CHAPTER VII

THE ADNJAMATHANHA LAND RIGHTS COMMITTEE

7.1 AN EXPLANATORY NOTE

In this and the following chapter a detailed analysis is made of both the Adnjamathanha and Kokatha land rights movements. Each analysis deals with three different aspects of land rights in Port Augusta. Firstly, the ideological level of land rights action is presented and analysed. Of relevance to this aspect of land rights is the policy and projected image of the land rights groups, which is referred to as their 'sphere of interest'. In some respects, it parallels the 'social product' or formal dimension of the land rights groups (Cohen, 1969; 197). The concepts of identity and tribal country are of particular significance to this ideological level and are treated in depth.

Secondly, the practical dimension of land rights action is analysed by way of a breakdown of participation in the land rights groups. Participation is treated from four main perspectives: kin affiliation, the role of tradition, associations of participants with external organisations and participation by gender. The kin analysis places participating Aboriginals into the context of the kin group from which they trace their descent. Although both the Adnjamathanha and the Kokatha have loosely practised patterns of descent persisting within their groups (the Adnjamathanha stress matrilineal descent and the Kokatha stress patrilineal descent) kin affiliation does not always follow these norms. In both
groups descent is not exclusively traced through the line suggested as correct. Both groups practise a far more selective and versatile pattern of descent affiliation which enables them to place emphasis on either the matriline or patriline. Usually the pattern of descent affiliation adopted allows identification with ancestors who had or have important status among the group. Thus, genealogies which are presented to describe kin affiliation may not seem consistent in terms of a normative pattern of descent but they are consistent with the internal reality of kin group association and identification.

A note of explanation is also necessary in relation to the form of the genealogies used to present kin affiliation. The genealogical model for each kin group is not a complete genealogical representation. They are designed to cover basically those members of the kin group who have participated in land rights action (demarcated on the genealogies by underlining) and their immediate family. The diagrams are standardised so that the same model appears for the one kin group each time it is presented with only alterations to the participants appearing. In this way the shifts in participation in relation to land rights action can be noted both between kin groups and within kin groups. The kin analysis is combined with an analysis of the role of traditional modes, organisation affiliations and the gender patterns of land rights participation. Combined, they lead to a better understanding of the social processes or informal level of land rights (Cohen, 1968; 197).
Finally, the specific events or issues that the land rights groups have been involved with are documented and analysed. The varying affiliations that are noted in the analysis of participation and the relationship this reality has with the projected ideology of the land rights groups, are set within the situation of land rights action in order to elucidate their impact on the local land rights process. The analysis of land rights action presents a highly fluid process based on participants developing and breaking alliances in order to make the best of the options available. The impact of the limited availability of land, the intense pressure upon the land from outside agents, and the inadequate political options through which the Aboriginal interest in land can be recognised, are clearly demonstrated. These features of the political environment in which land rights action operates exacerbate and even create tensions along existing kin-community lines as groups compete internally for control of the desired resource of land. Government penetration of the land rights groups, via local Aboriginals co-opted into Government ranks, often intensifies rather than alleviates tensions. The detailed studies of land rights action reveal that what appears to outsiders as internal disputes over land, or inconsistency in land rights ambitions, or opportunism, is often the result of attempts by Aboriginal groups to make the best of the available options by exercising choice rather than a reflection on the 'genuineness' of their land relationship.
In order to illustrate the fluidity in affiliation a basic model of affiliation has been constructed which incorporates a central ego from which radiate four main areas of affiliation: Cultural links, Kin links, Organisation links and Local Community links (Figure 7:1). This model is applied to a selected number of participants in the land rights groups. With each new climax in the scenarios of land rights action the models are presented as a means of illustrating variations in affiliation with internal and external factors.

7.2 SPHERE OF INTEREST

The Adnjamathanha Land Rights Committee (ALRC) focuses its attention on the Flinders Ranges area which the Adnjamathanha population see as the undisputed core of their country. The common identification with the Flinders Ranges is an intrinsic part of the collective Adnjamathanha identity concept. The Flinders Ranges holds much of the Adnjamathanha mythology, is the locale of the group’s post-contact experience, and the home of their ancestors and living kin. All Adnjamathanha people have some link to this physically outstanding environment, and the Ranges emerge as one of the most tangible aspects of the Adnjamathanha ideology of collective identity (cf. Jones and Hill-Burnett, 1982). The collective identity and territory concepts are strongly projected when the group deals with outsiders.

It is significant that while there is consensus over
what area constitutes Adnjamathanha territory, the spatial expression of the Adnjamathanha identity concept varies in detail between individuals. Map 7:1, compiled during fieldwork in 1980, shows the regional concept held by a number of Adnjamathanha people. The map reveals that despite the existence of an ideological consensus about the territorial component of identity (which is stressed by the Land Rights Committee), at an individual level there is marked variation in the spatial extent of this collective territory concept.

An indisputable 'core' region is displayed on the map which all informants include as part of their territory concept. The 'core' region centres on the Northern Flinders Ranges and particularly Nepabunna which was, until the 1960s, the home of most Adnjamathanha people. Outside of the 'core' area marked variations exist in the territorial concepts held by each individual. These variations are the result of individual differences in the criteria used as the basis of territorial definition. The least extensive territorial concept belonged to an aging initiated man who, in his last years, was the only Adnjamathanha person living in an out-station situation. He was camped on culturally meaningful land away from the reserve and towns. His spatial conception of Adnjamathanha territory was tied to a detailed knowledge of Adnjamathanha mythology. Those not so familiar with ritualistic and mythological definitives of the landscape have more extensive and generalised notions of 'Adnjamathanha country'. For these individuals, the definition of territory
MAP 7:1 Varying Individual Territory Concepts held by Adnjamathanha people.

Initiated man. Living in outstation camp, near Nepabunna.


Heritage Unit Ranger. Boundary follows course of populat/public mythology. Living Port Augusta. Kin at Nepabunna.

Young man. Living Port Augusta. Kin at Nepabunna.
 hinges on criteria such as long-association with areas of employment and current personal and kin residence. Quite often towns feature as boundary markers reflecting the importance of kin and personal residence as criteria for territory definition. Similarly, pastoral properties are also used to describe the spatial extent of territorial concepts, suggesting a significant change in the Adnjamantha conceptionalisation of place which is associated with their involvement in the pastoral industry (cf. Kolig, 1978: 70).

The expansion of territory concepts is not haphazard, that is, the spatial concepts do not extend to a degree which makes them incompatible with the collective ideology of identity and territory. Further, the expansion of territory concepts is related to the presence of other Aboriginal groups. For example, two individuals showing inflated territory concepts have extended their concept of country only in an easterly direction where no other strong or identifiable Aboriginal community exists. The presence of discrete and large Aboriginal groups to the north and west has discouraged the expansion of Adnjamantha territory concepts in these directions. The inflated territory concepts also have a political component as is indicated by their abrupt eastern boundaries which coincide with the South Australian-New South Wales border. The regard given to the eastern State boundary is related to the local misconception that the State political sphere is the most important in terms of Government funding and
reveals that external political values are becoming significant factors in the Adnjamathanha view of the land.

The individual variation in territory concepts illustrates the dynamics of both the Aboriginal associations with land and the related notion of identity. The spatial definition of country is variable, as are the criteria by which it is defined. The existence of such variation reflects post-contact alternations in the Adnjamathanha association with land. The resultant territory concepts are compiled from a range of meaningful criteria, including Dreamtime mythology, historical association, personal and kin birth and residence, and political aspirations. These definitive criteria of Adnjamathanha concepts of the land do not fit with the customary law stereotype. Nor does the spatial variability that results from the application of these criteria fit the fixed and inalterable definition of land association embodied in legislation based on what is seen to be a pre-contact norm.

A significant aspect of the individual variation in concepts of territory is its relationship to the ideal of a unified collective identity concept. Despite the existence of the aforementioned variation there is a surprising harmony among the Adnjamathanha in relation to their collective territory concept and rarely does the variation create internal disputes over the land with which the Adnjamathanha identify. This suggests that while a certain uniformity is implied in the collective ideal which is projected to outsiders, internally this ideal is based on, and quite happily incorporates, the various individual
expressions of identity and territory. The Adnjamathanha have been able to develop and sustain a strong collective concept by way of their close and relatively recent mission experience. They have a clear concept of 'who' is Adnjamathanha and, as a result of their continued association with the topographically distinct Flinders Ranges, the 'where' of their Adnjamathanha identity. The successful projection of this collective sense of identity, that is, internal and external acceptance of this concept, is further enhanced by the obviousness of the Flinders Ranges topographic region and the continued existence of an exclusively Adnjamathanha reserve area at Nepabunna.

Only one recent public example of internal controversy over the spatial extent of Adnjamathanha country could be traced. The nature of this controversy adds depth to the interplay between the Adnjamathanha collective ideal and the individual expressions of this ideal. The controversy arose in relation to the proposed development of a petrochemical plant at Redcliff, south of Port Augusta (near Port Pirie). When the development was announced an Adnjamathanha man spoke to the Press and suggested the site may be an Aboriginal sacred site (The Advertiser, 11/9/1980). He spoke to the Press not as an Adnjamathanha man claiming Adnjamathanha right to the area, but as a community spokesman and the acting Chairman of the Davenport Community Council. He spoke on behalf of the few remaining Nukanu and Pangkala people whose tribal boundaries, he said, coincided at the proposed site. His statement did not
pronounce a sacred site, or Adnjamathanha interest; it was simply a call for proper consultation with the relevant groups by the government and Dow Chemicals, the company involved in the development.

The community ramifications of this statement were immense. His elders chastised him for making the statement on the grounds that he had no rights to talk about the existence of sacred sites in another tribe's country. The Redcliff controversy appeared as a community dispute over territory. It seemed that one Adnjamathanha man, at least, was uncertain of his own people's interest in land. In fact, what was demanded of this man as a community spokesperson conflicted with the outer limits of the collective Adnjamathanha concept of territory, and with what was expected of him by the initiated men who set the main standards of this territorial ideal (cf. Jones and Hill-Burnett, 1982).

The Redcliff incident illustrates some important characteristics of land rights politics in Port Augusta: that of internal factionalism and land-related controversy resulting from the conflicting affiliations of Aboriginal leaders who have been co-opted into Government agencies and, as such, are responsible to both the expectations of their tribal/kin groups as well as a broader community group. The incident suggests that, untouched by outside influences, the individual variations in territory concept can coexist peaceably without creating internal controversy.

It was the intrusion of externally directed affiliations,
obligations and expectations which induced the internal controversy (by demanding an internally unacceptable commitment to the Redcliff's area by the spokesperson) and not an uncertainty among the Adnjamathanha about their territorial rights.

The efforts of the ALRC are consistent with collective Adnjamathanha commitment to the Flinders Ranges region. It stresses to newcomers in the area, and to external agencies its role as spokesbody for Adnjamathanha land issues which centre on the Flinders Ranges. Ideologically at least, it displays solidarity, collectivity and a commitment to the common ambition of the Adnjamathanha people.

Its formation in 1979 was in relation to the continuing Adnjamathanha claim for land rights in relation to Leigh Creek and began by a small group of Port Augusta men writing to the State Government claiming compensation. However, consistent action did not eventuate until later that year when the ALRC began directing its efforts towards the acquisition of Balcanoona pastoral lease. The ALRC has never formulated a specific policy on land rights but rather directs its energies to most property-based land issues emerging in the Flinders area. Its main activities consist of attempts to acquire funds to purchase pastoral leases, leaving the recording of cultural sites and the collection of cultural information in the hands of the Heritage Unit with which the Adnjamathanha have had a long association.
The Adnjamathanha Land Rights Committee has adopted many European-type procedures. The concept of forming a committee alludes to the forms of decision-making encouraged by the Government's self-determination policy. The application of this structure to the land rights struggle attests to its rapid acceptance among the people. Significantly, the ALRC is not sponsored by the Government. It solicits assistance from Government departments but has remained relatively autonomous. In this sense it is not comfortably placed into the existing hierarchy of organisations within Port Augusta (see Figure 4:5). The ALRC is not an incorporated group, although numerous times the members have discussed the possibility of incorporation. The failure to incorporate the Committee seems to be a result of the reluctance of those participating to commit themselves to what they see to be a legally binding arrangement. The added responsibility and commitment that are seen to accompany incorporation are incompatible with the casual but effective manner in which most Adnjamathanha participate in the Committee. As an unincorporated body the Committee functions essentially as a voluntary political lobby group, releasing press statements, mobilising the rest of the community and approaching Government agencies to seek assistance or publicise its land rights ambitions.

