attacking the ‘remotest parts of the province’; he ordered a mobilization of Roman allies before reaching Illyricum, but seemingly that was enough to calm the problems and permit the solution of the crisis through diplomatic means. It is not entirely clear what targets the Pirustae attacked or threatened. Scholars agree that they inhabited the mountainous and mine-rich area around modern Pljevlja (Northern Montenegro / South-eastern Bosnia). If this location is right, it is highly possible that the security of Narona, or that of the Roman allies in the area such as the Daors or the Taulantii, was under threat. Caesar's actions prove that Illyricum existed as a unified zone of operation at this time because the Pirustae dwelt in the area that had never been a responsibility for Roman magistrates operating in the northwest zone in the 2nd century BC (Chapter 3.4).

In 51 BC the Iapodes (it is not clear which ones, probably the Transalpine Iapodes) threatened the security of Aquileia and Tergeste. It appears to have been a serious incursion. Its consequences show the potential weakness of the Roman defense system, or possibly it appears to have been a result of Caesar's complete lack of interest in Illyrian matters. No reasons for this incursion are given in the sources, but it has been suggested that there is a possibility that the recent foundation of the municipium of Tergeste made the Cisalpine Iapodes feel threatened and for that reason they broke their agreement with the Romans. Strabo’s more recent source

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17 Caesar, B Gall. 3.7, cf. 2.35. Caesar does not say whether he reached Illyricum or not in 57-56 BC. We know for certain that he was at Aquileia at that time, where he met the delegation of the Issaeana commonwealth, see below p. 83. Gelzer (1968) 116; Skefich (1967) 107-113; Papazoglu (1976) 205 and Šašel-Kos (1986) 104 suggest that Caesar was in Illyricum in the winter 57-56 BC, while Wilkes (1969) 38-39 wisely leaves this question open.

18 Caesar, B Gall. 5.1. Caesar does not mention any Roman army units with him, but it is clear that he would have led the attack on the Pirustae in person. The Pirustae were mentioned by Vell. Pat. 2.115 as a dangerous and formidable enemy in the AD 6-9 rebellion.

19 Alföldy (1965a) 56-59; Garašanin/Garašanin (1967) 96-97; Wilkes (1969) 173-174; Bojanovski (1988) 90-91. The Pirustae were named by Strabo, 7.5.3 (C 314) as the Pannonii and it is possible that they were successors of the Autariatae who inhabited this area in earlier times; Wilkes (1992) 205.

20 Skefich (1967) 11-120 assumes that targets were more to the south, the civitates of Labetae, Taulantii and those civitates later united by the Roman administration in the civitas Docleatae, Pliny, HN 3.143, see Chapter 8.4.

21 Caesar (Hirtius), B Gall. 8.24. Suić (1967) 47-48; Calderini (1972) 29 make this reconstruction. They connect this raid of unnamed attackers with App. Ill. 18, who mentions two undated attacks of the Iapodes before 35 BC.

22 Zaccaria, quoted in Šašel-Kos (2000) 292 n.65. The foundation date of the colony in Tergeste is disputed, as it is possible to date it later in the 30s BC, and establishment of the municipium in 49 BC; Keppie (1983) 201-202.
for the description of this area clearly implies that the Iapodes extended their power almost to the pass of Ocra. The citizens of Aquileia built a protective wall after this raid and Caesar sent the legate T. Labienus and the XVth legion into the threatened area for its protection and to prevent further attacks.

The Promona affair happened in 50 BC, when the Delmatae attacked and took possession of the Liburnian-held border stronghold of Promona. After the Liburnian appeal, Caesar sent strong forces; they were defeated by the Delmatae and their allies, who tried to use the prospect of a new Roman civil war to make some territorial gains. Some scholars believe that there were no Roman troops committed in this engagement, but that Roman allies supplied troops possibly under the command of a Roman official, as they had done when the Pirustae earlier threatened the security of the area. This event also shows the importance of a local self-defense system, although it is unclear how that might pacify troubles arising in the hinterland, because Roman allies such as the Issaeans or Liburni had stronger naval than infantry capabilities. The Promona affair reveals the growing strength and vitality of the Delmataean alliance in the late 50s. There was a visible change in their strategic aims, from earlier unsuccessful pressure on Salona and the Manian Bay.

Still there were other obvious reasons like the opportunity for rich plunder, or maybe the Transalpine Iapodes who did not have a foedus with Romans, made this incursion; Šašel-Kos (2000) 292.

Strabo in two places 4.6.10 (C 207) and 7.5.2 (C 314) describes the same area, but his accounts derive from two different sources. 7.5.2 is older because it regards Nauportus as a Tauriscan settlement, and the Iapodean-controlled territory is larger in 4.6.10 as compared with 7.5.2; Šašel (1966) 199 n.5; (1977) 158; Šašel-Kos (1990) 144-145; (2002a) 146-148.

CIL I² 2648. The XVth legion had been recruited just a year before and lacked experience in fighting; Caesar, B Gall. 6.1; Šašel (1985) 547-548.

Whose possession was Promona before 50 BC? Suć (1960/61) 195-196 thought that Promona was part of the Liburnian Varvarian municipality. A different opinion is expressed by Čače, who argues that Cosconius took Promona from the Delmatae in 78-76 BC and gave it to the Liburni as a reward for their support; Čače (1989) 87 n.75. The population of Promona was culturally close to the Delmatae; Zaninović (1966) 47-55. Suć looks more persuasive here. The coastal communities of the Nestoi, Hyllaei or Bulinoi were not part of the Delmataean alliance, although culturally akin to them, see Chapter 2.5.1 n. 71. So it seems more probable that Promona belonged to the independent or Liburnian-allied Varvarini than to the Delmatae who had only recently expanded towards the northwest. It is doubtful whether they permanently controlled any part of it, especially north of Tragurion in that time.

App. Ill. 12. The names of these allies remain unknown. Čače (1993) 7-8 (after App. Ill. 12 καὶ ὅσοι ἀλλοι Ἰλλυριωτεῖς) suggests action by the larger Illyrian alliance composed of the Delmatae, their clients and allies. He also points out that it is very possible that numerous people of the Ditiones (239 decuriae Pliny, HN 3.142) who bordered the Liburni in the upper flow of the Titius joined the Delmataean alliance. See Bojanovski (1988) 262-265 for the location of the Ditiones.

They attacked for the first time in the west and threatened Liburnian territory. Still, it was probably an operation with limited aims as the Delmatae were not militarily able to handle the siege of numerous Liburnian strongholds in the Liburnian heartland - the Ravni Kotari area.\(^{28}\) It is unclear what happened to Promona later. It was certainly returned to the Liburni in the next decade because in 34 BC the Delmatae captured it again.\(^{29}\)

### 4.3 Proto-administration of the proto-province

Caesar apparently had more administrative and diplomatic than military duties in Illyricum as the situation remained stable during his magistracy, and he was more often engaged in the affairs of Gaul.\(^{30}\) Lack of sources prevents us from determining what Roman administrative structures, if any, existed before Caesar. Varro’s report of 89 *civitates* coming into, i.e. being administered from Narona may suggest that some basic administrative structure existed in Illyricum before Caesar’s time, but this information supplied by Varro should be dated later.\(^{31}\) In fact, it is very possible that Caesar during his *imperium* did not bother to make any more significant intervention into the administrative division of Illyricum, and was content with existing geographical-ethnic divisions in the area.\(^{32}\)

There is a damaged inscription from Salona, which mentions an embassy from the Greeks and Romans settled in Dalmatia to Caesar, while he was in Aquileia.\(^{33}\) Unfortunately, the preserved text is confusing and difficult to interpret;

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\(^{28}\) Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 173-174, from a military and archaeological point of view. We do not know the Liburnian capabilities or the political situation inside the Liburnian league at the time.

\(^{29}\) App. III. 25. The campaign of Asinius Pollio, see below p. 99, may well be the reason why Promona was returned to the Liburni. Contra Čače (1993) 9 (but still leaving the possibility open in n. 21) and Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 173-176, putting it during the civil war, and Nagy (1991) 58 expressing the opinion that it was taken by Octavian or his legate in 39-38 BC.

\(^{30}\) It has been suggested that the prospect of profit and glory in Gaul determined his preference for Gaul over Illyricum; Šašel-Kos (2000) 301. While this was an important secondary reason, we cannot forget that there was initially genuine fear (well manipulated by Caesar though, Gardner (1983)) of the consequences of Helvetian migration to Northern Italy, Cic. *Att.* 1.9.2 *Gallici belli metus*; Freber (1993) 168.

\(^{31}\) See Chapter 3.3, n. 55.

\(^{32}\) See similar point made by Čače (2001) 93, 100. Caesar’s laissez faire approach in Gaul is well known; Drinkwater (1983) 18-19.

\(^{33}\) Three inscriptions have been found on separate locations, originating from the same monument; Sherk (1969) 139-142 no. 24. Sherk regards this document (with or without reason, it is difficult to say) as a *senatus consultum*.
yet it is the only surviving document of this kind and therefore immensely important for any study of Roman Illyrian policy. The first part of the inscription is dated to early 56 BC and it mentions the embassy from Tragurion, an Issaean colony on the mainland. It was led by C. Gavenius, Roman citizen, who spoke about friendship between Issa and Rome. The second part provides Roman friendship and alliance with Issa. The last part, poorly preserved, give unclear references to the citizens of Tragurion and the Ἰάδαστινοι who were for some time regarded as the native inhabitants of the immediate neighborhood of Tragurion until modern scholarship agreed that they are in fact the citizens of Liburnian Iader.\(^{34}\)

The tantalizing reconstruction of this important document leaves plenty of scope for speculation about its contents. The first part mentions diplomats from Tragurion, the second part is concerned with Issa and the document was found in Salona, so that confusion is complete. Whose interests were in question and what happened in Aquileia? Several opinions are offered by modern scholars. Without any essential knowledge of the area, Culham recently stated that the Illyrians first threatened Tragurion so that the Tragurians asked Rome for help through the mother-colony. Salona was also an interested party to the problems with the natives, so that a copy was also kept there.\(^{35}\) In the same manner the suggestion that it was Graeco-Roman tensions in the area, which triggered the embassy rather than problems with the natives lacks any sound basis.\(^{36}\) This problem is at present unsolvable and only

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\(^{34}\) Rendić-Miočević (1935/49) argued in favour of the Iadasinoi. Sherk (1969) 141 reads Iader instead of Iadasinoi and the majority of scholars currently accept this reading; cf. the weighty linguistic evidence of Suić (1975a). Suić (1981) 142-143; Nikolanci (1989b) understood that the Iadasinoi were only the Roman citizens settled in Iader, and Čače (1993) 24-27; (1998) 76 ff. plausibly argues against Suić, pointing out that the Iadasinoi are the citizens of Iader, native Liburni.

There is also an alternative, more liberal reading of the inscription, suggesting that it conferred freedom from taxes, and guaranteed freedom of navigation in the Manian bay for Salona, Issa and Iader, instead of settling a border dispute; Suić (1973) 190-191.

\(^{35}\) Culham (1993) following the outdated reading of Rendić-Miočević (1935/49). It does not seem convincing that insignificant Iadastinioi from the neighbourhood of Salona (as in Wilkes (1969) 10, 154, 220-221, 360 who also follows Rendić-Miočević) would make such trouble for regional heavyweights.

\(^{36}\) Wilkes (1969) 38-39. Cf. the same opinion in Novak (1949) 73-74; Suić (1973) 184 ff.; (1981) 144-146; (1996) 273-274; Kuntić-Makvić (2002) 149-150. It is not fully convincing in light of the continuing good relationship between Romans and Issa, as convincingly argued by Čače (1998) 80. The other flaw is Suić’s understanding that Romans had already established portoria in Illyricum, and so threatened Greek interests, whereas they are not epigraphically attested there before the early Principate, see below p. 87.
speculation is possible. The mention of Iader, Issa, Tragurion, the Manian Bay\textsuperscript{37} and possibly Salona and Epetion together in the same document suggests its general importance and the complexity of the political situation inside Illyricum.\textsuperscript{38} After Caesar had settled problems with the Issaеans, he sent Q. Numerius Rufus as his legate to Issa, where he sponsored the repair of the public portico and became patron of the city.\textsuperscript{39}

Early Italian settlement and the municipalization of cities on the Illyrian coast are two very important aspects of Roman Illyrian policy that became more apparent in this period. They directly influenced the important strategic shift in Roman policy towards a more resolute approach to Illyricum. The personal influence of Caesar is thought to be very significant in this shift in policy.\textsuperscript{40} The settlement of a middle class,\textsuperscript{41} the economically more significant Italians, in the coastal cities on the eastern Adriatic coast was apparently encouraged during this period.\textsuperscript{42} Still, the number of settlers remains unknown.\textsuperscript{43} In order to establish a firmer foothold in Illyricum the Romans needed the support of the local population, which might have been secured by some limited enfranchizement of the native nobility, and the allocation of municipal rights to some native settlements. For that purpose they needed already urbanized native centres and a population belonging to the Mediterranean cultural core, and of all peoples in Illyricum, only the Liburni and southern Illyrians fully satisfied those requirements.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{37} Especially if we accept the opinion of Čače (1998) esp. 76-81 that Manian Bay includes not only Salona but extends all the way to the peninsula of Pelješac and the mouth of the Neretva, thus implicating Narona in this problem as well.

\textsuperscript{38} Regardless of the opinion of previous scholarship, the inscription from Salona does not mention \textit{conventus civium Romanorum} or the Greeks from Salona. The involvement of Salona is assumed only because the inscription was found there. The interested parties are \textit{socii}, Tragurion, Issa and Iadertinoi, appealing for arbitration to the Roman magistrate holding \textit{imperium} for that area.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{CIL} III 3078 – Numerius Rufus at Issa; cf. Gabričević (1970).

\textsuperscript{40} Alföldy (1965a) 200; Skefich (1967) 132-134; Freber (1993) 149-156.

\textsuperscript{41} The question of the middle class, as a class below the knights in Roman society, is not yet solved. Cf. more recent discussions in Millar (1998) 203; Yakobsen (1999) 41-48; Mouritsen (2001) 133-134 etc.

\textsuperscript{42} Suić (1960/61) 188; Medini (1974) 29-30 n. 10. However, it is still difficult to show how that emigration was encouraged. One of the more common reasons for emigration was in fact political – flight from proscriptions in the 80s and 40s BC; Wilson (1966) 78-80. Cicero’s letters suggest a strong Roman economic interest in the south-eastern Adriatic coast in the 50s and 40s BC, e.g. \textit{Fam.} 13.41-42; 13.77.3; see Deniaux (1993).

\textsuperscript{43} Settlers are generally more numerous in the western provinces, and perhaps settled in much larger numbers than we have evidence for; Wilson (1966) 9-12. The Roman \textit{conventus} in Salona is estimated at c. 10,000 inhabitants in the early 40s BC; Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 130 n. 46.

\textsuperscript{44} Medini (1974) 29 ff.
Conventus civium Romanorum on the Dalmatian coast pre-dated Caesar, but only as self-organized communities of Roman citizens and without defined public or administrative status. Caesar made some conventus responsible for administration of the cities in which they existed (we have confirmation of this for Lissus at least), but without more evidence we should not confuse the conventus mentioned in the sources as communities with conventus as administrative units.45 An early Italian settlement like Narona might have begun to appear as early as the 2nd century BC, but it is impossible to be sure of this without more evidence. In the mid-first century BC, conventus of Italian traders are attested in Lissus, Narona and Salona, and possibly in Epidaurum and Iader as well.46 These conventus increase in importance, not so much because of their numbers as because of their wealth and influence on local governors47 and they were to be an important element of support for Caesar in the Civil War.

Dating the establishment of colonies in Illyricum is difficult because more important colonies like Iader, Salona or Narona are called coloniae Itiae, which suggests that either Caesar or Octavian before 27 BC was their founder. It seems that a later rather than earlier date is more probable, although it is highly likely that Caesar gave municipal rights to some of these cities during his imperium over Illyricum.48 Some more significant cities in Liburnia, such as Curicum, Varvaria or

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45 Caesar, B Civ. 3.29 (Lissus). The Dalmatian conventus appear as recent, but in other places they had sprung up already in 2nd century BC; Wilson (1966) 76, so it is possible that lack of evidence alone prevents us also from dating the establishment of the Dalmatian conventus to the 2nd century BC. See also Wilson (1966) 13-17 on conventus civium Romanorum in general as communities and as administrative units.

46 Lissus: Caesar, B Civ. 3.29 … conventus civium Romanorum, qui Lissum obtinebant, quod oppidum eis antea Caesar attribuerat muniendumque curaverat … Cf. Wilson (1966) 16-17; Skefich (1967) 118-119 arguing that Lissus became an administrative conventus after the problems with the Pirustae about 54 BC. Papazoglu (1986) 221 thinks that Caesar established an administrative oppidum c. R. in Lissus but the passage may also imply that Caesar entrusted rule of the oppidum Lissus to conventus c. R., rather than established the oppidum c. R. as an administrative unit. Cf. Čače (1993) 25 and especially Vittinghoff (1951) 462, who vigorously opposes the opinion that oppidum c. R. as mentioned by Pliny was a formal administrative category.

Narona: CIL III 1820; Alföldy (1965a) 134; Salona: Caesar, B Civ. 3.9.2, Alföldy (1965a) 100.

Epidaurum: Hirtius, B Alex. 44.5 is not evidence in itself, but some authorities accept that there was a conventus in Caesar’s time; Alföldy (1965a) 139; Iader: Šuć (1981) 142-143. It is possible that Issa had conventus populi Romani as well, but as a settlement since Issaeans kept their independence until the Civil War; Šuć (1959) 149.


48 Brunt (1987) 236-239. Wilkes (1996b) 574; cf. Watkins (1979) 83 who argues that it was as a reward for their support for Caesar in the Civil War.
even Asseria possibly acquired *ius italicum* in the 50s but that matter is disputed and can not be precisely determined without more evidence.\(^{49}\) In this transitional municipal phase\(^{50}\) *praefecti civitatum* were the only magistrates appointed to administer local rule in Liburnian cities, and according to the inscription from Curictae, they were, at least in one case, picked from the most distinguished members of the native elite.\(^{51}\)

During his visit to Illyricum in 54 BC Caesar administered judicial *conventus* in the cities with significant communities of Roman citizens who were under the Roman judicial system.\(^{52}\) Unfortunately, his account is very brief, and it is not possible to deduce anything more from it, either his route or the cities he visited. Suić suggested that Caesar, during that visit to Illyricum, founded new *portoria* for trade and the collection of taxes from the natives.\(^{53}\) The existence of Roman *portoria* in Illyricum at this time is doubtful. They are attested only in the early Empire.\(^{54}\) The administrative center of Illyricum in this period is not known. Narona looks the most obvious place, although there are some less convincing indications that Issa played that role before it opted for Pompey during the Civil War.\(^{55}\)

### 4.4 The Civil War and dictatorship 49-44 BC

The civil war between Caesar and Pompey plunged the whole Mediterranean into conflict. Illyricum suddenly and unexpectedly became a significant theatre of the war. Inside Illyricum the civil war created chaotic divisions. The Delmatae, part of

\(^{49}\) Curicum: *CIL* III 13295; Varvaria: Suić (1960/61) 186-187, 189; Asseria (1960/61) 187 n. 33, 190 n. 42. A different opinion is held by Alföldy (1965a) 86; Wilkes (1969) 492, who date the municipalisation of Varvaria and Asseria to the early principate.

\(^{50}\) Alföldy (1961) 60 ff.; (1965a) 68 ff.; Medini (1974) 28 using Pliny’s account defines three stages of municipalization: peregrinal, the stage of *ius italicum* and/or exemption from taxes, and final municipalisation. If Vittinghof (1977) 24 ff. is right in pushing forward the date of final municipalization in Liburnia, it seems that the second stage was good enough for the Liburni so that they had no reason to insist on formal municipalization.


\(^{52}\) Caesar, *B Gall*. 5.1.


\(^{54}\) *CIL* V 706 (Tergeste) *CIL* III 12,914-15 (Salona); *CIL* III 13,225 (Senia). There was an *Aquileiensis portorium* at this time; Cic. *Font.* 2.

\(^{55}\) Caesar held judicial *conventus* in Illyricum afterwards, but it is not known where; Caesar, *B Gall* 5.1. Most probably he went to Narona, (Patsch (1907) 24; Skefich (1967) 121-122; Bojanovski (1985) 66) which was a significant centre for Roman citizens and native communities linked with Rome at the time; Pliny, *HN* 3.142 M. Varo LXXXIX civitates eo (Naronae) ventitasse auctor est. Issa as administrative centre was argued by Wilkes (1969) 39; Šašel-Kos (1986) 104. It is also possible that Caesar held assizes in other places; Skefich (1967) 120-122.
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the Liburnian civitates and the Issaean commonwealth supported Pompey, while Salona and the most of the Liburni, notably Iader, stood firmly by Caesar. Even after the Pompeians were finally defeated, there was no peace in Illyricum. The Delmataean alliance continued to resist the Romans, and even to enlarge their territory. This study will try to discuss how this conflict reflected on Roman policy in Illyricum in these tumultuous times, and the military and strategic consequences.\textsuperscript{56}

The success of Pompeian admirals in the Adriatic was a decisive factor in the decision of the Delmatae and Issa to support Pompey rather than Caesar.\textsuperscript{57} Caesar built one of his two fleets in the Adriatic and that fleet employed Liburni or Liburnian-constructed ships.\textsuperscript{58} On the other side, in Pompey’s camp, the Liburni were combined with the Achaeans as one of his five naval squadrons, commanded by M. Octavius and Scribonius Libo, and they used Issa as a base for Adriatic operations after taking control of the city.\textsuperscript{59} Caesar’s Adriatic fleet was later defeated and one of its commanders, G. Antonius, captured by the squadron of Octavius and Scribonius, i.e. the same squadron mentioned above, made up of the Achaean and the Liburnian fleet.\textsuperscript{60} The citizens of the Liburnian city, Iader,\textsuperscript{61} helped Caesar’s legate Q. Cornificius to win a naval engagement against the Pompeians, and Salona stubbornly resisted although they were besieged by Pompeians for a few months until the winter forced Octavius to lift the siege.\textsuperscript{62}

A few interesting, almost paradoxical, situations arise from this turbulent period. The division amongst the Liburni whom we can detect on both sides in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} There are some splendid works which concentrate on fighting in Illyricum during the Roman Civil War: Veith (1924) 267-274; Marasco (1995); (1997); Bilić-Dujmušić (2000). Wilkes (1969) 40-43 is a useful narrative of the events in English.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Marasco (1997) 315 argues that the success of the Pompeian fleet in the Adriatic brought the Delmatae to the Pompeian side rather than their fear of punishment for their attack on Promona in 50 BC. The success of the Pompeians and pure opportunism influenced Issa to support them, rather than the animosity of Greeks towards newly settled Romans; Čače (1998) 80. Certainly, in the case of Issa we need to take into account that the Greek East generally preferred Pompey over Caesar; Šašel-Kos (1986) 122.
\item \textsuperscript{58} App. B Civ. 2.41; Caesar, B Civ. 3.9.1.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Caesar, B Civ. 3.5.3; Plut. Pomp.64; Luc. Phars. 4.529 ff. The objection that the sources refer to the type of light warship originated by Liburni (liburnica; λιβυρνίδα) should be discarded as the sources mention the Liburnian fleet, not the fleet of liburnicae, see Dzino (2003) 28.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Dio, 41.40; Luc. Phars. 4.402 ff.; Livy, Per. 110.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Hirtius, B Alex. 42-43. Čače (1993) 26 ff.; (1998) 76, 78-79 suggesting that the Iadertinoi were both the Liburni and Romans from Iader. Contra Suić (1981) 142-143, understanding that there were only Romans (and Italians) settled in Iader.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Caesar, B Civ. 3.9; Dio, 42.11.
\end{itemize}
conflict, is certainly interesting and difficult to explain. Furthermore, it is interesting that Salona, a member of the Issaean commonwealth before the conflict took an independent course from the rest of the commonwealth and supported Caesar. Finally, it is more than surprising to find old enemies – Issa and the Delmatae – fighting on the same side.

The appearance of Liburnian naval auxiliaries on both sides in 49 BC seems rather contradictory, but it is definitely confirmed by our sources and it was not a surprising division in a Roman world already divided into two sides. It appears that Caesar was strongly supported by an urban element in Iadera, Aenona, Curicum and perhaps Pompey enjoyed support amongst a rural element in the Liburnian agricultural hinterland. This does not explain the presence of the Liburnian fleet on Pompey’s side, but assuming that the Liburni were a heterogeneous league of independent civitates rather than a unified state, it is not difficult to understand how it happened that some Liburnian communities supported Caesar and some Pompey. Another reason for some Liburnian support for Pompey could be their long-lasting connection with Picenum in Italy, the ancestral stronghold of Pompey.

According to the precisely carved argument of Čače, it was pure opportunism that caused the Issaeans to support the Pompeians, not some Greek-Roman quarrel, or any special animosity towards Caesar. Issa and Caesar were on friendly terms, his legate Q. Numerius Rufus had recently become the patron of the city. Bilić-Dujmušić speculates that the pro-Caesarian government of the Issaean commonwealth was overthrown and replaced by Pompeian supporters when the war started. However,
as Salona had more pro-Caesarian elements, it is possible that the city government simply refused to accept the change of government in Issa and continued to support Caesar. Salona grew significantly in the last decades before the war and it would be natural to suppose that there was rivalry between Issa and Salona for influence and leadership within the commonwealth.

After Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus, Illyricum increased in strategic importance even more, as it had been one of the battlefields of the civil war where the Pompeians were successful. Q. Cornificius was sent as quaestor pro praetore in 48–46 BC to fight Pompeians who, helped by the Delmatae, threatened Caesarian interests in Illyricum. It seems that Cornificius was a very capable and careful organizer and commander, patiently taking the mountain strongholds of the Delmatae one by one. In the winter of 48–47 BC the legate A. Gabinius (cos. 58 BC) was sent by Caesar to bring help to Cornificius but he was repeatedly ambushed and harassed by the Delmatae, and lost five cohorts together with their standards, until he finally died in Salona from the wounds incurred in this campaign. Modern scholarship assumes that Gabinius travelled by land from Italy to Salona, but the objection of Marasco that there was no time for a long march through Italy and the north Adriatic and that Gabinius actually sailed straight to Salona has recently challenged the prevailing opinion. In the following year the legate P. Vatinius helped Cornificius to extinguish the danger from the Pompeian fleet in the Adriatic. They defeated the Pompeian fleet under M. Octavius near the island of Tauris with the help of the citizens of Iader, and thus finally expelled Octavius from the

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68 Otherwise they would not support Caesar.
69 Hirtius, B Alex. 42-47. Hirtius, 42 does not mention specifically that Cornificius stormed strongholds of the Delmatae, but from the general context it appears obvious that he mainly fought them in a low-intensity campaign; Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 159-165. Wilkes (1969) 41-42 is very sceptical about Cornificius’ achievement, but his achievements, assessed in Hirtius 42, actually appear very praiseworthy.
70 Hirtius, B Alex. 42-43; App. Ill. 12, 25; B Civ. 2.58-59; Dio, 42.11; Plut. Ant. 7.1; Cic. Att. 11.16.1. Dio, Appian and Plutarch wrongly dated Gabinius’ expedition to before the battle at Pharsalus; cf. Marasco (1997) 311 ff.
71 Travel by land: Wilkes (1969) 41; Morgan (1971) 277-278. Travel by sea: Marasco (1997) 321-327. Marasco’s idea seems perfectly plausible and logical in any other circumstance, but in this case when Pompeians controlled the sea and with Issa being on the side of Pompey, any crossing of the Adriatic seems a highly risky (but not entirely impossible) venture.
The direct result of the Tauris battle was the unconditional and immediate surrender of Issa to Vatinius.

The elimination of the Pompeians did not discourage the Delmatae. It seems that they made good use of Roman internal fighting. They extended the area under their direct control, according to Vatinius’s letter dated 45 BC, from the initial 20 to 60 civitates, i.e. fortified places. It is very possible that with an internal crisis in the Issaean commonwealth, some native coastal communities turned away from the Salonitan-led Issaean commonwealth and recognized the sovereignty of the Delmatae.

P. Sulpicius Rufus replaced Cornificius in 46 BC but still had many problems in his operations against the Delmatae. Our sources for his campaign are very limited. In the next year P. Vatinius replaced him in command as a pro-consul. From his letters to Cicero, it seems that his camp was stationed close to Narona, and that operations extended deeply into the Adriatic hinterland because his complaints about the harsh Dalmatian winter are more applicable to the hinterland of modern Hercegovina than to the coastal strip. After the initial successes of Vatinius against

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72 Hirtius, B Alex. 44-47. The island of Tauris is not precisely located, perhaps it is the island Šćedro near Hvar; Wilkes (1969) 42 n.2; Nikolanci (1989a), island Šipan; Lučić (1964) or the Pakleni otoci archipelago near Hvar; Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 230-234.

73 Hirtius, B Alex. 47.4.

74 Cic. Fam. 5.10a.3; Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) 50 κατοικία of the Delmatae. See Čače (1994/95) 108-113 on the nature of the settlements of the Delmatae mentioned in Strabo.

75 This was not a war waged to recover lost possessions by the Delmatae as Marasco (1995) 288-289 suggests, Vatinius clearly says that the Delmatae expanded their power to the civitates, which previously were not members of the alliance. Marasco’s suggestion that the Delmatae took over Salona is also wrong, as our sources would have reported the fall of such an important city, see this section, n. 77.

The destruction of a large gradina (hillfort) on Veliki Biač near Tragurion is dated in this period. It is possible that it had been key stronghold of the Byllinoi who belonged, or were closely allied with, the Issaean commonwealth; Čače (1993) 10-12.

76 Cic. Fam. 13.77; Wilkes (1969) 42-43.

77 His camp can be located in Humac near Ljubuški; Bojanovski (1980); (1988) 41-42, 366-367. Bojanovski (1980) 5-6 also proposed an alternative reading of Cic. Fam. 5.9 ex castris (apud) Narona(m).

Narona was a much better base for the campaign against the Delmatae than Salona because the Roman army had friendly territory on the left bank of the Neretva in their rear, and freedom to chose the course of attack. An attack from Salona would be forced to face an easily defensible pass near modern-day Klis and the army would need to rely on sea-transport for supplies, as the Delmatae were able to cut off supply routes along the coast. Thus, the note of Marasco (1995) 288 that Vatinius choose Narona for his base because the Delmatae allegedly had taken Salona is not valid.

