28th November, 1956.

My dear Harrod,

I only recently heard of your new book on the foundations of inductive logic, and have just been able to look at a copy.

Needless to say it interests me very greatly, especially since, starting from very different standpoints, we seem to have concurred largely on all the essentials. In particular you seem to make a good deal of use of the logical situation which I recognize as that of tests of significance, which is, of course, quite different from the very artificial set up developed by Neyman and Pearson to interpret these tests.

I mean that you often use inductive inferences of a kind which I describe on page 43 of my book as "more primitive, or elemental" than, and not justifying any exact probability statement.

I am sure that what you call the foundations of inductive logic are at this level, which is perfectly capable of mathematical specification; and that the concept of mathematical probability, as used in the eighteenth century "Doctrine of Chances"
(a concept considerably narrower than the extended meaning which Keynes wished to give it), is so highly specialized that it scarcely occurs in the great majority of scientific inferences, though cases of special interest can be found in which it is quite properly applicable.

The mathematics in my book serve, I think, only to implement the more general arguments, and are no more than a vehicle for the corresponding reasoning.

Sincerely yours,