7.3 PARTICIPATION IN THE ADNJAMATHANHA LAND RIGHTS COMMITTEE

7.3.1 Kin Affiliation of ALRC Participants

The kin analysis of Adnjamathanha participation in land
rights action has been based upon five distinct kin groups, called Kin Group 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. These five major kin groups were isolated using genealogies of the Adnjamathanha collected by Christine Wilton, an Adnjamathanha woman working with the Heritage Unit. Members of Kin Groups 1, 2 and 3 are all closely related, descending from three brothers and sharing the same surname. These three groups may be seen as part of the one kin complex but are presented separately because their members have differing matrilinations which, in some situations, are used to assert distinctions. Kin Groups 4 and 5 are quite distinct although relatively distant relationships can be traced to the other groups. Two groups in particular, Kin Groups 1 and 5, are discrete units and it is only in the last decade that inter-marriage has occurred between the two.

The precursor to the formal ALRC was the aforementioned letter written to the Minister for Mines and Energy requesting compensation for the damage to Leigh Creek by the coal mining activities (18/4/79). The letter was drafted in a small informal meeting called by a member of Kin Group 1 and held in Port Augusta. It was written with the assistance of the Legal Rights lawyer and the head of the Heritage Unit. Although the Adnjamathanha drew upon the skills and advice of these Government employed men there was no formal sponsorship of the group by the Government. In comparison to its predecessor, the NFACC, the embryo land rights group was relatively autonomous. Although, as will be shown later,
indirect control by the Government has been possible by virtue of less obvious associations between the land rights participants and the Government.

The letter regarding Leigh Creek was signed by only the handful of Adnjamathanha people who attended the meeting. Seven of the signatories were from Port Augusta, one was from Nepabunna. All were of the same surname, bar one, and all were male. The Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex dominated the move, accounting for six of the eight signatories. Kin Group 4 was represented by only one man, and he was the only representative from Nepabunna. Kin Group 5 was also represented by only one man who, significantly, is also linked to the dominant Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex through his father and, thus, shares the same surname as the others.

The relationship of this last participant to his own and the other Kin Groups is particularly important. As a member of Kin Group 5, that group which has historically had little association with the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex, he is seen by the latter as an outsider to their own extended group. Personally this member of Kin Group 5 sees himself, by virtue of his father's link with the dominant Kin Complex, as being associated with Kin Groups 1, 2 and 3. His own Kin Group 5 also view him as being closer to the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex, if not in terms of genealogical connections certainly in terms of action and association. Thus, although Kin Group 5 was represented on this embryo committee it was through a member which this Kin Group saw to be closer to those who dominated the move rather than one
of their own core members. Conversely, by including this member of Kin Group 5 in this move the dominant Kin Complex ostensibly were offering fair representation to Kin Group 5. In fact, they were including a member of this Kin Group who had, in his actions and associations, displayed a preference for identification with their own group and was, therefore, more likely to agree with their strategies and decisions (Figure 7:2). The kin diagram illustrates clearly the essential feature of this initial land rights group, that is, the domination of the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex and the selective incorporation of members from other kin groups. The other significant feature of this embryo group was the minimal representation from Nepabunna. This structure remains the persistent form of Adnjamathanha land rights action.

Logically, the first attempt to form a formal community-elected land rights group was instigated by this Port Augusta faction. The meeting to decide the first land rights group was held at Nepabunna to ensure both Nepabunna and Port Augusta Adnjamathanha were present (June, 1979). The meeting agreed that there should be a land rights group and decided that it should consist of six representatives from Port Augusta and five from Nepabunna. Apart from the increase in Nepabunna representation the most important alteration from the embryonic form was the increase in representation from Kin Group 5.

The increase in representation from Kin Group 5 is a reflection of this meeting being held at Nepabunna as
opposed to Port Augusta, and is related to the historical patterns of division, movement and migration among the Adnjamathanha. Kin Groups 1, 2 and 3 have a majority of their group living outside of Nepabunna and especially in Port Augusta. The members of this Kin Complex were those who opposed mission control and moved away from Nepabunna during the late 1960s and early 1970s in a statement of their newly acquired civil rights. In contrast, Kin Group 5 stayed at Nepabunna. They supported the missionary and, after the missionary was expelled and self-determination was implemented, assumed control of the Nepabunna Council. Consequently, the first formal land rights committee to be instated via community nomination and voting reflected the dominant local power structure of Nepabunna, that is, Kin Group 5 domination. In keeping with the aforementioned justification for this shift in power, the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex suffered a loss of representation in this Nepabunna-based vote (Figure 7:3).

In this formal Committee, significant shifts not only occurred between the discrete Kin Groups but within the Kin Groups themselves. In the previously dominant Kin Group 1, representation not only fell from three to one but shifted to exclude all of the original instigators of land rights action. The Kin Group 1 representative to be instated in the place of the original participants is one of the Heritage Unit’s Aboriginal trainee Rangers. This was a significant shift in terms of external input to the Adnjamathanha Land Rights Committee for it facilitated a
direct link to the Government department which had, until the instigation of the Committee, controlled most activities in relation to land rights. In terms of the type of service offered by the Heritage Unit it is logical that it would aim to participate in this new local move for land rights. Indeed, the participation of the Heritage Unit head in the embryonic land rights group suggests that this department had considerable interest in the emergent moves for land rights. Moreover, the Nepabunna group viewed this representative of Kin Group 1 to be, by virtue of his affiliation with the Heritage Unit, the one representative who would be fair, unbiased, and would offer access to useful resources. By the representation of Kin Group 1 undergoing this internal shift the membership of the ALRC was more receptive to the new domination of Kin Group 5.

During the first month of the formal operations of the Land Rights Committee few Nepabunna representatives attended the meetings which were usually held at Port Augusta. Discouraged by this lack of response, the regular participants (essentially those who formed the first informal committee) suggested that a new committee be formed. This move came from one of the Port Augusta men who had instigated the initial action and organised the Nepabunna meeting but had not been elected to the formal Committee (ALRC, Minutes of Meeting, July 1979). The replacement Committee was characterised by two important changes. Firstly, the representation of Adnjamathanha people resident in Port Augusta increased. The Nepabunna community continued to have
five representatives but the Port Augusta contingent increased from six to ten. Secondly, the representation of the five Kin Groups altered dramatically (Figure 7:4).

The kin affiliation diagram of the replacement Committee reveals that Kin Group 1 representation increased from one to eight. Similarly, the closely linked Kin Groups 2 and 3 had their joint representation increased from two to three. Combined, the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex had a total representation of eleven people (out of sixteen positions) on the revised Committee. This rise in representation from the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex occurred to the detriment of Kin Group 5 which no longer held the majority. Additionally, representation from Kin Group 5 underwent a significant internal shift. In the first formal Committee a Nepabunna-based branch of this group dominated representation. In the amended Committee representation was shifted to a closely knit sub-group that resides outside of Nepabunna.

These alterations shifted power within the Land Rights Committee back to those who had initiated action. The power of Kin Group 5 was diluted by shifting representation to a branch of the group which has representatives living closer to Port Augusta and who, themselves, had previously been in conflict with the dominant core of their Kin Group. Additionally, the majority of Nepabunna representatives now belonged to the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex rather than Kin Group 5. These alterations meant that the ALRC were once again able to maintain, ostensibly, both representation from Kin Group 5 and from Nepabunna. However, the committee
was arranged in such a way that representatives were closer to the dominant group, both physically (in terms of residence) and genealogically. Again selective incorporation of individuals was being implemented to ensure internal co-operation.

The alterations which occurred in the membership of the 'formal' Committee of the ALRC point to two interrelated features of local Adnjamathanha politics. Firstly, shifts in power and membership occur along kin lines and essentially involve a struggle between the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 complex and Kin Group 5. All three Committees had a dominance of one or the other Kin Group. Secondly, this kin distinction is reflected in and reinforced by a community distinction between those Adnjamathanha resident at Nepabunna and those resident in Port Augusta. This community-kin distinction plays an important part in the Adnjamathanha land rights process. In particular the self-appointed Committee has faced serious difficulties in maintaining and recruiting supporters from those Kin Groups which originally had representation by their chosen leaders but which later had these representatives rejected.

An analysis of the frequency of participation in the ALRC illustrates the problems the Committee has had in recruiting support from outside its own kin and community base. The figures on attendance are based on the attendance lists for those meetings observed during 1981 as well as those appearing in the minutes of meetings held prior to my involvement in the area. From these data a core of regular participants has been isolated. In total, eighty-seven
Adnjamathanha people are known to have attended at least one of the twenty recorded meetings (thirty-six females and fifty-one males). This is only 17% of their estimated population of five hundred. From this pool of participants only a handful of people are recorded as having attended approximately half of the meetings and could therefore be considered as regular participants (Table 7:1).

The most striking feature of Table 7:1 is the limited number of regular participants. From the eighty-seven known participants only 9% attended regularly during the 1979-1981 period. (In terms of the estimated total population of 500 this is an astoundingly low 1.6%). This suggests that land rights action is conducted by a small group of politically active Adnjamathanha people. Table 7:1 also reveals that this elite consists essentially of Adnjamathanha people resident in Port Augusta. This reflects both the logistics of attending Port Augusta-based meetings and the politically active and aware environment of Port Augusta.

As was shown in the analysis of organisations in Port Augusta, the town is endowed with numerous local and regional Aboriginal services which rely on a complex system of committees and Aboriginal employees to ensure Aboriginal input. By virtue of this close association between the Port Augusta Aboriginals and the administrative and political matrix of the town there is a heightened political conscious-

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4 Ellis and Hoskyns (1977: 4) estimated an Adnjamathanha population of four hundred but the Heritage Unit now estimates the population to be five hundred.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual by Kin Group</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>No of Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>Port Augusta.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 5</td>
<td>Port Augusta.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 5</td>
<td>Port Augusta.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>Port Augusta.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>Port Augusta.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 3</td>
<td>Port Augusta.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 5</td>
<td>Port Augusta.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>Port Augusta.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ness among the Port Augusta Aboriginals. It would be expected that land rights action would emerge from this group of politically aware Aboriginals in Port Augusta.

As would be expected from the structure of the Committee the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex dominates attendance. In the period from 1979 to December 1981 this Kin Complex accounted for five of the eight 'regulars'. In contrast, there were only three 'regulars' from Kin Group 5. These included a husband and wife team. The wife is non-Aboriginal and is rarely accepted by Kin Group 5 or the rest of the community. Her husband is that individual who was previously noted as belonging to Kin Group 5 and identifying himself with Kin Group 1 but upon whom both Kin Groups have been reluctant to bestow leadership among their ranks. The other regular participant from Kin Group 5 belongs not to the Nepabunna-based core group but to the small sub-group located outside of Nepabunna. Thus, the majority of Kin Group 5 representatives that regularly participated in the Land Rights Committee were again those of Kin Group 5 who can be relied upon by the dominant Kin Group 1 and who are external to the Nepabunna-based Kin Group 5 core (Figure 7:5).

The pattern of participation reinforces previously noted patterns related to the structure of the Committee. This suggests that Kin Group 1 which dominates the ALRC has either been unable to solicit the support of other Kin Groups or has been reluctant to incorporate other, historically antagonistic, leaders into its activities. The self-appointment of a Committee dominated by Kin Group 1 suggests that the ALRC has
not been willing to operate in conjunction with the leaders of Kin Group 5. This is essentially a result of the friction between these two groups, but has been complicated by existing variations in the ambitions of the two factions. As the analysis of land rights action will show, the Nepabunna-based Kin Group 5 holds a differing concept of land rights to that of the Port Augusta-based Kin Group 1. Rather than combining and compromising, the ALRC chose to take an independent stand and fight to fulfil its own ambitions. Once the participants had taken this stand, and rejected the core of Kin Group 5 from the ranks of the ALRC it became difficult for them to solicit support among the rejected group and the Nepabunna people in general.

The move towards independent action, however, has not occurred without some reservations. In sharp contrast to the general pattern of Kin Group 1 domination the ALRC Chairman is from Kin Group 5. In keeping with the general pattern, he is not from the Nepabunna-based core group but from the small subsection of this Kin Group resident outside of Nepabunna. By bestowing the position of Chairman upon a Kin Group 5 representative the ALRC has been able to deny the often common accusation that it is elitist.

7.3.2 Traditional Status and ALRC Participation

The apparently contradictory appointment of a representative from Kin Group 5 to the position of Chairman cannot be viewed without consideration of his initiated status. When speaking of the Chairman to outsiders, or to individuals from their own group who questioned the Committee's right to
speak on land issues, the Committee stresses his initiated status. The ALRC feels that a major function of the Chairman is as a representative of the viewpoint of the initiated sector. Ideologically, it is the viewpoint of the initiated sector which is of primary consideration in the land rights issue. The Chairman, as an initiated man, has the responsibility of presenting this viewpoint and this gives his position as Chairman added security.