78 Cic. Fam. 5.9-11; Wilkes (1969) 43-44. Shackleton-Bailey (1977) II.425-426 suggests that there were two campaigns of Vatinius, one in late autumn, another at the beginning of winter of 45 BC.
the Delmatae and the temporary cessation of hostilities, Caesar’s murder sent the area again into turmoil. The senator Baebius was killed and his five cohorts defeated by the Delmatae.\textsuperscript{79} Vatinius tried to act preventively against the tyrannicide Brutus, governor of Macedonia, but the majority of soldiers from his three legions deserted him and the Senate transferred command of the army (and Illyricum) to Brutus.\textsuperscript{80} In this period we can place the destruction of the Daorsian stronghold, Daorson, which was burned and destroyed in the mid-1\textsuperscript{st} century BC, certainly by the Delmatae in the temporary absence of the Roman army.\textsuperscript{81}

Caesar’s plans for future military expeditions, interrupted by the Ides of March may suggest a planned change in his policy towards Illyricum. Ancient sources mention his plans for the Dacian and Parthian military campaigns as major future aims of foreign policy, and the sudden conciliatory mood of the Delmatae who asked Caesar for peace, suggests that he intended to pacify Illyricum as a prelude to his expedition to Dacia.\textsuperscript{82} The majority of scholars believe that Caesar considered Parthia to be a much more important target.\textsuperscript{83} However, R. Syme first concluded that Caesar was actually more modest in his designs, and intended to subdue Illyricum and destroy Dacian power in the hinterland, rather than to take the risk of attacking a strong and dangerous enemy such as the Parthian empire.\textsuperscript{84} A decisive expedition against peoples in the hinterland would certainly be necessary to give more lasting security to the settlements on the eastern Adriatic coast, so it is not impossible that

\textsuperscript{79} App. Ill. 13.
\textsuperscript{80} Cic. Phil. 10.13; App. Ill. 13; Dio, 47.21.6. This was just an extraordinary (but legal) command, an \textit{imperium maius} over local magistrates without administrative functions; Girardet (1993) 216, so that the conduct of Vatinius was basically unconstitutional.
\textsuperscript{81} The destruction of Daorson can be dated between 49 and 44 BC; Zaninović (1966) 28; Marić (1973) 123-124.
\textsuperscript{83} Gelzer (1968) 322; Rawson (1982) 437-438.
\textsuperscript{84} Freber (1993) 157 ff; Syme (1999) 175; Lica (2000) 87 ff. It is possible to discuss Caesar’s plans because both targets seem worthy of attention and equally tempting: on the one hand avenging the death of Crassus and following the steps of Alexander in the East, and on the other hand securing Rome’s northern borders. McDermott (1983/84) follows Suet. \textit{Iul.} 44.3 as the more realistic possibility: Caesar only wanted to expel Dacians from the Black Sea and Thracia via Macedonia and then \textit{maybe} to attack Parthia through Armenia later. Freber (1993) 182-183 compares Illyricum with Gaul where Caesar essentially secured coastal “\textit{italisch-spanisch Landbrücke}” with his conquest of the hinterland and was expected to do the same thing in a geographically similar situation, securing the coastal link between Italy and Greece.
Caesar had such a thing in mind. Yet, regardless of what were Caesar’s true designs in 44 BC, his assassination prevented their realization.

4.5 The making and keeping of Coastal Illyricum

Entrusting to a Roman magistrate, whether he was Caesar or someone else, *imperium* over Illyricum with no visible imminent military threat, signifies, besides matters of domestic policy, a genuine Roman decision to introduce changes in the political framework of Illyricum in 59 BC. In a way, it was the birth of Illyricum, as from this occasion it becomes officially recognized as a spatial-political (but largely artificial from a geographical and ethnic point of view) entity, direct product of contemporary trends in Roman foreign policy. Even as a spatial-political concept, Illyricum in this period was nothing more but the area that the Romans traditionally regarded as their sphere of interest - the coast and its immediate hinterland.

Caesar and his legates developed Roman interaction with Illyricum into a loosely defined framework of *proto-province*, binding more tightly weaker independent allies to Rome and relying more on support from the *conventus* of Roman citizens. The nature and reasons for Caesar’s *imperium* over Illyricum remain a riddle. It seems, that his *imperium* has been introduced for preventative and long-term purposes. Instability in the north (Pannonia, the Alps, Gaul) was a short-term reason for the change of political framework, but it is also possible to argue whether there was any serious instability. In the long run, changes in the framework show that the Romans finally acknowledged that the eastern Adriatic coast was ready to be politically included in the empire, as culturally it already was. However, ‘coastal’ Illyricum as a political framework was developed without foreknowledge of the civil war and the political disintegration of the Issaean commonwealth. In foresight we can see that the changed political circumstances of the 40s BC exposed ‘coastal’ Illyricum as an inadequate and unstable system.

Illyricum between 59 and 44 BC was a unified zone of political and military operations. This does not imply the establishment of Illyricum as an independent province at this time. A succession of Roman commanders between 48 and 44 BC is

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85 See Timpe (1965) 209-211 for Caesar’s new spatial-political concept of Gaul.
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not necessarily a sign of the creation of a separate province of Illyricum, but rather indicates the need for separate commands in extraordinary circumstances, like that of Cosconius in 78 BC.\textsuperscript{86} In the tumultuous year 44 BC, Illyricum was added to the command of M. Brutus who happened to be the governor of Macedonia, but only as a temporary and emergency measure. However, although Illyricum was not a province by definition, as there was no \textit{lex provinciae} or developed provincial organization, it is obvious that at this time some elements of provincial organization were introduced. Caesar in particular never cared too much for legal definitions, and it is possible to link the origins of \textit{proto-province} in Illyricum with his informal political approach. His “pacification” of Gaul was in practice not so different from \textit{de iure} provincialization, regardless of whether there was formal act of provincialization or not, and, on the other hand, the subjugation of individual peoples was not always regarded as conquest by him.\textsuperscript{87}

The dissolution of the Issaean commonwealth as an independent political entity after the defeat in the civil war, which repeats on a smaller scale the fate of Massilia in Gaul, was perhaps the most important single political event in Illyricum at this time.\textsuperscript{88} In the long run we may say that the end of the Issaean commonwealth was really the beginning of Roman Illyricum, but its immediate result was an escalation of the war with the Delmataean alliance. The support for Italian colonists signaled a shift in the Roman long-term interest, because the enlarged Italian settlement, clearly visible in the mid-1\textsuperscript{st} century BC, turned into a strategic stronghold for the future expansion of direct rule in the eastern Adriatic coast and the extension of Roman influence behind the Dinaric Alps.

\textsuperscript{86} Dio and Hirtius mention Vatinius and Cornificius as governors in Illyricum (Dio, 48.28; Hirtius, \textit{B Alex.} 42; see discussion of Rice-Holmes (1928) 247-248 n.5). However, we are dealing with an extraordinary situation where they were sent with \textit{imperium} to Illyricum to fight the Pompeians and their allies like the Delmatae and not to rule or administer the province; cf. Papazoglu (1976) 205 n.28. This error is reflected by Mommsen (\textit{CIL} III p. 279); Mommsen (1882) 540 who considers Vatinius to be the first pro-consul of Illyricum.

\textsuperscript{87} “Unterwerfung und Provinzialisierung decken sich also nicht.”; Timpe (1972) 294-295.

\textsuperscript{88} The southern city wall of Issa was removed in this time; cf. Gabričević (1973) 150 n. 10, but it does not seem that there were any other serious consequences for the Issaeans after they surrendered to Vatinius, except, of course, their loss of political independence; Hirtius, \textit{B Alex.} 47. 4; Suić (1959) 151-152. However, provincial arrangements after the establishment of \textit{provincia Dalmatia} suggest that the Issaean commonwealth survived, but in the form of a Salonitan \textit{res publica}, see Chapter 6.2 n. 26.
In the 40s Roman control of the eastern Adriatic loosened briefly to a certain degree. However, we should not overestimate the extent of this crisis in Illyricum. For the Roman trading community in Narona, it was business as usual even in the mid-40s. Rome’s strategic aims in the 40s were very limited; it wanted to pacify troublesome opponents like the Delmatae rather than to extend political influence deeper inland and to conquer them fully. The Pirustae and Iapodes were not able to expel Romans from the coast by themselves, nor did they try to do that. Their raids were more concerned with plunder and local political gains. The Delmataean alliance appears to be the most serious opponent to Romans in this period. It attempted to use weakening and the abolition of the Issaean commonwealth in order to accomplish their long-time strategic push to the Adriatic. It seems that they waged their local war on the Liburni in 50 BC rather than purposely attacking Roman interests there. Later, in the civil war they opportunistically recognized their interest to be on Pompey’s side (as the Issaeans did). They expanded when the Issaeans were eliminated from the game in 46 BC, but after the Pompean fleet was defeated, the Delmatae essentially were in a defensive mode.

Caesar’s mind and heart were not in Illyricum; Gaul was a much more urgent and rewarding task. Suetonius suggests that he perhaps planned to change his passive attitude to Illyricum if an agreement was reached with Pompey prior to the beginning of the Civil War. There is no reason to accuse Caesar of underestimating the situation in Illyricum. The strategic situation never appeared serious enough to require a Roman presence (especially when compared with Gaul) and real troubles arose only when civil war appeared imminent. Caesar paid as much attention to Illyricum as was necessary for the moment; he conducted a policy of consolidation, not of conquest or planned conquest. Caesar’s influence on the internal arrangements and municipalization in Illyricum is a matter where scholarship often places too much reliance on guesswork. It is not our intention to deny Caesar’s

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89 It was possible for an escaped slave to hide amongst the Delmatae even when his angry master was no other than Marcus Tullius himself; Cic. Fam, 5.9.2.
91 Suet. Iul. 29.4. It is not necessary to see this as a genuine change of Caesar’s policy; it may be nothing less than a momentary bargaining for better position.
92 Šašel-Kos (2000) 301-302. Skefich (1967) 102-137, esp. 136-137 on the other hand sees the Illyrian policy of Caesar as reasonably well developed and defined, initiated by opportunistic reaction to the enemy (the Pirustae in 54 BC) provocation.
personal influence on these developments in Illyricum, but only to assess its real extent on the basis of very limited sources. Except for Lissus, we do not know of any example where he entrusted the rule of the city to the community of Roman citizens. The support of some cities and communities, like Salona, for Caesar in the Civil War, does not imply that he made the administrative *conventus* and *municipia* before the war. They are just political players who chose one of the two sides. We should bear in mind that Caesar’s legate was the patron of Issa, but even so that city still supported Pompey.

The control of the eastern Adriatic coast and islands remains a dominant element of the policy in this period, but the sources show that change of political framework intended the coastal strip to become a unified and territorially compact Roman possession, which might (in time) be incorporated into the empire. It was necessary to solve the awkwardness of the position where Illyricum stood as neither belonging nor not belonging to the Empire. Increased Italian settlement and political troubles in the Alpine – Pannonian sector were catalysts that moved the process ahead. The campaigns of the 40s do not show Roman aggressive intentions. They seem to be continuing attempts to pacify the area and to defend ‘coastal’ Illyricum from threats from the hostile hinterland rather than to risk a decisive military commitment to eliminate these threats. Peace and security in the area was also disturbed because of the temporary self-destructive engagement of the Romans in the civil war and political vacuum created by the Issaean commonwealth’s disappearance, as neither of which were not anticipated when the new political framework was imposed and Illyricum was born. Still, ‘coastal’ Illyricum was only a transitional, provisional political framework, as it was impossible to survive and to function as a stable system without thorough pacification of the hinterland, a fact that was finally understood by Octavian and his advisers when in 35 BC the whole system threatened to collapse.
5. \textit{Pacare barbaros: Rome and Illyricum 44 – 33 BC}
(Change on the Horizon – the sequel)

(to Asinius Pollio)

\textit{Tu mihi seu magni superas iam saxa Timavi}
\textit{Sive oram Illyrici legis aequoris, en erit unquam}
\textit{Ille dies, mihi cum liceat tua dicere facta.}
\textit{Vergil, Eclogues 8.6-9}

5.1 \textit{Octavian in Illyricum: introduction and sources}

The main purpose of this chapter is to determine the context of Roman campaigns in Illyricum during 35 – 33 BC, whether they followed the pattern of previous policy towards Illyricum, as discussed and defined in the previous chapters, or whether Rome took on a completely new approach in its political interactions with Illyricum. This chapter will also discuss in depth the reasons behind Octavian’s decision to engage in Illyrian affairs so thoroughly for so long, analyze the implementation of the policy and its immediate consequences. The prevailing opinion amongst modern scholars, which is that Octavian planned a relatively easy campaign in Illyricum only in order to train his troops and earn personal prestige, will be seriously questioned.$^1$

This chapter will argue that Octavian was forced into this expedition by a worsening situation in the northern Adriatic area and that his campaign followed earlier Republican policy towards Illyricum only on the surface, by repeating the interventionist pattern of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century. Behind that first impression, something else, much more significant, was brewing in Illyricum. The political/constitutional framework of \textit{proto-province}, as discussed in Chapter 4 needed adjustments, especially in light of general political instability in the Roman world and local problems with the Delmataean alliance. The significance of Illyricum in the Mediterranean context increased enormously because of its proximity to the key geo-strategic axis Brundisium - Dyrrachium, around which the destiny of the whole

$^1$ Schmitthenner (1958) 196-197; Wilkes (1969) 48-49.
empire rotated between 49 and 31 BC. For that reason the area visibly demanded a
stronger military presence even after the Pompeians were defeated. In fact, ‘Coastal’
Illyricum as it was constructed and developed in the period 59 – 44 BC, would be a
still-born and unstable system without thorough and full pacification of the peoples
from the hinterland.

For Octavian’s campaigns of 35 – 33 BC there are no surviving contemporary
sources. Appian’s *Illyrike* and Cassius Dio are the only reliable sources we have
today. Appian drew his information directly from Augustus’ memoirs and Dio’s
account, generally in agreement with Appian, in some places obviously used other,
still unidentifiable, primary sources, probably Asinius Pollio or Cremutius Cordus. Agrippa
also wrote memoirs and he certainly discussed these campaigns in detail, but
it is difficult to believe that his account differed much from Augustus. For that
reason it seems reasonable to rely on these sources for the reconstruction of the
events, as it is unlikely that Appian and Dio taken together omit any really significant
event from this campaign. Appian should certainly be treated with caution as he
draws on the autobiographical work of a man who fully understood the importance
and benefits of multi-media propaganda in politics and who was a naturally gifted
self-propagandist. With the help of additional sources like Florus, Strabo and
Velleius Paterculus, Octavian’s campaigns can be reconstructed quite accurately, so
there is no need to reconstruct them here, as it has been done elsewhere in more
detail.

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2 The silence of contemporary extant sources (except the *Panegyricus Messalae*, of Tibullus; Tib. 3.7.106-117) for the Illyrian campaign of Octavian is strange; Schmitthenner (1958) 227-228.
3 Zippel (1877) 226-227 makes the interesting point that Appian also followed Octavian’s formal report to the Senate. That would explain the unusual classification of defeated peoples into three
groups; App. *III*. 16-17.
4 Šašel-Kos (1986) 142-144; Reinhold (1988) 68, but only if we believe that Pollio’s histories continued after the battle at Philippi, see above p. 24.
See Šašel-Kos (1997a) for detailed analysis of the differences between these sources regarding Octavian’s campaign.
7 Kromayer (1898); Veith (1914); Vulić (1907); (1926); (1933); (1934); Swoboda (1932); Josifović (1956); Schmitthenner (1958); Wilkes (1969) 46-58; Malevány (1977); Nagy (1991) 57-66. Regrettably, it was not possible to obtain and discuss M. Šašel-Kos ‘Octavian’s Campaigns in
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5.2 Rome and Illyricum 44 – 35 BC

Roman relationships with Illyricum between 44 and 35 BC remain obscure. P. Servilius Isauricus was possibly proconsul in Illyricum after 41 BC, but nothing is known about his mandate except the damaged inscription from Narona. Asinius Pollio was operating in the area, at war with the Illyrian Parthini and the Delmatae in 39 – 38 BC. Subsequently, he achieved a triumph for his victory over the Parthini. The Parthini were the allies of M. Brutus, who rebelled after his death, and the Delmatae were restless after the assassination of Caesar. We cannot assess the extent of his military success in 39 – 38 BC. The Parthini are not mentioned any more as troublemakers, although the Περθεηνάτας of Appian, who were people defeated easily by Octavian in 35 BC, may have been Parthini. On the other hand, Florus says that Pollio deprived the Delmatae of sheep, arms and land. Perhaps it was a hastily made settlement, driven by Octavian’s need for troops from Illyricum for the war against Sextus Pompeius. However, the standards of Gabinius captured in 46 BC remained in Delmataean hands, which meant that the Delmatae did not fully submit to Pollio and that his campaign in Dalmatia did not produce lasting results, but only an uneasy peace.

There is some heated scholarly controversy about whether Pollio acted as a proconsul with imperium for Macedonia, Illyricum, or for both these provinciae. Contradicting previous scholarship, Syme emphasized the fact that the Parthini were located inside Macedonia, in Antony’s part of the empire, and that Pollio as Antony’s supporter could not be appointed to the command of Octavian’s Illyricum. According

8 CIL III 1858 is unfortunately very uncertain proof. Isauricus was consul in 48 and 41 BC; Broughton (1952) 272, 370-371.
9 Dio, 48.41.7; Flor. 2.25; Horace, Carm. 2.1.15-6 (mentioning the Dalmatian triumph of Pollio); Vell. Pat. 2.78. The triumph can be dated anywhere between January 40 and November 38 BC; Insc. It. 13.1.86. In addition, Porphyrio on Horace, Carm. 2.1.15 and Servius on Verg. Ecl. 4.1 claim that Pollio captured Salona.
10 App. B Civ. 5.75.
12 App. III., 16; Bosworth (1972) 464-465; but this is only speculation. The Parthenetae (Parthini) are located amongst the south-eastern Illyrians; cf. Pliny, HN 3. 143; Wilkes (1969) 44, 155, 165.
13 Flor. 2.25, a bit of exaggeration in light of their substantial fighting capabilities in 34 BC. It is interesting to recall Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) who notes the non-monetary nature of their economy, and Polyb. 23.18, who says the Delmatae took tribute in cattle from their clients.
14 App. B Civ. 5.80, often overlooked by modern authorities, is important proof that the Romans had been militarily involved in Illyricum in the early 30s BC.
to Syme the way to resolve this problem is to assume that he was a governor of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{15}

There are a couple of flaws in Syme’s argument. The first one is the dogmatic view that Pollio was sent to the province as a supporter of Antony. Bosworth made a strong case against this view, pointing out that it is equally possible that Pollio changed his allegiances before being sent abroad, or that he was simply neutral.\textsuperscript{16} The second flaw is the notion that the \textit{bellum Dalmaticum} of Florus could refer to any place in the Illyrian world and therefore applicable to the Parthini who lived some 300 kilometers south of the Delmatae-controlled area. According to the same logic, Horace gave the honorific name \textit{Delmaticus} to Pollio for a victory over the Parthini, instead of the more appropriate \textit{Parthinius}.\textsuperscript{17} It would be very surprising if Florus, referring to the Delmatae elsewhere in the same passage, had made such a mistake, especially bearing in mind that he made a precise distinction in passages dedicated to the Roman conflicts against the Iapodes and Pannonii and the wars against the Delmatae.\textsuperscript{18} Also, regardless of all his high-profile connections, it would be quite unusual if Pollio earned a triumph fighting only against the otherwise irrelevant people, the Parthini.\textsuperscript{19}

We have also the testimony of Vergil’s 8\textsuperscript{th} eclogue, which mentions Pollio’s return to Italy along the Dalmatian coast.\textsuperscript{20} The return of a Macedonian governor to Italy via the insecure and tumultuous Dalmatian coast, instead of the short sea crossing from Dyrrachium to Brundisium, seems a very impractical route, if there was no job to be done in central Dalmatia. The problem of crossing inter-provincial

\textsuperscript{15} Syme (1937); Broughton (1952) 387-388; Wilkes (1969) 44-45.
\textsuperscript{16} Bosworth (1972). Woodman (1983) 196, 231-234 made the alternative argument against Syme that Pollio, although disillusioned with Antony, did not openly embrace Octavian before Actium, remaining neutral between them.
\textsuperscript{17} Flor. 2.25; Syme (1937) 42, supported surprisingly by Bosworth (1972) 466 who otherwise denies Syme’s argument. Wilkes (1969) on the other hand supports Syme elsewhere, but does not include this particular view in his argument.
\textsuperscript{18} Flor. 2.23 (calling the Iapodes - Illyrians); 2.24 (Pannonian war).
\textsuperscript{19} The last time they are mentioned, it is as Roman allies in 169-168 BC; cf. Livy, 43.23.6, 44.30.13.
\textsuperscript{20} Verg. \textit{Ecl.} 8.6-13 esp. 7-8, Syme (1937) 47-48 suggested Pollio’s return through Dalmatia. Contra Zippel (1877) 225 (arguing in favour of Pollio’s authority over two different armies, Illyrian and Macedonian); Patsch (1898) 169 n.2. In more recent times Bowersock (1971) argued that the addressee of the 8\textsuperscript{th} eclogue was Octavian after his 35-33 BC campaign, but he was criticized for that by Tarrant (1978) and Woodman (1983) 193 n.1. Nagy (1991) 58-59, gives more weight to the argument of Bowersock that Octavian (or his legate) campaigned in northwest Illyricum at the same time as Pollio. Unfortunately, there are no other sources to support this argument, see Chapter 5.3 n. 33.
borders (as the Parthini were located in Macedonian province) is hinted at by Bosworth as a piece of practical political thinking in times of trouble, and the relaxed political atmosphere between Octavian and Antony after they reached (temporary) agreement in the treaty of Brundisium in 40 BC. Thus it looks clear that Pollio in fact fought the Delmatae as well.

The war of Octavian against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BC and the withdrawal of Roman troops could be an important cause for further neglect of the area and the subsequent reaction of natives. Problems arose especially in the former north Adriatic sector, where the Romans were much more vulnerable because of intense Italian settlement and because of its geographic proximity to North Italy. Dio’s source blamed the Iapodes not only for ceasing to pay tribute like the other peoples named there, but also singled out for repeating their devastating raids of 51 BC on the cities of Tergeste and Aquileia. Taking into account the increased Roman and Italian settlement of the eastern Adriatic coast, it is understandable that when the situation in Illyricum took a turn for the worse in 35 BC, military action, at least in the northwest, became a pressing political task for Octavian. It was not merely a training field for his soldiers. Illyricum required more lasting pacification.

5.3 General political circumstances and the reasons for Octavian’s campaigns in 35 BC: “Illyricum – ein Land mit Reichtümern?”

Octavian’s campaigns can be divided into three distinctive phases, conducted in two separate expeditions. The first expedition in 35 – 34 BC was primarily focused on the north Adriatic and south Alpine area, although it is possible that some action was taken in the south Adriatic with the support of the fleet. In the first phase it was conducted against the Transalpine Iapodes and southern Alpine peoples like the Carni, Salassi and Taurisci, with additional supportive action by the fleet against

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21 Bosworth (1972) 464; André (1949) 22 n.11 supported by Woodman (1983) 193-194 suggests that Octavian and Antony jointly gave Pollio a roving commission to pacify the Eastern Adriatic. Cf. Zaninović (1966) 31-32, who explains Pollio’s action in Dalmatia as a joint venture of Octavian and Antony, agreed in Brundisium in 40 BC. According to him Pollio’s route was Aquileia-Salona-Parthini and, on the way back to Italy, he fought the Delmatae again.

22 Cf. App. B Civ. 5.80. Suggested by Schmitthenner (1958) 194 n.5, following Syme, that Pollio was governor of Macedonia.


24 Dio, 49.34.2; App. Ill. 18, see above p. 81.

25 Rice Holmes (1928) 130-131 and Syme (1933a) 67, clearly recognising the pressing necessity for immediate action in Illyricum 35 BC.

26 Schmitthenner (1958) 196.
small-scale Adriatic piracy. The first expedition, in the second phase, expanded deeper into the continent against the Pannonian people of the Segestani. The second campaign was waged in central Dalmatia against the Delmatae and their allies in 34 – 33 BC. This chapter will point out that the primary reason for the campaigns of Octavian was the insecurity of the whole area caused by an inadequate constitutional/political framework. His primary objective was already achieved in the first phase with the pacification of the Iapodes and Alpine tribes. The incursion inland towards Segestica does not seem to be provoked by the Segestani at all, but it appears to be a strategic attempt to create a new buffer zone against the successors of Burebista,\textsuperscript{27} to protect Roman trade with Pannonia and to expand Roman influence further into the Pannonian plains. The security and unity of the Norican kingdom, an important Roman ally, might also be endangered by the disturbances in the Alpine region, which were caused by the Carni, Salassi and Taurisci, and which might be used by the Dacians if they entertained any future offensive designs in the southern Alpine area.

The second campaign, conducted against the Delmatae, was primarily aimed at the final pacification of this alliance, which was potentially dangerous to the growing Italian communities in Salona and Narona, as well as at the recovery of Roman honour – lost with the standards of Gabinius and the defeat of Baebius in the 40s. There were other smaller campaigns, made by Octavian’s \textit{legati}, but they remain obscure, since they were not included in the accounts of Dio and Appian. There is not much controversy about the chronology or the course of the campaigns. Appian and Dio were quite precise in describing the campaigns so that it is possible to reconstruct accurately the movements of Octavian on the map.\textsuperscript{28} The main controversy is in fact the territorial extent of Octavian’s achievement. The view of Vulič and later Swoboda, restated by Josifović and Bojanovski, is that he established Roman control up to the River Sava and conquered the territory of the whole future province of Dalmatia in 33 BC. In fact, Vulič and Josifović argued the most extreme view that Octavian conquered even modern-day Western Serbia! However, Syme strongly opposed this idea and defended the earlier opinion of Kromayer, vigorously

\textsuperscript{27} The Dacian kingdom broke up after the death of Burebista; cf. Strabo, 7.3.11 (C 304).
\textsuperscript{28} Veith (1914), still provides the most complete geographical reconstruction of Octavian’s campaigns in 35-33 BC.
arguing that the extent of the conquest was more modest, and limited to just the immediate hinterland of the Adriatic coast.\textsuperscript{29}

There are several direct and indirect reasons why Octavian decided to begin an extensive military expedition in Illyricum in 35 BC. The sources mention three basic reasons behind this expedition. Dio is the most precise: after finishing with Sextus Pompeius and settling affairs in Italy, Octavian was intending to cross from Sicily to North Africa, when the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni and Iapodes not only failed to pay tribute but also the Iapodes threatened the security of the wider area.\textsuperscript{30} Appian repeated the reasons that Octavian himself gave to the Senate after the campaign: security of Italy from the raids from northwest Illyricum; revenge for Roman defeats in the 40s; and, in the background, a piece of well placed propaganda – the contrast with the slothfulness of Antony.\textsuperscript{31} Military training and his desire to keep his legions together under arms are other possible reasons, but they are overemphasized in the modern works and sometimes treated as the main reason for Octavian’s expedition into Illyricum.\textsuperscript{32} Velleius Paterculus indeed mentions the training of the army but in a very general context, and without having any knowledge of the potential threats the Iapodes represented to northern Italy. Furthermore, in Velleius’ account, the expeditions to Illyricum preceded the conflict between Octavian and Sextus Pompeius and probably referred to the pro-consulship of Asinius Pollio in 39 – 38 BC.\textsuperscript{33} Dio on the other hand clearly connects the training of


\textsuperscript{30} Dio, 49.34.1-2 (see Chapter 5. 4 n. 66 - the potential danger of the Iapodes). It is very doubtful whether the Liburni completely turned away from Rome, after two centuries of good relationships. It seems that individual communities who supported Pompey in the 40s, were forced to pay tribute after their defeat, see above p. 89. That is the only way to explain why the Liburni would pay tribute to Rome, because Liburnian communities had enjoyed \textit{immunitas} for quite a long time; Suč (1981) 137-138. Starac (2000) 17. Starac contradicts her previous argument, by stating that Tuditanus forced the Liburni to pay tribute; (2000) 15.

\textsuperscript{31} App. \textit{III.} 16; Schmitthenner (1958) 198-200 rightly emphasised that these are the only reasons given by ancient sources and that all the others are speculations of modern scholarship.

\textsuperscript{32} E.g. Charlesworth (1934) 84; Schmitthenner (1958) 197; Wilkes (1969) 48, 49 n.1; Gruen (1996) 172; Southern (1998) 88, 226 n.15.

\textsuperscript{33} Vell. Pat. 2.78.2 \textit{Caesar per haec tempora, ne res discipline innicissima, otium, corrumparet militem, crebris in Illyrico Delmatiaque expeditionibus patientia perculorum belligre experientia durabat exercitum}, is quite a general statement and it does not relate to the 35-33 BC expeditions. Bosworth (1972) 467 suggests that Velleius refers to Asinius Pollio 39-38 BC, not Octavian 35-33 BC, and explains why he placed these campaigns chronologically before the war with Sextus Pompeius in 36 BC. He is in agreement with App. \textit{B Civ.} 5.80, who mentions the army in Illyricum in 37 BC. It is worth noting the opinion of Nagy (1991) 57-59 that Velleius was describing campaigns in northwest Illyricum by Octavian or his legate in 39-38 BC.
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the army only with the expedition against the Pannonians, which followed the pacification of the Iapodes, Salassi and Taurisci. He makes it the main reason for the expedition.\(^\text{34}\)

What about the other motives? Modern scholarship has speculated about some motives, but only a few speculations can withstand serious criticism. The alleged grand strategy of Octavian makes the Illyrian expedition as a preventive move against the potential movements of Antony through Illyricum, but that does not seem a really valid reason.\(^\text{35}\) However, the point made by Mirković, that Octavian strengthened his position in southern Illyricum in the fear that Antony would use the Apollonia/Dyrrachium - Brundisium sea-link for the invasion of Italy, looks a much more likely reason.\(^\text{36}\) The opinion that there was no provocation from the Illyrian side and therefore no \textit{casus belli} for the Romans in 35 BC is unconvincing.\(^\text{37}\) The impression of Wilkes that the expedition was a continuation of Republican interventions in Illyricum, which had no actual connection with Illyrian affairs, makes a wrong strategic assessment of the contemporary situation.\(^\text{38}\) It is important to underline once more the point of Dio, often overlooked in the modern works, that Octavian was intending to sail from Sicily to Africa, because affairs there required settlement. Only bad weather and a rapid deterioration of the security situation in the northern Adriatic sector made him change his plans.\(^\text{39}\) The only source which suggests that Octavian had in mind an Illyrian expedition earlier is Appian, who mentions a mutiny of Octavian’s soldiers in Sicily in 36 BC and his promise of ‘Illyrian spoils’ to an angry crowd in order to calm them.\(^\text{40}\) Furthermore, there is a

\(^{34}\) Dio, 49.36.1.

\(^{35}\) Swoboda (1932) 1-17; Syme (1971) 17 suggested the potential danger from Antony from this direction. Contra Vulić (1907) 24-26; Miltner (1937) 201; Schmitthenner (1958) 198-199; Wilkes (1969) 49 n. 1 questioning and refuting this as a mere modern construction. The idea of Josifović (1956) 147-148, 154 that Octavian was looking for new recruiting areas in this expedition is nonsense.

\(^{36}\) Mirković (1968) 116, 126-127.

\(^{37}\) Gruen (1996) 172-173; Southern (1998) 226 n.15 assume wrongly from Dio, 49.36.1 that there was no significant native provocation. Dio was referring to the expedition against the Segestani only. Cf. the same objection expressed already by Šašel-Kos (1997a) 190-191.

\(^{38}\) Wilkes (1969) 49, 56-58; (1996b) 549. Interventionist it certainly was, but influenced directly by worsened Illyrian affairs.

\(^{39}\) Dio, 49.34.1-2; recognised by Hanslík (1961a) 1239; Nagy (1991) 60; Coppola (1999) 196.

