



**Reconciling the Roles of Status and Behaviour in Group  
Influence:  
Towards a Status-Confirmation Model**

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## Abstract

This thesis addresses the task of reconciling two discrete bodies of evidence relating to the emergence of influence hierarchies in small groups. Reviews are presented of research (1) documenting the phenomenon of status generalisation, and (2) identifying individual differences in nonverbal behavioural style as the basis of group differentiation. It is argued that previous attempts to integrate the two fields are flawed on two counts: the failure to differentiate empirically between the effects of nonverbal signals and those of differential task performance, and the corresponding tendency to depict such behavioural signals as a sufficient determinant of group structure. Findings obtained with behaviour separated from performance support the view that effects previously attributed to behavioural stimuli derived, instead, from differential task performance.

A status-confirmation model of the interactive effects of status and behaviour is proposed and evaluated. The primary assumption - that behavioural confidence and the initiation of activity represent claims to situational status - was endorsed by undergraduate subjects' accounts of the likely behaviour of a group member who seeks to attain group leadership. That established, the status-confirmation model proposes behavioural status-claims to be subject to confirmation or denial on the basis of the external status or competence of the claimant. Results of a field study, using extraversion as an index of a status-claiming behavioural style, support this argument; extraversion differentiated observer-rated influence of group members ranked high on either diffuse or specific status, but not those ranked uniformly high or low on both. The latter case, in particular, is inconsistent with the

view that behavioural confidence plays an independent causal role, comparable to that of external status, in hierarchy formation.

Evidence, also noted, of the ability of external status to influence the perception of behaviour, permits reconciliation of the status-confirmation model with the research base of status characteristics theory. Indications that the effects of behaviour on hierarchy formation are due to the pre-emption of leadership rather than the communication of confidence are considered, and the implications for the direction and methodology of future research discussed.

### Statement

This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

I give my consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being available for loan and photocopying.

Signed...

Date... 29/1/93 .....

*Note: Chapters 4 and 5 contain material previously published as Mohr (1986).*

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## CHAPTER 1:

### Introduction

When people come together to work at a collective task, they tend not to do so as equals. In addition to the differences they bring with them into the group - differences in the abilities they possess, in the places they occupy in society, and in their ways of behaving - there are differences that are likely to emerge in the roles played in the group itself. Small groups, it has long been noted, rapidly develop internal hierarchies of such a kind that, the higher one's position, the more one is involved in interaction, both as initiator and recipient, the more one's contribution is valued by colleagues and, of greatest interest to social psychologists, the more influential one is (Bales, 1950; Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills and Roseborough, 1951; Heinicke and Bales, 1953). The last-mentioned and, arguably, most consequential of these criteria - the amount of influence exerted - is now generally employed as sole index of where an individual stands in a group's situational status hierarchy (e.g., Berger, Fisek, Norman and Zelditch, 1977).

Of considerable interest to researchers has been the way in which such intra-group differentiation comes about: What are the characteristics that discriminate those who will lead from those who will follow? To date, the two main predictive correlates of situational status have been identified as external status and behavioural style. The operation of the first is generally referred to as the phenomenon of status generalisation, which describes the tendency for people's ordering on status positions external to the group to generalize to their ordering within the group (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch, 1972; Berger et

al., 1977; Webster and Driskell, 1978). The other view to receive support is one that emphasises differences in the behaviour of group members in the early stages of interaction as an indicator of eventual order. Such behaviours include activity level (Fisek and Ofshe, 1970); the initiation of speech (Rosa and Mazur, 1979); and taking the head seat at table (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974).

Two related questions that have concerned theorists for a decade or more are which, if either, of these two explanations is the more potent, and how the two can be related (Lee and Ofshe, 1981; Levine and Moreland, 1990). The concern of this thesis is primarily with the latter question, consideration of which should also cast light upon the former.

The two bodies of research that document the evidence, firstly, for status generalisation, and secondly, for the behavioural foreshadowing of group order, are reviewed in chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Their separate treatment in this way reflects their actual development: as two research traditions that progressed largely independently of one another. Status generalisation research, especially, given the extent of its domination by a single theoretical school with a cognitive orientation - Berger et al.'s (1972; 1977) status characteristics and expectation states theory - did not readily lend itself to the assimilation of a behavioural perspective.

Chapter 4 introduces the attempt to relate the two. This is a process that was initiated, in provocative fashion, by Lee and Ofshe (1981). Lee and Ofshe's rejection of the status characteristics and expectation states approach to group influence in favour of a behavioural explanation gave rise to a vigorous, sometimes colourful exchange of comments (Berger and Zelditch, 1983; Greenstein, 1981;

Ofshe and Lee, 1981; 1983), as well as some less partisan discussion (Nemeth, 1983; Sherman, 1983). The present approach is of the latter type, in that it seeks to give precedence to the explanatory traditions of neither school.

In the context of a critique of the Lee and Ofshe (1981) study, chapter 4 proposes a status-confirmation model, involving the interaction of status and behaviour, as a means of reconciling the roles of the two variables in social influence processes. Subsequent chapters are concerned with elaboration of the conceptual basis for the model; its development and refinement; the exploration of its ability to accommodate the products of both behavioural and status research traditions; and ultimately the testing of the model against alternative frameworks.

A brief explanation of terminology is appropriate. "Status" is used throughout the thesis to refer to *external status*, the ranking on some evaluative dimension that individuals bring with them into a group. In encompassing both diffuse and specific status, as defined in chapter 2, it may include, alongside factors such as age, occupation, gender, or wealth, factors such as purported or demonstrated competence at a group task. Usage will generally be apparent from context. Although the term is frequently used by authors to denote an individual's rank in a group hierarchy, in general that will not be the practice here. There are two exceptions: references to the term "status consensus", coined by Heinicke and Bales (1953), and the descriptions of behaviour as either "status-claiming" or "status-disclaiming", as developed in chapters 4 and 8. In these contexts, only, the unqualified term "status" refers to individuals' standing in a group hierarchy.

Other than in these composite expressions, such rank will be referred to as *situational status*, influence, or group rank.

The variety of possible references to behaviour similarly requires clarification. The following terms - "behavioural style", "demeanour", "nonverbal behaviour", and "behavioural confidence" - are used essentially interchangeably. "Dominant", meanwhile, is employed in the everyday sense of the term, consistent with the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition: "Exercising chief authority or rule; ruling, governing; most influential....Occupying a commanding position." (Little, Fowler and Coulson, 1969, p.550). The same is true of its variants, except for the compound expression "dominance cues", which Ridgeway (1984, 1987) has used to denote a particular sub-set of behaviours, involving threat or coercion, as noted in chapter 6.

## CHAPTER 2:

### Group differentiation and the role of status generalisation

#### 2.1 Group differentiation

It has long been accepted that small, initially leaderless groups of unacquainted individuals, convened to work at a collective task, develop internal inequalities in the patterns of interaction between members. This understanding derives primarily from the work of Bales and his colleagues four decades ago. These researchers observed the functioning of task-oriented groups in both laboratory and natural settings, and systematically recorded the patterns of interaction that took place. The latter were scored by means of Bales' (1950) well-known Interaction Process Analysis, which involved the recording of units of interaction as *acts* - subject-predicate combinations or their nonverbal equivalents - and their classification on a 12-category scale. That scale was, for most purposes, condensed into the four areas of *Positive Reactions*, *Negative Reactions*, *Attempted Answers*, and *Questions*, or further still into *Social-emotional* versus *Task-oriented* activity (Bales, 1950; Borgatta and Bales, 1953a; Heinicke and Bales, 1953; Slater, 1955.)

Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills and Roseborough (1951), reporting on their observations of a variety of groups of three to ten members, noted that,

If participants in a small group are ranked by the total number of acts they initiate, they will also tend to be ranked:

(1) by the number of acts they receive,

(2) by the number of acts they address to specific other individuals, and

(3) by the number of acts they address to the group as a whole (p. 468).

The emergence of such a participation hierarchy occurred very early in a group's history, generally in the course of the first meeting. Moreover, this ranking of members in terms of the amount of involvement in group affairs corresponded closely to the evaluation by colleagues of their contribution to the group in the execution of its task. Individuals of a given participation rank tended to be similarly ranked on the highly inter-related criteria of leadership, guidance, and quality of ideas (Heinicke and Bales, 1953). Indeed, Sherif, White and Harvey (1955), in a study with 12-year-old boys, found that performance at a valued task - a ball game, in this instance - was over-estimated for highly-ranked group members, and under-estimated for those of low rank. Harvey (1953) found a similar effect for predicted future performance.

An important paper by Strodbeck, James and Hawkins (1957) further related participation level to the ability to influence the group decision. These authors found that the more active group members deviated less than the others from their previously held positions in the course of arriving at a verdict in mock jury deliberations. This more consequential notion, social influence, has since come to replace participation as the principal index of where an individual stands in a group's situational status hierarchy.

Finally, as well as embracing a number of correlated dimensions, intra-group hierarchies were found to be remarkably stable, in that the leadership ranking of group members, either by their fellows or by observers, changed little over the course of a succession of meetings (Heinicke and Bales, 1953). This stability is reflected in the fact that

most subsequent research on hierarchy formation in so-called Bales groups considers only a single session.

These early findings still form the cornerstone for research into group structure. The regularity with which the emergence of participation hierarchies could be observed has seen the development of a number of mathematical models with the aim of predicting the distribution of participation in small groups (e.g., Goetsch and McFarland, 1980; Leik, 1967; Skvoretz, 1988; Stephan and Mishler, 1952). The promise of a universal pattern has, however, tended to obscure the existence of exceptions to the rule, their potential diagnostic value notwithstanding (Bales et al., 1951). Heinicke and Bales (1953), in their study of developmental trends in group structure, identified two distinct types of groups, which they described as being either high or low in *status consensus*. The term refers to the degree to which members agree where each stands in the group status hierarchy. Whereas the high consensus groups appeared to emerge from the characteristic second-session tension resolution with a quite stable hierarchical structure, in low consensus groups the social-emotional crisis occurred later, and there was a lesser tendency for occupancy of the lower status positions, in particular, to remain constant.

Although the particular case of low consensus groups has received some attention (e.g., Burke, 1967; Shelley, 1960; Slater, 1955), subsequent research has been largely indifferent to developmental aspects of small group structure. The major preoccupation, as has been noted, has been with the distribution of participatory acts over a single session of any given group. To the extent that differences between groups have been acknowledged, the explanation has been sought in

terms of characteristic interaction rates of individual members (Borgatta and Bales, 1953b; Stephan and Mishler, 1952).

In general, those seeking to predict or explain intra-group behaviour have implicitly adopted the more common high consensus group as the norm. That practice will be followed here. As will be seen, the endorsement of this approach does not deny the ability of less representative situations to inform the development or test the adequacy of an explanatory model. It simply defines the focal task in this project as one concerned with the processes whereby some individuals emerge as simultaneously more active, more valued, and more influential than their colleagues.

## 2.2 Status generalisation

In part, this task involves the identification of characteristics that differentiate those who attain high rank from their lesser ranked colleagues. In many respects this enterprise is well advanced. There now exists an extensive body of knowledge that identifies external status, by which is meant the standing of actors on status dimensions outside the group, as predictive of differentiation within the group. This is generally referred to as a particular instance of *status generalisation*, the process whereby status on one dimension is apparently generalised to confer rank on some other, not necessarily related dimension.

Torrance (1955) studied the interaction, on a number of problem-solving tasks, of three-man groups whose members occupied positions of differential power in the clearly defined command structure of B-26



combat crews. He compared 62 permanent crews with 32 temporary crews, the latter having the same personnel configuration as the former - pilot, navigator, and gunner - but brought together for the purposes of the study only. Pilots, the individuals normally highest in authority, emerged as most influential, and the low-status gunners the least, in both kinds of groups. On one task, indeed, the gunners in permanent groups failed to influence the group decision on three occasions out of every four on which they possessed the best answer. The corresponding figures for navigators and pilots were 35% and 17%, respectively. In temporary groups, although the influence rate of members with the correct answer was generally higher for all ranks, the differences between ranks persisted. This occurred despite the lack of relevance of rank to the tasks at hand, and in the absence, in the temporary groups, of a formal power structure.

Evidence of status generalisation was not confined to the military and its well-articulated authority structures. Accounts of this phenomenon in civilian groups are largely traceable to the work, in the 1950s, of the experimental jury project at the Law School of the University of Chicago. Researchers associated with this programme of research studied the functioning of mock juries, their members drawn from community jury pools. These researchers described the tendency for individuals of high socio-economic status to originate more acts than those of low status (Strodtbeck and Mann, 1956); for men to be more active than women (James, 1959; Strodtbeck et al., 1957; Strodtbeck and Mann, 1956); and for differences in educational level (James, 1959), and occupational status (Strodtbeck et al., 1957) to predict relative participation.

As suggested earlier, these effects go beyond mere talkativeness. In the Strodbeck et al. study, the effects of gender and occupation were found to extend both to jurors' influence over the verdict, and to how competent their colleagues perceived them to be. This suggestion of a generalised bias was further evident in the fact that proprietors, the highest occupational status group, and males were substantially over-represented in the role of fore-person. Females, indeed, had a probability of only one-fifth of that suggested by chance of being chosen as fore-person. Neither could the greater participation and influence of males and jurors of higher occupational status be attributed simply to their over-representation in the role of fore-person; removing the fore-person's contribution from calculations still left pronounced imbalances.

Lockheed and Hall (1976) have argued that the documented differences between males and females in amount and type of interaction in small groups are, like those of different occupational groups, instances of status generalisation. They found that whereas, in groups consisting of two males and two females, the former were more active, more influential, and more likely to be leaders, there were no sex differences in type or amount of interaction when individuals worked in same-sex groups. This, and the fact that the participation rate of females in mixed-sex groups increased following task experience, were viewed as inconsistent with explanations in terms of sex roles. Their conception of gender as a status characteristic draws on the theoretical perspective provided by expectation states theory, which is reviewed in the next section.

Similar observations have been made for race. Katz and his colleagues reported on the passive and subordinate manner of black

children when interacting with white children on a problem-solving task (Katz, 1970; Katz and Cohen, 1962; Katz, Goldston and Benjamin, 1958). Cohen (1972) brought groups comprising 2 black and 2 white schoolboys together in a game requiring group strategy. She too found that whites were more likely to be high participators than were blacks, and that they were more likely to have their task suggestions adopted as the group decision. Again, influence and activity rates were highly correlated. Cohen's analysis of her findings, and her subsequent interventions, are based on the conception of race as a status characteristic (Cohen, Lockheed and Lohman, 1976; Cohen and Roper, 1972), and employ, like those of Lockheed and Hall, the theoretical framework of expectation states theory.

### 2.3            The status characteristics approach to group differentiation

The most complete account of the phenomenon of status generalization is the status characteristics and expectation states theory (EST), of Berger and his colleagues (Anderson, Berger, Cohen and Zelditch, 1966; Berger, Cohen and Zelditch, 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman and Zelditch, 1977; Greenstein and Knottnerus, 1980; Wagner and Berger, 1982; Webster and Driskell, 1978). This theory identifies both *specific status characteristics* (e.g., mathematical ability), and *diffuse* (i.e., general) *status characteristics* (e.g., age, gender, occupation), as determinants of the direction of influence in task groups. It proposes that, in the absence of information on actors' abilities in relation to the task at hand, the differential evaluation associated with a status characteristic carries with it specific performance expectations for that

task. These performance expectations become both the basis for the formation of a power-prestige order - the way in which the correlated elements of action opportunities, performance outputs, communicated evaluations, and influence are distributed in the group - and, through the continued biasing effect on perceptions, the means whereby it is maintained.

The scope of the theory is explicitly restricted to explaining the emergence of a power-prestige order between two or more individuals who are engaged in working on a collective task. Central to this process is the concept of *expectation states*, variously described as "probabilistic functions of expectations for the performance of self in relation to one (or more) other(s)" (Berger et al., 1977, p. 19), or "stabilized beliefs about future conduct which, in turn, determine behaviour" (Berger, Rosenholtz and Zelditch, 1980, p. 483). These expectation states, identified as the basis for interactants' predictions of their future performance at a task relative to one another, are linked to the levels of the status characteristics possessed.

Associated with the differentially evaluated states of a specific status characteristic are specific expectation states; two individuals possessing high and low states of the characteristic "mathematic ability" will be expected to perform, respectively, well and poorly at a mathematical task. Diffuse status characteristics can also be the basis for specific performance expectations, as would be the case when males and females - differentiated on the diffuse characteristic gender - are expected to differ in mechanical ability, or at sewing. What sets diffuse characteristics apart from specific characteristics, however, is their ability to invoke *general* expectations for differential performance in a range of unspecified circumstances. Strodtbeck and Lipinski's (1985)

observation that prior jury experience carried with it an elevated likelihood of being elected fore-person might be seen as an account of the operation of a specific status characteristic. That occupational status also predicted a juror's chance of becoming fore-person is more appropriately seen as the operation of a diffuse characteristic; that characteristic, moreover, might perform a similar function in a variety of other situations, as a consequence of the generalized expectation state associated with it.

This is not to say that the effects of specific status characteristics are restricted to situations to which they are obviously and logically relevant. Indeed, the distinction between specific and diffuse characteristics is blurred somewhat by what expectation states theorists call the *burden of proof* process. This principle states that, unless the relevance of an external status characteristic is specifically dissociated from the group task, actors will act as though the characteristic is relevant. That is, any status characteristic that differentiates between actors in an interaction will, if its relevance is not specifically challenged, become the basis for expectations of task competence, regardless of its logical relevance to the task (Berger et al., 1980; Webster and Driskell, 1978).

A related - if less fully developed - concept is the notion of *paths of relevance* (Berger et al., 1977; Berger et al., 1980; Wagner and Berger, 1982). A path of relevance is defined as "a cognitive connection between the actor and the task that links the status characteristic possessed by the actor to an outcome state of the task, either success or failure" (Berger et al., 1980, p. 485). A path of relevance thus represents one of the theoretical processes whereby status characteristics can become salient in an interaction. In addition, it can be graphically

depicted to symbolise the direction - whether task connotations are positive or negative - and, more importantly for present purposes, the strength of the expectation states associated with states of a status characteristic. For example, the path of relevance connecting a relevant specific status characteristic to task outcomes is likely to be shorter than that of a salient diffuse characteristic; the shorter path identifies the specific characteristic as a correspondingly more powerful basis for the emergence of a power-prestige order in that task situation.

### **2.3.1 Evidence for EST**

The status characteristics branch of expectation states theory is supported by a substantial body of research, whose standard experimental situation involves subjects in presumed negotiation, via an Interaction Control Machine (ICOM), with an unseen other, purported to be of higher or lower status (Berger et al., 1977). In reality, equal-status pairs of subjects interact. They are engaged in an ambiguous binary choice task, most commonly described as requiring one or other of "contrast sensitivity" or "meaning insight". The contrast sensitivity task requires subjects to decide which of two rectangles has a greater area of white; meaning insight calls for the matching of an English word with the "correct" one of a pair of obscure foreign words. In either case, a subject registers a choice, is informed of the other's choice - frequently mendaciously, to ensure a high standard rate of initial disagreement is met - and makes a final, private, choice. The influence measure is the proportion of stay responses, that is the incidence of rejection of the other's choice.

Using this framework, Moore (1968) observed the effect of educational status on the reactions of 85 female junior college students. In the high status condition, subjects were led to believe that they were interacting with high school students; in the low status condition, their partners were presumed to be students of the prestigious Stanford University. Relative educational status was found to predict the likelihood a subject would yield to a partner's influence; moreover, this happened to a similar degree regardless of whether or not educational status had been directly associated, in the experimental instructions, with task competence. This study thus returned evidence simultaneously for status generalisation and, because of the similarity of effect of performance-associated and non-associated status conditions, the burden of proof assumption.

Berger et al. (1972) reported a generally similar finding using Air Force rank as a diffuse status characteristic. Subjects in this case were differentiated (they believed) either by rank alone, or by rank and, congruently, Army General Classification Score (AGCS); in half of the latter cases, AGCS was further linked to task performance. Relative status again predicted the proportion of stay responses in all conditions to a similar degree, Except for high-status subjects, whose resistance to influence increased when status was linked, via AGCS, to competence. This discrepancy was not, however, viewed as a serious impediment to the burden of proof principle. Berger et al. (1972) attributed it to subjects' greater doubts, in the other conditions, that sergeants were more able than enlisted men, and subsequent discussion favoured an ordinal over an absolute treatment of group differences (Berger et al., 1977).

Experimentation within the ICOM framework has recorded the effects of other diffuse status characteristics, in addition to educational achievement and military rank. These are gender (Pugh and Wahrman, 1983), although not consistently (Riordan, 1983), age (Freese and Cohen, 1973), and race (Webster and Driskell, 1978). Specific status characteristics studied most commonly involved experimentally-manipulated feedback about performance at either the contrast sensitivity (De Gilder and Wilke, 1990; Freese and Cohen, 1973; Riordan, 1983) or meaning insight tasks (Freese and Cohen, 1973; Riordan, 1983; Webster and Driskell, 1978). Variants on these tasks are Pugh and Wahrman's (1983) spatial judgement ability, and Webster and Driskell's (1978) relational insight.

Driskell (1982) extended the notion of diffuse characteristics to include what he called valued personal characteristics (VC). When empathy (a VC) was claimed to be related to general task performance, in the manner assumed of diffuse status characteristics, individuals who believed they had scored more highly on empathy than their partners were more resistant to influence than those who thought they had similar scores to their partners. The resistance to influence of individuals for whom high status on the VC had not been linked to ability fell between the two, but did not differ significantly from either.

Such extensions to the range of characteristics accommodated by expectation states theory rest on the assumption that a characteristic that differentiates individuals is a status characteristic if one of its states is more highly valued than another (Berger et al., 1977; Berger et al., 1980). A test of the assertion that evaluational differences are essential for influence was undertaken by Greenstein and Knottnerus (1980). They randomly classified subjects as alpha or beta types following a



"Modes of Perception" test. Only when told that beta types possessed superior perceptual sensitivity did subjects given these two labels differ in their acceptance of influence on a word construction task. Similar arguments apply to the conception as status characteristics of individual distinguishing features like height and physical attractiveness. These arguments invoke the general perception of some states of these characteristics as being better or more desirable than others: the evaluative bias whose extension to performance expectations is EST's central postulate (Berger et al., 1980; Greenstein and Knottnerus, 1980; Webster and Driskell, 1983).

### 2.3.2 Applications of EST

The notion of status-associated performance expectations has stood EST in good stead. Researchers in applied settings continue to achieve success in manipulating specific status to temper the effects of the so-called interaction disability suffered by individuals of low rank on the pervasive diffuse characteristics of race and gender. Such studies have demonstrated the ability of high rank on one dimension to counter the effects of low rank on another. Webster and Driskell (1978) used white female students who thought they were interacting with a black female partner (low diffuse status); feedback indicating the partner's higher rank on two specific characteristics - meaning insight and relational insight - of no apparent relevance to the contrast sensitivity task, significantly reduced resistance to influence. The resultant proportion of stay responses was still significantly higher, however, than that obtained when race of the high specific status partner was unknown, and presumed white.

Cohen and Roper (1972) applied EST principles to the task of achieving interaction equality between white and black schoolboys, by means of a process described as *expectation training*. Prior to interacting with whites in racially balanced groups of four, blacks were taught both how to build a radio and how to teach another person to do so. This process was directed at raising blacks' own expectations of competence. In two of three experimental conditions, in which whites' expectations were targeted also, the black boys taught their white partners to assemble the radio. In the subsequent group decision game, the customary patterns of white dominance were observed to persist in groups in which blacks' expectations only had been treated. Where the expectations of both races had been treated, a pattern of racial equality emerged. Although the effect was somewhat less when blacks had been pre-informed of the task relevance of their training, due to an unanticipated decrease in the participation rate of the less active black in a group, blacks and whites remained equally likely to be chosen leader. In a subsequent field experiment, black students taught different white students a different task on each of four mornings in summer school. Again, equal status interaction was observed in small groups, which paired children who had not been paired with one another in the teacher-student phase. Follow-up three weeks later revealed the effects had persisted in female groups; in male groups, a pattern of black dominance had emerged over that time (Cohen, Lockheed and Lohman, 1976).

Attempts to modify the generally observed interaction disability of women have achieved similar success. Pugh and Wahrman (1983) reported that men deferred less than women in mixed-sex interaction via ICOM; neither did telling subjects of both gender that task

performance was unrelated to gender modify this imbalance. When equal ability was demonstrated through bogus performance feedback, an apparent shift in the pattern for males removed the significant sex difference. Demonstrating that women were *more* skilled than men brought about a shift in the responses of both, although it did not result in a significant difference in favour of women. A similar pattern was evident the next day, when the same subjects interacted in different pairs.

Wood and Karten (1986) used Bales' Interaction Process Analysis to score interaction in groups in which 2 male and 2 female students engaged in a discussion task requiring a unanimous decision. In some groups, one of each gender was assigned high and the other low competence on a test of intellectual and moral aptitude. In groups in which gender was the only differentiating characteristic, it was found that males engaged in a higher level of task activity, and were perceived to be more competent. In the other groups, experimentally-assigned competence was the basis for differences in task activity and perceived competence. Where Webster and Driskell (1978) and Pugh and Wahrman (1983) demonstrated the ability of a specific status advantage to diminish or overcome a diffuse status advantage, the Wood and Karten finding thus extended the demonstration beyond the ICOM framework, to that of face-to-face interaction<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The E.G. Cohen studies also used face-to-face groups, but manipulated more than specific status, in that it cast interactants in different roles prior to the group experiments.

### 2.3.3 Multicharacteristic status situations

Applied research of this kind has itself contributed to the development and refinement of expectation states theory, most notably in relation to the question of what happens when individuals are simultaneously, and possibly inconsistently, differentiated on several status characteristics (Berger, Wagner and Zelditch, 1985). When actors possess the high state of one characteristic and the low state of another, do they and those with whom they interact *balance* the status information, and behave as if one or the other characteristic - not necessarily the same one - does not exist; or do they *combine* status information, taking an average of the two; or do different strategies apply in different circumstances?

Webster and Driskell (1978), in arguing for EST's favoured combining explanation, pointed out that the achievement by Cohen et al. (1976) and Cohen and Roper (1972) of equal status interaction patterns did not amount to the *elimination* of the effect of the diffuse characteristic, race. Had this been the case, they maintained, the highly trained blacks and females should have been considerably more influential than their white or male colleagues. The authors' own finding, that specific status diminished the effects of race, fits the combining argument.

This argument conflicts with that of Freese and Cohen (1973), whose research indicated that the presence of congruent status on two specific characteristics was able to reverse the effect of an inconsistent diffuse characteristic. The experimental task was a spatial judgement test, in which female college students, aged 18-21, interacted with a partner presented as either a 38 year old woman or an 11 year old girl.

The effect of age status on rejection of influence was apparent only when age was the only differentiating characteristic. When the age differential was accompanied by feedback indicating the younger of a pair had done extremely well, and the older extremely poorly, at two preliminary tests, age was apparently ignored, and the pattern of stay responses resembled that of performance-differentiated diffuse status equals.

Although the Freese and Cohen result supports a form of balancing explanation for the reaction to multiple characteristics, it has tended to be viewed as an exceptional finding, whose interpretation requires further research. To date, the weight of opinion remains behind the view that the effects of status characteristics are generally additive, although not in a simple linear manner. The *method of organised subsets* proposes that the incremental increase in effect of multiple consistent characteristics diminishes as the number of such characteristics increases. In other words, the possession of a positive state of only one characteristic will result in a stronger effect than possession of two positive states and one negative state of different characteristics; although the negative and first positive states may negate one another, the contribution of the second positive state is less than it would have been in the absence of the other two (Berger et al., 1977; Norman, Smith and Berger, 1988; Webster and Driskell, 1978).

The range of applications of this explanation has yet to be established. It will need to be tested both for its accuracy in describing such combining as takes place, and for its ability to predict when combining will occur. In the meantime, the possibility that balancing of status information will take place under some conditions cannot be discounted (Norman et al., 1988).

### 2.3.4 The nature of performance expectations

Although theoretical details remain to be resolved, the fact that applications of its principles occur largely as predicted by expectation states theory lends credence to the view that expectations of competence lie at the core of the effects noted. Nonetheless, questions have been raised as to whether the intervening causal construct, the expectation state, is indeed a necessary device to explain what occurs between status differential and power-prestige order (Alexander and Lauderdale, 1977). Nor do proponents of the theory appear to be entirely decided on the nature and limitations of their causal construct. On occasions it is treated as a metaphor for the unknown processes that take place, unavailable to conscious scrutiny.

It is assumed that individuals behave *as if* certain connections between status elements, actors, and task elements have been made, but [the theory] does not assume that the individual is actually cognitively aware of these connections (Berger et al., 1977, p.28).

On other occasions, expectation states are effectively equated with responses to questionnaire rating scales targeting perceptions or predictions of relative performance in general or specific domains. These may include most or all of intelligence, abstract ability, reading ability, grade point average, "situations in general", "most tasks", and "things that you think count in this world" (Webster and Driskell, 1983; Wood and Karten, 1986; Zeller and Warnecke, 1973; see also Driskell, 1982; Webster and Driskell, 1978).

Driskell and Mullen (1990) conducted a meta-analysis of four published and two unpublished studies that used variants of the latter questionnaire measure in conjunction with a measure of power-prestige behaviour, generally influence. Using observers' ratings of the strength of the status manipulation in each case, they reported that partialing out the effects of *expectations*, as thus measured, reduced the mean correlation between the strength of status and the size of the influence effect from .36 to .10. Partialing out the effect of status strength had a lesser effect on the expectation-influence correlation, reducing it from .48 to .37, and the residual correlation was significantly greater than that for status and influence. On the strength of this analysis they concluded that, consistent with EST, status exerts its effect on expectations, and expectations are in turn the basis for power-prestige behaviour.

This interpretation is open to a number of challenges. It is unclear, for example, how to reconcile Driskell and Mullen's (1990) analysis with Driskell's comments of some years earlier.

The [same] attitudinal measure of expectations is available as corroborative data, but precautions must be taken to avoid relying heavily on attitudinal responses. We predict no strict theoretical correspondence between the behavioural and attitudinal data, as the theory is formulated in terms of observable behaviour rather than pre or post behavioural attitudes. The induction of performance expectations in status generalization is not necessarily a conscious process, and the switch from interactant to observer modes of response is distinct. In other words, actual influence, governed by organizing principles specified by the theory, and observations of behaviour, governed perhaps by different principles, are not seen as interchangeable (1982, p.235).

These remarks make the subsequent use of the questionnaire responses as an index of expectation states particularly surprising. A rather simpler interpretation of the results of the meta-analysis is possible, moreover. The findings undoubtedly demonstrate that competence ratings of this kind are more sensitive to the extremeness of a status manipulation than are the measures of power-prestige behaviour used. They also demonstrate that the net relationship between the two dependent, or intra-sample measures is stronger than that between one of them, influence - the partial correlation for expectations is not reported - and the between-studies variable, status strength<sup>2</sup>. When considered in these terms, the results are quite unremarkable, and devoid of implications for understanding of underlying causal processes. To view them as more than this is highly speculative.

Although this issue is not of central concern in this thesis, its consideration at this point is justified for two reasons. Firstly, it anticipates Lee and Ofshe's (1981) criticism of EST's emphasis on performance attributions, which is the subject of a later chapter. Secondly, it highlights the potential for the term *expectation* to be used with rather more licence than is warranted by its formal definition in the context of the theory. Nagel (1979) warns,

The uncritical extension of the range of application of an expression, even when guided by analogies, is a common conviction that since the *same expression* is employed throughout a series of contexts, there must be a *generic meaning* common to all its uses (p.57).

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<sup>2</sup> It is not clear whether EST would even predict a necessary relationship between the extremeness of a status differential, and the extremeness of its effect. Indeed, Berger et al. (1980) reject the importance of absolute values in status differentials, and identify the ordinal relationship between characteristics, evaluations, or expectations of different actors as the sole basis for comparison (p. 482).



In this case, the risk is that anything that can be called an expectation will be paraded as an instance of a (reified) causal expectation state. This observation, also, recurs.

## CHAPTER 3:

### The role of behaviour

The other view that has gained support is one that emphasises differences in the behaviour of group members, particularly in the early stages of interaction, as indicators of eventual situational status order. Most of the behaviours in question can be and have been classified in a variety of ways in various contexts. In the grouping in which they are presented here, they can be considered to warrant common description as acts of confidence and leadership. No particular justification is offered for this terminology beyond its general descriptive aptness. Nor is the description intended to anticipate or presume the meanings the behaviours have to the interactants themselves. Additionally, the studies cited are primarily of the kind Duncan (1969) describes as employing the external variable approach, as opposed to a structural approach, in that they document statistical relationships between variables. Consideration of structural issues such as the rules governing use of and reactions to these behaviours is reserved for a later section. Furthermore, although many sub-classifications of relevant behaviours are possible, only two broad groupings will be used in this case. Within these groupings - given the tendency of many of the studies cited to examine simultaneously the effects of more than one aspect of behaviour - the focus will be on individual research efforts rather than on molecular behaviours.

### 3.1 Gaze and speech

Fisek and Ofshe (1970) argued against the assumption that task groups commence in a state of behavioural equality, giving way with the passage of time to the behavioural differentiation that marks the emergence of an internal status order. Their study of three-man discussion groups, with members of similar age, social class and race, revealed that half of the groups already showed imbalances in members' *activity levels* in the first minute of interaction. In these initially differentiated groups, observed inequalities in participation rate in the early stages of a group's life were found to predict the eventual distribution of activity. Specifically, the mean proportional contributions of high, medium, and low initial participators varied little in the course of a forty-minute meeting. In the essentially undifferentiated groups, a lesser differentiation of activity emerged over time.

Willard and Strodtbeck (1972) employed 4-person male groups comprising either high-school seniors or juniors, matched for school grade and differentiated according to their characteristic *verbal response latency* - time lapse before speaking - as measured beforehand. Verbal latency was calculated from the time taken for subjects to complete sentence stubs, the mean of the fastest five of 18 tape-recorded responses by each subject being used as the experimental measure. Willard and Strodtbeck found a correlation of  $-.60$  between members' relative response latency and their level of activity in subsequent group discussion.

Rosa and Mazur (1979) also measured participation level in a study involving same-sex problem-solving triads. Members in this case

were of like age, race and social class, but differentiated, on the strength of preliminary pair-wise contacts engineered by the experimenters, on either *visual dominance* (experimental group) or *speech initiation* (control group). Visual dominance or speech initiation rank was established by the experimenters having each member of a triad interact with each other member in three pair-wise get-acquainted sessions of one minute's duration. The control differed from the experimental condition in that a screen obstructed subjects' views of each other, making the initiation of speech the only avenue to interaction. Each group of three subsequently came together in a problem-solving task. In experimental triads, participation rank was found to be strongly related to pre-established visual dominance; in control triads, being first to speak (in the triadic encounter rather than the earlier dyadic interactions) was the best predictor. In either case, the authors conclude, status inequality was already evident in the first stages of interaction.

There are some difficulties, of course, in using a behavioural criterion such as participation level as one's index of situational status when the predictor variables are related behaviours. In so far as behaviours are not isolated units, but occur in patterns of correlated tendencies (Patterson, 1982), one may be recording (for example) not the ability of speech initiation to determine situational status, but rather the persistence of a trait or disposition, of which speech initiation and verbal activity rate are component behaviours. The additional dimension that endorses a participation inequality as a situational status hierarchy is the extent to which contributions are differentially evaluated. To this end both Fisek and Ofshe (1970) and Rosa and Mazur (1979) supplemented their data with reported

associations between the dependent variable, participation rank, and the group's evaluation of a member's performance (ability, guidance and quality of ideas). In the former study, this association was reported to hold for initially differentiated groups only; in the others, the authors suggested, the cognitions associated with differential participation were yet to develop<sup>3</sup>. Willard and Strodtbeck (1972) found a correlation of .30 between their independent variable, verbal latency, and peer ratings of social influence obtained months before.

Other studies wherein the question of correlated evaluative differences was not pursued have also noted links between initial behaviour and eventual interaction inequalities in small groups. Lamb (1981) employed a similar procedure to that of Rosa and Mazur to examine sex differences in 3 methods of control: visual dominance, initial speaking order, and time consumed while speaking. He found that, for both sexes, the *order* in which individuals spoke correlated positively with the amount of *time* they spent talking in the dyadic situation. The relationship of speaking order in dyads to speaking time in triads was significant only for males, and dyadic visual dominance did not predict relative talking time in either dyads or triads for either sex.

Koomen and Sagel (1977) pre-measured both latency (LVR) and duration of verbal response (DVR) of their 48 male subjects, in a manner comparable to that of Willard and Strodtbeck (1972). Both measures returned significant correlations with subjects' relative activity in 15-minute dyadic discussions. For individuals for whom the experimental instructions had emphasised cooperative interaction,

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<sup>3</sup> The sequence implied here is the reverse of that of EST, wherein the cognitive evaluations of competence are presumed to precede and direct behaviour.

however, speed of response in the course of the discussion itself was not significantly related either to participation or to pre-measured LVR. This was unlike the case of those involved in competitive interaction, although the correlations between pre-measured LVR and discussion participation were similar for the two conditions. The implication is that rapid responding in the interaction was not a necessary requirement for high participation; rather, it is likely that individuals with the propensity to respond quickly possessed other attributes with consequences for their standing in the participation hierarchy.

The findings above all relate to pre-existing or initial differences between group members in their manner of interaction. Slightly more difficult to accommodate is evidence that group members who do the most talking attract the strongest endorsement by colleagues of the value of their contributions (Bales, 1955), and their standing as leaders (Bass, 1954). The difficulty of interpretation derives from the alternative use of participation rate as a partial index of situational status. The challenge lies in distinguishing talkativeness as an individual characteristic from the high rate of interaction that signifies high rank in an already established status structure. Nonetheless, several demonstrations of the effect of activity rate per se have been achieved.

Bavelas, Hastorf, Gross and Kite (1965) used operant conditioning techniques, by means of red and green "feedback" lights, to increase verbal participation of a low participator and decrease that of other members of their four-man discussion groups. By these means, they were able to produce a corresponding increase in sociometric status - a composite of rated guidance, ideas, participation and leadership - of the target low participator. The method was

successful even when reinforcement was not contingent on the content of speech, being administered instead on a predetermined schedule when the target was speaking. Although the result is remarkable for its demonstration of the power of operant conditioning procedures, in other respects it appears less so. In a situation in which individuals' contributions are the basis for evaluation, the extremely reticent lack negotiable tender; it might be expected, therefore, that an increase in verbal output should be, on average, advantageous.

Riecken (1958) provided more direct evidence of a relationship between activity and influence. He equipped either the most or least active member of a group of four with the solution to the group problem, and found that the solution was twice as likely to be accepted by a group when suggested by a high participator than when suggested by a low participator. Moreover, group members more accurately recalled the source of an accepted solution when the source was a high contributor. Similarly, an experimental confederate participating in four-woman groups was found to receive more leadership votes when she was highly talkative but incorrect, than when she was highly accurate, but silent (Jaffee and Lucas, 1969); a related study found performance at the group task to be over-estimated in the talkative inaccurate role, and underestimated in the silent accurate role (Lucas and Jaffee, 1969).

What is not clear from these findings is whether a high rate of participation is merely a contributing factor in the achievement of leadership, or whether it is essential thereto. Morris and Hackman (1969) found that 31% of subjects who had received above average leadership ratings from their group and an observer were below-average participators. Forty percent of these had been arbitrarily pre-

nominated as leaders by the experimenters, however; the authors speculate the remaining 60% may have owed their high leadership ratings to other, possibly nonverbal characteristics.

Moreover, it seems reasonable to expect that the nature of a person's contribution should have some bearing on reactions to how much there is of it. Two studies in which both variables were manipulated have returned rather different results. Gintner and Lindsfold (1975) employed a confederate who demonstrated either high expertise at the group task, or no particular expertise, and either spoke more than her three colleagues, or less than two of them. Although both participation rate and expertise affected ratings of leadership, ideas and guidance, the effect of participation rate was only evident when the confederate was non-expert. The expert was highly rated, regardless of whether or not she dominated discussion; by comparison, the non-expert was able to enhance her rating through high participation, although it still fell short of that of the other, and the effect diminished from the first discussion topic to the second.

Sorrentino and Boutillier (1975), on the other hand, found a high-quality/high-quantity confederate received the highest rating, and high-quality/low-quantity confederate the lowest, on rated social-emotional leadership ability. Here, the ratings received by a *low* quality contributor were unaffected by amount of participation. This study differs from that of Gintner and Lindsfold in a number of ways, however, of which gender of subjects is probably the least significant. The first study manipulated amount of task activity, and employed a non-specific measure of leadership. The second operationalised quantity of interaction through social-emotional activity - statements expressing agreement, disagreement, and requests for opinions or



suggestions - and used ratings of social-emotional leadership, as defined. (Ratings of task leadership, also obtained, returned effects for both quantity and quality separately, but not in interaction.) A third study manipulated reputed, though not demonstrated expertise, and found verbal participation differentiated rated leadership of an expert more than that of a non-expert (Reilly and Jaffee, 1970). This finding, although not the method used, more closely resembles that of Sorrentino and Boutillier (1975).

Interpreting the role of talkativeness in hierarchy formation is thus complicated by further considerations, in addition to the need, discussed earlier, to distinguish cause from consequence. Those considerations include the source, content, and quality of the contribution (Gintner and Lindskold, 1975; Reilly and Jaffee, 1970; Sorrentino and Boutillier, 1975). As regards the last-mentioned, in particular, it is apparent that the amount of time an individual spends talking can not be as easily divorced from the amount and quality of information imparted as can visual dominance, for example. The inclusion of talkativeness alongside nonverbal predictors of situational status is therefore made subject to this reservation, which is explored in greater detail at a later stage, in the context of a theoretical distinction between behaviour and performance.