Similarly, the position of Vice-Chairman has been given to a man who is a direct descendant of the late Walter Coulthard, an initiated man renowned for his land rights efforts. The link between the two official leaders of the ALRC and the diminishing group of initiated men is an important political tool for the Committee. It is used by the Committee to justify their right to be spokes-group over the land issue both in internal dealings with Adnjanathanha not involved in the ALRC and in external dealings with the Government and other outsiders.

Similarly, it is not uncommon for initiated men who do not regularly participate in the ALRC to be called upon to attend important meetings, particularly those involving discussions with the Government. Increasing the attendance of initiated men at such meetings has a dual function. Firstly, there is genuine concern among the ALRC that major decisions should not be made without guidance from the initiated sector. Generally, the Chairman is able to offer this guidance but in meetings with the Government which demanded larger, often binding, decisions to be made the ALRC prefers to operate with the support of as many
initiated men as possible. The ALRC openly admits that this is its reason for soliciting additional support from the initiated sector. A less overt, but equally crucial rationale for calling in additional initiated men in consultation situations is the political credence given to the 'traditional' facet of Aboriginal society by external bodies. Both the Adnjamathanha themselves and the external agents they deal with, view the initiated sector as being the last direct link to traditional Adnjamathanha culture and a strong representation from this sector helps to make land rights moves legitimate by both internal and external standards.

For example, a submission to the ADC for funds to purchase Balcanoona pastoral lease included the names of all initiated men but very few non-initiates outside of Kin Group 1 (17/12/80). Similarly, in an ALRC meeting with the Department of Environment, held to discuss Balcanoona, seven of the seventeen representatives were initiated men (21/10/81). Not only was the Balcanoona issue of interest to these men but also their presence substantiated the ALRC's claim for Balcanoona by the ideological standards of both the ALRC and the Government. In keeping with this ideology, the Legal Rights lawyer assistant the ALRC stressed the significance of the Balcanoona land to the wilyaru (initiated) men. Most of the initiates also spoke of the cultural significance of the land. The members of the ALRC also decided, prior to this meeting, to talk between themselves in their own
language. This allowed privacy in decision-making but also stressed to the non-Aboriginal officials that the Adnjamathanha remain closely linked to their cultural heritage. Thus, the use of the Adnjamathanha language, like the calling in of initiated men, is a deliberate strategy to impress upon the Government the 'traditionality' of the Adnjamathanha. The presence of an all-male contingent at this meeting further stressed the Adnjamathanha relationship with the land by the standards expected by the Government. The stressing of overtly traditional cultural features during consultation with outside groups is an indication of the Adnjamathanha's awareness of Government expectations in relation to land rights and of the fact that land rights success for other Aboriginal groups has, in part, been the result of their continuance of overtly traditional practices.

7.3.3 Organisation Affiliation of ALRC Participants

Although the ALRC is not under the direct control or sponsorship of a Government body they are not completely independent. As was stated in relation to the participant who was employed by the Heritage Unit, indirect input can be facilitated by the penetration of local people who have been co-opted into Government agencies. Among regular participants in the ALRC there are a number who are associated with Government agencies (Table 7:2).

The ALRC, when compared with the Kokatha equivalent, has a small number of participants affiliated with Government agencies servicing the local Aboriginal community. In the case of two of the six affiliated participants their attendance
TABLE 7:2  GOVERNMENT AFFILIATION AMONG AN EXTENDED LIST OF ADNJAWATHANHA LAND RIGHTS COMMITTEE PARTICIPANTS, 1979 TO DECEMBER 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation by Kin Group</th>
<th>Major Government Affiliation</th>
<th>Nature of Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>NPWS</td>
<td>Trainee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
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<td>N.A.</td>
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<tr>
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at ALRC meetings was as representatives of their employers. The most significant feature of the Government affiliation of ALRC participants is the association with the Department of Environment, either through the Heritage Unit or the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS). This reflects the long-standing association between the Department, especially through the Heritage Unit, and the Adnjamathanha people. The association between the Adnjamathanha and the Heritage Unit is of considerable importance to the land rights issue. It has operated via the selective incorporation of Adnjamathanha people into the ranks of the Heritage Unit and has helped to shape the very nature of Adnjamathanha land rights activities. Through the association certain sectors of the Adnjamathanha population have been exposed to many ideas about cultural preservation and revival, and political action. The Adnjamathanha/Heritage Unit association is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. As will be shown many of the kin/community distinctions and shifts evidenced in the kin analysis are related to this link with the Heritage Unit.

7.3.4 Gender Analysis of ALRC Participants

The final feature of participation in the ALRC is the lack of women. Only one woman was in the original community-elected Committee and, in the self-appointed replacement Committee, no women were nominated. Further, on the basis of regular participation, only one female was heavily involved in the ALRC, a non-Aboriginal woman married to one of the regular male participants.
Women played an important role in only a few of the ALRC meetings. At two meetings, called by the ALRC to discuss Balcanoona pastoral lease, held at Nepabunna a number of women attended and spoke openly. At the first of these meetings almost half of those in attendance were female, at the second meeting the female representation accounted for 42% of the attendance. This pattern stands in sharp contrast to the male-dominated ALRC meetings held in Port Augusta. In both meetings the women led the community's disapproval of the proposals of the ALRC, and were instrumental in ensuring the non-cooperation of Nepabunna people. The uncommon emergence of a female directive at the Nepabunna meetings reflects the matrifocal power arrangement of the reserve. Women at Nepabunna are active participants in local Nepabunna politics and decision-making, a responsibility which has been acquired during the years when men regularly worked on pastoral leases away from the mission.

The female power at Nepabunna stands in sharp contrast to non-Aboriginal perceptions of Aboriginal society which contend that initiated males hold the most power. It also contradicts the initiated male image that the ALRC present to external agents when discussing land issues.

The matrifocal power arrangement demonstrated at these two meetings cannot be viewed in isolation from existing community-kin distinctions operating within the Adnjamathanha. Those women who spoke against the ALRC belong to the Kin Group which has its power-base secured at Nepabunna. While this adds greater dimension to the non-cooperation of the Nepabunna group it remains significant that women acted to
present this view. The women are essentially the dominant core of Kin Group 5.

Other ALRC meetings in which women participated were those instigated by Government agents. Two such meetings were called by ADC to discuss the purchase of the Mount Serle pastoral lease. The first of these meetings was exclusively between the ALRC and ADC. For the first time during field observations the ALRC men brought their wives to a meeting. The unprecedented nature of female participation in the Port Augusta meetings suggests that the move was part of a deliberate ALRC strategy. Once the meeting was underway the nature of this strategy was clear. Firstly, the presence of the mother of one of the men, a Nepabunna resident, impressed upon the ADC representative the concern the Port Augusta ALRC have for the Nepabunna point of view. Too often the group has experienced their views being challenged on the grounds that they represent only the Port Augusta Adnjamathanha. Further, the issue at hand was the purchase of the Mount Serle pastoral lease and the management of the station. The ALRC used this meeting to stress the need for the management of the station to be placed in the hands of a family man. The presence of their wives worked well to illustrate their 'familiness' and thus their potential as suitable managers of the lease.

The second ADC instigated meeting was to elect a management committee for the Mount Serle lease and again the female representation was significant (50% of the total attendance). Although the ALRC and other men presided over this meeting, the tone and direction of the meeting was set by the women. After the first instance of disagreement, one Adnjamathanha
woman rose and made a stirring speech about the need for the Adnjamathanha to forget their differences and work together on the Mount Serle issue. Her advice was heeded and the meeting proceeded smoothly. Another woman, later in the meeting, stressed a similar point and asked that, 'all you men get together, pull together and have Mount Serle for each and all of us' (Adnjamathanha Community Meeting, 28/11/81). This second Mount Serle meeting was the first time that the women's role in land rights was openly discussed. The ALRC vied for the position of management committee, however a number of women spoke strongly against its appointment. Logically, the vocal Nepabunna females were particularly influential not only in discouraging the appointment of the ALRC but in ensuring female participation in the management committee.

In summary, the detailed analysis of the ALRC reveals that there is a significant gap between the ideological level of land rights and the local level of action. The ideological level is shaped by external expectations and is characterised by a projected image of solidarity, collectivity and tradition-orientation. The local level is characterised by community kin divisions and by new applications of old concepts and values. The persistent community/kin divisions have developed historically but are now, as will be shown, maintained and even created by new forces. Consideration of these internal divisions presents a far more fluid picture of Aboriginal land rights. Similarly, initiated status, as with other pre-contact values, is now gaining new value and meaning as it
is selectively applied to the inter-ethnic political arena by younger, political members of Adnjamathanha society wishing to validate their land rights efforts by standards acceptable to both the intra- and inter-ethnic political arena.

7.4 THE ADNJAMATHANHA LAND RIGHTS COMMITTEE IN ACTION

7.4.1 The Association with the Heritage Unit

The Adnjamathanha involvement with the Heritage Unit has had a massive impact on the Adnjamathanha people in general and, more specifically, their land rights action. Because of the intensity of the relationship and its impact on the Adnjamathanha, the association has been isolated as a landmark in the Adnjamathanha land rights movement and analysed in detail.

a) The early phase of association

The association between the Adnjamathanha people and the Heritage Unit (then the Relics Unit) began in the early 1970s. The head of the Unit devoted seven years to the area in an effort to encourage the Adnjamathanha to use the site recording facilities of the Heritage Unit. The attention given by the Heritage Unit to the Adnjamathanha was essentially in response to the tourist pressure in the region and the natural beauty of the region, rather than an Aboriginal request for assistance. It was part of more
general conservation and preservation efforts being directed at the area by the Department of Environment under which the Unit operated. The Adnjamathanha were the first group towards which the Heritage Unit devoted an extensive site recording effort. In many ways the Adnjamathanha were an ideal group for the Heritage Unit to work with in order to establish its role among the Aboriginal population of the State as an appropriate body for recording and protecting sites. The Adnjamathanha were a close-knit and identifiable group which had maintained a close physical association with the Flinders Ranges and yet were also Europeanised to the extent that communication was not difficult.

Today the Adnjamathanha people look upon the man who headed the Heritage Unit with considerable gratitude and respect. His attention to their culture, his reverence for the older initiated men, and his role in convincing these men to allow the Unit to record Adnjamathanha sites and stories, has made him almost a hero-figure amongst them. The development of a personalised and trustworthy relationship between the head of the Unit and the Adnjamathanha had an immense influence on their decision to begin recording information that, previously, was managed by the elders of the tribe. The Adnjamathanha decision to co-operate with the Heritage Unit and utilise its services arose out of their acceptance of it as the only viable land rights option available. Initially there was considerable opposition among the Adnjamathanha elders to passing over
what was once secret and sacred information and which many had refused to transfer even to the younger members of the Adnjamathanha tribe. The eventual decision by the older members of the Adnjamathanha group to give the Heritage Unit access to their cultural information resulted only after significant links had been established between the head of the Heritage Unit and certain sections of the Adnjamathanha group.

The relationship between the Heritage Unit and the Adnjamathanha has focused on the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex. The dominance of the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex in the Heritage Unit's association with the Adnjamathanha is a reflection of this group's suitability for dealing with external agents. As noted previously, this Kin Complex had moved out of Nepabunna in response to the conflict between mission control and their growing sense of civil rights. They had been the group who had questioned title to Nepabunna in 1967. It was one of their ancestors who had been called a 'communist' because he refused to risk his stock by moving on to the waterless site of Nepabunna in the 1930s. And it was another of their group who had independently attempted to gain compensation for Leigh Creek. In this sense the family group has a history of political action in relation to land rights. Although they were not always in agreement with the dominant order, they were certainly characterised by an attitude which was complimentary to the ambitions of the Heritage Unit. This stands in stark contrast to the type of attitude to land rights to be found among the more overtly Christian group.
at Nepabunna. For example, one woman, when asked about land rights, replied 'We don't need land rights here, we have our own land rights in heaven, and it has streets paved with gold'. Perhaps this is an extreme example (it was a Sunday and we were talking straight after the morning Church service) however, it does seem to account for the general opposition to land rights moves by the Nepabunna group particularly Kin Group 5, and for the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 preference shown in the Heritage Unit's association with the Adnjamathanha.