\(^{40}\) App. \textit{B Civ.} 5.128. It is amazing that Octavian could suggest Illyrian spoils and not be lynched by his soldiers who certainly were not so ignorant as not to know that it was a battlefield, which promised anything but rich booty. Dio writes of the same mutiny and does not mention any such a thing (49.13-4). It might be that Appian here followed Augustus’ biography ‘filtrated’ for political and personal reasons, and Dio some other source. Augustus would naturally be interested in representing himself as someone who wanted to stop civil strife and begin war against barbarians, as we see in Appian. Comparison of Appian \textit{B Civ.} 5.127 (Octavian granting pardon to Sex. Pompeian leaders after their
hint by Appian that Antony also thought of joining Octavian in the Illyrian expedition, which suggests the seriousness of the situation there.\(^{41}\) Therefore, it is evident that the Illyrian expedition was not planned in advance, but that it was primarily caused by native attacks upon Roman interests in Illyricum and a threat to the stability of the Norican kingdom.

There were other reasons in the background as well.\(^{42}\) The personal reputation of Octavian and the opportunity to prove himself on the battlefield after his bleak performances at Philippi and Sicily cannot be disregarded as significant secondary motives. Antony’s military prestige was still much greater than that of Octavian, but this argument should not be overemphasized.\(^{43}\) The success against Sextus Pompeius and the elimination of Lepidus from further power-sharing placed Octavian in a very strong position in Rome, and there was no immediate necessity to show himself as a great general.\(^{44}\) Of course, Octavian well understood the importance of propaganda. One example is his hint that, as a good son and real successor, he was following the designs of his adoptive father on the Dacians with this expedition.\(^{45}\) Keeping the army together for a final war with Antony is also an important additional reason,\(^{46}\) which appears in the sources. However, a direct clash between them was not yet in sight. Keeping so many legions under arms was difficult, expensive and potentially troublesome. This note of Appian and Dio is obviously taken from the same source that anticipates a war with Antony, i.e. Augustus’ autobiography.\(^{47}\) This seems an appropriate place in the autobiography

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\(^{41}\) App. B Civ. 5.132, of course only if we accept that Antony is the subject of the sentence and not Octavian; Schmitthenner (1958) 191 n. 5.

\(^{42}\) It is difficult to agree with Coppola (1999) 195 who included economic reasons such as Dalmatian mines (after Flor. 2.25 12) because Octavian in 35 BC was not there to annex the territory, and he did not go into the Bosnian mountains where the best potential for mining existed.


\(^{44}\) Cf. App. B Civ. 5.130 ff.; Dio, 49.15-16.

\(^{45}\) Vell. Pat. 2.59.4; App. Ill. 22-23. It is difficult to believe this; cf. Miltner (1937) 204-205; Schmitthenner (1958) 194-195; Mócsy (1974) 21-22; Coppola (1999) 203-204; Lica (2000) 91-92. Some preventive action against the Dacian king Cotiso might have been contemplated (only if we accept the less likely possibility, that Flor. 2.28.18 perhaps referred to a period as early as 36-35 BC, like Dacoviciu (1977) 909) but only on a very limited scale. Vulić (1907) 4-5 and Josifović (1956) 154-155 make the interesting point that the Roman-Dacian relationship was actually quite good at that time.

\(^{46}\) Schmitthenner (1958) 196-197.

\(^{47}\) Dio, 49.13.4; App. B Civ. 5.128; cf. App. Ill. 17 for the repeated motif of Octavian’s anticipation of future war with Antony, drawn from the autobiography of Augustus.
where he could emphasize his foresight and his expectation of Antony’s treachery followed by his own wise conduct, but it is highly questionable whether at that moment he really needed so many legions in one place merely as a preventive measure.

5.4 The Campaigns: strategic plans and realization

The first campaign was waged in 35 – 34 BC. There is no reason to see in it any special change in Roman policy. Octavian directed the campaign following the example of Aurelius Cotta and Metellus Diadematus from 119 BC, and possibly the unidentified Cornelius who made pre-emptive strikes into Iapodean territory in order to protect the security of Aquileia and the Alpine trade routes from Iapodean and Tauriscan threat. The plan was simple and emphasized the final neutralization of the Iapodes as a goal, the strengthening of Roman influence in the southern Alps and the expansion of it towards the Sava, thus enabling the easier defense of North Italy and Noricum, in case of a potential hostile (Dacian) threat. At the same time it provided an opportunity to confirm and redefine relations with different Illyrian civitates in southern Illyricum. The peoples overcome by Octavian in both campaigns fell into three categories: “those overcome at one blow”; “those overcome by more prolonged effort”; and finally “those who gave him most trouble”. The peoples belonging in the first and second categories were settled on the south Adriatic coast and Adriatic islands, far away from the area of unrest in the northwest with only a couple of exceptions. Amongst the latter no doubt were included not only those whom he fought, but also peoples who renewed or made formal submissions when threatened by movements of the Roman navy and army.

This was by far the largest and the most comprehensive Roman campaign in Illyricum during the Republican period. Octavian attacked on three fronts in 35 BC

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48 See above, p. 68 ff.
49 App. Ill. 16-17; Kromayer (1898) 4; Wilkes (1969) 49-50; Schmitthenner (1958) 201-207. Mirković (1968) 117 ff. does not make a strong argument in favour of her idea that Octavian’s operations in southern Illyricum were in Antony’s part of the empire. She also wrongly identifies Appian’s Βοσσοί with Strabo’s 7.5.12 (C 318) Thracian Βέσσοι located in Moesia; Mirković (1968) 123 ff., Schmitthenner (1958) 206 is not right either to regard them as “möglicherweise thrakische Splittergruppe”, but he is without doubt right in locating them, from evidence provided by Appian, on the north-west, close to the Taurisci; cf. Wilkes (1969) 50 n. 2.
50 Iapodean, Alpine and the fleet in the southern and central Adriatic. Šašel (1974a) 193-194; (1974b) 731-732 argues that Octavian started the attack simultaneously from Aquileia (Alps), Pola (Liburnian pirates), Brundisium (Melitan pirates), Scardona/Burnum (Iapodes), Salona (Delmatae), Narona and
with some 40-50,000 soldiers, leading the campaign against the Iapodes himself and leaving the other opponents to his legati. He took this campaign very seriously, having with him in the field his best military commanders such as Agrippa, Statilius Taurus and Valerius Messala Corvinus. Octavian’s route was probably similar to that taken in previous Roman campaigns against the Iapodes, i.e. approaching Illyricum via Tergeste, and starting in the Liburnian safe bases, and going through the narrowest part of the Dinaric Alps up to the River Sava. The main army went from Italy via Tergeste and Senia. Supporting Octavian’s main course of attack, from the Celtic north-west wing in the Alps, the legate C. Antistius Vetus was sent against the Salassi and although his achievement did not last long last long, for the moment he completed his task with success. However, after the defeat of the Salassi, the other Alpine tribes, like the Carni and Taurisci, who were named by Dio among the main troublemakers, conceded defeat and started to pay the tribute again, thus securing Octavian’s north-west flank, and enabling him to focus more closely on the Iapodes and Segestani.

The Roman fleet operated in the eastern Adriatic as some minor piracy was successfully tackled on the islands of Melita (Mljet), Korkyra (Korčula) and the Liburnian islands. The extent of piracy is doubtful because there are no other mentions of piracy in this period apart from Appian’s note taken from Augustus’
memories. Especially enigmatic is the sentence where it is stated that Augustus deprived the Liburni of their ships. The Liburni had not been mentioned as pirates for a couple of centuries,\(^5^8\) and it is difficult to believe in the existence of endemic piracy in the eastern Adriatic, except for the period of Ardiaean state-sponsored piracy in the 3\(^{rd}\) century BC.\(^5^9\) The widespread political crisis in the Roman world had caused some small-scale piracy in some communities (the Liburnian islands and Velebit channel), which required the attention of the Roman fleet.\(^6^0\) The young Caesar used his large fleet to make a show of full force and a lasting impression of military strength in this area not only to its inhabitants but also to the neighboring areas belonging to Antony’s part of the empire. The punishment of the Melitani, who were either slaughtered or sold into slavery, seems unusually cruel, taking into account the cautious and diplomatic approach towards other enemies in this campaign, but it is possible that the Romans encountered strong resistance, or maybe they just wanted to make an example. Pirates from Melite and Corecyra Melaina disrupted trade and important communications with Narona,\(^6^1\) so it was necessary to deal decisively with the problem. The main role of the fleet in subsequent operations was to provide logistical support for the main army, especially in the campaign against the Delmatae. They had no reason for many battleships since they expected no significant naval opposition.\(^6^2\)

Octavian himself tackled the greatest problem – the Iapodes. They not only refused to pay the tribute that the others did, but were the only people Dio singled out as a real threat to northern Italy in 36 BC. Firstly, Octavian swiftly dealt with the Cisalpine Iapodes, whose individual *civitates* surrendered even before the Romans took their leading *civitas*, Arupini.\(^6^3\) Later, Octavian encountered much stronger

\(^{58}\) Livy, 10.2.4, for year 302 BC, is the only source before Appian that ever mentioned Liburnian piracy, and he does so in a very general context.

\(^{59}\) Dell (1967).

\(^{60}\) Čače (1985) 313-317. This statement of Appian is often misunderstood by modern scholars. Although Octavian took away ships from Liburnian pirates, he did not confiscate the whole Liburnian fleet, because the Liburnian L. Tarius Rufus was commanding a squadron at Actium. Also, we should distinguish the terms Liburnian ships from *liburnicae* – a type of warship originated there and adopted by Romans in the mid 1\(^{st}\) BC; cf. Dzino (2003) 27 ff.

\(^{61}\) Zaninović (1980) 177.

\(^{62}\) It does not seem that the fleet was starting from Tergeste (as suggested by Hanslik (1961a) 1240), except perhaps for supply ships. It rather seems that some ships returned from Sicily via Brundisium; Kromayer (1898) 3-4.

\(^{63}\) App. *Ill.* 16; Schmithenner (1958) 234-236 suggests that Messala Corvinus completed the subjugation of the Arupini and Cisalpine Iapodes while Octavian was hastening away elsewhere.
Chapter 5: Pacare barbaros

resistance when attacking the Transalpine Iapodes, but relatively speedily defeated them, after taking and destroying their key *civitas*, Metulum (located southeast of modern Ogulin). It is, nevertheless, possible that the siege of Metulum lasted longer than Appian suggested, and that he abridged his source at this spot. The Transalpine Iapodes represented very real military danger for North Italy and Histria, because they were so numerous, well ordered and trained especially if acting in cooperation with the other Alpine peoples. However, they were not able to defend themselves alone against disciplined, decisive and numerous Roman forces.

The second part of the first campaign, which reached into the land of the Pannonii is more controversial. Dio states that it was an unprovoked action, so Octavian must have been driven by some other strategic reasons. Appian draws his information from Augustus’ memoirs, where the action is justified by Octavian’s intention to attack the Dacians and Bastarnae. We can discard this as propaganda, or just accept that he changed his plans for some reason which remains obscure. On the one hand, if he did indeed intend to attack, it would have been military suicide, because Roman lines of communications would stretch from the not yet pacified Segestica, through to uncontrolled territory open to attack from the hostile Pannonii from both banks of the Sava, such as the Breuci or Mezaei. It is not impossible that Octavian wanted to finish his, so far, brief and successful campaign at some easily

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64 Veith (1914) 29-50.
65 Malevany (1977) 136 after Veith (1914) 37-38 observed that it is not really possible that the Iapodes surrendered a day after they had repelled the Roman attack and after Octavian was wounded. The splendid story of Octavian leaping on the walls of Metulum alone (App. III. 20) carries an obvious propaganda-driven resemblance to Alexander the Great; Wilkes (1969) 51 n. 3; Coppola (2000) 201 ff.
66 The Transalpine Iapodes represented real, not only potential danger for Romans. The Metulan *civitas* alone was able to raise 3,000 well-trained warriors to defend Metulum, and they were able to use Roman fighting machines (taken from Decimus Brutus retreating after Mutina in 40 BC, Dio, 46.52.2) against them successfully; App. III. 19. See Čače (1979) 61, 71 ff. on Iapodean military organization.
67 Dio, 49.36.1. “This tribe actually inhabited a region too distant from Italy to have ever threatened it seriously; also they had never paid tribute to the Romans, thus in their case there was no just reason for war, ..., and Dio’s statement is perfectly correct in so far as it refers merely to the Pannonians.”; Šašel-Kos (1997a) 191.
68 App. III. 22.
69 For the propaganda see above. If Octavian contemplated a limited expedition against the Dacians, it is possible that circumstances suddenly changed and that intervention was not necessary at that moment. (cf. Suet. Aug. 63.4, who suggested a marriage alliance between Octavian and Cotiso as a possibility).
70 App. III. 23 mentions help sent to the Segestani by the other Pannonii, possibly the Breuci who dwelt in the valley of the Sava, or the Mezaei from northwest Bosnia. It seems obvious that they were not friendly to Romans. Whether they had been under Dacian influence is impossible to determine, but looks less likely.
defensible point where garrisons could be placed, such as on the banks of the Sava and Segestica. Adding to this confusion about the intentions of Octavian in 34 BC, Appian and Dio give different and somewhat confusing accounts about the ships employed in the siege of Segestica. Appian mentions ships being built on the Sava in order to bring provisions to the Danube during his planned campaign against the Dacians. Dio, on the other hand, mentions ships constructed by some allies in that vicinity, which, after they had been towed through the Ister into the Sava and further in the Colops, helped Octavian to attack Segestica from the river as well. It is relatively easy to accept that Dio or his source was wrong, and had mixed up information taken from Augustus’ autobiography. Precedence should be given to Appian as a source here. The identity of those allies mentioned by Dio remains disputed; the Noricans and Taurisci seem the most likely candidates because they were located close to Segestica, just as Dio suggested.

Octavian’s approach was apparently more cautious at the beginning of this campaign, but as he encountered more resistance, he became more aggressive. However, Octavian did not encounter as much resistance as in his campaign against the Iapodes, except for the siege of Segestica, which lasted for 30 days, and finished with the full surrender of the Segestani. The siege of Segestica cost Octavian the life

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71 Kromayer (1898) 6; Syme (1933a) 67. See Durman (1992) on the geo-strategic importance of Siscia/Segestica before and after Roman conquest.
72 Octavian needed ships in order to take Segestica because the pre-Roman city (locality Pogorelec near Sisak) was surrounded by the river Colops (Kupa) on three sides; Faber (1972/73) 151-153; Šašel (1974b) 719-726; Nenadović (1986/87) 72-73, fig. 1. The other reason is clearly stated by Appian – the army needed supplies and it was too difficult to get them through the land of the Iapodes, which was not yet fully pacified.
73 App. Ill. 22.
74 Dio, 49.37.4-6.
75 This idea is impossible for one basic reason: how could Octavian organise in such a short time for ships to arrive all the way from the lower stream of the Danube (in Antony’s part of the empire) through hostile territory? Patsch (1932) 59-61 thought that the Dacians of Cotiso supplied ships, and Papazoglu (1978) 337-339 recognized the Scordisci as the allies mentioned in Dio. Both of these hypotheses were rightly discarded by Šašel-Kos (1997a) 193-194, on account of their distance from Segestica. Nagy (1991) 61-62 is possibly right in his view that that Dio’s source was confused as to the geography.
76 These allies could be from the Norican kingdom; Zippel (1877) 230; Šašel-Kos (1986) 140, or the Taurisci; Wilkes (1969) 53; Nagy (1991) 62; Šašel-Kos (1997a) 193-194. Wilkes accepts a less likely travel reconstruction of the voyage via Drava, Danube and Sava. It still seems too dangerous to undertake such a dangerous trip through hostile Breucian, Scordiscan and Dacian controlled territory. Šašel-Kos (1997a) 193-194 makes a more plausible synthesis of Dio and Appian and argues that the allies in the vicinity of Siscia (in Dio) were the Taurisci, and that they constructed ships on the Sava, (in Appian) and sent them downstream to Segestica.
77 Or at least he presented himself in such way in his autobiography. Nagy (1991) 62 gives a good reason for such cautious behaviour on the part of Octavian – inadequate supplies for the army.
of his famous admiral Menodorus.\textsuperscript{78} The settlement was pretty moderate, without
unnecessary reprisals on the Segestani. Dio states that the remainder of Pannonia
capitulated as well, but there does not seem to have been a capitulation of all the
Pannonii; Dio must have been wrong here.\textsuperscript{79} Octavian left 25 cohorts to garrison the
place, and that actually proved to be a wise decision, as they put down a brief but
serious revolt that winter.\textsuperscript{80}

The fall of Segestica signalled the end of campaigning for the year.\textsuperscript{81} What
Octavian’s intentions were, it is again difficult to understand. A Dacian invasion
seems to have been abandoned, if there was ever any serious Dacian plan. Dio
mentions Octavian departing for Gaul in order to reach Britain before returning to
Illyricum to deal with the rebellion of the Segestani and the Delmatae, while Appian
states that he intended to return to Illyricum in the spring and that he actually
returned earlier on news of the uprising.\textsuperscript{82} Despite Appian’s statement, it does not
seem that Octavian planned the Dalmatian campaign much in advance, but rather that
he was forced to return to Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{83} The rebellion started again amongst the Alpine
peoples, but it ended quickly and there were no serious consequences for the

\textsuperscript{78} For Menodorus see Münzer (1932). Appian is silent on this matter, but he does not suggest
the existence of conspiracy between Octavian and Agrippa to eliminate Menodorus as suggested by Šašel-
Kos (1997a) 195. If there was conspiracy, Dio’s source would be informed of rumours.
\textsuperscript{79} Dio, 49.37.6; Syme (1933b) 68-71; Schmitthenner (1958) 215-216. Perhaps some of the Pannonii
who sent help to Segestani (App. Ill. 23) made deditio without fighting, being discouraged by the fall
of Segestica, and gave hostages to Rome, or simply retreated.
\textsuperscript{80} Dio, 49.37.1-2; App. Ill. 22-24. The Pannonian nobility was apparently friendlier towards the
Romans than the rest of the population; cf. App. Ill. 23. The rebellion of the Segestani appears to be
much more serious in Dio than in Appian. No source mentions what happened to the garrison in
Segestica after 33 BC. Perhaps it was abandoned, or garrisoned with minimal forces, because
unidentified Pannonii and Norici were able to launch raids into Istria in 16 BC; Dio, 54. 20.1, see
below p. 131.
\textsuperscript{81} Some authors think that Octavian sent detachments of the army to control the valley of Sava after he
took Segestica; Zippel (1877) 231-232; Kromayer (1898) 7. It is difficult to believe this because the
campaigning season was already over and no source confirms that any troops were sent from Siscia
further north or east; cf. Nagy (1991) 64.
\textsuperscript{82} App. Ill. 24; Dio, 49.38. There is a slight temptation to prefer Dio as a source for Octavian’s
campaigns. Καίσαρας, appearing in Appian, is always presenting himself in a better light whenever
contradicting Dio’s source, see Chapter 5.3 n. 40. He was not going to Britain, leaving the Illyrian job
unfinished as Dio suggests, but intending to return to Illyria in the spring as a responsible general
combating barbarians. Coppola (2000) 200 suggested that the idea of campaigning in Britain was
nothing but a piece of propaganda in his autobiography - aemulatio Caesaris. It would be plausible,
but only if this story had been told in Appian, who follows Augustus, not in Dio (although it is not
impossible that Augustus dropped it from the Autobiography).
\textsuperscript{83} It is important to emphasise that the Delmatae were not singled out amongst the rebels who refused
to pay tribute in 35 BC; Dio, 49.34.1-2 (overlooked by Coppola (2000) 197). However, this is one
situation where an historian cannot support with confidence either of the offered possibilities.
Thorough pacification of the Delmatae was after all a very important prerequisite for the formation of
‘lesser’ Illyricum as a separate province.
Romans. The targets of Octavian in 34 BC were the Delmatae who meanwhile raised the army and fought Romans with more than 12,000 soldiers under the leadership of their princeps Οὔερσου (Versus), and, after he perished, one Τέστιµου (Testimus) was elected as leader. From the sources it appears that they made the first offensive moves in occupying the stronghold of Promona again, but after the Romans took Promona and Synodium, and secured the Roman community in Salona, the Delmatae capitulated and started to pay tribute again.

There is no valid or reasonable explanation why the Delmatae would provoke the Romans after Octavian had so decisively and successfully dealt with the Iapodes and Segestani in the previous year. Perhaps they tried to settle accounts with the Liburni and expected the Romans to be engaged elsewhere, as in 50 BC, and to recognize the de facto situation afterwards, or maybe it was simply a pre-emptive reaction caused by their fear of further aggression. The fast return of Octavian to Illyricum, whether planned or not, was a reasonable strategic move as he could not leave the Delmatae unpacified, bearing in mind Caesar’s unexpected troubles with them in the 40s.

5.5 Daisioi – Daesitiates: What happened to the rest of the Pannonii?

We should accept that the subjugation of the Segestani and Delmatae were the limits of Octavian’s expedition and that he never crossed into the Bosnian mountains with his legions. There was no apparent danger to Roman interests in that area and certainly no need for Octavian to extend his lines of communication

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84 According to Appian the army led by Verzo had 12,000 warriors, but the size of Testimus’ army is unknown. Čač (1979) 103-109 estimates that Testimus led an additional 8,000 warriors.
85 App. Ill. 25-28. There was fighting around Salona, unreported by Appian and Dio, but mentioned in Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) where Σάλωνα is included amongst the cities burned by Octavian, and distinguished from the port Σάλων. It might be only the Delmataean Salona located near Klis in the hinterland and not the Italo-Greek Salona on the coast, see Chapter 3.3 n. 44.
86 It is possible that they just wanted to change the peace terms enforced by Asinius Pollio in 39 BC. Their overall successful war record against the Romans in the 40s might be a good reason for overconfidence, and if it is true that Octavian left for Gaul, we have the circumstances so suitable for them to attack that they could recognize their window of opportunity.
87 Vulić (1926) 49 thinks that taking Promona was a pre-emptive move on the part of the Delmatae who knew that the Romans would attack them anyway.
88 Kromayer (1898) 11-12; Dobiáš (1921) 219-223; Syme (1933a); Schmithenner (1958); Wilkes (1969) 55-57; Nagy (1991) 65-66. Still, there was nothing to imply that he did not receive nominal deditio from some neighbouring peoples, without actually fighting them, see Chapter 5.4 n. 79.
into hostile terrain, test his luck and risk resources once his operation had finished successfully. Thus large areas of today’s central and northern Bosnia and the valley of the Sava remained free of direct or indirect Roman control. There is a note in Appian mentioning the sickness of Octavian, which prevented him from subduing other peoples,\(^{89}\) possibly referring to the Pannonii in the hinterland. Of course, it is impossible to determine precisely what was the real reason behind his decision to finish the campaign. Octavian was wounded in the knee during the siege of Synodium.\(^{90}\) We can assume that this injury really was severe enough to prevent his continuing the campaign. On the other hand, it would be an excellent excuse to finish the campaign before reaching the potentially dangerous terrain in the hinterland and to start preparing for a much more important showdown with Antony. Statilius Taurus, Octavian’s legate was left to complete the campaign, and to mop up the remnants of the Delmataean resistance.\(^{91}\)

An important but unclear question still remains: who are the Δαίσιοί, people singled out together with the Salassi, the Iapodes, the Segestani and the Delmatae, as a people who gave Octavian the greatest problems. They are an otherwise unknown people. The overwhelming majority of scholars have suggested that Appian referred to the Daesitiates, a significant Pannonian people, who inhabited central Bosnia.\(^{92}\) It is difficult either to accept or to discard this. If we accept that Octavian fought the Daesitiates so deeply inland, the question is why are there no other references in either Appian or Dio to such an important military incursion. An unsuccessful outcome of the operation, or *deditio* of the Daesitiates without actual fighting, might be a reasonable and suitable explanation for this problem.\(^{93}\) On the other hand, if we

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\(^{89}\) App. *Ill.* 28.

\(^{90}\) App. *Ill.* 27; Suet. *Aug.* 20 (adding also the accident with the collapsing bridge not mentioned by Appian); Dio, 49.38.4.

\(^{91}\) Dio, 49.38.4.

\(^{92}\) *CIL* III 3201 and the more significant inscription from Breza *T. F(lavius) Valens f. princeps D(aesitiati)um*; Sergejevski (1940) 141 n. 10 pl. 11. Vulić (1933) 14-17; (1934) 164-166; Josipović (1956) 144; Schmitthenner (1958) 213; Malevany (1977) 134. Dobijaš (1921) 216-218 is wrong in locating the Daesitiates south of Split, and alone in defending the original App. *Ill.* 17 Δαίσιοι τε και Παίονες instead of the reconstructed Δαισιταίται και Παίονες.

\(^{93}\) Kromayer (1898) 12 n. 4; Pašalić (1956) 273-276 say that Octavian or his legates fought the Daesitiates but without success, so that there is mention of them giving resistance but not being subdued in Octavian’s report to the Senate. Vulić (1907) 22 although opposed to this opinion, suggests that there is a lacuna in Appian where he described Roman (successful in his opinion) fighting with the Daesitiates. Dio is silent on the matter and in our opinion his silence confirms the argument of Kromayer and Syme.
discard the hypothesis that the Daesitiates were Daisioi, it is difficult to accept that the people who were such an obstacle to Romans, as the Daisioi apparently were, simply disappear from the map of Illyricum in all the later sources.\footnote{Schmitthenner (1958) 213 is not certain about them either. Although it is difficult to accept that Octavian campaigned in Bosnia or the valley of the Sava, it seems that he received either \textit{deditio} or made some kind of treaty with some of the Pannonii, certainly, the Varciani, maybe the Osseriates, and less likely the Daesitiates and Breuci recognizing nominal Roman suzerainty, without actually fighting them. That would explain why Romans regarded the wars in 12-9 BC as rebellions.}

\section{Octavian’s campaigns: the assessment}

The changes in the constitutional/political framework that Rome imposed on Illyricum during the period of Caesar's governorship and dictatorship affected the situation in Illyricum after his assassination. The emphasis of mid- and long-term Roman policy shifted from islands and isolated points on the coast to the whole length of the coast. Changed strategic priorities of Rome in the region were not followed by a changed strategic position and that seems to be the largest Roman problem at the time. Illyricum as a unified zone of operation was more difficult to protect, being a narrow strip without strategic depth and foothold in the hinterland, and preventative intervention was necessary to ensure the security of the Roman position on the seacoast and in the south Alpine area. Limited-scale interventions such as Pollio’s produced no lasting results. However, the wave of disturbances in 36 BC was the necessary catalyst. It, rather than some preconceived plan, triggered the action. Octavian had an opportunity to gather his forces and coordinate their efforts like no other Roman general before him except Caesar or Pompey, and he had used it successfully, in Illyricum and in Gaul few years earlier by means of the masterful generalship of Agrippa.\footnote{Gaul also suffered from the neglect of Caesar’s, already outdated, laissez-faire approach, until Agrippa implemented a decisive and successful change of the political framework in 39 BC; Drinkwater (1985) 19-20, 120-121; Roddaz (1984) 66-75.}

Internal and external Roman political problems played a significant, but secondary role in the Illyrian policy of the period. It cannot be determined precisely how dangerous to Roman interests was the rise of the Dacian state under Burebista and his successors, especially after Burebista’s death. However, no source suggests the existence of a direct danger to Italy from this area, and it is obvious that the Dacians were not threatening to cause a large wave of migrations, which would be harmful to Italy, such as those of the Cimbri and the Teutones had been. Their
interest was focused on the eastern and southeastern Balkans. Nevertheless, the Roman internal crisis and civil wars were enough to weaken their position in Illyricum to some degree. We cannot overstate this assessment, as Italian settlement of the eastern Adriatic continued despite all the troubles and it was encouraged, as it helped defence and at the same time strengthened the base for inland military operations.

Octavian’s campaigns should be seen as the beginning of a new phase in Roman Illyrian policy, completing all necessary prerequisites for a new constitutional framework that would be imposed by the establishment of Illyricum as a separate province. On the surface the campaigns do not appear to have produced radical change such as had occurred under the Republic and, which placed in the forefront the security of the Italian mainland and the protection of the allies. Octavian used more soldiers than previous commanders but his campaigns were defensive in nature, and aimed at the pacification of the region, the eradication of piracy and the security of North Italy and Noricum, as well as the communities of Romans and Italians on the Adriatic coast. This was not a continuation of ‘coastal’ Illyricum from Caesar’s time, as Romans had never showed any intention to deal with the area more decisively before Octavian. It was the thoroughness of the action and the final pacification of the Delmatae and Iapodes that eliminated the last obstacles to the establishment of Roman provincial arrangements in Illyricum. The garrisoning of Segestica seems to have been the greatest change in the policy, as the Roman army had never remained permanently in Illyricum before, especially as it was so far from the sea.

The settlement with the natives was far from a permanent annexation. Although there is nothing preserved of Octavian’s peace agreements with the defeated peoples of Illyricum, it was certainly a form of deditio, after which they became socii of Rome. This type of settlement was very usual with non-Italian gentes at this time, so we can assume that it was imposed in Illyricum as well. Already existing agreements were re-asserted, hostages were given and payment of

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96 Contra Kromayer (1898) 1; Miiller (1937) 202 seeing it as a Totalitässtreben, a prelude to his future imperial policy of expansion. This would be acceptable if Octavian had fully conquered Illyricum, instead of just pacifying it.
retrospective tribute imposed.\textsuperscript{98} Only the Transalpine Iapodes and Segestani are explicitly mentioned as being brought for the first time under Roman domination.\textsuperscript{99}

Previous security arrangements without any lasting commitment of Roman troops became outdated because Rome’s attitude towards Illyricum had changed and a stronger military presence was now a necessity for the security of new Roman and Italian settlers on the coast and the new position of Illyricum in the Empire. The \textit{proto-province} established in 59 BC was Roman acknowledgment that the situation changed, but in just two decades ‘coastal’ Illyricum became outdated and dysfunctional. Octavian’s campaigns restored political stability in the area. It was a modest but thorough achievement, primarily aimed at and achieving pacification of some troublesome peoples from Illyricum and additionally acquiring some welcome military \textit{gloria} for the young Caesar.\textsuperscript{100} He created (whether by intention or not) conditions for the subsequent Roman political and military penetration towards the Danube. However, the changes in the Roman constitution, army and military strategy, and the completion of the municipalization on the coast, which will be discussed in the next chapter, were necessary prerequisites for Roman conquest of the hinterland.