### **3.2 The use of space**

Early interest in the patterns of communication in groups (e.g., Steinzor, 1950) led to the observation that activity and influence were not randomly distributed, but favoured some seating positions over

others. Strodtbeck and Hook (1961) analysed the seating configuration of 69 mock juries. They classified the twelve seats at the rectangular table as either end (two), middle (2), corner (4), or flank seats (4), the latter referring to the positions between corner and middle seats at the long sides of the table. They reported that end seat occupants participated more and had their contributions valued more highly than occupants of other seats, with middle seats scoring second on both counts. Formally, this bias was evident in the fact that a fore-person was fifty percent more likely to be selected from either of the two end seats than the other ten seats combined; a corner seat produced the fore-person twice as often as either a flank or middle seat.

Hare and Bales (1963) reported a similar phenomenon in five-man laboratory groups, in which seat arrangement permitted the choice of either of two end seats, or three adjacent seats along one side. Analysis of the data from 12 such groups indicated a tendency, though not statistically significant, for occupants of end or central seats to give and receive most interaction. Ward (1968) also observed the interaction of 5-man groups, whose members were randomly assigned to positions at a round table, including 2 relatively isolated seats opposite a cluster of 3. In groups whose members were unacquainted, occupants of the isolated seats tended to speak more often, and to receive higher leadership ratings (guidance of the discussion, best ideas, and liking), although all effects were of marginal significance only.

Audience ratings suggest that end-seat occupants are beneficiaries of a general halo effect. Pellegrini (1971) had psychology undergraduates rate photographic slides of five college girls seated at a rectangular table, and all photographed in full-face view. The head seat occupant received the highest ratings on all items tested - perceived

talkativeness, persuasiveness, dominance, leadership, self-confidence, and intelligence - and was chosen significantly more often than occupants of any other seat as having contributed most to the group task. A similar study by Davenport, Brooker and Munro (1971) - differing only in that it used high school girls as raters, and substituted friendliness for dominance as a dependent variable - returned a similar result.

These perceptual data suggest the advantages of occupying an end seat are unlikely to derive exclusively, or even primarily, from the greater visibility of such a position. Understanding of this was taken further by Nemeth and Wachtler (1974), in an experiment with 5-member mock juries. Subjects read a case study of a personal injury claim involving a \$25,000 suit, and recorded their opinions on the amount of compensation that should be paid, before taking part in the jury discussion. In each of four experimental conditions, one of the five jury members was the same trained confederate. Jury members were either assigned seats at the table or permitted to choose their own; the experimental conditions differed in whether the confederate chose a head or side seat, or was assigned a head or side seat. In this way, the experimenters were able to separate the effect of choosing a position from that of mere occupancy. Moreover, in the ensuing discussion, purportedly aimed at producing an unanimous group decision, the confederate adopted a highly deviant position. Whereas most subjects recommended a payout of \$12,000 or more, and none recommended less than \$8,000, the confederate proposed a payment of only \$3,000, supporting his views with six well-rehearsed arguments. The measure of the confederate's influence was the degree to which subjects' post-test awards differed from their initial recommendations.

The apparent halo effect was again in evidence, in that the mere occupancy of the head rather than a side seat was positively associated with perceived consistency, perceptiveness, warmth, activity, leadership, and making colleagues think. However, Nemeth and Wachtler found the confederate was more influential when he *chose* the head seat at table than when he was assigned the head seat, or chose a side seat; his influence when assigned a side seat fell somewhere between. The effect, observed in the differential tendency for subjects to make proportionally lower awards against the benchmark of their initial recommendations, generalised to their opinions on a second, different case. The confederate who chose a head seat was seen as more confident than when assigned to it, or choosing a side seat, and more consistent than in each of the other permutations.

The authors point out that seat choice occupied only four seconds of a forty-minute interaction, and suggest the confidence communicated by this act coloured group members' perceptions of the confederates' ensuing behaviours and arguments. Even if one suspects that the act of choosing might also have influenced the actor's own subsequent behaviour, whether directly or via the reactions of others, the finding remains a persuasive demonstration of the effect of a confident behavioural style.

### 3.3 Summary

The findings reviewed indicate the ability of a number of behavioural characteristics to predict, with some reliability, the distribution of activity in task groups, or the direction of influence, or

both. Thus the effect has been observed of individual differences in response latency (Koomen and Sagel, 1977; Willard and Strodbeck, 1972) and response duration (Koomen and Sagel, 1977). More directly, visual dominance hierarchies established in members' initial pair-wise encounters have been found to be reflected in the participation hierarchies of triads (Rosa and Mazur, 1979), though not consistently (Lamb, 1981). Finally, situational variables implicated in the emergence of group structure are initial activity level (Fisek and Ofshe, 1970); the initiation of speech (Lamb, 1981; Rosa and Mazur, 1979); taking of the head seat (Hare and Bales, 1963; Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974; Strodbeck and Hook, 1961; Ward, 1968); and, depending on the circumstances of interaction, verbal latency (Koomen and Sagel, 1977); and talkativeness (Jaffee and Lucas, 1969; Lucas and Jaffee, 1969; Riecken, 1958).

### **3.4 The dominance-contest approach to group differentiation**

Partially on the strength of such findings, researchers have pointed to structural similarities between human and other-primate groups (Mazur, 1973), and thence to possible cross-species commonalities in behavioural dominance gestures. Dominance-related gestures identified in this way include maintenance of eye-contact (Rosa and Mazur, 1979), non-smiling and (in Western cultures) lowered brows (Keating, Mazur and Segall, 1977; Keating et al., 1981; Mazur, 1985). Erectness of posture, a relaxed demeanour, threat and, for humans, assertive speech and verbal expressions of dominance, have also been suggested as warranting consideration in this context (Mazur, 1985).

In explanation of the means by which such behaviours translate into an intra-group hierarchy, Mazur et al. (1980) argued that dominance signals have a stress-inducing effect in face-to-face interaction. They proposed a physiological model of status in primate groups, mediated by autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity. According to this, situational status emerges out of the ability of individuals to "outstress" one another through the use of dominance signals of the kind mentioned above. In support of the model, the authors reported that participants in a staredown recorded an increase in arousal as measured by thumb blood volume, a measure sensitive to the diversion of blood to the "fight and flight" activity of the sympathetic nerves of the ANS. Contrary to expectation, however, *degree* of arousal was not found to predict performance on an aggregate index of group dominance involving speech initiation and task influence, although the self-reported comfort of subjects during the staredown emerged as a reliable predictor of performance on this dominance index. Mazur's (1985) elaboration of the model subsequently differentiates between "good" and "poor" stress-handlers, where stress is conceived of as comprising both physiological reactions and subjective discomfort.

## **CHAPTER 4:**

### **The debate about status versus behaviour**

A difficulty currently confronting theorists, and the main concern of this thesis, is how to reconcile the products of two such disparate lines of endeavour, one with its emphasis on nonverbal behaviour, and the other focussing on interactants' relative external status and presumed competence, as the basis of status in small groups.

#### **4.1 Relationship between the variables**

The issue receives partial resolution in the observation that the two key variables tend to covary; there is increasing evidence that high-status individuals are likely to assume nonverbal behavioural styles of a kind that might be classified as confidence-leadership behaviours. For instance, Conner (1977) found that members of same-sex dyads who had been accorded the higher score on a fictitious task-related test initiated the higher proportion of problem-solving attempts. Leffler, Gillespie and Conaty (1982) reported that subjects assigned a teacher role claimed more space, talked and interrupted more, and symbolically intruded more in interaction with subjects assigned the role of student. Ridgeway, Berger and Smith (1985) found that, when mixed-sex interaction was compared to same-sex interaction, females (low status) recorded an increase in verbal latency and reduction in initial gaze duration, and males (high status) the opposite. Preference for the head seat at table has been observed in elected group leaders (Sommer, 1961), individuals of higher occupational status (Strodtbeck

and Hook, 1961), and men (as opposed to women; Hare and Bales, 1963).

There appears to be a considerable generality about these behavioural differences, in that they are apparently confined neither to specific status relationships nor to isolated behaviours. Instead, they present as elements of a more general status-associated behaviour pattern. The record of research on visual dominance provides a good illustration of the progressive linking of a single behavioural index both with a range of status dimensions and with other behaviours. Exline (1974) observed male dyads in which one member had been assigned the power to administer rewards. He found that the less powerful member of a dyad looked at the other more than vice versa, the essence of this difference lying in the low-power member's tendency to look at his partner more while listening than the other looked while speaking. Later research found status (age and education) differences in the ratio of looking while speaking (LWS) to looking while listening (LWL) of members of female dyads (Ellyson, Dovidio, Corson and Vinicur, 1980); subsequently, Dovidio and Ellyson (1982) found judges attributed greater power to actors with higher ratios of LWS to LWL. More recent studies with male-female dyads have documented the effects of expert power, reward power, and gender on this index of visual dominance (Dovidio, Ellyson, Keating, Heltman and Brown, 1988), and the effects of both task familiarity and gender on visual dominance, as well as on gesturing, speech initiation and amount of speaking (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson and Keating, 1988). Consequently, visual dominance behaviour has acquired a context as part of a repertoire of behavioural characteristics through which status differences in general may be expressed.



The data reviewed, then, suggest that there are nonverbal behaviour patterns that differentiate individuals who differ in *external* status - both diffuse and specific - and that those patterns resemble those that appear either to predict or reflect the eventual *situational* status order in groups. The observation that higher status individuals will tend to behave differently from individuals of lower status might in turn invite speculation that only the one variable plays a causal role in group differentiation. This was the approach taken by Lee and Ofshe (1981) who argued that behavioural cues alone were causal, external status being merely a covariate.

#### 4.2 Two-process theory

In a controversial paper based on Lee's (1979) PhD dissertation, Lee and Ofshe (1981) questioned the utility of the expectation states approach as a general model of the relationship between status and influence. In particular, they challenged the theory's cognitive assumptions as being the product of an experimental design (ICOM) that admits of no alternative explanation. Lee and Ofshe argued that status differences are normally accompanied by differences in behavioural style, and that, under normal conditions, the emergence of group hierarchies is the direct consequence of these differences in the demeanours of interactants. From this perspective, post-experimental attributions of differential ability are merely post-hoc rationalizations - the attempts of subjects to impose a logical or socially acceptable order on what are, in fact, spontaneous responses elicited "out-of-awareness" by stimuli present in the demeanours of others.

These authors reported an investigation appearing to demonstrate that when demeanour and status knowledge are experimentally separated, demeanour predicts influence whereas status does not. Subjects were exposed to videotape presentations of a simulated jury deliberation, wherein a target actor would present his argument in either a deference-demanding, a neutral or a deferential manner, in company with two other actors, who employed a neutral presentational style in all conditions. Working with a script based on Nemeth and Wachtler's (1974) personal injury case, the target argued for an award of \$2,000, and the other confederates for \$15,000, of a possible \$26,000. In line with prediction, the results showed the demeanour of the target actor to predict influence, and perceived competence and argument quality, whereas the actors' alleged occupational status - the other experimental variable - did not.

#### 4.2.1 Criticisms of two-process theory

Irrespective of the merits of Lee and Ofshe's criticisms of EST, their demonstration of the presumed superiority of demeanour over status attracted considerable disapproval on methodological grounds, and was widely viewed as inconclusive. Complaints were levelled, in particular, against the apparent "stacking" of variables against the status manipulation, for where the latter consisted merely of flashed occupational sub-titles (e.g. "accountant", "bookkeeper", "shipping clerk"), demeanour variation involved vocal tone and volume, speed and fluency of speech, eye contact, nervousness of facial and physical gestures, and even dress. Nemeth (1983) criticized this as an instance of single versus multiple definitions. Berger and Zelditch (1983) objected

that the status information was provided by a single "indicative" cue, whereas much of the demeanour manipulation took the more potent form of "expressive" cues (dress, speech characteristics) of a kind which, they believed, normally serve as expressions of *status* (i.e., sources of status information). The issue was hardly resolved by Ofshe and Lee (1983), in reply, maintaining expressive cues as a category to be *synonymous* with demeanour characteristics. However, even if one accepts the validity of Lee and Ofshe's demeanour variable, there is, as Sherman (1983) pointed out, absolutely no basis for deciding whether the influence effect was the product of automatic responding, as claimed, or of complex cognitive processing.

#### **4.2.2 Problems of definition: the distinction between demeanour and performance**

Damaging as some of the criticisms were, there is a rather more elementary basis on which the paper's findings can be questioned, rendering criticism such as Sherman's premature. Specifically, it needs to be asked whether Lee and Ofshe were, in fact, correct in identifying *demeanour* as their effective variable. This question arises because the internal validity of the study depended on the researchers holding constant across conditions the content of their target actor's communications, while varying only his behavioural style. This they sought to do by having the actor use the same script in his three behavioural roles. The central assumption of their design, therefore, was that content of argument would survive, unmodified, gross variations in presentational style - i.e., that constancy of argument was *assured* by constancy of text.

This assumption is by no means unproblematic. At the simplest level, one might posit differences in attention to follow from the *demeanour* manipulation: Might not an actor with an arresting personal style communicate more of the content of his argument than one whose presentation is punctuated with distracting nervous gestures and expressions? If so, the effect warrants description neither as spontaneous deference to behavioural cues, nor as the product of complex reasoning.

More crucially, however, it would seem ill-advised to overlook the probable interaction of verbal content and nonverbal behaviour (over and above whatever assessments individuals might make of the speaker's personality or motivations; cf. Sherman, 1983). The semantic content of an argument delivered quickly, fluently and confidently is not assuredly the same as that of an argument whose delineation is continually undermined by a slow, stumbling, nervous, uncertain presentation. To deny the likelihood of such a text-behaviour interaction is to deny the difference between, for example, sincerity and sarcasm; it is also to deny the daily evidence of theatre and film, whose practitioners will craft any number of realities from a given constant text. On the other hand, to admit the possibility is to call into question the least ambitious of Lee and Ofshe's conclusions, for what emerges may be something other than a single argument overlaid with three varieties of behavioural style; rather, the several performances of the target actor may well constitute three different arguments. The result would be that in place of or in addition to the *demeanour* differential there would exist a task-relevant *performance* differential. In short, Lee and Ofshe's subjects may have been quite correct in rating the deferential actor's argument as being of worse quality.

In the event that demeanour was, in fact, confounded with task performance, there would be little room for confidence that the results obtained were due to the processes suggested by the authors. The best that might be claimed is that, since any differences in argument content were a direct consequence of the differences in behavioural style, behaviour remained the effective variable - albeit once removed. Whereas this presents no difficulties for some more cognitive notions of behavioural style<sup>4</sup>, it defies a purely behavioural interpretation.

Lee and Ofshe readily acknowledged that demeanour will normally co-vary with argument content and performance "when observed in natural settings" (1981, p. 80). To this might be added the observation that there exists a point, in field and laboratory alike, beyond which demeanour variation *shades into* performance differential. Thus a gesture may become a blow; a better-articulated or longer address more comprehensible, or comprehensive, or tiresome; and a mumbled statement inaudible. Again, this reservation need not be equally critical to all theories of behaviour-mediated influence. For example, Moscovici (1976) describes behavioural style as the " 'rhetoric' of behaviour and opinion," and further as "encoded fragments of an underlying content ... [which] has to be *inferred*" (p.110). However, in any theory invoking so emphatic a causal hypothesis as that of Lee and Ofshe, it is of critical importance.

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<sup>4</sup> cf. Moscovici (1976) and his typology of investment, autonomy, consistency, rigidity, and fairness.

### 4.2.3 Steps toward a resolution

If the Lee and Ofshe paper failed to present an entirely convincing case, it did generate some pertinent questions, as identified by Nemeth (1983). Nemeth (1) pointed to the probable futility of comparing two variables that cannot be calibrated on a common scale; (2) questioned the wisdom of seeking to deny the relevance of either, given evidence of the importance of both, and also of their tendency to co-vary; (3) called for a clarification of definitions in light of the dispute about whether some of Lee and Ofshe's (1981) demeanour characteristics might in fact, be "social markers" or sources of status information; (4) made the additional observation that cues of this kind

cannot always change the status variable....Once we recognize that tone, articulation, speed of speech and even dress are subject to choice, we recognize that there is not only an empirical distinction but also a theoretical one. People can choose to behave contrary to expectations: the question is whether such behaviours are rendered ineffective or have the potential for social change (Nemeth, 1983, p. 72).

#### 4.2.3.1 Demeanour as claim rather than cause

With due regard to Nemeth's first warning, the main focus of the present analysis is on the last three points. Both cognition-based and behaviour-based variables have legitimate claims to effectiveness as agents of social influence, in so far as status and competence are held to be examples of the former, and demeanour or behavioural confidence instances of the latter. However, whereas an entirely

cognitive model appears limited in the range of situations it can claim to represent, an exclusively behavioural one would also seem untenable. Given human sensory and intellectual endowments, it seems hardly feasible to suggest that such behaviour-prompted processes will not normally be subject to mediation or modification by other information present, either in the environment or in the individual.

As an illustration of this, consider the behaviour of the harmlessly deranged Teddy Brewster in the film of *Arsenic and Old Lace* (Capra, 1944). Imagining himself Teddy Roosevelt, he assumes (within the liberal bounds of comic licence) an appropriately presidential bearing, to which the other characters react with mock deference at best. They, at least, know he is no president, and even strangers quickly assess him as someone of little consequence, well before the characteristic charge up the stairs undoes the behavioural presentation. At a more mundane level, the deference of adults to an assertive six-year-old, or of senior managers to an assertive junior clerk, seems similarly improbable, except in the unlikely circumstance that the individual in question was highly ranked on some criterion of importance in the situation. In the case of the six-year-old, that might be control over a resource such as affection, or domestic harmony; in the case of the junior clerk, it might be the ability to do political or even physical damage.

It is thus proposed that, whatever its similarities to other-primate behaviour (Dovidio & Ellyson, 1982; Knipe and Maclay, 1972; Mazur, 1973; Rosa & Mazur, 1979), *human* dominance behaviour is not characteristically a *cause* of status (be it influence, leadership or rank on any other evaluative dimension), but may be better conceptualized as a

*claim* to status<sup>5</sup>. By this is meant that its effectiveness will be provisional: subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by the actor's external status or ability to perform relative to others present. Only in the presence of confirming information - or, perhaps more accurately, the absence of disconfirming information - might a demeanour-generated differential be expected to prevail.

#### 4.2.3.2 Demeanour as distinct from concrete indices of status or performance

It follows, moreover, that to characterize demeanour variations as differential claims to status is to distinguish them from concrete social markers, such as symbols of wealth or position. Instead, behavioural characteristics might be more appropriately represented as belonging to that sub-category of status symbols least subject to intrinsic and other restrictions (Goffman, 1951), and thus most readily feignable. At the point at which a demeanour differential shades into a tangible status differential (or as indicated earlier, a performance differential), it loses its integrity. What then exists is not a claim to status but a mark of rank on a particular status dimension. By way of metaphor, consider the distinction between the wearing of fashionable attire in general and the wearing of a Paris original; whereas the former might be considered a behavioural characteristic, the latter, to the initiated at least, is at the same time a concrete symbol of wealth and worldliness.

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<sup>5</sup> This involves no necessary motivational assumptions: "claim" is used here as a descriptive term to denote the activation of a potentiality. Clearly, though, the use of demeanour to claim status can be, and no doubt frequently is, consciously motivated.



### 4.3 Theoretical implications

Identification of the manner in which the effects of differential demeanour may modify or be modified by the effects of external status offers one possible route to reconciliation of the behavioural and status research traditions. The purpose of Experiment 1 is to approach this task in a manner that simultaneously permits an evaluation of the effects claimed for demeanour by Lee and Ofshe (1981). The critical test for that theory is whether an actor's demeanour, when experimentally separated from argument content and status, is sufficient basis for the production of influence in an audience.

In addition, the alternative proposition - the concept of demeanour as status-claim - raises its own theoretical questions. Firstly, the proposition that behavioural status claims will be subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by, respectively, congruent or incongruent status or performance, makes different predictions for task influence from those of two-process theory. Under circumstances in which argument content were held constant, instead of a main effect for demeanour, the model would predict a demeanour-status interaction on influence.

Secondly, there is the question of *what* status is being claimed. Although the immediate response is that behavioural confidence claims *situational* status, in the context of the task-group, where this is generally operationalised as influence, a demeanour differential might be hypothesized to be signalling, *inter alia*, differential task performance or leadership ability. Similarly, given indications from status generalization research that there exists, for any given situation, a *set* of status dimensions capable of ordering interaction, it is also

feasible that demeanour differences will be interpreted in terms of the standing of individuals on one or more of these external dimensions. This possibility is also explored.

## **CHAPTER 5:**

### **Experiment 1**

#### **5.1 METHOD**

##### **5.1.1 Overview**

One hundred and twenty-six first-year psychology students from two tertiary institutions took part in what was described as a jury video exercise. Each participant was issued with a six-page answer-book containing only elementary instructions and numbered but otherwise unidentified facilities (scales, etc.) for answering whatever questions were to follow (Appendix A1). The exercise itself was entirely self-contained on video-cassette, and took the following form. Participants heard a description of a personal injuries compensation case (text derived, with modifications, from Lee's (1979) adaptation of Nemeth and Wachtler's (1974) text), prior to witnessing a discussion of the case by two male "members of the workforce". The discussion was interrupted after six or seven minutes by Question Session A, which started with four questions concerning the compensation award, asking subjects for their own recommendation, their upper and lower limits, and the amount they thought the two jurors might eventually agree on; next, using 7-point rating scales provided in the answer-book, subjects rated one juror, and then, in a different order, the other, on 5 descriptive factors as these appeared on screen. Three of the latter - assertiveness, likeableness, and argument quality - correspond to Lee and Ofshe's (1981) main factors; the fourth, intelligence, to an item

whereon Lee (1979) reported effects for both status and demeanour; and the final one was jury foreman suitability, which concerns task leadership. Finally, Question Session A posed and subsequently "answered" three questions directly comparing the jurors on the dimensions of age, education, and job prestige. Thereafter, the discussion film resumed for a further 4 1/2 to 5 1/2 minutes, to be followed by Question Session B, which repeated, in different order, all but the last three questions from Session A, plus, for Series II participants only (see below), 2 further items regarding each juror's commitment to the task of jury member. "Comments" and "Personal Details" sections completed the exercise. Two series of four films were used; within a series, two demeanour conditions (operative in both stages of the discussion film) were coupled with two status treatments (operative in the second stage only), for a given pair of actors. The juror referred to by the initial "J" always argued for an award of \$7,000, and juror "G" for \$18,000; the maximum possible award, and the professed amount of the lawsuit, was set at \$25,000. (See Appendices A2 and A3 for instructions and transcript of the video sound-track.)

### **5.1.2 Variables**

#### **5.1.2.1 Demeanour**

Demeanour condition 1 had juror J (low award proponent) assume a dominant manner relative to juror G. In this condition, J entered the room ahead of G, took it upon himself to close the door after G had entered, and (after Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974) chose the head seat at the long table, while G hesitated before taking an adjacent

side seat. During the discussion, the two jurors differed in proxemic behaviours (see e.g., Leffler et al., 1982), J tending to lean forward and claim a considerable area of the table with his hands, while G sat low in his seat, with his hands rarely intruding beyond the edge of the table. This effect was enhanced by the camera angle, which emphasised forward movements of the occupant of the head seat and compressed those of the side seat occupant. Eyelines were largely dictated by the placement, off-camera, of keyword cue sheets, each actor's prompt list being just wide of the other's far shoulder - at eye-level for G and a few degrees above that for J. In Demeanour Condition 2 the behavioural roles were reversed, with G (high award proponent) taking the dominant part. The standard script had G speak first, regardless of the dominance order<sup>6</sup>; to prevent this undermining condition 1, where J was the dominant party, that version of the film depicted J as appearing to take the initiative and inviting G to speak.

#### 5.1.2.2 Status

The external status information was introduced in a "jurors' personal profiles" segment at the end of Question Session A, justified to participants by the argument that the three questions immediately preceding it (comparing the jurors on age, education and job prestige) were the only items in the exercise to which objectively correct answers were possible. The personal profiles segment informed participants that G and J had received similar amounts of formal education, that they worked for the same organisation, and that J (say) "who is a few years older and has been working longer than G, is manager of a district

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<sup>6</sup> The terminology used in the published version of this argument has been retained. If "confidence-leadership" is substituted for "dominance", confusion with Ridgeway's (1984, 1987) usage of the latter can be avoided.

branch office, while G is on the staff of another branch office". This example is from status treatment 1; treatment 2 had G as the higher status juror. The status segment employed was designed with three objects in mind: (1) that it fit comfortably yet prominently into the presentation; (2) that it provide no clear objective basis for assumptions about the jurors' relative capacities or limitations; (3) that it minimize political connotations, given the nature of the legal case that formed the focus of the exercise. To the latter end, the personal profiles segment contained an additional sentence establishing that there were no consistent differences between the two jurors' general political views.

### **5.1.3 Separation of demeanour and argument content**

The original soundtracks of the discussion master-tapes were electronically suppressed, and a standard soundtrack overdubbed whereon the texts of the actors' individual statements were presented in précis form by two female narrators. In the instructions to participants, this contrivance was attributed to alleged sound quality problems, stated to be a legacy of both unobtrusive recording techniques and editing cuts. The use of other-sex narrators was designed to maintain the separation between added voice and original image, and thereby minimize unwanted emphases deriving from the interaction between an actor's gestures at any point and the text at that point. To aid this separation, the original soundtrack was not entirely erased, but was allowed to intrude during intervals in the narration; except for J's invitation to G to speak first (in demeanour condition 1) the intrusions consisted of an essentially unintelligible mumble.

Consistent with the demeanour variable, the volume of these intrusions was marginally greater for the dominant actor's speeches.

#### 5.1.4 Description of the film

Narration of the introduction, case description and all questions was provided by the same unseen male narrator. The on-screen images prior to the discussion segment were, predominantly, a still shot of the local Supreme Court building, a floor plan relating to the compensation case, and the interior of the "jury room", with occasional superimposed titles (Appendices A4 to A7). The key word(s) pertaining to each question remained on screen for the full response time allowed for the item (varying between 12 seconds and one minute). For the personal profiles segment and all questions concerning the two jurors, key words were superimposed on or wiped over a still image of the actors in characteristic pose for the particular condition. Two pairs of actors were used: in the initial series of films, J and G were two brothers<sup>7</sup>, aged 32 and 28; in the second series, they were 2 unrelated males in their mid-twenties and matched for apparent age (16 of 20 judges having rated them as of similar age, with the remainder equally divided, on the basis of neutral portrait photos; see Appendix A8). Jurors were dressed in neat casual trousers and open-necked shirt (plus pullovers in Series I), with sleeves partly rolled or pulled up. Clothing was not varied with behavioural role. All 8 films used the same soundtrack, although periods of silence between

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<sup>7</sup> A number of independent judges confirmed there to be no detectable family resemblance, and none was reported by subjects. As I took the part of J myself, all subject contact in Series I was handled by a research assistant.

questions and during the discussion were generally shorter in Series II, on the strength of feedback received from Series I participants 12 months earlier.

### **5.1.5 Procedure**

Participants viewed the film in numbers of between one and nine at a time. After an initial briefing, the exercise proceeded unsupervised. Nine subjects were excluded from the final analysis: 2 because of a technical problem, one each for expressed suspicion and misapprehension, and 5 for collaboration. The remaining 42 males and 75 females ranged in age from 17 to 49 years.

## **5.2 RESULTS**

### **5.2.1 Part A: Demeanour effects**

Whether the high-award or the low-award proponent was dominant had no measurable effect on viewers' award recommendations ( $F_{1,115}=0.11$ ), neither did it appear to influence the highest ( $F_{1,115}=0.18$ ) or lowest ( $F_{1,115}=0.22$ ) amounts they were prepared to award. Participants who witnessed a dominant actor arguing for a relatively higher amount did, however, expect the jurors' agreement figure to be somewhat higher than did those who viewed the reverse dominance order ( $F_{1,115}=5.32$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Treatment means are listed in Table 1.



| <b>Dominance</b>         |                    |                |               |                       |
|--------------------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Order<sup>a</sup></b> | <b>Recommended</b> | <b>Highest</b> | <b>Lowest</b> | <b>Joint</b>          |
|                          | <b>Award</b>       | <b>Award</b>   | <b>Award</b>  | <b>Recommendation</b> |
| 1                        | 12,856             | 16,441         | 8,559         | 12,398                |
| 2                        | 12,560             | 16,810         | 8,190         | 13,121                |

<sup>a</sup>1 = low award proponent dominant; 2 = high award proponent dominant.

**Table 1.** *Mean (Part A) award recommendations by behavioural dominance order.*

A multivariate analysis of variance of the descriptor rating scales returned a main effect for demeanour of juror ( $F_{5,222}=14.03$ ,  $p<.0005$ ; effects due to series or juror role, the 2 other factors tested for, will be considered later in this section). Table 2 lists response patterns for the five descriptors. Matched-pairs t-tests showed that people tended to see a dominant actor as more assertive than his partner ( $t_{116}=6.71$ ,  $p<.0005$ ) - as would be expected if the demeanour manipulation were successful - and, as predicted, as more suited to task leadership (jury foreman ratings:  $t_{116}=2.21$ ,  $p<.05$ ). There was no effect for demeanour on the three remaining factors of likeableness ( $t_{116}=0.33$ ), intelligence ( $t_{116}=0.06$ ), and argument quality ( $t_{116}=1.14$ ).

| Demeanour   | Assertive | Likeable | Intelligent | Argument | Leadership |
|-------------|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|------------|
| Dominant    | 5.23      | 4.01     | 4.74        | 4.45     | 4.27       |
| Nondominant | 3.97      | 4.07     | 4.74        | 4.69     | 3.85       |

**Table 2.** *Mean juror descriptor ratings by demeanour (Part A).*

| Dominance<br>Order <sup>a</sup> | Status<br>Treatment | Award  | Highest  | Lowest | Joint  |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|--------|----------|--------|--------|
| 1                               | 1(Congruent)        | -9 0 7 | -796     | 18     | -5 7 4 |
|                                 | 2(Incongruent)      | -6 5 6 | -609     | 7 6 5  | -4 2 1 |
| 2                               | 1(Incongruent)      | -5 3 3 | -1 1 0 0 | 2 6 7  | -4 1 7 |
|                                 | 2(Congruent)        | -5 1 8 | -1 2 8 6 | 1 9 6  | -5 3 6 |

<sup>a</sup>1 = low award proponent dominant; 2 = high award proponent dominant.

**Table 3.** *Mean (part B) shifts in award recommendations by behavioural dominance order and congruence/ incongruence of status information.*

### 5.2.2 Part B: Demeanour and status

Shifts in responses on the four financial measures were analysed by means of a repeated measures analysis of variance (using a

regression approach, as did all analyses of variance reported). Whereas three of the measures showed a significant before-after effect in the form of a general downward shift (award  $F_{1,113}=10.0$ ,  $p<.005$ ; highest  $F_{1,113}=11.7$ ,  $p<.0005$ ; joint agreement  $F_{1,113}=10.1$ ,  $p<.005$ ), in no case was this effect associated with either the dominance order or the status order, or with an interaction of the two. Table 3 shows the mean shift for each dominance order-status order combination.

A multivariate analysis of the part B descriptor ratings, using repeated measures in conjunction with the four 2-level factors of juror role (G or J), series, demeanour of juror and status of juror, produced a significant effect for status on the repeated measures ( $F_{5,214}=2.34$ ,  $p<.05$ ; the only other results to reach significance - a before-after effect for juror ( $F_{5,214}=4.29$ ,  $p=.001$ ) and a before-after main effect ( $F_{5,214}=2.30$ ,  $p<.05$ ) - will be considered later). Taking the five descriptors separately showed that three - assertiveness ( $F_{1,218}=4.69$ ,  $p<.05$ ), likeableness ( $F_{1,218}=6.09$ ,  $p<.05$ ) and task leadership ( $F_{1,218}=5.52$ ,  $p<.05$ ) - registered status-related shifts in ratings between parts A and B. Table 4 lists the mean changes between Parts A and B by demeanour and status of juror.

Planned comparisons on the repeated measures revealed, in more detail, the nature of the changes that followed the introduction of status information.

(1) Assertiveness. There was a significant difference between the low dominance-high status condition and the 3 other demeanour-status combinations ( $t_{230}=3.12$ ,  $p<.005$ ); against the general trend of a decline in assertiveness ratings between sessions A and B, low-dominance actors tended to be rated more assertive after disclosure of high status. (From a congruence perspective, the margin between

perceived assertiveness of a dominant and non-dominant actor remained unchanged where status was congruent with the dominance order; where status was not congruent with demeanour, the gap appeared to close.)

(2) Likeableness. Disclosure of low status was associated with a relative decline in the rated likeableness of a low-dominance actor ( $t_{230}=2.12$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

(3) Task leadership. The reactions to low-dominance actors of low status and low-dominance actors of high status each differed significantly from all others. Task leadership ratings increased most where a low-dominance actor emerged as being of a high status ( $t_{230}=2.73$ ,  $p<.01$ ), and showed a relative decline where low dominance was coupled with low status ( $t_{230}=2.00$ ,  $p<.05$ ). (Again, from a congruence perspective, the demeanour-based difference in leadership ratings continued following introduction of congruent status information; incongruent status, on the other hand, appeared to nullify the Part A difference in favour of high-dominance actors.)

Although effects on the two other descriptors were less clear-cut, a non-significant demeanour by status by series interaction on the repeated measures MANOVA ( $F_{5,214}=2.07$ ,  $p=.07$ ) pointed to the possibility that viewers of the two series of films had tended not always to respond in quite the same manner. Subsequent analysis revealed apparently distinct demeanour by status interactions within series: on argument quality in Series I ( $F_{1,92}=4.99$ ,  $p=.005$ ), and in Series II on intelligence ( $F_{1,126}=5.60$ ,  $p<.05$ ), and on task leadership ( $F_{1,126}=3.97$ ,  $p<.05$ ), where it complemented the status effect already noted. Results of specific comparisons were as follows: On task leadership (Series II), the pattern noted for the larger grouping was accompanied by a

significant difference between congruent and incongruent status-demeanour combinations ( $t_{130}=2.48$ ,  $p<.05$ ); on intelligence (Series II), a status-demeanour congruent pairing showed a different shift from an incongruent pairing ( $t_{130}=2.49$ ,  $p<.05$ ), the essence of which was further traceable to a relative decline in rated intelligence of a low-dominance actor who was revealed to be of low status ( $t_{130}=2.53$ ,  $p<.05$ ); on argument quality (Series I), a significant difference between congruent and incongruent combinations ( $t_{96}=2.75$ ,  $p<.01$ ) appeared to reflect the relative decline in rated argument quality of an actor for whom status and behaviour were incongruent. The relevant means appear in parentheses in Table 4.

| Demeanour    | Status   | Assertive | Likeable | Intelligent <sup>b</sup> |         | Argument <sup>a</sup> |         | Leadership <sup>b</sup> |         |
|--------------|----------|-----------|----------|--------------------------|---------|-----------------------|---------|-------------------------|---------|
| Dominant     | High(C)  | -0.13     | 0.20     | -0.02                    | (-0.09) | 0.00                  | (0.45)  | 0.22                    | (0.27)  |
|              | Low(IC)  | -0.34     | -0.05    | 0.02                     | (0.12)  | -0.27                 | (-0.43) | 0.03                    | (0.29)  |
| Non-dominant | High(IC) | 0.31      | 0.15     | 0.15                     | (0.24)  | -0.16                 | (-0.46) | 0.53                    | (0.71)  |
|              | Low(C)   | -0.11     | -0.22    | -0.31                    | (-0.42) | -0.16                 | (-0.09) | -0.11                   | (-0.27) |

<sup>a</sup>Series 1 data in parentheses

<sup>b</sup>Series 2 data in parentheses

**Table 4.** *Mean shifts in juror descriptor ratings by demeanour and congruence/incongruence of status information (Part B).*

### 5.2.3 Other effects: Biographical items, commitment, juror and series differences.

It was intended that the three biographical items, whose main purpose was to facilitate introduction of the status information, might double as a test of the ability of demeanour to evoke external status inferences. Responses were assigned a value of either 1 (for "G"), 2 (for "about the same") or 3 (for "J"), and analysed by t-test, but revealed no differences between the two dominance orders on comparative age ( $t_{115}=1.48$ ), educational level ( $t_{115}=0.34$ ) or job prestige ( $t_{115}=0.90$ ) ratings of the jurors, although the overall pattern of the data was in the predicted direction. Interestingly, Series I responses taken by themselves did show an effect for age ( $t_{48}=2.81$ ,  $p<.01$ ), in that actor J (who was, in fact, four years older than G) tended to be *perceived* as older when in the dominant role, as opposed to the same age when G was dominant; i.e., it seemed the actual age difference was only apparent where congruent with demeanour. This finding remains uncertain, however, as subsequent testing with matched portraits lifted from the stimulus films failed to support any suggestion that unambiguous age cues were present in the actors' appearances.<sup>8</sup>

A series by juror interaction on the Part A MANOVA pointed to the existence of an underlying actor effect ( $F_{5,222}=2.37$ ,  $p<.05$ ) which, although most pronounced on likeableness, was not significant for any one descriptor taken alone. Follow-up of a juror effect on the repeated measures MANOVA indicated that a high award juror was seen to decline in assertiveness and argument quality in part B, relative to his

<sup>8</sup> Of 38 psychology undergraduates approached, 14 rated G as older, 9 thought J was older, and 15 detected no difference. Appendix A9 refers.

partner (assertiveness:  $F_{1,218}=5.27$ ,  $p<.05$ ; argument quality:  $F_{1,218} = 12.50$ ,  $p < .0005$ ). As might be inferred from Table 4, task leadership ( $F_{1,218}=3.96$ ,  $p<.05$ ) recorded a significant, if unremarkable, before/after main effect.

Subjecting task commitment ratings for the 2 jurors to a within-subjects analysis by status and dominance condition yielded a significant juror effect in favour of G ( $F_{1,63}=5.56$ ,  $p<.05$ ), and a near-significant juror by dominance interaction (i.e., demeanour effect;  $F_{1,63}=3.78$ ,  $p=.056$ ), the margin between ratings being .53 in favour of G (the high-award juror) where G was dominant, and .06 (same direction) in the other condition. There was no juror by status interaction ( $F_{1,63}=0.62$ ), and no 3-way interaction ( $F_{1,63}=1.44$ ). Although it is not unreasonable that a juror's relative benevolence and outspokenness should be translated into apparent task commitment, it must be said that the sensitivity of the measure to more subtle reactions (in response, for example, to the status-appropriateness of an actor's deportment) was probably not enhanced by the form it took here - i.e., as two consecutive items at the end of part B.

### 5.3 DISCUSSION

The results for the behavioural variable are consistent with the argument that Lee and Ofshe's (1981) "demeanour" owed much or all of its effect to its association with a performance differential. Here, with argument content more rigidly controlled, demeanour itself had no apparent bearing on task influence. This is not to say that these findings are necessarily representative of what might be expected in

direct social interaction. The experimental designs on which this field is founded characteristically involve participants in some order of interaction with real or fictitious others, not, as here, both shielded from the pressure to defer and denied the scope to dominate, together with their attendant consequences. What can be said is that the present results are not promising for notions of reflexive response to behavioural cues.

It is interesting, too, that the reported association of demeanour with perceived argument quality, and with intelligence (see Lee, 1979) failed to materialise, again apparently reflecting the removal of the performance component. On the other hand, congruence of the dominance order with the status order *was* reflected in ratings on these variables, if not consistently (the lack of concordance between series perhaps a further reminder of the likely contribution of actor or even sample characteristics). Elsewhere, the effects of demeanour showed themselves to be subject to modification by status information. On the question of task leadership, status information had the effect of either consolidating or undermining preferences based on the dominance order, and even perceived assertiveness showed itself subject to revision on the basis of status. (Lee and Ofshe reported a main effect for status on this factor, also). That a patently introverted individual may come to be seen as less retiring once his higher status is made known has some implications that further highlight the inadvisability of embracing simple cause-effect hypotheses in this area. Firstly, the high-status individual may be at a dual advantage in social interactions: the well-documented advantage of being known to be of high status, and the additional advantage of being seen to be more assertive or confident than might in fact be true. Secondly, the probability of a high-



status individual *failing* to live up to others' behavioural expectations is likely to be diminished by the degree to which these same expectations colour the way the individual is *perceived* to be behaving.

There still remains the question of why status should produce no effect on the financial (award) measures, despite its effectiveness elsewhere. One possibility is that it was simply too easy for subjects to anchor their part B recommendations to those made in part A; in fact, on the basic award item, almost half stayed with their initial choice. In this respect, the situation is reminiscent of Nemeth's (1983) distinction between public and private influence; whereas the format of the exercise made it difficult for respondents to refer to their initial responses when rating each juror for the second time, this same difficulty did not exist for the award items.

Another possibility is that the implicit financial connotations of the status information produced a counter-status effect for a particular juror-status combination. Walster, Aronson and Abrahams (1966) demonstrated the persuasive power of a low-prestige communicator who argues against the direction of his own interests. In the present case, it might be proposed that the low-status (i.e., less wealthy) juror who advocates a low award (Status Treatment 1) is more likely than his partner to seem to be opposing his own interests, thereby enhancing the credibility of his argument; meanwhile the high-status low-award juror in Status Treatment 2 - where the arguments tend to be neutral or selfish - is likely to benefit from his higher status, with similar consequences. Given that mean award recommendations dropped in part B, and the high-award juror's argument was perceived (accurately or otherwise) to deteriorate, such a two-edged "status" effect may be at

least part of the story. A similar explanation may hold for Lee and Ofshe's similarly impotent status manipulation<sup>9</sup>.