In the development of this relationship, two types of people were of particular importance to the Heritage Unit: the younger Adnjamathanha men (and to a lesser extent women) who were keen to record their cultural heritage, and the elderly initiated men who were seen by both the Unit and the people themselves as the main custodians of this information. The Heritage Unit was able to solicit the support of the younger Adnjamathanha who were impressed by the genuine interest the Unit had in their cultural heritage and keen to have access to the information that their elders were reluctant to pass on. The support of these younger men and women was instrumental in the Heritage Unit finally gaining access to the information it desired. The younger Adnjamathanha operated as cultural brokers, directing the Unit to elders they thought would be of assistance and encouraging the elders to give information to the Unit.

The relationship between the Unit and the older Adnjamathanha (especially men) took much longer to develop. Again, it focused upon a personalised relationship between
the head of the Unit and a select number of elders. The time the head of the Unit spent in the area, his eagerness to learn, and eventual ability to speak, the Adnjamathanha language and his reverence for the elders encouraged the custodians of this cultural knowledge to deal with the Unit and use its services. For the Adnjamathanha, both young and old, the head of the Heritage Unit was the first 'white-fella' to be 'on their side'. This outsider did not just want to know their secret and sacred information for his own use but he wanted to know it so that he could help the Adnjamathanha protect their land.

The passing on of secret and sacred information to the Unit was particularly important in galvanising the emergent relationship. Collmann (1977) and Berndt (1962) have both dealt with this process in the context of inter-ethnic associations. They suggest that transactions in secret and sacred information enable Aboriginals to gain access to non-Aboriginal resources. That is, by offering an outsider access to this information they bind the outsider to their community and thereby secure his or her services. From the Aboriginal viewpoint this provides them with a degree of power in the consequent relationship by establishing obligations of secrecy with the entrusted outsider. In the case of the Heritage Unit this type of relationship was particularly important for it was cultural information that it sought from the Adnjamathanha. For the Unit to be able to retain its informants it had to at least give the impression that it was obeying conditions of secrecy, or convince its informants that if this secrecy was broken (which it had to be if the site was to be recorded) then it was to the benefit of the
community and its interest in the land.

It is significant that what the Adnjamathanha saw to be the source of their power in the relationship with the Unit, the transfer of secret or sacred information, has been an important factor in the ability of the Unit to establish power and status within the community.

Once information is given to the Unit, the control and application of the information is transferred from the Adnjamathanha informants to the Heritage Unit. And while a recorded site is bestowed protection under the Act, decisions governing access to records relating to the site rest with the Minister of Environment and not the Aboriginal informant. Recently this aspect of the Unit's operations has altered by the establishment of a confidential register in which secret and sacred information is kept and to which access is controlled by the relevant Aboriginal groups.

Despite this alteration in the early stages of Adnjamathanha-Heritage Unit association, the transferral of cultural information carries with it a loss of control over that information and its use by external bodies. In essence, by entering into the association with the Heritage Unit the Adnjamathanha have traded control of their information and its use in the inter-ethnic field, for protection of their sites.

This trade-off has had a dramatic effect upon the structure through which cultural information is transferred. Increasingly, it is the Heritage Unit which has the most complete compository of recorded sites and other cultural information derived from the Adnjamathanha. The decline in
the number of older, initiated Adnjamathanha, previously the sole custodians of this information, will provide the Unit with the status, both among the Adnjamathanha and external groups, of the new custodians of the Adnjamathanha cultural heritage. The decline (and eventual disappearance) of initiated men will especially influence the Adnjamathanha-Heritage Unit association. As these individuals disappear so too does the basis of Adnjamathanha control over the Heritage Unit, that is, the obligations that arise from transactions in secret and sacred information.

The current personalities of the Heritage Unit suggest that the power that might accrue from this role will not be used to the detriment of the Adnjamathanha. Certainly its move to introduce a confidential register over which the relevant Aboriginal communities have some control, suggests that this is the case. However, this is a matter of personality and, to an extent current policy, and the situation has the potential for exploitation. The greatest danger in this situation is that the Unit or the Government might give external groups access to this information without the consent of the Adnjamathanha themselves. In the case of an EIS it may be possible for the company involved to by-pass the local Aboriginal population and simply deal with the Heritage Unit. In this sense, the data collection of the Unit has the potential to reduce Aboriginal input rather than increase it. Even if its status as custodian of cultural information is
not overtly exploited, it remains that its control of large bodies of such information will, and indeed has, galvanised the growing Adnjamathanha dependency on the Unit and ensured it of a permanent clientele.

b) The confirmation of the Heritage Unit Association

As stated, the Unit's ability to gain access to the information held by the elders was largely dependent upon it soliciting the support and assistance of younger Adnjamathanha. Essentially this process was male; younger men supported the male head of the Unit and assisted him when talking to the initiated male sector. Recollections of this period suggest that discussions between the Unit and the elders were rarely conducted without a younger member of the family being present. The presence of younger men reinforced the notion that cultural information was not going simply to a non-Aboriginal outsider, but that it was 'for their younger ones' and assisting in a general heritage move within the group. In 1977 the role of younger Adnjamathanha people in the Heritage Unit association was formalised by the Unit providing three positions for Aboriginal trainee Rangers. The provision of
these positions was aimed at facilitating more direct and influential community input to the operations of the Unit. The Rangers were to act as community representatives, ensuring that the operations of the Unit and the Unit's handling of Adnjamathanha information did not contravene community standards.

The selection of the Rangers was made by the Heritage Unit in consultation with the community. Although all Kin Groups were welcome to and did nominate representatives for the positions, the close association between the Unit and the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex made nominations from this group the most likely candidates for selection. It would not have been difficult for Kin Group 1 to solicit support for nominees from their own Kin Group outside of their immediate family on the basis of their prior involvement with the Unit and familiarity with its procedures. As would be expected, two of the three positions for trainee Ranger went to male nominees from the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex. The other position went to a female from Kin Group 4. Notably, Kin Group 5 was not represented. Thus, the selection of Rangers did not incorporate groups outside of those already associating with the Unit on a regular basis. In many ways the incorporation of younger members of these Kin Groups into paid positions was seen, both by the Adnjamathanha and the Unit, as just payment for the information that had been transferred (cf. Myers, 1982). But by appointing these
Rangers the Unit has been able to secure a more permanent clientele among the Adnjamathanha, thus guaranteeing the support not only of the employed individuals, who are keen to retain their positions, but of that individual's family, which are equally keen to see one of their group (and sometimes themselves) incorporated into and benefiting from the Heritage Unit.

The formalisation of the intermediary role assumed by the younger Adnjamathanha dramatically altered the relationship between the Unit and the people. As Rangers they were trained in the procedures of site recording and began to undertake many of the tasks formerly in the hands of the non-Aboriginal employees of the Unit. In undertaking these functions they ostensibly fulfilled the aim of the training programme, that is, to increase local Aboriginal involvement in the Unit. However, the Ranger training programme also transformed an informal community affiliated brokerage role into a formal, Unit-affiliated role. The trainee Rangers were in the pay of the Unit and this increased their obligations to this external organisation. In particular, the trainee status of the Ranger's association with the Unit encouraged their compliance with their employer's ideals and ambitions as they sought to secure more permanent positions. Even as permanent employees of the Heritage Unit, as is the case now, there are severe pressures upon the Rangers to satisfy their employer so as to maintain their positions and the benefits that accrue from these positions.
Perhaps the most dramatic alteration in the Ranger's brokerage role has been the change from being brokers operating between their elders and the Unit itself, to brokers acting on behalf of the Unit in situations of consultation between their elders and bodies outside of the Unit seeking consultation with or information on the Adnjamathanha people. For example, in EIS consultations the Rangers will assist company consultants in the field, introduce them to the proper informants and help these external groups to solicit the required information. This role does not directly work to the detriment of the Adnjamathanha group in that the Rangers are viewed by the elders as valuable and helpful assistants in such situations. However, it does reduce the options available to the Adnjamathanha in terms of how they deal with consultants and enables the Government, by way of its Adnjamathanha employees, to infiltrate and, in some cases, control such consultations. As the Kokatha case shows, there are alternatives to working through the Heritage Unit. However, the Adnjamathanha have not, and are not likely to adopt procedures which exclude the Unit. This is particularly the case when to disassociate themselves from the Unit would mean reducing their control over the information already collected by it, losing access to the skilled Adnjamathanha co-opted into its ranks and forfeiting the research skills offered by the Unit and which have enabled the Adnjamathanha to have much of their cultural information recorded. The benefits which accrue to the
people generally from the association with the Unit work to deter alternative procedures being adopted. In this way, the co-opting of young Adnjamathanha into the positions of Rangers has worked to secure the dependency of the people which began via the procedure of transferring cultural information.

c) The Heritage Unit association and its impact on the land relationship

The association with the Heritage Unit has also shaped the way in which the Adnjamathanha, particularly the younger members of the group, view the land. The emphasis of the Heritage Unit is on the recording of Aboriginal sites, that is, spatially discrete locales which are of cultural significance to Aboriginal communities or of archaeological significance. Although the legislation it works under has a very narrow definition of what constitutes an Aboriginal site, the Unit has been far more flexible in its definition and has defined a number of site types. Currently, they are equipped to record nine site types: archaeological deposits (such as camp sites), stone arrangements, burial sites, engraving sites, painting sites, historic sites, mythological and ceremonial sites, quarry sites and sacred trees (Department of Environment December, 1982). Rather than working under the 'relics' logic of its 1965 Act the Unit views the sites they record as being part of a living culture and of considerable contemporary relevance to the Adnjamathanha (pers. com. Rosemary Buchan, Heritage Unit, Department of Environment and
Planning, 1982). However, it remains that the site recording emphasis of the Unit has inherent deficiencies by way of its isolation of discrete spatial units. This has eroded the continuity of the Adnjamathanha landscape view, particularly among the younger Adnjamathanha who may know of the recorded status of a site but not of its traditional, spatially contiguous mythological context. Thus, the recording procedure is changing the Adnjamathanha landscape emphasis. Rather than a landscape characterised by tracts of meaningful country it is fast becoming a landscape dotted with discrete sites of meaning.

As stated, an important part of the Adnjamathanha commitment to the Heritage Unit was the disclosure of secret and sacred information for recording on the Unit's sites register. This has been but one aspect of a general process of the recording and research of cultural information related to the Adnjamathanha. At one time the head of the Heritage Unit and the Adnjamathanha people developed a plan for a local museum which would contain information on the Adnjamathanha people and their relationship with the Flinders Ranges. The purpose of the museum was to provide an Aboriginal perspective on the Ranges for the benefit of tourists visiting the area. The project never eventuated; however the Unit, with the assistance of the Adnjamathanha people, has produced two booklets on Adnjamathanha culture. One of these booklets details the Ram Paddock Gate campsite (Heritage Unit, 1981) the other presents an 'Aboriginal View' of the Flinders Ranges (Wilton, et. al., 1980). A significant
proportion of the latter booklet deals with the mythology of the Flinders Ranges. Some of these stories are secular, others are versions of stories which refer to the initiation procedure and, at one time, were considered secret and sacred. The public presentation of this mythology has changed the status of some Adnjamathanha sites from secret, sacred sites to public sites known not only by uninitiated Adnjamathanha but other Aboriginals as well as non-Aboriginals. Although the versions given for publication are diluted and have much of their sacred detail edited, it remains that sites which initially held a sacred and secret status now hold a more secularised and public status which incorporates European as well as Aboriginal evaluations of sites (Appendix XI).

d) The Heritage Unit association and its impact on land rights action

The impact of the Heritage Unit on the course of the Adnjamathanha's dealings with land rights issue has been considerable. The relationship, and the patron-client nature of the relationship, has established a norm of interdependency which both parties are reluctant to sever and which in itself is quite inflexible. Perhaps the most lucid and, indeed, the most relevant example of this power relates to the interaction between the Unit and the ALRC. As has been stated, the actual breadth of ALRC operations has been shaped by the control the Unit had over site recording and general cultural research. The ALRC was established to deal with claims relating to pastoral leases
and, in its early stages, compensation. In fact the head of the Heritage Unit had been involved in the creation of the ALRC which accounts for the dominance of the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex in the Committee and suggests that originally it may have been an informal extension of the Unit's involvement in the area. Throughout its operation, as has been shown, there has been a link to the Unit via participants co-opted into the Unit's operations in the area although today the ALRC does not emphasise its original Heritage Unit associations.