\textsuperscript{98} Cf. App. \textit{III.} 16, 28 (the Delmatae and the Derbani).
\textsuperscript{99} App. \textit{III.} 21 (Transalpine Iapodes), 22 (the Segestani).
\textsuperscript{100} Thus the objections of Veith (1914) 108-109 that Octavian could have done much better in these campaigns are unrealistic.
6. **From Lesser to Greater Illyricum: Bellum Pannonicum**

(to Augustus)

*Nunc tibi Pannonia est, nunc Illyris ora domanda*

Ovid, *Trist. 2.225*

6.1 **First years of the Principate**

In 33 BC Octavian’s campaigns were finished and Illyricum was finally *de iure* a Roman province. In 30 BC the Roman civil wars ended and Octavian was finally supreme master of the Mediterranean. There is some symbolic connection between the fortunes of the first *Princeps* and Illyricum, as military victories in Illyricum in 33 and 9 BC mark the high points of his political career, and the *bellum Batonianum* AD 6 – 9 coincides with the darkest hours of his foreign policy. This chapter will analyze Roman – Illyrian political and social interactions in the period while Illyricum was the senatorial province or the phase of ‘lesser’ Illyricum and explore their significance in the internal context of Illyricum, and the changed external circumstances of a new regime. This chapter will also analyze the causes and reasons that influenced the change of the political/constitutional framework in 12 – 11 BC and consequently through the *Bellum Pannonicum*, and together with Chapter 7 assess the consequences of that change.

There is no space here to discuss in depth the great social and political changes in the Roman world that followed the victory of Octavian in the civil war. The battle of Actium and the new constitution from 27 BC finished the long socio-political process of Rome’s transformation. Political power had already shifted from the Senate more than two decades before but this time, instead of two or three, there was only one unchallenged master of the empire – Augustus. However, the transformation was not yet completely finished in the first years of the Principate. A new system needed some time to consolidate, working by trial and error rather than following some pre-determined plan. Augustus implemented a series of reforms patiently and gradually during the whole of his long reign, carefully avoiding a definition of the exact extent of his non-constitutional powers, keeping the façade of
constitutional and traditional government, but concentrating all power in his hands and preserving it for members of his family.\footnote{There is a large body of writing on this topic of transition. Particularly useful are: Syme (1939) 313 ff.; Millar (1984b); Raaflaub/Toher (1990); Southern (1998) 100 ff.; Crook (1996) 113-146, etc.}

The conduct of foreign policy changed as a consequence of the new system. The \textit{Princeps} directly controlled most of the army and foreign policy. In 27 BC the provinces were divided into imperial, ruled by legates appointed directly by Augustus, and senatorial, where governors were appointed in the Republican way, by the casting of lots among ex-magistrates. Imperial provinces were generally the troublesome parts of the empire, requiring a strong military presence, while the senatorial were more peaceful areas without imminent threat; they required able administrators, not soldiers.\footnote{Dio, 53.12.4; Strabo, 17.3.25 (C 840); Suet. \textit{Aug.} 46-47 (In addition there was also an equestrian prefect of Egypt.). See also Bowman (1996). Still, we cannot be so naive as to understand the ‘independence’ of senatorial governors under Augustus as anything more than propaganda; cf. Millar (1984a) 46 ff.} An important change in foreign policy was that now military cooperation between the governors of different provinces was more likely than in the Republic. Under the new constitution the \textit{Princeps} had power to override individual governors and co-ordinate their efforts, so that larger military operations became possible.\footnote{Cf. Wilkes (1965a) 9 ff. on the development and for examples of this strategy.} Even so, a need for internal consolidation, a reorganization of the army, and rest after the decades of civil unrest perhaps delayed the offensive in the West, before territory over the Rhine and up to the Danube was brought under Roman rule - the most impressive foreign policy achievement of the Augustan Principate. Augustan expansion remains a very controversial topic. The sources make it difficult to recognize the main reason for sudden Roman interest and a full-scale military engagement beyond the Rhine into Germany, Pannonia and the mid-Danube. It is unclear whether it was primarily an internally driven issue, such as to prove Augustus’ successors to be capable leaders and to give an impression of the new system’s vitality, or an externally influenced search for easy defensible borders in Europe, or a combination of both (Chapter 6.4).

The sources for the first years of the Principate are often inadequate, especially for the history of Illyricum. Appian’s Illyrian monograph stops with the end of Octavian’s wars, so in this period we rely mainly on Dio’s dry annalistic account and excerpts from Suetonius’ \textit{Vitae}, as well as contemporary sources such as
Velleius Paterculus or Augustus’ own *Res Gestae*. Secondary sources such as the epitomes of Livy (up to 9 BC), Florus or epitomizers drawing on Livy such as Eusebius and Rufus Festus, often make the reconstruction of events even more confusing. The inscriptions from Illyricum are not numerous in this period, yet epigraphy is a necessary tool of the Roman imperial historian, and is the only way of discovering anything about the scale of Italian colonization and the ethnic composition of the new colonies in the Dalmatian coast during this period.5

6.2 Illyricum in the first years of the Principate: the Pax Augusta

There is not much information from Illyricum itself following Octavian’s campaigns. As we saw in the previous chapter, the extent of the conquest in 35 – 33 BC was actually quite modest, but the fact that no new troubles were reported points to the area being pacified and secured to a reasonable degree. Illyricum was finally organized as an independent province. It is said in the sources that Illyricum was put under senatorial administration after 27 BC,6 so many scholars believe that it was established as a regular province as a direct consequence of Octavian’s campaigns in 35 – 33 BC.7 However, we cannot point precisely to when in the period after the summer of 32 and 27 BC, that happened.8 Neither is known where the administrative center of this province was, nor is there any mention of its governors in the first years of the Principate, apart from Tamphilus Vála who is mentioned in the inscription recently found in Iader, and P. Silius Nerva, proconsul in c. 16 BC.9 There is also an

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4 Gabba (1984a) is useful on the bias of different historians towards Augustus and his reign. See also Toher (1990); Reinhold/Swan (1990).
5 Unfortunately, we are on very slippery ground here. The methodology used in the most important works on municipalization in Illyricum such as Alföldy (1962a); (1965a) 17 ff. and Wilkes (1969), so-called “statistisch-epigraphische Methode”, has been subjected to damaging criticism by scholars such as Vittinghoff (1977). See an overview of the debate in Wilkes (1977) 746-751.
6 Dio, 53.12.4 τὸ Δελματίκον; Strabo, 17.3.25 (C 840) Ἰλλυρίδα.
8 Nagy (1991) 67 pointed out that Illyricum is missing from the list of provinces which swore an oath to Octavian in the summer of 32 BC (RG 25.2), so the establishment of the province of Illyricum must be dated after that event. The First book of Propertius’ *Elegies* which mentions the departure of the Illyrian governor was composed after 30/29 but before 27/26 BC; Prop. 1.8; cf. Butler/Barber (1933) xxv-xxvi; Camps (1961) 6-7.
9 The earliest known proconsul of Illyricum is Cn. Baebius (f.) Cn. Tamphilus Vála Numonianus, and it is very possible that he was first governor of senatorial Illyricum when it was founded in 27 BC; Fadić (1986) 416-424; (1999); see Plate II. The other known name is the proconsul P. Silius Nerva; Dio, 54.20.1-2; CIL III 2973 from Aenona. Nagy (1991) 68 n. 87 and Wilkes (1996b) 551 express doubts that Silius was the governor of senatorial Illyricum. See discussion on Silius below p. 128. Wilkes (1996b) 567 also argues that Illyricum (excluding Liburnia) was administered in conjunction with Macedonia until 27 BC. It is difficult to accept that fact after 35 BC, because relations between Octavian and Antony worsened and their line of division was between Illyricum and Macedonia. Certainly Illyricum was under extraordinary command before it became a province.
unnamed love rival of the poet Propertius, who was governor of Illyricum.\textsuperscript{10} Still, knowing that Illyricum had been given to senatorial administration is an important hint that the situation was under control and that no new military undertakings were necessary there for almost two full decades.\textsuperscript{11}

The most important piece of information we have from this period derives from epigraphic sources. Augustus’ reign included a large program of Italian settlement in the coastal Illyrian cities, which consolidated and strengthened Roman rule. Those coastal cities, which already had \textit{conventus} of Roman citizens and earlier had gained some municipal privileges from Caesar,\textsuperscript{12} have their status advanced to the level of \textit{colonia Romana}. The colonies were established in Iader\textsuperscript{13} (c. 27 BC), Salona,\textsuperscript{14} Narona,\textsuperscript{15} and less likely in Senia,\textsuperscript{16} Epidaurum,\textsuperscript{17} and Emona.\textsuperscript{18} Other cities, such as Scodra, Lissus, Tragurium, Issa or Aenona, perhaps acquired

\textsuperscript{10} Prop. 1.8; 2.16. Propertius calls him \textit{praetor} in 2.16.1, but it might be a colloquialism. \textit{Fasces} mentioned in 2.16.11 confirm that he was a magistrate; Butler/Barber (1933) 164; Camps (1967) 130.

\textsuperscript{11} Ritterling (1925) 1218-1219; Betz (1938) 3; Nagy (1991) 67-68 believe that the northern part of Illyricum, where some army units were stationed, was organized as a separate province or the \textit{panon-illyrischen Militärdistrict} under an imperial legate. However, we do not have any evidence to confirm the existence of these legates; Syme (1933c) 22 n. 55; cf. Papazoglu (1976) 207-208. That hypothetical ‘imperial Illyricum’ would be limited only by the Adriatic hinterland and southern Alps, (both inscriptions mentioning governors of senatorial Illyricum were found in Liburnia, confirming that it was part of senatorial Illyricum as well). It is after all very unlikely that Augustus would establish such a small province in a light of his fondness for large provinces (Dio, 53.12.8), and his reluctance to create new provinces; Braunert (1977). There was no external or internal reason why such an extraordinary command should exist; see this section n. 29.

\textsuperscript{12} Above, p. 85.


\textsuperscript{14} Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.141; Archaeology has proved the existence of two settlements. Alföldy suggested that Salona was a double colony: Caesarian and Octavian in c. 33 BC; Alföldy (1962a) 359-361; (1965a) 101-105, 110, but we lack evidence for the establishment of a Caesarian colony. See also Wilkes (1969) 221-224; Salmon (1969) 160; Clairmont (1975) 6, 18 ff.; Brunt (1987) 251-252, 597 (C 74).

\textsuperscript{15} Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.142; Alföldy (1962a) 357-358; (1965a) 135; Šašel-Kos (2000) 297 regard it as a Caesarian colony, Salmon (1969) 160 puts it after 27 BC and Wilkes (1969) 248 shortly before 27 BC.

\textsuperscript{16} Alföldy (1962a) 362-363; (1965a) 76; Wilkes (1969) 200. There is less evidence for the date when Senia and Epidaurum became colonies than there is for Iader, Salona and Narona; Vittinghoff (1977) 18.

\textsuperscript{17} Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.143; Alföldy (1962a) 357-358; (1965a) 139; Wilkes (1969) 252; Šašel-Kos (2000) 297 regard it as a Caesarian. Contra Vittinghoff (1977) 16, see previous note.

\textsuperscript{18} Mommsen (\textit{CIL} III, p. 489) followed by some authorities such as Wells (1974) 185-187; Keppie, (1984a) 77-78 suggested that Emona was established as a colony in the Augustan period. Majority opinion places its foundation in the early – mid Tiberian era; Saria (1938); Degrassi (1954) 109-111; Wilkes (1963); Šašel (1968) 564-565, but some scholars date it even after Tiberius; Sherwin-White (1973) 242 n.3; Šašel-Kos (1995) esp. 243-244, see this section n. 34.
municipal status in this period, but this view, which assumes that Pliny’s *oppida civium Romanorum* were cities with municipal status, has been questioned recently.

It is interesting that early Augustan colonists were not military veterans as in Gaul or Spain but civilians. That could be the reason why Augustus omitted Illyricum in the *Res Gestae* from the list of provinces to which he sent his discharged veterans. Some, if not the majority of these colonies, were probably of an agrarian nature. If this is true, it can be regarded as an important sign that Illyricum was regarded as a safe area. This wave of colonization hastened the process of Italian settlement, which had already begun in the 2nd – 1st century BC, when Italian traders started to settle there. Epigraphy reveals that the settlement of the colonists on the eastern Adriatic coast corresponded with their places of origin across the Adriatic. Thus the majority of the settlers in Liburnia were of North Italian origin, central Italians settled in central Dalmatia, especially in Salona, and the settlers from southern Italy settled on the south. Narona is the only exception, as it had an unusually high percentage of freedmen in the population. There are many freedmen attested by the epigraphy who worked for patrons in other cities in Dalmatia or Italy. Epidaurum is the only colony where a substantial indigenous element has been attested.

It is not known what happened with Issa after its defeat in the Civil War. The Issaean *κοινόν* was dissolved in 46 BC but very soon Issa and its colonies gained Roman citizenship, and were joined to the Salonitan administration. They were not a part of the Salonitan *conventus* reserved for Illyrian *peregrini*, as was previously argued by Novak, but as full members of a wider Salonitan *res publica*. Salonitan territory enjoyed substantial autonomy, extending into the coast and islands previously belonging to the Issaean commonwealth.

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19 Brunt (1987) 606-607 (M 35-48). Alföldy (1962a) 363-365; (1965a) 141 regards some, if not all, of these cities as Augustan colonies.
21 Wilkes (1969) 231, 108 ff. The explanation of Mommsen (*CIL* III, p. 121; also Ridley (2003) 84) that Illyrian colonies were included in Italian colonies in the *Res Gestae* is thus not right.
22 Suić (1981) 152-155 arguing that Iader was an agrarian colony. Perhaps some of 80,000 Roman poor resettled by Caesar were transferred to Illyricum; *Suet. Iul.* 42; Watkins (1979) 83.
23 Alföldy (1965a) 185; Wilkes (1969) 300-306.
24 Wilkes (1969) 306-307. A somewhat similar situation was in Magdalensburg – capital of Noricum; Kolosovskaya (1974) 44 ff, or in Corinth; Strabo 8.6.23 (C 381). For freedmen in colonies see Watkins (1979) 76-78.
25 Alföldy (1965a) 140.
26 Suić (1959) effectively refutes Novak (1949) 90 ff. who argued that Salona had two administratively independent parts, Roman and Issaean. Salona as *res publica: CIL* III 12,922. Perhaps it is possible to suggest that the Salonitan *res publica* succeeded the Issaean commonwealth when Salona assumed leadership over Issa after the defeat of Pompeians in 46 BC.
The exact borders of the province of Illyricum in these early years of the Principate are not known. Some borders were determined by geography; essentially, Illyricum was the Dalmatian coastal strip with its immediate hinterland and islands, bordering in the south on Epirus. In the north the boundary followed the limits of Octavian’s conquest in 33 BC, but as it was the frontier of the empire at that time, it does not seem that the border was fixed firmly. It was rather loosely determined, depending on Roman relations with individual peoples from the interior. Perhaps Romans regarded territory up to the Sava as being nominally part of the imperium Romanum without requiring any administrative tasks, but there is no evidence to either confirm or dispute that. In fact we can compare the situation on the northern frontier of Illyricum with Germany and other border areas in this period, where Romans used to exercise control far beyond their military strongholds.

It would be reasonable to assume that the army was maintained close to the coast where it had secure lines of supply by sea and from where it could efficiently intervene in the case of any problem. The role of the army appears in this phase to be entirely pre-emptive. There was no point in making some kind of defensive limes defending Illyricum without actually possessing any strategic depth in the narrow coastal area necessary for efficient defence. It is obvious that any defense of Illyricum would have to be performed far beyond its provincial boundaries with efficient and mobile forces. Still, it is possible that a garrison in Siscia was connected to the coast by the network of small defensive points and speculae through

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27 Strabo, 17.3.25 (C 840); Pliny, HN 3.145.
28 Wells (1972) 248; Christ (1957) 425 ff. See Luttwak (1976) 13-20, 46-50 on that strategy in general.
29 Ritterling (1925) 1218-1219 argued that the army of Illyricum was stationed on the northern boundary of the province commanded by an imperial legate and not a proconsul appointed by the Senate. Perhaps some forces were stationed in Segestica, but otherwise the argument of Ritterling is difficult to maintain due to the geographical position of Illyricum before the Bellum Pannonicum, as those forces on the border would be easily cut off in the case of native rebellion, see also this section n. 11.
30 Wilkes (1969) 91-92 rightly refutes earlier views (Patsch (1898) 172 ff.; Veith (1914) 111; Dobiaš (1921) 222-223; Alföldy (1962b) 284 ff.; (1965a) 25, 171-172, defended by Šašel (1974a) 193-196) that Octavian created a limes of connected defensive military strong-points in the Dalmatian hinterland all the way from Burnum to Narona in 33 BC, or shortly afterwards. That was neither necessary nor Roman practice anywhere at that time; cf. Luttwak (1976) 19, 46-50. It is possible that this was a military communication network rather than a limes, see below p. 169.
the territory of the Iapodes.\textsuperscript{31} It is very difficult to determine the position of legions placed in Illyricum at this time. It is possible that during this period the first military base in Tilurium for legion VII was established,\textsuperscript{32} and later in Burnum to accommodate legion XX after it had been moved from Aquileia,\textsuperscript{33} as well as bases in Poetovio, Sisica, and less possibly Emona for other legions during, or just after, the \textit{Bellum Pannonicum}.\textsuperscript{34} Auxiliary troops were also placed in Illyricum but it is even more difficult to locate them precisely in the period before AD 6.\textsuperscript{35} Romans rebuilt and strengthened fortifications around coastal cities and ports and started to move some native cities from mountain sides overlooking the sea towards the coast.\textsuperscript{36}

The western border of Illyricum with Italy moved in this period so that Histria was included in Italy on a permanent basis in c. 18 – 12 BC.\textsuperscript{37} It remains a controversial issue as to whether it was fixed on the river Arsia, or whether it included Liburnia as well. Pliny the Elder is guilty of causing this confusion as he places the same Liburnian cities into \textit{regio} X of Italy as well as in the province of Illyricum.\textsuperscript{38} Modern scholarship is still divided as to whether Liburnia was part of Italy in the very late Republic or whether those Liburnian cities with \textit{ius Italicum} were administered by Italian cities for census purposes because of their geographical

\textsuperscript{31} Patsch (1898) 172-173; cf. Šašel (1974a) 195-196, 199 who dates it in 35 – 10 BC. Unfortunately this defensive communication network cannot be dated precisely, so it might be a product of the \textit{Bellum Batonianum} as well, or even later.
\textsuperscript{32} Betz (1938) 8; Wilkes (1969) 94-95, and ff. suggest that legion VII was in Tilurium no later than 15 BC.
\textsuperscript{33} Location of Burnum and Tilurium; Zaninović (1967) 8-9, 16-17; (1986) 164-167. Legion XX at Burnum; Ritterling (1925) 1770; Wilkes (1969) 93 n. 4. Burnum was strategically placed in friendly Liburnian territory (in the place of the small Liburnian community which was possibly destroyed in the wars with the Delmatae; Čače (1989) 78-79, just next to the Delmatae; cf. Zaninović (1966) 41 n.58; (1968) 120-121; Suić (1981) 227-228.
Zaninović (1968) 119-122; Suić (1981) 232 date placement of Roman legions in Burnum and Tilurium as early as 33 BC. Unfortunately archaeology and epigraphy cannot verify exactly when these bases were established, since they are attested only after AD 9 (Wilkes (1969) 142-143; (1996b) 570), except for legion XX, which was stationed in Burnum before AD 6, see Chapter 7.5 n. 61.
\textsuperscript{34} The existence of these bases before AD 6 is highly speculative. The previously accepted view of Saria (1938) that legion XV Apollinaris was stationed in Emona came under the valid criticism of Kos (1986) 54-56. Numismatic evidence denies the existence of a military camp in Emona and questions its existence in Poetovio before the late Augustan period. Cf. also the same opinion in Šašel (1968) 562-565; Wells (1974) 185-187; Šašel-Kos (1995) 231ff.
\textsuperscript{35} Alföldy (1962b); Wilkes (1969) 139 ff. and 470-474.
\textsuperscript{36} Faber (2000) 147 ff. Generally, this was not necessarily an aggressive and violent process; Hanson (1988) 56-58.
\textsuperscript{37} Strabo, 7.5.3 (C 314); Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.129; Degrassi (1954) 54-60. Thomsen (1947) 28 puts the border adjustment in AD 9, but Degrassi supplies weightier arguments.
\textsuperscript{38} Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.130, 139-140.
proximity to Italy.\textsuperscript{39} It seems that Liburnia was after all part of Illyricum, despite this controversy, because both known governors of senatorial Illyricum were patrons of Liburnian cities, as we saw from the two inscriptions found there.\textsuperscript{40} We do not know where the provincial capital was. It might have been Iader or, more probably, the later capital Salona. The administrative division of the province at this time is not known. The division is known from Pliny’s list of judicial districts - \textit{conventus} and native communities – \textit{civitates}, further subdivided into \textit{decuriae} before the \textit{Bellum Pannonicum}, which describes the situation in the later period.\textsuperscript{41}

A high degree of Romanization in this period is only apparent in Liburnia, the area closest to Italy. Some native Liburnian families progressed in importance and the first consul of Liburnian origin appears to have been L. Tarius Rufus, consul already in 16 BC.\textsuperscript{42} In fact, the local elite in Liburnia seems to be mainly of native origin, unlike the rest of Illyricum where natives and the Greeks are very rarely enfranchised and hardly play any part at this time in the municipal life of Illyricum.

Other aspects of Roman policy in Illyricum are obscure. Evidently, there was an economic boom in the northwest Adriatic. Some distinguished Roman and Italian families like the Calpurnii Pisones or the A. Caecinae were buying land and establishing a strong position at the head of the Adriatic.\textsuperscript{43} The spread of vineyards in Istria certainly affected Liburnia as well and the economic enterprise of L. Tarius Rufus should be seen in that context.\textsuperscript{44} Links between the Baebii family and Illyricum in the last years of the Republic and the first years of the Principate were also established.\textsuperscript{45} There is no trace of any Roman road being built in this period,\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{39} Thomsen (1947) 26 ff. esp. 28-29 (Liburnia was part of Transpadana and enfranchised in 49 BC but included in Illyricum in 42 BC when Transpadana joined Italy); Kubitchev (1889) 105; (1925) (Liburnia part of Italy until the boundary was fixed on the river Arsia - Raša); Premerstein (1919) 1246-1247; (1924); Suić (1967) 36; Wilkes (1969) 489-490 (Liburnian cities with \textit{ius italicum} although provincial, were administered from Italy because of proximity); Wilkes (1996b) 551 (part of Transpadana after 27 BC and returned to Illyricum in 9 BC); Degrassi (1954) 94-100 (overview of different opinions). The problem is too complex to be dealt with here, but from archaeological evidence (the inscription mentioning Tamphilus Vála) it seems that Liburnia was part of Illyricum in the early Augustan period.

\textsuperscript{40} See this section, n. 9.

\textsuperscript{41} Pliny, \textit{HN} 3.139 ff., see Chapter 8.4.

\textsuperscript{42} Wilkes (1969) 330-331; Wiseman (1971) 264 no. 419. Syme (1939) 362 n.2 thought that he was Picene, because of his estates in Picenum. However, these estates were purchased, not ancestral, according to Pliny, \textit{HN} 18.37.

\textsuperscript{43} Wilkes (1969) 199-200, 331-332 n.6.

\textsuperscript{44} Pliny, \textit{HN} 14.60-61; Purcell (1985) 16, n.80.

which shows a lack of interest and perhaps lack of need, as the Adriatic was still a major communication link with Italy; large scale Roman road building in Illyricum starts only after the end of the Pannonian rebellion (Chapter 8.3).

From the scarce information available, we may conclude that Roman policy towards Illyricum in the 20s BC was intent upon consolidating Roman influence through the administration and organization of the province. Italian domination of the Dalmatian coast is now unchallenged. The territory was organized as a province, but direct Roman control did not penetrate any more deeply into the continent than in Republican times. The Iapodes and the Delmatae were now under firmer Roman control, and this period of peace can also be ascribed to the pacification of these troublesome peoples. Behind the coastal strip was a buffer zone made of disorganized and relatively harmless Pannonii and there were no outside factors, which would cause aggressive Roman treatment of the area. Thus, we can understand why Illyricum became a senatorial province in 27 BC, and why there was no reason for settling veterans there. Strategic thinking was still deeply Republican in essence, never ready to risk military engagements in the hinterland, unless the defensive needs of coastal settlements required the pacification of inland peoples. This, however, was in accordance with the generally defensive and inactive foreign policy mood in the West during that period. It would soon change.

6.3 The neighborhood of Illyricum in the 20s BC

Regardless of the closing of the doors of Ianus’ temple, and the peaceful mood prevailing throughout the Empire, some military activities were evident in the 20s. The new regime needed military success to establish itself more firmly; peace was just a political catchword.46 There are two areas of military operations that are strategically important, if not crucial, for the destiny of Illyricum and the Illyrian policy: the Alpine passes and the wider region of Macedonia – Moesia. The Alpine area had been for centuries a potential threat to the security of northern Italy, and it is quite obvious why Augustus wanted to put this region under firm control as early as possible. The campaigns of Antistius Vetus and Valerius Messala Corvinus against

46 Wells (1972) 5, 8; Schmitthenner (1962); Gruen (1985); Woolf (1993).
the Celtic Salassi in the Alps did not fully pacify this people. The task was completed only by A. Terentius Varro Murena in 25 BC.\footnote{Dio, 53.25.3-5; Strabo, 4.6.7 (C 205-206).}

On the eastern frontiers of Illyricum, M. Licinius Crassus, grandson of the triumvirs, fought successfully against the Thracians and the Getae in 29 BC, extended Roman influence towards Lower Moesia and earned a triumph.\footnote{Dio, 51.23-27.} He actually fought the Dacians and their allies and destroyed Dacian influence in Thrace and Moesia, but for propaganda purposes the facts were distorted and he celebrated a triumph over the Thracians and Getae.\footnote{Mócsy (1966); (1974) 23-24; Lica (2000) 124-129.} These campaigns on the western and eastern borders of Illyricum brought peace in the next decade and extended Roman influence towards the lower Danube and Alps. They brought no spectacular results or advance in Roman power, but changed the strategic situation in the area. Crassus’ campaign removed Dacian aggressive designs (real or not) against Thrace, and enabled Roman influence rather than Roman direct rule to extend further. Murena subjugated a rebellious people, which potentially threatened northern Italy and established a significant foothold for future Roman expansion in this area.

6.4 The winds of change in the early 10s: the Bella Augusta

The political situation in Rome and the Empire changed in this decade. Relative peace on the western and northern frontiers gave way to a sudden expansion of Roman power up to the Elbe and Danube. The theories emphasizing Augustus’ grand designs either for European (or ‘world’) conquest, or for the establishment of stable imperial borders are disregarded by some modern scholars who prefer to explain this expansion as a short-term reaction to a change in circumstances.\footnote{Gruen (1996) 195-196; Southern (1998) 155, see above p. 34.} There were many factors influencing this renewed imperialism (and which prevented its appearance earlier) such as the need to prove Augustus’ successors capable leaders, false notions of European and Central Asian geography, the need to present the vitality of an ‘ever expanding empire’ for propaganda purposes, and perhaps for the economic benefits of the conquest.\footnote{False geographical notions: Moynihan (1985); Nicolet (1991) 57-84; propaganda: Gruen (1986); (1996) 188-194; internal reasons for postponement: Syme (1939) 328-329; Roddaz (1984) 480-481 (including insufficient finances).} This new approach also included Republican understanding of border-defence, essentially based on the idea that peace can be achieved only by
pacifying and subduing potentially dangerous neighbors. However, it also departed from this approach in that annexation was used only as a last resort. These peoples were incorporated into the empire and Roman influence was further expanded. It was nevertheless still the expansion of Roman power rather than full-scale occupation, as the Roman army did not impose reliable administrative control over conquered territories in the first years of the expansion.

The Roman army was reorganized at that time. Veterans who had fought at Actium were demobilized and new recruits filled their ranks so that this new generation of soldiers, recruited 27 – 20 BC, reached its peak in 15 – 7 BC when Rome fought decisive wars in the Alps, Germany and Illyricum. Augustan military strategy was simply and efficiently based on ‘economy of force’; large concentrations of forces were used in order to knock down opponents, which made possible the maintenance of only a relatively small army. The push through the Alps during 16 – 13 BC was the first visible example of this renewed imperialism in practice, although we can also see the Alpine campaigns as a strategic necessity, because it was important to finally remove that permanent danger to North Italy. It was a relatively fast but also thorough process and it prepared the ground for long-term Roman engagement in the affairs of central Europe.

The border with Macedonia was again insecure. The victories of Crassus did not make much impact on the Scordisci and the Dentelethae who remained untouched by his campaign in 29 – 28 BC. The troubles with the Scordisci and Denthelethae arose in 16 BC, when they threatened the security of Macedonia and when the Sarmatians crossed the Danube at the same time. However, the next time we hear of the Scordisci was in 12 BC, when they appear on the stage as close allies.

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52 The strong argument of Syme (1933c) 14-21 and ff. cannot be questioned, although we can ask to what extent Augustus deliberately built a new army and to what extent it was just a change of generations in the army. On the other hand it is impossible to believe that the Roman army did replace soldiers en masse rather than gradually, because a large number of inexperienced soldiers would present a security risk. Cf. Raaflaub (1980) on the wider political consequences of Augustus’ military reforms.

53 Luttwak (1976) 15 ff. There were four army groups on the West at the time: two in Spain, one in Gaul and Illyricum; Ritterling (1925) 1218-1219 distinguishes the army group in Northern Italy from the army group in northern Illyricum. The argument of Syme (1933c) 22 n. 54 who recognizes only one army group in Illyricum, seems more likely, see this section n. 64.


56 Or, at least that is what Dio, 54.20.2-3 reports.
of Rome in the war against the Pannonii.\(^{57}\) There is an obvious problem for historiography in explaining why they suddenly changed sides and became Roman allies. Some unreliable sources\(^ {58}\) placed Tiberius in the vicinity of Thrace at this time, so some scholars have assumed that Tiberius accepted the Balkan command in 15 BC and conquered the Scordisci, operating from Macedonia or Pannonia.\(^ {59}\) Syme cautiously pointed out the unreliability of the sources and showed that that the subjugation of the Scordisci before the Pannonii was geographically impossible. He concluded that northern Moesia was probably conquered by an unknown general operating from Macedonia who brought the Scordisci into the alliance with Rome, either by diplomacy or by force.\(^ {60}\)

At the same time troubles arose in the northwest of Illyricum. The governor of Gaul, M. Lollius, had unexpected problems with the Germans and the situation for a moment became serious enough to cause Augustus to travel to Gaul.\(^ {61}\) The clades Lolliana made Augustus rethink his Alpine policy, as any potential invader from the north would threaten Italy by passing quickly through the Alpine passes that were not under Roman control. The governor of Illyricum, P. Sulpicius Nerva, was conducting a campaign in Cisalpine Gaul against the Alpine peoples of the Cammuni and the Vennii, located around Val Trompia and Val Camonica.\(^ {62}\) Whether Silius extended his operations into the Alpine passes as far as the valley of Upper Rhine, as a beginning of the Alpine operations that were to be conducted by Drusus and Tiberius the following year, or whether it was just a preventative or a defensive action is difficult to say from the available evidence.\(^ {63}\)

\(^{57}\) Dio, 54.31.3; Suet. Tib. 9.
\(^{58}\) Vell. Pat. 2.39.3 ; Euseb. Chron. 167f, 168b. Perhaps Eusebius confused Raetia and Thrace; Vulić (1907) 29-30.
\(^{60}\) Syme (1934a) 127-129; Wilkes (1965a) 15-16; Papazoglou (1978) 343. Papazoglou also pointed out that it is doubtful whether the Scordisci were really conquered, as they appear in 12 BC as free allies of Rome; Papazoglou (1978) 341; Vulić (1907) 31 ff. Perhaps they were in the position of an ally, as described in Dio, 53.12.8-9, 54.9; Lica (2000) 138-144. Also doubtful is how Tiberius can be both with Drusus conquering the Alpine peoples and fighting on the borders of Thrace in 15 BC; cf. narrative of Levick (1976) 27-28, n. 51.
\(^{61}\) Dio, 54.20.4-6; Vell. Pat. 2.97.1; Suet. Aug. 23.1; Tac. Ann. 1.10. Departing for Gaul, Augustus also enjoyed the company of Maecenas’ wife; Dio, 54.19.3.
\(^{62}\) The location of the Vennii is still not precisely determined; see the bibliography given in Gruen (1996) 169 n. 106.
\(^{63}\) Wells (1972) 63-66 allows the possibility that the campaign of Silius, which was much more extensive than as described by Dio, took more than a year, and started even before 16 BC. However, we think that the fact that the Illyrian governor was intervening in Italy suggests that this was a reaction to the defeat of Lollius.
When some scholars found the governor of Illyricum suddenly in Cisalpine Gaul they questioned whether he was governor of senatorial Illyricum at the same time, but the controversy can be explained. There was no army available immediately in Italy or its vicinity except the Illyrian army. The army in Gaul was in a state of high alert after the defeat of Lollius and the Spanish armies were too far away, and partly engaged in the short-lived Spanish rebellion. In light of Silius’ engagement in Cisalpina and the overstretched Illyrian legions, some Pannonians and Noricans, unidentified by Dio, plundered Histria in 16 BC, perhaps attracted by the area’s rising prosperity. However, it was nothing but a raid. Silius and his legates quickly repulsed them. The Romans first defeated the Pannonians and afterwards they collaborated in the pacification of the Noricans, finishing operations before the end of the year.