Whatever its origins, this ineffectualness of the status variable means that the present data are able to cast little direct light on the joint roles of status and demeanour in the allocation of situational status. For this reason, the adequacy of a status-contingent explanation of the role of demeanour - of the kind suggested in chapter 4 as a response to the more absolute claims made by Lee and Ofshe (1981) - remains untested. There is some, as yet tentative, evidence available from other sources for the status-conditional nature of the effects of behaviour (Carbonell, 1984; Eskilson and Wiley, 1976; Fleischer and Chertkoff, 1986; Katz and Cohen, 1972; Tuzlak and Moore, 1984). The consideration of such evidence, and the subsequent development and refinement of a theory of the status-confirmation of behavioural claims, are taken up in chapter 7 and subsequently.

Meanwhile, the finding that demeanour had leadership but not subjective performance connotations supports the argument for the maintenance of a clear theoretical distinction between demeanour and performance (even though the two variables may often be so implicitly linked that their separation, empirically, can only be approximated). The case for the differentiation of demeanour from manifestations of performance, and also from symbols of status, is central to this thesis and provides the conceptual basis for the status-confirmation model alluded to above. The implications of this distinction extend, moreover, not only to two-process theory, but also to expectation states

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<sup>9</sup> This possibility is supported by the fact that Sev'er (1989), using race as a status characteristic in a study that otherwise resembled that of Lee and Ofshe - both in design and in the non-differentiation of demeanour from performance - obtained main effects for both status and demeanour.

theory's response to the question of the relative roles of status and behaviour. An account and critical analysis of that response follow.

## CHAPTER 6:

### Expansion of expectation states theory

#### 6.1.1 Distinction between task cues and categorical cues

As the stock expectation states experiment has an individual interacting with an unseen other via machine (ICOM), the question of face-to-face social signals is not easily accommodated. Expectation states theorists have sought the answer in the notion of *cues*. An addition to the theory now distinguishes between behavioural *task cues* on the one hand, and *categorical cues* of status group membership on the other (Berger and Zelditch, 1983; Berger, Webster, Ridgeway and Rosenholtz, 1986; Ridgeway, 1984; Ridgeway et al., 1985). Categorical cues, it is argued, come first (in a causal sequence that can occur almost simultaneously), serving to identify the status characteristics present, and interactants' standing thereon. This gives rise to expectation advantages, which are then expressed in nonverbal task cues. Task cues include response latency, duration of eye contact, loudness, rate, confidence and fluency of speech, posture and choice of seat at the table. Findings that show initial behavioural differences in groups of status equals to be reflected in their subsequent differentiation (e.g., Fisek and Ofshe, 1970; Rosa and Mazur, 1979; Willard and Strodbeck, 1972) can then be explained by the historical association of these behavioural task cues with the expectation advantage normally endowed by categorical cues. In other words, task cues, through their customary association with categorical cues, themselves become the basis for differential performance attributions (Berger et al., 1986; Ridgeway et al., 1985).

### 6.1.2 Distinction between task cues and dominance cues

This extension to the theory further distinguishes task cues from so-called *dominance cues*, reserving the dominance label for a rather more circumscribed set of behaviours than those to which it is frequently extended (Ridgeway, 1984, 1987; Ridgeway and Berger, 1986, 1988; Ridgeway and Diekema, 1989). Dominance cues are described as attempts at control through threat or coercion, and can include shouting, staredowns, commanding or interrupting, generally involving anger or other emotional content. Low-level behaviours on this dimension - described as submissive or propitiating activities - include such gestures as pleading, cringing, downcast eyes and wringing of hands. Dominance cues are argued to constitute a class of behaviour that may be appropriate to the maintenance of a legitimate status order in established groups, but tends to be inappropriate as a means of attaining situational status, being likely to incur resistance and disapproval instead. Exclusion of these more extreme behaviours from a task cues explanation is supported by findings that actors employing a high level of dominance cues were no more influential and were rated as less competent than "neutral" actors (Ridgeway and Diekema, 1989).

## 6.2 Evaluation of the task cues concept

The test for task and categorical cues, meanwhile, lies jointly in their explanatory ability and the clarity of their relationship to the

existing components of expectation states theory. This presents no apparent difficulties for the notion of categorical cues, which rectifies the apparent insensitivity of the status characteristics concept to the reality that, outside the laboratory, information concerning an individual's status is not given but needs to be communicated. Categorical cues may be seen to be the means by which external status - diffuse more often than specific - is made salient. Their relationship to status characteristics would appear to be sufficiently close and their possession sufficiently exclusive (cf. Goffman, 1951 on status symbols) to suggest these two concepts are frequently interchangeable, and causally equivalent in a majority of cases.

The case of task cues is less clear. The expanded theory proposes that the differential use of these cues is, like status differences, read as differences in competence, and results in differential influence. This prompts the question: How does the causal power of task cues compare to that of status characteristics? Berger et al. (1986) argue that task cues will have stronger effects than diffuse characteristics, by virtue of a shorter path of relevance to task outcomes.

There is an apparent difficulty here, in that relevant specific status characteristics also have this advantage over diffuse characteristics (Berger et al., 1980; Zelditch, 1985), and yet it seems unlikely that a task cue differential will be functionally equivalent to a specific status differential. For example, in groups confronted with a mathematical task, a confident manner should not command the same influence as a degree in mathematics. The reason is quite simple: Whereas there may be a one-to-one correspondence between categorical cues and some diffuse status characteristics such that their possession is similarly restricted, nonverbal behaviour is not reliably

linked to any characteristic, and is far more readily brought under individual control in the interests of impression management (Edinger and Patterson, 1983; Nemeth, 1983; Schlenker, 1980). We must question, then, whether the sorts of *expectations* one might have of a confident individual are indeed comparable to the unidentified and theoretical processes - EST's causal construct, the *expectation state* - whereby influence is achieved in an ICOM experiment. Remember that the causal construct arose out of subjects' reactions to irrefutable status differences under strictly controlled circumstances; its application to task cues lacks such a heritage, and relies instead on a presumed association between those cues and an established causal variable, the status characteristic.

These observations raise the possibility that the task cues notion, like two-process theory, may be making rather stronger claims than are currently warranted for behavioural signals of task confidence in general. Ironically, the objections this invites are similar to those applied to two-process theory, invoking a similar blurring of the conceptual distinction between behaviour and performance. In specifying the empirical generalisations on which the task cues formulation is based, its proponents have, however, provided a framework wherein this counter-argument may be more fully developed.

### 6.2.1 The empirical basis for the task cues theory

The task cues notion is based on two empirical generalisations. One of these is that individuals' differentiation on task cues will

coincide with their differentiation in terms of external status. This point has been dealt with in an earlier section; it is subject to the observation that people can choose or be disposed to adopt nonverbal behaviours inappropriate to the prescriptions of external status (Nemeth, 1983), although this is not a crucial limitation in the present context.

The second generalisation is:

In homogeneous situations, if individuals differ in terms of task cues, this leads to correlated differentiation in power and prestige behaviours and/or assessments of task capacity (Berger et al., 1986, p.7; see also Ridgeway et al., 1985, pp.964-5).

It is in this statement, and the evidence offered for it, that the limitations of the formulation are to be found, due to a combination of two factors. These are (1) the subsuming under the task cues mantle of evidence pertaining to two separate sub-categories of behaviour, and (2) the reliance on an insufficiently rigorous definition of what constitutes a status homogeneous situation. Discussion of each of these follows.

### **6.2.2 Differentiating between types of nonverbal behaviour**

The empirical evidence offered for task cues (Berger et al., 1986) can largely be classified under two headings: that pertaining to paralinguistic characteristics (such as speed and fluency of speech) on the one hand, and that pertaining to other nonverbal manifestations of confidence and the presumption of leadership (such as speech initiation and proxemic behaviours) on the other.



### 6.2.2.1 Paralinguistic behaviours

Among the research cited in overview by Berger et al. (1986) is a body of literature documenting the effects of speech characteristics on audience perceptions of an actor's capabilities and performance. Researchers in this field have manipulated speech rate, either mechanically or by natural means, and recorded the effects on listener reactions. The latter are generally reported in terms of responses on a competence factor (active, ambitious, intelligent, good-looking, confident) and, of less interest in the present context, a benevolence factor (sociable, dependable, likeable, happy, sincere, kind, religious, just, friendly, polite). The mechanical manipulation of speaking speed has involved the generation of computer-synthesized voices from natural speech to produce normal-sounding voices of various rates. Brown, Strong and Rencher (1973) reported that slowing voices below their natural rate in this way resulted in their being rated as less competent, and increasing the rate caused them to be rated as less benevolent. Subsequent research with more varied voices and rate-ranges also indicated that reducing a speech-rate was associated with a reduction in rated competence, whereas increasing the rate had the opposite effect. (Benevolence showed an inverted U-relationship with speech rate, speakers sounding most benevolent at their normal speaking speeds; Brown, 1980; Smith, Brown, Strong and Rencher, 1975.) Similar results have been obtained with natural voices "acted back" at varying rates, with competence ratings increasing either throughout the range (Brown, 1980), or until an intermediate rate of speech was reached (Street and Brady, 1982). A field experiment by Miller, Maruyama, Beaber and Valone (1976) revealed a faster speaker

to be perceived to be more knowledgeable, intelligent, and objective, and to elicit greater agreement.

Two further items of research into speech characteristics belong under this heading. Sereno and Hawkins (1967) found that increasing the number of non-fluencies - "ahs", sentence corrections, stutters, repetitions, or tongue-slip corrections - in a standard speech had an adverse effect on rated competence (experienced, expert, trained, and competent) and dynamism (aggressive, bold, energetic, and extraverted) of a speaker. The manipulation did not affect rated trustworthiness, neither did it affect amount of attitude shift toward the speech topic (Black Muslims) measured by three 7-point semantic differential scales (good-bad, pleasing-annoying, beneficial-harmful). Finally, Sorrentino and Boutillier (1975) reported that the amount of speaking a confederate engaged in affected rated competence, confidence, interest, influence, task leadership ability, and social-emotional leadership ability.

#### 6.2.2.2 Confidence/leadership behaviours

A second group of studies among those cited by Berger et al. (1986) is that recording the tendency for behavioural differences between group members, apparent prior to or in the early stages of interaction, to be reflected in a group's *eventual* structure. Some of these document links between initial behaviour and eventual interaction inequalities. Thus, Hare and Bales (1963) reported that occupants of end or central seats gave and received most interaction; Lamb (1981) found initial speaking order to predict relative talking

time; Strongman and Champness (1968) found amount of directed gaze and amount of speech with gaze (LWS) correlated with final visual submission. Other studies, in which the dependent variable consisted of or was supplemented by a measure of group-rated performance or peer-rated influence, have demonstrated the effect of initial participation rate (Fisek and Ofshe, 1970), speech initiation and visual dominance (Rosa and Mazur, 1979), verbal latency (Willard and Strodbeck, 1972), and taking of the head seat at table (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974). These studies were reviewed in greater detail in chapter 3; see also Patterson (1983).

### 6.2.3 The assumption of equivalence

These two bodies of evidence, then, show, on the one hand, the subjective performance implications of some paralinguistic behaviours, and on the other, the ability of some confidence/leadership behaviours to predict situational status<sup>10</sup>. The specific contribution of each to EST's umbrella concept *task cues* is apparent in the generalisation quoted above. Firstly, the reference to assessments of *task capacity* clearly derives from the performance

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<sup>10</sup> Berger et al. (1986) also list as evidence for their formulation a number of studies that do not fit neatly into either category, and whose relationship to the empirical generalisation is less clear. These include studies reporting the effects on factors other than competence or situational status of paralinguistic behaviours (Apple, Streeter and Krauss, 1979; Hollandsworth, Kazelskis, Stevens and Dressel, 1979; Lay and Burron, 1968; Miller and Hewgill, 1964; Rose and Tryon, 1979; Ryan and Giles, 1982) or other nonverbal behaviours (Argyle, 1967; Kendon, 1967; Kleinke, Bustos, Meeker and Staneski, 1973); the dominance-contest approach (Mazur, 1973; Mazur et al., 1980); and consistency and patterning of response as conditions for minority influence (Levine, 1980; Moscovici and Lage, 1976; Moscovici and Nemeth, 1974; Nemeth, Swedlund and Kanki, 1974; Nemeth, Wachtler and Endicott, 1977). Many of these studies are discussed elsewhere in this thesis.

connotations of *paralinguistic behaviours*. This reference provides the justification for the assertion that task cues exert their presumed effect through performance expectations. Secondly, the reference to task cues as the basis of power and prestige orders relies on evidence linking the differential use of *confidence/leadership behaviours* to the eventual structure of groups. The first thing that becomes apparent is that the eventual theoretical argument that task cues in general lead to situational status differences via their effect on subjective performance or competence requires one to combine these two sets of evidence: to ascribe the effects of confidence/leadership behaviours to paralinguistic behaviours, and vice versa. This process is not made explicit, and no justification is offered for it.

#### 6.2.4 The problem of status-homogeneous groups

The problem is compounded by the reference in the same empirical generalisation to homogeneous situations, which asserts that these processes occur in groups of external status equals. This allusion provides the rationale by which the second body of evidence - that relating confidence/leadership behaviours to situational status - translates into the theoretical assumption that such behaviours (and, following the assumption of equivalence, task cues in general) *cause* the effect. This, too, is an inference that does not stand up to close scrutiny. In their most rigorous operationalisation, the *status-homogeneous groups* used in these studies have consisted of individuals matched for gender and age, together with either school grade and task knowledge (Willard and Strodbeck, 1972), or race and

social class (Fisek and Ofshe, 1970<sup>11</sup>; Rosa and Mazur, 1979). The studies in which they feature permit the conclusion that some confidence behaviours are reliable *predictors* of eventual situational status.

The task cues formulation goes further than this, however, and concludes that these behaviours *lead* to situational status, arguing that they are the cause of group differentiation, comparable in function to status characteristics. Such an interpretation depends on a literal reading of the term *status-homogeneous*. It requires us to assume that these groups of "status equals" consist of people who are absolutely equal in everything save behavioural style. If, as will be argued, this assumption cannot be met, we are left with correlational data, unable to rule out the possible role of intervening variables, and thus unable to attribute cause with any certainty. This, in itself, in does not invalidate attempts to demonstrate a causal role for confidence behaviours empirically; it does, however, emphasise the need for such attempts to control for alternative explanations.

#### 6.2.5            Interpreting correlational findings for behavioural confidence

Two main sources of alternative explanations suggest themselves.

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<sup>11</sup>     The Fisek and Ofshe study is the only study among those reviewed that is not cited by Berger et al. (1986) as evidence for task cues. It is included here for its ability to strengthen the EST case, in providing a third instance of relevant research in which the attempt has been made to match group members for status.

#### 6.2.5.1 The possibility of underlying status and performance differences

One explanation that needs to be considered is that members of these status-homogeneous groups were differentiated in terms of competence and/or status criteria other than those controlled for by the experimenters. Fisek and Ofshe raised this possibility in considering the case of groups that failed to show an initial behavioural differentiation.

For at least this subset of the discussion groups it must be the case that attributes of the participants themselves are the variables that determine the groups' status structures. That is, in the same manner that general status [sic] characteristics determine status orders in task group [sic] in which members differ with regard to these variables...there must exist a set of variables which cause differences in the behaviours of individuals who are apparent status equals. (1970, p.343).

It seems improbable, indeed, that group members will fail to differ in a multitude of ways, including eloquence, the extent to which they have opinions on the subject toward which group activity is directed, physiognomy (Berry and McArthur, 1986), attractiveness (Dion, Berscheid and Walster, 1972; Webster and Driskell, 1983), or even sporting prowess, proposed by Willard and Strodbeck (1972) as a possible mediating variable for their findings. These are all differentially evaluated characteristics and, therefore, potential bases for generalization (Berger, Wagner and Zelditch, 1985; Berger, Rosenholtz and Zelditch, 1980; Driskell, 1982).

This being so, might not those groups wherein the initial behavioural hierarchy has endured to the end also be groups in which the behavioural differentiation reflects the members' ordering on such

competence or status dimensions, however subtle, as may be present? Given the association between external status and behaviour reviewed earlier, such status-behaviour congruence might be expected to be a routine occurrence. Mazur et al. (1980) suggested something similar, in canvassing the possibility of one subject's having an "edge" - in addition to the ability to tolerate a staredown - as an alternative, though less favoured explanation for the attainment of group leadership.

#### **6.2.5.2 The performance implications of nonverbal behaviours**

Another possibility is that nonverbal confidence behaviour covaries with behaviours that influence actual or subjective task performance. Explanations offered for the operation of nonverbal behaviours tend to depict such behaviours in general as expressive - as cues or stimuli - without regard to the possibility they may play a more direct part in the individual's ability to perform. Such a possibility is easily illustrated by a crude example: If an unconfident actor's relative lack of vocal volume actually impedes communication, it is apparent that whatever other signs of lack of confidence may have been present have been coupled with a paralinguistic behaviour with direct task performance implications. Similar, if more subtle, explanations can be applied to other behaviours. Willard and Strodtbeck (1972) acknowledged the possibility that the apparent effect of verbal latency was mediated by participation. A high level of participation, although itself an expression of confidence, is also a means of exercising one's ability to contribute, subject to the quality of that contribution (Sorrentino and Boutillier, 1975). Further, the manner in which a message is presented may affect factors such as the content of the

message, as argued earlier (see also Argyle, 1967), the communication of emotion or anxiety (Cook, 1969; Davitz, 1964), how credible (Miller and Hewgill, 1964), truthful, emphatic, or nervous the speaker appears (Apple, Streeter and Krauss, 1979), and how favourably the speaker is perceived (Lay and Burron, 1968). Finally, when confidence manifests as a faster rate of speaking and the commission of fewer speech errors, perceived competence may be enhanced, as the earlier review of paralinguistic behaviours indicates. Since nonverbal behaviours tend, moreover, to appear in patterns of interrelated characteristics (Patterson, 1982), behaviours that might themselves be unlikely to have direct performance connotations - for example, visual dominance - will frequently coincide with behaviours that are less removed from performance.

This second argument - that separate components of a behavioural grouping may have different effects - is especially germane to the manipulation of nonverbal behaviour for empirical purposes. Firstly, if confidence cues and paralinguistic characteristics are not functionally equivalent, the practice of operationalising task cues as a combination of both will prevent a distinction revealing itself, and perpetuate the illusion of equivalence. Secondly, although the piecemeal examination of units of behaviour can give a distorted picture of social interaction (Patterson, 1982), the more behaviours we include in a behavioural profile, the greater is the number of competing explanations. Consider, for example, Ridgeway's (1987) study of the relative effects of task and dominance cues. The operationalisation of the profile of a low-task actor in this study shares five of its ten characteristics with those that DePaulo, Stone and Lassiter (1985) have found to be generally perceived (some of them



appropriately) as signalling deception. Those cues are a low level of eye-contact, slow speech, low speed of response, and a high incidence of hesitations and speech errors. At very least this raises the question whether a theoretical link with status characteristics and expectation states is the most parsimonious explanation for the lack of influence of an experimental confederate who employs these cues en bloc, and further cautions against extending such an explanation to behavioural confidence in general.

Ridgeway's (1987) design warrants further comment for its similarity to that of Lee and Ofshe (1981). Indeed, the main differences lie in the absence, in the later study, of a status manipulation, and its use, with all-female subjects, of a female target who employed variously high-task, low-task, dominance or submission cues. As a demonstration of the effect of demeanour, the findings, which indicated the high-task manipulation to be more influential than the others, are subject to similar reservations to those expressed earlier in relation to Lee and Ofshe. Here, too, the findings of Experiment 1 support the suggestion that one must consider factors other than the cue or stimulus value of the behaviours employed to explain the effect observed.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Ridgeway herself has interpreted the results of Study 1, published as Mohr (1986), as evidence against *dominance* cues (Ridgeway and Diekema, 1989). This may simply reflect the references in that study to a behavioural dominance order, although such an interpretation was not intended. Otherwise, the behavioural differentiation itself would not seem to warrant description as dominance in Ridgeway's sense of the term; even the use of space by a dominant actor was hardly intrusive to the point of implying threat.

### 6.3 Summary

Like two-process theory, the expanded Expectation States Theory attributes efficient cause to behavioural confidence and leadership, in this case as part of a broader category of task cues. The development of this position has involved two suppositions. The first is a literal reading of the meaning of status equal groups, allowing a causal interpretation of the implication of some confidence/leadership behaviours in hierarchy formation. The second is the summing of the effects of different categories of behaviour, to extend (1) this presumed causal role of behavioural confidence to paralinguistic behaviours, and (2) the competence connotations of paralinguistic behaviours to behavioural confidence. The result, among others, is conducive to a possible overstatement of the role in hierarchy formation of nonverbal confidence and leadership, in that such behaviour may be receiving sole credit - albeit via an abstraction like expectation states - for effects achieved in harness with status or performance factors. Those factors may be correlated attributes of the interactants for which a particular research design has been unable to control, or the consequences of other, usually paralinguistic<sup>13</sup>, aspects of the behaviour patterns employed.

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<sup>13</sup> I have treated the possible effects of paralinguistic behaviours as essentially unremarkable, in that these behaviours have been shown to have subjective performance implications. This does not mean to imply that there is no need to explain how and why these subjective performance differences come about, which is clearly one of the aims of the task cues concept.

## CHAPTER 7:

### The status-confirmation of behavioural claims

The need for the observation of a conceptual distinction between demeanour and performance has been noted. So, too, has the fact that behaviour and performance are not always clearly separable. It is likely, for instance, that paralinguistic characteristics like fast talking or hesitation-free speech themselves function to some degree as signals of confidence. What this thesis is concerned to establish is in what measure and by what means the confidence/leadership component of a behaviour pattern contributes to group influence processes, when the effects of status or subjective performance are separated out. Given the possibility that the subjective performance implications of paralinguistic behaviours are not wholly attributable to their expressive function as confidence signals, such behaviours must be excluded, as in Experiment 1, from the experimental study of the effects of behavioural confidence.

Such considerations are especially important to the stimulus-depleted interactions of social psychological experimentation, wherein explanatory models are tested and refined. For general descriptive purposes, however, the division need not be as scrupulous. For instance, one might identify as essentially demeanour-oriented that initial period of uncertainty wherein co-actors negotiate their respective positions, armed with little or no status or performance information. In considering evidence of initial participation rates (Fisek and Ofshe, 1970) or speech initiation and initial visual dominance (Rosa and Mazur, 1979) as predictors of subsequent differentiation in groups, one might speculate that the *eventual* pecking-order is dependent on the *initial*

behavioural differentiation being consummated in performance or otherwise legitimated. Indeed, it is conceivable that Heinicke and Bales' (1953) troubled low status consensus groups exemplify a perceived demeanour-performance mismatch. In a high-consensus group, activity level (demeanour) and task ability (performance) tend to be correlated; by comparison, the low-consensus group is characterised by "an active participator who is neither well-liked nor highly rated on task ability [and] a more passive task specialist who is not well-liked" (Slater, 1955, p.303).

### 7.1 Evidence for status-confirmation

Although the results of Experiment 1 were unable either to confirm or refute the argument that the effects of demeanour will normally be mediated by status, a small number of studies provide support for such an interaction. An experiment by Tuzlak and Moore (1984; Tuzlak, 1988) examined the influence exerted by confident and unconfident white (high status) or black (low status) actors on an ICOM spatial judgement task. Demeanour in this case was conveyed via television monitor for two minutes prior to interaction. Confident actors portrayed a relaxed, open manner, smiling and indicating enthusiasm; unconfident actors, on the other hand, adopted a rigid, slouched, closed posture, and engaged in nervous fidgeting, such as nail-biting. A non-significant interaction of status and demeanour with time suggested the tendency for confident whites to become the most influential and confident blacks the least. Although the fact that the high status condition had subjects interacting with status *equals* may have attenuated the effects of the variables, and the unconfident condition

arguably communicated something approaching neuroticism, the findings are promising. In particular, the contrasting reactions to confident whites and blacks appear to be consistent with the notion of demeanour as provisional status-claim, dependent for its effectiveness on the legitimating effect of external status.

Further, and indirect support for the status-confirmation argument is available from a number of sources. Meeker and Weitzel-O'Neill (1977) argued that making a task contribution tends to raise the contributor's (situational) status relative to other members of the group, and that this act is a legitimate one for those high in external status but not for persons of low external status. Their review of research revealed a corresponding tendency for the task-related activity of women to be inhibited in mixed-sex interaction, as predicted from the standpoint of gender as a status characteristic. Katz and Cohen (1962; Katz, 1970) reported on the passivity of black children in interaction with white children; when equipped with the solution to the group task and induced to behave assertively, black children were able to exert influence, although they aroused considerable resistance in so doing. Eskilson and Wiley (1976) noted deficiencies in leadership behaviours of females appointed to lead in mixed-sex groups, in contrast to the performance of females who had earned the role of leader. They attributed the difference to the legitimating effect of competence. Finally, several studies have paired individuals high in trait dominance with low-dominance partners, and found a tendency for the former to become leader in same-sex dyads and in those mixed-sex dyads involving a high-dominant male (Carbonell, 1984; Fleischer and Chertkoff, 1986; Megargee, 1969; Nyquist and Spence, 1986). High-dominant women were, however, much less likely to assume

leadership over low-dominant men, except when the task was a feminine one (Carbonell, 1984) or when they had received superior performance feedback on a pretest (Fleischer and Chertkoff, 1986).

## 7.2            Developing the status-confirmation model

Several questions follow from the status-confirmation proposition. Ultimately, these include that of its ability to explain both the findings of the behavioural studies, as briefly undertaken above, and those of EST research. Also to be considered is whether an assertive behavioural style is indeed a necessary condition for the attainment of high rank. Before such questions are addressed, however, the rationale behind the assertion that behavioural confidence may *claim* situational status needs to be elaborated. The proposition was advanced on largely intuitive grounds, supported by the consideration that such behaviour cannot be expected to trigger unconditional deference in those at whom it is directed. The term *claim*, as used here, thus has two defining characteristics. Firstly, there is the sense of petition: the lodging - functionally at least - of a bid, or even the assertion of a right. Secondly, and of longer-term interest, there is the sense of conditionality: of a petitioning that is not guaranteed to succeed, but whose success is contingent on other factors.

Experiment 2 was designed as a preliminary analysis of the appropriateness of the status-claim description, prior to pursuit of the more crucial question: that of the adequacy of the conditionality and, ultimately, status-confirmation assumptions. The main emphasis here is thus on the justifiability of the petitioning connotation. If the use of

the term *status claim* is appropriate in principle, one would expect to find that the behaviour of an individual who aspires to high rank will differ from that of one who does not in the extent to which it conveys confidence and leadership. Also considered is the possibility that the strategies for status attainment will differ according to whether an individual enters a group with higher, lower, or equal external status relative to other group members. Such differences might be further reflected in the implications of different behaviours for the likeableness of individuals of different external status.

## CHAPTER 8:

### Experiment 2

#### 8.1 METHOD

##### 8.1.1 Subjects and procedure

Subjects were 167 first-year university students, 118 of them female. One hundred and twenty-two subjects were psychology students, who participated in the course of one of six group testing sessions held at the beginning of the academic year. The remaining forty-five were students of social work, who completed the questionnaire in their own time.

Subjects read a scenario about a target person of their own gender, referred to as Robin, whose experience, in outline, is as follows: Robin has just completed her<sup>14</sup> first year as a tertiary student; during the summer break, she answers an advertisement for volunteers to organize a holiday recreation program for primary school children. She finds herself on a team of three volunteers who, together, will be responsible for planning, organising and overseeing a recreation program for the surrounding area. They have 5 days to formulate and agree on a program, at the end of which time they will be asked to report back for approval and funds to get their program underway.

The questionnaire asked subjects to consider Robin's likely behaviour on Day 1, at her first meeting with her same-sex colleagues,

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<sup>14</sup> Female version given; male scenarios were identical, but for the pronouns used. See Appendices B2 to B4.



Kim and Terry. The latter were described either as "apparently a little older than she, and both *tertiary students, nearing the end of their degrees*" (low status condition); "apparently a little younger than she, and both *planning to enter tertiary education in the new year*" (high status); or "*somewhere about her own age, and probably, like she, on holiday from school or a tertiary institution*" (equal status). The task, subjects were told, "appeals to [Robin] as an interesting and challenging one, and one in which she would like to take an influential, even a leadership role. ROBIN WOULD LIKE TO RUN THE SHOW. HOW IS SHE LIKELY TO APPROACH THIS FIRST MEETING?" There followed a list of 26 behaviours or approaches Robin might engage in, each of which subjects were asked to rate for its likelihood of occurrence. Twelve-point rating scales labelled "very unlikely" and "very likely" at the extremes were provided for this purpose.

Next, the 26 items were repeated, and subjects rated (as either negative, zero, or positive) the consequences for Robin's leadership chances and likeableness of her behaving in the manner described by each item. Although the likeableness responses were of main interest, ratings for leadership were requested to ensure that the referent for the likeableness ratings was the behaviour itself, and not subjects' perceptions of *likely* behaviour, as rated earlier. This procedure had the added advantage of allowing the two measures to be classified on a common scale, allowing for easier comparison than if leadership were extrapolated from the likelihood ratings. This section of the questionnaire concluded with an invitation to subjects to provide their own descriptions of Robin's likely behaviour on Day 1, regardless of the perceived adequacy or otherwise of the list items. Approximately a half page was provided for responses.

The remainder of the questionnaire presented a control or baseline condition. Subjects were asked to consider what Robin's behaviour would be "if the situation were different". The Day 1 scenario and status information were given as before, but subjects were now asked to consider the task as "one in which [Robin] is happy to play a part as a team member. ROBIN, HOWEVER, HAS NO AMBITIONS OF RUNNING THE SHOW." On the strength of this different scenario, subjects were again asked to rate the 26 behaviours for likelihood, and nominate their own descriptions of Robin's likely behaviour.

## 8.2 RESULTS

### 8.2.1 Behavioural pursuit of leadership

A repeated measures MANOVA on the status-claiming and status-disclaiming likelihood ratings of the 26 items revealed that all but two - smiling ( $p=.09$ ) and talking about studies ( $p=.64$ ) - differentiated significantly between the claiming and disclaiming of group leadership (overall  $F_{26,120}=34.77$ ,  $p<.0001$ ). The difference scores were subsequently subjected to a principal components analysis and varimax rotation, returning 3 main factors that accounted for 41% of the variance. (See Appendix B5 for factor loadings.) These factors were identified as Behavioural Initiative, Social-emotional, and Task Confidence. Table 5 shows the main composition of each, the pattern of responses under the leadership-claiming and leadership-disclaiming conditions, and the difference scores for the 2 sets of 12-point ratings.

| Behaviour <sup>a</sup>  | Claiming | Disclaiming | Difference |
|---|----------|-------------|------------|
| <i>Behavioural Initiative</i>   |          |             |            |
| Speak in a soft voice   | 3.29     | 8.00        | 4.72       |
| Get in first: initiate discussion   | 10.38    | 4.34        | 6.03       |
| Let things take their natural course  | 3.30     | 10.61       | 7.31       |
| Play a waiting game   | 3.62     | 7.60        | 3.98       |
| Not say very much to begin with   | 3.45     | 8.50        | 5.05       |
| Propose a plan of attack  | 9.83     | 3.84        | 5.99       |
| Suggest the team should choose a leader   | 8.15     | 4.59        | 3.56       |
| Hint she has special knowledge of the area <sup>b</sup>                                 | 9.43     | 4.56        | 4.87       |
| <i>Social-emotional</i>   |          |             |            |
| Admit to being mistaken on something  | 6.17     | 9.56        | 3.39       |
| Drop names  | 5.07     | 2.96        | 2.11       |
| Be prepared to compromise   | 7.23     | 10.41       | 3.18       |
| Side with one colleague against the other   | 4.58     | 3.04        | 1.54       |
| Look serious  | 7.23     | 5.44        | 1.79       |
| Hint that her family is well-off <sup>b</sup>   | 4.33     | 2.76        | 1.57       |
| <i>Task Confidence</i>  |          |             |            |
| Try to present sound, logical arguments   | 10.71    | 7.91        | 2.80       |
| Avoid eye-contact   | 2.95     | 5.63        | 2.68       |
| Act confident   | 10.77    | 6.81        | 3.96       |
| Skirt around issues   | 3.09     | 5.70        | 2.61       |
| Look intelligent  | 9.94     | 7.03        | 2.91       |
| Use big words   | 6.92     | 4.10        | 2.82       |
| Talk quickly  | 6.31     | 4.21        | 2.10       |
| Avoid disagreements   | 7.17     | 9.17        | 2.00       |
| Smile a lot   | 8.39     | 8.99        | 0.60       |
| Mention mother worked here as a cleaner   | 2.21     | 4.19        | 1.98       |
| Talk about her studies <sup>b</sup>   | 6.40     | 6.07        | 0.32       |
| Just be her usual self  | 6.95     | 10.38       | 3.44       |
| <sup>a</sup> Blocks 1-3 clustered according to factor loading; factor names in italics. |          |             |            |
| <sup>b</sup> Female wording given.  |          |             |            |

**Table 5.** *Target behaviours and their rated likelihood of occurrence under conditions of leadership claiming or disclaiming.*

As is apparent, the Behavioural Initiative factor most strongly differentiated the two conditions. The overall mean difference score of the eight items that load most strongly on this factor is 5.2 (of a possible 11), compared to 3.0 for Task Confidence, and 2.5 for Social-emotional. The fact that the item returning the highest difference score was "Let things take their course" testifies to the endorsement of behavioural intervention as essential to the attainment of situational status.

The importance of behavioural initiative relative to confidence should not be over-rated, however. Indeed, the two items returning the highest ratings as avenues to leadership (claim condition) - "Act confident" and "Present sound, logical arguments" - load on the confidence factor, instead. The difference that favours initiative as a predictor of leadership intent lies in the leadership-disclaiming behaviour pattern. Clearly, eschewing the practical activities of a leader was seen to be a somewhat stronger indicator of the disclaiming of leadership than was abstinence from the expressive manifestations of confidence and competence. At the same time, mean status-claim ratings of 9.9 for Task Confidence items and 9.0 for Behavioural Initiative items identify both as essential weapons in the armory of an aspiring leader.

A slightly different, though comparable picture emerges for social-emotional behaviour. Whereas the avoidance of offence tended to be endorsed in both claiming and disclaiming conditions, it was less so in the former. The difference might be tentatively attributed to a slightly greater concern with saving face on the part of a candidate for high rank. Indeed, the mean rating of 6.7 (of a possible 12) suggests a degree of ambivalence about the importance of social niceties to the attainment of rank.

## 8.2.2 Status and sex differences

### 8.2.2.1 Factor scores

Analysis of variance of the weighted factor scores permitted consideration of the possible differences due to status or gender. The only effects noted were on Behavioural Initiative, which differentiated claim and disclaim responses more strongly for males than for females ( $F_{1,145}=5.2$ ,  $p<.05$ ). It was also apparent that males and females differentiated initiative of claimers and disclaimers to differing degrees in different status relationships (interaction  $F_{2,145}=10.3$ ,  $p<.0005$ ). For females, difference scores were higher for a low-status actor than one in an equal or high status relationship with her colleagues; for males, on the other hand, differentiation was least for a low-status actor. What is not clear from these data is in what measure these effects reflect differences in approach to the *attainment* of leadership or differing baselines of leadership *disclaiming* behaviour. For this reason, the 8 items loading most strongly on this factor were subjected to multivariate analyses of variance for each of these conditions separately. Although resultant omnibus F values for main and interaction terms were nonsignificant in each case, those for the disclaiming condition approached significance, with probabilities of .07 (status), .08 (sex), and .09 (interaction), compared to .18, .18, and .12, respectively in the claiming condition. Indications, then, are that marginal baseline differences - differences in approach to the role of group *member* - are the major contributors to the effects observed on the Initiative factor; what remains unclear, however, is whether the effects on the difference measure are attributable to its greater sensitivity as an index of likely behaviour, or to artifact.

### 8.2.2.1 Leadership and likeableness ratings

Leadership and likeableness ratings of the 26 items were scored from 1 (negative) to 3 (positive). The two ratings were significantly correlated for all but 3 items: letting things take their course, initiating discussion, and being oneself. All significant correlations were positive. Leadership returned multivariate main effects for both status ( $F_{52,256}=1.66$ ,  $p<.01$ ) and gender ( $F_{26,127}=1.88$ ,  $p<.05$ ). The former could be traced to three items for which univariate  $F$  values were significant. Unsurprisingly, the leadership implications of talking about studies were perceived more positively for actors whose studies were relatively advanced (mean=2.3) than for those of equal (mean=2.0) or lower age and educational status (mean=1.8) relative to other group members ( $F_{2,152}=8.53$ ,  $p<.0005$ ). Letting things take their course was viewed significantly more favourably in the high (mean=1.9) than in either equal (mean=1.6) or low (mean=1.5) status conditions ( $F_{2,152}=5.6$ ,  $p<.005$ ). Looking intelligent was highly recommended, but more so for equals (mean=2.9) than for subordinates (mean=2.6;  $F_{2,152}=4.76$ ,  $p<.05$ ; all pair-wise differences reported were significant by LSD test). The multivariate gender effect, in turn, was traceable to 5 behaviours that attracted generally negative ratings for leadership, with sample means of between 1.1 and 1.6. The nature of the effect was that initial reticence, speaking softly, avoiding eye-contact, disclosing a low-status background (mother was a cleaner), and taking sides were each rated as *more* detrimental to leadership attainment by females than by males. Although gender (alone) also produced a multivariate effect on likeableness ratings of the 26 behaviours ( $F_{26,126}=1.78$ ,  $p<.05$ ), here there were only two significant univariate effects: females attached more dislike to hinting that one's

family was well-off, and more liking to the presentation of logical arguments. A visual inspection revealed the responses of males and females to be virtually inseparable on sixteen of the remaining items, and there was no consistent pattern about the direction of differences on the other eight to suggest the pursuit of leadership was differentially associated with likeableness for males and females. The multivariate effect for gender notwithstanding, this and the absence of any other significant effects suggest likeableness was not an important determinant of either sex or status differences in approach to leadership attainment. Neither do the leadership ratings lead one to expect any marked sex- or status-based differences in the behaviours of those who seek to attain high rank. See Appendices B6 to B10 for means and correlations.

### 8.2.3 Content analysis of comments

The unstructured questions that concluded the two sections of the questionnaire gave respondents the opportunity to record their own views, under less constrained conditions. Of the 167 participants, 121 (87 females) and 109 (77 females) offered an account of Robin's behaviour to the leadership-claiming and leadership-disclaiming scenarios respectively<sup>15</sup>. These accounts were transcribed (Appendix B11), and subsequently content analysed with the aid of the Richards and Richards' (1990) NUDIST software for the analysis of qualitative data<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> This high response rate in an already long questionnaire suggests a high degree of involvement in the exercise. A low incidence of criticisms of the structured items renders unlikely the alternative possibility that subjects put pen to paper out of frustration.

<sup>16</sup> This software greatly facilitates the storage and retrieval of indexing categories and related text. In addition, the incorporated Boolean and other operators permit the creation of new categories out of varied combinations of

| Approach <sup>a</sup> | Leadership Claiming Status |      |       |     | Leadership Disclaiming Status |      |       |     |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|------|-------|-----|-------------------------------|------|-------|-----|
|                       | Total                      | High | Equal | Low | Total                         | High | Equal | Low |
| Confident             | 36                         | 34   | 39    | 32  | 5                             | 3    | 8     | 0   |
| Diplomatic            | 26                         | 18   | 30    | 27  | 4                             | 0    | 6     | 3   |
| Competent             | 25                         | 16   | 26    | 32  | 4                             | 0    | 6     | 3   |
| Take lead             | 23                         | 26   | 26    | 16  | 0                             | 0    | 0     | 0   |
| Friendly (3)          | 21                         | 24   | 22    | 19  | 19                            | 10   | 21    | 25  |
| Assertive             | 20                         | 18   | 22    | 19  | 1                             | 3    | 0     | 0   |
| Likeable (9.5)        | 20                         | 18   | 13    | 30  | 10                            | 14   | 10    | 6   |
| Take initiative       | 18                         | 26   | 20    | 8   | 0                             | 0    | 0     | 0   |
| Cooperative (1)       | 14                         | 18   | 13    | 11  | 34                            | 34   | 38    | 28  |
| Leader ability        | 12                         | 8    | 13    | 14  | 0                             | 0    | 0     | 0   |
| Lead discussion       | 11                         | 11   | 13    | 8   | 0                             | 0    | 0     | 0   |
| Compromising (2)      | 9                          | 11   | 13    | 3   | 25                            | 24   | 21    | 31  |
| Dominating            | 7                          | 8    | 9     | 5   | 0                             | 0    | 0     | 0   |
| Cautious              | 7                          | 11   | 4     | 8   | 3                             | 0    | 6     | 0   |
| Using status          | 7                          | 18   | 2     | 0   | 1                             | 0    | 0     | 3   |
| Uncompromising        | 7                          | 5    | 11    | 3   | 1                             | 0    | 0     | 3   |
| Natural (9.5)         | 7                          | 0    | 7     | 14  | 10                            | 10   | 8     | 13  |
| Not dominating        | 6                          | 3    | 7     | 8   | 5                             | 7    | 4     | 3   |
| Talkative             | 5                          | 3    | 4     | 8   | 0                             | 0    | 0     | 0   |
| Not using status      | 5                          | 5    | 0     | 11  | 2                             | 3    | 2     | 0   |
| Relaxed (8)           | 2                          | 0    | 2     | 5   | 12                            | 14   | 10    | 13  |
| A contributor (7)     | 1                          | 0    | 0     | 3   | 13                            | 17   | 13    | 9   |
| Unassertive (5)       | 1                          | 3    | 0     | 0   | 17                            | 21   | 21    | 6   |
| Avoid initiating (4)  | 0                          | 0    | 0     | 0   | 17                            | 14   | 19    | 19  |
| Not talkative (6)     | 0                          | 0    | 0     | 0   | 15                            | 17   | 15    | 13  |

<sup>a</sup> Ranked by frequency of nomination as a leadership attainment strategy. Figures in parentheses denote leadership avoidance rank of 10 most frequently nominated approaches. Frequencies are expressed as a percentage of number of respondents in column category.