Generally, this association has not worked to the detriment of the ALRC. It has been able to exploit its access to Heritage Unit resources for the benefit of land claims. For example, in submissions made to the ADC in relation to Balcanoona and Mount Serle pastoral leases the amount of recorded information collected and held by the Unit assisted in the ALRC compiling a convincing case of cultural interest in the areas. Logically, the assistance the Unit can offer in such situations has endorsed and helped maintain its patronage role both in the eyes of the Adnjumathanha and the Government. However, the mutually beneficial nature of this relationship is only sustained when the ALRC restricts its activities and ambitions to the areas designated by its position as a client of the Unit.

For example, in October of 1981 the ALRC joined with a newly formed regional committee dealing with land rights, the South Lands Council (SLC). The SLC included commitments from the Yalata, Pitjantjatjara and the
Oodnadatta groups. Essentially it was the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex which had made the Adnjamathanha commitment to the SLC. At the first SLC meeting (October 3-4, 1981) this Kin Complex accounted for nine of the thirteen Adnjamathanha representatives. The other representatives were the 'reliables' from Kin Group 5. In keeping with the general pattern of the ALRC, eleven of the thirteen representatives were from Port Augusta (Table 7:3).

The incorporation of the ALRC into the SLC was not without some hesitation on the part of other groups involved, which were all culturally similar, had significant genealogical connections and had members who had lived and worked together in the past. The Adnjamathanha were culturally distinct and had few genealogical links outside of their own group and, essentially, had only mixed with these other groups since their movement to Port Augusta. The other groups made no overt effort to rationalise their unification over the land rights issue and in fact the combined strategy had been discussed between them at a previous meeting. In contrast, great effort was made by both the Adnjamathanha themselves, and the Kokatha (who hosted the meeting) to justify the Adnjamathanha presence. One of the first public statements of the meeting was from an older Kokatha man who welcomed an Adnjamathanha man he had once worked with on a pastoral lease. Similarly, the Chairman of the meeting (a Kokatha man) when introducing the Adnjamathanha group, made special reference to their valued ochre reserves which were once traded throughout the area. In essence, the Adnjamathanha were relying upon the Kokatha, the group which
<table>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>13</strong></td>
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knew them by way of a joint association with Port Augusta and particularly the Legal Rights lawyer, to introduce them and justify their joining with the others. Even some of the symbolic procedures undertaken at the meeting, such as language translation and the cooking of a kangaroo, were done to the exclusion of the Adnjamathanha. Although most present could speak English, on the first day of the meeting most statements were translated into Pitjantjatjara. This could be understood by all but the Adnjamathanha. Similarly, the kangaroos that were cooked for all to share were done in the Kokatha-Pitjantjatjara style and could not be eaten by the Adnjamathanha.

The rather uncomfortable inclusion of the ALRC into the SLC had two immediate effects upon the Committee. Firstly, it altered its ambitions and aims considerably. The philosophies and ambitions of this Council were markedly different to those held by the ALRC as clients of the Heritage Unit. Of greatest significance was the Council's commitment to autonomy and control of cultural information, and its emphasis on independent site recording procedures, which the ALRC endorsed during the SLC meeting. Secondly, it introduced affiliations with new groups and organisations which supported the SLC philosophy and which were necessary to the fulfilment of the ambitions of the SLC. For example, the SLC had the support of the Pitjantjatjara Council and, in particular, the legal advice and anthropological skills of its non-Aboriginal professionals. Similarly, the role of the local Legal Rights lawyer was intensified as his skills and knowledge were also imperative to the carrying out of SLC
policies. In essence, the SLC established alternative patrons for the ALRC, patrons which were endorsed by the support of a number of other Aboriginal groups and, especially, the successful Pitjantjatjara group. It was also a link which was overtly opposed to the pattern of land rights action and affiliation established under Heritage Unit patronage (Figure 7:6).

In a meeting held between the ALRC and the Heritage Unit only one week after the Committee's commitment to the SLC the consequences of this altered affiliation became obvious. The meeting had been called by the Heritage Unit to try and establish a committee which would direct the activities of the Adnjamathanha Rangers. The formation of such a committee was seen as important by the Unit. It not only needed to formalise the current consultation procedures between itself and the Adnjamathanha, but it wished to strengthen the relationship between its brokers and their clients which, since two of the Rangers had moved to Adelaide and one seconded to the National Parks and Wildlife Service, had become less secure. This was especially important in terms of pending developments within the Unit and the region. Firstly, the Unit was about to embark on State-wide consultation with Aboriginal communities over the format and content of a new Heritage Bill. Secondly, the Unit wished to confirm its association with the grassroots level of Adnjamathanha people in preparation for its involvement in recording sites in the proposed Gammon Ranges National Park in the region. Logically, the point of debate in this meeting became that of who would sit on the committee.
FIGURE 7:6 Example of Adnjamathanha Affiliation during the ALRC Commitment to the Southern Lands Council (compare with Figure 7:7).

QUADRANT A - Cultural Links. QUADRANT C - Organisation Links.
QUADRANT B - Kin Links. QUADRANT D - Local Community Links.
Underlying this debate was the attempt by the ALRC to assert its power over that of the Heritage Unit and implement SLC policies and procedures by being appointed as the consulting committee.

The spokesmen for the new ALRC stance included essentially four individuals: the Legal Rights lawyer, the Vice-Chairman of the group, and two of the regular participants in the Committee. The lawyer's involvement in presenting the SLC view was related to the instrumental role he played in the Council. Not only did he assist in the establishment of the Council but, under the proposed policies of the Council, his legal skills were of great importance. It was to his own advantage, and in accordance with his client's ambitions, to speak in favour of the SLC stance and the appointment of the ALRC as advisers to the Heritage Unit Rangers. The others who spoke out were those who had been the most vocal at the SLC meeting and who had rapidly agreed to the strategies proposed by the SLC. Significantly, a number of individuals who had attended the SLC meeting and who had agreed to the formation of the Council and implementation of its policies, did not vocally commit themselves to this stand in the ALRC-Heritage Unit meeting. In fact, a number of these men physically disassociated themselves from the more vociferous men by sitting away from them and the lawyer around which this vocal group sat.

The ALRC's stand was presented by questioning the Heritage Unit's involvement in the area and the confidentiality of sites recorded in the register, that is, presenting the SLC
point of view. After considerable debate, in which the Legal Rights lawyer and a few of the ALRC argued for the adoption of the 'Pitjantjatjara model' (the SLC strategy), the question of whether the Heritage Unit should continue recording sites was put to vote by the Aboriginal Ranger. The meeting voted fourteen to ten in favour of the sites being recorded. Those who voted against the motion of continued Heritage Unit involvement were those of the ALRC who had attended the SLC meeting. But a significant number of Adnjamathanka who had attended the SLC meeting and were regular ALRC participants voted for the motion thus betraying their apparent commitment to the Council.

Those who voted for the Unit later proceeded to undermine the ability of lawyers (an essential ingredient in the Pitjantjatjara/SLC formula) to assist them in land rights claims. One man stated, 'How many lawyers and solicitors for Leigh Creek [claim]. They took tapes and all, but they [ETSA] made millions out of that'. His comment was endorsed by another man who stated, 'Lawyers just put it all on papers and put in rubbish bin'. Both these individuals had attended the SLC meeting and at the meeting had supported the strategies proposed by the legal advisers and accepted by the Council. By defaming the legal advisers they were able to justify their reversion to an alliance with the Heritage Unit. In the case of the individual who was exemplified in Figure 7:6 the shift of alliance resulted in the dropping of affiliations with those organisations which threatened the Heritage Unit's position in the community.
Further, the shift resulted in alignments with Kin Groups and community groups not normally part of the commitment of ALRC participants, such as Kin Group 9 and the Nepabunna community (Figure 7:7).

The shift in alliance by a number of regular ALRC participants who originally supported the SLC reflects the nature of the patron-client relationship operating between the Unit and the Adnjamathanha. As clients of and brokers for the Unit, the group as a whole, and some individuals in particular, have a vested interest in supporting it. Significantly, most of the ALRC participants who shifted their support to the Unit have a close association with the Unit. For example, two of the initiated men who shifted support are important informants for the Unit. This role as informant has provided them with status both within the community and with the Unit. To deny Heritage Unit involvement in the area would mean losing this status. Similarly, a younger Adnjamathanha man keen to become a Ranger with the Unit chose to shift his alliance to the Unit rather than remain in support of the ALRC. The impact of this process was considerable on the ALRC's stand. Essentially, it involved a shift among Kin Group 1 which purportedly was the mainstay of the ALRC. Its effect on the strength of the ALRC in this situation of conflict was devastating.

Once the issue of continued Heritage Unit involvement was 'solved' the meeting returned to the question of who should be on the advisory committee. The diminishing number of SLC affiliates argued that the ALRC should become the
advisory committee so as to ensure all land rights issues worked through the SLC. The meeting strongly opposed this. The Heritage Unit representative claimed that the Government would oppose dealing with a committee known to be involved in land rights politicking. The Adniamathantha had little choice other than to reject the ALRC if they were to retain some control over Heritage Unit involvement. The ALRC attempted to defend its perceived right to assume the role as consulting committee, and a debate ensued on the role and the position of the ALRC in relation to the Heritage Unit. The most outstanding feature of this debate was the general assumption among the people that land rights was distinct from the business of the Unit. One man said, 'The Southern Lands Council, well that's land rights. We want to get a committee that knows about our history'. Another man said, 'The Land Rights Committee, that talks about claiming land, not protecting sites'. Similarly, a motion was made by one of these men to have two different groups, it was not formally voted on because the meeting degenerated into argument, but again endorsed the idea that the land rights group was distinct from the Heritage Unit and dealt with different business.

The final decision of the meeting, and by this stage some of the ALRC members had walked out, was to have the initiated men form the advisory committee. This did little more than formalise the established pattern of the Unit, using initiated men as informants on cultural information. Nothing had changed; the ALRC and its loyal supporters had been relegated to the position of a land acquisition lobby group.
the role initially created for them by the Unit.

7.4.2 The Pastoral Lease Struggle

a) Early Adnjamathanha Action: the Heritage Unit controversy continues

As stated, the Heritage Unit's involvement with the Adnjamathanha group marked out the nature and limits of the ALRC's activities in relation to land rights. Even within the limits of their land rights efforts, that is, the lobbying of Government bodies for funds to acquire land, similar processes of patronage and brokerage are at work and result in internal conflict and shifting alliances within the Adnjamathanha people as a whole, and the land rights group specifically. The majority of the ALRC's efforts to acquire a tract of land have focused upon the Balcanoola pastoral lease which lies directly east of Nepabunna. The property has been worked by many of the Adnjamathanha men in the past, its high country holds many mythological sites and tracks and the area is seen by the Adnjamathanha to have good economic potential.

The first move made by the ALRC in relation to Balcanoola was to approach the South Australian Aboriginal Lands Trust to discuss the possibilities of the Trust purchasing the property on their behalf (ALRC Files, 27/6/79). At this meeting the Trust informed the ALRC that such a purchase would occur only if a strong enough submission was made. Exactly what constituted a 'strong submission' was not specified. In that same meeting it became clear that the reason the Adnjamathanha needed a strong submission was
that they would possibly have to compete against the Department of Environment and Planning for control of Balcannoona. The Trust were aware of the proposed, but as yet unconfirmed, desire of the State Government to resume the land for use as a National Park. As an agent of the Government it was difficult for the Trust to guarantee support and assistance for the Adnjamathanha claim. The Trust was delaying a firm commitment to the Adnjamathanha until they were aware of the Government's intentions in the area, thus ensuring they did not place themselves into a position of conflict with their sponsor.

A month later the intentions of the Government were made public in a press release from the then Minister of Environment, Mr. Cornwall (29/7/79). The statement not only announced the Government's intention to resume the land for a National Park but also outlined the reason for the resumption of the land;

Balcannoona Station contains one of the most scenically attractive and rugged areas in the Flinders Ranges and in the State as a whole...[it is] a wilderness area of outstanding quality (Department of Environment, Press Release, 29/7/79).

In immediate response to this statement, the ALRC, with the assistance of the Legal Rights lawyer, sent letters explaining the Aboriginal interest in the area and requesting funds and political support to the Minister of Environment, the Australian Democrats, the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission, the South Australian Aboriginal Lands Trust (again) and the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. The letter, in part,
stated:

For the Adnjamathanka peoples we wish to obtain this area as it has important sites relating to our tribal culture. There are grave sites, mythological sites, engravings and painting sites also ceremonial grounds. We wish to keep it as a station property, but protect Aboriginal sites, in the area.

This is where our people will be able to shoot kangaroos, without any interference and restrictions. This will also supply employment for our children. Having this station which is the boundary of Nepabunna property would supply much needed opportunities for the members of that community also it would give them access to a much better water supply.