The subsequent annexation of Noricum remains very unclear because some of the sources contradict each other. The fact is that the old ally and client kingdom of Rome was suddenly annexed and made into a province, possibly under the pretext of the incursion of 16 BC. However, the sources do not mention the annexation specifically as an individual campaign, or in the context of the Alpine campaigns, when Tiberius and Drusus operated in the vicinity of Noricum. Most scholars accept 15 BC as the date of annexation, but it could be any time from 16 BC to AD 6. The annexation of Noricum is one more example of the way Roman policy changed and developed new strategies in changed circumstances. This antiquated ally, who had an important role in late Republican times, had no place in the renewed imperialism of the early Principate. On the other hand, this event was significant for Illyricum as the *deserta Boiorum* between Drava and upper Danube, including the important

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64 When he departed for Gaul Augustus left T. Statilius Taurus in charge of Rome and Italy; Dio, 54.19.6. If there was Italian army, Taurus would take charge of the fighting of the Camunii and Veneti.
65 Brief revolt in Spain; Dio, 54.20.3.
67 Silius began his campaign in Cisalpina in the summer, so there was enough time for him to return to Illyricum and deal with this incursion; Nagy (1991) 70.
68 For an overview of different opinions, see Alföldy (1974) 52 n.2; Gruen (1996) 171 n. 114; Šašel-Kos (1997b) 32. The annexation was peaceful, without any significant resistance, and it could easily be that at first the civil administration of the new province was performed by a local Vassalenfürst; Winkler (1977) 198, 200 n. 87.
settlement and stronghold of Carnuntum, was going to be joined to Illyricum and later Pannonia. It is very possible that the annexation of Histria to Italy and the fixing of the Italian border on the river Arsia was made in the context of the new border arrangements in Noricum.

6.5 The Bellum Pannonicum 12-9 BC: the reasons

With the advantage of historical hindsight we can recognize that the Bellum Pannonicum was a decisive stage in the development and final shaping of Roman Illyrian policy. It was part of the new strategic approach that finally broke with traditional policy based on indirect control of the hinterland. This change finally gave Romans the benefit of strategic depth in Illyricum instead of the previous policy which just maintained a strategic buffer zone. The full conquest of Illyricum certainly was part of Augustus’ new western policy, or what we have previously termed ‘the new imperialism’. Nevertheless, there were local reasons behind this war. The area became a security threat again in the mid-10s and Rome, as usual in this kind of situation, decided to pacify the area, this time once and for all, to prevent any further complications. Illyricum was dangerously close to Italy. The need for conquest was part of the need for security of Italy, as Roddaz puts it plainly: “Auguste et son étatmajor ont toujours été parfaitement conscients que la sécurité politique et militaire de l’Empire exigeait de nouvelles conquêtes.”

There is hardly any primary source material for these events, but the chronology can be reconstructed from Dio’s annalistic report. However, the main problems arise from the terminology used in Dio and Velleius Paterculus, our chief sources, as they persistently use the generic term ‘Pannonians’, which in fact encompasses many different peoples belonging to the Pannonii ethnic group north of the future Dalmato-Pannonian provincial frontier, such as the Breuci, Latobici, Andizetes, Colapiani, Amatini, etc.

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69 Tóth (1977) 283-284, fig. 2, see Chapter 8.2.
70 Degrassi (1954) 59-60.
71 As we saw the Romans often lacked decisiveness in Illyricum, but this time the existence of colonies and settlements on the coast was the decisive factor, which brought about an active response to these troubles.
72 Roddaz (1984) 479. Cf. Šašel (1976) 84 also recognizing the protective role of Illyricum for Noricum and North Italy after the conquest.
It is not necessary to repeat Syme’s argument, repeated and reinforced by Wilkes, which sees behind this new approach a wider and more elaborate plan to open the overland route from Italy to Macedonia and Asia, as it was certainly not a contemporary concern in the 10s. Roman links with Asia functioned perfectly well through the Brundisium – Apollonia sea-link and further on by way of the Via Egnatia. If the land-link was desired, it would be natural to expect that the Romans would use the safety of the tightly controlled Dalmatian coast for land-communications, rather than open a new communication line through the hostile and unknown interior. “Not until the middle course of the Danube had been secured could Rome hold and exploit the overland route between Italy and her Eastern territories”, wrote Wilkes. This happened at least three or four decades after the Bellum Pannonicum (Chapter 7.2). This was not a war for communications with the East, nor was it a war to establish links between the Danube and Rhine. These were the consequences rather than the reasons for the conquest. Perhaps more limited aims were in the mind of Augustus such as full control of the Sava valley, an important trade artery linking the Alps and lower Danube. The position of Illyricum remained awkward between the Moesian and Alpine advances, and the need for a change of policy arose. Furthermore, we cannot underestimate the need to secure Italy and the Dalmatian coast. The extension of Roman power and direct control of territory towards the Danube would ultimately solve this problem.

As stated above, the year 16 BC marks a definite change in Illyrian policy. Illyricum was set on fire after enjoying a decade of relative peace. The incursion of the Pannonii and Noricans showed, once again, the geographical vulnerability of North Italy. After repelling this incursion P. Silius Nerva and his legates also renewed the subjugation of the western Pannonii around Siscia who had made deditio to Octavian in 35 BC, whether they were directly involved in the attack or not. In the same context is mentioned the rebellion of the Dalmatians, which was

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74 Syme (1934b) 352-353; Wilkes (1965a) 13-14, recently strongly emphasized by Burns (2003) 196.
75 Despite the objection of Syme (1934b) 352-353. The governor of Illyricum was crossing the Adriatic comfortably in the middle of the winter sailing for Oricus, the harbour on the Macedonian-Ilyrian border, to resume his post; Prop. 1.8. See Rougé (1987) esp. 255-257 who convincingly underlines continuing significance of this sea passage for Rome.
76 Wilkes (1996b) 545.
77 The security of Italy; Roddaz (1984) 483. We should also note Velleius Paterculus’ awareness of how close to Italy the war was fought at 2.96.3 (bellum) ... vicinium imminebat Italiae. The reason of security is given in the part of the Res Gestae, which justifies the conquest of Illyricum (RG 30.1-2)
perhaps caused by these disturbances and an over-stretched army, and easily put down by the same proconsul or, more likely his legate whom he had left in Illyricum. There is mention of another rebellion of the Pannonians in 14 BC but nothing significant is attached to it by our sources. The current governor of Illyricum and his legates, probably without extensive fighting or resistance, extinguished it.

6.6 The Bellum Pannonicum: the conduct

The decisiveness of Augustus can be seen in the initial choice of commander for this operation. No one else but Agrippa himself was entrusted with the command in Pannonia. It is difficult to believe that Augustus used him to extinguish a merely local rebellion. More elaborate designs were hidden behind his mission. Dio gives a rough sketch of the chronology of the campaigns. Evidently, there were five separate campaigns in the Bellum Pannonicum, high intensity campaigns in 13 – 11 BC and the suppression of local rebellions in 10 and 9 BC. Agrippa set out on the first campaign in 13 BC and his approach initially calmed passions amongst the Pannonians, but his sudden death resulted in further native unrest. Since Dio does not imply that Agrippa was involved in any important military engagement, he might have preferred at first to quell unrest by means of his military reputation and diplomacy. Velleius and Florus add valuable additional information: M. Vinicius was the other commander and he was fighting the Pannonii who lived between the Sava and the Drava, most likely the powerful Breuci and their allies, who inhabited that area.

After the unexpected death of Agrippa, Tiberius carried on further operations in 12, 11, 10 and 9 BC as commander-in-chief. The first campaign seems to be the

contrast with the ‘civilizing factors’ which justify the conquest of the other Northern areas; Davis (2002) 261-262.
78 Dio, 54.20.3.
79 Dio, 54.24.3, but only those already under Roman power, i.e. those peoples who had invaded Histria two years earlier, unhappy with the new arrangements imposed by Silius; Nagy (1991) 73-74. Perhaps the governor in question was Vinicius; Roddaz (1984) 479 n. 12.
80 Roddaz (1984) 478 ff. It was a war waged against a previously unconquered peoples; Nagy (1991) 75.
81 Cf. Dio, 54.24.6 for the similarly fast submission of Bosporans to Agrippa in BC 14.
82 Vell. Pat. 2.96.2-3 states that Agrippa started the war and Tiberius finished it. Gruen (1996) 174-175 and Roddaz (1984) 483 regard Vinicius as proconsul of Illyricum who started the operations in 14 BC, prior to Agrippa’s departure. Nagy (1991) 74-75 puts the beginning of the campaign in 13 BC and suggests that Agrippa was called in only after Vinicius reached stalemate with the Breuci at the end of the year.
most important as he used the alliance with the Scordisci in order to defeat the Pannonians. The campaign was conducted against the Breuci – specifically named by Suetonius. They were the western neighbors of the Scordisci dwelling in the valley of the Sava. Tiberius disarmed the defeated Pannonians and sold prisoners into slavery, earning an *ovation* for these exploits.84 The disarmament of the Breuci and the enslavement of the prisoners of war appears an extraordinary measure compared with the usual Roman conduct against defeated subjects.85 We can only guess why Tiberius used extreme measures. Perhaps the punishment was intended to be an example to the other Pannonii as to what could happen if they rebelled against Rome. Syme, and after him Wilkes, regarded the conquest of the Sava valley as a crucial step in the ultimate success of the operations in the Bosnian mountains and Dalmatian hinterland.86 Tiberius campaigned in 11 BC from two directions, the Dalmatian coast and the valley of the Sava, and fought simultaneously on two fronts.87 Unfortunately we do not know if he fought the same opponents as in 12 BC, or, more probably, the term Pannonians was only a generic term and Tiberius in fact fought different peoples. The most probable reconstruction is that he first fought the Breuci and their allies in Slavonia in 12 BC, but after they were defeated and seriously weakened, it seems that subsequent operations in 11 BC were carried out in Bosnia and the Dinaric Alps against the Daesidiates and Mezaei.88 Dio suggests that

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84 Dio, 54.31.2-4; Suet. Tib. 9. The alliance with the Celtic Scordisci supports the impression that Roman campaigns and reprisals were centred mainly on the Pannonii, without touching Celtic groups in the area such as the Boii or the Eravisci as Celtic peoples do not appear in the description of campaigns of 12-9 BC nor during the rebellion in AD 6-9; Wilkes (1996a) 417. Syme (1971) 22 does not exclude the possibility of a Roman general operating from Macedonia/Moesia together with the Scordisci.

85 Brunt (1975) 260, 269-270. However, there were some similar situations such as Agrippa and the Cantabri in Spain 19 BC; Dio, 54.11.5-6.

86 Syme (1934b) 355; (1971) 19, 21; Wilkes (1965b) 118-119; (1969) 62. Swoboda (1937) 296-305 using geo-strategic and military factors strongly argued against any other advance in Bosnia except southwards from the valley of the Sava. He draws the ideas from Austro-Hungarian experience in the occupation of Bosnia in 1878 (dating the conquest of the Breuci wrongly in the context of Octavian’s expedition 35-33 BC). Contra Miltner (1937) 208 ff. who sees the *Bellum Pannonicum* waged north of the Sava, extending Roman conquest up to the Danube as early as 10 BC, but that opinion is effectively refuted by Tóth (1977); Fitz (1977).

87 Dio, 54. 34.3-4; Wilkes (1965b) 118-119; (1969) 64. It is not necessary to insist, as Wilkes does, on Tiberius being able to manoeuvre himself through Iapodean and Liburnian country. It seems rather that some other legate commanded the forces from Dalmatia while Tiberius commanded those from the valley of the Sava.

88 Syme (1971) 22; Nagy (1991) 78-79. Perhaps Mócsy (1962) 530, 534-536; (1974) 21 was overenthusiastic to see a united Pannonii as the political power, which replaced Dacian overlordship over Pannonia, (refuted clearly by Papazoglu (1978) 339 n.206). Certainly Romans fought one by one the Pannonian peoples (or a loose alliance led by the Breuci or Daesitiates) rather than faced a unified force. Pašalić (1956) 276, 297 is opposed to the idea that Tiberius entered the area of modern-day Bosnia during this period, for a lack of direct evidence. Regardless of whether Tiberius waged war there at
his subsequent campaigns in 10 and 9 BC followed the pattern of pacifying the Pannonians and Dalmatians who would always rebel after Tiberius departed from Illyricum.89

In 11 BC the legal status of Illyricum changed from a senatorial province to an imperial one.90 It marked a legal recognition of the important shift in Rome’s Illyrian policy. Wilkes argued that the imperial provincia Illyricum had come into existence already in 13 BC when Agrippa and Vinicius attacked the Pannonians, and that it encompassed the Sava and Drava region outside Dalmatia. He tried to explain the change in 11 BC as the union of Illyricum with Dalmatia because the military situation required coordinated military action from Pannonia and Dalmatia.91 While the necessity for coordinated action, especially in light of the Dalmatian rebellion, seems quite reasonable as Tiberius’ tactic, the administrative part of the explanation is not. It is obvious that Dio was looking from his 2nd century perspective, and distinguishing Dalmatia and Pannonia as separate provinces, when he states that Dalmatia was given to Augustus because of the neighboring Pannonians and due to potential problems in Dalmatia itself. He himself stated that at that time provinces were larger than in his time; on the other hand, Agrippa, when departing for Illyricum already had extraordinary imperium, overriding the imperium of the local governor.92 Augustus used to hand out extraordinary commands in this period to members of his household, e.g. Tiberius and Drusus in the Alps. Agrippa, and Tiberius after him, were both sent to Pannonia to coordinate military efforts so that there would be no clash of authority with the local governor. There was already a governor of Illyricum – Vinicius, on the spot, fighting the Pannonians. Therefore, there is no reason to see a Pannonian command independent of Dalmatia before or after 11 BC. Augustus is clear in that respect; he extended already existing borders –

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89 Mócsy (1962) 540-541 was perhaps right in concluding that the Bellum Pannonicum lasted only one year 12 BC, and that all subsequent campaigns were actually to extinguish local rebellions, and mop up the resistance as Dio appears to say. ‘Dalmatians’ for Dio does not mean the Delmatae but the Pannonii south of the Sava; Nagy (1991) 77-78.
90 Dio, 54.34.4; 53.12.7. Hanslik (1961b) 115 sees Vinicius as a first legatus Augusti pro praetore of Illyricum.
91 Wilkes (1965a) 17-18; (1965b) 119. Nagy (1991) 79 following Ritterling (1925) 1218 explains this event as a merging of senatorial Dalmatia with panon-illyrischen Militärdistrict. Syme (1939) 394 n.2 – Illyricum, an imperial province already in 12 BC.
92 Dio, 53.12.8, in the early principate the provinces were administered together. Dio, 54.28.1 – Agrippa’s extraordinary imperium.
protulique fines Illyrici ad ripam fluminis Danui. They were both part of the Illyrian command and Agrippa was commander-in-chief. In 11 BC Augustus regarded the situation as unsettled. He feared new rebellions and Dacian raids, so no wonder he formally transferred the command to himself. On the other hand he transferred full command of the increased number of legions, who were concentrated in Illyricum, into the safe hands of an imperial legate. Finally, it was necessary to organize the newly annexed territory, a significant task that had to be controlled by Augustus.

The danger from the Pannonians and Dalmatians in 11 BC was surely overestimated by Augustus and his advisors, but the Dacian incursion in 10 BC certainly made the Romans worry. However, it appears to have been just a raid. The Dacians were worried about the extension of Roman influence and used the opportunity to plunder disarmed and helpless Pannonians. This provided a good opportunity for Romans to bind some of the Pannonians more tightly to themselves in view of the Dacian danger. Tiberius had fewer and fewer problems in extinguishing the subsequent rebellions of 10 and 9. The rebels were newly subjected Pannonii in modern-day Bosnia. In the last campaign of 9 BC he had time in the summer of the same year to join his dying brother in Germany. The reason for these rebellions lay in the very nature of Roman conquest; armies subdued new subjects and withdrew without imposing military or civilian control, so the conquered people rebelled as soon as the Roman army went to winter quarters.

6. 7 The aftermath of the Bellum Pannonicum

The Bellum Pannonicum was a key event in the history of Roman relations with Illyricum. The old-fashioned Republican policy based on a buffer zone in the Dinaric Alps was finally and decisively replaced with imperial expansion towards the

93 RG 30.1, cf. 26.1. Certainly, the Danube in this context should be properly understood; Tóth (1977).
94 Dio, 54.34.3-4 states that status of Dalmatia (i.e. Illyricum) changed after Tiberius’ campaign in that year. In fact, it is possible that the transfer of the province corresponds with the Dacian raid in 10 BC. The raid must have happened between two Roman campaigns, because the Romans did not meet Dacians on the battlefield.
95 Dio, 54.36.2; Nagy (1991) 81-82.
96 Miltner (1937) 213 ff. connects the Roman incursion of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus against the Dacians (Flor. 2.28 ff.; Tac. Ann. 4.44) suggested in RG 30 with 10 BC. The majority of modern scholars oppose this opinion but no precise date has yet been determined; Syme (1934a) 115 ff.; Mócsy (1962) 543; Lica (2000) 129 ff.
97 Dio, 54.36.3 (rebellion of the Dalmatians in 10 BC), 55.2.4 (Tiberius’ last campaign 9 BC).
Danube, which gave strategic depth and geo-strategic advantage to the Roman position in Illyricum. It was much easier to control the plains of Pannonia as a buffer zone rather than the Dinaric Alps, once the latter were under full Roman control. An enlarged Illyricum strengthened the imperial frontier and linked Illyrian-Pannonian advances with the advances in Moesia and the Alps. It is still doubtful whether this was a deliberate plan from the beginning, or just the most positive outcome of Roman intervention, but Agrippa’s presence in the first campaign at least showed the decisiveness of Augustus in dealing with Illyricum. It was a relatively brief and easy war, despite Velleius calling it *magnum atroxque*. Except for the campaign of 12 BC when the Romans were subduing the valley of the Sava, and possibly the next one in 11 BC when they were subduing the interior of Bosnia, our sources do not speak of particularly large problems for the Roman army, although that would be expected considering the nature of the country. The sources do not mention conquered nations or conquered cities, which is strange in the light of the Roman passion for cataloguing conquered nations.\(^9\) Their silence paints a picture of a sparsely inhabited country. Certainly, at this stage the Romans were not yet in a position to rule directly over these areas. After receiving *deditio* from individual peoples, they dealt with friendly chieftains who were in some measure Romanized and thus not particularly opposed to Roman rule.\(^10\) The *Bellum Pannonicum* created a large zone of semi-pacified client-states stretching from Drava to the hinterland of the Adriatic, who were now included in the provincial framework.\(^11\)

Nevertheless, the final result is obvious – Illyricum expanded from the Dalmatian coast deeply into the continent, reaching over the banks of the Drava into the Pannonian plains. While the colonies and cities on the Dalmatian coast actually benefited from this war, gaining security and increasing prosperity, the Pannonian interior was devastated by the war and its consequences. Illyricum was extended far beyond its previous frontiers. It encompassed the Dinaric Alps and the valley of the Sava, and Roman influence stretched all the way to the Danube.\(^12\)

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\(^9\) Cf. Mattern (1999) 162-168. Pliny’s description of Pannonia is also very brief. There is no mention of any Pannonian cities; *HN* 3.147.

\(^10\) There was a certain degree of romanization amongst the Pannonian elite at this time; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.110.5.

\(^11\) Perhaps, the framework imposed to the Pannonii outside former ‘lesser’ Illyricum was not so different from the *proto-provincial* framework imposed to the coastal areas in times of Caesar.

\(^12\) Again, it is difficult to determine precisely the northern boundaries of Illyricum in 9 BC. *Res Gestae* 30.1 mentions control of the Danube, a conclusion we can broadly agree with, from the
now turned to organizing new areas and advancing the northern borders; these huge spaces opened up to traders and colonists. The future looked bright in 8 BC and it must have seemed very improbable that Illyricum would ever require the special attention of Roman policy planners.

_evidence we have. Modern scholarship agrees that the advance to the middle Danube happened slowly and without much resistance after 8 BC when the elderly Sex. Appuleius was put in command of the Illyrian armies; Syme (1934a) 357-358; Wilkes (1969) 66. That ‘slow advance’ towards the Danube was perhaps much slower than previously thought, extending well into the 1st century AD; Fitz (1977); Tóth (1977); Ridley (2003) 154-157, see Chapter 7.2._
7. **The failure of Greater Illyricum: The Bellum Batonianum**

7.1 **Introduction**

The great Pannonian Rebellion of AD 6 – 9 was one of the most significant events, if not the most significant one in the history of the political relationship between Rome and Illyricum. Its significance went far beyond local, provincial history; it shaped the future foreign policy conduct of the early Principate, and perhaps, combined with the aftermath of the *clades Variana* in the Teutoburg forest, caused a sudden end to Roman expansion in north and central Europe. This uprising considerably affected both systems in their interaction; it brought destruction and devastation to almost every corner of Illyricum, and for the first time in many years, even Italy feared the external enemy. This was the first rebellion of this kind after the end of the Republic that seriously undermined Roman confidence and Rome’s position in its newly occupied territories.

These events were not a separate phase of Roman Illyrian policy, but we need to examine it in a more detail as a direct consequence of the political framework defined as Greater Illyricum. Although the final result was Roman victory and the ultimate establishment of Roman rule, the rebellion and its scale and ferocity is the result of the monumental failure of the previous policy. It made Romans seriously rethink their previous arrangements and devise new ones. The most important consequence was the post-rebellion division of Illyricum into the provinces of *Illyricum inferius*, later Dalmatia, and *Illyricum superius*, later Pannonia. This was an administrative-geographical, but not ethnic, division, which was to have long lasting consequences for the destiny of Illyricum, and which would stretch into the period of the later Empire with minor changes. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Modern scholarship tends to overlook the ethnic character of the rebellion and to avoid emphasizing its significance.\(^1\) The bulk of the rebels belonged to the peoples known to ancient writers as the Pannonii.\(^2\) No other neighboring ethnic group in Illyricum is said by our sources to join the Pannonii in the rebellion. The location of the main battles and movements of the Roman army and the rebels are limited to the areas inhabited by the Pannonii, as will be shown.

The sources for the period between the *Bellum Pannonicum* and the *Bellum Batonianum* are extremely scarce. Dio’s account is preserved partially in dry but useful reports, and Velleius Paterculus seems to be not much interested in the period because his hero, Tiberius, was not on the stage. For the rebellion, these two writers still remain the key sources of information, with important additional bits and pieces found in Suetonius, Strabo and the elder Pliny. Both key sources have been criticized for inadequacy and partiality by modern scholars, especially Velleius Paterculus for his ignorance of the events of which he did not have a personal experience. Velleius relied too much on rumors and facts he heard from other people. He was uninterested in and took no particular care of things that did not exalt Tiberius’ deeds.\(^3\) Dio’s otherwise continuous narrative breaks into two parts, and a lacuna in text omits events from the middle of AD 8. It has been suggested that he used an unidentified source heavily biased towards Germanicus, which often distorted facts in favour of the young prince and minimized Tiberius’ achievements.\(^4\) Dio’s account also has its good and bad sides. Modern scholars have criticized him for confused chronology and lack of military knowledge, but have praised him for objectivity and the broader picture.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Pašalić (1956) sensed a decisive ethnic component in the uprising even before linguistics established links between the Delmatae and Pannonii; cf. also Benac (1991).

\(^2\) See above p. 53.

\(^3\) See Vulić (1911) 201-202; Rau (1925) 316, Syme (1934b) 340; Mócsy (1983) 173-174 for criticism of Velleius Paterculus. Wilkes (1965b) 112-114 recognised Velleius’ failure to see the bigger picture behind his own experiences. He was especially unreliable in reporting events on the Moesian border, but still well informed of the events that took place closer to him on the western front. Köstermann (1953) 346 and Pašalić (1956) 253-256 are generally more positive about Velleius, as well as Woodman (1977) 153-183.

\(^4\) Rau (1925) 314-315 recognized two sources of Dio: one, an eyewitness from Germanicus’ circle and a second secondary source hostile to Tiberius.

\(^5\) Vulić (1911) 200-204; (1926) 62; Saria (1930) 92-93 (positive); Rau (1925) 314-315; Swoboda (1932) 34-36 (negative). Pašalić (1956) 256-267 gives a balanced opinion on Dio, with all the positive and negative sides of his account.
7.2 Prelude to the rebellion (the Greater Illyricum 8 BC-AD 6)

The renewed imperialism of the early Principate at first resulted in success on all fronts, one following the other. Romans imposed their overlordship over the Alpine area, over Germany up to the Elbe, Pannonia up to the Danube and Moesia, in the first two decades. Despite some personal problems with military leadership – the death of Drusus and the departure of Tiberius for Rhodes, Augustus still had a strong army and capable generals to command it. Two major focal points of Roman foreign policy after the Bellum Pannonicum and the expansion into Germany were the Dacian kingdoms and an even more formidable opponent – the kingdom of Maroboduus in Bohemia. In time Roman armies strategically encircled the Marcommanic kingdom in Bohemia and in AD 6 everything was ready for its final elimination.\(^6\) As we noted in the previous chapter, Roman expansion into central and northern Europe was more an expansion of influence than a full annexation of these territories. Some scholars have assumed that Romans already overextended their forces with these conquests, but it seems more likely that the military system of the early Principate, defined by Luttwak as ‘the concentration of force’, was actually well suited to further expansion, and that reasons for slowing down the expansion lay elsewhere.\(^7\)

Not much is known about the situation in Illyricum after 8 BC. The evidence is scattered and rather uncertain. It is, after all, unclear where the northern frontier of Illyricum was at this time. Augustus claims in a famous line from the Res Gestae that his power reached the Danube, and the majority of scholars support the idea that Transdanubia (the plains between the rivers Drava and Danube) was joined to Illyricum in the Bellum Pannonicum or shortly after.\(^8\) Still, some authors like Fitz and Tóth plausibly argue that the Romans had not yet established their frontier on the Danube at this time and there are a couple of strong arguments to support this view. No sources mention campaigns in Transdanubia north of the Drava, Pannonia had no significant economic or strategic value for Romans nor did its inhabitants

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\(^7\) Luttwak (1976) 7-50. Overextension is implied by Syme (1934b) 340. There are many works dealing with the sudden end of Roman expansion emphasizing different reasons, such as logistics; Fulford (1992), or socio-cultural differences; Cunliffe (1988) 174-177.

\(^8\) RG 30, imperio populi Romani subieci protulique fines Illyrici usque ad ripam fluminis Danui; Fitz (1977) n.2 for earlier works written on the subject.
pose any threat to Roman interests. The native people of the Eravisci continued to mint their own coinage for a long time. From this lack of evidence it seems reasonable to delay the dating of the conquest for a while, at least until the campaigns of Ahenobarbus, Vinicius and Lentulus, discussed below, or even later. Even then, it is not absolutely clear whether Romans formally annexed Transdanubia before Augustus died, or just exercised strategic control over the area, without providing any administration until the reign of Claudius.

Despite uncertainty over just where its northern frontier lay, imperial Illyricum was a huge province. Noricum was probably under the Illyrian administration for some time, especially in military matters. Such a large area was very difficult to administer efficiently, and it does not seem that much administrative reorganization was done very far inland from the coast. Illyrian governors had more military tasks than administrative ones. Some military bases were established and colonies of military veterans were planted in the area after 9 BC, probably at Poetovium and Siscia, and, as some scholars have speculated, there was an unnamed veteran settlement somewhere in central Bosnia. It is possible that some military praefecti civitatum were already in position to control the most troublesome of the conquered peoples, but again, unfortunately, no epigraphic or written source exists to confirm this before the rebellion, so it is likely that most of them were introduced after the rebellion. It is also certain that Romans tried to administer the province through the local nobility, retaining the pre-Roman political structure but slowly introducing elements of Roman administration (Chapter 8.2). While the Dalmatian coast and hinterland enjoyed the benefits of peace, the north remained a zone of military operations, which supported preliminary actions against the kingdom of Maroboduus. We can only assume the stronger economic presence of Roman/Italian traders and businessmen inside the continent from the fact that they were the first victims of the rebels in AD 6. It is also significant that

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9 This is an old opinion of Mommsen CIL III, p. 415 after RG 5.21 defended convincingly by Fitz (1977) 543-545 and Tóth (1977). Low economic value of Pannonia; Mócsy (1962) 541-542.
10 Fitz (1977) 551-555 puts the final Roman conquest of the Transdanubia in the context of Sarmatian settlement in the mid-1st century AD; cf. Tóth (1977).
11 Emphasized strongly by Tóth (1980) 83-86, see below p. 162
12 Poetovio, Siscia; Wilkes (1969) 63 n. 6. For a supposed veteran settlement, see Chapter 7.4 n. 33.
13 Wilkes (1977) 742 assuming that they were in place after AD 9.
14 Vell. Pat. 2.110.5, not unlike Italian traders in Asia Minor 88 BC. They were conducting their business in the Pannonian lowlands rather than in the Bosnian mountains; Köstermann (1953) 348-349.
archaeology has not found any trace of the construction of major Roman roads built in Illyricum in this time.