**Table 6.** *Content analysis of suggested approaches to the claiming and disclaiming of leadership, by status of actor.*

existing ones, including - of particular benefit here - by means of cross-tabulation of categories.



The main themes of the responses are summarised in Table 6. The divisions by status condition are shown as percentages rather than frequencies of column categories because of the differing response rates, with the equal status conditions attracting at least 25% more responses than each of the others. Sub-sample sizes in the high, equal, and low categories, respectively, were 38, 46, and 37 (claim), and 29, 48, and 32 (disclaim). As can be seen, the behaviour mentioned most frequently for an individual who seeks to lead was confidence (e.g. "try to appear confident and composed, as if she knew about the subject"). Diplomacy ("guide the group rather than pushing"; "careful not to 'step on any toes'") and the communication of competence ("seem intelligent and informed on the subject"; "show them that he is capable and qualified to do the job") were each mentioned in one account in four. Similarly prevalent were expectations of the straightforward assumption of leadership, evident in statements like "simply assume the leadership role"; "take charge"; and "'chair' the meeting and delegate tasks". Interestingly, friendliness, ranked fourth, likeableness (sixth), and cooperation (eighth) featured highly in the profile of a disclaimer, also, indicating a general endorsement of social-emotional considerations. This is consistent with the findings with the structured items, which further showed such considerations to be emphasised *less* strongly for one who claims leadership. Here, reservations of the latter kind were apparent in statements like "friendly, but not so friendly that she drops down to the others' level i.e. that she just tags along and agrees with them in order not to make enemies".

Four further references were prominent among allusions to an aspiring leader, but largely or entirely absent from the alternative profile. Foremost among these were assertion ("be assertive and up front";

"make his presence felt") and initiating activity ("let it be known that she wanted to take charge by initiating discussions"; "get in first and try to run things"). Somewhat less prevalent were suggestions that Robin demonstrate leadership ability ("impress the other two of her capabilities as a leader") and attempt to lead the discussion ("take the lead and let the other two follow").

As some of the direct quotations illustrate, the distribution presented in Table 6 is the result of a highly specific analysis, involving numbers of potentially overlapping classification categories. The tenuous nature of the distinctions between concepts means that apparent differences in their distribution among the sub-groups in the table are to be viewed with caution. For further analysis, leadership-claiming approaches were broken down into the four broader categories of *behavioural confidence* (confident, assertive, dominate and talkative), *conciliatory behaviour* (diplomatic, friendly, likeable, cooperate, compromise, and cautious), *pre-emptive behaviour* (assume leadership, take initiative, and lead discussion), and *ability* (competent and leadership ability). Their distribution across the three status conditions is shown in Table 7. No significant differences due to status were observed ( $\chi^2=2.79, .77, 3.48$ , and  $3.36$ , respectively). Even the apparent tendency for ability to be increasingly mentioned with decreasing status fell well short of statistical significance ( $p=.19$ ). The effects of gender were evident on conciliatory behaviour only, which was nominated by 63% of female respondents, compared to 38% of males ( $\chi^2=5.23, p<.05$ ). Behavioural confidence was mentioned by 61% of females and 44% of males ( $\chi^2=2.16$ ); pre-emptive behaviour by 37% of females and 35% of males ( $\chi^2=.001$ ); and ability by 34% of females and 24% of males ( $\chi^2=.90$ ).

| Response Category      | Total | Status |       |     |
|------------------------|-------|--------|-------|-----|
|                        | %     | High   | Equal | Low |
| Behavioural confidence | 56    | 47     | 65    | 54  |
| Conciliatory behaviour | 56    | 55     | 61    | 51  |
| Preemptive behaviour   | 36    | 39     | 43    | 24  |
| Ability                | 31    | 21     | 33    | 41  |

**Table 7.** *Behavioural attributes by status of an individual who claims leadership: results of content analysis.*

| Response Category      | Total | Status |       |     |
|------------------------|-------|--------|-------|-----|
|                        | %     | High   | Equal | Low |
| Conciliatory behaviour | 58    | 62     | 58    | 53  |
| Withdrawal             | 39    | 45     | 42    | 31  |

**Table 8.** *Behavioural attributes by status of an individual who disclaims leadership: results of content analysis.*

Table 8 shows the results of a similar summary analysis of responses to the status disclaiming scenario. Conciliatory behaviour was mentioned with a frequency almost identical to that recorded in Table 7. The frequency with which either conciliatory behaviour or the only other prevalent theme, behavioural withdrawal (avoid initiative, unassertive, and not talkative), was nominated was unaffected by status

condition ( $\chi^2=.51$  and  $1.35$ ). Neither did the figures for males (53% and 31%) differ significantly from those for females (60% and 43%;  $\chi^2=.18$  and  $.84$ ).

### 8.3 DISCUSSION

Responses to the structured sections of the questionnaire indicate that an individual who seeks to attain leadership of a group might be expected to initiate activity, present as confident and, although mindful of social-emotional concerns, be less constrained by these than might otherwise be the case. Responses on the social-emotional factor, indeed, were suggestive of little more than a limited preparedness to trade off interpersonal concerns against leadership ambitions. By contrast, initiative and confidence were emphatically endorsed as features of the behaviour of one who claims situational status. They differed from one another only as a means by which one might distinguish a status-claiming behaviour pattern from a status-disclaiming pattern, where behavioural initiative emerged as the clearer indicator.

When subjects volunteered their own descriptions of status-claiming behaviour, allusions to confidence, assertiveness, talkativeness and similar behaviours - loosely classified here as behavioural confidence - were evident in more than half the responses. So, too were behaviours with a social-emotional flavour, here classified as conciliatory behaviours. Pre-emptive action and demonstrating competence at task or leadership were also prominent. Again, consideration of the disclaiming accounts helps complete the picture. An incidence of allusions to conciliation almost identical to that of the

status-claiming condition serves to identify social-emotional activity as of general rather than specific concern. The theme of social withdrawal, meanwhile, reinforces the general emphasis on personal initiative and involvement as precursors to leadership.

There was little to suggest the existence of substantial differences in approach by different sub-groups. The few status differences in leadership ratings of the questionnaire items are largely unremarkable. Gender produced rather more noticeable effects than status, although again these were hardly startling. Firstly, several behaviours rated detrimental to leadership were rated more so by females than by males, suggesting a differential sensitivity to the negative implications of social transgressions. Secondly, females were more likely than males to refer to conciliatory behaviours in their voluntary accounts of the probable behaviour of an aspiring leader. The latter finding is consistent with earlier observations of females' greater concern with social-emotional matters and friendly non-competitive interaction (e.g., Eagly, 1978), at least when interacting with members of their own gender (Carli, 1989). There was also some indication, although inconclusive, that males and females recommended behavioural initiative as a status-claiming strategy to differing degrees for individuals of different status.

Neither the possibility of such an interaction or the other effects noted detract from the main findings, however, which are an endorsement of the argument that behavioural confidence and initiative merit description as claims to situational status. This theme emerged through both the factor analysis of the questionnaire items and subjects' personal accounts. Importantly, too, the latter accounts did not

offer competing strategies<sup>17</sup>, beyond a general emphasis on harmonious rather than confrontational interaction. At the same time, they added a degree of detail not available from the questionnaire information. This was most apparent in the nature of the allusions to behavioural initiative, which was evident as an organising concept in both structured and unstructured analyses. The additional information available from the latter tended to paint this as a strategic rather than an expressive activity. The emphasis tended to be on pre-emption of the status order: on getting in quickly and "taking the reins". This same element of pre-emption can be detected in some of the behaviours researchers have identified as avenues to situational status, such as being first to speak, having a lot to say, or taking the head seat at table. The suggestion is that in order to become a leader, one assumes the behavioural trappings of leadership, of which behaviours like those above are arguably the most obvious, and the most likely to attract the attention of researchers.

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<sup>17</sup> The degree to which this can be seen to sanction the questionnaire results is, of course, limited by the fact that the accounts were obtained in the context of the questionnaire, and may have been influenced by the preceding items.

## CHAPTER 9:

### Behavioural attribution: relating a status-confirmation explanation to EST's ICOM experiments

If one accepts that situational status can be claimed behaviourally, one might ask whether it *must* be claimed in order to be accorded. In other words, is a status-claiming demeanour - where demeanour is available for scrutiny - a necessary pre-condition for the attainment of situational status through external status or performance? Should this be so, one might expect, moreover, that where demeanour *cannot* be monitored (as in an ICOM experiment), an actor would be likely to ascribe a status-claiming manner to a high-status or high-performance co-actor (or, indeed, to co-actors in general), as the default assumption for encounters under conditions of uncertainty. This is a potentially significant possibility, in that it would offer a means by which the results of EST's experimental research might be accommodated within a status-confirmation framework.

Experiment 3 was designed to explore the reactions of subjects to communications received from an other whose behaviour they were unable to monitor. The aim, in part, was to test some possible implications of a status-confirmation model for the results of status characteristics and expectation states theory's ICOM research. The possibilities to be considered were that the behavioural and communication characteristics of an unseen other would tend to be perceived differently

(1) for others of different external status; and/or

(2) according to whether or not a respondent was engaged in interaction with the other.

The first possibility, for which there is already some evidence (Experiment 1; Lee, 1979), predicts that the degree to which unseen others are perceived to employ behaviours that might be described as claiming rank will be greater for high-status than for low-status others. The second predicts that the tendency to attribute a status-claiming behavioural style to an unseen other will be greater for an interactant, than, for example, for an observer. As has been noted, a positive result for either would, in pointing to an implicit behavioural dimension to such interaction, suggest that the behavioural claiming of status may be a *necessary* part of the social influence equation.

## 9.1 Experiment 3

## 9.2 METHOD

### 9.2.1 Subjects and procedure

Participants were 123 undergraduate students, approximately two-thirds of them female. They participated in groups, in the course of normal class activity. The study was introduced as an attempt to find out "how people react to written communications from people whom they can't see and haven't seen", as in the case of a "letter to the editor". After a short briefing on the subject of the letters - a controversy over the removal of traffic barriers in an unnamed



residential area - each was given a *letter to the editor* to read. After approximately 3 minutes reading time, participants were asked to respond to 7 oral questions using scales etc., printed on the backs of the stimulus letters. The questions asked subjects to rate the extent of their agreement with the letter, how forceful and well-written they found it to be, the confidence, intelligence and social prominence of the writer, and the letter's length in words. All but the last were answered on 8-point scales with poles labelled "not at all" and either "very much" or "extremely". Responses were anonymous, and participants briefed about the purpose of the exercise after data collection had been completed.

### 9.2.2 Letters and status manipulation

Each letter was, in fact, either a high- or a low-status version of one of two standard letters, status information being conveyed by an indirect allusion to the writer's occupation in the second paragraph. In one letter, the writer referred to people encountered in either "the course of my employment" (low status) or "the course of my profession" (high status). In the other, reference was made either to "my staff and clients" (high status), or "staff and clients where I work" (low status).

Each letter was prepared in six print-format styles, resulting in substantial differences in appearance, to ensure that participants' involvement in the exercise not be undermined by the perception that they were all responding to one of just two letters. All letters resembled photocopied newspaper cuttings. The text was loosely based on several

letters that had appeared in the local press some five years before. All names and references to location were deleted, and no participant reported being other than vaguely aware that the traffic-barriers issue had been publicly aired. The manner of expression in the stimulus letters was grammatically correct and essentially status neutral.

### 9.2.3 Interaction conditions

To permit examination of the possibility that being engaged in interaction may trigger particular behavioural attributions, each group of subjects was given either of two sets of instructions, the initial order determined by coin toss. In the low-interaction condition, oral instructions simply concluded with the statement "Please read the letter carefully". In the high-interaction condition, the sentence continued "with a view to preparing a reply to it. I want you to read the letter and consider how you might respond to it". Copies of the oral instructions, questions, and ratings scales, and an example of each of the 4 letters appear in Appendix C.

## 9.3 RESULTS

Ratings of the social prominence of the writer significantly differentiated the high and low status conditions ( $F_{1,118}=19.89$ ,  $p<.0005$ ), confirming the effectiveness of the status manipulation. Curiously, social prominence also showed a marginal effect for interaction condition ( $F_{1,118}=3.04$ ,  $p=.08$ ); it seemed that the prospect of replying to

a letter tended to raise its writer's perceived social standing. The pattern of responses to this and the other items is shown in Table 9.

| Rating                     | Status        |                |         | Interaction   |                |       |
|----------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------|---------------|----------------|-------|
|                            | Low<br>(n=63) | High<br>(n=59) | F       | Low<br>(n=62) | High<br>(n=60) | F     |
| Agree                      | 4.87          | 4.47           | 1.53    | 4.55          | 4.82           | 0.66  |
| Forceful                   | 5.68          | 6.22           | 4.03*   | 5.68          | 6.22           | 4.05* |
| Well-written               | 4.59          | 5.20           | 4.99*   | 4.77          | 5.00           | 0.78  |
| Confident                  | 6.35          | 6.78           | 3.96*   | 6.53          | 6.58           | 0.09  |
| Intelligent                | 4.94          | 5.51           | 5.89*   | 5.00          | 5.43           | 3.51† |
| Prominent                  | 3.97          | 5.34           | 19.89** | 4.39          | 4.88           | 3.04† |
| Word quantity              | 10.31         | 63.27          | 5.17*   | 58.8          | 13.08          | 3.76† |
| Word quantity <sup>a</sup> | -10.59        | 25.94          | 4.69*   | 20.02         | -5.72          | 2.22  |
| ( <sup>a</sup> n=)         | (58)          | (52)           |         | (53)          | (57)           |       |

† p<1  
\* p<.05  
\* \* p<.0005

**Table 9.** *Mean ratings by status of communicator, and interaction condition.*

The extent to which subjects agreed with a letter was found to be unaffected by either the status of the writer or the interaction condition. To what extent this reflects limitations of either the medium or the subject matter as the basis for influence cannot be determined. The remaining items, referring to aspects of competence or behaviour, were each, however, affected by either or both

manipulated variables. A high-status correspondent was perceived to be more intelligent and more confident, and to have produced a better-written, longer and more forceful letter. Of these, the finding for intelligence is probably least remarkable. The other items include, in well-written, a stylistic attribute with both behavioural and competence connotations and, in confidence, forcefulness, and word quantity, three patently behavioural attributes.

The interaction instructions were not subjected to a manipulation check; there are indications, however, that they had a systematic effect on subjects' responses. Those whose instructions required them to consider a response to the letter found its tone more forceful, and tended to attribute more intelligence and a higher social position to its writer than did those with a lesser involvement. All three effects (two of them of borderline significance) resemble those of status, suggesting the possibility the two variables may operate in a similar manner.

Paradoxically, the effects of the interaction condition on estimates of the length of the letter opposed the pattern. Those in the high interaction condition over-estimated word quantity less than low interaction subjects, whereas strict correspondence to the effect of status would predict greater over-estimation. Inspection of the distribution revealed responses to this measure to be highly positively skewed, because of a small number of extreme estimates (over 450 words, compared to actual letter lengths of 173 and 208 words). To test the possibility that either the status or the interaction effect was a chance product of the great variability of responses to this measure, the analyses were repeated with the outlying estimates excluded. The consequence was an undermining of the apparent effect of interaction

instructions, whereas that of status survived effectively undiminished, indicating this to be the more reliable effect. The lower section of Table 9 refers.

#### 9.4 DISCUSSION

The results of this experiment support the expectation that the behaviours people ascribe to another whose behaviour they are unable to monitor are likely to be a function of the other's status. Specifically, a communicator was perceived to be more confident, and to have produced a better-written, longer and more forceful communication, when presumed to be of higher occupational status. The finding is consistent with that of Experiment 1, and also of Lee (1979), that status affected perceived assertiveness of an actor. It is also consistent with Humphrey's (1985) finding that group members rated colleagues who had been randomly assigned manager status as more assertive and talkative than those assigned to be clerks. Unlike the latter, it cannot simply be explained in terms of role-related differences in *actual* behaviour.

Casting subjects in the role of interactant also affected their responses, although in ways that are slightly more difficult to interpret. The clear-cut effect on forcefulness mirrors that of status, suggesting at first sight that a similar process of behavioural ascription may have been at work. The effect did not extend to confidence, however, nor reliably to word quantity. Rather than affecting perceptions of the communicator's behaviour, therefore, the prospect of replying to the other may just have made the arguments appear more challenging.

That the same manipulation had near-significant effects on perceived intelligence and social prominence is more difficult to explain. In neither case was there any hint of a status by treatment interaction, tending to rule out the suggestion that subjects were simply more perceptive when in interaction mode. Clearly, the results for this manipulation must be viewed cautiously.

Of the perceptions influenced by status, on the other hand, confidence and interaction rate (in the form of word quantity) are among behavioural characteristics found to be predictive of rank in groups. Together, perhaps, with forcefulness, with its hint of attempted persuasion, they qualify for description as status-claiming behaviours. The effect of status on the perceived quality of the writing - more than its effect on intelligence, which might reflect information implicit in the status manipulation - completes the picture of status-appropriate behaviour and presentation. If, as seems reasonable, this situation can be generalised to interaction via ICOM, it provides the means whereby the status-confirmation model can be related to EST research.

This has several implications. Firstly, by suggesting the existence of an implicit status-correlated behavioural dimension to such interaction, it obviates any pressing need for revision of EST to accommodate behavioural style as an *alternative* causal factor, in the manner attempted by the task cues formulation. Secondly, it is consistent with what would be expected if a status-claiming demeanour were necessary for the attainment of situational status. Thirdly, it further supports the view that higher status individuals are advantaged in the likelihood that they will be seen to measure up behaviourally, as well as in perceived competence. Fourthly, it again raises the possibility that the effects of behavioural confidence are

essentially cognitively mediated: that it is the *communication* of confidence or leadership intent that underlies its effects in social interaction. This issue is the subject of Experiment 4.

## CHAPTER 10:

### Experiment 4

#### 10.1 Rationale

This study was designed to explore the joint action of status and a confident demeanour under controlled conditions able to test a cognitive explanation. The intention, firstly, was to explore the possibility that the communication of confidence and leadership intent might underlie the effects of behavioural confidence. A related aim of the design employed was to provide a partial test of the task cues notion as an explanation of the effect of behavioural confidence.

Methodologically, the test of a cognitive account should require only that an actor be able to monitor the other's behaviour. Consequently, by shielding subjects from a direct face-to-face encounter, it should be possible to rule out a behavioural explanation, such as Mazur's outstressing argument (Mazur, 1985; Mazur et al., 1980), for any main effects for confidence that might be observed. Moreover, whereas the absence of a main effect would not, of course, be conclusive evidence against a causal role, it should be noted that the opposite finding would strongly support the general thrust of the task cues approach. A status by demeanour interaction on task influence, meanwhile, would suggest a cognitive version of the status-confirmation model. It would suggest a causal process in which the reaction to behavioural status-claims was largely a cognitive process: comparable, perhaps, to that proposed by the task cues formulation, except that the expectations triggered by behaviour would be



provisional rather than causal, and subject to the legitimating effect of status.

The study also offered the opportunity to address some of the suggested limitations of Experiment 1 as a test of the status-confirmation model. There, the non-effect of status on task influence - possibly due to a confounding of the financial connotations of both status and influence variables - and the fact that subjects were spectators to rather than participants in an interaction, may have prevented an adequate assessment of the joint contributions of the two independent variables. These limitations - the need to employ a value-free status-task combination, and to involve participants in the interaction - were both taken into account in the design of the present study.

## **10.2 METHOD**

### **10.2.1 Subjects and overview**

The study consisted of two complementary experiments. Participants were 253 undergraduate students, aged 17 to 45 years, enrolled in introductory psychology and research methods courses. They participated as part of class exercises, the findings of which were to be incorporated into subsequent unspecified course material. One hundred and forty-six females and 20 males took part in a person perception study; the remaining 62 females and 25 males were involved in a social influence experiment.

The two experiments dealt with different aspects of reactions to nonverbal confidence communicated via photograph. The person perception experiment targeted the perceptions associated with confident and unconfident stimulus photographs. These data performed a dual function: As well as being of interest in their own right, they acted as partial validation of the photographs for use in the spatial judgement experiment. The latter experiment examined the joint effects of confidence and status on social influence.

## **10.2.2 Instruments and procedure**

### **10.2.2.1 Person perception experiment**

The 166 participants were each issued with a single-page questionnaire (Appendix D1), to the upper right-hand corner of which was attached a photograph of a confident or unconfident actor of the same gender as the subject. Alongside the photograph was a brief set of instructions, which described the study as being concerned with the nature of *first impressions*. Subjects were asked to consider the person in the photograph, referred to as *M*, to imagine that the two of them had been assigned to work together on a decision-making task, and to indicate, with only a photograph to go by, what sort of person they expected *M* to be. Twenty-three 7-point rating scales of the semantic differential type were provided for this purpose. Responses were anonymous. Subsequent elimination of 3 inappropriate stimulus photograph pairs from further use in the study (see below) reduced the sample to 98 females and 20 males.

#### 10.2.2.2 Social influence experiment

Subjects attended in groups to undertake a *spatial judgment task*, which required them to estimate what percentage of a white rectangular space was taken up by various black geometric patterns. After completing a practice series of 4 patterns, each participant was given a test booklet of 15 patterns, the cover of which opened upwards to protrude above the pages of the booklet. The inside face of the cover, which was visible whenever the booklet was in use, contained a 4-item personal details questionnaire, and provision for a passport-size portrait photograph. Each subject was also given the completed answer-book of an anonymous person of the same gender, whose photograph was attached to the visible upper strip of the cover sheet.

Participants were instructed to look at the other person's estimates as they made their own, because they would be asked to evaluate the other's performance at the conclusion of the exercise. They were told that the study was concerned, among other things, with the way in which people build on the estimates of others in arriving at their own. The photograph of the other was justified by the statement that it was "the closest we can come to having numbers of people interact with other people they don't know, short of trying to get them all to come in at the same time." The completed personal details section exposed subjects to fictitious *status information* (age, education) about the actor whose file they had to hand. In an attempt both to enhance their involvement in the task, and provide a context for the other's portrait, subjects were asked to indicate in the photo space on their cover sheet whether they objected to having their photographs taken and their own booklets used in the same manner as the reference booklets before them. Each page of a booklet contained one stimulus

pattern and provision for respondents to record their estimate for that pattern. See Appendices D2 to D7 for instruments and instructions.

There were three behavioural conditions and two status conditions. The photographs revealed either a *confident bearing*, an *unconfident bearing*, or had the *facial features obscured* by a diagonal band (Appendix D8). For status information, the personal details items alongside the photograph described the actor as being either 16 or 17 years old, and a final-year high-school student, or 22 or 23 years old, and a fourth-year college student<sup>18</sup>. "Names" had been blacked out. The influence measure used was the mean difference between subjects' estimates and those of their reference actors. A post-session evaluation questionnaire had subjects rate both the reference actor's and their own ability at spatial judgments, estimate the other's rating of his or her own ability, and indicate how helpful they had found access to another's responses to be. Ten-point scales were used. All participants but one appeared to take the exercise seriously, and were included in the final analysis.

### 10.2.2.3 Stimulus photographs and test booklets

Nine female and two male student volunteers from another university posed for the photographs selected for use in the two studies. Each was photographed, above shoulder height, in both a confident and an unconfident pose. In the former condition, they tended to be upright, unsmiling, and looking slightly down on the

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<sup>18</sup> The greater age range of subjects meant that half of those (randomly) assigned to the high status condition were older than their reference actors. Whereas this may have lessened the status differential between subject and actor (who was invariably of higher educational rank, nonetheless), it does not, of course, threaten the validity of the status manipulation, which involves the differential status of the two sources of estimates.

camera, with the head tilted slightly backwards. In the unconfident condition, head and body were inclined forwards, eyes raised to the camera, and mouth generally upturned in a slight smile. The height of the camera was varied according to the role being assumed, to facilitate creation of the impression of greater or lesser social power. The twenty-two photographs selected were pretested for confidence with 39 undergraduates, each of whom rated a systematically varied collection comprising one from each actor (Appendix D9). Mean ratings for each actor differed in the desired direction, significant by directional t-test, t values ranging from 1.7 to 8.6 ( $p < .05$ ; Appendix D10). All eleven photograph pairs were used in the person perception experiment; three pairs for which the confident pose returned significantly lower relaxed ratings than its unconfident counterpart were subsequently excluded from further analysis. The stimulus photographs in the analyses reported for both the perception and influence experiments were of the remaining six females and two males, aged from 17 to 21 years.

The obscured photographs that made up the control condition in the influence experiment were defaced versions of the confident set; these were felt to convey minimal information, beyond confirming the existence and sex of the respondent. All completed reference booklets bearing an actor's photograph were identical (apart from the manipulation of status information), with answers based on that actor's original estimates. The only systematic change was the substitution in all booklets of a constant extreme estimate for the ninth pattern, in order that this might be used as a supplementary single-item influence measure. This item did not prove sufficiently sensitive as a measure, however, and was relegated to an equal contributory role with the other items.

## 10.3 RESULTS

### 10.3.1 Perceptions of the actors

Responses to the 23 first-impressions rating scales were subjected to a principal components analysis and varimax rotation, yielding 6 factors that together explained 68% of the variance. (See Appendix D11 for loadings.) These factors were identified as Leadership, Agreeableness, Resourcefulness, Social Attractiveness, Humility, and Emotion. A two-way (actor by demeanour) multivariate analysis of variance on the six factor scores returned an effect for demeanour only ( $F_{6,97}=4.21, p<.005$ ). Univariate F tests showed confident and unconfident portraits to be differentiated on the Leadership ( $F_{1,102}=5.66, p<.05$ ) and Humility ( $F_{1,102}=9.36, p<.005$ ) factors; there was also a non-significant tendency for unconfident actors to be seen as more Agreeable ( $F_{1,102}=3.12, p=.08$ ). The portraits did not differ significantly on Resourcefulness ( $F_{1,102}=1.00$ ), Social Attractiveness ( $F_{1,102}=0.26$ ), or Emotion ( $F_{1,102}=2.19$ ). If one takes the individual items as the basis of comparison<sup>19</sup> (Table 10), it emerges that a "confident" actor was seen as more of a leader, more dominant, confident, aggressive, assertive, active and intimidating, better educated, and less likeable, fair, or modest. The photographs were not differentiated on the performance dimensions of competence, intelligence or resourcefulness; the only result suggestive of performance connotations was that a confident actor was seen as better educated,

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<sup>19</sup> The 23 items were first subjected to an omnibus F test, showing, as had the weighted factor scores, a significant treatment effect ( $F_{23,80}=2.19, p<.01$ ).

| Dimension <sup>a</sup>       | Confident | Unconfident | F      | p.   |
|------------------------------|-----------|-------------|--------|------|
|                              |           |             | 1, 102 |      |
| <i>Leadership</i>            |           |             |        |      |
| Dominant-Submissive          | 4.70      | 3.93        | 7.93   | .006 |
| Leader-Follower              | 4.84      | 3.87        | 11.22  | .001 |
| Persuasive-Unpersuasive      | 4.18      | 4.11        | 0.06   | .80  |
| Confident-Unconfident        | 5.33      | 4.44        | 8.27   | .005 |
| Convincing-Unconvincing      | 4.75      | 4.30        | 3.17   | .078 |
| Aggressive-Unaggressive      | 4.26      | 3.33        | 10.06  | .002 |
| Assertive-Unassertive        | 5.18      | 4.30        | 9.23   | .003 |
| Active-Passive               | 4.79      | 4.16        | 5.53   | .02  |
| <i>Agreeableness</i>         |           |             |        |      |
| Reasonable-Unreasonable      | 4.42      | 4.69        | 1.31   | .26  |
| Likeable-Unlikeable          | 4.42      | 5.18        | 11.66  | .001 |
| Pleasant-Unpleasant          | 4.47      | 4.85        | 2.44   | .12  |
| Cooperative-Uncooperative    | 4.28      | 4.61        | 3.07   | .08  |
| <i>Resourcefulness</i>       |           |             |        |      |
| Resourceful-Unresourceful    | 4.58      | 4.49        | 0.05   | .82  |
| Educated-Uneducated          | 5.18      | 4.62        | 6.19   | .01  |
| Competent-Incompetent        | 4.95      | 4.69        | 1.20   | .28  |
| <i>Social Attractiveness</i> |           |             |        |      |
| Honest-Dishonest             | 4.54      | 4.92        | 2.33   | .13  |
| Attractive-Unattractive      | 4.53      | 4.31        | 1.31   | .25  |
| Intelligent-Unintelligent    | 4.89      | 4.64        | 1.07   | .31  |
| Fair-Unfair                  | 4.37      | 4.84        | 5.70   | .02  |
| <i>Humility</i>              |           |             |        |      |
| Intimidating-Fearful         | 4.67      | 4.02        | 7.56   | .007 |
| Modest-Egotistical           | 3.49      | 4.41        | 11.96  | .001 |
| <i>Emotion</i>               |           |             |        |      |
| Relaxed-Tense                | 3.68      | 3.93        | 0.85   | .36  |
| Positive-Negative            | 4.26      | 4.66        | 2.83   | .10  |

<sup>a</sup> Items are arranged in blocks according to factor loading, and are scored in the direction of the first of each adjective pair. Factor labels in italics.

**Table 10.** *Ratings of confident and unconfident stimulus photographs.*

suggesting a link with a salient diffuse status characteristic, if not directly with performance.

### 10.3.2 Influence

| <b>DEMEANOUR</b> |                    |                              |                             |                |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|
| <b>STATUS</b>    | <b>Unconfident</b> | <b>Confident</b>             | <b>Not Visible</b>          | <b>TOTALS</b>  |
| <b>Low</b>       | 9.72<br>(7.36)     | 10.77 <sup>c</sup><br>(7.92) | 8.99 <sup>b</sup><br>(3.67) | 9.87<br>(6.51) |
| <b>High</b>      | 8.65<br>(3.78)     | 10.33 <sup>a</sup><br>(7.07) | 6.36 <sup>a</sup><br>(2.20) | 8.44<br>(4.99) |
| <b>TOTALS</b>    | 9.19<br>(5.76)     | 10.57<br>(7.42)              | 7.72<br>(3.28)              | 9.19<br>(5.85) |

S.D.s in parentheses. N for each cell=13, except where noted.

<sup>a</sup>N=14

<sup>b</sup>N=15

<sup>c</sup>N=17

**Table 11.** *Mean deviation from targets' estimates of % shaded area, by demeanour and status of target.*

Table 11 shows the extent to which respondents' estimates differed from those of the reference actors under the three behavioural and two status conditions. A 3-way (actor by demeanour by status)



analysis of variance returned main effects for both status ( $F_{1,38}=11.01$ ,  $p<.005$ ) and demeanour ( $F_{2,38}=4.02$ ,  $p<.05$ ). As is apparent from Table 11, high-status actors were more influential than low-status actors. The demeanour effect, meanwhile, is mainly due to the fact that actors whose behaviour could not be monitored were more influential (or less resisted) than either confident or unconfident actors ( $t=2.75$ ,  $p<.01$ ). What is of interest to the present debate is that a confident appearance yielded no influence advantage over an unconfident one ( $t=.56$ ), the figures, in fact, tending to favour the latter. Although the influence of status appeared to be concentrated in the face-obscured condition, there was no status-demeanour interaction ( $F_{2,38}=.34$ ). From a status-confirmation standpoint, it is clear that status did not play a mediating role in subjects' receptiveness to influence from confident or unconfident actors. Responses varied for the different actors ( $F_{7,38}=23.55$ ,  $p<.0005$ ), and interactions of actor with status ( $F_{7,38}=3.73$ ,  $p<.005$ ) and demeanour ( $F_{14,38}=3.47$ ,  $p<.005$ ) were also noted; these effects defy a simple interpretation, however, as the variable *actor* subsumed all things that varied with the source of the reference booklets, including gender, (accuracy of) estimates, and appearance.

### 10.3.2.1 Post-experimental ratings

The post-session questionnaire showed rated helpfulness of the reference actors' estimates to be unaffected by any of the manipulated variables. Subjects' ratings of the target's ability differed according to who the target was ( $F_{7,37}=4.54$ ,  $p<.005$ ), but was unaffected by either status ( $F_{1,37}=0.66$ ) or demeanour ( $F_{2,37}=1.74$ ). However, subjects interacting with unconfident others rated their own ability less highly than those in the other two conditions ( $F_{2,37}=3.46$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Conversely,

self-rated ability was higher for those interacting with low status as compared to high-status others ( $F_{1,37}=7.88, p<.01$ ); as if in compensation, estimates of the other's self-rating also tended to favour the low-status actor, though not significantly so ( $F_{1,37}=3.61, p<.07$ ). Table 12 refers. Overall, participants rated their own ability more highly than the other's ( $t_{84}=2.96, p<.005$ ), and estimated the other's self-rating as higher still ( $t_{84}=2.19, p<.05$ ), indicative, perhaps, of a norm of immodesty.

| Status           | Rated Ability |      |      |      |             |      |
|------------------|---------------|------|------|------|-------------|------|
|                  | Other's       |      | Own  |      | Other's own |      |
|                  | Low           | High | Low  | High | Low         | High |
| <b>Demeanour</b> |               |      |      |      |             |      |
| Unconfident      | 6.54          | 5.50 | 6.46 | 5.83 | 7.15        | 6.67 |
| Confident        | 5.94          | 5.36 | 7.35 | 6.29 | 7.18        | 6.79 |
| Not Visible      | 6.20          | 6.50 | 7.20 | 6.43 | 7.33        | 6.29 |
| <b>Totals</b>    | 6.20          | 5.80 | 7.04 | 6.20 | 7.22        | 6.58 |

**Table 12.** *Mean ability ratings, by demeanour and status of target.*

## 10.4 DISCUSSION

### 10.4.1 Implications for task cues

The two phases of this study explored separate aspects of subjects' reactions to behavioural signals that an actor is confident and disposed to lead. As regards the implications for task cues, the initial questions to be considered are whether the reaction these signals invite from coactors (1) extends to the attribution of ability commensurate with apparent confidence, and (2) promotes task influence. The present findings do not support an affirmative answer to either question, although they deny the second more strongly than the first. Firstly, the perception of actors as confident and leadership-oriented did not enhance their perceived competence or intelligence. Secondly, subjects were quite as inclined to resist the influence of confident as of unconfident actors. These results were obtained under circumstances in which status and performance were controlled for, and only the minimum conditions necessary for an expectation states explanation - a subject's ability to monitor a coactor's nonverbal cues - were met. They appear to provide little encouragement for the notion that the perception alone of nonverbal confidence gives rise to performance attributions, and thence to influence.

The possibility of demeanour-related performance attributions cannot be entirely dismissed, given that a confident actor was perceived to be better educated - suggesting a potential status advantage - and (marginally) more convincing. Significantly, the failure of these perceptions to translate into influence is a reminder that impressions

or expectations - including expectations of competence - should not be presumed to be synonymous with causal expectation states<sup>20</sup>.

In defense of task cues, it might be argued that the rating of confident actors as more dominant, aggressive, unlikeable, intimidating, and egotistical signified a dominance cue pattern, which would not, therefore, predict influence. In opposition to this stands the fact that Ridgeway (1987) found a similar pattern for task cues - her target's influential high-task performance being seen as more intimidating, demanding of agreement, dismissive of other, and threatening than the low-task role. Although the effect for likeableness differs between the two studies, likeableness is not a criterion for influence (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974). It may well be that confidence viewed from a safe distance will be responded to with similar disdain and resistance as will the behavioural excesses classified as dominance cues, functionally equating the two kinds of behaviour; it must be said, however, that the ability to convey threat or coercion through a photograph is unlikely to be great.

This point raises the more telling question of whether the communication of confidence by means of a photograph, only, might have produced too weak a stimulus to elicit performance expectations. This quite plausible argument relies, however, on an invidious comparison of behavioural cues with status characteristics. Innumerable studies, this one included, have demonstrated the readiness with which individuals' judgments are influenced by another's status, this often presumed on the basis of minimal information. Participants in the present study were able to witness

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<sup>20</sup> Indeed, in the social influence experiment, high-status stimulus actors, although more influential than low-status actors, were not rated as having greater ability at the spatial judgement task.

their coactors' confidence cues, but were screened from a "whites of the eyes" encounter, in order to rule out the possibility of explanation in terms of interpersonal pressures. If the invoking of expectation states through behavioural confidence requires a materially stronger or more immediate stimulus than does status, we need to reconsider the way in which the explanatory mechanisms of status might be extended to behaviour. An entirely cognitive framework may not be enough<sup>21</sup>.

The limitations of a task cues explanation are further suggested by the observation that confident actors were less influential than those in the face-obscured condition, whose approach to the task was left to a coactor's imagination. One interpretation is that, compared to an actor whose demeanour could not be monitored, a confident one was accorded resistance rather than deference (as, less surprisingly, was an unconfident one). Indeed, it may be that, if an individual is given the opportunity to reflect, unencumbered, on a colleague's confident behaviour, the outcome of such reflection tends more to defiance than acceptance. The effect resembles that of a simple act of self-assertion - of meeting confidence with confidence - under circumstances in which there are no strong constraints against such a response.

Alternative explanations of the different reactions to obscured versus visible faces, generally, are possible. One such is that the obscured photographs, in leaving the other's appearance to a subject's imagination, represented an ideal situation that the unobscured representation of actors' looks or demeanour failed to match. Another

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<sup>21</sup> What is under consideration here is the communication of behavioural or situational confidence, which is qualitatively different from the communication of confidence in one's argument (e.g., Maslow, Yoselson and London, 1971; Nemeth et al., 1977); the latter is more appropriately classified as a task performance variable, and might reasonably be expected to be primarily dependent on cognitive processing for its effect.

is that the greater resistance to the influence of visible others, overall, was related to subjects' sense of familiarity or comfort with the identity of the person with whom they had to deal. A third possibility is that subjects were simply more involved in the exercise, finding the situation less contrived or more personal, when the alleged other's face was visible. None of these possibilities, of course, detracts from the finding that a confident appearance was not more influential than an unconfident one.

#### **10.4.2 Implications for status-confirmation**

There is no support in these findings for an entirely cognitive version of the status-confirmation argument. This is despite the fact that the behavioural manipulation had an apparent status implication - relating to educational attainment - that the status manipulation used was able to confirm or refute. This makes the lack of a status-demeanour interaction more discouraging for a cognitive confirmation explanation than it might otherwise have been. One might be tempted to attribute the result to weakness of the status manipulation at the interpersonal level, on the grounds that the age advantage of many subjects over the high-status other may have diminished or nullified their educational status disadvantage. On the other hand, Tuzlak and Moore (1984) obtained a near-significant status-demeanour interaction in a design that used status equals exclusively in the high status condition. This would lead one to expect at least a hint of such an effect here. There is, however, nothing in these data to suggest that individuals appraised the behaviour of others, and responded according to the status-appropriateness of that behaviour.

The findings reported here, if reliable, suggest two possible conclusions. One is that behavioural confidence has no causal role to play, but is simply a covariate in status processes, owing its presumed effects *entirely* to its coincidence with status or competence. The evidence reviewed earlier (e.g., Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974<sup>22</sup>; Tuzlak and Moore, 1984) suggests this is unlikely. The other, more plausible conclusion is that for one actor's display of confidence to contribute to influence over another requires something more than the other's simple awareness of it. Whatever the precise mechanisms involved, it is likely that the operation of behavioural confidence is essentially a dynamic process that derives its power from elements peculiar to face-to-face encounter - even when this occurs via video monitor (Tuzlak and Moore, 1984) - and is not primarily dependent on cognitive processing for its effect. The further exploration of this possibility is reserved for a later section.

In summary, this study found that a more confident appearance, as conveyed by photograph, did not enhance an actor's influence, and both confident- and unconfident-looking actors were less influential than unseen ones. Although actors were more influential when appearing to be of high rather than low status, the effect of status was not mediated by apparent confidence. The results for demeanour are consistent with the argument that effects generally attributed to nonverbal confidence are due, in part at least, to the intrusion of

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<sup>22</sup> Nemeth and Wachtler (1974), it will be recalled, found that the ability of a confederate to influence a group decision was enhanced by the act of choosing a head seat, by comparison with being assigned the head seat or choosing a side seat. Lest this be seen as evidence for behavioural style alone, it should be noted that the confederate was armed with a well-rehearsed six-point argument, guaranteeing his ability to perform; what is of interest is the degree to which the exercise of this competence gained from a simple nonverbal act that took only a few seconds.

uncontrolled status and performance factors. Like the results of Experiment 1, they suggest the need for studies of nonverbal behaviour to differentiate between confidence displays and performance-related paralinguistic and other behaviours.

The findings do not support cognitive explanations of the effects of behavioural confidence, either alone or in interaction with status. The implications for the task cues formulation are not encouraging, as has been noted. From a status-confirmation perspective, the null result for behavioural confidence, supplementing that of Experiment 1, further supports the argument that behavioural cues will not normally qualify as a sole basis for influence. The lack of a significant interaction effect on influence has been interpreted in terms of its implications for the causal processes by which a status-confirmation effect might take place. This same finding, however, means that there is still no direct evidence of the status-related differences in the effects of demeanour on group influence that the theory predicts.



## CHAPTER 11:

### Experiment 5

#### 11.1 Rationale

The emphasis in the foregoing studies has been on exploring suggested limitations of alternative models, and testing and refining the theoretical basis of status-confirmation theory. In consequence, they have involved a number of experimental contrivances in which the need for control has been satisfied at the cost of mundane realism. The study now to be described was intended to investigate the social structure of existing (as opposed to experimentally-constituted) small groups in terms of the behavioural, status and competence characteristics of members, and to test findings against the predictions of each of the two-process, task cues, and status-confirmation theories. The methods used were designed to be minimally intrusive, and to make use, as far as possible, of available data on both the status characteristics present - specific and diffuse - and behavioural style. The diversity of ways in which behavioural confidence manifests itself dictated the desirability of using a single indicator of the likelihood of occurrence of one or other of this category of behaviours. A dispositional measure was selected for this purpose, for reasons that follow.