The members of the Adnjamathanka Tribe have worked and helped to build that area since it first became a Station, with no real gain to themselves, or their community. It is hoped that if we obtain this land, we will be able to take students both Aboriginal and European, and any other peoples to this area to show them part of our cultural heritage thus giving them a better understanding and insight into our way of life (ALRC Files, 30/7/79).

The stated reasons of the claim for Baicanoola reveal the multi-faceted nature of the Adnjamathanka interest in the area. Basic to this interest is the existence of sites of cultural significance. In its letter, the ALRC stressed its desire to protect these sites and to control European access to these sites by instigating an education programme. This ambition is of some interest in relation to its previously noted association with the Heritage Unit. It is an early indication of the growing dissatisfaction among the ALRC with the Heritage Unit's control over, and dealings with, recorded sites. Of particular concern was
(and remains) the fact that the recording of sites, while providing 'protection' under the law, does not always stop outsiders violating those sites or damaging them with graffiti (see Plate 4:2).

Further, while the Act under which the Unit operates its site recording also promises that people who violate a protected site will be fined, it is difficult to police such matters in the rugged and expansive Flinders Ranges and rarely are the culprits caught. Thus, what the Unit sees as protection is not always interpreted as such by the Adnjamathunga. In real terms all they have done is passed over information and the reward of this transaction, the protection of sites, is not always apparent. Initially, it was hoped that the Rangers would be involved in policing sites and that in the future the number of Rangers could be increased. The number of Rangers employed by the Unit has not increased and in fact one of the three has been transferred to the National Parks and Wildlife Service. Also two of the three Rangers are now in Adelaide and no longer function as local 'caretakers'. These factors have worked to seriously undermine the credibility of the Unit in the area and encourage moves which oppose or seek to control its activities.

The failure of the Heritage Unit to consistently fulfil its obligations as established in the original exchange relationship, was a major factor in the ALRC's ambition to own land and to put into action more direct control over access to the sites thereon. (It is the same reason that
the concepts and strategies proposed by the advisers to the SLC captured the support of the Committee and led to an overt conflict with the Heritage Unit. This is a significant rift for originally the Heritage Unit encouraged the formation of the ALRC. It is doubtful that the unit would have anticipated the dissatisfaction with its procedures which later emerged. Nor would it have expected that the ALRC would attempt to control its operation.

The initial claim for Barkanauna also separated the Unit and the Committee by virtue of the desired use of the land. The ALRC, as its letter of the 30/7/79 points out, wanted an area in which the Adnjamathanha could exploit the resources of the land as they saw fit. Part of this ambition was the desire for the freedom to shoot kangaroos 'without any interference or restriction'. It is worth noting that legally Aboriginals do have this right of access to land and the freedom to shoot kangaroos (as stated in the Pastoral leases). However, it is obvious from this claim that these rights are not always realised by the Adnjamathanha and, discussions with them reveal that the right of access to land and the killing of kangaroos are matters negotiated (and not always successfully) with local pastoralists. Right of access to land for the purpose of hunting and collecting traditional food sources was seen as one of the more pertinent issues in relation to the proposed dedication of the area as a National Park. Under normal circumstances National Park status would deny the Adnjamathanha
the right to use native flora and fauna. As the Unit is part of the Department of Environment and thereby affiliated with the NPWS this ambition to use the land as a pastoral lease placed the Unit and the ALRC in opposition.

The other aspect of their desired use of the land was related to the depressed economic and social position of the Adnjamathanha and their desire to improve this position by having control of a viable economic venture such as a pastoral lease. Unemployment at nearby Nepabunna is almost 100% (only four of the ninety-six residents at Nepabunna have permanent work). The prospect of having a nearby pastoral run that could provide work for the Nepabunna population and also benefit it economically was of great importance to the Adnjamathanha. Even the Port Augusta-based ALRC desired this sort of development, and many saw it as opening an opportunity for a return to their home area of the Northern Flinders Ranges.

In response to the ALRC's appeal the Department of Environment invited the Committee to meet with the Minister (ALRC Files, 7/8/79). No minutes of this meeting are available but it is clear from discussions of the meeting that the Adnjamathanha people who attended emerged from the meeting under the impression that they had five years in which to raise the money to buy Baiganaona. In fact, as was pointed out to the Committee in later correspondence, what was said by the Minister was that it would be five years before the park would be dedicated. Prior to this clarification, which the ALRC interpreted as a broken promise, it acted upon its misinterpretation and reapplied
to the DAA and the ALFC for funds (ALRC Files, 29/8/79 and 5/9/79 respectively). In a letter to the DAA it stated that:

The National Parks and Wildlife has come to some agreements in selling the Balcanoona Property to the Adnjamathanha Community for the sum of $360,000. (Letter, ALRC to DAA ALRC File, 29/8/79).

The unsatisfying nature of the Department of Environment's dealings with the ALRC had encouraged it to try, once again, for the assistance of alternative Government bodies offering assistance in relation to the purchase of land.

As with the Lands Trust, the DAA and the ALFC, as Government departments, were aware of the plan to dedicate the area as a park and rejected the ALRC request. Strangely, they did not justify their rejections on this basis. The ALFC refused funding on the grounds that it was already making enquiries into the excision of land around three main engraving sites in the Flinders Ranges: Red Gorge, Sacred Canyon and Mount Chambers Gorge. The Land Fund Commission also pointed out that its funds were limited and it was already considering a large number of land claims (ALRC Files, 19/9/79). Similarly, the DAA rejection was justified on the basis of its limited funds for land purchase and the fact that they had, at an earlier stage, provided the Adnjamathanha with the Nantawarinna pastoral lease (ALRC Files, 19/9/79).

The DAA and ALFC responses reveal well the dilemma facing Aboriginal groups forced to utilise the limited resources of Government options. Because of the limited
financial resources available to these options an Aboriginal claim for finances to purchase land must compete with claims from a large number of other community groups. It is obvious from the responses given by the Government departments in this incident that there is also an informal quota placed upon the amount of assistance that can be offered to one particular group. Thus, those groups which already have land can be seriously disadvantaged in this highly competitive field characterised by limited resources.

In the case of the DAA excuse of their prior purchase of Nantawarinja, the community's attitude to the land and this purchase was of little consequence. Nantawarinja had been purchased by the DAA during the early stages of the Government's self-determination policy. According to the Adnjamathanha, they had no choice in relation to Nantawarinja. The offer was presented to them in terms of 'take it, or leave it'. Logically, the Adnjamathanha seized the opportunity even though the land holds little cultural significance for them and has only moderate potential as a viable economic development. The Nantawarinja lease has, in fact, become a burden for the Adnjamathanha, it has many financial problems and has been the cause of numerous incidents of in-fighting between Kin Group 5, which has monopolised positions generated by the property, and the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex which has essentially been excluded from involvement in its operations.

Significantly, it was Kin Groups 1, 2 and 3 which, as the dominant participants in the ALRC, were seeking control
of the Balcanoona lease. Their claim for Balcanoona cannot
be seen in isolation from the internal inequalities that
arose from the Government's prior purchase of Nantawarinja
and the subsequent monopolisation of this venture by Kin
Group S. The ALRC wished to redress the internal imbalance
which had resulted from the purchase of Nantawarinja and
benefit from their control of a similar venture. In this case
of DAA assistance the Government's action had exacerbated
internal tensions. Its refusal to assist in the purchase of
Balcanoona, on the basis of the Nantawarinja purchase, showed
its insensitivity to the local scene and the consequences
of its prior action. In the light of this important internal
inequality the ALFC's refusal, which was justified on the
basis of their efforts to excise land already under the
'protection' of the Heritage Act, meant little to the ALRC.
The excision of this land was not going to assist the
participants in the land rights group to regain an economic
foothold in their home area.

These Government responses reveal how previous
allocations of land, or current efforts to assist in the
allocation of land, can in fact be manipulated by the
Government and used as excuses for their denial of additional
assistance. The quota system, which these two examples
have suggested exists, is unavoidable in terms of the limited
financial resources available to bodies such as the ALFC and
the DAA and the massive number of discrete Aboriginal groups
they must service. Unfortunately this system does not
take into account the internal inequalities it creates
(obviously the Government is under the impression that
a whole community can participate in and benefit from one property) nor does it always have the resources available to overcome this situation.

Further, the limited resources available to such government bodies and the procedures of land acquisition under which they operate, forces the recipients of these services to make unrealistic decisions about land. Funding bodies such as the ALFC, DAA and, more recently, the ADC, operate essentially within the open market. They function as any other land tender, buying when land is available, and as such are market opportunists. The Aboriginal groups which use the resources of such bodies, if they are to be successful claimants, must fit with this form of operation. It is astute political strategy on the part of Aboriginal communities desiring land, especially considering the scarcity of available land, to take advantage of an area being opened for tender. Not only does this procedure result in Aboriginal groups appearing to be opportunists rather than 'genuine' claimants, it also forces Aboriginal groups to make unrealistic commitments to the land they have chosen to pursue.

As the preceding examples suggest, the Government in such cases demands that the Aboriginal commitment to the land it had already provided or is in the course of providing supercedes any other land commitment. In complete contradiction to the market-dictated procedure under which such bodies function (and their clients consequently function) they demand that their Aboriginal clients isolate the area
they seek from the Government as the most important to them culturally. Thus DAA and the ALFC were able to argue that they were already dealing or had dealt with important land issues for the Adnjamathanha and thereby reduce the opportunities for the Adnjamathanha to extend their land rights success. The ALRC were not deterred by these continued rejections of their claims. When the State Labor Government lost power to the Liberals in late 1979 the ALRC reapplied to the Government for funds to purchase Balcanoona and requested yet another meeting with the Government to discuss the proposed resumption of the land for a National Park (ALPC Files, 24/9/79). The Adnjamathanha records of this meeting suggest that similar forces were brought to bear on the Adnjamathanha as those apparent in the responses from the DAA and the ALFC. During the meeting the Director General of the Department of Environment asked the Adnjamathanha what, if they had a free choice, would they consider to be the most important area in the Flinders Ranges. Logically, the ALRC answered that it was Balcanoona (ALRC Files 13/11/79). The ALRC had, in fact, previously discussed its answer to such a question at a meeting with the Legal Rights lawyer (ALRC Files, 10/11/79). At this meeting the ALRC, with the advice of its lawyer, made the decision to opt for Balcanoona in preference to other areas in which it and the rest of the Adnjamathanha group had an interest. In the meeting this decision was made not on the grounds that the area was any more significant than other areas but, on the basis of the claim for Balcanoona being seen as potentially successful,
taking advantage of a rare opportunity (the holding of land near Nepabunna by the Government which is the traditional benefactor of the people).

The Liberal Government proved unresponsive to the Adnjamathanha request. It remained committed to dedicating the hill country as a park and merely suggested that the Adnjamathanha tender for the plain country. It became clearer to the Adnjamathanha after these two meetings with the Department of Environment and from the continued rejections of their claims by other Government bodies, that the Government opposed the idea of the area being used as a pastoral run. It was an obvious case of more general Government ambitions hindering the ability of the bodies it had established to adequately service the needs of their clients. In an effort to convince the Government that they were the appropriate group to take on the responsibility of caring for this land the Adnjamathanha began to place more emphasis on their right to the land on the basis of its cultural significance. In a letter sent to both the State and Federal Government, the ALRC wrote:

The Adnjamathanha people do not just want the plain land [as a station] with National Parks controlling the hills. We want to protect the many sites in the hills, improve vegetation and use the land as a base to educate our own and other children and people, especially through the Adnjamathanha Trainee Rangers. (ALRC File, 12/1/80).

As the extract from the letter suggests this attempt of the ALRC to gain control of Balcanoona was couched in terms more sensitive to the ambitions of the Government. The Committee compromised its original ambition of running the
whole area as a pastoral lease and suggested that only
the plains country would carry stock. In terms of the
hills country they stressed their concern for protecting
sites, their desire to use the area for educational purposes
and their intentions to improve vegetation. It shows a
deliberate refashioning of their original intentions to
include concepts of conservation, education and even public
access, which were more compatible with the Government's
ambitions and which incorporated the Heritage Unit.