It is commonly assumed that the known legates for Illyricum in the period 8 BC – AD 5 were, in chronological order (but perhaps not in unbroken succession): Sex. Appuleius, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 16 BC), M. Vinicius (cos. 16 BC), Cn. Cornelius Lentulus. We can accept Appuleius and possibly Vinicius with a caution, and we can assume that Vinicius made a deep incursion, crossing the Danube with the army of Illyricum as a part of campaigns intended to encircle Maroboduus. The role of Ahenobarbus and Lentulus as hypothetical legates for Illyricum is based on very questionable evidence. Dio states that Ahenobarbus, while ‘governing the districts along the Ister’ (not specifying upper or middle Danube), intercepted wandering Hermunduri, settled them in Marcomannian territory, crossed the river Albis, set up an altar to Augustus and transferred his headquarters to the Rhine. For Lentulus, the situation is even more scattered and obscure. He intervened in Dacia, was engaged in fighting on the lower Danube, and received triumphal insignia for his victories against the Getae.

The situation throughout the empire immediately preceding the rebellion was generally tense: fiscal deficit, rebellions in Isauria and Africa, piracy in Sardinia, famine and fire in Rome and the conspiracy of Publius Plautius Rufus, which worried rather than seriously threatened the regime. At the start of the rebellion the Illyrian army with its governor, praepositus Illyrico M. Valerius Messala Messalinus (cos. 3 BC), was stationed with Tiberius in Carnuntum, which was intended to be the southern operational wing for an approaching Roman

15 Syme (1934a) 128-134; (1934b) 364 ff.; Wilkes (1969) 67-69; Mócsy (1974) 35-36. Dobó (1958) 16-20 (nos. 3-5) places Vinicius in 10-9 BC, Appuleius in 8-7 BC and Ahenobarbus in 6 BC-AD 1. 16 The sources are the main problem. Of Appuleius we can be certain; Cassiodorus; MGH, Chron. Min. 1, 135 and for Vinicius a fragmentary inscription from Tusculum ILS 8965 mentions a certain ...cius as the legate of Illyricum operating against the Bastarnae across the Danube. Syme (1933b) 144 ff. makes strong arguments in favour of Vinicius as the unknown legate over the other candidates, although without providing a reliable answer as to why Velleius Paterculus omitted to mention this achievement of his patron’s grandfather; (1933b) 147. 17 Klemenc (1961) 5-6 sees this action as prevention of Maroboduus’ expansion in the Hungarian plains and separation of the Quadi and the Dacians. 18 Dio, 55.10a.2-3. 19 Flor. 2.28-9 confirmed by RG 30-31; Strabo, 7.3.11 (C 304); Tac. Ann. 4.44. Syme (1934a) dates Lentulus as a legate in Illyricum in AD 1-4. 20 Dio, 55.24.9-28.4. Publius Rufus; Dio, 55.27.2, Plautius Rufus; Suet. Aug. 19.
invasion of the Marcommanic kingdom. Only minor forces were stationed in the rear, close to the Dalmatian coast.  

7.3 Reasons for the rebellion

We do not know much about the reasons for this uprising apart from those given by our sources. The explanation of Velleius Paterculus that long years of peace made Pannonians suddenly restless and eager to rebel cannot be taken seriously.  

Dio, on the other hand, suggested the large amount of tribute given to be the key factor in Dalmatian anger. Since the exaction of tribute influenced the short-lived rebellion of the Pannonii in Dalmatia in 10 BC, and since the economic situation throughout the Empire was generally serious in AD 5 – 6, Dio’s explanation sounds reasonable enough. The other apparent external reasons are linked with the previous one: administrative cruelty and the incompetence of Roman administrators as well as the greed of negotiatores and publicani in the exploitation of the province.

There was something else, much more difficult to see and define, and that is the growing resentment of the Pannonii. Dyson compared the situation in Illyricum before the bellum Batonianum with Vercingetorix’s Gaul in the late 50s BC and finds common reasons for both uprisings. His sharp observation deserves to be quoted in full:

“The province was undergoing Romanization and the interior regions were getting the first real sense of what Roman

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21 Vell. Pat. 2.109.5; Dio, 55. 30.1. It is commonly assumed that the army of Illyricum consisted of 5 legions at that time: IX Hispana, XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina, XV Apollinaris and XX; Syme (1933a) 33; Wilkes (1969) 92. At the outbreak of the war the first four were with Tiberius and legion XX, insufficiently filled, semiplena, was in its base at Burnum, see below p. 151.
22 Vell. Pat. 2.110.2 ... universa Pannonia, insolens longae pacis bonis .... Velleius was following traditional political theories rather than just being contemptuous towards Tiberius’ enemies; Woodman (1977) 157.
23 Dio, 55.29.1; Köstermann (1953) 346 n.3. We need to remember the different definition of Dalmatians and Pannonians used by sources, see Chapter 2.5.2 n. 115. For Dio, the Dalmatians and Pannonians are inhabitants of the administrative provinces Dalmatia and Pannonia, not the Delmatae and Pannonii, while for Velleius they are ethnic groups. Cf. Mócsy (1962) 547; (1983) 174-175.
24 Dio, 54.36.2.
25 Dio, 55. 24.9-25.
26 Dio, 56.16.3. Maladministration in the provinces continued in the early principate e.g. Q. Varus in Syria quam pauper diviinem ingessus dives pauperem reliquit Vell. Pat. 2.107.2-3. See Brunt (1961) 216 ff. Some scholars emphasized simplistically the uncontrolled greed of Roman businessmen;
conquest meant for native customs and power structure. There was a native leadership class intact and this apparently had had some contact with Roman military skills. Like the Gallic assemblies, joint levies for armed service must have given the natives some sense of strength and unity. This plus the increasingly uprooted and desperate psychological state of a people undergoing cultural change, created the ‘nativistic atmosphere’ that helped to overcome local differences and produce a unity that completely surprised the Romans.”

It is what Dyson calls “nativistic atmosphere” that played the role of catalyst in Illyricum. The Pannonii shared a common destiny after being conquered, in that they shared a common frustration with sudden social change. This frustration was combined with a sense of ethnic unity, which in turn created ethnic homogenization and xenophobia resulting in a polarization between ‘us’ (Pannonii) and ‘them’ (Romans and all others collaborating with Roman government). Those elements united most conservative elements amongst the Pannonii and gave an impetus towards the rebellion.

It has been pointed out that provincials often showed resistance to Roman rule in the early Principate, which sometimes turned into rebellion when Romans attempted to draft them into service in distant provinces. This was indeed such a situation and it would be no surprise if the draft of Dalmatians for the war against Marobrodus was the final spark needed to ignite an already explosive situation in Illyricum (Figure 3).

Šašel (1974c) 8 (=Šašel (1992) 512), or the native wish for freedom; Bojanovski (1988) 49 as important causes of the rebellion.


28 Brunt (1974b) 104 ff.

29 Dio, 55.29.2-3. Mócsy (1983) 173-174 goes too far in describing this revolt as a blunder of Tiberius, in that he insisted on using Pannonian auxiliaries against Marobrodus. Tiberius did not introduce conscription in Pannonia. The causes of rebellion were much more complex, see Figure 3.
FIGURE 3 *The factors creating Pannonian resentment in AD 6*

Difficult economic situation

Increased taxes

War with Marobroduus

Mobilization

Administrative cruelty/incompetence

Common frustration with social change

Xenophobia

Awareness of strength

Sense of cultural and ethnic unity

Joint levies

*Pannonii*
7.4 The beginning of the revolt: numbers, actors, aims

The most prominent peoples in this rebellion are, according to our sources: the Daesitiates, Breuci, Pirustae, Mezaei and Delmatae, no doubt with other unmentioned smaller peoples supporting, or being compelled to support them. Whether any other ethnic group supported the rebellion remains an unknown and highly questionable matter. The names of three rebel leaders are known. They were the Daesitiate princeps Bato, his Breucian namesake, and one Pinnes. Evidently, the uprising was swift and a surprise for the Roman military, who did not expect it, just like Gaul in 52 BC or Britain in AD 60. Romans sustained losses in the beginning; some citizens and traders as well as a detachment of veterans paid the ultimate price at the hands of the rebels. The rebels were an incoherent mass of many Pannonian peoples, although some of them had already been trained in Roman methods of combat; it is amazing how they achieved such a level of organization and relative unity in such a short time. Dio is specific in describing the situation at the beginning. This rebellion was not planned in advance; it was just an emotional outburst which might have become a rebellion, or not. The initial
defeat of a small Roman detachment by the Daesitiates, however encouraged other Pannonii to join the uprising.\footnote{36}

The numerical strength of the rebels is estimated by Velleius at 200,000 \textit{colligebantur armis habilia} foot soldiers, and 9,000 cavalry recruited out of a total population of 800,000.\footnote{37} Modern authorities have failed to criticize Velleius for this huge exaggeration, which is typical for ancient writers.\footnote{38} Modern scholarship estimates the population of the Roman province of Dalmatia to have been 700,000 and, excluding Roman colonies and peoples like the Liburni, Iapodes or southern Illyrians, who did not take part in the rebellion, there were only 400,000 or even fewer inhabitants.\footnote{39} While these numbers are nothing more than approximations, even if we take into account the population of rebellious peoples from Pannonia,\footnote{40} there is no way by any criterion that their total number could be much over 100,000 men. In fact, according to the estimate given in Figure 4, it looks reasonable to estimate rebel forces at a maximum of 90,000 -100,000 foot soldiers, even if mobilization\footnote{41} was as high as two thirds of all militarily capable males (which we doubt)\footnote{42} and 9,000 cavalry. As previously noted, the account of Velleius is influenced by his own point of view as a contemporary witness of the events. Thus we should not be surprised if there really was at that time a rumor circulating in Rome that 200,000 savage and fierce Pannonians were ready to invade Italy at any moment.

AD were not an ideologically led and motivated army. Cf. a slightly different line of criticism by Pašalić (1956) 269-270 n.40.\footnote{36} Dio, 55.29.2-3. Velleius Paterculus blames Pannonians in general for starting the rebellion 2.110.2 but that can be explained by his general approach (as Pannonia was the main battlefield in his account) rather than care for particular details as to whether the uprising started in Pannonia or Dalmatia. Cf. Köstermann (1953) 347.\footnote{37} Vell. Pat. 2.110.3.\footnote{38} Pašalić (1956) 246; Mócsy (1983) 177 n.46 have some doubts.\footnote{39} Alföldy (1965a) 24, 29 n. 17 600-700,000 with 200-300,000 who did not rebel. Wilkes (1977) 752-753 puts the total at 700,000.\footnote{40} We need to count only peoples living between the valleys of Sava and Drava, not the whole of Pannonia. We cannot agree either with Köstermann (1953) 347, who maintains that Pannonians made up the bulk of the rebels, and that they supplied an equal number of rebels, as Alföldy (1965a) 29 n. 17, suggests. The Dalmatians made up the bulk of the rebels; Mócsy (1962) 543.\footnote{41} The Pannonians perhaps had a higher level of mobilization, as initially fighting was limited only to southern Pannonia, and they suffered famine (Vell. Pat.2.112.3), which also spread into Dalmatia; Dio, 55.33.1. Cf. Vell. Pat. 2.112.2, when Messalinus defeated Bato the Daesitiate and the bulk of the Dalmatian army is estimated at 20,000 men. Also App. Ill. 22 mentions only 100,000 Pannonii capable of bearing arms.\footnote{42} According to Brunt (1987) 66, c. 50% of Roman citizens liable for service were drafted into the armed forces during the most dangerous years of the 2nd Punic war. There were still plenty of slaves and \textit{proletarii} remaining to produce essential food, a luxury the Pannonii certainly did not have.
FIGURE 4 Approximate numbers of the Pannonian rebels

4.1 The peoples involved in the uprising and their approximate male population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civitates</th>
<th>Decuriae</th>
<th>Involvement in the uprising</th>
<th>Total (adult males)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delmatae</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>34,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deures</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Assumed</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditiones</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>23,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mezaei</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>26,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardeatae</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Assumed</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerauni</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Confirmed (the Pirustae)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daorsi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daesititates</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dacleatae</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deretini</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Assumed</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deramistae</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dindari</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glintidiones</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melcumani</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narensii</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scirtari</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Confirmed (the Pirustae)</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardiaei</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siculotae</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Confirmed (the Pirustae)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breuci, Amantini, Andizetes, Colapiani, Latobici</td>
<td>Max. 600(^{45})</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Max. 60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total adult males</th>
<th>Southern Illyrians and Dindari (not rebelling)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salona Conventus</td>
<td>206,700</td>
<td>-30,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narona Conventus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pannonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{43}\) This table is based on Pliny’s list of peregrine civitates in Dalmatia and the number of their decuriae HN 3.142-144, on the assumption that 1 decuria of Pliny represents 100 adult males, Beloch (1886) 238 ff.; Wilkes (1977) 752-753, and on the assumption that only the Pannonii were involved in the uprising as argued above. This methodology might be questioned as Beloch might be wrong in assigning 100 adult males to one decuria, but taking in account population density of 10-12 inhabitants/km\(^2\) (like pre-Roman Belgic Gaul, Wightman (1985) 32-33) numbers should not be much different for the territory of 71,000 km\(^2\) approximately inhabited by the Pannonii.

\(^{44}\) The Pirustae were broken into the civitates of Cerauni, Scirtari and Siculotae after the rebellion, cf. Alföldy (1965a) 50-53; Wilkes (1969) 157, see Chapter 8.4.

\(^{45}\) This is an assumption only, as Pliny does not give number of decuriae for the Pannonian civitates. The Breuci were broken into smaller civitates after the rebellion; Möcsy (1962) 606; (1974) 53-55, and we estimate that before the rebellion the Breuci were at least equal in numbers to the largest civitas in Dalmatia (the Delmatae – 342 decuriae) and, by the addition of the Amantini, Andizetes, Iasi and Colapiani, made a maximum of 600 decuriae. The figure for the Breucian population is also influenced by the fact that they were missing a large number of males in the age group of 35-45 years, who had been sold into slavery by Tiberius in 11 BC; Dio, 54.31.2-4.
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4.2 Adult male population

| Adult males in rebelling civitates | 176,400 |
| Population older than 46⁴⁶ | 44,100 | 25% |
| Adult population of military age | 132,200 | 75% |

4.3 Mobilization rate⁴⁷

| Adult population of military age | 132,200 |
| Rate of mobilization 66% | 88,200 | 83,800-92,620 |
| Rate of mobilization 50% | 66,600 | 63,270-69,930 |

4.4 Final estimate (numbers rounded)

| Soldiers (total) | 63,000-92,500 |
| Foot soldiers | 54,000-83,500 |
| Cavalry | 9,000 |

It is uncertain what the initial aims of the rebels were, besides attacks on the nearest Roman settlements and garrisons in the area. The Daesititates attacked Salona, and the Breuci Sirmium. Almost certainly they counted on the absence of the Illyrian army and did not anticipate the speedy return of Tiberius from Carnuntum with all the legions.⁴⁸ According to Velleius⁴⁹ the rebels divided their forces into three main armies: one to attack Macedonia; one to attack Italy; and the home army. This is a wrong and careless assessment and excellent proof that sometimes it is not good to be too close to the events as the bigger picture can be missed.⁵⁰ Velleius assumed this threefold division from reports arriving, initially, in Rome. In fact the rebel army had four operative groups at the start of the uprising. The first group was led by Bato the Daesitiate who attacked Salona with elite forces of the Daesititates and Delmatae (possibly the Ditiones and Mezaei†?). He sent some units (the second group) to pillage the southeastern coast, going as far as Apollonia

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⁴⁶ We estimate that the proportion of militarily capable males in the total adult male population was 70 – 80%, so for calculation purposes we use the average value of 75%. According to the estimates based on Roman census figures, the iuniores, age 17 to 46, made 71-72% of the adult male population; Brunt (1987) 66-67; Lo Cascio (2001) 135-136. Frier’s table for the population structure of the Roman empire estimates that the proportion of those in the age group between 15 and 50 was 52.44% of the total population, and therefore 81.56% of the population were older than 15 years, Frier (1982) 245 Table 5.

⁴⁷ More than 50% (close to 75%) of the iuniores, were conscripted into the legions during the most dangerous years of the 2nd Punic war; Lo Cascio (2001) 135 Table 1B; Brunt (1987) 66.

⁴⁸ Köstermann (1953) 349.

⁴⁹ Vell. Pat. 2.110.4, was unaware of the Breucian movement to Sirmium; Dio, 55.29.3-4, cf. Wilkes (1965a) 113.

⁵⁰ Surprisingly many of the authorities believe Velleius Paterculus; cf. Köstermann (1953) 349-350; Wilkes (1969) 70 n. 3.
(possibly the Pirustae). The third operative group, commanded by Bato the Breucian, attacked Sirmium. Finally, there was a home army guarding the heartland of Pannonian country and providing reserves to the three operative groups.

The aims and strategy of the rebels, beyond obvious intention to drive the Romans out, are obscure. Velleius Paterculus implies that the rebels planned to invade Italy, but according to Dio we see that Tiberius thought of that only as a possibility. There is nothing the rebels would gain by attacking Macedonia or Italy except possibly plunder. The movements of Bato the Daesitiate were not obviously strategic; he spent precious time sending troops to plunder the Dalmatian coast as far as Apollonia, and personally led an unsuccessful attack on Salona. There was no apparent danger threatening him from the south. Modern scholars have suggested that a much better strategy would have been the immediate seizure of key Roman positions in Siscia. An even better strategy would have been immediately to cut off Roman troops from Italy by taking the passes in the Julian Alps after advancing northwest through the Adriatic coast and hinterland. Apparently, the rebels were not under unified command in the first days of the war. The Daesitiates made common cause with the Breuci only after being beaten by Messalinus.

Panic in Italy is well attested by the sources; Augustus’ speech in the Senate and conscription in Italy suggest this, but it is questionable how justified it really

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51 Vell. Pat. 2.110.4, 111.1; Dio, 55.30.1.
52 Velleius’ assessment that the rebels had already poured into Macedonia (2.110.4) actually refers to some units of Bato’s army who were making a raid on Apollonia, in Macedonia; cf. Dio, 55.29.4. Dio, writing much later never mentions this threefold division of rebels but rather only the Breucian and Dalmatian (Daesitiate) Bato. From the topography it is possible to speculate that the Pirustae made the raids into Macedonia. For the location of the Pirustae; cf. Wilkes (1969) 173-176. Alternatively, it is possible to side with Rau (1925) 319-320 (also Mócsy (1974) 36) who argued that there was no Moesia as a separate province at that time, and that the Macedonian command extended to the Danube, so that the attack on Sirmium was in fact an attack on the Macedonian provincia.
53 Köstermann (1953) 351. Yet the Pannonii defeated some Roman units there, probably veterans or auxiliaries; Dio, 55.29.4.
54 The importance of Sirmium and Siscia: Syme (1934b) 370; Köstermann (1953) 353-354; Wilkes (1969) 70; Hoti (1992) 140. Of course these are only speculations, but if we follow the reconstruction of Koestermann (see Chapter 7.5 n. 61) that Caecina Severus fought the Daesitiae in northern Dalmatia, it is possible that Bato tried to eliminate the garrison of legion XX in Burnum and cut the supply route for Roman forces from Italy via Nauportus. If true, that would give him much more credit than otherwise appears from his Adriatic adventure. Tiberius had problems with supplies for the army in Siscia; Suet. Tib. 16; Köstermann (1953) 353-354.
55 Dio, 55.30.2.
was. Syme points out the wider context of a potential Thracian rebellion, Maroboduus’ next move, and the already attested domestic problems. These made the rebellion more threatening and Augustus more despairing. Dio does not mention panic in Italy, although he says that Tiberius thought that the security of Italy (probably Northern Italy) could be endangered, so he decided to return from Germany with all the Illyrian legions. Suetonius mentions the recruiting of slaves and freedmen in Italy only in the context of defending of the Roman colonies in Dalmatia, i.e. on the coast, without suggesting the contemporary panic that is described in Velleius Paterculus’ account. Some emergency administrative measures are apparent, such as the grouping of the Liburni and Iapodi through a joint praepositus, thus establishing a kind of cordon sanitaire for the protection of northern Italy.

7.5 Short overview of the campaigns

The course of the campaigns is difficult to ascertain due to the conflicting accounts of Dio and Velleius Paterculus. After the first skirmishes and initial shock, the Romans tried to keep the rebellion in check and stop it spreading. The first clash with regular Roman troops happened between the Daesidiates and the governor of Illyricum, Messalinus, who commanded an insufficiently manned legion XX. Roman military success cut off the rebels from North Italy, which prevented any possible threat there and stopped their devastation of the coast. The

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56 Vell. Pat. 2.110.6-111.2; Sumner (1970) 272. It seems that Augustus’ panic was genuine, not a deliberate manoeuvre to introduce unpopular measures more easily, as Köstermann (1953) 349 suggests, but we cannot fully exclude either possibility.

57 Syme (1934b) 371, cf. Pliny, *HN* 7.149. It is doubtful whether Maroboduus would have had any hostile intentions after negotiating a treaty with Tiberius in AD 6; cf. Dobiáš (1960) 159-161.

58 Dio, 55.30.1; Suet. *Aug*. 25.

59 *CIL* V 3346. This was only a temporary measure; Patsch (1898) 177-178; Sušić (1991/92). Sušić (1991/92) 62-64 suggests that Romans established in Liburnia and amongst the Iapodes an independent administrative province during the war, but it appears that we deal here primarily with an emergency military command over one part of the province. There is no doubt that praepositus *Iapudiae et Liburniae* was under the supreme command of a *legatus Augusti*. Sušić also confuses this incident with the transfer of Illyricum from the Senate to a *legatus Augusti*, which happened in 11 BC, see above p. 134.

60 Rau (1925); Köstermann (1953); Wilkes (1965a); (1969) 69-77, did this difficult task, often giving different interpretations.

61 Dio, 55.30.1-5; Vell. Pat. 2.112.1-2. Perhaps this time Velleius was right; Köstermann (1953) 350 and n.3; Mócsy (1962) 545, while Rau (1925) 317; Wilkes (1965a) 113; (1969) 70; Hoti (1992) 140 and Syme (1934b) 370, believe Dio who said that Tiberius sent Messalinus from Germany to stop the rebels before Tiberius’ arrival, and fought them close to Siscia. Köstermann argues that the battle was fought in north Dalmatia, close to Burnum - the base of *legio* XX at that time. This opinion sounds more plausible, as Bato was already attacking Salona, so it would be strange if he suddenly turned towards Siscia (where Syme and Wilkes suggest was the battlefield) rather than continued to ravage the Dalmatian coast.
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Moesian governor, A. Caecina Severus, strengthened by Thracian cavalry led by King Rhoemetalces, defeated the Breuci near the Drava, and prevented them from taking the stronghold of Sirmium. However, when he himself suffered heavy losses, he withdrew. Meanwhile the Daesidiates, beaten by Messalinus, joined the Breuci on the Mons Almus (Fruška Gora), which continued the pressure on Sirmium, so that Caecina was compelled to return and fight them once more – this time without a clear result. The danger of the Sarmatian and Dacian raids from the north forced him to return to Moesia again. When Tiberius reached Siscia with the Illyrian army in autumn AD 6 and met Messalinus, and when reinforcements of veterans from Italy led by Germanicus and including our source Paterculus arrived, it seemed that the Romans were already controlling the damage.

However, Tiberius was cautious when he advanced against the rebels in the next year, and he managed to cut off and surround part of the rebel forces on the Mons Claudius (Moslavačka gora near Varaždin). Dio’s source is very critical of Tiberius’ tactics in AD 7 when the Romans tried to divide the army into small units in order to cover more ground, apparently without much success. In the late autumn/early winter five legions, three Moesian led by governor Caecina, and two...
arriving as reinforcements from the East led by M. Plautius Silvanus, with the addition of Thracian cavalry and auxiliary troops, managed to reach Siscia, despite being ambushed and almost decimated by the strong forces of the united rebels at the Volcaean Marshes. Thus Tiberius had in Siscia huge forces and he decided that there was no need to keep them all together. He personally escorted the eastern reinforcements back to Sirmium in the winter of AD 7 – 8. Silvanus remained in charge of Sirmium and Caecina definitely returned to Moesia. Dio reports that at that time Germanicus conquered the Maezaei in the valley of the rivers Vrbas and Una.

The next year was decisive for the outcome of the rebellion as the Pannonians who were suffering from famine and disease surrendered to Tiberius in the summer at the river Bathinus. Their scorched earth tactics backfired during the severe winter of AD 7 – 8. Breucian Bato supposedly laid down his arms, surrendered his fellow-leader Pinnes and, as a reward, got an amnesty from the Romans who left him in charge of his people and some other Pannonians. That was the most decisive event in the course of the war, taking into account the large resources and population of the Breuci. However, Pannonians required additional pacification by Silvanus despite the formal surrender at Bathinus when unrest

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67 Those were VII, VIII Augusta and XI (Moesian legions) IV Scythica and V Macedonica (Eastern legions); Wilkes (1969) 92-93, seen slightly differently by Syme (1933c) 29-31. There is no foundation to support the claim of some scholars (e.g. Bojanovski (1990) 700, 704) that VIII Augusta was involved in fighting AD 6-9; cf. Alföldy (1989) 205-206.

68 Vell. Pat. 2.112.3-4; Dio, 55.32.3. The Volcaean marshes are located in the area of later Cibalae (Vinkovci); Köstermann (1953) 362; Wilkes (1969) 72.

69 Vell. Pat. 2.113.1-3: 10 legions, 70 auxiliary cohorts, 14 cavalry units, 10,000 veterans. It would be more than difficult and unnecessary to sustain such an army. The large numbers were due to the initial panic of Augustus (Köstermann (1953) 362-363; Sumner (1970) 272, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.110.6 as eye-witness ... tantus huius belli metus fuit ... Caesaris Augusti animum quateret atque terreret. It was not a tactic of ‘shock and awe’ as suggested by Gruen (1996) 177. Köstermann (1953) 363 n. 3 suggests that Tiberius chose the route through mountains south of the Sava to escort the Eastern legions, thus avoiding the main force of rebels.

70 Silvanus is attested later operating from Sirmium; Dio, 55.34.6-7; 56.12.2, Caecina is not mentioned afterwards.

71 Dio, 55.32.4. Perhaps it was only a raid (cf. Wilkes (1969) 73), purposely planned for raising the morale of the army; Pašalić (1956) 288, 291.

72 Dio, 55.33.1. It is assumed that the surrender was on the 3rd of August after CIL I² 248. The date is questioned by Woodman (1977) 178, who suggests the earlier date.

73 Vell. Pat. 2.114.4. Bathinus was either the river Bosut (Köstermann (1953) 366-367 n.4), or more likely Bosna; Saria (1930); (1933); Vulić (1933) 3-12; Wilkes (1969) 73; Bojanovski (1974) 192-199. Mócsy (1962) 547-548 suggests that the Daeutitae held hegemony (under Roman protection) over the Pannonii before the rebellion, and that Bato was established as vassal king by Tiberius, also Rau (1925) 331.

74 After the war the Breuci were able to supply 8 cohortes of auxiliaries; Bojanovski (1988) 364-366.
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followed the murder of the Breucian Bato by his Daesitiate namesake. Later in the year, Tiberius left M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. AD 6) in command of Siscia, Plautius Silvanus in Sirmium and he (possibly) went to Dalmatia before returning to Rome to give a report to Augustus.

The last year of the war witnessed operations in the mountainous Dinaric area. The Romans apparently advanced in three columns led by Silvanus (southeast from Sirmium), Lepidus (northwest from Siscia along the Una valley towards Burnum) while Tiberius and Germanicus operated from the south in the Dalmatian hinterland. Lepidus and Silvanus had no extensive problems in pacifying the Pirustae and Daesitiae. Germanicus encountered more problems. His campaign was covered in some detail in Dio; he took the forts of Splonum, ‘Ραίτινον and Seretium. Tiberius pursued Bato until he finally captured him at Andretium, close to Salona after a brief siege, thus completing military operations. There were significant numbers of Roman military deserters on the Pannonian side who, in fear of punishment, obstructed all peace negotiations and dragged out the war for a while. These deserters were most likely from auxiliary units recruited locally

75 Dio, 55.34.4-7. Apparently not all Breucian subjects were happy with Bato’s betrayal of Pinnes; Dio, 55.34.4-5.
76 Vell.Pat. 2.114.5. It is uncertain where Tiberius was after he gave up command to Lepidus in autumn AD 8. Wilkes (1965b) 114-116 suggests that Tiberius went to Dalmatia (accompanied by Velleius Paterculus’ brother as legate; Vell. Pat. 2.115.1) with Germanicus after the surrender of the Breuci, and there almost won the war on his own leaving his legates to finish the job and then returned to Rome in early AD 9; cf. Dio, 56.1.1. Rau (1925) 330 ff. and Köstermann (1953) 367-368 suggest that Tiberius thought that the war was over after the surrender of the Breuci so that he returned immediately to Augustus, leaving Germanicus in charge. Cf. Suet. Tib. 16; Dio, 56.11-12.
77 Dio, 56.12.2-3. Cf. detailed analysis of Pašalić (1956) 288-295. Köstermann (1953) 370 who assumes that Germanicus went from Siscia through the valley of Una was strongly opposed by Wilkes (1965b) who argues that Germanicus operated from the south. The route of Lepidus: Wilkes (1969) 75, wrongly assuming that base of legion XX in Burnum was established only then. Legion XX was attested to be part of the Illyrian army before the rebellion, and it was moved to Germany after AD 9; cf. Ritterling (1925) 1770; Tac. Ann. 1.39.
78 Dio, 56.11.1-12.1. Splonum is identified with Pljevlja in modern day Montenegro; Wilkes (1965b) 121-125, valley of river Sana; Pašalić (1956) 288-291 or Šipovo in Western Bosnia; Alföldy (1962c) 3-12. There is a problem in identification of Dio’s ‘Ραίτινον with Raetinium placed near city of Bihac (as Bojanovski (1988) 314-315), because it was in the territory of the Iapodes who did not take part in the uprising. One explanation is that population of Raetinium were ethnic Pannonii. Marić (1975) suggests that the Iapodes only in 1st century BC acquired control over the left bank of the river Sana, which was inhabited by the Pannonii. The another is that Wilkes’ location of Splonum in Montenegro is the right one because it is clear from the context (although Wilkes never noted that explicitly) that ‘Ραίτινον was located close to Splonum. See Šašel (1953) for location of Seretion.
79 Dio, 56.15.
amongst the Celtic population of Pannonia, and Germans who came with Tiberius, rather than Roman legionaries.

7.6 Errors in strategy: the assessment of the uprising

This was the last historically recorded attempt at organized native resistance to Roman power in Illyricum. The Romans proved themselves reasonably tolerant towards the rebels. They did not exercise unnecessary violence after extinguishing the rebellion; their treatment of leaders seems decent and the population did not suffer to the same extent it suffered during the Bellum Pannonicum. It was an extraordinary event, not comparable with problems Roman policy experienced in the region during the Republic. Instead of being a political periphery of the Roman world as before, where police actions and trustworthy allies could keep things in order, Illyricum now represented an important organic part of the imperium Romanum, its geo-political core necessary for supporting important military operations in central Europe. Thus, any trouble arising in Illyricum now significantly affected other parts of the empire, and it was a matter of the utmost importance to keep the area peaceful in the future.