## 11.2 Use of the Extraversion scale of the EPQ as a behavioural index

The Extraversion (E) scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) was used as an index of a person's disposition to behave in a status-claiming manner. The appropriateness of this novel use of the measure is indicated, in the first instance, by the content of scale items - e.g., "Are you a talkative person?"; "Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?"; "Do you nearly always have a 'ready answer' when people talk to you?" - reflecting the underlying dimensions of sociability, activity and impulsiveness (Eysenck, 1967; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975).

Justification for this use goes beyond face validity, however, in that there is considerable evidence that introverts and extraverts differ in their use of the sorts of behaviours that are of interest here. Thus, Carment, Miles and Cervin (1965) found that when high-intelligence extraverts were paired with high-intelligence introverts, the former would speak first and speak more. Campbell and Rushton (1978), using female subjects, found extraverts talked more than introverts in discussion with a female experimenter. Rutter, Morley and Graham (1972) reported a similar advantage in the initiation of speech bursts in conversation with an experimenter, as well as differences in the initiation of eye-contact and the amount of looking while speaking.

Kendon and Cook (1969) had eleven subjects interact with each of four others, and found a positive relationship between extraversion and a subject's mean frequency of looking while speaking; Mobbs (1968) with a similarly small sample, reported that extraverts looked at a

confederate more of the time than did introverts or neutrals. Positive relationships between extraversion and speed and volume of speech (Siegman, 1978), and assertiveness (Hernandez and Mauger, 1980), and a negative relationship with self-reported shyness (Pilkonis, 1977), have also been reported.

A number of studies have explored preferred interpersonal distances. Two studies found that extraverts would approach an interviewer more closely and talk for longer (Leipold, 1963, cited in Wilson, 1977; Patterson and Holmes, 1966), although the latter study involved female subjects and a male interviewer, and its result may simply have reflected allusions to cross-sex interaction in the extraversion scale used<sup>23</sup>. Cook (1970) found that extraverts chose to sit closer to, and to sit next to or opposite another person more often than introverts, who preferred a right angle orientation. Pedersen (1973) reported a small negative correlation between extraversion and minimum comfortable interpersonal standing distance. Two studies found no relationship with chosen seating distance, although one of these employed a rather insensitive measure, involving chairs placed at intervals of 3ft. (Meisels and Canter, 1970), and the other did find extraverts able to tolerate greater proximity when approached by another person (Williams, 1971). See Patterson (1982) and Wilson (1977; 1981) for summaries of research in the area.

Further, though rather more tentative support for the proposed use of the measure may be found at another level. These personality-behaviour associations are generally explained either in terms of the greater social interest of the confident, assertive extravert or, at the

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<sup>23</sup> Eysenck's (1959) MPI. Of the studies reviewed, all but one used either the MPI, or Eysenck and Eysenck's (1959) EPI, or (1975) EPQ; Mobbs (1968) employed Heron's (1956) sociability scale.

physiological level, by reference to the extravert's greater need for arousal (Cook, 1970; Wilson, 1977; 1981). The latter explanation derives from the view of extraverts as chronically under-aroused, and thus more tolerant of, and indeed seekers of, arousing stimuli (Eysenck, 1967). It is interesting to compare this, in turn, with Mazur's "outstressing" argument for the operation of dominance cues in dyadic interaction. Mazur has argued that dominance signals, such as the maintenance of eye-contact, are stress-inducing, and that status hierarchies emerge out of individuals' differential ability to tolerate that stress (Mazur et al., 1980; Mazur, 1985). Although the proposition linking this process to autonomic nervous system reactivity has not been supported<sup>24</sup>, self-reported comfort during a staredown has been found to predict performance on a composite measure of speech initiation and influence (Mazur et al., 1980), which, regrettably, confounds what would be independent and dependent variables respectively from the perspective of the present study. These observations must be further tempered with the acknowledgement that staredowns and other extreme attempts at domination and coercion of the kind Ridgeway (1984, 1987; Ridgeway and Berger, 1986; Ridgeway and Diekema, 1989) has called dominance cues, although probably on a continuum with the behaviours that are of concern to this paper, may not be representative of them.

Questions of biological mechanisms aside, if we assume that extraversion is, indeed, a reliable indicator of the kinds of behaviours in question, what should we expect to find when an extraverted behavioural style and both diffuse and specific status are examined

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<sup>24</sup> Eysenck, it will be noted, invokes ARAS underactivity and not ANS activity as the basis for extraversion.

simultaneously for their effects on influence? The three theoretical perspectives considered predict three different outcomes.

### **11.3 Predictions**

#### **11.3.1 Behaviour as stimulus**

Two-process theory (Lee, 1979; Lee and Ofshe, 1981) holds that people respond reflexively to deference-demanding behaviours of the kind that high-status individuals tend to use. This perspective sees status as a mere covariate in the influence process, and would predict a main effect for behaviour. The ability of status to influence behaviour might also be expected to show up in weaker effects for status, although the causal agent in this event would again be behaviour, albeit not as directly measured. No interaction effects would be expected. The predicted pattern would be Behaviour > Diffuse status & Competence.

#### **11.3.2 Behaviour as cue**

Expectation states theorists emphasize the historical association of behavioural task cues with status characteristics, and conclude that these cues themselves come to invoke the performance expectations of, and produce the same effects as status (Berger and Zelditch, 1983; Berger et al., 1986; Ridgeway, 1984; Ridgeway et al., 1985). As regards the joint action of the variables, some debate has surrounded the reaction to multiple status characteristics, with both combining and discounting

explanations being proposed. To date, the balance of evidence favours the view that people combine status information (Norman, Smith and Berger, 1988). Thus, in the absence of a behavioural dimension, the most pronounced effects would be expected where diffuse and specific status were congruent (both high or both low), with intermediate effects occurring for incongruent characteristics. The contribution of behavioural task cues should be similarly additive, and individually greater than that of diffuse status (Berger et al., 1986), though presumably less than or equal to that of specific status. EST would therefore predict no interaction effects, and only a series of main effects of different size, in the order: Competence  $\geq$  Behaviour  $>$  Diffuse status.

### 11.3.3 Behaviour as claim

The status-confirmation approach identifies two ways in which behavioural style can exert an effect. It proposes that what might be described as the symbolic or expressive function of behavioural confidence, its claiming of situational status, will be differentially successful for high and low-status individuals. Influence exerted by the low-status extravert should differ little, if at all, from that of an introvert of similar status, because of the illegitimacy of the former's claim to rank. It remains to be determined whether a status-claiming demeanour is a *prerequisite* for the attainment of situational status; if it is, intermediate and high-status introverts should be disadvantaged, relative to extraverts of like status, by a lesser ability to claim the rank due to them. These effects would show up as an interaction between status and behaviour.

The absence of an interaction of this kind would not, however, rule out the possibility that rank must be claimed behaviourally to be accorded. Indications that behaviour, or perceived behaviour, will not be predominantly a function of personality, may be found in the documented tendency for status to influence behaviour (chapter 4), the tendency for high-status individuals to receive more interaction opportunities, and evidence that *perceived* confidence and assertiveness may increase with status, as noted earlier. Similarly, in so far as a high level of verbal activity, and the ability to make oneself noticed, will enhance the communication of opinion, an extraverted behavioural style should confer some general performance advantage over introversion at most levels of competence. A status-confirmation model thus does not rule out main effects for both status and extraversion; the likely order (following EST's identification of the relative power of specific and diffuse status) being Competence > Diffuse status > Behaviour.

Underlying the differences between these three theoretical stances are fundamental disagreements as to whether behavioural differences between individuals are either a necessary or sufficient condition for social influence. Two-process theory, in arguing that situational status is the product of behavioural differentiation alone, depicts behaviour as both necessary and sufficient cause. Status characteristics theory, for all the heated disputation with the other (Berger and Zelditch, 1983; Greenstein, 1983; Ofshe and Lee, 1983), accepts the view that behaviour is causally sufficient, but disputes that it is indeed necessary. Status-confirmation theory differs from both, and argues that behavioural confidence per se is not sufficient cause except in the unlikely circumstance that status or competence

information will be absent. The view of behavioural confidence as a necessary condition is subject to the observation, noted earlier, that the chances of appearing to be behaving confidently are rather weighted in favour of those high in external status.

#### 11.4 METHOD

Subjects of the study were 218 members of first-year tutorial classes in psychology, enrolled in one of three successive years. They were selected on the basis of their having completed the EPQ in beginning-of-year testing sessions, in which all students were encouraged to participate. The use of undergraduate students in an academic setting allowed the inclusion of age<sup>25</sup> as a salient diffuse status characteristic, and end-of-year subject mark as a specific characteristic, appropriate to the influence measure used. Ages fell between 16 and 45 years, although 40% of the sample started the year as 17-year-olds. The ratio of females to males was 150:68.

The sole dependent variable was each individual's rated influence within his or her tutorial group; the judgments were made by the group tutors at the end of the academic year. For this purpose, tutors were provided with seven-point scales labelled "not at all" and "extremely" at the poles, and a list of names of target students who had been in tutorial groups under their supervision in the just-completed year. They were asked to consider, for each person named, and the tutorial group of which that person was a member, the following scenario: "If that group were convened in your absence, after the last

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<sup>25</sup> This is something of a catch-all, in that it is likely to encompass other bases for differentiation, such as occupational status, worldly experience, etc.



tutorial of the year, to discuss and prepare a joint response to a psychological question, how influential do you think the person named would have been within the group in its execution of this task?" (see Appendix E1). An oral briefing accompanying the initial approach to each tutor identified the concept of influence as positive in direction, as distinct from reactance. Otherwise, the raters were naive as to the purpose of and conceptual basis for the study. They reported no difficulty making the ratings, and several volunteered the information that the scenario was a familiar one to them. From a methodological standpoint, it was considered that the presence of tutors within the groups was unlikely to have had a serious distorting effect on group functioning, particularly by the end of academic year. In addition, the tutors' familiarity with the groups may have diminished discrepancies sometimes found between peer and observer ratings of leadership (Mann, 1959). That the tutor represents an attendant authority figure is similarly unexceptional: It is difficult to conceive of a group that does not exist in relation to some external authority structure, be it in the form of court officials or social psychological experimenters. Eight tutors contributed, four of them throughout the full three years, who were responsible in all for three-quarters of the data. Three of the remaining tutors contributed only 10% between them, and were treated as a single source in the subsequent analyses. Ninety-three percent of ratings were made by female tutors<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> Subject sex was not used as a status characteristic, as it was felt the predominance of female subjects and the groups' existence in a predominantly female authority structure (see Geis, Boston and Hoffman, 1985) rendered strong gender effects unlikely. Preliminary analysis supported this view (see Table 13).

## 11.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

|              | Influence | Age    | Extraversion | Competence |
|--------------|-----------|--------|--------------|------------|
| Age          | .27***    |        |              |            |
| Extraversion | .20**     | -.23** |              |            |
| Competence   | .37***    | .06    | -.13         |            |
| Gender       | -.08      | 0      | .02          | .16*       |

\* p<.05  
 \*\* p<.005  
 \*\*\* p<.0005

**Table 13.** *Partial correlations between influence and predictor variables.*

Table 13 lists the partial correlations between the variables. Competence, age and extraversion were confirmed as predictors of influence; the point-biserial correlation for gender was not significant. The small correlation between gender and competence reflects the greater mean mark of females (64.1% vs 60.6%). Extraversion was negatively related to age.

For further analysis, extraversion was dichotomised at the median (15). Age and competence were trichotomised. In the case of age, which had a highly skewed distribution, the most even division was into under 18 (44%), 18-19 (29%), and over 19 year age groups (27%). For competence, divisions were at the 34th and 67th percentiles, corresponding to assessed marks of 59% and 68%. Influence scores were then subjected to a 6x2x3x3 (rater, extraversion, competence, age) analysis of variance, using a step-down procedure. Factors were entered

into the analysis in order of effect size, identified by a preliminary analysis of main effects and first-order interactions using an experimental-design analysis of variance, which processes main effects before interactions, and is recommended by Overall and Klett (1972) for unbalanced designs. Empty cells ruled out three-way interactions involving rater, and prevented the exclusive use of the experimental-design approach. The resultant analysis explained 54% of the variance. There was no significant difference between raters, although a first-order interaction indicated that judges differed in the degree to which they differentiated between more or less extraverted individuals ( $F_{5,133}=3.99$ ,  $p<.005$ ). This appeared to reflect differences between the variously-sized sub-samples (e.g., in distribution of abilities, and group constitution), rather than different judgemental styles; subsequent analysis with a more uniform sub-set of the data, as reported later, showed no sign of such an interaction.

Main effects were noted for all three predictor variables. The strongest effect was for competence ( $\eta^2=.30$ ;  $F_{2,133}=28.85$ ,  $p<.0005$ ), mean influence ratings for high, mid and low competence groups being 5.7, 4.8, and 3.8, respectively (see Appendix E2). The main effect for age status ( $\eta^2=.14$ ;  $F_{2,133}=10.85$ ,  $p<.0005$ ) was primarily traceable to the substantially higher ratings received by those high on this dimension (5.7) than those of low (4.5) and mid (4.4) classification. Extraverts (4.9) were more influential than introverts (4.6;  $\eta^2=.05$ ;  $F_{1,133}=7.12$ ,  $p<.01$ ).

This rank ordering of main effects - particularly the relative weakness of the extraversion effect as compared with those of the two status dimensions - clearly does not favour two-process theory, with its emphasis on the pre-eminence of behaviour. Moreover, the effects for

the status variables are too strong, by comparison, to be explained exclusively in terms of status-associated behavioural differences; such an explanation would require competence to be a 6-times better predictor of behaviour, and age almost 3 times better, than extraversion. The finding is consistent with the lack of empirical support for the behavioural model noted earlier.


In accord with an expectation states explanation, specific status (competence) had a stronger effect than diffuse status (age). Contrary to EST's claims for task cues, however, the effect of the behavioural measure did not exceed that of diffuse status. The smallness of effect of extraversion, unless one attributes it to shortcomings in the use of the measure<sup>27</sup>, is consistent only with a status-confirmation explanation, wherein the effect of behavioural confidence is conceived of as largely conditional upon status.

Status-confirmation theory receives further apparent endorsement from the three-way interaction of extraversion with specific and diffuse status ( $\eta^2=.08$ ;  $F_{4,133}=3.08$ ,  $p<.05$ ). As Figure 1 shows, the pattern is rather too complex to permit a simple interpretation. The Least Significant Difference procedure was used to identify six homogeneous subsets in the data. These were reduced to a three-tiered classification through the subsequent elimination of cases of overlapping membership. (Although descriptively useful, this ordering of data does not, of course, permit the conclusion that any two values in adjacent bands will be significantly different.) The high-influence band can be seen to comprise Low E subjects ranked high on

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<sup>27</sup> The interpretation of ordinal relationships between variables is, of course, constrained by the extent to which an obtained size of effect may be assumed to reflect that in real life. In the present study, as will be seen, interpretations suggested by data of this kind are supported by the results of subsequent analyses that are not similarly constrained.

one status dimension, and at least mid-ranked on the other; or High E subjects ranked high-high, high-low, or mid-mid. The lowest influence group consists of Low E subjects of low or average age status and competence, and High E low-competence subjects of low or average age status.



**Figure 1.** *Rated influence as a function of extraversion, status, and competence.*

|              |      | STATUS COMBINATION <sup>a</sup> |       |       |       |      |      |       |
|--------------|------|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|
|              |      | L-L                             | L-M * | M-M * | L-H * | M-H  | H-H  | Total |
| Extraversion |      |                                 |       |       |       |      |      |       |
| Low          | Mean | 3.17                            | 3.42  | 4.00  | 4.94  | 6.00 | 6.00 | 4.58  |
|              | SD   | 1.95                            | 1.84  | 2.00  | 1.46  | 1.21 | 1.07 | 1.89  |
|              | N    | 12                              | 24    | 9     | 33    | 12   | 15   | 105   |
| High         | Mean | 3.17                            | 4.40  | 6.00  | 6.00  | 5.00 | 6.36 | 4.93  |
|              | SD   | 1.90                            | 1.72  | 1.70  | 1.12  | 1.46 | 1.03 | 1.81  |
|              | N    | 12                              | 47    | 10    | 17    | 16   | 11   | 113   |
| Total        | Mean | 3.17                            | 4.07  | 5.05  | 5.30  | 5.43 | 6.15 | 4.76  |
|              | SD   | 1.88                            | 1.81  | 2.07  | 1.43  | 1.43 | 1.05 | 1.04  |

<sup>a</sup> Denotes possible combinations of Low (L), Mid (M), or High (H) rank on diffuse and specific status dimensions, irrespective of order.

\* Low E and High E means significantly different by LSD procedure ( $p < .05$ ).

**Table 14.** *Rated influence as a function of extraversion and combined status.*

The generally linear pattern of effect of each variable is interrupted by two dips in the High E graph where a mild (high-mid) status incongruence obtains. The impression given is that, unlike the apparent discounting of the low status in the clearly incongruent (low-high) situation, discounting of the *high* status<sup>28</sup> was occurring when high rank on one dimension coincided with average rank on the other. Subsequent analysis did not support this interpretation, however.

Table 14 lists the means and standard deviations when the distinction

<sup>28</sup> The situation resembles discounting of high status rather than combining of high and mid, as comparison with the mid-mid cell indicates.

between diffuse and specific status is ignored, and the data are organised by degree of status congruence. Application of the LSD procedure confirmed that extraversion differentiated the influence ratings of subjects at all intermediate combinations of status, bar mid-high, and the high E mean at this classification was significantly lower only than that of high E individuals of congruent high status. Nonetheless, this hint of a counter-effect for extraversion where high status on one dimension coincided with average standing on the other raises the possibility that behavioural style might moderate reactions to multiple status characteristics differentially, as a complex function of the degree of status ambiguity. But for the behavioural factor, of course, the pattern would simply document the additive effect of two status dimensions on influence.

| Predicted  |              | Observed         |            |
|------------|--------------|------------------|------------|
| EST        | Confirmation | E (Median split) | E vs I     |
| HE-HC-HS > | HE-HC-HS >   | HE-HC-HS >       | HE-LC-HS > |
| HE-HC-LS > | HE-HC-LS >   | HE-LC-HS >       | HE-HC-HS > |
| LE-HC-HS ≥ | HE-LC-HS >   | LE-HC-HS >       | HE-HC-LS > |
| HE-LC-HS > | LE-HC-HS >   | HE-HC-LS >       | LE-HC-HS > |
| LE-HC-LS ≥ | LE-HC-LS >   | LE-HC-LS >       | LE-HC-LS > |
| HE-LC-LS > | LE-LC-HS >   | LE-LC-HS >       | LE-LC-HS > |
| LE-LC-HS > | HE-LC-LS >   | HE-LC-LS =       | LE-LC-LS = |
| LE-LC-LS   | LE-LC-LS     | LE-LC-LS         | HE-LC-LS   |

**Table 15.** *Predicted and observed rank-ordering of mean influence ratings by extraversion, age status, and competence.*

Meanwhile, consideration of the relative merits of the status-confirmation and task cue explanations is better served by study of the effects of extraversion at the more familiar extremes of status: the eight combinations of low or high E, age status, and competence (n=100). At the simplest level one can compare the rank order of effects predicted by the two theories with those found. The first 3 columns of Table 15 refer. This is a fairly insensitive measure, however, as the two predicted profiles are very similar. The similarity of the Spearman rank-order correlations between prediction and the obtained orderings - .86 for EST and .92 for status-confirmation ( $p < .05$  in each case) - is not surprising, therefore.

| High E   | HE-LS-LC |    |                |                | HE-LS-HC |    |                |                | HE-HS-LC |    |                |                | HE-HS-HC |    |                |                |
|----------|----------|----|----------------|----------------|----------|----|----------------|----------------|----------|----|----------------|----------------|----------|----|----------------|----------------|
| Low E    | ES       | SC | M              | EI             | ES       | SC | M              | EI             | ES       | SC | M              | EI             | ES       | SC | M              | EI             |
| LE-LS-LC | <        | =  | = <sup>b</sup> | > <sup>c</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>*</sup> | < <sup>*</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>*</sup> | < <sup>*</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>*</sup> | < <sup>*</sup> |
| LE-LS-HC | =        | >  | > <sup>*</sup> | > <sup>*</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>c</sup> | < <sup>*</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>c</sup> | < <sup>*</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>*</sup> | < <sup>*</sup> |
| LE-HS-LC | <        | >  | > <sup>*</sup> | > <sup>*</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>*</sup> | < <sup>c</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>*</sup> | < <sup>*</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>*</sup> | < <sup>*</sup> |
| LE-HS-HC | >        | >  | > <sup>*</sup> | > <sup>*</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>b</sup> | < <sup>b</sup> | ≤        | <  | < <sup>b</sup> | < <sup>c</sup> | <        | <  | < <sup>c</sup> | < <sup>c</sup> |

<sup>a</sup> Symbols denote relationship of row value to column value, as predicted by expectation states (ES) or status-confirmation (SC) theories; or as obtained with median split (M) or extreme (EI) Extraversion dichotomy.

<sup>b</sup> Cell means equal, or differing by less than 5% of row value in indicated direction.

<sup>c</sup> Non-significant difference in indicated direction.

<sup>\*</sup> Significant difference in indicated direction by LSD procedure ( $P < .05$ ).

**Table 16.** *Observed and predicted relative<sup>a</sup> influence of Low E and High E subjects as a function of age status (S) and competence (C).*



A higher degree of precision is obtainable when we consider the predicted and actual differences in effect of various combinations of status and extraversion. Table 16 considers all low E combinations against all high E combinations. The columns headed ES and SC indicate the predicted relationship under expectation states theory and status-confirmation theory respectively; column M reports the actual finding. Again, the pattern of predictions is the same for 12 of the 16 cells, and in these cases is almost universally supported. In one of the four circumstances in which EST and status-confirmation predict different outcomes - HE-HS-LC vs LE-HS-HC - the result is inconclusive; the remaining three favour status-confirmation. Those three results all involve on one side the pairing of high E with low age status and competence, and warrant rather closer inspection.

Where status-confirmation theory differs most from the other theories is, as noted earlier, on the ability of behaviour *alone* to contribute to influence. Both EST and two-process theory depict nonverbal behavioural style as causal, and as either a status-alternative or sole route to influence. In a status-confirmation framework, on the other hand, status-claiming behaviour is portrayed as provisional: as dependent for its legitimacy on status or competence. Even the non-expressive aspect of such behaviour - its ability to enhance (through talkativeness, for example) the communication of a point of view - assumes a certain degree of competence on the part of the communicator. Where the divergence between predictions made by causal and provisional explanations will be most pronounced, therefore, will be at the lowest levels of status and competence.

The present findings indicate that, whereas extraversion is implicated at various combinations of specific and diffuse status, it does

not differentiate the influence of individuals low on both status dimensions nor those high on both. At these two extremes, people are, respectively, low in influence or highly influential, irrespective of behavioural disposition. The result for high-status individuals supports neither task cues or status-confirmation theories emphatically, but can be accommodated by both<sup>29</sup>. The result for low status accords only with a confirmation explanation, which asserts the ineffectualness of behavioural confidence in the absence of legitimating status.

This explanation, of course, assumes that the behaviours of low-status individuals high or low on extraversion actually differed, at least initially. What is the likelihood they did not? Considerable debate has surrounded the utility of trait measures as predictors of behaviour, following Mischel's (1968) questioning of the assumption that behaviours show more than a small degree of cross-situational consistency. Subsequent formulations place varying degrees of emphasis on the role of situation and context as determinants of the likelihood a particular behaviour will occur (e.g., Endler and Magnusson, 1976; Wright and Mischel, 1987).

On the assumption that the problem of low trait-behaviour consistency will be most pronounced for those in the middle of a dimension, whose membership of either category is questionable

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<sup>29</sup> The tendency for high status group members to receive more interaction opportunities, and to be perceived as more assertive, etc., has been discussed. This has the potential effect of reducing actual or perceived differences in behaviour of introverts and extraverts of high status. Expectation states theorists might also point to limited sensitivity, particularly at the upper end, of the 7-point scale used to measure influence. Alternatively, applying the *method of organised subsets* to include task cues might predict a similar result. This principle proposes that the incremental increase in effect of multiple consistent status characteristics diminishes as the number of such characteristics increases (Norman et al., 1988). Other explanations are considered later in this paper.


(Argyle, 1976), the analyses above were repeated using as category boundaries E scores of 11 and 17, corresponding to the 31st and 68th percentiles. Figure 2 shows the pattern of cell means (see also Appendix E3). A 2x2x2 analysis of variance<sup>30</sup> using the classical experimental approach revealed main effects for competence ( $F_{1,56}=32.80$ ,  $p<.0005$ ) and age status ( $F_{1,56}=17.00$ ,  $p<.0005$ ), and a marginal effect for extraversion ( $F_{1,56}=2.83$ ,  $p<.1$ ). A two-way interaction of age status and competence ( $F_{1,56}=9.42$ ,  $p<.005$ ) reflected the tendency, consistent with the principle of organised subsets, for the added contribution of a high status to be greater when rank on the other was low than when it, too, was high.

More significantly, a 3-way interaction of extraversion with age status and competence ( $F_{1,56}=5.74$ ,  $p<.05$ ) indicated that the combined effects of the two status dimensions again differed for extraverts and introverts. LSD comparisons of means confirm that extraverts high on either diffuse or specific status were more influential than introverts of the same status. Extraversion did not differentiate individuals of congruent high or, more importantly, low status, and group members who ranked low on both status dimensions were significantly less influential than all other sub-groups. Overall, the pattern with this smaller sample ( $n=64$ ) mirrors that of the larger grouping. The rank ordering of effects, seen in the last column of Table 15, correlates .91 and .79 ( $p<.05$ ) with those predicted by status-confirmation and task cues theories, respectively. Column EI of Table 16 shows the relationship between observation and prediction. The only noteworthy

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<sup>30</sup> Empty cells led to the exclusion of *rater* as a factor, after it was established that there were neither main nor interaction effects for this variable.

change with this more extreme dichotomy is a non-significant anti-extravert tendency for those of congruent low status.



**Figure 2.** *Rated influence of introverts and extraverts as a function of status and competence.*

Again, use of this more rigorous classification of extraverts and introverts does not guarantee that low-status introverts and extraverts behaved in different ways. At the same time, the effect of extraversion at other combinations of specific and diffuse status rules out any blanket dismissal of the dispositional measure. The possibility of a debilitating constraint on trait-consistent behaviour must then be sought specifically within the particular situation of low-status group members. Monson, Hesley and Chernick (1982), in a study with self-identified introverts and extraverts, found that the strength of situational pressures present was a strong determinant of trait-consistent behaviour. They found that subjects tended to behave in accordance with the trait when there were no strong pressures upon them to behave in either an extraverted or introverted manner. When there were such pressures, the ability of the trait to predict differences in the behaviours of introverts and extraverts diminished greatly. In addition, circumstances involving strong pressure for introverted behaviours emerged as a particular situation in which subjects' predictions of their own behaviour were unrelated to the trait.

The implications for the present study are equivocal. If we accept that low-status individuals may not have exhibited the behavioural characteristics presumed to differentiate extraverts and introverts because of pressure on them to act in an introverted manner, the question arises whether those pressures are not themselves indicative of the social legitimacy of extraverted behaviour by low-status people. This possibility does not diminish the observation that extraverted behaviour was not a successful strategy for low-status group members.

A still more conservative assessment would be one that assumes extraverts and introverts to be differentially equipped to benefit from

circumstances in which a confident, assertive manner is an advantage. On the strength of the present findings, those circumstances do not include the case of individuals whose status is either unambiguously high or unambiguously low.


If we set aside the causal claims made for behaviour, and view an extraverted behavioural style as the province of those of high status (external or situational, on the evidence reviewed earlier), this finding is not surprising. Competence and diffuse status can be considered to be instances of Hollander's (1958) *alpha value* and *beta value* variables: sources of the *idiosyncrasy credit* that licenses the high ranking individual to violate role expectations with relative impunity. It can be argued that both high-status introverts and low-status extraverts, if they act according to trait, violate the expectations held of them, and that such deviance will be more tolerated in the former, because of the greater idiosyncrasy credit accorded them. Low-status individuals whose deviance consists of a bearing and level of participation not befitting their station, might expect their presumption to be, at worst, punished, and, at best, not rewarded. See Wagner (1988) for a more detailed discussion of status violations of this kind.

A similar argument was presented by Ridgeway and Berger (1986; 1988), but with a crucial difference. These authors differentiate between group status orders that have been legitimated - that is, in which the distribution of power and prestige positions enjoys the implicit support of group members - and those yet to receive this "collective validation". They describe as *status markers* the appropriate use of task cues in a legitimated order, and as *status violations* the use of higher or lower levels of such cues than justified by rank. The more common status violations - those by low ranked actors seeking to

enhance their standing - are likely to be resisted in legitimated orders, but successful in groups in which the power and prestige order has not yet stabilised and acquired legitimacy. Consequently, it is the distinction between legitimated and non-legitimated orders that underlies whether or not task cues are sufficient cause of differentiation.

In effect, this is a distinction between the use of task cues in the initial stages of interaction, and their subsequent use, with only the former expected to be causal. It is in such a scenario, of course, with its relative lack of external constraints on individual behaviour, that one would expect the differences between extravert and introvert to be most sharply drawn. This makes the observed lack of influence of low-status extraverts especially problematic for the attribution of an independent causal role to behaviour. Although it might be argued that the structure of these groups may have changed in the course of a lifespan of nine months and some twenty meetings, this has rather more serious implications for the representativeness of the short-lived groups of laboratory experimentation.

One reservation remains to be considered. In this study, influence was treated as an individual characteristic, and analysed in terms of individual characteristics, without regard to group context. This reflects a concern with the reconciliation of different theoretical perspectives, and its broad implications for social influence processes, rather than with a detailed study of the hierarchical organisation of small groups per se. To the extent to which the latter can be addressed, Figure 3 shows the structure of the most fully represented group from each of the five main judges. Ranked in each case are the six or seven of the group members who saw the year out - typically numbering 8 to 10 - for whom data were available.



a Superscript denotes group number.

**Figure 3.** *Influence hierarchies in 5 groups<sup>a</sup>, as a function of competence, extraversion, and age status.*



A number of things are apparent. It is impossible to identify a clear leader in most cases, the tendency for several individuals to share top ranking probably reflecting the emphasis of the data collection procedure on individual ratings. There is general concordance between the patterns returned by different groups (and judges); in addition, the individual orderings are largely consistent with that suggested by the nomothetic analysis. At the same time, the influence of situational factors is evident; in group 3, which lacks a member of either high age status or high competence<sup>31</sup>, highest rank goes to low-status extraverts of moderate competence. The possible influence of factors not monitored here is evident in the relatively high rating in the fifth group of a high-status introvert of extremely low competence. What is not known is whether the competence measure inaccurately reflected ability in this case, or whether the result might have denoted social-emotional rather than task leadership, which was not the intention of this study. At the very least, it is a further reminder of the limitations of reducing individual characteristics to a small number of measurable differences, a more extreme form of which practice was one of the motivating factors behind this study.

## 11.6 Conclusion

Implicit in the comparison of three theoretical perspectives on the role of behavioural confidence in status processes was the question whether such behaviour is either necessary or sufficient basis for group differentiation. The finding that extraverts of consistently *low* status

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<sup>31</sup> This applies also to two further group members, of unknown E, who were not included in the study.

were not more influential than similarly ranked introverts argues against the sufficiency proposition, and consequently against formulations, such as expectation states theory's task cues, that ascribe discrete causation to nonverbal behaviour. The finding that extraverts of consistently *high* status were not more influential than similarly ranked introverts argues against the necessity proposition, although this interpretation is less secure. Firstly, it has to be weighed against existing evidence that, for individuals of high external status, the behavioural prescriptions for leadership, if such they are, may be largely met by default. Secondly, among group members of average standing or better on either one of diffuse status or competence, extraverts were generally the more influential.

The sum of these observations is consistent with the status-confirmation argument that behavioural confidence registers an individual's claims to rank, which are subsequently endorsed or denied on the basis of external status or competence. It is also consistent, within the reservations noted, with the view that such claims are a necessary condition for the attainment of rank. The fact that introverts at most levels of status were themselves at least moderately influential does not undermine this assessment, given that behavioural differences between extraverts and introverts are not absolute but a matter of degree. Even the non-effect of extraversion where high status on one dimension coincided with average standing on the other might, if replicable, be more readily accommodated by a legitimisation argument than by suggestions that the effects of behavioural confidence duplicate or supplant those of status.

## CHAPTER 12:

### Overview and conclusions

Levine and Moreland (1990) remarked upon the fragmented nature of small group research, observed in the tendency for researchers working on related questions to do so without acknowledging one another's work. Levine and Moreland attributed this to the multidisciplinary nature of the field, with different disciplinary groups publishing in and reading different journals. A contributory or alternative explanation might be sought in the existence of individual explanatory frameworks or paradigms, their exclusiveness sustained by differences in methods, aims, and terminologies. Difficulties may arise, therefore, when an attempt is made to relate two radically different approaches to explanation of a similar phenomenon. The options are to discount one or other approach entirely; to absorb the findings from one into the explanatory framework of the other; or to reconcile the two in a third framework constrained by neither paradigm.

It was in such a context that the debate between status and behaviour as the basis for group differentiation arose. Lee and Ofshe (1981) drew attention to the failure of the expectation states theory research tradition to acknowledge evidence of the effect of individual differences in behaviour on hierarchy formation. In relegating status to the role of non-causal covariate in a behaviour-driven process, Lee and Ofshe effectively discounted the EST paradigm in favour of a behavioural perspective, derived from an alternative, if less unified, line of research. The response of expectation states theorists included, initially, a retreat within the paradigm, through an invoking of the

theory's scope conditions (Greenstein, 1981). Ultimately, however, resolution was sought in the absorption of the evidence for behaviour into EST's existing explanatory scheme, through the concept of task cues (Berger et al., 1986; Ridgeway et al, 1985).

Neither the discounting approach or the absorption approach is necessarily flawed in principle; a theory arrived at by whatever means remains a product of the assumptions underlying it. Ironically, given the intensity of the debate triggered by Lee and Ofshe's (1981) paper (Ofshe and Lee, 1981; 1983), the two-process and task cues approaches share two assumptions that threaten to limit the usefulness of each.

### **12.1            Stimulus or performance?**

Firstly, both theories offer explanations couched in terms of minimal signals - stimuli or cues - but operationalise these by means of multidimensional behaviours. The implicit assumption is that whatever effects are observed may safely be attributed to the cues or stimuli of theoretical interest, and not to some other function of one or more of the behaviours involved.

It is the argument of this thesis that, just as a conceptual distinction must be made between behavioural style and status signals, such as dress or regional dialect (Berger and Zelditch, 1983), so must a distinction be made between behavioural style and manifest task performance. In practice, of course, the latter distinction, especially, is unlikely to be an easy one, concerning, as it may, almost adjacent points on a continuum. Nonetheless, the tendency for researchers to attribute the presumed effects of nonverbal behaviours to their action as stimuli

(Lee and Ofshe, 1981), or to their communicative function as expressive signals or "cues" to task ability (Berger et al., 1986; Ridgeway, 1984; Ridgeway et al., 1985), may be excluding simpler explanations. It ignores the direct effect a nonverbal behaviour pattern, especially through paralinguistic characteristics such as speed and fluency of speech, may have on an actor's argument content (Argyle, 1967; Mohr, 1986), conveyed emotion or anxiety (Cook, 1969; Davitz, 1964), or even perceived intent to deceive (DePaulo, Stone and Lassiter, 1985). However limited such effects might prove to be outside the laboratory, they are likely to be rather more pronounced in the short-lived and stimulus-depleted interactions of social psychological experimentation, wherein testable bases for discrimination between actors and arguments may be in short supply.

Experiment 1 was designed to engineer an increased separation of behaviour from performance. When one compares the results obtained with those of Lee and Ofshe (1981) and Ridgeway (1987), one finds few of the effects claimed for behavioural signals by either. Demeanour did not affect subjects' perceptions of an actor's intelligence or performance, and even perceived leadership fitness was subject to substantial revision on the basis of status information, when that was introduced. More importantly, there was no apparent effect of demeanour on influence. Null results of this kind must, of course, be interpreted cautiously; nonetheless, the pattern of responses on the main influence measure, in opposing the direction of the behavioural differentiation, somewhat lessens the risk of inappropriate generalisation<sup>32</sup>. Overall, the findings

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<sup>32</sup> The same is true of the nonsignificant difference in influentialness of confident and unconfident target actors in Experiment 4; here, also, confidence in the generalisability of the null result is slightly enhanced by a pattern of means that favours the unconfident condition, if either.

obtained here suggest that the demeanour *alone* of an actor on a video screen is a most doubtful trigger of the sort of influence claimed for it by either of the other studies, supporting the contention that those effects might be more appropriately accredited to performance than to demeanour *per se*.

Proponents of the task cues notion might argue that it is just such "performance" effects that the formulation seeks to explain: why it is, for example, that fast talking should enhance the perceived competence of a speaker. The present argument, of course, is that this process should not be simply assumed to be the same as those whereby choosing a head seat or being first to speak enhance an individual's standing in a group.

## 12.2 Cause or correlate?

The second assumption shared by the task cues and two-process theories is that behavioural signals play an independent causal role in group differentiation. This view is traceable to an uncritical interpretation of the findings of behavioural studies of the kind reviewed in chapter 3. Such an interpretation, however, ignores the correlational nature of the evidence; specifically, the limited controls employed in the behavioural studies mean that the case for behavioural characteristics as a *sufficient* basis for situational status may have been overstated. The groups used in the most controlled of these source studies (Fisek and Ofshe, 1970; Rosa and Mazur, 1979; Willard and Strodbeck, 1972), although sometimes described as *status homogeneous* (Berger et al., 1986), comprise individuals who have been matched for a small number of the most obvious characteristics,

but who might, in fact, be differentiated on many more. Consequently, given the tendency for status and behaviour to covary, the effects attributed exclusively to behaviour might have been due to or achieved in conjunction with coincident status or performance differences.

### 12.3 The status-confirmation perspective

The latter possibility is consistent with the status-confirmation model, proposed here as an explanation of the joint effects of status and demeanour. Constrained by neither the behavioural or EST research traditions, status-confirmation represents an impartial approach to this issue. It assumes, firstly, that confidence/leadership behaviours warrant description as the means by which a group member might register a claim to high rank. The findings of Experiment 2 sustain this view; confidence and initiative were central themes in respondents' accounts, via both closed- and open-ended measures, of the likely behaviour of a group member who seeks to become group leader. This might equally be the case, of course, if such behaviour were sufficient basis for the establishment of a group hierarchy. The defining characteristic of the confirmation argument is that the ability of such behaviour to *determine* situational status is subject to its ratification by external status or competence or, more precisely, the absence of disconfirmation<sup>33</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Use of the double negative accommodates the unlikely situation that group members are not effectively differentiated on any dimension. Note, however, that the acknowledgement of status equality as a theoretical possibility does not contradict the earlier criticism of the concept of status homogeneity as a reliable characteristic of face-to-face groups.

Experiment 5, a quasi-experimental field study, complements the experimental evidence cited earlier in justification of this proposition. Moreover, it provides a revealing illustration of the extent of information loss likely to be inherent in the study of *either status or* behaviour without reference to the other. As Figure 2 illustrates, an extraverted disposition was associated with increased influence for individuals who possessed high rank on either specific or diffuse status, but not for those of low rank on both. The identification of subgroups like these, for whom the ability to claim status behaviourally may not be advantageous, would not, of course, have been possible in studies in which individual differences in behaviour were the sole predictor monitored (e.g., Fisek and Ofshe, 1970; Rosa and Mazur, 1979).

Interestingly, the fact that extraversion did not affect rated influence of individuals of uniformly high diffuse and specific status does not contradict the confirmation argument. An incidental finding of Experiment 1, and of Lee (1979), was that an actor's purported status had an effect on how assertive subjects perceived that actor to be. Experiment 3 took these observations further, demonstrating that the presumed occupational status of a letter-writer affected, *inter alia*, readers' perceptions of the length and forcefulness of the letter, and confidence of the writer. In so far as personal assertiveness and confidence, and forcefulness and length of communication can be viewed as consistent with a status-claiming behavioural profile, a high-status group member has an apparent head-start, irrespective of extraversion, relative to a low-status colleague. It appears, in fact, that the same fiat for status-behaviour congruence that is presumed to underlie the status-confirmation model prejudices its prosecution.



The same findings (Experiment 3), by confirming the tendency for status to inform perceived or assumed behaviour as well as competence, make possible the reconciliation of a status-confirmation explanation with the main research base of expectation states theory. They suggest the possibility that subjects in ICOM experiments will make status-related behavioural attributions as well as the performance attributions documented by expectation states theorists. The effect of this would be to add an implicit behavioural dimension to these remote, electronically-mediated encounters, possibly imparting a more imperative quality to a high-status than to a low-status other's communications.

These possibilities notwithstanding, status-confirmation theory makes no assumptions about the nature of the processes by which behaviour and status/competence exert their joint effects in face-to-face interaction. The lack of effect of behavioural confidence either on an audience (Experiment 1), or when conveyed to a co-actor by photograph (Experiment 4), suggests, however, that the process relies on more than a spontaneous intra-psychic response to a perceptual cue. It directs attention, instead, to the level of social interchange.

A tentative account of the process might be as follows. The behaviours in question comprise acts of confidence, assertiveness, the use of space, and the initiation of activity, of a kind that invite description as superordinate or precedence<sup>34</sup> behaviours, and whose use might thus be described as pre-emptive of the role of leader. Such

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<sup>34</sup> "Precedence behaviours" is probably a more apt term for this class of behaviours, in that it both captures the essential element of presumption that typifies them, and avoids the possibility of confusion with other, less delimited notions of behavioural confidence.

pre-emption, it will be recalled, was a prevalent theme in responses to the leadership-claiming scenario of Experiment 2.