The final application for funding by the ALRC was made
to the newly formed Aboriginal Development Commission in
December 1983. By this stage the Committee had accepted
that the National Parks and Wildlife Service was in control
of the hills country and only submitted for funding to assist
in the purchase of the Mitchell Grass Plains area (ALRC
Files, 17/12/83). The submission also requested that the
homestead and part of the hills country be included in the
funding allowance. Again the Adnjamathanka stressed the
potential economic, cultural and educational value of the
land. Again the submission was rejected. The grounds
for the rejection were that the Adnjamathanka could not
claim the area including the homestead which was to be
incorporated in the National Parks and Wildlife Development.
Without the homestead area the Adnjamathanka would have
found it very difficult to run the land as a viable economic
venture. Indeed, with the relatively small amount of land
included in the plains country this would have been difficult
even with the homestead. The hesitation of the ADC to fund
the refashioned Adnjamathanha proposal was a result of the philosophies and ambitions of this department, in particular, its preference for funding by loan or a loan/grant combination. Under the ADC loan system benefiting groups are required to repay the Commission. It is therefore to the Commission's advantage to fund proposals that have a fair chance of economic success, not only for the benefit of its clients but also as a means of sustaining and expanding its own resource base and, consequently, its role in the land rights sphere.

b) The National Park Question

By early 1981 it had been accepted by the ALRC that the hills country of Balcanoona was to be National Parks and that the plains country alone was not a viable or obtainable substitute. It was at this time that the course of the Balcanoona struggle changed dramatically. The Department of Environment, in an effort to consider the Adnjamathanha interest in the area, began consulting with them over the possibility of collaboration in the management of the Gammon Ranges Park which was to be located on the Balcanoona area. The Department of Environment was keen to implement a form of joint-management similar to that operating in the Kakadu Park in the Northern Territory. In the Northern Territory example the Aboriginal occupants of the area have been granted title to the land under the Northern Territory Land Rights Act. This land has subsequently been leased to the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service and functions as a conservation and tourist region. Under this agreement the local Aboriginals have entered into a joint-management
programme in which decisions about the running of the Park derive from consultation between National Parks and themselves. The management of the park is overtly, and proudly, based on traditional Aboriginal modes of land management. Areas of restricted access have been established while other areas have been developed for controlled public access. The joint-management plan is administered by way of both local Aboriginal Rangers and non-Aboriginal Rangers.

The South Australian Government’s interpretation of the Kakadu model was eclectic. In proposing a ‘Kakadu-style’ it was not willing to commit itself to Adnjamathanha ownership of the land. Its interpretation was based on the Government retaining ownership (and, thus, ultimate control) with the Adnjamathanha being incorporated only by way of consultation with regard to a management programme and as Rangers to assist the implementation of this programme. The moves towards a joint-management plan in relation to the Gammon Ranges Park resulted in the Heritage Unit (affiliated to National Parks and Wildlife through the Department of Environment) assuming the role of mediator. Apart from its initial role in the formation of the ALRC the Unit had played a subliminal role in the Balcanoona issue. As the ambitions of the ALRC in relation to Balcanoona had moved further towards its direct control of sites and further away from the current situation of Heritage control so the relationship between the Unit and the Committee became less cooperative.

Outside the community sphere the Heritage Unit would have had considerable influence upon its
Department’s decision to incorporate the Adnjamathanha interest in Balcanooona by way of Aboriginal Rangers. A joint-management plan modelled, at least partially, on the Kakadu situation fitted well with the established relationship between the Unit and the Adnjamathanha. As will be shown, the Department of Environment and NPWS were able to exploit this relationship in establishing their own position within the community and enforcing their ambitions in relation to the Balcanooona area.

The Government’s proposal of joint-management was a genuine move to incorporate the Aboriginal interest, but it fell short of meeting the initial or even the refashioned ambitions of the ALRC. The basic issue was control and, quite rightly, the ALRC saw control resting in ownership. The Committee’s response to the Department of Environment remained consistent with this basic concern, and its members would accept joint-management only if the Adnjamathanha owned the land. The ALRC’s interpretation of the Kakadu precedent came via the Legal Rights lawyer who acted as its adviser. His perspective stressed the Aboriginal ownership of the land in the Kakadu situation. As such he presented an option which he felt would best satisfy the compromised ambitions of his clients. The Committee accepted his strategy and began action to secure ownership with the condition that the land was re-leased to the State NPWS.

This phase of the Balcanooona struggle is of considerable interest. It marked yet another alteration in the ALRC’s stand in relation to Balcanooona, and it was an alteration that
required the ALRC to finally forfeit its original intentions to use the area as a pastoral lease. Instrumental in this new strategy was the reliance upon the advice and services provided by the Legal Rights lawyer. Since its inception the ALRC had used the services of the local Legal Rights lawyer, however, their relationship was relatively informal and the Committee usually sought his assistance only at times when it was drafting submissions or embarking on a new strategy. In 1981, however, the relationship between the Committee and the Legal Rights lawyer strengthened considerably. Meetings were no longer held at the Social Club but at the Legal Rights Movement office (Plate 7.1). Not one of the ALRC meetings witnessed by myself in 1981 was held without the presence of the ALRM lawyer.

The increasing dominance of the Legal Rights lawyer cannot be isolated from the widening gap between the ambitions of the ALRC and those of the Heritage Unit, the previously most influential patron. As the Balcanoona struggle proceeded the ALRC found the attitude and approach of the lawyer far more compatible with its own ambitions than those held by the Unit. The personal attitude and ambitions of the lawyer were of particular importance in the development of this relationship. As a lawyer for the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement his main tools involved advising and assisting Aboriginais with legal difficulties. In this role he had a guaranteed clientele. The extension of his role as a provider of legal skills and advice to the land rights issue was done from personal choice rather than fulfilling obligations associated with his position in Legal Rights. The
PLATE 7:1 Members of the ALRC discussing business outside of the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement Office in Port Augusta.
status that can be gained for a lawyer by breaking new
ground in the legal area of land rights should not be
underestimated in relation to this. In the land rights
sphere his clients were not guaranteed. Their commitment
to his services had to be won by competing with established
patronage relationships such as that of the Heritage Unit.
In soliciting the ALRC as clients his legal skills
and commitment to its point of view became invaluable.
And, in the final stages of the Balcanoona struggle, when
the ALRC accepted his advice to follow his interpretation
of the Kakadu model rather than that of the Department of
Environment, the patron-client relationship was consolidated.

Furthermore, the involvement of the ALRC in the SLC was,
as previously noted, a significant factor in establishing
the Legal Rights lawyer's patronage role in land rights. In
the first SLC meeting the Adnjamathanka representatives had
spoken strongly about their problems with acquiring Balcanoona
and their frustration with Government intervention. The
Legal Rights lawyer spoke to the meeting about his client's
intentions to proceed with negotiations along the lines of
the Kakadu precedent. This was endorsed by the meeting. Thus
the SLC meeting not only consolidated the role of the Legal
Rights lawyer, it also resulted in the ALRC's most recent
stand gaining the untested support of the newly formed SLC.

Throughout this phase of negotiations the ALRC was
dependent upon its new patron's knowledge of the Kakadu
precedent. As the previously discussed, conflict-ridden
meeting between the Unit and the ALRC reveals, the shift in
affiliation from the Heritage Unit to Legal Rights/SLC created
major problems. Some individuals in the ALRC could afford to sever all links with the Heritage Unit for they did not have an interest in nor had they gained from the Heritage Unit's patronage. Others found this shift in patronage by the ALRC a little more difficult. During this period the Heritage Rangers only associated with the ALRC as representatives of their employer, thus severing all personal links with the ALRC. Some of the regular participants who saw the potential for inclusion in the joint-management plan, such as young men who might be candidates for Rangers or older initiated men who might be incorporated as informants, were less polarised in their commitment. Most of these individuals remained with the ALRC, giving tentative but unreliable support, shifting to support the Heritage Unit in situations of confrontation or conflict (as in the Heritage Unit meeting held to select an advisory committee). For these individuals it was astute strategy to remain tentatively affiliated to both the ALRC (and their Legal Rights patron) and to the Heritage Unit. Both were working towards a joint-management plan which might result in opportunities for them; whichever was victorious (the Unit or the ALRC), it would be seen that they had had the support of these jointly affiliated individuals during the struggle for victory. Thus, in the final stages of the Balcanonos struggle the ALRC fractured into three distinct groups with differing and conflicting affiliations (Figure 7:8).

c) The ADC and the pastoral lease struggle

The factionalism that was apparent in the ALRC was exacerbated by a new event in the area. In late 1981 the Mount
FIGURE 7:8 The three way split in affiliation which occurred among the ALRC during the final stage of the Balgoopina struggle.

QUADRANT A - Cultural Links. QUADRANT C - Organisation Links.
QUADRANT B - Kin links. QUADRANT D - Local Community Links.

*Heritage Unit Association.
Serle pastoral lease, which adjoins Nepabunna, came on to the market, creating confusion in terms of both the ambitions of the ALRC and the patronage niche it had chosen. When the Mount Serle lease became available the Aboriginal Development Commission approached the Adnjamathanha people to see if they wished to make a submission for funding. The ADC had only been established in 1980, and even more recently (1981) had had a regional branch set up in Port Augusta. The Mount Serle lease offered a prime opportunity for the regional ADC to establish its role in the area as a Government agency assisting land rights. Additionally, the ADC's only Aboriginal employee was an Adnjamathanha man and use of his connections with his own group made dealing with Mount Serle an even more appealing test case.

The ADC had little difficulty in motivating the Adnjamathanha people to apply for funding for Mount Serle. Mount Serle had been the original congregating point for the Adnjamathanha and contains many areas of cultural and mythological significance. Moreover, it was a relatively successful pastoral lease and in this sense had the potential to alter the economic position of Nepabunna (without being a great burden upon the ADC). In fact, Mount Serle had been the focus of an earlier land rights attempt by the Adnjamathanha. In the mid seventies, prior to the formation of the ALRC, it was placed on the market and the Adnjamathanha began to discuss acquiring funding to tender. However, according to the Adnjamathanha, once the lessee heard the local Aboriginals were interested he took the lease off the market.
The involvement of the ADC in the Mount Serle issue did not occur in isolation from the Balcanoona struggle. Once again the Adnjamathanha were pressured into making a whole-hearted commitment to Mount Serle, to the detriment of their interests in other areas and particularly Balcanoona. The ADC, through its Adnjamathanha employee, approached the ALRC and the Nepabunna community to discuss the aims of the people in relation to Balcanoona. In essence, the question was, 'Balcanoona or Mount Serle?'. In relation to the Nepabunna community the ADC had little difficulty in gaining support for Mount Serle. The existing division between the Nepabunna and Port Augusta groups and the Nepabunna community's general opposition to proposals by the ALRC worked to the advantage of ADC. Further the Adnjamathanha man in the employ of ADC was from Kin Group 5 which dominated Nepabunna's local politics. Their support of a Kin member was translated into support for ADC. The ADC's attempt to solicit support among the ALRC was less successful. And, in essence, the involvement of the ADC worked to further separate the land rights ambition of the Nepabunna group (who supported the Mount Serle claim whole heartedly) and the Port Augusta ALRC (which supported Mount Serle but were not willing to forego its intentions in relation to Balcanoona).

Essentially, the ADC intervention in the Balcanoona issue via the Mount Serle question worked to further factionalise the ALRC, and indeed the Adnjamathanha people. Within the ALRC some individuals, when confronted with the Balcanoona or Mount Serle ultimatum began to renege upon their commitment to the Balcanoona issue. Two individuals made this
patently clear by bringing, for the first time, their wives to an ALRC meeting. By bringing their wives these individuals were making a deliberate statement of their way of life, knowing full well that the ADC was looking for a family-minded man to manage Mount Serle if the tender was successful. Others within the ALRC were less willing to display any loss of commitment to the Balcanoona issue, but in the final meeting between the ALRC and the Department of Environment which occurred only three days after consultation with the ADC, the impact of ADC intervention (and the other conflicting affiliations within the ALRC) became quite clear and the ALRC's stand appeared diluted and fragmented.

Fifteen Adjamathanha men attended this final meeting with the Department of Environment which the ADC had requested, on behalf of the ALRC, in order to 'sort out' the issue. While the meeting was seen by the ALRC as an opportunity to state, in full, its case of Aboriginal ownership of Balcanoona and a joint-management plan, in reality it was used by the Government as a forum in which to state its steadfast intention to dedicate the areas as a Park, under Government ownership and, at best, joint management. The Government's stand at this meeting was to suggest that NPWS control of the area would adequately protect the Aboriginal interest because of the concern of this body for conservation. It was stressed by the Government, in relation to this point, that the Heritage Unit would have a large role in the management of the Park. By introducing the role of the Heritage Unit the Government was exploiting
the established relationship between the Adnjamathanha and the Unit.