Rome’s Illyrian policy in hindsight seems reckless, inadequate and dangerous in the period preceding the rebellion. The constitutional framework imposed on Illyricum after the Bellum Pannonicum created a system that was too large, spatially and ethnically diverse and thus too complex to control. The imposition of high taxes, creation of local resentment in an insufficiently pacified country and transfer of almost all available troops far north against the Marcommani endangered their own strategic rear in Illyricum and made Italy vulnerable. Any of those elements would not have been fatal individually but combined they created

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81 German cavalry: Dio, 56.11.2; Celts are not attested in the written sources, but as this uprising was not joined by any known Celtic people in the Pannonian basin, Celtic auxiliaries may perhaps be found in Tiberius’ army. The Liburni were involved in fighting on the Roman side as well; CIL III 3158; Wilkes (1969) 289.

82 Wilkes (1969) 139-140 suggests an almost total extermination of the most rebellious peoples; it was a bloody and cruel struggle, with grave consequences to all those who resisted; Vell. Pat. 2.115.2-4; Dio, 56.14.6-7. However this statement should be understood generally. There are no mentions of large enslavement of the population or excessive Roman retaliation after the fighting was over; Dio, 56.16.4. The main strongholds of the rebels were besieged and destroyed with their population, but other settlements where the majority of the population lived mainly surrendered peacefully; Dio, 55.34.6 (Pannonians) 56.15.1, 3 (Dalmatians), and the lives of Bato and his followers were, after all, spared; Dio, 56.13-16; Suet. Tib. 20. Archaeology finds traces of
dangerous circumstances (see Figure 3). Ethnic policy also partly\textsuperscript{83} failed in respect of the Pannonii who were able to form a strong ethnically homogeneous army and threaten the Roman position. In one respect, they had nowhere else to go they could not just leave and resettle out of Roman influence, as the Germans for example could do.\textsuperscript{84} Also, they did not have a city-based culture as did the Gauls, or coastal communities on the Adriatic coast, not to mention the Hellenized East, so they were not used to an organized system of paying taxes and tribute. Therefore it was very easy to create resentment towards Roman rule. Furthermore, Romans lacked fortresses and strong garrisons in the Sava valley. There is nothing to suggest that the only known military strongpoints, Sirmium and Siscia, were militarily sufficient for that task in AD 6.\textsuperscript{85} Before the rebellion no military roads\textsuperscript{86} connecting the coast with the hinterland had been constructed.\textsuperscript{87} It was a disaster waiting to happen.

Looked at in isolation, the rebellion made Romans rethink their military and political arrangements in Illyricum. It exposed their weaknesses and resulted in many military improvements in the next decade, which will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. It became obvious that one large command was not enough to provide efficient security in the western Balkans, so it was divided into two separate commands. Three legions were placed in Pannonia and two in Dalmatia, as strategic reserves and at the same time to watch over the natives. Furthermore, they established a strong defensive line of legionary and auxiliary fortresses in the Dalmatian hinterland. The Romans also established efficient communications,
which meant massive road building throughout these provinces. Romans learned fast from their errors and their policy in Illyricum in the next decades reflects experience gained from this rebellion.

The Pannonian rebellion was extinguished just a couple of days before Varus lost his legions in Germany. How the Illyrian rebellion and the Varian disaster affected Roman plans to continue expansion in Europe is a matter for discussion. Their losses had been great but Roman military capabilities were not so difficult to restore. It was celebrated as a great victory and the exotic names of defeated Pannonii, such as the Pirustae or Andizetes, became more familiar throughout the empire and the victory celebrated as a triumph in a foreign war. However, psychologically and personally, it must have been a real disaster for Augustus in the last years of his life. His successor was certainly not too keen to continue wars of conquest after all the campaigns he had endured, especially hard fighting in the snow and mud of Illyricum.

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were not under Roman influence, there would have been no conscription, no taxation and thus no reason for the rebellion.

88 Suet. Tib. 16. The personifications of the Pirustae and Andizetes (and Iapodes) were amongst those represented in Sebasteion at Aphrodisias; Smith (1988) 55 ff., see Plate IV.

89 Tac. Ann. 1.11; Dio, 56.33.
8. **Iulio-Claudians in Illyricum: The tale of two provinces**

“If the empire was to outlast its founder and be proof against intruders, it had to have something to offer its conquered peoples, something that would persuade them that their way of life under the conqueror would be ultimately better than that which they had enjoyed before.”

Pagden (2001) 36

8.1 **Introduction and sources**

The division of Illyricum, which takes place after the *Bellum Batonianum* represents the beginning of the end of Illyrian policy as such, because it broke the administrative and political unity of Illyricum into two parts, creating an entirely new geo-political situation. The northern part, soon to become Pannonia, was formed as a frontier province to defend against (potential) hostile forces threatening from beyond the Pannonian plains. The Dalmatian coast was, geographically and culturally already part of the inner cultural core, and its hinterland was rich in mining resources. Therefore it was natural to expect that Dalmatia would be separated from Pannonia. The *Bellum Batonianum* exposed all the weaknesses of the Roman policy of Greater Illyricum and the Romans were compelled to make decisive changes in their long-term policy if they wanted to maintain their position and avoid further troubles. The most important elements of the changed Roman Illyrian policy were extensive road-building, resettlement of some natives, removal of excessive native youth through conscription in auxiliary units, military administration of the most troublesome *civitates* and additional military measures.1 Certainly, these changes cannot be observed in isolation as Illyricum was part of a wider imperial system, so this chapter will also try to place them into the more general context of provincial transformation that took place in this period throughout the empire.

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1 See Alföldy (1965a) 171 ff. who defined these measures for Dalmatia. He also considers amongst these measures the completion of three lines of defence protecting the Dalmatian coast, the so-called Dalmatian *limes*, the existence of which is disputed, see Chapter 6.2 n. 30 and below p. 169.
The chapter will look at the first decades of this new, and - as time showed - more permanent political framework that Rome imposed over Illyricum. Roman internal matters connected with the area, such as the mutiny of the Pannonian legions in AD 14, or the rebellion led by the Dalmatian governor L. Arruntius Camillus Saturninus against the emperor Claudius in AD 42 are beyond the scope of this thesis and will be disregarded.\(^2\)

Unfortunately, the sources are extremely scarce for the period, even by the perpetually modest standards of Illyricum, so we need to rely more on information provided by archaeology and epigraphy. Inscriptions are helpful in matters such as: boundary settlements between peregrine communities; origins and extent of Italian emigration to Dalmatia; composition of legions and auxiliary units; building of roads; and involvement of native aristocracy in administration, etc. Written sources have no interest in Illyricum in this period. Velleius Paterculus and Dio supply limited information for the years immediately after the rebellion, but Tacitus remains our chief historical authority for the period. Lack of political and military events in Illyricum usually kept the province out of Tacitus’ Rome-focused sight. Nevertheless, on occasion he supplies useful information on the movements and positions of individual legionary camps and road building.\(^3\)

8.2 The foreign and provincial policy of the early Principate

In this period Rome’s Illyrian policy should be seen in the context of its foreign and provincial policy, as it was a province with a potentially troublesome frontier. Foreign policy during the Iulio-Claudian era is sometimes obscure in respect of individual regions or periods, but some general models of Roman action can be recognized. A decisive shift from Augustan aggressive and imperialistic foreign policy is obvious, whether it was intended by Augustus himself after the Pannonian rebellion and the Varian disaster, or was a political program developed

\(^2\) Tac. \textit{Ann.} 1.16-32; Schmitt (1958); Wilkes (1963) – mutiny of AD 14. Dio, 60.15; Suet. \textit{Claud.} 37.2 (AD 42); Jagenteufel (1958) 19-21 (no. 5); Plate III – Saturninus

\(^3\) This is not a surprise. Tacitus and people of his class who produced historical accounts of the principate knew and cared almost nothing for military and provincial affairs; Cornell (1993) 164-168.
Chapter 8: The tale of two provinces

entirely by Tiberius. The new approach was almost Republican in its essence. It was focused on the control of frontiers and the space behind them without establishing formal boundaries, as well as an apparent reluctance to annex new territories, except when necessary. Regardless of this general shift in policy, strong emphasis continued to be laid in literary sources on the continuing expansion of the empire and the aspiration of doing so persisted in the minds of the Roman elite of the period.

Provincial policy in this period is also very heterogeneous and depends on the cultural, historical and geographical context in the individual province and for the degree of its inclusion in the Mediterranean world. Larger provinces like Gaul or Illyricum were divided into smaller parts and thoroughly reorganized and so the efficiency of their administration increased and the power of their governors decreased. There were two opposite approaches to provincial policy in the early Principate. Tiberius, who was more conservative and Italy-centered, maintained the policy of Augustus and hesitated to spread Roman citizenship and assimilate the provinces, while Claudius implemented a more inclusive approach towards the provincials. Essentially, he returned to the policy developed by Iulius Caesar and with that approach brought about a significant social change in provinces.

Modern scholars are divided in their assessment of provincial policy during the long reign of Tiberius. Some follow the positive and enthusiastic assessment of Velleius Paternculus, and see his involvement in the provinces as generally more constructive and beneficial for the provincials. However, there is also the more recent, and more accepted, view that Tiberius used the provinces as a source of income only, that he stopped all juridical and social progress in the provinces and

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7 See the observation of Goudineau (1996) 487, and 467-469 that the division of Gaul was arbitrary and based on rudimentary geographic knowledge. The division of Illyricum was based on completely different premises, as it was the product of a carefully planned and executed policy, see Chapter 8.3.
9 Vell. Pat. 2.126.3-4.; Smith (1942) 233-256; Kornemann (1960) 236-240.
improved their administration for the sole purpose of improving the efficiency with which they were exploited.\footnote{Alföldy (1965b); Orth (1970) summarized 124-126; Seager (1972) 170-173; Levick (1976) 129-141.}

### 8.3 The administrative division of Illyricum

The logical consequence of the rebellion and the failure of the political framework of Greater Illyricum was that the province was broken into two parts which could be more easily controlled and fitted into the imperial system of provinces. The division was a decisive political move and carried the most significant consequences for Illyricum. In the long run it broke up the whole geopolitical system of Illyricum, creating two different regional political systems, and even three economic sub-systems.\footnote{According to Hopkins’ classification of provinces by their role in the political macro-economy of the empire, Pannonia is a military, frontier province, while Dalmatia can be placed among tax-exporting provinces as it is neither grain-producing nor a frontier province; Hopkins (1980) 101 ff. modified by Garnsey/Saller (1987) 95-97. However, Dušanić (1991) recognizes that *metalla Illyrici*, the mining district organized in the 2nd century in the Dalmatian hinterland, parts of Noricum and Upper Moesia, as a separate, third economic sub-system in imperial Illyricum, between the Dalmatian coast and the military-frontier economy of Pannonia, see also Škegro (1991) 81-114.} The southern part, *Illyricum superius*, the future Dalmatia and *Illyricum inferius*, the future Pannonia and their destinies started to separate and to follow different paths for a moment, but in the later Empire Illyricum was re-invented as a artificial cultural concept through the rise of Illyrian soldier-emperors (Chapter 8.7).

Modern scholarship has accepted the fact that Illyricum was divided after the rebellion, but the point of disagreement is the exact date when it actually happened, as the sources are in conflict. The majority of scholars place the date of the division in the period from the start of the rebellion to shortly after its ending, mainly arguing in favor of AD 8 and the Breucian capitulation at the river Bathinus.\footnote{Alföldy (1965a) 26-27 (AD 6); Ritterling (1925) 1236; Jagenteufel (1958) 9-10; Dobó (1968) 11; Bojanovski (1988) 56 (AD 8), Nagy (1970); Fitz (1977) 545 (AD 9, but Fitz later altered his opinion, arguing in favour of a much later date, see next note); Betz (1938) 5 (AD 10).} Very intriguing is the minority view that dates the division of Illyricum much later, after the second mission of Drusus the Younger to Illyricum, therefore after c. AD 19 – 20, but still before Claudius’ reign.\footnote{Fitz (1988); Novak (1966); Braunert (1977) 215-216 (Illyricum was divided into two separate commands, but still remained a single province after AD 14).} This argument is very convincing as it can explain the inconsistency in the sources, so that the division should be dated to early Tiberian times. If this is true, then it seems obvious that Augustus himself
contemplated the division of Illyricum before his death, and that only his death and a change of princeps delayed it.\textsuperscript{14}

The division of Illyricum was geo-strategic rather than ethnic (although ethnic considerations played a very significant part in determining the boundary between the provinces – see below), and it was part of a larger reorganization of the northern provinces. Initially, all the troops in the area of Illyricum and Noricum were under a single command, and it is possible that even the whole area was under a common military administration, constituting the “Provinzkomplex Dalmatia-Illyricum (i.e. Pannonia)-Noricum” as Nagy called it.\textsuperscript{15} Some parts of eastern Noricum such as Carnutum and deserta Boiorum were later joined to Pannonia, so that all legions in this central-Danubian frontier section were de facto under the single command of the Pannonian governor.\textsuperscript{16} Pannonia was formed as a frontier province and included in a trans-provincial imperial system that comprised the Danubian provinces, regardless of whether it included Transdanubia in this period or not. Most changes happened in the western parts of the new province where the old political contexts of regnum Noricum were replaced for new imperial strategic benefits, such as unified control of the Amber road.\textsuperscript{17} The legions positioned in Pannonia were equally defensive as they could be used at any time for offensive tasks across the Danube if the need arose. There were possibly other reasons for the reorganization. The mutiny of the legions in Pannonia after Augustus’ death exposed the potential danger for present and future principes of keeping all five Illyrian legions together, under a single command.\textsuperscript{18}

Although there are still some uncertainties in detail in the determination of the administrative boundary between Dalmatia and Pannonia, it is possible to

\textsuperscript{14} Tiberius was going to Illyricum when he heard that Augustus was on his deathbed, Vell. Pat. 2.123.1, \textit{ad firmanda paci quae bello subegerat}; cf. Tac. \textit{Ann.} 1.5. There were no obvious reasons why the successor of Augustus would go to Illyricum at that time, but reorganisation and the census, which Germanicus was doing in Gaul, seems the most likely one; \textit{Ann.} 1.31, \textit{agenda Galliarum censui tum intentum}. Cf. Nagy (1989) 64 n. 18.

\textsuperscript{15} Nagy (1989) 68. Töth (1980) 84-86 says that the unity of the entire Illyro-Norician administration, not only in the area of army command, lasted until the era of Claudius.

\textsuperscript{16} Alföldy (1974) 57 placed this event in AD 14 but it is possible that it happened later; see this section n. 15. Alföldy (1974) 60-61 – eastern frontier of Noricum.

\textsuperscript{17} Fitz (1977) 549 ascribes the reorganisation to fear of the Marcomanni, but that looks exaggerated, especially if we date the reorganisation to the mid- to late-reign of Tiberius.

position it roughly in the space south of the Sava and north of the Dinaric Alps.\textsuperscript{19} The division of Illyricum divided the Pannonii into two parts: the Breuci, Colapiani,\textsuperscript{20} Andizetes, Osi and Amantini were in Pannonia; and the Mezaei, Ditiones, Pirustae and Daesidiates in Dalmatia. The reasons are obviously strategic; to destroy the potentially dangerous ethnic unity of the Pannonii, counterbalancing them with the Celts in Pannonia and Italian settlers, southern Illyrians, the Iapodes and Liburni in Dalmatia. Some Pannonii were in turn resettled to counterbalance Celtic ethnic unity in north Pannonia (see below). Also, a frontier between the provinces fixed on the Dinaric Alps looked more natural in the eyes of Romans. The mountainous chain presented a significant and easily defensible buffer with only a few easily defensible passages. This natural position would give time to the Dalmatian command to act against any attack from the north, because such an attack might circumvent or neutralize the Pannonian army, which was intended as the first line of defence. Dalmatian legions were also handy as strategic reserves, which could be employed elsewhere if need arose.\textsuperscript{21}

8.4 The administration of Illyricum

The administrative organization of Illyricum must be dated to the late Augustan/early Tiberian era, regardless of whether the province was in fact divided. Tiberius carried out initial arrangements in the last weeks of the rebellion just before the capitulation of Daesitiate Bato. He was supposed to complete them in AD 14 but the task was interrupted by the death of Augustus.\textsuperscript{22} The primary purpose of the second mission of Drusus to Illyricum (AD 17 – 20) was meant to organize defences against the Marcomanni,\textsuperscript{23} but we cannot exclude the possibility that he carried out some other arrangements, not only in the context of his mission but in an attempt to organize the administration of the provinces.\textsuperscript{24}

The most prominent role in the organization of Illyricum was given to its governors. The governors in both parts of Illyricum continued to be appointed as

\textsuperscript{19} Bojanovski (1988) 325-330; Šašel (1953) and especially Dušanić (1977) 64-65 are in agreement in drawing the frontier between Dalmatia and Pannonia further south than Wilkes (1969) 78-80.
\textsuperscript{20} The civitas Colapiani succeeded the Segestani who are known from the later Republic.
\textsuperscript{21} Cf. Luttwak (1976) 27.
\textsuperscript{22} Dio, 56.14.7-15.1, see Chapter 8.4 n. 13.
\textsuperscript{23} Tac. \textit{Ann.} 2.44, 46; Syme (1979) 324; Nagy (1989) 64; contra Mócsy (1974) 40. The first mission of Drusus was to calm the legions in AD 14, Tac. \textit{Ann.} 1.24-1.30.
\textsuperscript{24} Cf. Tac. \textit{Ann.} 2.46 Missus tamen Drusus ut rettulimus, paci firmator.
*legati Augusti pro praetore*, but the term *praepositus* is sometimes used in the years immediately after the rebellion.\(^{25}\) Their terms of office lasted substantially longer than before, in accordance with the policy introduced by Tiberius and followed by his successors. Twelve governors of Dalmatia are attested by name in the period between AD 9 – 68, and in addition there is the possibility that one or both of 2 anonymous *legati* can be dated before Flavian times.\(^{26}\) For Pannonia, 11 different *legati* can be attested in the same period from preserved written sources and inscriptions.\(^{27}\) One of the most significant governors of *Illyricum superius* that we know of was P. Cornelius Dolabella.\(^{28}\) During his term important building activity was carried out as well as administrative tasks, especially the fixing of boundaries between individual *civitates*. A map of the province (or perhaps only Liburnia – opinions differ) *forma Dolabelliana* was also made during his term.\(^{29}\) The delimitation was performed under the supervision of military personnel and under direct orders from the governor himself.\(^{30}\)

The old, late Republican administrative scheme based in Narona and mentioned by Varro became obsolete for the administration of a new province. Urban coastal communities with substantial Italian immigration or Greek populations were already organized, or in the process of being organized as *municipia* and enjoyed significant autonomy inside the province, like the Salonitan *res publica* or the Liburnian communities (Chapter 6.2). For the interior of the future province of Dalmatia and for Pannonia as a whole the Romans used a system based on peregrine *civitates*, the system generally used in less urbanized western provinces. Pliny mentions the division of Dalmatia into three *conventus iuridici* for the administration of peregrine communities based on the coast, Scardona, Salona and Narona.\(^{31}\) He also provides the names of individual *civitates* and even the number of their sub-units, *decuriae* (but only for the Salonitan and Naronitan *conventus*).\(^{32}\) Although we are informed about the administrative scheme of

\(^{25}\) E.g. Vell. Pat. 2.116.1.

\(^{26}\) Jagenteufel (1958) 12-30, 63-66 (no. 1-12, possibly 39 and 41).

\(^{27}\) Dobó (1968) 23-31 (no. 9-19).

\(^{28}\) Governor in AD 14-20, see the sources in Jagenteufel (1958) 14-17 (no. 3).

\(^{29}\) Rendić-Miočević (1968) 64.


\(^{31}\) There are some indications that the *conventus* based in Scardona (14 *civitates* of the Liburni and the Iapodes) enjoyed privileged position inside the province; Suić (1975b) 110-114.

\(^{32}\) Pliny, *HN* 3.141-144, see Figure 4.1.
Dalmatia, the early administrative picture of Pannonia remains largely obscure. Pliny mentions only administrative civitates, without providing information on the number of their decuriae or any other details.  

In general, a conventus was divided into civitates, which were organized on a regional and ethnic basis. Roman military personnel, praefecti civitatum, mainly ruled civitates, and in some instances ruled several civitates jointly. The praefecti civitatum were initially appointed in order to keep close control over the most troublesome of the conquered peoples. However, praefecti were merely superimposed upon previously existing social structures and organizations. In some communities the Romans exercised power through local chieftains, principes and praepositi, often holders of Roman citizenship, who essentially kept the pre-Roman structure and the local political systems and slowly introduced elements of Roman administration. Civitates were further divided into decuriae, which were governed by decuriones or duumviri. The decuriones of the municipal decuriae were, in almost all known cases, of native stock, often adding the Roman titles to native title, which was the equivalent of princeps.

In practice, a peregrine civitas did not have much direct Roman influence over everyday matters. Everything except foreign policy, tax payment and military matters remained in the hands of the local elite as they were before the Roman arrival. In a way, imperial administration treated civitates like client-states, only with tighter control, payment of tax instead of tribute, and the compulsory conscription of youth into the auxiliary units. Civitates also played a significant buffer role, surrounding and protecting Roman provincial strong points such as colonies and legionary camps.

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33 Pliny, *HN* 3.147.
34 *CIL* V 3346; IX 2564; IX 5363.
35 Wilkes (1977) 742.
36 Patsch (1899) 176-179 (the Iapodes) followed by Rendić-Miočević (1962) 329-330 (the Delmatae) believes that municipal principes formed an advisory council helping the praepositus chosen amongst the principes to administer the area; cf. *CIL* III 14,324, III 14,326 praepositus et princeps Iapodum.
37 Many of these inscriptions are dated to the later 1st century AD, but they reflected the earlier period; cf. Rendić-Miočević (1962) esp. 330-331; (1975c) 53-55; (1989) 419-420; Zotović (2002) 15 ff. There is also no reason whatsoever to see the first years of Roman rule in Illyricum exclusively as a direct military occupation, which continued almost to the Flavians (as Bojanovski (1988) 60 ff.). Roman rule always required a friendly native elite for administration on a local, municipal level.
38 Rendić-Miočević (1962); (1975c) 53-55, relying on epigraphic material dated to a later period.
39 Burns (2003) 210-212 (for Pannonia, but can be applied to the interior of Dalmatia as well).
The Romans made some surgical administrative interventions in Illyricum. The Breucian alliance in the valley of the Sava and the Drava was broken into smaller administrative units after the rebellion. It is not certain when this happened, probably after the rebellion was extinguished. The same destiny awaited the Pirustae in southeastern Dalmatia, who were broken into three smaller administrative units, thus providing an easier task for military administrators. We need to take into account the fact that the Scordisci might also have been broken into different civitates and dispersed between the provinces of Moesia, Pannonia and Dalmatia. The resettlement of some Delmataean communities in the eastern parts of the Dalmatian province is also possible, and, if it happened as Alföldy claims, no doubt it took place at this time. The resettlement of the Pannonian Azali on the banks of the Danube separating the Celtic Boii and Eravisci also took place in the Iulio-Claudian era but it is difficult to determine exactly when. The other solution, the grouping of smaller, ethnically similar communities into larger administrative units, took place in some instances, such as the civitas of Docletiae, which was composed of smaller Illyrian peoples living on the southeastern Adriatic coast.

8.5 Military commitments and strategic measures

The Roman military had several roles in Illyricum. Keeping an eye on natives was the most obvious one, and the defence of frontiers and the building of roads were equally significant additional tasks. Legions VII and XI were initially stationed in Dalmatia and legions VIII Augusta, IX Hispana, XI Apollinaris in Pannonia. It is uncertain where Pannonian legions were positioned. It is usually assumed that legionary camps were based in Poetovium, Emona and Siscia, but

40 The Breuci were broken into the three civitates, Oseriates, Breuci and Cornacates, mentioned by Pliny, Mócsy (1962) 606; (1974) 53-55. Mócsy dates this reorganisation after the Bellum Pannonicum, but this dating remains uncertain.
42 Alföldy (1964b) 109, 123-127; contra Katičić (1965b) 63-69; Papazoglu (1978) 171-178.
43 Alföldy (1965a) 56, 173.
44 Mócsy (1974) 55, 59, dating it after the bellum Pannonicum. It seems that it took place later, as the Romans annexed Transdanubia much later as previously thought, see above p. 140.
45 Wilkes (1969) 166-167; (1996b) 578. In Gaul, for example, Romans grouped natives into large administrative units based on ethnic principle like the Arecomici; Goudineau (1996) 474-476.
Emona as a legionary camp remains controversial.\textsuperscript{46} Legion VII was moved from Dalmatia to Moesia under Claudius or Nero between AD 42 and 67; the exact date remains uncertain, probably 56 – 57.\textsuperscript{47} It is much easier to trace the Dalmatian legions. They were placed in camps at Burnum (Šuplja crkva) and Tilurium (Gardun), strategically placed close to the coast but also able to keep an watchful eye on the interior.\textsuperscript{48} In addition to the legions, significant auxiliary forces were stationed in Illyricum. However, modern scholars dispute their exact number and position, especially those stationed in Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{49}

The situation on the northern Pannonian frontiers showed unexpected stability throughout this period. The most significant event appears to be the settlement of the Iazyges, one branch of the Sarmatians, allegedly expelled from the lower Danube by the Dacians.\textsuperscript{50} They settled on the north Pannonian plains with the approval of the Roman government before AD 50, probably between AD 17 and 20. It seems to be a significant strategic measure of Rome, in that it was trying to establish a protective barrier against the Dacians and the Marcommani.\textsuperscript{51} A similar measure was the establishment of a vassal Germanic (Quadi) king Vannius on the northern banks of the Danube on the Hungarian plains in the Tiberian era, as a buffer against the Germans.\textsuperscript{52}

Tiberius was generally very conservative in the enfranchisement and expansion of colonies. He returned to the Republican policy of granting citizenship to provincials and peregrine communities very selectively, and not encouraging the establishment of colonies in the provinces.\textsuperscript{53} Still, despite the general attitude of Tiberius, Illyricum profited in some ways in his reign. Some Liburnian communities gained the \textit{ius italicum} and completed the process of their cultural incorporation in

\textsuperscript{46} Šašel-Kos (1995) 236-237 strongly objects to Emona as a legionary camp, and suggests a site for a camp closer to the frontier, also Mócsy (1974) 42-43, see Chapter 6.2 n. 34.
\textsuperscript{47} Ritterling (1925) 1619; Wilkes (1969) 96-97.
\textsuperscript{48} Wilkes (1969) 97-98; Zaninović (1968) (Burnum); (1984) (Tilurium); (1985) (both camps). See also Sanader (2003) for up to date results of most recent excavations of Tilurium.
\textsuperscript{50} Pliny, \textit{HN} 4.80-81.
\textsuperscript{51} These events still remain unknown except in outline; Alföldy (1936) 85; Mócsy (1977a); Wilkes (1983) 259.
\textsuperscript{52} Mócsy (1974) 57; Nagy (1989).
\textsuperscript{53} Alföldy (1965b) 836-840.
The reign of Tiberius saw the planting of the first veteran colonies in Illyricum such as *pagus Scunasticus* near Narona, and possibly the establishment of the colony in Emona.\(^{55}\)

A couple of inscriptions suggest important building activity in Dalmatia after the rebellion of AD 6 – 9 was under way. There is an interesting inscription from Issa mentioning Drusus the Younger and the governor, Dolabella, dedicating *campus* for military exercise in AD 20.\(^{56}\) The inscription from an architrave of the temple in Salona, dated AD 12 – 14, commemorates the Roman victory over the Pannonian rebellion.\(^{57}\)

Road building became an extremely significant part of the policy after the rebellion. Learning from their painful experiences, the Romans understood the importance of linking the Dalmatian coast and Pannonia with roads of sufficient quality. During the governorship of Dolabella, five major roads were built in Illyricum inferior, linking the provincial center Salona with strategically important parts of the province.\(^{58}\) In AD 16 – 17 two roads had already been completed: Salona – ... *ad fines provinciae Illyrici* extending towards the northern administrative border on the Sava; and the *via Gabiniana* from Salona to Andertium, extending later to Burnum. In 19 – 20 another three roads were completed: from Salona to the *castellum* Hedus in Daesidiate country (central Bosnia), a second linking Salona and the land of the Breuci leading towards the river Bathinus, along the valley of Bosna;\(^{59}\) and a third in the direction of Siscia. It is possible that the route linking Salona and the Via Egnatia in the direction of Dyrrachium was built in this period.\(^{60}\) It is easy to recognize their strategic and primarily military purpose, which was to connect the legionary camps in Burnum and Tilurium, Salona as the administrative centre of the province and the lands of

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\(^{54}\) Alföldy (1965a) 68 ff., 200-201; Wilkes (1969) 107-115 (places municipalization in this period). However, Vittinghoff (1977) 21 ff. seriously questions the methodology used by Wilkes and Alföldy in dating it to the reigns of Tiberius and Claudius.

\(^{55}\) *Pagus Scunasticus: ILJ* 113-114; Emona, see Chapter 6.2 n. 34.

\(^{56}\) *ILJ* 257; Rendić-Miočević (1952) 43 ff. dates it plausibly in the second consulate of Drusus.

\(^{57}\) *ILJ* 123; Rendić-Miočević (1950/51a) 170-175.

\(^{58}\) *CIL* III 3198-3201; *ILJ* 263 Bojanovski (1974) gives the most comprehensive study of Dollabella’s roads in Dalmatia so far.

\(^{59}\) Unfortunately this road is the most difficult to locate, and it seems that it is identical with the previous one; cf. Bojanovski (1974) 199-202.

\(^{60}\) Garašanin/Garašanin (1967) 169-175; Bojanovski (1973) 171-172.
potentially troublesome peoples like the Daesitiae, Delmatae and Breuci, as well as to establish a vital communication link with Pannonia and the Via Egnatia.\[^{61}\]

Romans also built roads in Pannonia at this time. The road between Aquileia and Emona had either been built during the last years of Augustus’ reign or just prior to this.\[^{62}\] The Romans used an almost entirely new network of roads in this part of Pannonia, disregarding previous native settlements and connecting only those points they considered necessary.\[^{63}\] The main strategic concerns, both offensive and defensive, were to link Carnuntum with Aquileia via Emona, Poetovium and Sabaria, following the ancient Amber road.\[^{64}\] It was a link crucial for keeping efficient watch over the middle Danube, and for bringing reinforcements from Italy. It was also necessary to protect it with a network of fortifications and military colonies, as this was the shortest and easiest way for any attacker to reach Italy.