When individuals assume the cues of leadership, they are arguably exerting on their fellows, however subtly, the pressure to defer. The exact nature of that pressure remains a matter for speculation. As an explanation, Mazur's (1985; Mazur et al., 1980) outstressing argument, in its present form at least, is probably limited on two counts. Firstly, its emphasis on dyadic dominance contests, such as staredowns, raises questions of its utility in situations involving more subtle cues in other than a one-to-one context. More importantly, in locating the effectiveness of behavioural cues within the individual, outstressing does not readily accommodate situational factors of the kind suggested here<sup>35</sup>.

Whatever the underlying mechanisms, it seems reasonable to propose that the assumption by a group member of a leadership role is a potential source of tension within a group: a particular instance, perhaps, of an interactional infraction (Goffman, 1971). Research in other settings has indicated that social transgressions, in the form of impositions on another's rights, are likely to be more tolerated when committed by high-status than low-status individuals (Doob and Gross, 1968; Iverson, 1964; Steffen and Eagly, 1985; Ungar, 1981). Similarly, Kemper and Thissen (1981) observed that subjects had more accurate recall of impolite requests made by low-status actors, and polite requests made by actors of high status, each possibly indicative of a violation of role expectations, according to which social transgressions are the rightful domain of those of high status. Whether such effects

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<sup>35</sup> Mazur (1985) is not dismissive of the effects of what he terms *constant status signs* (status characteristics), but offers no rationale for their relationship to *controllable status signs* (i.e., dominance behaviours).

extend to specific as well as diffuse status is a matter for future research. Nonetheless, the data are promising for a socially-situated explanation of the process of status-confirmation.

#### **12.4 Future directions**

In the meantime, the possibility that the contribution of individuals' behaviours to group hierarchy formation is a function of the dynamics of interpersonal interaction, rather than the products of cue-driven behavioural or cognitive associations, prompts a reconsideration of what constitutes a suitable methodology for their study. It suggests the requirement that subjects of small group research be engaged in interaction, either actual (e.g., Carbonell, 1984; Fisek and Ofshe, 1970; Fleischer and Chertkoff, 1986; Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974) or presumed (e.g., Tuzlak and Moore, 1984). This is a criterion, it will be noted, that the prevalent practice of observing the effects of an actor's deportment on audience reactions (e.g., Lee and Ofshe, 1981; Ridgeway, 1987; Sev'er, 1989) fails to meet. There is a lack of reciprocity about these contacts; the flow of communication is uni-directional, and participants' responses are exempt from even the potential scrutiny of those to whom they are reacting. An inference that might be drawn is that, however informative such research may be for students of communicator effectiveness, it is of questionable relevance to the understanding of group processes. This possibility compounds the reservations already expressed about the two-process and task cues theories as models of group functioning.

Deserving of closer scrutiny, also, is the use of influence as an indicator of situational status. When it permits a rank ordering of group members, as in Experiment 5, or a demonstration of one individual's precedence over a colleague, there is no apparent difficulty. What is not clear, however, is how one should interpret research in which the use of influence as a dependent variable fails to reveal where an individual stands in a group. For example, does demonstrating that certain characteristics will enhance an individual's influence necessarily establish such characteristics as a basis for the attainment of high group rank? There are indications that it does not.

Carli (1990) found that women's speech was more tentative in interaction with men than with women, and that men were, in fact, more influenced by a woman who spoke tentatively than one who spoke assertively. If one takes influence as a metaphor for group rank, the latter finding appears to contradict the status-confirmation argument that such rank must be claimed, if it is to be accorded. Carli, on the other hand, proposes that the results

support the contention of Meeker and Weitzel-O'Neill (1977) that low status persons must first demonstrate that they have no desire to compete for status before their ideas will be considered by higher status individuals. Tentative language may serve the function of communicating that the speaker has no intention of enhancing his or her own status (1990, p.949).

By this analysis, the observed gain in influence is not at all indicative of the potential attainment of group leadership; if anything, it is contingent on the preclusion of that possibility.

The plausibility of this interpretation cautions against the depiction of an influence-enhancing strategy as an avenue to absolutely

high (as opposed to relatively higher) group rank. In the present case, such a practice would invite the self-contradictory conclusion that low-status actors can attain group leadership by assuming a self-effacing, relatively incompetent, un-leaderlike manner.

Carli's analysis, indeed, rather than contradicting the status-confirmation argument, tends to endorse it, and adds a dimension. It suggests that the claiming of high rank by individuals of low status will not only be ineffectual, but may, in fact, be counter-productive, attracting greater resistance than that accorded the appropriately unassuming. There is a hint of such an effect in Figure 2 (Experiment 5), but the small apparent disadvantage of low-status and low-competence extraverts relative to introverts of the same status fell well short of statistical significance ( $t_{11}=.58$ ,  $p<.3$ , 1-tailed). It remains to be established whether Carli's result did, in fact, derive from the status difference between interactants, or whether it reflected gender role expectations specifically. These questions warrant further exploration.

## 12.5 Concluding remarks

It has been argued that, given the present state of knowledge, both the two-process and task cues approaches to nonverbal behaviour may be over-reactions to the findings of research with initially undifferentiated groups. The status-confirmation model is an attempt at an alternative formulation that (1) addresses both the matter of status cues and the role of nonverbal behaviour; (2) although not constructed in terms of expectation states theory, is a ready adjunct to

that theory, and (3) is, in principle, amenable to generalisation beyond the realm of the task group to everyday interactions<sup>36</sup>.

The theory asserts that nonverbal acts of confidence and the initiation of activity register actors' claims to high rank in a social group. One who adopts a rank-claiming behaviour pattern is likely to present as confident, assertive, and talkative; may be quick to speak and quick to respond; inclined, perhaps, to take the head seat at table; and likely to maintain a steady gaze, although looking at others rather more while speaking than while listening. As this is the same kind of behaviour pattern as is likely to be employed by an individual of already high standing in a group, it constitutes an act of presumption: Its assumption acts to pre-empt the situational status order. Status-confirmation theory argues that the persistence of the resultant behavioural differentiation of group members will customarily be conditional upon its consistency with their differentiation in terms of external status.

Present indications are that status-confirmation promises a fruitful area for further research. Given further evidence of the explanatory utility of the framework, research attention might turn to exploration of the means by which groups move towards the attainment of congruence between status and behaviour. Such processes may conceivably involve the offering and withholding of attention and interaction opportunities, in accord with presumed merit; they may also extend to the bringing of sanctions by group

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<sup>36</sup> This last point sets it apart from EST, whose concepts lend themselves less readily to translation into non-task-related interaction: a potentially important limitation, if one accepts that interaction in task groups is likely to reflect more general rules of social interchange.

members against a colleague whose behaviour is considered presumptuous.

Whatever the forces that drive it, it is conceivable that, if congruence is not achieved, unproductive and dissatisfied groups - like those described four decades ago as being low in status consensus - will be the result (Slater, 1955). Whereas this, too, is an appropriate subject for future research, it must be said that the potential ability thus to accommodate both the rule (high status consensus) and the classic exception (low status consensus) in group hierarchy formation adds to the persuasiveness of a status-confirmation account of group differentiation.

Although the status-confirmation model needs further development, it is the argument of this thesis that it offers, at present indications, a tenable alternative to some existing and influential approaches to explaining the role of behaviour in social influence. The theory has its basis in a conceptual distinction between nonverbal behaviour and performance, of a kind that is not generally acknowledged in this field of research. Although the argument for the empirical observance of such a distinction has been couched in theoretical and methodological terms, its importance transcends the purely theoretical. The proposition that reactions to behaviour will be contingent on other characteristics of interactants - although enjoying implicit acceptance by some researchers into gender-related interaction inequalities (Carbonell, 1984; Carli, 1990; Fleischer and Chertkoff, 1986; Meeker and Weitzel-O'Neill, 1977; Megargee, 1969; Nyquist and Spence, 1986) - represents a substantial departure from the prevalent view in small-group research. There, the acknowledged role of variables such as gender is as determinants of *differences in* behaviour,

but not of *reactions to* behaviour (Berger et al., 1986; Lee and Ofshe, 1981; Ridgeway et al., 1985); the implication is that, simply by changing a low-status individual's behaviour, one can overcome or reduce the interaction disability that would otherwise be experienced.

It is clear, therefore, that evidence of the differential social legitimacy of confidence displays by individuals of differing status has important implications for the options available to the relatively powerless in seeking to redress their condition (cf. Tuzlak, 1988). It is in such circumstances, in particular, that the status-confirmation model predicts very different outcomes from those of formulations that represent a confident behavioural style as an alternative route to influence in its own right.



## APPENDICES

**APPENDIX A:**  
Appendix to Experiment 1

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <i>A1: Answerbook .....</i>                                  | <i>171</i> |
| <i>A2: Oral instructions. ....</i>                           | <i>178</i> |
| <i>A3: Video soundtrack.....</i>                             | <i>179</i> |
| <i>A4: Video images: Outline; Series 2, G dominant. ....</i> | <i>192</i> |
| <i>A5: Video images; Series 2, J dominant. ....</i>          | <i>199</i> |
| <i>A6: Video images; Series 1, G dominant.....</i>           | <i>202</i> |
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| <i>A9: Photographs; Series 1 age post-test .....</i>         | <i>209</i> |

JURY VIDEO

RESPONSE BOOK

Both the case and the questions you will be asked to answer will be presented on the video screen.

The questions will comprise two sets:  
"A" and "B".

Please answer all questions in the order in which they are presented on screen.

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

SESSION TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

QUESTION SESSION "A"

1. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

2. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

3. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

4. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

EXAMPLE: If you were asked to indicate how TALKATIVE you would rate a particular juror,

and you considered that juror to be moderately talkative, you might mark the scale like this:

NOT AT ALL / / / / / X / / / EXTREMELY

or,

If you considered that juror to be quite untalkative, you might mark the scale like this:

NOT AT ALL / / X / / / / / EXTREMELY

5. NOT AT ALL \_\_\_\_\_ EXTREMELY

6. NOT AT ALL / / / / / / EXTREMELY

7. NOT AT ALL \_\_\_\_\_ EXTREMELY

8. NOT AT ALL \_\_\_\_\_ EXTREMELY

9. NOT AT ALL \_\_\_\_\_ EXTREMELY

10. NOT AT ALL / / / / / / / EXTREMELY
11. NOT AT ALL / / / / / / / EXTREMELY
12. NOT AT ALL / / / / / / / EXTREMELY
13. NOT AT ALL / / / / / / / EXTREMELY
14. NOT AT ALL / / / / / / / EXTREMELY
15. \_\_\_\_\_
16. \_\_\_\_\_
17. \_\_\_\_\_

(END OF SESSION "A". DISCUSSION FILM RESUMES AFTER DE-BRIEFING.)

QUESTION SESSION "B"

18. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

19. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

20. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

21. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

22.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
23.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
24.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
25.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
26.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
27.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
28.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
29.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
30.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
31.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
32.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY
33.      /      /      /      /      /      /      /  
NOT AT ALL      EXTREMELY



ITEM 34: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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## 35: PERSONAL DETAILS

- (a) Name (or a code you would recognise if necessary - e.g. car registration, number, name of a pet, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

- (b) Year of study (i.e. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

- (c) Age

\_\_\_\_\_ yrs      \_\_\_\_\_ mths

- (d) Sex

\_\_\_\_\_

2 points about this exercise.....

1. It is not a test: we are not interested in how flexible or inflexible you might be in your thinking, nor in how your responses might compare to anyone else's.
2. It is a solo exercise: please do not talk to or allow yourself to be distracted by your co-participants.

Just relax and follow the film.

The purpose of this study is to examine the processes involved in jury-type decision-making.

What follows is a description of a personal injuries lawsuit, based on a case that was heard a few years ago. The names used are, of course, fictitious. After hearing the description, you will be asked to imagine yourself in the position of a member of the jury which has to determine what amount of compensation should be awarded to the plaintiff.

To facilitate this, you will be able to view a short film of two people discussing the case in a simulated jury room. At one point during the presentation, and again at the end, a brief series of questions will be posed, to which you will be asked to respond on the numbered response sheets provided. These questions are all judgemental ones, dealing with some aspect of the case or of the jury film; as judgemental questions, they generally do not involve the possibility of any one answer being more or less correct than another. Like any jury member, you are only able to make your judgement on the information before you, and within the time available to you.

.....

Action was brought by Robert Wilson against the Beaucannon Insurance Company and Mr and Mrs Ralph Davis for recovery of damages for personal injuries and expenses resulting from a fall into a garage pit.

On the morning of April 7, 1980, Robert Wilson, aged 40, arrived at the house of Mr and Mrs Ralph Davis in response to a newspaper ad advertising an antique desk for sale at the Davises' home. On arrival he was greeted by Mrs Davis, who informed him that the desk was being stored in the garage, and directed him to a side door near the rear of the garage. As the main doors of the garage were locked shut, and the one small window in the rear partly obscured by a cupboard, the garage was quite dark inside. Mr Wilson entered through the side door, and on making his way toward the sole light switch located just inside the main front doors, he stepped into a partially uncovered mechanic's pit in the garage floor. His consequent fall onto a platform one metre below floor level caused the injuries complained of. It emerged at the trial that the side door of the garage was not normally used, but that, in this instance, Mrs Davis had been unable to locate the

key to the main doors. In mitigation, the defence pointed out that Mr Wilson had declined Mrs Davis' offer to go in and turn on the garage light for him. Mr Wilson, in turn, indicated that Mrs Davis' utterance had been more in the nature of a polite gesture than a serious offer, and that he had responded in the same spirit. It was also established that Mrs Davis had informed Mr Wilson of the exact location of the light switch, the most direct route to which did not, in fact, necessitate passing over the pit.

During the trial, Mr Wilson offered evidence to prove that his injuries included bruises about the face and head, a broken leg, and severely torn cartilage in his knee; that as a result of these and other injuries he received, he was unable to return to his employment for ten weeks: that he thereafter worked for only three or four hours per day for eight to ten weeks more and was unable to resume full and normal work activities for four or five months following the accident; that his knee was not normal for a year in that it chronically swelled and caused him pain; that his knee does not function normally, causing him to walk with a slight limp, and has slipped out of joint on at least two occasions, causing severe pain. In fact, it was shown that only a week before the trial his knee had dislocated while he was at work, causing him two days of severe pain and some loss of income. A doctor had stated that the cartilage would remain stretched and weakened and that there would always be a possibility that his knee would slip out of joint if sudden pressure were applied.

Mr Wilson showed that he had personal insurance to cover his hospital costs. This same insurance paid him an adequate amount in loss of income and will continue to reimburse him for future pecuniary losses resulting from this accident.

It was also established that Mr Wilson's sole recreation had been bowling and that he was a member of a league wherein his skill had brought him notice and popularity. Mr Wilson stated that the lingering pain in his leg and his uncertainty about whether his knee would slip out of joint now prevents him from bowling and will keep him from bowling ever again.

Mr Wilson is asking for 25 thousand dollars compensation (after lawyers' fees), which he knows to be the full amount of personal injury coverage (again after lawyers' fees) in the Davises' insurance policy. This amount, he contends, is to reimburse him for the past and present pain and suffering and the worry and grief which he has undergone as a result of this accident - including, as his lawyer stated,

"the irrevocable loss to him of an important aspect of his life, his ability to participate in the game of bowling, or any other activity which may cause his knee to separate painfully".

It was established during the course of the trial that the Davises and their insurance company are responsible to Mr Wilson and should compensate him for his losses. However, it is left to you, the jury, to decide the amount of damages to be awarded. The judge turns to you and instructs you that, in reaching the amount of your verdict, you will consider how much you should award in order to fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for the pain and suffering, worry and grief, and humiliation that has been endured and will hereafter be suffered. You will take all these matters into consideration, and, using your best judgement, award such a sum that you consider should be awarded to fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for the injuries received.

In summary: Mr Wilson's own insurance company has paid and will continue to pay, should the need arise in the future, for Mr Wilson's hospital bills and loss of income resulting from this accident. Mr Wilson has made his case that the injury to his knee had caused him great pain and will prevent him from participating in active sports in the future, although he is capable of full-time employment. He anticipates pain, inconvenience, and a change in his life-style in the future. It is up to you to decide how much to give Mr Wilson (after lawyers' fees) for the "pain and suffering, worry and grief, and humiliation" that he has undergone and will continue to undergo as a result of this accident.

This case was earlier described to a number of people from various sections of the workforce, with the request that they consider the case and record their views on the amount of compensation that should be awarded. In the simulated jury discussion to follow, you will see the interaction of two of these people, whose initial award recommendations differed somewhat.

It was separately arranged with each of them that they attend the jury room at a predetermined time to discuss the case. The layout of the room used made it possible for the jury table to be filmed from several angles via three one-way observation windows, which between them allowed a full view of all possible seating position. The two participating jurors understood they would be filmed and that, after a final check, the concealed cameras would be left to run unattended once

they had chosen their seats at the jury table. Consequently, the ensuing discussion had no direct audience.

Unfortunately, unobtrusiveness in the method of recording was achieved at the expense of sound quality, resulting in variations in volume and clarity. In addition, the need to shorten running time by editing out repetitions and irrelevancies, produced a further, slightly disjointed effect. For control reasons, therefore, the volume level of the original soundtrack has been suppressed in the film you are to see. Instead, the jurors' individual statements were transcribed onto paper, whereupon they were examined for their main points, and subsequently over-dubbed in summary form by narrators.

.....

**[Discussion: Part A]**

- G: I think it's clear that the accident was the result of carelessness, and that the Davises could have prevented it occurring. Considering the extent of Mr Wilson's injuries, I think at least eighteen, perhaps twenty thousand dollars should be awarded as compensation.
- J: I agree that the accident was ultimately the responsibility of the Davises, but I can't agree on the amount of compensation. The extent of the injury is not all that serious, and all medical and other expenses have been paid for. I don't think any more than six or seven thousand dollars should be awarded.
- G: I can't see that \$7000 would be sufficient. It seems to me a lot of physical and mental suffering resulted from the accident, and the plaintiff still experiences some pain. On top of that, the whole incident must have been very depressing to him.
- J: \$7000 isn't a small amount. I think it would be an appropriate and fair award. The injuries sustained were not that serious, and most of them have healed by now. Also, the plaintiff is capable of full employment, so it isn't as if he could no longer support himself financially. I don't think you can regard \$25000 as a realistic claim. I don't believe he should expect to collect the full value of the defendants' insurance policy for injuries of that kind.

- G: I don't see the consequences of the injury as being so mild. The plaintiff was out of work for 10 weeks, and after that he was only able to work half days for the next 10 weeks. For 4-5 months, then, he wasn't able to work a normal day. For him to be inconvenienced for that long a time is some indication of the physical severity of the injury. As well as that, there is the mental aspect to consider: it must have been very depressing to him not being capable of much activity the whole time he was recuperating.
- J: It's true that 4 or 5 months is not an insignificant period. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's own insurance did reimburse him for any loss of income, and therefore he hasn't lost out financially. In addition, although he would have had to take things easy while he was recuperating, you cannot assume he was suffering that entire time. You could equally argue that he's gained a fair amount of paid leisure time, for a good part of which he would have experienced little or no discomfort.
- G: Well, regardless of what other insurance cover Mr Wilson has, the point remains that the Davises are at fault, and should be held responsible. It would be somewhat different if the defendants had absolutely no control over what happened, but I think it should have been foreseen, and they should have taken steps to prevent it. They advertised a desk for sale, and they would have expected people to want to inspect it. It would have been very simple for them to have ensured the pit was covered, or at least that the main doors could be opened. If Mrs Davis had been able to open the large doors there would have been no problems with the illumination level; not only would the doors have let in more light, but the light switch would have been immediately to hand.
- J: I agree that the defendants are essentially at fault in that the accident happened on their property. It's also clear that if they had taken a few basic precautions this sort of accident need not have happened. But that would seem to be the extent of their responsibility. Against it you must weigh the fact that Mr Wilson was there entirely voluntarily; it's not as if he was there in the course of his employment, or at the specific request of the Davises. He was there in pursuit of his own interests. As well as that, he turned down Mrs Davis's offer to turn on the light for him. I think that Mrs Davis largely fulfilled her responsibility in making that offer. I also think that in

declining the offer, the plaintiff took a considerable amount of the responsibility for the accident onto himself.

G: Still, the fact that he entered the garage may well have prevented Mrs Davis having this sort of accident, and I really don't think he should be penalised for it. In any event, it is clear from Mr Wilson's account that he didn't interpret what she said as an offer at all; he thought she was just being polite, and so he did the polite thing himself and declined.

J: My argument is that the Davises cannot be seen as entirely to blame beyond the fact that it was their pit and it was not completely covered. When the plaintiff indicated he would turn on the light himself, Mrs Davis told him exactly where the light switch was. She could not foresee that he would stray into the middle of the floor over the pit. Neither is it her fault that he didn't wait a moment and give his eyes a chance to adjust to the poor light. The fact is that the accident was an unfortunate occurrence for which neither party is without blame. I think \$7000 is a considerable amount of compensation. I don't see how more than that can reasonably be justified, particularly when you allow for the fact that Mr Wilson will continue to be covered by his own insurance for any further loss he might incur in the future.

G: Because of the extent of the injuries and the continuing uncertainty about the plaintiffs future, I don't think \$7000 is anywhere near adequate. In cases like this, people often just consider the physical injuries and overlook the psychological consequences. I think both are important issues. For example, it must have been very distressing for the plaintiff not being able to work normally for several months, or do anything else which required any degree of physical activity. I don't think we could reasonably award less than \$18000.

.....

#### Question Session "A":

Please open your response books, and prepare to answer each question as it appears on the screen. In general, you will have between 15 and 40 seconds per



question in which to write down your answer. Please answer all questions in the order in which they are presented.

QUESTION 1: At this stage of the exercise, what amount, between nought and twenty-five thousand dollars, do you feel Mr Wilson should be awarded?

QUESTION 2: If you were a third member of the jury panel you have been watching, and the three of you had to reach agreement on a single figure, what, do you think, is the highest amount you would be prepared to go to for the sake of such agreement?

QUESTION 3: If you were a third member of the jury panel you have been watching, and the three of you had to reach agreement on a single figure, what, do you think, is the lowest amount you would be prepared to go to for the sake of such agreement?

The remaining questions concern the two jurors in the film, whom we shall refer to by the initials "J" and "G".

QUESTION 4: What amount of compensation do you think "J" and "G" might eventually agree on, given time, if it were essential that they reach an agreement?

The next several questions each ask you to rate one of the jurors on some descriptive dimension. In each case, a 7-point rating-scale is provided in your response book.....Please study the example at the top of page 2 for information on how to use the rating scale. Questions will commence about 30 seconds from now.

(30 sec.s pause.)

Questions 5 to 9 refer to juror "G". [order:A]

Questions 5 to 9 refer to juror "J". [order:B]

QUESTION 5: How assertive would you rate "G"?

[Also 13, 25, 29

J G J]

QUESTION 6: How likeable would you rate "G"?

[Also 12, 23, 27

J G J]

QUESTION 7: How intelligent would you rate "G"?

[Also 10, 26, 28

J G J]

QUESTION 8: How highly would you rate the quality of G's argument?

[Also 14, 24, 31

J G J]

QUESTION 9: How good a jury foreman would G make?

[Also 11, 22, 30

J G J]

[Order A given]

Questions 10 to 14 refer to juror "J".

[Order B: Questions 10 to 14 refer to juror "G".]

Q: 10: How intelligent would you rate "J"?

Q: 11: How good a jury foreman would J make?

Q: 12: How likeable would you rate "J"?

Q: 13: How assertive would you rate "J"?

Q: 14: How highly would you rate the quality of J's argument?

The final 3 questions in session "A" each ask you to compare the 2 jurors on some specific biographical factor. In each case, write down which of the supplied answers you consider to be the most accurate.

QUESTION 15: If you had to guess at the relative ages of "J" and "G", would you say

- (a) that G was at least a year or two older than J?
- (b) that they were pretty well the same age?
- (c) that J was at least a year or two older than G?

QUESTION 16: If you had to guess at the amount of education J and G had each completed would you say

- (a) that G was the better educated?
- (b) that G and J had been educated to much the same level?
- (c) that J was the better educated?

QUESTION 17: If you had to guess at the relative prestige of the jurors' everyday jobs, would you say

- (a) that G had the more prestigious job?
- (b) that G and J had jobs of similar prestige?
- (c) that J had the more prestigious job?

The previous three questions relate to aspects of each juror's everyday existence outside the jury room. Consequently, unlike the other items in this exercise, these questions do admit of factually correct answers. In brief, the jurors' personal profiles are as follows. J and G have had essentially the same amount of formal education, and are similarly qualified. As concerns employment, although they don't work together, they do work for the same organisation. The main difference is that \_\_\_\_, is manager of a district branch office, while \_\_\_\_ is on the staff of another branch office. Information obtained concerning their general political attitudes revealed no real or consistent differences between them in that area.

.....

### [Discussion: Part B]

- G: The main question seems to be how much to compensate the plaintiff for his time and suffering, in the future as well as the past. The time aspect is clear enough, and I think the suffering is too. There still remains a risk that the knee may slip out of joint whenever sudden pressure is applied. Because of

this he has to limit his activities. And as well as the knee injury, there were bruises to the face and head, and a broken leg to be taken into account.

J: Nevertheless, all the injuries have completely healed, except for the weak knee. I see no evidence that there will be any serious permanent injury. Mr Wilson's own insurance will continue to cover him for any expenses or income loss he may still incur. This virtually takes care of the question of any problems that might emerge in the future.

G: But even if costs are covered by the plaintiff's own insurance, compensation involves more than just equating any financial loss. I think it's very serious that Mr Wilson feels he can't bowl any more, especially since that was his only form of recreation. This may not seem important, but just think what it means to someone who has no other pastimes. Moreover, it was more than recreation to him: it was a source of pride. His skill at the game brought him attention and popularity, so it must be very distressing for him to have withdrawn from it.

J: Well, I think that the plaintiff may be overly cautious in limiting his activities, and that he has consequently brought some of the possible mental suffering on himself. It hasn't been established that he shouldn't continue to bowl. He has chosen to stop going because he is overly cautious about his knee. To compensate him for having chosen to discontinue bowling is not the same as compensating him for being genuinely unable to bowl.

G: From the plaintiff's point of view there is no choice. Obviously, he feels that it will be too risky for him to continue in this sport. I think we should respect that choice of his and try to compensate him for the loss of that activity. I can understand his reluctance to continue bowling - I think it is wise of him to be cautious, because dislocating a knee must be a very painful experience. I think it's unfortunate, because this sport was something he was good at and admired for.

J: Still, there is nothing to say he won't bowl again. If you cannot establish that he is unable to bowl, and for how long, you have no basis on which to determine that it warrants a large amount of compensation. In any event, \$18000 is quite excessive.

G: I think it might be different if he had other forms of recreation in addition to the bowling. The important thing here is that he feels he can no longer engage in the only form of sport in which he had skill. A lot of the mental anguish arises from that, but there is also the concern with the pain in his knee, and being uncertain how long it will take to recover. Neither should his other injuries be overlooked simply because they have healed by now. The responsibility for the accident clearly lay with the Davises. I don't think it is unreasonable for Mr Wilson to claim \$25000, although my recommendation would be \$18000.

J: No-one can deny that Mr Wilson has suffered as a result of the accident. What we disagree on is the amount of suffering that has been established to have occurred and to be likely to occur in the future. The plaintiff has not lost out financially, nor will he in the future. On the question of responsibility, the accident was in some measure the result of his own carelessness. Whether or not he resumes bowling would seem to be a matter of choice on his part rather than something definitely determined by the accident. I think it would be unreasonable of him to expect \$25000 compensation simply because that is the maximum value of the Davises' insurance cover. The amount of the claim should not be taken as any indication of what the claim is worth. It simply reflects the practice of claiming as much as you can, and then waiting to see how much you are actually given. I think that even \$18000 is more than is warranted for this type of injury. I really don't think the injury calls for more than \$7000. That's not a small amount, nor is it unreasonable under the circumstances.

.....

#### [Question Session "B"]

Please open your response books to part "B". Now that you have seen more of the discussion, you will be asked to consider the case again. The following questions repeat some of those put to you earlier, although in a different order. Please respond to them on the basis of what you feel now, after the additional time and information you have had to allow you to form your opinions. The point must be made that this is not a test of any sort. The questions to follow represent a second sampling of your feelings and impressions. The aim is to duplicate as nearly as possible the situation of a

jury member taking a few minutes out to stop and think during a break in the discussion.

QUESTION 18: At this stage of the exercise, what amount, between nought and twenty-five thousand dollars, do you feel Mr Wilson should be awarded?

QUESTION 19: If you were a third member of the jury panel you have been watching, and the three of you had to reach agreement on a single figure, what, do you think, is the highest amount you would be prepared to go to?

QUESTION 20: If you were a third member of the jury panel you have been watching, and the three of you had to reach agreement on a single figure, what, do you think, is the lowest amount you would be prepared to go to?

QUESTION 21: What amount of compensation do you think "J" and "G" might eventually agree on, given time, if it were essential that they reach an agreement?

Questions 22 to 26 refer to juror "G".

[Order B: Questions 22 to 26 refer to juror "J".]

QUESTION 22: How good a jury foreman would G make?

QUESTION 23: How likeable would you rate G?

QUESTION 24: How highly would you rate the quality of G's argument?

QUESTION 25: How assertive would you rate G?

QUESTION 26: How intelligent would you rate G?

Questions 27 to 31 refer to juror "J".

[Order B: Questions 27 to 31 refer to juror "G".]

QUESTION 27: How likeable would you rate J?

QUESTION 28: How intelligent would you rate J?

QUESTION 29: How assertive would you rate J?

QUESTION 30: How good a jury foreman would J make?

QUESTION 31: How highly would you rate the quality of J's argument?

QUESTION 32: How highly would you rate J's commitment to the role of jury member? [Series II only]

QUESTION 33: How highly would you rate G's commitment to the role of jury member? [Series II only]


ITEM 34 [Series II]

ITEM 32 [Series I]: If there are any comments you would like to make about any aspects of this exercise, or if you know or think you recognise either of the jurors, please give an account in the space provided.


When you have done so, or if you have no comments, please complete the personal details section on the last page.


As a final request, may we ask you not to discuss the exercise in the presence of other people who have yet to participate. You will appreciate that it is important that all who take part do so under the same conditions.


Thank you very much for your contribution to this study.





















Question  
Session  
B

34. Any Further  
Remarks?


Thank you  
for your participation.

































Subjects were asked: If you were asked to judge the relative ages of these two people, would you say they were about the same age, or that one was at least a year or two older than the other; if so, which one?





Subjects were asked: If you were asked to judge the relative ages of these two people, would you say they were about the same age, or that one was at least a year or two older than the other; if so, which one?

**APPENDIX B:**  
Appendix to Experiment 2

|   |     |
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| <i>B12: NUDIST nodelist.....</i>                                | 256 |

This exercise is somewhat different from the sort of questionnaire you might normally encounter. As you will see, it presents a brief description of a social situation, and what you are asked to do is indicate what is likely to happen in that situation. The purpose of the research is to investigate the probable structure of certain types of social interactions. By participating, you will be contributing part of a network of information, from which an overall picture can be assembled. Clearly, this is not an attitude test or any other sort of test, and there is no question of any answer being any better or more accurate than any other.

Robin has just completed her first year as a tertiary student. During the summer break, she answers this advertisement, placed by a local community group:

Volunteers wanted to help organize holiday recreation program for primary school children.

She is interviewed, and familiarised with the aims of the project. Several days later, she is informed that she is one of three volunteers who, together, will be asked to make up Team C. Team C will be based at C\_\_ School hall, and will be responsible for planning, organising and overseeing a recreation program for the surrounding area. Robin and her 2 colleagues are introduced to one another, and given their timetable. They have 5 days to formulate and agree on a program, at the end of which time they will be asked to report back for approval and funds to get their program underway.

\*\*\*\*\*  
Day1\*. Robin, Kim and Terry meet in the school hall and seat themselves at a small round table. It is their first meeting, apart from the brief introductions of the day before. Robin knows little about either of her two colleagues, beyond the fact that they, too, are *female*, apparently a little *older* than she, and both *tertiary students*, *nearing the end of their degrees*.

What she does know is that Team C's task appeals to her as an interesting and challenging one, and one in which she would like to take an influential, even a leadership role.

ROBIN WOULD LIKE TO RUN THE SHOW.

HOW IS SHE LIKELY TO APPROACH THIS FIRST MEETING?

The following is an inventory of things Robin might feasibly do or say, or ways in which she might behave on this first day. What

Robin will:

[illegible][illegible]

very    very  
unlikely /...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../ likely

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

very    very  
unlikely /...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../ likely

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]



What would be the likely consequences of the actions you have just considered? In particular, is a given course of action likely to have a *negative* (-), a *neutral* (0), or a *positive* (+) effect

(1) on Robin's **leadership** chances?

(2) on how **well-liked** she will be by her 2

colleagues?

The items are repeated below. For each one, circle what you think might be the **Leadership** and **Likeableness** consequences of Robin's doing what the item says. Before you do so, you might read again the passage headed Day1\*.

|  | Leadership |   |   | Likeableness |   |   |
|--|------------|---|---|--------------|---|---|
| Let things take their natural course.        | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Get in first: initiate discussion.           | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Not say very much to begin with.             | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Suggest the team should choose a leader.     | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Just be her usual self.                      | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Play a waiting game.                         | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Speak in a soft voice.                       | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Smile a lot.                                 | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Use big words.                               | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Talk quickly.                                | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Look serious.                                | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Act confident.                               | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Talk about her studies.                      | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Propose a plan of attack.                    | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Look intelligent.                            | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Be prepared to compromise.                   | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Hint she has special knowledge of this area. | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |
| Hint that her family is well-off.            | -          | 0 | + | -            | 0 | + |

|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <b>Avoid disagreements.</b>   | - | 0 | + | - | 0 | + |
| <b>Avoid eye-contact.</b>   | - | 0 | + | - | 0 | + |
| <b>Skirt around issues.</b>   | - | 0 | + | - | 0 | + |
| <b>Try to present sound, logical arguments.</b>                         | - | 0 | + | - | 0 | + |
| <b>Drop names.</b>  | - | 0 | + | - | 0 | + |
| <b>Mention that her mother once worked as a cleaner at this school.</b> | - | 0 | + | - | 0 | + |
| <b>Side with one of her colleagues against the other.</b>               | - | 0 | + | - | 0 | + |
| <b>Admit to being mistaken on something.</b>                            | - | 0 | + | - | 0 | + |

\*\*\*\*\*

How would *you* describe Robin's probable behaviour on Day 1? If you have any thoughts on the subject - regardless of how adequate or inadequate you may have found the list items - please offer them in the space below. The same applies to any other comments you might like to make.



What if the situation described on page 1 were to read as follows? (The sections that have been changed are in **bold print**.)

[illegible]





Robin has just completed his first year as a tertiary student. During the summer break, he answers this advertisement, placed by a local community group:

Volunteers wanted to help organize holiday recreation program for primary school children.

He is interviewed, and familiarised with the aims of the project. Several days later, he is informed that he is one of three volunteers who, together, will be asked to make up Team C. Team C will be based at C\_\_ School hall, and will be responsible for planning, organising and overseeing a recreation program for the surrounding area. Robin and his 2 colleagues are introduced to one another, and given their timetable. They have 5 days to formulate and agree on a program, at the end of which time they will be asked to report back for approval and funds to get their program underway.

\*\*\*\*\*  
Day1\*. Robin, Kim and Terry meet in the school hall and seat themselves at a small round table. It is their first meeting, apart from the brief introductions of the day before. Robin knows little about either of his two colleagues, beyond the fact that they, too, are *male*. They appear to be *somewhere about his own age*, and probably, like he, *on holiday from school or a tertiary institution*.

What he does know is that Team C's task appeals to him as an interesting and challenging one, and one in which he would like to take an influential, even a leadership role.

ROBIN WOULD LIKE TO RUN THE SHOW.

HOW IS HE LIKELY TO APPROACH THIS FIRST MEETING?

The following is an inventory of things Robin might feasibly do or say, or ways in which he might behave on this first day. What you

Robin has just completed her first year as a tertiary student. During the summer break, she answers this advertisement, placed by a local community group:

Volunteers wanted to help organize holiday recreation program for primary school children.

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\*\*\*\*\*  
Day1\*. Robin, Kim and Terry meet in the school hall and seat themselves at a small round table. It is their first meeting, apart from the brief introductions of the day before. Robin knows little about either of her two colleagues, beyond the fact that they, too, are *female*, apparently a little *younger* than she, and both *planning to enter tertiary education in the new year*.

What she does know is that Team C's task appeals to her as an interesting and challenging one, and one in which she would like to take an influential, even a leadership role.

ROBIN WOULD LIKE TO RUN THE SHOW.

HOW IS SHE LIKELY TO APPROACH THIS FIRST MEETING?