Initially the ALRC took a unified stand and strongly opposed the Government's proposal. Led by its lawyer it stated its case for a full implementation of the Kakadu precedent, stressing Aboriginal title to the land. A number of the initiated men endorsed the stand by making individual statements on the cultural significance of the land and the suitability and capability of the Adnjamathanha people to care for the land. The Government refused to accept this proposal and restated its conviction that NPWS and the Heritage Unit could, in consultation with the Adnjamathanha, adequately protect the areas of significance to the Adnjamathanha. One man convincingly remarked, 'How can we trust you blokes to look after our sites? You don't even trust us to look after our sites'.

As the meeting proceeded the ALRC realised that the stand it had taken, at its lawyer's direction, was not going to succeed and the meeting factionalised. For example, a number of younger Adnjamathanha men left the issue of title and began to press the Government to make a firm commitment to employing Aboriginal Rangers to implement and advise on the management plan. These were the same young men who, since the Department of Environment's involvement in the issue, had only tentatively supported the ALRC. As Department of Environment victory became imminent, they overtly displayed support for or, at least, interest in its proposals. Their stand was endorsed by one of the initiated men who is the
main informant for the Heritage Unit. Again, as Department of Environment control of the area became established as an inalterable fact, it was to his benefit to support the Heritage Unit. Thus, the loss of direct support for the ALRC's stand was facilitated through the prior co-opting or promised incorporation of Adnjamathanha people into the ranks of the Heritage Unit. This faction was successful in making the Government commit itself to the training of Aboriginal Rangers in the Park.

Other members of the ALRC were less accepting of the Government's proposal of joint-management, even if it did involve Aboriginal Rangers. Joint-management was seen as no different from the land being owned by a pastoralist for whom the men then worked. They still were not the 'bosses' of the land; joint-management offered just 'small involvement' when what this group wanted was 'big involvement'. For this group the main issue was control of the land, and they remained loyal to their association with and the strategy endorsed by the lawyer.

Interestingly, a third group emerged in this meeting. A number of older men, no doubt disappointed at the failure of their association with the lawyer and unwilling to accept that a Government-style joint management plan would satisfy their ambitions to control the land, began to restate their original ambition to have the land as a pastoral lease. The persistence of the desire to have the land as a pastoral lease was not simply a matter of economics or employment. It was a matter of unconditional control. Having the land as
a pastoral lease would mean the Adnjamathanka would have a form of control over the land equivalent to that of the surrounding landholders. This is a form of control the Adnjamathanka are familiar with and which they view as autonomous. Although it carries with it the obligation to use the land in European terms of productivity this was an obligation they were willing to fulfil. In contrast, the NPWS option was viewed as compromised control. One Adnjamathanka man commented outside of the meeting that NPWS control would mean the people would have to deal not just with 'one Government, but lots of Governments', referring to his impression that their power in the Park and their control over the Park would not be autonomous but obtained only through a process of bargaining and negotiating with a number of Government bodies. The fact that, in the final stages of negotiations, a total of four separate Government agencies were involved (the Heritage Unit, NPWS, ADC and Legal Rights) as well as the SLC, attests to the validity of this concern. Another complaint related to the NPWS option was the fear that the increased public access associated with the establishment of a Park would erode the limbed control they had been given. The immense damage already wrought upon other Adnjamathanka sites by tourists made this fear of public access quite justifiable. In fact, the same man who complained about 'many Governments' said he would prefer the area to remain as a pastoral lease under someone else's ownership rather than go to the NPWS. Under pastoralist control the land was under 'lock and key'
and, while the Adnjamathanha could negotiate (and, in fact, had a legal right) to access, the land was not open to the public.

The final 'agreement' of the meeting was that ownership would remain with the Government but that joint management, with Aboriginal Rangers, would be implemented. The Government had been victorious. Instrumental in this success was the fragmenting of the ALRC along lines that accorded with the various patrons involved in the issue. In particular the Heritage Unit association proved a valuable asset to the Government in co-opting support for its plan of joint-management. The Gammon Ranges National Park was dedicated in 1982. It was opened by the oldest Adnjamathanha woman at a ceremony held at the base of an important women's site (Plate 7:2). This woman is the head of Kin Group 5, that group traditionally opposed to the ALRC. The majority of Adnjamathanha people attended the opening and although the ALRC had talked of protesting at the opening, it attended and showed its support. Currently the involvement of the NPWS and the Heritage Unit in the area is considerable, a tourist information area has been opened, more Adnjamathanha have been co-opted into the ranks of the Department of Environment as trainee Rangers, and an intensive site-recording programme is being implemented. Although relations between the ALRC and the Heritage Unit have deteriorated the Unit has been able to solicit support elsewhere in the community and its role as patron is firmly established.
PLATE 7:2  The dedication stone in the Gammon Ranges National Park. In the background is the rock face associated with an important female myth.
The role of the ADC in the defeat and subsequent acquiescence of the ALRC cannot be underestimated. As stated, the ADC's late intervention into the issue diluted the unity of the ALRC by presenting another opportunity to secure a pastoral lease and presenting this opportunity in an 'either Mount Serle or Balcanona' mentality. In particular, many of the ALRC participants wished to control the Mount Serle issue and become the mediators between ADC and the rest of the Adnjamathanha people. This could not occur without compliance with the ADC proposition that the Committee wind down its efforts in relation to the title of Balcanona. Thus, although many of the members of the ALRC were not satisfied with the outcome of the Balcanona issue they accepted the decision and redirected their energies towards controlling the administration of the Mount Serle pastoral lease which the ADC had been successful in purchasing.

The ALRC's first move to gain control of the Mount Serle issue was to demand that the management meeting, called by ADC in November of 1981, be held in Port Augusta rather than Nepabunna. This demand was consistent with previous difficulties the ALRC had experienced in asserting its power at Nepabunna. The ADC was particularly resistant to this idea, claiming that Mount Serle had been purchased 'for all Adnjamathanha and not just one mob'. The ADC eventually accepted the idea of a Port Augusta based meeting and the ALRC acted as host. This decision was an important step in the ALRC securing the favour of the ADC. Ninety-one Adnjamathanha attended this meeting, an indication of the
general support of, and interest in, the Mount Serie purchase. Eleven male representatives from the ALRC sat on a podium at the front of the meeting and the Chairman of the ALRC assumed the role of Chairman in this meeting (Plate 7:3). As usual, the majority of this representative body from the ALRC consisted of individuals from the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex based in Port Augusta. Only three men were from Nepabunna, all were closely affiliated to the dominant kin group.

During this meeting the Nepabunna-Port Augusta tension surfaced once more. Again it was manifested through the Port Augusta-based Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex and the Nepabunna-based Kin Group 5. Although the meeting was held to discuss how the lease should be run, the issue was really who should run the lease. In this sense both kin groups were attempting to secure the favour of the ADC who would essentially make the decision of who would manage the lease. The interim committee chosen consisted of six people (Table 7:4).

The breakdown reveals, once again, Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex domination and a consequent Port Augusta bias. Furthermore, four of the six committee members were participants in the ALRC. The format of the interim committee attests to the ALRC's success in securing the favour of the ADC. Instrumental in this was its forfeiting of both the issue of ownership in relation to Balcanoona and its commitment to the SLC. In so doing the ALRC (that is, the Kin Group 1, 2 and 3 Complex) has in fact satisfied
PLATE 7:3 Members of the AIWC hosting the Mount Seile meeting called by the ADC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kin Group</th>
<th>Residence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 5</td>
<td>Quorn*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 5</td>
<td>Nepabunna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>Port Augusta*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 2</td>
<td>Port Augusta*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 3</td>
<td>Port Augusta*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin Group 1</td>
<td>Nepabunna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Regular ALRC Participants
PLATE 7:4 An ALRC Meeting held at Nepabunna at which strong opposition was expressed towards the Committee's association with the SLC.
its original ambition to control a pastoral lease and redress the imbalance resulting from Kln Group 5's domination of the Nantawarrinna lease.

Of particular significance to this final shift in affiliation was the ALRC's withdrawal from the SLC. As the Balcanoona issue faded and the Mount Serle issue gained momentum the Adnjamathanha commitment to the SLC weakened. (Table 7:5). The ALRC's withdrawal from the SLC is directly linked to its shift to the ADC and the need to have more general community support if it was to assume an important role in relation to Mount Serle.

The ALRC's commitment to the SLC was never fully supported by the rest of the Adnjamathanha group. In exclusively Adnjamathanha meetings that followed the first SLC meeting it became apparent that those Adnjamathanha outside of the participating land rights people were unhappy with the arrangement of joining with the SLC (Plate 7:4). The origin of those SLC participants outside of the Adnjamathanha was of particular concern to many, especially the Nepabunna women. They realised that the SLC had developed in close association with the Pitjantjatjara and were under the impression that the Pitjantjatjara were active participants in the Council. The Nepabunna women made it known at two Adnjamathanha meetings that they feared involvement with the Pitjantjatjara would erode their decision-making power as women. The logic of this concern rested with the Adnjamathanha view of the Pitjantjatjara as strict traditionalists. They spoke as women who
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting Date and Location</th>
<th>Representation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-4/10/81, Port Augusta</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/11/81, Coober Pedy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/2/81, Port Augusta</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
feared that the Pitjantjatjara link might carry with it an obligation to conform with the perceived Pitjantjatjara practice of having only male decision-makers. For the women of Nepabunna, who are powerful community figures and the instigators of most action within the community, what they saw to be a link with the Pitjantjatjara was a potential threat not only to their personal status but their control over the well-being of their community.

A similar concern existed among some of the men. They were against joining with any other tribes on the grounds that this would mean the others would be able to have some say over their land.

These concerns reflect significantly on the unamended transfer of the Pitjantjatjara collective model to other regions of the State. There are two basic distinctions between the Pitjantjatjara situation and that facing the groups in this more southerly region. Firstly, the Pitjantjatjara collective consists of closely linked, culturally similar people for whom a political liaison would not be incompatible with already existing non-political associations. This was not the case with the SLC and particularly the Adnjamathanha faction. In fact, within the Port Augusta sphere, relations between the Kokatha and Adnjamathanha were quite competitive. Secondly, the Pitjantjatjara collective was claiming land in a remote region of the State, of which a considerable portion had long been established as an Aboriginal reserve. Although this land was now under scrutiny from mining interests it was not good pastoral land.
As in the Northern Territory, the Pitjantjatjara success in their claim for land was assisted by the availability of claimable land in the area.

In contrast, the region covered by the SLC has very little vacant Crown Land which the Aboriginal groups may claim. Little of the region has been allocated to Aboriginal groups and most of the land allocated during the mission era is now under Aboriginal control through the Lands Trust. The land rights ambitions of the SLC group rest outside these areas in regions where pastoral, mining, tourist and Government interests compete with that of the Aboriginal interest.

The existence of a number of discrete Aboriginal groups with distinct land interests in a region under extreme pressure from a number of external groups with conflicting land interests makes land an extremely scarce resource. The Aboriginal groups of this area must compete against the external interest groups and other Aboriginal communities for the attention of bodies such as the ADC, DAA and ALRM. Under such circumstances the Adnjamathanha fear of an association with other groups, and particularly the Pitjantjatjara who they perceive as more powerful and with the potential to compete more successfully for the attentions of the Government, were justifiable.

The broader community opposition to the ALRC's commitment to the SLC proved a threat to their ambitions to gain the favour of the ADC. It put the ALRC in overt opposition with those factions from which it needed, if not support, at least not overt opposition, if it was to present an acceptable 'community' image to the ADC and
thereby improve its chances of controlling the Mount Serle issue.

7.5 CONCLUSION

In summary, the Adnjamathanha land rights experience can be seen as tension-filled, characterised by community and kin groupings competing for access to and control of the scarce resource of land. The intervention of the Government in the land rights process creates and further fragments existing community divisions as the various groups compete for the attention of these patrons and access to the resources they control. Furthermore, land rights efforts can be shaped and even thwarted by the demands on the Aboriginal client by the chosen or enforced patron. As has been shown, the apparent opportunism of the Adnjamathanha group is a factor induced by the conditions dictated by existing patrons. In such situations the ALRC have shown considerable fluidity as they shift from one niche to another seeking the service which will best fit their ambitions. The unfortunate consequence that arises from such behaviour is that the Adnjamathanha appear to be unsure of their own ambitions and willy-nilly in terms of the areas to which they direct their efforts. Furthermore, land rights success for the Adnjamathanha has only been possible when they conformed with the ambitions of the Government. As has been shown, the Adnjamathanha have been relatively successful in their land rights attempts (Map 7:2), but this has only been possible through cooperation with those controlling land, funding and other resources.
MAP 7:2 The Northern Flinders Ranges showing areas under full or partial control of the Adnjamathanha. The large number of sites recorded by the Heritage Unit are not shown.