An important new feature was the strengthening of defences around military camps. The walls of Siscia were strengthened significantly.\[^{65}\] Probably it was the governor Dolabella who ordered additional fortification of the camps of Burnum and Tilurium in Dalmatia.\[^{66}\] The strategy towards Dalmatia shows much more confidence and careful planning. There was no Dalmatian limes stretching from Salona to Siscia as some authors used to suggest.\[^{67}\] The link in question was the system of defence designed for multiple purposes such as keeping the province under control, enabling the exploitation of necessary resources and, the most important factor, keeping communications with Pannonia open.\[^{68}\] In fact, modern scholarship has never considered this Rochadstraße as a line of communication rather than as a defensive limes.\[^{69}\] The way between Salona and Siscia followed the

\[^{61}\] Bojanovski (1974) 26 ff. rightly emphasised the military purpose of these roads, which followed the shortest route rather than linked commercial and otherwise significant pre-Roman sites.

\[^{62}\] Tac. Ann. 1.20.

\[^{63}\] Šašel (1977) 158-159.

\[^{64}\] Burghardt (1979) 7-8; Burns (2003) 208, 213.

\[^{65}\] Nenadić (1986/87) 74-76.

\[^{66}\] Zaninović (1976) 165.

\[^{67}\] Some modern scholars have dated the origins of the alleged Dalmatian limes to the period of Lesser Illyricum, see Chapter 6.2 n. 30.

\[^{68}\] Paškvalin (1986) 153 ff. Zaninović (1986) 167 rightly points to the advantages of this position, such as easy supply of troops through eastern Adriatic ports.

\[^{69}\] Šašel (1974a) 195 is right when he states that “Es wäre ein militärischer Nonsens, wenn sie nicht mit einer Rochadestraße ausgestattet gewesen wäre.” However, further in his argument, he mixes up the terms, presenting this communication as a supposed Dalmatian limes.
Chapter 8: The tale of two provinces

8.6 The rewards of Illyricum: conscription, mining, trade

Illyricum became more and more a field for recruiting new soldiers. Although conscription was one of the reasons for the AD 6–9 rebellion, it continued in Illyricum after Augustus. In a way, it was a repressive measure of the occupying forces, aimed at removing some of those of military age. It is very difficult to determine the real demographic impact of the dilectus on the native population of Illyricum and the popular attitude to conscription. Warrior values were an important part of cultural values amongst some peoples in Illyricum, and after the Pax Romana took away the opportunity to wage independent war, service in auxiliary units could be a way for some to prove themselves. A few native auxiliary units are attested in the later Iulian-Claudian period in inscriptions such as VIII cohortes Breucorum, VII cohortes Delmatarum, I cohort of the Liburni, and the mixed cohort Pannoniorum et Delmatarum.

Increasingly, an important aspect of Roman activities was the mining and exploitation of other natural resources, especially in Dalmatia. The Dinaric Alps in modern-day Bosnia are very rich in metals, but the pre-Roman level of exploitation...
was not efficient enough to satisfy Roman needs.\textsuperscript{74} There were three main mining areas in the Dinaric Alps, corresponding with the areas of modern-day Bosnia (the division of Pašalić): the central region providing gold and copper; the western region providing iron; and the eastern region, rich in silver, lead and copper.\textsuperscript{75} Written sources from the early Principate give us a hint that gold mining in Illyricum was the most famous and most interesting characteristic of Illyricum that was known to the Romans,\textsuperscript{76} but inscriptions and archaeology confirm that silver and iron were dug there too. Their real importance, however, significantly increases in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century AD.\textsuperscript{77} Perhaps the Roman state first concentrated on exploiting the more interesting and tempting silver and gold, and that iron mines remained in private hands.\textsuperscript{78}

Trade and Italian imports into Illyricum increase rapidly in the period following its final pacification, but it was mostly intended for the coastal settlements, while in the hinterland archaeology has not detected any extensive change in the trade patterns for the period. There were significant customers for Italian goods in Dalmatia, especially for building materials like roof tiles, pottery, glass, but also olive oil and wine were needed by Italian settlers and Roman soldiers. The demand, according to archaeological evidence, peaked in the mid-later 1\textsuperscript{st} century AD, but later gradually declined as the links with Italy lessened. In exchange, Dalmatia produced food and timber for export.\textsuperscript{79} We cannot say that trade or economic interests ever significantly influenced Rome’s Illyrian policy; they should rather be regarded as its consequence. Nevertheless, trade was an important tool of integration. It ultimately helped to open the Dalmatian hinterland and Pannonia to more extensive trade and hastened their incorporation into the wider imperial macro-economic system.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{74} The tradition of mining in the northwest Balkan begins a long time before the Romans; Pašalić (1954) 64-67; much better documented in Čović (1980); Škegro (1991) 79-80 but the efficiency and profitability of mines before the Roman arrival is doubtful.


\textsuperscript{76} Flor. 2.25; Stat. Silv. 1.2.153; 3.3.90; 4.7.14; Pliny, \textit{HN} 33.21, Martial, \textit{Ep.} 10.78.8. Gold was extracted in central Bosnia: Pašalić (1954) 50-54, but epigraphic sources confirming gold mines are unfortunately very scarce, Škegro (1991) 81 ff.


\textsuperscript{78} Bojanovski (1982) 107.


8.7 The end of Roman Illyrian policy

The aims and the consequences of Roman policy in this period are surprisingly clear, though we do not have many sources to rely on. Keeping the status quo inside Illyricum and effectively controlling and preventing any challenge to it seems the primary aim of the policy. Keeping a check on activities beyond the Danube, and even intervening directly in some cases, remains a dominant element of Pannonian frontier policy. The reasonable assumption is that military administration seems eventually to be replaced through time with a native civilian administration. The social dimension of Roman policy is not so significant as it was to be under the Flavian dynasty. Enfranchisement was very rare, the planting of colonies significant only in Pannonia, and only Liburnia witnessed a significant level of municipalization. The silence of the sources tells at least something, that the security measures show a high level of efficiency because no other troubles with natives are reported, and frontiers remain stable. Ethnic policy is the more dominant part of Roman policy in this period. It tried to break the ethnic unity of the Pannonii in particular, and establish a provincial system that would make future uprisings and internal disruption more difficult.

The hold over Pannonia was the ultimate result of Roman Illyrian policy, which was always significantly driven by the urge to enable a more efficient geo-strategic position for the defence of the Italian homeland. Romans recognized that Pannonia might have become a weak spot in the new, realigned imperial geography, because of its natural defencelessness. The occupation of Pannonia was a more efficient solution when we take into account the situation in Dalmatia where the Romans now fully controlled the Dinaric mountains and the passes through them. The legions in Pannonia thus provided only a first line of defence, while the Dalmatian legions provided strategic reserves and reinforcements. The establishment of the Flavian limes and the demilitarization of Dalmatia are beyond the scope of this thesis, but they suggest that measures taken in the Iulio-Claudian period worked. Dalmatia was ultimately pacified and the attention of Romans shifted further north, to keep watch over the Danube.

This is the most obscure period of Roman Illyrian policy and also the most one-sided, as it provides information only about the elements of the Roman system,
the Roman army, administration, trade, ethnic policy, etc. All the peoples of Illyricum are left entirely in almost impenetrable darkness for any historical enquiry. For the peoples of Illyricum, this was a period of adjustment, a period of accepting new realities and dealing with them; they were now a structural part of the imperial system. Roman Illyrian policy as such ceased to exist as Illyricum ceased to exist as a separate geo-political system and became part of a wider imperial system. After AD 9 Romans showed that they had learned from their mistakes and that they were serious in keeping Illyricum and incorporating it as an essential territorial part of the Empire, rather than just keeping it as a buffer zone. Incorporating its peoples would require time and a change of attitude amongst both Romans and natives, but that is a different story.

Roman Illyrian policy ceased to exist but Roman-Illyrian interaction continued, and as time passed by it became increasingly significant for both systems. To return to the passage of Pagden quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Rome not only did plenty of things to offer Illyricum, Illyricum also had something to offer Rome. Who would assume that three centuries after Bato capitulated, a Roman writer would write that the emperors born and bred in Illyricum would be optimi rei publicae? Tiberius and Bato fighting each other through rugged Illyrian landscapes could not have imagined that Rome and Illyricum would develop a symbiosis in many ways depending on each other in order to preserve their very existence. The Roman empire needed Illyrian mines and Illyrian soldiers for its survival, and Illyricum needed the shade of the Roman cultural umbrella in order to define itself. Illyrian soldier-emperors defended the empire as long as they were able to but once the empire was destroyed, Illyricum and its peoples (culturally and ethnically rather than physically) slowly ceased to exist as a geo-political system. The Roman world-empire contracted and Illyricum remained abandoned in the political vacuum, infested and ultimately overwhelmed by the Slaviniae - Slavic chiefdoms. The destruction of the Roman empire caused the disappearance of

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82 It was overwhelmingly through Roman culture and Latin language that Illyrian soldier-emperors culturally defined themselves; cf. Mócsy (1974) 259-263, 358; Alföldy (1952a) 121-124 (Valentinian I); Toynbee (1973) 556-558. Their ethnicity was another matter, and cannot be always regarded as native; Syme (1973); Mócsy (1977b) 570-571.
Illyricum as a living and functioning spatial concept, as Illyricum was after all, a superficial spatial concept defined as such by the Romans in c. 2nd - 1st century BC.\textsuperscript{84} The disappearance of Illyricum, the “missing link of the Empire”, brought lasting consequences to the wider world, such as the division of the church, and the increasing isolation of Byzantium from the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{83} Wilkes (1992) 265-280 the end of Roman Illyricum.
\textsuperscript{84} Mócsy (1974) 263 looks into the superficiality of Romanization in Illyricum as a reason for its disappearance. His argument is valid in some respect, but it should be supplemented with the superficiality of Illyricum as a spatial concept, something close to “der Sammelbegriff Illyricum” that according to him appears only in the later Empire; Mócsy (1977b) 571.
\textsuperscript{85} Dvornik (1956) 43-45 warns that the destruction of Illyricum had a much more significant impact on the separation of the Roman East and West and the division of Christianity, than the majority of modern historians are ready to admit; cf. Wilkes (1996a) 418.
9. **The Conclusion**

“... the Roman conception of the place to be conquered and the process of conquest are so closely related as to be the aspects of the same mentalité, and there is no need to disjoin them or seek more elaborate explanations.”

Purcell (1990) 21

9.1 **Introduction**

Previous chapters have examined in detail Roman Illyrian policy from 168 BC – AD 68 as depicted in the sources and as interpreted by modern historians, trying to see it as an interaction of two systems, Rome, the archetypal ‘world-empire’ of Wallerstein, and the regional geo-political system of Illyricum. This final chapter will try to extract the most significant elements of that interaction and the mechanisms that characterized and determined it. In other words, it will try to see how Rome as a hegemonic, dominant political power in the Mediterranean macro-system affected the regional geo-political system of Illyricum. As stated in the introduction (Chapter 1.4.2), there are some elements that emerge from the analysis of Roman policy, the Roman operational policy mode, the political-constitutional framework imposed by Rome over Illyricum, the geo-strategic emphasis of Roman interests, and finally the particularities of ethnic policy (Chapter 1.4.2 and 9.3). This chapter summarizes the impact of these elements of Roman policy on the situation in the regional system of Illyricum. It will also examine how Roman Illyrian policy reflects upon the wider picture of Rome’s impact on the Mediterranean macro-system. Finally, its ethnic policy and some economic and cultural factors will be examined.

9.2 **Illyricum as a geo-political system and the Roman impact on the system**

Chapter 1.5 defined chronological phases in the Roman-Illyrian political interaction and the transformation of the political/constitutional framework Rome imposed upon Illyricum. This section will analyse how the change of constitutional/political framework impacted on Illyricum as a geo-political system.
In the first phase of Illyrian policy 230 – 168 BC (not discussed in the thesis, see Chapter 3.2), Rome dealt with an unstable, transitional geo-political system. Its policy worked towards establishing essentially two different political frameworks that in the end achieved stability in the system as a whole. In many ways Romans did not yet consider Illyricum as a single system. The northern area was in a process of rapid political transition and Roman interests were chiefly concerned with the extension of political influence and control of northern Italy. Rome’s interests encompassed the Histrian peninsula, and its aims were ultimately achieved by the foundation and survival of Aquileia. Roman conduct was a combination of force and diplomacy, but overall we can see that it was implemented by a means of aggressive Roman action. The greatest problem was the hostility of the Histrian kingdom that was caused by Rome’s extending its political influences, and the ultimate solution was its destruction and dissolution for the sake of achieving Roman control and securing Aquileia.

Southern Illyricum was initially a buffer zone against the other hegemonic power in the area – the Macedonian kingdom. Rome tried to establish a political framework based on a network of allies, which controlled and prevented aggressive Macedonian designs. The greatest problem was the unreliable policy of the Illyrian kingdom and its rulers, who although often working in the Roman interest, also represented a danger to Rome when they allied themselves to Macedonian ambitions. The only way to achieve stability in the system and secure Roman influence was by the imposition of a new political framework through the dissolution of the Macedonian and Illyrian kingdoms and the fragmentation of the political map of southern Illyricum. There are similarities in Roman political solutions in the north and south of Illyricum with the significant exception that, in the south, Rome had the full support of the regional power, the Issaean commonwealth. The operational mode in the northwest was a combination of passivity and aggression, but it became increasingly aggressive towards the end of the phase. Geo-strategic emphasis in this period is clearly maritime, as Rome did not show even the slightest interest in the hinterland.
Roman policy in this period is ambiguous, mostly because Rome was still not established as sole hegemon (or a ‘world-empire’) in the Mediterranean system, and the imposition of a political framework was affected by the simultaneous and more important wars against Carthage and Macedonia. Although the period is regarded as an initial phase of Illyrian policy, a consistent Roman view of Illyricum as a geo-political system was far from being established, and the political frameworks that were established at the end of the period are influenced by the political frameworks established in the neighboring regional systems of Macedonia/Epirus and North Italy/Alps.

The second phase of Illyrian policy, 167 – 60 BC, dealt with a stable geo-political system that had been established during the previous period, and the imposition of a political framework was projected bifocally onto the eastern Adriatic coast. The northern focus was preventative defense and the protection of North Italy through a mixed political approach: the extension of client-states and the annexation of critical territories. The Liburni, Taurisci and Iapodes (at least the Cisalpine Iapodes) were included in the network of Roman allies/clients through war or diplomacy, and the entrance to Italy from the Pannonian plains was closed, in alliance with the Norican kingdom that kept control over the eastern Alps. A preventative but unsuccessful raid was made towards the Segestani, most likely with the aim of extending the network of clients to the north. Histria and the western part of the Tauriscan territory were annexed. This policy was complemented with the southern framework, composed of a fragmented mosaic of client states, both Greek and native, and which had been established in the previous phase. The significance of the Roman alliance with the Issaean commonwealth as a regional hegemon (after the Illyrian kingdom was dissolved) was enormous, as it created stability without direct Roman military involvement for a whole century. This system was occasionally under threat from Ardiaean piracy or the aggressive policy of the Delmataean alliance or the Transalpine Iapodes, and the Romans were forced to intervene and pacify them in order to preserve the system. Despite those occasional conflicts, the system remained stable.

The third phase, 59 – 33 BC, dealt with the initially stable system that turned into a transitional one when Illyricum became one of the battlefields of the civil
war. New requirements appeared in changed circumstances (the increasing economic interest and migration of Italians on the eastern Adriatic coast), so that a proto-provincial framework became established in 59 BC to smooth the transition from bifocal hegemony to the provincial system. It was Rome’s acknowledgment of the political and social change that had taken place in eastern Mediterranean, rather than its attempt to impose rapid political change on the system. The change in the political/constitutional framework did not correspond with any change in the operational mode initially. The system remained stable in the first decade despite the political framework changing.

The Roman civil war was an external factor that changed the situation inside Illyricum and it was the civil war rather than the establishment of a proto-province in 59 BC that made the system unstable. The dissolution of the Issaean commonwealth, after supporting the losing side in the intra-Roman conflict, threw the system into further instability. This event opened the way for the establishment of the Delmataean alliance as a hostile regional power in the central Adriatic and thus the most significant threat to Roman interests and the whole proto-provincial framework. The Romans did not change their operational mode in this phase; they remained passive and aimed only at the pacification of the Delmatae. Continual civil strife inside the Roman system, as well as the Roman refusal to change the political framework extended this phase and in the mid-30s BC almost brought about a collapse of proto-provincial political structures in the northwest. The extension of the network of client-states and the re-assertion of Rome’s authority were necessary in order to secure its interests. Octavian included the Transalpine Iapodes and Segestani in the network of client-states and thoroughly pacified the Delmatae. This campaign enabled the establishment of the constitutional framework of a senatorial province in the next phase. Although Octavian’s operation against the Segestani was aggressive and briefly extended into the continent, it was only a brief excursion. Overall, we can see the operational mode in this phase as predominantly passive and the geo-strategy still with a maritime emphasis.

The fourth phase dealt with a stable system. The sources are scarce but the process of the municipalization of the coastal cities and the absence of further substantial political troubles show that the 27 – 12 BC political framework of
‘lesser’ Illyricum was a functioning system. Increased municipalization and the establishment of colonies in the native settlements with a substantial Italian and Roman population completed the establishment of a functional provincial core that was able to uphold Roman power and at the same time strongly influence the inclusion of the periphery into the system. However, the crisis of 16 BC reveals serious problems with the Norican kingdom and the whole regional system that encompassed the Alps. That instability in the neighbouring regional system also affected Illyricum. The constitutional framework required change and the only possible solution was the annexation of unstable Noricum and a sudden change of policy towards continental Europe. The annexation of the Norican kingdom was followed by an extension of direct Roman power in the direction of the Pannonian plains, which affected Illyricum directly.

In the fifth phase, 12 BC – AD 9, Illyricum was a transitional system. The most significant feature of the policy was that the geo-strategic emphasis shifted decisively to the continent. Through aggressive operations the Romans first included the Pannonian states of the Mezaei, Breuci, Daesitiate into the network of client-states. This, in theory, enabled much better functioning of Illyricum as a regional system incorporated into the empire because the coastal provincial core was joined with a provincial periphery, which brought the establishment of the regional economic system under full Roman control. However, the great weakness of the Roman position was lack of communications between the coast and frontier, and the absence of firmer provincial structures in the Bosnian hinterland and the Pannonian north ultimately resulted in the initial success of the great Pannonian rebellion.

Finally, the last phase of Illyrian policy created and maintained an overwhelmingly stable system, established through the division of the territory into two provinces that could be more efficiently administered. The two provinces in time became two different regional systems. Firstly, Dalmatia belonged more to the cultural core of the Empire. Secondly, Pannonia remained as semi-peripheral, keeping relations with the peripheral peoples outside of the empire, and also enabling a strong and impenetrable frontier by means of Danube, which was a strategic link with other frontier provinces.
FIGURE 5 Phases of Roman Illyrian policy

Bifocality 168-60 BC

Coastal Illyricum 59-33 BC

Lesser Illyricum 33-12 BC

Greater Illyricum 12 BC – AD 9

Two Illyricums c. AD 10

Pannonia

Dalmatia
Chapter 9: The Conclusion

9.3 Roman Illyrian policy in a wider context: Rome and the Mediterranean macro-system

Roman Illyrian policy was one of many political interactions inside a larger Mediterranean system and it is important to see how it fits into the global picture of Roman interactions with other regional systems and the state of the Mediterranean macro-system. Roman foreign policy had a major impact on degree of stability of the system, especially after Rome became the sole hegemon, a ‘world-empire’ in the Mediterranean system in 168 BC. The criteria we used in assessing Illyrian policy can also be applied to the macro-system as a whole. The mode of operations that imposed the political/constitutional framework is determined by whether the Romans sought to expand their power (aggressive mode) or to keep the status quo and engage in regional wars, without expanding on a large scale (passive mode). The geo-strategic emphasis was maritime and/or mixed before Caesar,\(^1\) and continental afterwards (Figure 6.1).

\(^1\) Although Caesar clearly shifted the Roman geo-strategic emphasis into the continent, the strategy of both the civil wars was without doubt developed in a maritime context.
FIGURE 6 Impact of Roman foreign policy on regional and global levels

FIGURE 6.1 Roman foreign policy and the Mediterranean macro-system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Mode of policy</th>
<th>Geo-strategic emphasis</th>
<th>State of the Mediterranean macro-system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 229 – 168 BC</td>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>Transitional/Unstable</td>
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<td>Maritime</td>
<td>Working/Stable</td>
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<td>4. 31 – 16 BC</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Continental</td>
<td>Working/Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 16 BC – AD 9</td>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>Continental</td>
<td>Transitional/Unstable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AD 9 – 68</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Continental</td>
<td>Working/Stable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 6.2 Roman foreign policy and the Illyrian regional system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Mode of policy</th>
<th>Geo-strategic Emphasis</th>
<th>State of the Illyrian regional system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 229 – 168 BC</td>
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<td>Maritime</td>
<td>Transitional/Unstable</td>
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<td>2. 168 – 60 BC</td>
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<td>4. 33 – 12 BC</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Maritime</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 12 BC – AD 9</td>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>Continental</td>
<td>Transitional/Unstable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AD 9 – 68</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Continental</td>
<td>Working/Stable</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
These figures contain some interesting features. The periods when the Mediterranean was in an unstable/transitional state are generally characterized by an aggressive mode of Roman policy while during periods when the system was stable/working, the mode of Roman policy was passive. Thus it is obvious that Romans, generally speaking, used an aggressive policy when the whole macro-system became unstable in order to make it stable again. It seems that the Romans mainly reacted to the changes in the macro-system, rather than initiating them, with some exceptions.²

In Illyricum, the first phase corresponds with the macro-system, but in the second and the early third phase (168 – 50 BC), stability lasted two decades longer than in the macro-system. The length of the other phases is roughly the same. Increased stability in Illyricum can be attributed to the Issaean commonwealth and a very cautious Roman policy towards Illyricum that did not cause increased resentment in the native population. The change of political framework in 59 BC was not initiated by any crisis in Illyricum but rather it was the acknowledgment that political circumstances changed. An interesting feature is the passive operational mode in phase 3. One reason is the civil war. It is also evident that the instability of the system that occurred after the dissolution of the Issaean commonwealth was much more severe than previously thought. Although Roman citizens regrouped and firmly entrenched themselves in some strongholds on the coast, nothing was done to modify the ambitions of the Delmataean alliance and to make a new political framework until the system collapsed in 35 BC. Thus, we can see more clearly that Octavian was forced to act in Illyricum to prevent disaster, and not only to increase his auctoritas.

The geo-political emphasis of the Republican system was basically maritime-oriented and had no interest in Illyricum, except the coast and the areas bordering North Italy. This was one of the most significant reasons why Illyricum remained outside the main focus of Roman foreign policy. There was a changed

² The shift in 70 BC was triggered by the general instability of the system in the decade after Sulla’s death. In the eastern part of the system piracy paralysed significant parts of the system, and there was a war in Thrace, and a renewed threat from Mithridates VI that introduced instability into the whole East. In the west, there was the Sertorian rebellion and also the third Dalmatian war, 78-76 BC. In 16 BC the instability of the Norican kingdom and problems on the German frontier were a significant impetus towards a shift in policy. However, there were strong domestic reasons for the shift of policy as well (see Chapter 6.3), so that this phase can perhaps be treated as an exception.
position in the early Principate after a new political system was established, and foreign policy concentrated on the continent as more peripheral systems were tightly bound with the Mediterranean macro-system. Military advances in the regional systems of the Alps and Moesia forced the Romans to their change policy towards Illyricum and advance towards the Drava and later the Danube. The policy towards Illyricum shifted accordingly with the realignment of imperial geography. Pannonia needed mobile forces and colonies of military veterans to protect it, but on the other hand the creation of Pannonia made a buffer zone separating the coastal core and mountainous semi-periphery of Dalmatia and the outer periphery of Danubian frontier. The creation of Pannonia was in a way the ultimate achievement of two centuries of Roman strategic attempts to protect and secure northern Italy.

Thus, we can say that the phases of Roman Illyrian policy mainly, but not always, corresponded with the phases and the mode of Roman interaction with the Mediterranean macro-system. The establishment and contractions of the Roman ‘world-empire’ significantly but not exclusively affected Mediterranean macro-system. Roman Illyrian policy was influenced by regional political and social fluctuations in Illyricum, but also affected by fluctuations in the macro-system. Therefore, Roman Illyrian policy should be understood only as a joint product of the fluctuations in the Mediterranean macro-system and regional fluctuations inside Illyricum.

**9.4 Ethnic dimension of Illyrian policy**

In dealing with an ethnically diverse and heterogeneous area where ethnicity was intimately connected with the development of proto-state formations, such as Illyricum, the Romans were compelled to develop different relationships with different peoples in order to assert their authority with more success. To some extent they developed a rudimentary ethnic policy, as some ethne were generally treated in a friendlier manner than others, for different strategic reasons, or because of specific cultural, historical, geographical circumstances. Ethnic policy was an opportunity to fine tune the general course of Roman regional policy and adjust it in the light of different political factors that existed inside the geo-political system of Illyricum. In general, Roman ethnic policy concentrated on establishing more friendly relationships with the peoples who were culturally more attuned to the
Mediterranean cultural/social system, such as those ethne who inhabited the Eastern Adriatic coast. Romans also sought to look upon and ally themselves with weaker against stronger ethnic groups, encouraging the separatist ambitions of individual south Illyrian civitates from the Illyrian kingdom, or gaining personal support from native principes like Bato the Breucian who was bribed with the promise of rule over all the Pannonii in AD 8.

The Romans had more problems in the hinterland of the Adriatic, and the importance of ethnic policy increased. The main troublemakers were not entirely included in the Mediterranean system (Iapodes, Pannonii, Delmatae). They either had political aspirations of their own (Delmatae), were a threat to political stability with their raids (Iapodes), or were frustrated by their rapid inclusion into the Roman empire and into the Mediterranean macro-system after the initial Roman conquest (Pannonii). In addition, the Delmatae and Pannonii represented a homogeneous ethnic block that was most hostile to the expansion of Roman influence. Romans counteracted the Pannonian-Delmataean block by establishing alliances with their Celtic neighbors (Scordisci, Taurisci), who themselves had also opposed Rome in the earlier phases of Roman Illyrian policy, but were successfully pacified and won over as valuable allies. Roman ethnic policy succeeded in keeping the Pannonii isolated from other ethnic groups during the Bellum Batonianum, and finally the administrative arrangements, after the uprising was crushed, enabled Rome to achieve stability in the system and prevent further unrest.

9.5 Economic and socio-cultural interactions

The economic aspect of Roman Illyrian policy does not fit the model of aggressive, profit-driven imperialism. If the policy was aggressive and profit-driven, Romans would have been much more militarily and politically involved in Illyricum. There were large metal deposits in the Dalmatian hinterland, which they were aware of but they did nothing to acquire them for a long time. The protection of maritime commerce and navigation in the Adriatic against piracy had some impact on the course of the policy, especially in its initial phases. There is a link between the economic penetration of Italian citizens and the establishment of proto-provincial structures in 59 BC, and certainly they played some limited influence on Roman Illyrian policy later as their protection became one of the factors that
impacted upon policy-making. Despite these factors, it seems clear that economic matters played a secondary role to political considerations in the making of Roman Illyrian policy and so helps explain long periods of Roman inactivity in Illyricum.

Culturally, parts of Illyricum were in very different stages of inclusion in the Mediterranean world. The coastal areas and the immediate hinterland were culturally close and relatively easy to incorporate into the Mediterranean cultural core, if not already part of it. This coastal core had a strong cultural impact on the mountainous hinterland of Dalmatia even before Roman conquest; nevertheless the hinterland remained semi-peripheral in relation to the Mediterranean. Pannonia, on the other hand, was exposed to strong cultural influences from Italy for a long time, and the concentration of the Roman army and colonies made it easier to absorb into the empire.

9.6 Final remarks

Insufficient evidence remains a great, almost unbeatable curse Clio cast upon Illyricum and its history. It is the main reason why the peoples of Illyricum still remain the ‘people without history’, to paraphrase the title of E. Wolf’s book.\(^3\) Thus, the historian working in this field must remove him/herself and see matters from a distance, dealing with structural changes that occur through passages of time rather than get too immersed in the detail of events.

This thesis has attempted to present Roman Illyrian policy as an interaction between two systems. It has shown that in their political considerations Romans were aware of and accordingly treated Illyricum from the 2\(^{nd}\) century BC as something we could call a regional geo-political system, developing a regional policy that was fine tuned, mainly through the means of ethnic policy. The regional policy was not too sophisticated. It included a basic understanding of the territory and the peoples inhabiting it and Roman conduct towards that territory and its peoples followed an overwhelmingly artificial political conception of Illyricum. In a way, we may say that the creation of Illyricum as a spatial concept was a product of the Roman need to create Illyrian policy. By examining Illyricum we can see (especially during the Republic) the Romans as perpetually conservative policy-

\(^3\) Wolf (1982).
Roman Illyrian policy is the interaction of two systems, Rome and Illyricum. Interaction was influenced by the consequences of Roman interaction with the Mediterranean macro-system and by the state of affairs in Illyricum. The view that Illyrian regional system and events in Illyricum have nothing to do with Illyrian policy must therefore be abandoned (see Chapter 3.1), in the same way as views that the conquest of Illyricum was a Roman search for a land-link with the East or a fixed frontier at the Danube. They are nothing but responses to a much wider question, oversimplified answers to a complex question. We asked at the beginning (Chapter 1.6) whether an Roman Illyrian policy existed, and whether it would be worthwhile to examine it. The first part of the question is answered without doubt, taking into account historical circumstances. Illyrian policy had its beginning, its successive phases and its end. This thesis provides answers to the other part of the question. The Illyrian policy of Rome was distinct, as it was influenced by a clearly defined space with its natural and cultural specifics. On the other hand, it shows that Illyricum was a part of the wider Mediterranean world, that it was affected by the changes and fluctuations in that wider system, and that it could in turn affect them.
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<thead>
<tr>
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² The publications of ANUBiH are rather confusingly numerated by the publishers with two different numbers and that confusion is reflected in the works referencing these publications. In the annual publications first number marks ANUBiH issue and second GCBI. Also there are completely different numerations for the monographies and for the special publications of the ANUBiH and CBI.
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GZMS Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja u Sarajevu (Bulletin du Musée National de Bosnie-Herzegovine), Sarajevo

HAD Hrvatsko Arheološko Društvo (Archeological Society of Croatia) publications, Zagreb

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Histria Archaeologica Časopis Arheološkog muzeja Istre (Bulletin du Museé archeologique d'Istrie), Pula

HSCPh Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Harvard

Iliria Revue Archeologique, Tirane

JEA Journal of European Archeology, UK

JHG Journal of Historical Geography, London

JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies, London

JIČ Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis (Yugoslav Historical Revue), Belgrade

JRA Journal of Roman Archaeology, London

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MAP 1
Illyricum and neighbouring geo-political systems

GAUL
GERMANY
NORICUM
ITALY
ILLYRICUM
DACIA
THRACE
MAP 2 Civitates and the peoples of Illyricum
From Wilkes (1996b) 560, map 12
Plate I

Daorson, political center of the Daorsian *civitas*, destroyed in 44 BC by the Delmataean alliance. The remains of the citadel, IV - I ct. BC.

*Gradina Ošanići, near Stolac, SE Herzegovina*
Plate II

Crown of the well from the forum of Iader, bearing the name of pro-consul Cneius Tamphilus Vála Numonianus, the governor of senatorial Illyricum and the patron of Iader (c. 27-25 BC)

Archaeological Museum in Zadar
Photo: Smiljan Gluščević
Plate III

*CIL* III 2975

L. Volusius Saturninus, L. f., governor of Dalmatia,
AD 34 - 40 (?)

Archaeological Museum in Nin

Photo: Smiljan Gluščević
Plate IV

Female personification of the Pirustae ΕΘΝΟΣ ΠΙΡΟΥΣΤΩΝ from the Sebasteion in Aphrodisias, 1 ct. AD

Photo: M. Ali Düğenci
from Smith, 1988 pl. 1

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