The following is an inventory of things Robin might feasibly do or say, or ways in which she might behave on this first day. What

| ITEM                                       | FACTOR1 | FACTOR2 | FACTOR3 |
|--|---------|---------|---------|
| Speak in a soft voice                      | .73807  |         |         |
| Get in first: initiate discussion          | -.69553 |         |         |
| Let things take their natural course       | .67481  |         |         |
| Play a waiting game                        | .65604  |         |         |
| Not say very much to begin with            | .55733  |         | -.31410 |
| Propose a plan of attack                   | -.51286 |         |         |
| Suggest the team should choose a leader    | -.42643 |         |         |
| Hint she has special knowledge of the area | -.42013 |         | .33061  |
| Admit to being mistaken on something       |         | -.71574 |         |
| Drop names                                 |         | .68920  |         |
| Be prepared to compromise                  |         | -.68192 |         |
| Side with one colleague against the other  |         | .66856  |         |
| Look serious                               |         | .56733  |         |
| Hint that her family is well-off           |         | .49823  |         |
| Try to present sound, logical arguments    |         |         | .81397  |
| Avoid eye-contact                          |         |         | -.66334 |
| Act confident                              | -.43198 |         | .60641  |
| Skirt around issues                        |         |         | -.57785 |
| Look intelligent                           |         | .32224  | .47771  |
| Use big words                              |         |         |         |
| Talk quickly                               |         |         |         |
| Avoid disagreements                        |         |         |         |
| Smile a lot                                |         |         | .38102  |
| Mention mother worked here as a cleaner    |         |         |         |
| Talk about her studies                     |         |         |         |
| Just be her usual self                     |         | -.33747 |         |

| Item                                      | r      |
|---|--------|
| Let things take their natural course      | -.12   |
| Get in first: initiate discussion         | -.00   |
| Not say very much to begin with           | .15 *  |
| Suggest the team should choose a leader   | .17 *  |
| Just be her usual self                    | .14    |
| Play a waiting game                       | .16 *  |
| Speak in a soft voice                     | .23 ** |
| Smile a lot                               | .34 ** |
| Use big words                             | .39 ** |
| Talk quickly                              | .38 ** |
| Look serious                              | .31 ** |
| Act confident                             | .30 ** |
| Talk about her studies                    | .24 ** |
| Propose a plan of attack                  | .27 ** |
| Look intelligent                          | .31 ** |
| Be prepared to compromise                 | .33 ** |
| Hint she has special knowledge of area    | .34 ** |
| Hint that her family is well-off          | .26 ** |
| Avoid disagreements                       | .46 ** |
| Avoid eye-contact                         | .59 ** |
| Skirt around issues                       | .52 ** |
| Try to present sound, logical arguments   | .28 ** |
| Drop names                                | .42 ** |
| Mention mother worked here as a cleaner   | .40 ** |
| Side with one colleague against the other | .34 ** |
| Admit to being mistaken on something      | .17 *  |

\*  $p < .05$

\*\*  $p < .01$

| Item                                      | Total | High | Equal | Low  |
|---|-------|------|-------|------|
| Let things take their natural course      | 1.69  | 1.92 | 1.62  | 1.54 |
| Get in first: initiate discussion         | 2.96  | 2.96 | 2.96  | 2.94 |
| Not say very much to begin with           | 1.40  | 1.48 | 1.36  | 1.37 |
| Suggest the team should choose a leader   | 2.60  | 2.74 | 2.52  | 2.54 |
| Just be her usual self                    | 2.31  | 2.23 | 2.41  | 2.19 |
| Play a waiting game                       | 1.46  | 1.42 | 1.55  | 1.39 |
| Speak in a soft voice                     | 1.36  | 1.38 | 1.39  | 1.31 |
| Smile a lot                               | 2.48  | 2.46 | 2.41  | 2.56 |
| Use big words                             | 2.21  | 2.26 | 2.20  | 2.17 |
| Talk quickly                              | 1.65  | 1.64 | 1.71  | 1.58 |
| Look serious                              | 2.36  | 2.28 | 2.48  | 2.31 |
| Act confident                             | 2.99  | 3.00 | 2.96  | 3.00 |
| Talk about her studies                    | 2.03  | 2.32 | 1.96  | 1.81 |
| Propose a plan of attack                  | 2.92  | 2.98 | 2.86  | 2.94 |
| Look intelligent                          | 2.77  | 2.78 | 2.88  | 2.64 |
| Be prepared to compromise                 | 2.73  | 2.86 | 2.66  | 2.69 |
| Hint she has special knowledge of area    | 2.72  | 2.66 | 2.79  | 2.69 |
| Hint that her family is well-off          | 1.50  | 1.42 | 1.61  | 1.46 |
| Avoid disagreements                       | 2.03  | 2.06 | 1.95  | 2.08 |
| Avoid eye-contact                         | 1.17  | 1.18 | 1.18  | 1.15 |
| Skirt around issues                       | 1.15  | 1.08 | 1.20  | 1.17 |
| Try to present sound, logical arguments   | 2.97  | 2.98 | 2.96  | 2.96 |
| Drop names                                | 1.55  | 1.52 | 1.54  | 1.60 |
| Mention mother worked here as a cleaner   | 1.39  | 1.42 | 1.36  | 1.40 |
| Side with one colleague against the other | 1.65  | 1.46 | 1.89  | 1.56 |
| Admit to being mistaken on something      | 2.44  | 2.48 | 2.29  | 2.56 |



| Item                                      | Total | Females | Males |
|---|-------|---------|-------|
| Let things take their natural course      | 1.69  | 1.69    | 1.70  |
| Get in first: initiate discussion         | 2.96  | 2.96    | 2.94  |
| Not say very much to begin with           | 1.40  | 1.32    | 1.59  |
| Suggest the team should choose a leader   | 2.60  | 2.63    | 2.52  |
| Just be her usual self                    | 2.31  | 2.35    | 2.22  |
| Play a waiting game                       | 1.46  | 1.41    | 1.57  |
| Speak in a soft voice                     | 1.36  | 1.30    | 1.52  |
| Smile a lot                               | 2.48  | 2.46    | 2.50  |
| Use big words                             | 2.21  | 2.28    | 2.04  |
| Talk quickly                              | 1.65  | 1.72    | 1.46  |
| Look serious                              | 2.36  | 2.33    | 2.44  |
| Act confident                             | 2.99  | 3.00    | 2.96  |
| Talk about her studies                    | 2.03  | 2.05    | 1.96  |
| Propose a plan of attack                  | 2.92  | 2.95    | 2.87  |
| Look intelligent                          | 2.77  | 2.79    | 2.72  |
| Be prepared to compromise                 | 2.73  | 2.76    | 2.67  |
| Hint she has special knowledge of area    | 2.72  | 2.71    | 2.74  |
| Hint that her family is well-off          | 1.50  | 1.56    | 1.35  |
| Avoid disagreements                       | 2.03  | 1.98    | 2.13  |
| Avoid eye-contact                         | 1.17  | 1.10    | 1.33  |
| Skirt around issues                       | 1.15  | 1.12    | 1.24  |
| Try to present sound, logical arguments   | 2.97  | 2.98    | 2.94  |
| Drop names                                | 1.55  | 1.58    | 1.48  |
| Mention mother worked here as a cleaner   | 1.39  | 1.34    | 1.52  |
| Side with one colleague against the other | 1.65  | 1.55    | 1.89  |
| Admit to being mistaken on something      | 2.44  | 2.48    | 2.33  |

| Item                                      | Total | High | Equal | Low  |
|---|-------|------|-------|------|
| Let things take their natural course      | 2.42  | 2.47 | 2.40  | 2.40 |
| Get in first: initiate discussion         | 2.27  | 2.35 | 2.25  | 2.24 |
| Not say very much to begin with           | 1.86  | 1.84 | 1.81  | 1.93 |
| Suggest the team should choose a leader   | 1.76  | 1.82 | 1.66  | 1.80 |
| Just be her usual self                    | 2.73  | 2.78 | 2.76  | 2.67 |
| Play a waiting game                       | 1.85  | 1.71 | 1.93  | 1.89 |
| Speak in a soft voice                     | 2.08  | 2.02 | 2.15  | 2.07 |
| Smile a lot                               | 2.83  | 2.86 | 2.76  | 2.89 |
| Use big words                             | 1.41  | 1.33 | 1.42  | 1.47 |
| Talk quickly                              | 1.58  | 1.51 | 1.59  | 1.64 |
| Look serious                              | 1.62  | 1.59 | 1.59  | 1.67 |
| Act confident                             | 2.68  | 2.63 | 2.59  | 2.80 |
| Talk about her studies                    | 1.92  | 2.10 | 1.81  | 1.87 |
| Propose a plan of attack                  | 2.25  | 2.27 | 2.19  | 2.29 |
| Look intelligent                          | 2.36  | 2.29 | 2.43  | 2.35 |
| Be prepared to compromise                 | 2.94  | 2.94 | 2.93  | 2.95 |
| Hint she has special knowledge of area    | 1.75  | 1.78 | 1.70  | 1.78 |
| Hint that her family is well-off          | 1.23  | 1.25 | 1.11  | 1.33 |
| Avoid disagreements                       | 2.64  | 2.59 | 2.59  | 2.73 |
| Avoid eye-contact                         | 1.21  | 1.25 | 1.21  | 1.18 |
| Skirt around issues                       | 1.39  | 1.43 | 1.26  | 1.47 |
| Try to present sound, logical arguments   | 2.72  | 2.71 | 2.72  | 2.73 |
| Drop names                                | 1.22  | 1.22 | 1.15  | 1.29 |
| Mention mother worked here as a cleaner   | 1.72  | 1.65 | 1.81  | 1.69 |
| Side with one colleague against the other | 1.13  | 1.06 | 1.23  | 1.11 |
| Admit to being mistaken on something      | 2.88  | 2.90 | 2.87  | 2.87 |

| Item                                      | Total | Females | Males |
|---|-------|---------|-------|
| Let things take their natural course      | 2.42  | 2.46    | 2.33  |
| Get in first: initiate discussion         | 2.27  | 2.26    | 2.31  |
| Not say very much to begin with           | 1.86  | 1.83    | 1.93  |
| Suggest the team should choose a leader   | 1.76  | 1.78    | 1.71  |
| Just be her usual self                    | 2.73  | 2.78    | 2.62  |
| Play a waiting game                       | 1.85  | 1.83    | 1.89  |
| Speak in a soft voice                     | 2.08  | 2.13    | 1.96  |
| Smile a lot                               | 2.83  | 2.85    | 2.80  |
| Use big words                             | 1.41  | 1.45    | 1.31  |
| Talk quickly                              | 1.58  | 1.61    | 1.51  |
| Look serious                              | 1.62  | 1.60    | 1.67  |
| Act confident                             | 2.68  | 2.68    | 2.67  |
| Talk about her studies                    | 1.92  | 1.89    | 2.00  |
| Propose a plan of attack                  | 2.25  | 2.30    | 2.13  |
| Look intelligent                          | 2.36  | 2.40    | 2.24  |
| Be prepared to compromise                 | 2.94  | 2.94    | 2.93  |
| Hint she has special knowledge of area    | 1.75  | 1.73    | 1.80  |
| Hint that her family is well-off          | 1.23  | 1.16    | 1.40  |
| Avoid disagreements                       | 2.64  | 2.62    | 2.69  |
| Avoid eye-contact                         | 1.21  | 1.17    | 1.31  |
| Skirt around issues                       | 1.39  | 1.38    | 1.42  |
| Try to present sound, logical arguments   | 2.72  | 2.80    | 2.53  |
| Drop names                                | 1.22  | 1.22    | 1.22  |
| Mention mother worked here as a cleaner   | 1.72  | 1.71    | 1.73  |
| Side with one colleague against the other | 1.13  | 1.12    | 1.18  |
| Admit to being mistaken on something      | 2.88  | 2.88    | 2.89  |

NUDIST STAND-ALONE v.2.2 FOR MACINTOSH

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dsq

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- 
- \* Responses to DSQ open-ended questions: "a items refer to probable
  - \* behaviours of an actor who seeks to become group leader; "b" items
  - \* refer to behaviours of one who does not wish to lead.

----- TEXT UNITS 1-334:

1.a Acting confident would help Robin's leadership chances but if he came over as being too over confident, he may appear arrogant which would go against him as far as likeableness goes. Whether he will be successful will depend on how he approaches the situation. If he is firm in what he want to achieve but is still willing to incorporate some flexibility to accommodate for the other two, he should be successful. He need not show deference for the other two merely because they are older or a little

more educated. If he things that he can do the job well and really get something done he should convey this to the other two in a tactful way and try to instil in them some of his own enthusiasm - try to persuade them subtly towards his way of thinking if need be. 1

1b. Robin would probably take more of a "back seat" approach. He is obviously keen to help since he has volunteered to do the work, but if he is not concerned with having it done the way he wants, then he wouldn't be likely to push hard for a particular issue. He would be more likely to compromise and ensure that his own part of the job gets done well. 2

2a. I must admit that I do find the questions or at least some of them, inadequate. The text isn't sufficient to answer some of the questions because some require information on the guy. For instance, he's not even going to consider dropping names unless he's a dickhead. The same can be said for suggesting to choose a leader. - If he's a amiable sort of guy then he won't. In fact he wouldn't ask this unless he was a jerk. 3

2b. blank 4

3a. Likely to attempt to be assertive and confident with her abilities in this area. By being evasive (ie. little eye contact and skirting around issues) as well as being a name dropper or trying to appear more knowledgeable than her colleagues she will only be disliked which would only hinder her chances of becoming a leader. 5

3b. She would probably be more her "usual" self and hence would not feel the need to impress others by acting overly confident. Her behaviour may be less assertive. 6

4a. Robin's probable behavior on day one would be to take the initiative and lead the discussion in an easy going though confident manner. He would probably say only enough about himself to show a small amount of friendliness but not as much as would make him sound a fool. If he is to be the leader of this kind of group he should be decisive and direct yet remain amicable so as not to appear aloof. 7

4b. Robin's probably behaviour is that of an affable and confident person with little ambition. His behaviour would have changed only in that he would not take the initiative in discussion and would be willing to concede points. 8

5a. Depends on what type of person she is ie whether she is skilled in gaining other people's faith in her or not. Some people do all the wrong things unwittingly. But generally I feel a good leader is one that promotes the completion of the task by involving everyone. The style of

leadership varies.

9

5b. Answered but crossed out.

10

6a. Robin would present herself confidently after having done some basic research on recreation programmes for children. She would let it be known (perhaps subtly at first) that she wanted to take charge by initiating discussions and talking about having a group leader thus indicating to the other two that she "meant business". If the others responded in the way she desired, her confidence will have the effect wanted, and she would thus take charge. If one or both of the others also wanted to lead the three it would depend on Robin's dedication confidence and intelligence as to whether she would persist with her endeavour to run things, by providing herself superior to the other two.

11

6b. Robin would approach the situation by keeping reasonably quiet in the first meeting. She would not present her own ideas or theories but wait for the others to take charge and willingly participate in what has been suggested without further debate.

12

7a. Robin is likely to be assertive and co-operative. Confidence would be a major attribute, and being prepared to pool ideas. She would probably make suggestions and give room for the other members of the team to contribute.

13

7b blank

14

8.a yes to be her usual self, but if you have a particular goal then you need to be flexible in your character in order to turn the situation to her advantage - bit-noting herself etc will only have a negative affect on her goal and being liked.

15

8b. blank

16

9a. The passage given shows that he is trying to assert himself - as shown by the italic versions of the words. Male - so automatic competition is placed in his way. Younger - being "older" he will not want to be dominated by these "youngsters". Planning to enter uni - so he is more experienced than his colleagues.- all of these are factors that will make him assert himself.

17

9b. Robin - although not wanting to lead the gp will still want the others as friends and will do all he can to see that the scheme goes ahead.- So he must still assert himself but in different areas.

18

10a. blank

19

10b. Many of the same rules would apply: If Robin has any ideas it is essential that he be influential to see them given proper

development/discussion. Hence, as he would as a leader he must be at once firm yet likeable (allow others space etc a la Dale Carnegie). If he really wants to be effective he should choose to be a team member, in which case he will not have to bother with the ego-clash of leadership. 20

11a. Flexible, confident and friendly and open with some indications of expertise and willingness to take responsibility. 21

11b. Relaxed, affable, quiet, happy to go along with whatever eventuates and encourage the other two. 22

12a. blank 23

12b. blank 24

13a. She would let her own expertise, personality and natural leadership qualities become apparent during the course of the day, and maybe mutually agreed leader, except if another team member has the same goal. Then things may take another course. 25

13b. She would be willing to give her opinion or thoughts on an issue, but possible not bring issues up herself. She still would make a positive contribution. 26

14a. blank 27

14b. blank 28

15a. blank 29

15b. blank 30

16a. Robin would probably be assertive and up front, he would probably make sure his ideas were used at the expense of one of the others. 31

16b. Robin would probably show a concerted interest in the situation and contribute many ideas but he would most likely not be overly concerned if his ideas were rejected in favour of someone else's. 32

17a. Robin should be honest cheerful straightforward - in a small group (such as 3) people, maybe esp. women are aware of manipulations. If she is likeable, the other two are more likely to accept her leadership. 33

17b. Again, she should be honest, cheerful and straightforward, but maybe she wouldn't try to take the initiative as much. 34

18a. blank 35

18b. blank 36

19a. As Robin intends to make a dynamic leading personality to the group it is plain that her actions would be of an initiating nature. She would be pleasantly confident. 37

19b. If Robin's intentions were to participate in the group as on equal with her colleagues it is likely that she would present herself neatly in

both appearance and attitude. Her actions would probably be of a neutral and helpful manner. 38

20a. I think Robin would have felt confident and thus tried to participate and present ideas as best she could. She would have acted fairly naturally. 39

20b. Robin probably a bit intimidated by her fellow colleagues and decided to let the meeting follow its own course without much intervention on her part. 40

21a. In the beginning Robin on the first day should wait to see what the other two girls are like before she begins her 'leadership campaign'. She ought not to be bossy, or brass but nor too quiet, and come up with some good ideas. If one acts with confidence, smiles and is generally likeable with the two girls (and there are only the two of them) she ought to be in good stead. As a leader one should try for diplomacy not aggression. 41

21b. Robin has no leadership ambitions. She will want to be as friendly and amiable as possible to assist in the working group. Make it known that she able to help and be a willing and participating member. 42

22a. blank 43

22b. blank 44

23a. Her behaviour would probably be very assertive, designed to "show off" her favourable qualities and downplay her unfavourable ones. However I think she would be willing to compromise on some issues and admit she was wrong on a few others because she would not want jeopardise her budding leadership by appearing to be too dogmatic and inflexible. 45

23b. Content to play a minor role in the team but still interested in its goals etc. I think she would be unlikely to initiate arguments dissensions etc. between members. 46

24a. Robin would be aggressive and confident in his approach. He would lead discussion and also try and seem to be of appealing character. 47

24b. He would generally be withdrawn although not overly so. He would stand back and let the others take charge and would give an impression of shyness - he would also seem less confident and friendly. 48

25a. Confident, self-assured, capable, direct. 49

25b. Reserved, shy, reticent, unsure, interested but unwilling to initiate discussion or "hold the floor". 50

26a. Robin could go and be his usual self provided that he is friendly, confident and pleasant. If he is arrogant and a show-off he will be



- unliked and not liked as a leader or person. He should initiate discussion by perhaps saying a little about himself, without boasting or going overboard, and offering the others to do the same. Vote Robin 1 51
- 26b. Robin takes it easy. He is in the plan which is what he wanted and has no more ambitions, eg running the show. 52
- 27a. Difficult to answer without having some idea of the peoples personalities, but Robin would try to act as though he had the knowledge and ability to lead the team and deserved to do so. 53
- 27b. Robin would be more relaxed and a little quieter but still helpful. 54
- 28a. blank 55
- 28b. blank 56
- 29a Perhaps Robin would try to adopt the 'older' stance, inferring that his completion of 1st year University would/should automatically deem him the higher ranking. Perhaps he would even bend the truth in some ways to influence the other two that he is more suited to lead. i.e. he may infer that his studies correspond with some of the areas of interest in the activities group. 57
- 29b. He would try to comfort everyone perhaps because he feels more at ease being both older and further advanced in his studies giving him a passive confidence. He would try to stimulate ideas. 58
- 30a. Robin would probably be eager to show her talents in the area, but because of the higher quality of the others her leadership qualities would be hidden for a while although she'll try. 59
- 30b. Robin would be more at ease than in the other situation because she's not out to prove herself. 60
- 31a. blank 61
- 31b. blank 62
- 32a. I think she would certainly walk in confidently - or at least have to act it and she would have definite ideas on what plan of action she thinks the group should take. She would be friendly but not so friendly that she drops down to the others level ie. that she just tags along and agrees with them in order not to make enemies. 63
- 32b. She would be very friendly, amiable and very willing to listen to other peoples ideas. She wouldn't put many views of her own forward because she wouldn't really have any. She'd just be willing to have lively discussion. She wouldn't be over confident or under-confident - just herself. 64
- 33.a Robins behaviour - on task, suggesting idea, listening to others,

eye contact, pre planned knowledge attack of subject                      Ambiguous questions

- I found 'just be her usual self' difficult - what is her usual self.                      So

too "hint at special knowledge                      "hint" implies a deception and evasion

and is annoying                      talk of special knowledge is cleaner.                      65

33b. inattentive, distracting, low energy                      66

34a. Arrives early to meet Terry/Kim first; talk about University, try to be helpful and confident about Terry/Kim entering University. She should then be friendly and appear to have leadership qualities to at least one

of her colleagues.                      - wear bright clothes and make-up                      - offer to help at

Uni for both girls                      - check her watch often - write down everything that

is decided on.                      67

34b. - Arrive last (but not late)                      - Wear conservative clothes

- appear

friendly but not too knowledgeable                      68

35a. Friendly, confident. Prepared with suggestions. He would want his colleagues to think of him as capable, interesting. Talking about studies is not interesting. This topic is usually used to fill in when no other topics of conversation appear to be available. Name dropping is a big turn off. He would not want to brag about himself, but he would not want to belittle himself either. Show qualities of a good leader - easy to talk to, intelligent, capable, logical. Not taking over everything, but asking for opinions and suggestions from his colleagues.                      69

35b. Robin would want to appear eager to participate, but he would be more quiet, less talkative than someone proposing leadership. Participation is important, but he should make allowances for someone else who obviously would prefer to be a leader.                      70

36a. I think that she would be reasonably friendly to the others while still remaining fairly self-confident. I don't think that she would be at all nasty about becoming the leader, but would rather prefer to be a leader on good terms with the rest of her group.                      71

36b. She would seem insular and quiet, but I think she would still try to be reasonably friendly with the others. She would not be at all confident in her ability as a leader.                      72

37a. I think that if Robin is confident, friendly, capable and interested then she will have a good chance of becoming the leader. If she dominates the meeting in the beginning she will seem overbearing and egotistical

and the other two won't like her at all and probably side against her. It

will be a lot easier to lead when you are respected and liked by the others. Smiling's great if it's natural but no good if it's a big put on! 73

37b. Robin would be friendly, natural and have good ideas. She probably wouldn't initial discussions to much would admit mistakes and be

generally positive to the program without trying to dominate at all. 74

38a. - not a leader - he won't take control but instead be helpful and

cheerful - a friendly guy. 75

38b. eager, out to have some fun - always ready to put forward suggestions 76

39a. Robin is likely to be assertive. He will seek to dominate the meeting subtly and avertly. Robin will present his ideas politely but strongly and since he seeks to "run the show" he will treat any disagreements as threats to his wanted role of leader. He will use first names many times - but with the underlying hint of condescension. Robin will do much talking and will "chair" the meeting and delegate tasks to his companions rather than work with them as a team.\* The question is clearly addressed to one's attitude of the social acceptability of being a cleaner. Seems a bit odd for the purposes of this

questionnaire. (relating to question - (mention that his mother once worked as a cleaner at this school)) 77

39b. He'll try to be one of the team co-operative etc. 78

40a. If Robin's aim was to obtain position of leadership she had to assert herself and realise the practical notions of what's needed to be a leader. Also what else is needed but not necessarily essential is to be liked and admired not just respected by her colleagues. Hence eye contact, smiling etc should help her with that. 79

40b blank 80

41a She should be 'in control' - not totally, allow her colleagues to have their say and let their influence be felt within the group. If she feels she is able to lead the group, she should guide the group rather than pushing to have her own way. Be kind and thoughtful, understanding, not patronising. Encourage her colleagues and be genial. Don't get discouraged herself if things don't go the way she would like. 81

41b Have a quiet voice, making her presence felt, but not having it be obtrusive, putting her wedge in the discussion, she doesn't want to be overlooked, but at the same time she doesn't want to have the major

responsibility of the group either. Lots of comments about 'young, new ideas!' Encourage the leader, support the other colleague. 82

42a I think What I would like her to do and what she would do are two very different things! I guess she would be quite overbearing and dominant - or attempt to be - depending on the character of the other 2 girls present. 83

42b A person who is able to make a worthwhile contribution to the project, and accept and compromise with the ideas of the other 2 girls. 84

43a She would be forward and show initiative. If she desperately wanted to lead then she might drop names, hints etc. 85

43b Robin would be more relaxed and inclined to listen and let things "flow" rather than jumping and trying to push things along. 86

44a Arrogant. Aggressive. The other two women are her peers, so she is more likely to want to gain control and dominate. 87

44b Passive, would rather hear suggestions of other colleagues. 88

45a blank 89

45b blank 90

46a blank 91

46b Robins behaviour on day 1. If she is willing to be an active member there is no reason why she shouldn't actively put forward her ideas and assert herself as an able person just because she doesn't want to be group leader. Those asserting themselves as leaders, normally find themselves in situations where because nothing is being done its easy to take over. Lots of people are timid in areas of discussion especially with strangers. 92

47a She would act "normally" ie be her usual self, with the exception that she would try to be outgoing, friendly, ready to be frank and honest, but showing she has a good background for her team's work. 93

47b She would be willing to agree with any suggestions made by her colleagues, however she would not act as enthusiastic as she might, if wanting to be team leader. 94

48a blank 95

48b blank 96

49a blank 97

49b blank 98

50a Robin would take the initiative, and do everything possible to ensure that he is chosen as the leader, although this may somewhat affect his popularity. 99

- 50b Robin would probably develop a sound working relationship with the other two. He would be fairly well liked, things should run smoothly. 100
- 51a Robin probably would have acted very authoritative and very confident - she would have tried to intimidate the others somewhat by dropping names etc - she would have felt this was the way to become leader. 101
- 51b It would (her behaviour that is) be much more relaxed and natural - she would feel happier less anxious to please or impress. 102
- 52a Her behaviour would have been positive and confident yet not too over confident so as to not create a wrong impression from the other 2 colleagues. 103
- 52b She would have been confident yet not over ambitious to create the impression she wanted to be in charge. 104
- 53a blank 105
- 53b blank 106
- 54a blank 107
- 54b Let the natural course of the meeting take place. 108
- 55a Robin would have entered confidently but have been surprised by her partner's unwillingness to cooperate with her forthright manner. 109
- 55b Robin would have been more willing to listen to the others and thus they would have valued her contribution. 110
- 56a blank 111
- 56b blank 112
- 57a blank 113
- 57b blank 114
- 58a blank 115
- 58b blank 116
- 59a Robin should just be herself and if she feels she has some special knowledge in some area she should then let the others know. 117
- 59b Here Robin can just be herself and doesn't need to prove her worth as a leader. 118
- 60a Her probably behaviour would be to get in the conversation and express her ideas for a programme, then choose a leader and go on from there after telling the other two a bit about herself. 119
- 60b blank 120
- 61a She would have tried to make a sound friendship with the two others before trying to race in and take over. 121
- 61b She would have waited for the other two to make all the decisions and just agree with them. She feels that she would not take kindly to the

responsibility of organiser and would much prefer to let the others worry about that. 122

62a I don't see why there has to be a leader - why all three just can't work together without someone being the leader. 123

62b blank 124

63a I think if she seemed too eager to run the show and be the leader the other two would be turned off and she would lose her chance to be leader to make friends. 125

63b blank 126

64a I think she would have been assertive, confident and outgoing. She would naturally act as leader. 127

64b She would be pleasant, confident, have some input but not take a role as leader, she would be led to some degree by a stronger personality in the group. 128

65a He initiates discussion, proposing solid, basic ideas, asking/allowing for other views and compromises. Assumes a leadership role but does not try to get on the bad side of others ie does try to be liked. 129

65b He will initially let things take their natural course, trying to offer his help as a member of the group but taking no leadership steps. I think this part of the test is really not necessary as my idea of his probably behaviour I think is communicated in the ratings part of the test. Also, trying to think what Robin would do, not knowing his personality, only a brief scenario is not quite good enough grounds to answer so many questions if we were asked to answer them as we would do in the situation is better. Also the other two maybe weak or strong minded, not allowing for some instances to occur. 130

66a She would try to make a good impression - be friendly, to "get them on her side", get them to like her, seem intelligent and informed on the subject so they will take her seriously. The girls are older than her, which may/may not inhibit her. She probably wouldn't talk about studies (being younger and it is irrelevant), wouldn't drop names or hint she's well off. It would not be easy to work out how to act since she doesn't know the other girls, doesn't know if they have any leadership goals etc. Needs to assert herself, yet be careful not to "step on any toes". 131

66b This situation would be easier to handle. She can be more relaxed, easygoing - she "has nothing to lose", and only wants to be involved in the program, which she already is. (very difficult to scale these

answers!!)

132

67a He would try to be a little overpowering just enough to show that he is motivated and good enough to lead the team, but not so overpowering as to put them off.

133

67b He would try to assist in the discussion indicating that he is interested and keen but as a support member so he would join in on 'already initiated discussions'.

134

68a Robin will be tentative at first gauging likely competition for leadership and structure his "tactics" accordingly. He will take a progressively stronger stand on his own plan of action and defend it vigorously. This may lead to his leadership or to direct conflict.

135

68b Robin would be tentative but relaxed. He would be interested in the discussion without feeling much pressure to "outperform" the others. He may wish to have his opinion respected but will avoid taking over the conversation.

136

69a She may be tempted to "impress" the other 2 by what she has, who she is etc and this, I find, is a very negative quality about a person. She should try to act natural as this is usually the way people like to view others. Admitting mistakes appearing organised, eye contact, and the ability to compromise would all leave a favourable impression of her on the others. Anybody wanting to assume a leadership position must be able to show the above characteristics not only to instil likeness from the group but also to be an efficient leader. Any shy, backward behaviour may be fatal to her cause as "1st impressions can be long-lasting". Self confidence, although not pushiness is the way she must go about making the others recognise her authority (if that's what she wants) and respect it and like her at the same time.

137

69b She would approach the meeting with an open mind, some ideas to present and expecting feedback and other ideas from the others. She would like to appear open honest and most of all friendly. Being able to admit to her mistakes and to compromise would be advantageous to her. She would be tempted more towards sitting back and seeing what the others have prepared with an open mind rather than "knowing" that her method is the best.

138

70a If Robin genuinely thought his leadership was a product of thinking well for the tasks of the programme, then he should listen well to his colleagues to obtain their best thinking on the subjects to be handled. After which he should devise a way that incorporates the best thinking of

- everybody. To see that this gets done is one of the important facets to leadership. 139
- 70b blank 140
- 71a Asserting himself while not showing off or being pushy; sensible enthusiasm without being overbearing, a wise thing to do. 141
- 71b Enthusiasm with a degree of indifference. 142
- 72a I think Robin would dive straight into it. Perhaps even being a little careless about getting the two other peoples' trust. I think overall he'll get his own way, but he might have to give and take on a few points needing a decision. 143
- 72b Robin would enter the meeting very subdued if not relaxed. He'd probably only speak if he had something positive to say about a particular issue he felt a little stronger about: He would go along with the others and most probably agree with them on nearly every aspect. 144
- 73a Robin would probably try to get off to a good start by being very friendly but also to try and subtly push things along in the right direction. She should especially listen to what the other two have to say before putting her ideas forward. 145
- 73b Robin would try to keep the team in agreement without pushing her own views on anything. 146
- 74a The effectiveness of someone's behaviour is really dependant on the background and type of people she is dealing with. Although her colleagues are about her own age and female and from school - for example - they might be poor:- mentioning that she has a wealthy background would be a negative. But if they were also from wealthy backgrounds it would have a positive reaction. Socio-economic background is definitely a determining factor. 147
- 74b Playing a passive role is much easier and other peoples impressions are not as important to obtain this goal. 148
- 75a blank 149
- 75b She would probably just concentrate on getting the job done in the best possible way. There would be no need for a leader. Decisions could be made by consensus. 150
- 76a blank 151
- 76b blank 152
- 77a She would try to appear confident and composed as if she knew about the subject. 153
- 77b She would just be herself and try to get to know the others to see



how best all three could work together. 154

78a I think she would be swayed by her first impressions of the other 2 girls. If when they first spoke, they seemed very assertive I think she would hold back more, but if they seemed a bit shy, I think she would quickly move in and hold the reins. This is what I would do. 155

78b I think she would wait and see if one of the other girls appeared to want the job of leader before she became too confident or outspoken, otherwise if she appeared intelligent and the other girls didn't want to be leader, they would suggest she be leader, she would have to get out of it. If one of the other girls appeared right from the start to want the leader's job, she would then just be relaxed and her natural self, as she wouldn't have to worry about having the leader's job forced on her. She wouldn't be afraid to appear intelligent and with some ideas, where she would be if she didn't want to be "volunteered" for the leader's job. 156

79a Given the info that Robin wants to run the show, she is more likely to have some plan formulated before meeting the colleagues. Too little is known about her personality to answer questions eg. "talk about her studies" or mention "her mother once worked.....etc." My own experience has influence my response and my own ideas on leadership have influenced my trying to duplicate Robin as a character. If Robin truly has leadership qualities in this situation she will be prepared to compromise although with maturity realizes her likeableness may suffer consequentially - her age is c17 or c18yrs and I am too old to recall what life is like at that time!! My description of Robin's behaviour is that confidence and plans of action will help her achieve the goals in all probability. 157

79b Robin's behaviour is one of being led rather than leading; more of a "grass roots" behaviour in helping rather than formulating ideas. She may not necessarily be un-assertive however but she may not be over-full of confidence either. (Again influenced by my own experience). If she comes from University she may be less likely to assume a non-leadership role, although again this may or may not be so. Motivation and a sense of values re worthwhile projects may influence her. "To look intelligent" - I find puzzling - do men "look intelligent" - does age matter?? 158

80a Robin would try to find a line of action which maximised her chances of leadership, but also made her appear to be well liked. If she was chosen as leader because she appeared more capable but did not get along

well with the other team members the team would not work well together. The fact that the other two are older and nearing the ends of their degrees shouldn't matter in this situation as the one best suited for the leadership role will be selected regardless of background. If a leader was picked merely on a basis of knowledge or age the group may be jeopardised. Not much information is given about Robin's personality so we don't know if it will be difficult for her to act in the ways which would best maximize her chances of leadership. Although she wants this position she may not be best qualified for it. Although I put "acting herself" as being positive for both aspects, this may not be the case if she is usually shy. 159

80b In this case she would act herself no matter what her personality because she knows she already has a position on the team. No extra effort would be needed to impress her quality on the other members. However she would still have to be friendly to make sure the team worked successfully. 160

81a. Confident, trying to organise things into logical sequence however letting the other two speak their opinions and listening to each in turn. 161

81b. Quiet, awaiting the other two's guidance, happy to be one of the panel but not bombastic. Other some sound advice and contributing to overall meeting (not running the show). 162

82a. If he has any ambitions to be in control of the situation, we would probably try to present a tough, business like attitude and try to submerge any tendency to compromise or to be passive which he might feel. Probably less receptive to other's ideas than if he was disinterested in controlling the situation. 163

82b. I think he would present a more likeable side of himself, and should also be able to contribute more as a member of the group rather than one who was striving always to get his own way and prevent other members from overshadowing his own contributions. 164

83a. Robin would be confident and a little bossy perhaps. She would be outspoken perhaps and very assertive and persuasive in her views with other two colleagues. She would be good at manipulating the situation to her advantage at all possible opportunities. 165

83b. blank 166

84a. He would get in first and initiate discussion; look serious; act confident; propose a plan of attack; try to look intelligent and finally try to present sound, logical arguments. 167

84b. He would be quiet and act shy. He would only get involved in planning and discussion only if directly asked or disagreed violently. 168

85a. Robin would probably be a bit quiet at first, just observing her two colleagues ie level of maturity, trying to see if they really want to achieve something, like she does. Then I think she would introduce a few ideas of her own, and see what the two other girls think. This would be the beginning of their sessions together. 169

85b. If she wants to play a part as a team member, then she may or may not be the first one to initiate discussion. Depending on how long the two other girls talk about everything but what they have been assigned to. 170

86a. Depending on the personality of the other two, by using her initiative and enthusiasm it would probably have been quite helpful in their plan of attack. However, Robin could have appeared over confident and domineering which may have been quite annoying to the other two. 171

86b. Robin would have been quite happy for the other two to make the decisions and follow them. She obviously feels she has few leadership qualities or bright ideas, and thus has little to do with any organisation. 172

87a. Actions making a good leader, and those defining a likeable person are sometimes opposed. For example:- Taking charge from the very beginning may entrench Robin in his position. It also may make him appear domineering and therefore not such a great person (a variation on "you've got to be cruel to be kind"). These answers\* are more from Robin perspective than mine, as I tend to take a while to adapt to a situation (although I can then often take charge). \* in the questionnaire. 173

87b. Robin, in this instance, would probably be very easy going - just 'one of the boys' (He wouldn't suggest choosing a leader in case he got landed with the job). He would more likely be his real self, not having to be responsible (in the sense that he has to prove his suitability.) 174

88a. blank 175

88b. blank 176

89a. blank 177

89b. blank 178

90a To be an effective leader he may have to temper his desire to "run the show" in order to build more rapport with his colleagues - so a lot of careful listening may be necessary. This would also give him very useful information for planning his own strategy - knowing how his colleagues operate. 179

- 90b. Apart from the above, his body language may suggest a more laid back, less crafty approach - he is less intent on the task, more likely to distract onto social pleasantries. 180
- 91a. blank 181
- 91b. blank 182
- 92a. blank 183
- 92b. blank 184
- 93a. Would probably get in first and try to run things from the start and try to assert her own "authority". But at the same time she'll probably still try to be "well-liked" by the other two and not try to make too much friction. 185
- 93b. Would be somewhat quieter in this case, less assertive, willing to take a "back seat" - take a slightly less 'involved' attitude. 186
- 94a. blank 187
- 94b. blank 188
- 95a. blank 189
- 95b. blank 190
- 96a. blank 191
- 96b. blank 192
- 97a. blank 193
- 97b. blank 194
- 98a. She would be assertive and confident without bulldozing her way into the position by using status, names etc and/or being disagreeable. Things like smiling and eye contact will win her colleagues confidence in her. 195
- 98b. She would be more willing to accept her colleagues ideas thoughts and plans of action if they seemed reasonable to her. She would basically be herself. 196
- 99a. be cool, calculating and energetic 197
- 99b. Basically just try to be friendly with everyone while at the same time concentrating on the task at hand and ensuring sound leadership even if it isn't him. 198
- 100a. Try to act pretty cool - mistake. and generally be fairly knowledgeable whether he succeeds or fails. 199
- 100b. blank 200
- 101a. blank 201
- 101b. blank 202
- 102a. Robin would initiate the conversation, use a firm voice, hold

- herself confidently, make positive eye contact, mention her studies, talk as though she is noticeably older than the other 2. I would probably suggest being team leader. 203
- 102b. blank 204
- 103a blank 205
- 103b blank 206
- 104a She will try a bit too hard to get what she wants, slightly insensitive to the feelings of the other two. 207
- 104b blank 208
- 105a blank 209
- 105b Having no leadership aspirations, Robin is freer to pursue personal satisfaction. 210
- 106a If he is keen to lead the group, he would need to concentrate on building a good rapport with his colleagues. He would need to show them that he is capable and qualified to do this job. Also he would do well to show how his leadership would be beneficial to the success of the program. To describe Robin's probably behaviour or course of action would require a more detailed description of his personality. 211
- 106b He should not be afraid to show his interest but he would probably be fairly passive and not very dynamic. 212
- 107a Robin should go into the school looking and acting confidently about what he is saying and doing. All Robin really has to do is be honest and tell the other two that he would like to be the leader of the group. 213
- 107b blank 214
- 108a Robin needs to prove he is worthy to be the leader and has the qualities necessary. This is also dependent on Robin's character and personality, which haven't been described and so can't really be judged. 215
- 108b Robin would be a much more friendlier, easy to get along with than in the first situation because he hasn't got the personal ambition. Group would be more cohesive (unless Kim or Terry are determined to lead). 216
- 109a He should make his presence felt, be friendly but show that he has opinions about the way things should be done, and listen without bias to the suggestions of the others. 217
- 109b He shouldn't do anything to indicate that he has leadership aspirations but should be receptive and involved. 218
- 110a blank 219
- 110b blank 220
- 111a Robin, would have not been pushy, however would have said her piece

at all times she thought appropriate. It would have been a matter of letting the meeting take off review the people there and working out a strategy as best she could. 221

111b If Robin had wanted a back seat role she could still be a fairly positive and direct person but not quite so assertive. 222

112a blank 223

112b blank 224

113a blank 225

113b blank 226

114a Robin would probably presume authority from the outset of the first meeting - "initiate discussion" try to be diplomatic and try to be the first to give her ideas and opinions. She would take the lead, and let the other two follow, and having put herself over as the most informed party, the others would look to her as the "head". 227

114b She would join in the discussions, giving ideas and opinions but make no attempt to dominate. 228

115a I think she has to organise some ideas and arguments on how to get this project off the ground, and then present them as soon as the meeting begins. Let the other two know she is dominant, she is the boss, but is willing to listen to other ideas, possibly consider compromises if necessary - she needs to make the other two not object to the idea of her being the leader. 229

115b Possibly listen to any other suggestions, and take it from there, or else suggest an idea and ask the other two for their opinions and other ideas before going on. 230

116a She wouldn't act entirely naturally, because not knowing the other women, Robin Could act in any way she saw as appropriate, or helpful in her aim to be leader. 231

116b Robin would be very agreeable, always willing to compromise and go along with the suggestions of the others. 232

117a Robin would most likely try to get to know the other two girls, and talk to them about their interests, hobbies, study and any ideas they had on Team C's task. She wouldn't try to be too loud or bossy, but be friendly and confident. She would be looking to get the other girl's approval as a leader. 233

117b Robin would be much quieter if she were not aiming to become a leader for Team C's tasks. She wouldn't really initiate discussions or nominate herself as a leader. Primarily she would be concerned with

- getting to know the girls a little better and being friendly and  
interested in what they all plan to do for Team C. 234
- 118a blank 235
- 118b blank 236
- 119a blank 237
- 119b blank 238
- 120a The sort of person I generally avoid socially, but am happy to work  
with in an academic or work environment. 239
- 120b A bit like mine would be happy to participate but reluctant to lead. 240
- 121a blank 241
- 121b blank 242
- 122a She would attempt to become group leader as she has already stated  
she is older and has previous tertiary education. That is, she is  
already doing what the other two are about to attempt. She may feel this  
gives her some advantage. 243
- 122b She would probably sit back and not volunteer anything useful to the  
group unless asked. That is, she probably would not initiate any  
discussion. She would like to be involved as long as she does not have  
any great responsibility toward the others or the programme 244
- 123a Eager to get started, pushy, her aim now is to lead group not work  
as a team. 245
- 123b Acceptable, willing to be part of the team. 246
- 124a blank 247
- 124b Robin would probably agree with the other members of the group and  
may occasionally offer arguments or information that may be relevant. On  
the whole she may let the meetings take their natural course without  
initiation on her part at all. 248
- 125a Robin's behaviour would probably be confident and self assured, so  
that she gives a good impression to the other two. Presenting her best  
qualities, suited to a leadership role, while not being too overpowering  
would be her best course of action for what she wants. 249
- 125b She wouldn't be as outspoken probably, about what she wants, or be  
as worried when something happens she disagrees with. At the same time  
she would give the appearance of being confident and capable, so she can  
prove herself as a worthy team member. 250
- 126a Robin would probably approach her two colleagues in a confident,  
friendly manner. By appearing to be well informed on the type of program  
necessary for a recreation program for primary school children she may

- be likely to gain the interest and support of Kim and Terry. By "dropping names", hinting that her family is well off and suggesting a leader be chosen she would be manipulating procedures to her effect. 251
- 126b Robin may appear nervous, shy and make it obvious that she knows little about what is required in the foundation of a program but would be pleased to assist. She will be happy for either Kim or Terry to take the responsibility of leadership and possibly may under-rate the talents she can contribute. 252
- 127a Friendly, interested, enthusiastic, keen excited, confident. Could be reserved and shy with new colleagues, to begin with. 253
- 127b Submissive, inadequate, unproductive quiet, shy. 254
- 128a Robin will need to be assertive and to show that she has the qualities of a good leader, if she is to acquire this position. She will need to gain her colleagues confidence in her so that they are supportive. Robin should also be flexible, and conscious of their thoughts and feelings. (I was a bit confused with how we were supposed to relate part 1 and part 2, or whether they were related at all) 255
- 128b Robin should be co operative with Kim and Terry and because she wants the project to go well she should do her best to keep the team together and functioning effectively. 256
- 129a Robin on day 1 would try to act naturally. Putting forward ideas of her own as well as listening to Kim and Terry. Robin will need to assess their ability and knowledge to compare with her own. Robin may even at the end of the session decide one of them would make a better leader than herself. Although she has an interest in this field she may find one of her colleagues has more experience than herself. If Robin knows well what is expected and prepares for the session receiving as well as giving she could well end up leader without anyone feeling a need to choose. Robin's own confident and positive attitude along with her willingness to share ideas will stand her in good stead. Robin will behave in an open and friendly manner showing an interest in each of her colleagues. 257
- 129b Robin would in this case listen to and get to know something about Kim and Terry. Robin would be helpful in exploring their ideas but produce few ideas of her own. Robin would be happy to learn about her colleagues would answer questions about herself but be unlikely to volunteer this information. Robin would make it apparent that she did not wish to be leader. Apart from this she would make it clear that she would be a good team member willing and able to do her share. 258



- 130a Quite tense, forcing himself to take charge 259
- 130b Relaxed, willing to listen and allow the other two to dominate 260
- 131a I imagine Robin would have been very eager and excited about her project. She would probably have been nervous also about how Terry and Kim would react to this eagerness, and so would be very aware of maintenance skills while she put forward many suggestions. 261
- 131b Robin would tend to contribute to the discussions, but not be so eager to put her opinion and ideas across. Tend to sit back and help things along rather than push them. 262
- 132a blank 263
- 132b blank 264
- 133a Robin would act confident, whilst trying to impress her colleagues with her education and any experience she has had in this field - Robin would attempt to initiate discussions and form a plan for the job. 265
- 133b blank 266
- 134a Behaviour probably would have been dictatorial and authoritative. Robin would probably like to impress upon other colleagues her importance and power, so they will respect her and hand her the leadership. 267
- 134b Robin would be suggestive, she would be easy to get along with, friendly, but also prepared to disagree so that the level of contribution can be raised. 268
- 135a As Robin wishes to "run the show" I feel that she would like to both impress the other two of her capabilities as a leader and would also feel that she has a better chance of attaining leadership, if they like her as well. As the other two are perhaps a little more naive than Robin (having no experience of tertiary education, at this stage) they may be impressed by such things as name dropping and having association with the school (mother as cleaner) whereas I would not be impressed by such comments. In these instances I have indicated neutrality. 269
- 135b I think that Robin may be somewhat more relaxed and act herself in this situation as she is content to be included in the team and is less ambitious (personally). I imagine that the others may find her more likeable as I think that she could be less pushy than if she desired leadership. 270
- 136a WOULD NOT:- Enquire re: the other female's experience and knowledge in this field of work. Become acquainted with them on a more personal level, before engaging in the tasks in question. Perhaps wouldn't have

done all the "nice" things other than what has been ticked in the questionnaire eg. offered or suggested leadership to others, avoid name dropping, use understandable, simplistic language. 271

136b Robin would have been happy to go along with any suggestions offered, provided that the end result was satisfactory for a good programme to be implemented. She would be pleasant, easy to get along with and a member willing to help in any area necessary. 272

137a It is hard to describe Robin's probable behaviour when one does not know anything about her personality i.e. - although some people do adopt a 'divide and rule' approach when they wish to 'run the show', this may not apply to Robin. She almost certainly would initiate discussion and act in a confident manner. 273

137b Robin would try to present sound logical arguments and show a willingness to compromise. She may adopt a 'testing the water approach'. 274

138a Robins ambition would probably cause her to initiate discussion. She is not likely to suggest a leader be chosen for fear that they may not choose her, at least in the early stages. She would probably promote herself as the most logical choice for leader and simply assume the leadership role. Because they will be a team for a short period only. Not knowing just how clever Robin is and how well equipped she is with leadership skills, it is difficult to predict if she would be prepared to compromise or avoid disagreements or skirt around issues and admit to mistakes. I have presumed Robin to be a capable leader type person. I have presumed also that Kim & Terry do not have leadership goals of their own. If they did have things would be different. 275

138b Robin's approach is likely to be more casual. She would not seek to initiate discussion and say a lot in the beginning, although this would depend on her level of enthusiasm. She is more likely to be her usual self and convey a preparedness to cooperate and negotiate with the others. Robin doesn't have so much at stake in this case. 276

139a blank 277

139b blank 278

140a Robin will probably let things take their natural course for a while - just to 'sus' out the situation, then from there will attempt to gain leadership. 279

140b Robin would sit quietly and agree with most of what is said. She would act in such a manner as to give plenty of leeway for a potential leader to take control. 280

- 141a Let it be known to others that she is somewhat superior in particular areas 281
- 141b Act and treat others like equals 282
- 142a blank 283
- 142b blank 284
- 143a How do you look intelligent? Robin would try to find out more about the other girls first. What qualifications they had, their interest in the program, their ideas about the program and if either of them was interested in being the leader. She would not be stand-offish, but would find out about the other girls before she presented her ideas and take over running the show. Perhaps she would suggest that they introduce themselves and get to know each other before they got down to organising the program. 285
- 143b How do we know if she has a soft voice anyway? She would sit back and take it all in. She would contribute her suggestions, but not dominate the conversation. 286
- 144a Robin would probably try to establish herself as the leader of the group, she would not take into consideration that they are working as a team and either of the other two members may be just as worthy a leader or joint leadership itself may be more appropriate. 287
- 144b blank 288
- 145a Robin would possibly try and assert herself to try to get a leadership role so that she would end up running the show. It would depend very much on the personalities of all three involved, whether the other two would be prepared to offside to Robin. 289
- 145b Apart from being prepared to play the waiting game, Robin might mention she would prefer to be a foil and not too interested in being the leader. 290
- 146a I could see Robin as a leader with positive qualities if she uses her leadership qualities in a way that will aid the group achieve its goals. Robin will probably try to assert herself and mention particular skills she has that will aid the group to achieve its goals. She will probably appear to be confident and possess the qualities that will best suit a leader. Yet I do not see herself necessary to be negative. 291
- 146b Robin will most likely be an interested yet low participating member. She will probably consider that the other women will have more skills than herself and be willing to listen attentively to what they have to say, yet she may find that she can present skills to the group

that will aid in task completion.

292

147a I suggest Robin would begin by playing a waiting game so as to learn more about her colleagues, their interests, ideas, enthusiasm and knowledge regarding the project. She may find the others have no desire to lead and are prepared to follow Robin "natural leader" provided their ideas and experiences etc are considered. For Robin to be effective as a leader of a group of three she is going to need leadership qualities and maintenance skills. She must present herself as a likeable person who is prepared to listen to and share ideas, encourage others, not put others and their ideas down, build on ideas, not take sides with one or other party etc. For the project to be successful this group of three are going to need to get along, to work as a team. Perhaps Robin will find by the end of Day 1 that there is no need for her alone to run the show.

293

147b I suggest Robin would offer little input to the group and its discussion critically, first being prepared to listen to others and follow their ideas. She may put forward ideas to indicate her enthusiasm and interest but would be quite happy to compromise. Robin would try to present herself as a likeable person interested and enthusiastic but not pushy.

294

148a Probable behaviour Spend a little time getting to know colleagues - being friendly. But then move fairly smartly into task. - initiate lots of suggestions. volunteer to take on major tasks - listen to their comments incorporate into own suggestions, be flexible. In rating

consequences I found that answer would differ depending on how colleagues interpreted behaviour - ie initiating could be seen as aggressive or they could be grateful. Consequences totally different then for both.

295

148b Would sit back more initiate less Spend more time on maintenance/relationships. Be more concerned about how behaviour may be interpreted. May be more prepared to take on drudge tasks/left overs.

296

149a blank

297

149b blank

298

150a As Robin has ideas of running the show her probable behaviour would have been to steam-roller the two younger girls into making agreements without allowing them time to think.

299

150b Robin would have initiated some discussion but probably would spend

- as much time listening to the others as she did talking. 300
- 151a She would give an impression of confidence and would assume a high profile early on. She might find out what skills others have and suggest areas for them to work on, or just ensure that her skills were known about. 301
- 151b She would be friendly and co-operative and would give others an opportunity to disclose their ideas, skills and so on. She would participate actively in discussion but not impose her views. 302
- 152a blank 303
- 152b blank 304
- 153a I would presume that her manner would be favourable and that she would be very willing, helpful and full of 'good' ideas. Just from reading the short introduction, I realised or presumed that Robin was a 'go-getter'! 305
- 153b Relaxed and probably very much a harmoniser 306
- 154a blank 307
- 154b blank 308
- 155a Robin is desperate. He makes every effort to 'impress' and I suspect succeeds. 309
- 155b Robin is likely to play 'the middle road' not wanting to make waves whilst remaining important. He chooses those actions which best fit this image. 310
- 156a blank 311
- 156b blank 312
- 157a blank 313
- 157b blank 314
- 158a She may feel lacking - in area of study achievements - intimidated by age diff. - may affect her confidence level - her ability to handle the meeting as efficiently as she wants. However if she is a confident person and believes in herself these factors may make no difference at all. She would however I feel have to feel her way carefully. 315
- 158b blank 316
- 159a Robin would be very assertive in her approach, not to the extent perhaps the questionnaire suggests (siding against her colleagues). She would be diplomatic and non-aggressive in her approach to gain her colleagues' respect. This would be different if she wanted to dominate the situation instantaneously in which case she may use tactics which would gain a positive reaction for leadership and a negative reaction for

likeableness.

317

159b Robin would be enthusiastic, thoughtful and considerate of the others in her approach to the task. She would probably put forward any appropriate suggestions and listen to any others which may have been put forward. She would not try to dominate proceedings or create any exaggerated image of herself.

318

160a blank

319

160b blank

320

161a Difficult to answer question concerned with Robin's "usual self" as do not know whether her usual self is to take a leadership role - so assumed this to be so. Day 1 Robin would initiate discussion, act confident and intelligent; look serious; propose plan of attack and mention her own knowledge in this area; allow disagreements and compromise final decisions. Direct eye-contact would not be avoided.

321

161b Again = assumed "usual self" was not to take leadership role in this case. Day 1 Friendly, easy to get on with; not be assertive; not appear especially intelligent, or well-off; unlikely to initiate discussion.

322

162a She would be trying to make an impression - to make her colleagues feel that she, because she is older and has more experience in this area that she is simply a more suitable person to be leader than the other two. - A note as to what sort of leader Robin wants to be would be useful.

eg - autocratic, democratic. That would help determine what sort of behaviour Robin would undertake.

323

162b She is likely to be a passive member of the group and avoid any hints that she may in some way be better than her colleagues.

324

163a I think it would depend a lot on what kind of person she is. If she was already confident, intelligent and got along well with people then she probably wouldn't need to overact or push herself, then she may do things which are bad for her leadership.

325

163b blank

326

164a Not knowing how the other two women would have reacted to some of these issues, and what their attitudes were makes it very subjective answering.

327

164b Again how the others behave and react in the situation effects how Robin will behave to some degree. Thus the responses are very subjective and limited due to the limited information given.

328

165a Because this is Robin's first day, along with his associates, it would seem unlikely that any major decisions or leadership/participator

roles would be established. Nevertheless, Robin would probably promote his interest and enthusiasm in the tasks ahead, and perhaps intimate some willingness to handle leadership. 329

165b Robin, who is willing to participate as a team member, would probably listen a lot, and offer help in any of the tasks that are brought up in the discussion. However, there is not enough information on Robin's character to make any particular comments on foreseeable probable behaviours. It would seem that Robin probably would act in a way that shows his interest and enthusiasm towards the tasks at hand. 330

166a I found it hard to answer the questions in relation to Robin and found myself answering them from the way I would behave if I felt that I would like to 'run the show'. Also some of her behaviours would be dependent on many other factors that details were not supplied for. 331

166b I found it quite difficult to rate the likelihood of occurrence of behaviours in a hypothetical situation without knowing more about 'Robin'. 332

167a This may have been easier if the above situation was related to myself and how I think I would behave. My answers are greatly influenced by my own thoughts and actions. 333

167b blank 334

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| 137: (38 4) | /natural by leadership/4            |
| 138: (39)   | /contribute by leadership           |
| 139: (39 1) | /contribute by leadership/1         |
| 140: (39 2) | /contribute by leadership/2         |
| 141: (39 3) | /contribute by leadership/3         |
| 142: (39 4) | /contribute by leadership/4         |
| 143: (40)   | /use status by leadership           |
| 144: (40 1) | /use status by leadership/1         |
| 145: (40 2) | /use status by leadership/2         |
| 146: (40 3) | /use status by leadership/3         |
| 147: (40 4) | /use status by leadership/4         |
| 148: (41)   | /caution by leadership              |
| 149: (41 1) | /caution by leadership/1            |
| 150: (41 2) | /caution by leadership/2            |
| 151: (42)   | /domination by leadership           |
| 152: (42 1) | /domination by leadership/1         |

|              |  |
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| 153: (42 2)  | /domination by leadership/2                |
| 154: (42 3)  | /domination by leadership/3                |
| 155: (42 4)  | /domination by leadership/4                |
| 156: (43)    | /diplomatic behaviour by leadership        |
| 157: (43 1)  | /diplomatic behaviour by leadership/1      |
| 158: (43 2)  | /diplomatic behaviour by leadership/2      |
| 159: (43 3)  | /diplomatic behaviour by leadership/3      |
| 160: (43 4)  | /diplomatic behaviour by leadership/4      |
| 161: (44)    | /dip beh by lead by age                    |
| 162: (44 1)  | /dip beh by lead by age/1                  |
| 163: (44 2)  | /dip beh by lead by age/2                  |
| 164: (44 3)  | /dip beh by lead by age/3                  |
| 165: (44 4)  | /dip beh by lead by age/4                  |
| 166: (44 5)  | /dip beh by lead by age/5                  |
| 167: (44 6)  | /dip beh by lead by age/6                  |
| 168: (44 7)  | /dip beh by lead by age/7                  |
| 169: (44 8)  | /dip beh by lead by age/8                  |
| 170: (44 9)  | /dip beh by lead by age/9                  |
| 171: (44 10) | /dip beh by lead by age/10                 |
| 172: (44 11) | /dip beh by lead by age/11                 |
| 173: (44 12) | /dip beh by lead by age/12                 |
| 174: (44 13) | /dip beh by lead by age/conciliatory beh 1 |
| 175: (44 14) | /dip beh by lead by age/conciliatory beh 2 |
| 176: (44 15) | /dip beh by lead by age/conciliatory beh 3 |
| 177: (45)    | /confidence by lead by status              |
| 178: (45 1)  | /confidence by lead by status/1            |
| 179: (45 2)  | /confidence by lead by status/2            |
| 180: (45 3)  | /confidence by lead by status/3            |
| 181: (45 4)  | /confidence by lead by status/4            |
| 182: (45 5)  | /confidence by lead by status/5            |
| 183: (45 6)  | /confidence by lead by status/6            |
| 184: (45 7)  | /confidence by lead by status/7            |
| 185: (45 8)  | /confidence by lead by status/8            |
| 186: (45 9)  | /confidence by lead by status/9            |
| 187: (45 10) | /confidence by lead by status/10           |
| 188: (45 11) | /confidence by lead by status/11           |
| 189: (45 12) | /confidence by lead by status/12           |
| 190: (45 13) | /confidence by lead by status/beh prom 1   |
| 191: (45 14) | /confidence by lead by status/beh prom 2   |
| 192: (45 15) | /confidence by lead by status/beh prom 3   |
| 193: (46)    | /competence by lead by age                 |
| 194: (46 1)  | /competence by lead by age/1               |
| 195: (46 2)  | /competence by lead by age/2               |
| 196: (46 3)  | /competence by lead by age/3               |
| 197: (46 4)  | /competence by lead by age/4               |
| 198: (46 5)  | /competence by lead by age/5               |
| 199: (46 6)  | /competence by lead by age/6               |
| 200: (46 7)  | /competence by lead by age/7               |
| 201: (46 8)  | /competence by lead by age/8               |
| 202: (46 9)  | /competence by lead by age/9               |
| 203: (46 10) | /competence by lead by age/10              |
| 204: (46 11) | /competence by lead by age/11              |
| 205: (46 12) | /competence by lead by age/12              |
| 206: (46 13) | /competence by lead by age/ability 1       |
| 207: (46 14) | /competence by lead by age/ability 2       |
| 208: (46 15) | /competence by lead by age/ability 3       |
| 209: (47)    | /likeableness by lead by age               |
| 210: (47 1)  | /likeableness by lead by age/1             |

|              |  |
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| 211: (47 2)  | /likeableness by lead by age/2                     |
| 212: (47 3)  | /likeableness by lead by age/3                     |
| 213: (47 4)  | /likeableness by lead by age/4                     |
| 214: (47 5)  | /likeableness by lead by age/5                     |
| 215: (47 6)  | /likeableness by lead by age/6                     |
| 216: (47 7)  | /likeableness by lead by age/7                     |
| 217: (47 8)  | /likeableness by lead by age/8                     |
| 218: (47 9)  | /likeableness by lead by age/9                     |
| 219: (47 10) | /likeableness by lead by age/10                    |
| 220: (47 11) | /likeableness by lead by age/11                    |
| 221: (47 12) | /likeableness by lead by age/12                    |
| 222: (48)    | /initiative by lead by age                         |
| 223: (48 1)  | /initiative by lead by age/1                       |
| 224: (48 2)  | /initiative by lead by age/2                       |
| 225: (48 3)  | /initiative by lead by age/3                       |
| 226: (48 4)  | /initiative by lead by age/4                       |
| 227: (48 5)  | /initiative by lead by age/5                       |
| 228: (48 6)  | /initiative by lead by age/6                       |
| 229: (48 7)  | /initiative by lead by age/7                       |
| 230: (48 8)  | /initiative by lead by age/8                       |
| 231: (48 9)  | /initiative by lead by age/9                       |
| 232: (48 10) | /initiative by lead by age/10                      |
| 233: (48 11) | /initiative by lead by age/11                      |
| 234: (48 12) | /initiative by lead by age/12                      |
| 235: (49)    | /cooperation by lead by age                        |
| 236: (49 1)  | /cooperation by lead by age/1                      |
| 237: (49 2)  | /cooperation by lead by age/2                      |
| 238: (49 3)  | /cooperation by lead by age/3                      |
| 239: (49 4)  | /cooperation by lead by age/4                      |
| 240: (49 5)  | /cooperation by lead by age/5                      |
| 241: (49 6)  | /cooperation by lead by age/6                      |
| 242: (49 7)  | /cooperation by lead by age/7                      |
| 243: (49 8)  | /cooperation by lead by age/8                      |
| 244: (49 9)  | /cooperation by lead by age/9                      |
| 245: (49 10) | /cooperation by lead by age/10                     |
| 246: (49 11) | /cooperation by lead by age/11                     |
| 247: (49 12) | /cooperation by lead by age/12                     |
| 248: (50)    | /compromise by lead by age                         |
| 249: (50 1)  | /compromise by lead by age/1                       |
| 250: (50 2)  | /compromise by lead by age/2                       |
| 251: (50 3)  | /compromise by lead by age/3                       |
| 252: (50 4)  | /compromise by lead by age/4                       |
| 253: (50 5)  | /compromise by lead by age/5                       |
| 254: (50 6)  | /compromise by lead by age/6                       |
| 255: (50 7)  | /compromise by lead by age/7                       |
| 256: (50 8)  | /compromise by lead by age/8                       |
| 257: (50 9)  | /compromise by lead by age/9                       |
| 258: (50 10) | /compromise by lead by age/10                      |
| 259: (50 11) | /compromise by lead by age/11                      |
| 260: (50 12) | /compromise by lead by age/12                      |
| 261: (51)    | /friendliness by leadership                        |
| 262: (51 1)  | /friendliness by leadership/1                      |
| 263: (51 2)  | /friendliness by leadership/2                      |
| 264: (51 3)  | /friendliness by leadership/3                      |
| 265: (51 4)  | /friendliness by leadership/4                      |
| 266: (51 5)  | /friendliness by leadership/concil avoid           |
| 267: (51 6)  | /friendliness by leadership/concil avoid eldest    |
| 268: (51 7)  | /friendliness by leadership/concil disclaim eldest |

269: (51 8) /friendliness by leadership/concil disclaim same  
 270: (51 9) /friendliness by leadership/concil disclaim youngest  
 271: (51 10) /friendliness by leadership/concil disclaim male  
 272: (51 11) /friendliness by leadership/concil disclaim female  
 273: (52) /friendliness by lead by age  
 274: (52 1) /friendliness by lead by age/1  
 275: (52 2) /friendliness by lead by age/2  
 276: (52 3) /friendliness by lead by age/3  
 277: (52 4) /friendliness by lead by age/4  
 278: (52 5) /friendliness by lead by age/5  
 279: (52 6) /friendliness by lead by age/6  
 280: (52 7) /friendliness by lead by age/7  
 281: (52 8) /friendliness by lead by age/8  
 282: (52 9) /friendliness by lead by age/9  
 283: (52 10) /friendliness by lead by age/10  
 284: (52 11) /friendliness by lead by age/11  
 285: (52 12) /friendliness by lead by age/12  
 286: (53) /talkative by lead by age  
 287: (53 1) /talkative by lead by age/1  
 288: (53 2) /talkative by lead by age/2  
 289: (53 3) /talkative by lead by age/3  
 290: (53 4) /talkative by lead by age/4  
 291: (53 5) /talkative by lead by age/5  
 292: (53 6) /talkative by lead by age/6  
 293: (53 7) /talkative by lead by age/7  
 294: (53 8) /talkative by lead by age/8  
 295: (53 9) /talkative by lead by age/9  
 296: (53 10) /talkative by lead by age/10  
 297: (53 11) /talkative by lead by age/11  
 298: (53 12) /talkative by lead by age/12  
 299: (54) /assertiveness by leadership  
 300: (54 1) /assertiveness by leadership/1  
 301: (54 2) /assertiveness by leadership/2  
 302: (54 3) /assertiveness by leadership/3  
 303: (54 4) /assertiveness by leadership/4  
 304: (54 5) /assertiveness by leadership/withdrawal avoid  
 305: (54 6) /assertiveness by leadership/withdrawal disclaim eldest  
 306: (54 7) /assertiveness by leadership/withdrawal disclaim same  
 307: (54 8) /assertiveness by leadership/withdrawal disclaim youngest  
 308: (54 9) /assertiveness by leadership/withdrawal disclaim male  
 309: (54 10) /assertiveness by leadership/withdrawal disclaim female  
 310: (55) /domination by lead by age  
 311: (55 1) /domination by lead by age/1  
 312: (55 2) /domination by lead by age/2  
 313: (55 3) /domination by lead by age/3  
 314: (55 4) /domination by lead by age/4  
 315: (55 5) /domination by lead by age/5  
 316: (55 6) /domination by lead by age/6  
 317: (55 7) /domination by lead by age/7  
 318: (55 8) /domination by lead by age/8  
 319: (55 9) /domination by lead by age/9  
 320: (55 10) /domination by lead by age/10  
 321: (55 11) /domination by lead by age/11  
 322: (55 12) /domination by lead by age/12  
 323: (56) /lead ability by lead by age  
 324: (56 1) /lead ability by lead by age/1  
 325: (56 2) /lead ability by lead by age/2  
 326: (56 3) /lead ability by lead by age/3

327: (56 4) /lead ability by lead by age/4  
 328: (56 5) /lead ability by lead by age/5  
 329: (56 6) /lead ability by lead by age/6  
 330: (56 7) /lead ability by lead by age/7  
 331: (56 8) /lead ability by lead by age/8  
 332: (56 9) /lead ability by lead by age/9  
 333: (56 10) /lead ability by lead by age/10  
 334: (56 11) /lead ability by lead by age/11  
 335: (56 12) /lead ability by lead by age/12  
 336: (57) /relaxed by lead by age  
 337: (57 1) /relaxed by lead by age/1  
 338: (57 2) /relaxed by lead by age/2  
 339: (57 3) /relaxed by lead by age/3  
 340: (57 4) /relaxed by lead by age/4  
 341: (57 5) /relaxed by lead by age/5  
 342: (57 6) /relaxed by lead by age/6  
 343: (57 7) /relaxed by lead by age/7  
 344: (57 8) /relaxed by lead by age/8  
 345: (57 9) /relaxed by lead by age/9  
 346: (57 10) /relaxed by lead by age/10  
 347: (57 11) /relaxed by lead by age/11  
 348: (57 12) /relaxed by lead by age/12  
 349: (58) /natural by lead by age  
 350: (58 1) /natural by lead by age/1  
 351: (58 2) /natural by lead by age/2  
 352: (58 3) /natural by lead by age/3  
 353: (58 4) /natural by lead by age/4  
 354: (58 5) /natural by lead by age/5  
 355: (58 6) /natural by lead by age/6  
 356: (58 7) /natural by lead by age/7  
 357: (58 8) /natural by lead by age/8  
 358: (58 9) /natural by lead by age/9  
 359: (58 10) /natural by lead by age/10  
 360: (58 11) /natural by lead by age/11  
 361: (58 12) /natural by lead by age/12  
 362: (59) /contribute by lead by age  
 363: (59 1) /contribute by lead by age/1  
 364: (59 2) /contribute by lead by age/2  
 365: (59 3) /contribute by lead by age/3  
 366: (59 4) /contribute by lead by age/4  
 367: (59 5) /contribute by lead by age/5  
 368: (59 6) /contribute by lead by age/6  
 369: (59 7) /contribute by lead by age/7  
 370: (59 8) /contribute by lead by age/8  
 371: (59 9) /contribute by lead by age/9  
 372: (59 10) /contribute by lead by age/10  
 373: (59 11) /contribute by lead by age/11  
 374: (59 12) /contribute by lead by age/12  
 375: (60) /use status by lead by age  
 376: (60 1) /use status by lead by age/1  
 377: (60 2) /use status by lead by age/2  
 378: (60 3) /use status by lead by age/3  
 379: (60 4) /use status by lead by age/4  
 380: (60 5) /use status by lead by age/5  
 381: (60 6) /use status by lead by age/6  
 382: (60 7) /use status by lead by age/7  
 383: (60 8) /use status by lead by age/8  
 384: (60 9) /use status by lead by age/9

385: (60 10) /use status by lead by age/10  
 386: (60 11) /use status by lead by age/11  
 387: (60 12) /use status by lead by age/12  
 388: (61) /caution by lead by age  
 389: (61 1) /caution by lead by age/1  
 390: (61 2) /caution by lead by age/2  
 391: (61 3) /caution by lead by age/3  
 392: (61 4) /caution by lead by age/4  
 393: (61 5) /caution by lead by age/5  
 394: (61 6) /caution by lead by age/6  
 395: (62) /assertiveness by lead by age  
 396: (62 1) /assertiveness by lead by age/1  
 397: (62 2) /assertiveness by lead by age/2  
 398: (62 3) /assertiveness by lead by age/3  
 399: (62 4) /assertiveness by lead by age/4  
 400: (62 5) /assertiveness by lead by age/5  
 401: (62 6) /assertiveness by lead by age/6  
 402: (62 7) /assertiveness by lead by age/7  
 403: (62 8) /assertiveness by lead by age/8  
 404: (62 9) /assertiveness by lead by age/9  
 405: (62 10) /assertiveness by lead by age/10  
 406: (62 11) /assertiveness by lead by age/11  
 407: (62 12) /assertiveness by lead by age/12  
 408: (63) /lead by leadership  
 409: (63 1) /lead by leadership/1  
 410: (63 2) /lead by leadership/2  
 411: (63 3) /lead by leadership/3  
 412: (63 4) /lead by leadership/4  
 413: (64) /lead by leadership by age  
 414: (64 1) /lead by leadership by age/1  
 415: (64 2) /lead by leadership by age/2  
 416: (64 3) /lead by leadership by age/3  
 417: (64 4) /lead by leadership by age/4  
 418: (64 5) /lead by leadership by age/5  
 419: (64 6) /lead by leadership by age/6  
 420: (64 7) /lead by leadership by age/7  
 421: (64 8) /lead by leadership by age/8  
 422: (64 9) /lead by leadership by age/9  
 423: (64 10) /lead by leadership by age/10  
 424: (64 11) /lead by leadership by age/11  
 425: (64 12) /lead by leadership by age/12  
 426: (65) /not blank  
 427: (66) /response  
 428: (66 1) /response/yes  
 429: (66 2) /response/no  
 430: (67) /responses by condition  
 431: (67 1) /responses by condition/1  
 432: (67 2) /responses by condition/2  
 433: (67 3) /responses by condition/3  
 434: (67 4) /responses by condition/4  
 435: (68) /resp by cond  
 436: (68 1) /resp by cond/seekers  
 437: (68 2) /resp by cond/avoiders  
 438: (69) /condition by age  
 439: (69 1) /condition by age/1  
 440: (69 2) /condition by age/2  
 441: (69 3) /condition by age/3  
 442: (69 4) /condition by age/4

|              |                                  |
|--------------|----------------------------------|
| 443: (69 5)  | /condition by age/5              |
| 444: (69 6)  | /condition by age/6              |
| 445: (70)    | /condition by sex                |
| 446: (70 1)  | /condition by sex/1              |
| 447: (70 2)  | /condition by sex/2              |
| 448: (70 3)  | /condition by sex/3              |
| 449: (70 4)  | /condition by sex/4              |
| 450: (71)    | /behavioural prominence          |
| 451: (71 1)  | /behavioural prominence/eldest   |
| 452: (71 2)  | /behavioural prominence/same     |
| 453: (71 3)  | /behavioural prominence/youngest |
| 454: (72)    | /behav prom by age by sex        |
| 455: (72 1)  | /behav prom by age by sex/1      |
| 456: (72 2)  | /behav prom by age by sex/2      |
| 457: (72 3)  | /behav prom by age by sex/3      |
| 458: (72 4)  | /behav prom by age by sex/4      |
| 459: (72 5)  | /behav prom by age by sex/5      |
| 460: (72 6)  | /behav prom by age by sex/6      |
| 461: (73)    | /condition by age by sex         |
| 462: (73 1)  | /condition by age by sex/1       |
| 463: (73 2)  | /condition by age by sex/2       |
| 464: (73 3)  | /condition by age by sex/3       |
| 465: (73 4)  | /condition by age by sex/4       |
| 466: (73 5)  | /condition by age by sex/5       |
| 467: (73 6)  | /condition by age by sex/6       |
| 468: (73 7)  | /condition by age by sex/7       |
| 469: (73 8)  | /condition by age by sex/8       |
| 470: (73 9)  | /condition by age by sex/9       |
| 471: (73 10) | /condition by age by sex/10      |
| 472: (73 11) | /condition by age by sex/11      |
| 473: (73 12) | /condition by age by sex/12      |
| 474: (74)    | /conciliatory behaviour          |
| 475: (74 1)  | /conciliatory behaviour/eldest   |
| 476: (74 2)  | /conciliatory behaviour/same     |
| 477: (74 3)  | /conciliatory behaviour/youngest |
| 478: (75)    | /concil beh by age by sex        |
| 479: (75 1)  | /concil beh by age by sex/1      |
| 480: (75 2)  | /concil beh by age by sex/2      |
| 481: (75 3)  | /concil beh by age by sex/3      |
| 482: (75 4)  | /concil beh by age by sex/4      |
| 483: (75 5)  | /concil beh by age by sex/5      |
| 484: (75 6)  | /concil beh by age by sex/6      |
| 485: (76)    | /ability                         |
| 486: (76 1)  | /ability/eldest                  |
| 487: (76 2)  | /ability/same                    |
| 488: (76 3)  | /ability/youngest                |
| 489: (77)    | /ability by age by sex           |
| 490: (77 1)  | /ability by age by sex/1         |
| 491: (77 2)  | /ability by age by sex/2         |
| 492: (77 3)  | /ability by age by sex/3         |
| 493: (77 4)  | /ability by age by sex/4         |
| 494: (77 5)  | /ability by age by sex/5         |
| 495: (77 6)  | /ability by age by sex/6         |
| 496: (78)    | /concil (avoid) by age           |
| 497: (79)    | /preempt1                        |
| 498: (79 1)  | /preempt1/eldest                 |
| 499: (79 2)  | /preempt1/same                   |
| 500: (79 3)  | /preempt1/youngest               |



501: (80) /preemption  
 502: (80 1) /preemption/eldest  
 503: (80 2) /preemption/same  
 504: (80 3) /preemption/youngest  
 505: (81) /sex by age  
 506: (81 1) /sex by age/1  
 507: (81 2) /sex by age/2  
 508: (81 3) /sex by age/3  
 509: (81 4) /sex by age/4  
 510: (81 5) /sex by age/5  
 511: (81 6) /sex by age/6  
 512: (82) /preemptive by age by sex  
 513: (82 1) /preemptive by age by sex/1  
 514: (82 2) /preemptive by age by sex/2  
 515: (82 3) /preemptive by age by sex/3  
 516: (82 4) /preemptive by age by sex/4  
 517: (82 5) /preemptive by age by sex/5  
 518: (82 6) /preemptive by age by sex/6  
 519: (83) /confidence beh  
 520: (83 1) /confidence beh/eldest  
 521: (83 2) /confidence beh/same  
 522: (83 3) /confidence beh/youngest  
 523: (84) /confid beh by age by sex  
 524: (84 1) /confid beh by age by sex/1  
 525: (84 2) /confid beh by age by sex/2  
 526: (84 3) /confid beh by age by sex/3  
 527: (84 4) /confid beh by age by sex/4  
 528: (84 5) /confid beh by age by sex/5  
 529: (84 6) /confid beh by age by sex/6  
 530: (84 7) /confid beh by age by sex/union with preemption  
 531: (85) /presumption by age by sex  
 532: (85 1) /presumption by age by sex/1  
 533: (85 2) /presumption by age by sex/2  
 534: (85 3) /presumption by age by sex/3  
 535: (85 4) /presumption by age by sex/4  
 536: (85 5) /presumption by age by sex/5  
 537: (85 6) /presumption by age by sex/6  
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**APPENDIX C:**  
Appendix to Experiment 3

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <i>C1: Instructions to experimenters .....</i>           | <i>267</i> |
| <i>C2: Instructions to participants. ....</i>            | <i>268</i> |
| <i>C3: Example of Letter 1; high status version.....</i> | <i>269</i> |
| <i>C4: Example of Letter 1; low status version. ....</i> | <i>270</i> |
| <i>C5: Example of Letter 2; high status version.....</i> | <i>271</i> |
| <i>C6: Example of Letter 2; low status version .....</i> | <i>272</i> |
| <i>C7: Response scales. ....</i>                         | <i>273</i> |
| <i>C8: Oral questions.....</i>                           | <i>274</i> |

Procedure:

1. Read instructions to students.

There are two conditions to this study: Interactive and Non-interactive.

Before the first tute, toss a coin to determine which condition to run first; run the remaining condition in the second tute.

The difference between the two conditions lies in the last sentence of the instructions to participants.

Interactive: read all of the last sentence, including the part in brackets.

Non-interactive: read only the first part of the last sentence, ignoring the section in brackets.

2. Allow them about 3 minutes reading time, then check that they have all read it, and instruct them to turn the letter face down, and answer the questions you are going to ask them. Tell them:

"I'm going to ask you a number of questions about the letter.

I want you to answer each question in the space provided for it. Don't turn the letter over again, and don't make any comments or do anything to distract anyone else."

3. Read out the questions, repeating each question once immediately after you've read it out.

As part of a broader study, we are trying to find out how people perceive and react to written communications from other people whom they can't see and haven't seen. A common example of this sort of situation is the case of "letters to the editor". I have here a batch of copies of such letters, and I want to give each of you one of these to read. These particular letters concern a local council decision to re-open four arterial roads to through traffic by removing a series of road-blocks that had been in existence for several years. We're not concerned with the name of the suburb: I've blacked out all the names and identifying features.

The council decision prompted a number of letters, which fell into two groups: those that objected to the removal of the road-blocks, and those that supported the re-opening of the roads to traffic. The people who wanted the roads to remain closed included a small group of parents of children attending a primary school on one of the roads affected. People in favour of removing the road-blocks included local residents inconvenienced by the detours the road-blocks imposed.

You'll notice the backs of the letters have a few blank rating scales on them. Don't worry about these to begin with; I'll be asking you to fill them in afterwards.

[On handing out:] The letters aren't all the same, so please concentrate on the one you've got and don't look at anyone else's; I want your reaction to your letter .

Please read the letter carefully (with a view to preparing a reply to it. I want you to read the letter and consider how you might respond to it.[-- interactive condition])

Sir - I wish to object to your reporting of the current debate on road closures in the [redacted] area.

Having resided in this area for 15 years, I am tired of the publicity given to the carry-on of a small group of people who won't teach their children road safety. Judging by people I encounter in the course of my profession, I am not alone in this view.

The Primary School is being used as an excuse for a few people to continue to live in a closed street. How do people think children from big primary schools on busy highways manage to cross without accidents?

The Council and the Road Traffic Board have acted most responsibly in removing the barriers and replacing them with roundabouts and other safety devices. If there is still a danger, the council could consider putting rumble strips near the school, like some schools interstate.

In the past four years there have been two council elections held on this issue, and residents (including people with children at the school) have voted over-whelmingly in favour of removing the barriers.

Opening the streets gives everyone a fair deal, even if it upsets some selfish people who think they should be able to live in a closed street.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

Sir - I wish to object to your reporting of the current debate on road closures in the [REDACTED] area.

Having resided in this area for 15 years, I am tired of the publicity given to the carry-on of a small group of people who won't teach their children road safety. Judging by people I encounter in the course of my employment, I am not alone in this view.

The Primary School is being used as an excuse for a few people to continue to live in a closed street. How do people think children from big primary schools on busy highways manage to cross without accidents?

The Council and the Road Traffic Board have acted most responsibly in removing the barriers and replacing them with roundabouts and other safety devices. If there is still a danger, the council could consider putting rumble strips near the school, like some schools interstate.

In the past four years there have been two council elections held on this issue, and residents (including people with children at the school) have voted overwhelmingly in favour of removing the barriers.

Opening the streets gives everyone a fair deal, even if it upsets some selfish people who think they should be able to live in a closed street.

[REDACTED]

Sir - People demanding that the road closures in [REDACTED] remain are missing the point of the matter. Roads are public places, for the use of both vehicles and pedestrians, including school children, and you can't just expect one group to stop using them.

From the time the barriers were first erected, they have been a continual nuisance to both my staff and clients. It is unrealistic to expect everyone else to be inconvenienced by being forced to take alternative longer routes in order to meet the wishes of a small minority.

If people wish to live in a cul-de-sac that is where they should have bought their homes.

Signposts, school lights and zebra crossings, as well as teachers or parents on road duty can all be employed to protect fairly the rights of children and motorists.

Obstacle courses presently being prepared will prevent heavy traffic from using any but the main arterial roads.

At some time children must learn in their own interests to negotiate traffic; over-protection won't help them learn.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Sir - People demanding that the road closures in [REDACTED] remain are missing the point of the matter. Roads are public places, for the use of both vehicles and pedestrians, including school children, and you can't just expect one group to stop using them.

From the time the barriers were first erected, they have been a continual nuisance to both staff and clients where I work. It is unrealistic to expect everyone else to be inconvenienced by being forced to take alternative longer routes in order to meet the wishes of a small minority.

If people wish to live in a cul-de-sac that is where they

should have bought their homes.

Signposts, school lights and zebra crossings, as well as teachers or parents on road duty can all be employed to protect fairly the rights of children and motorists.

Obstacle courses presently being prepared will prevent heavy traffic from using any but the main arterial roads.

At some time children must learn in their own interests to negotiate traffic; over-protection won't help them learn.

[REDACTED]



1.

/...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../  
not at all very  
all much

2.

/...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../  
not at all extremely

3.

/...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../  
not at all extremely

4.

/...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../  
not at all extremely

5.

/...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../  
not at all extremely

6.

/...../...../...../...../...../...../...../...../  
not at all very  
all much

7.

-----

Questions [read out by experimenter]

1.

To what extent do you agree with the statements expressed in the letter?

2.

How forceful would you rate the tone of the letter?

3.

How well-written did you find the letter?

4.

How confident would you rate the writer of the letter?

5.

How intelligent would you rate the writer of the letter?

6.

Do you think the writer is likely to be a prominent person in the community?

7.

Approximately how many words long would you say the letter was?

**APPENDIX D:**  
Appendix to Experiment 4

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <i>D1: First impressions questionnaire.....</i>                | <i>276</i> |
| <i>D2: Instructions to participants. ....</i>                  | <i>277</i> |
| <i>D3: Practice patterns .....</i>                             | <i>278</i> |
| <i>D4: Spatial Judgement Exercise coversheet (outer) .....</i> | <i>280</i> |
| <i>D5: Spatial Judgement Exercise coversheet (inner). ....</i> | <i>281</i> |
| <i>D6: SJE test patterns .....</i>                             | <i>282</i> |
| <i>D7: Evaluation questionnaire.....</i>                       | <i>290</i> |
| <i>D8: Stimulus photographs.....</i>                           | <i>291</i> |
| <i>D9: Pretest questionnaire format.....</i>                   | <i>294</i> |
| <i>D10: Confidence pretest results. ....</i>                   | <i>295</i> |
| <i>D11: Factor loadings. ....</i>                              | <i>297</i> |

**Person perception study.**

This study is concerned with the nature of first impressions - the impressions we form of people on first seeing or meeting them.

Consider the person in the photograph, whom we shall call M.

Imagine that you and M have been assigned to work together as a two-person team on a decision-making task.

With only a photo to go by, what sort of person do you expect M to be? In other words, what are your first impressions of M?

Listed below are pairs of adjectives, representing opposite poles of the same characteristic. For each adjective pair, please circle the number which best corresponds to your impression of M.

(This is not a test: there are no correct or incorrect answers!)

**M appears to be:**

|             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |               |                             |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------|-----------------------------|
| attractive  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unattractive  | <input type="checkbox"/> 1  |
| reasonable  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unreasonable  | <input type="checkbox"/> 2  |
| competent   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | incompetent   | <input type="checkbox"/> 3  |
| pleasant    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unpleasant    | <input type="checkbox"/> 4  |
| tense       | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | relaxed       | <input type="checkbox"/> 5  |
| educated    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | uneducated    | <input type="checkbox"/> 6  |
| assertive   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unassertive   | <input type="checkbox"/> 7  |
| passive     | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | active        | <input type="checkbox"/> 8  |
| likeable    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | dislikeable   | <input type="checkbox"/> 9  |
| aggressive  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unaggressive  | <input type="checkbox"/> 10 |
| negative    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | positive      | <input type="checkbox"/> 11 |
| cooperative | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | uncooperative | <input type="checkbox"/> 12 |
| persuasive  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unpersuasive  | <input type="checkbox"/> 13 |
| confident   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unconfident   | <input type="checkbox"/> 14 |
| fearful     | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | intimidating  | <input type="checkbox"/> 15 |
| resourceful | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unresourceful | <input type="checkbox"/> 16 |
| fair        | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unfair        | <input type="checkbox"/> 17 |
| intelligent | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unintelligent | <input type="checkbox"/> 18 |
| convincing  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | unconvincing  | <input type="checkbox"/> 19 |
| leader      | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | follower      | <input type="checkbox"/> 20 |
| modest      | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | egotistical   | <input type="checkbox"/> 21 |
| dominant    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | submissive    | <input type="checkbox"/> 22 |
| honest      | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | dishonest     | <input type="checkbox"/> 23 |
|             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |               | <input type="checkbox"/> 24 |
|             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |               | <input type="checkbox"/> 26 |

The task that forms the basis of this exercise is one involving your ability to make spatial judgements. The design is very simple; you'll be provided with a booklet which contains three series of 5 patterns, making a total of 15 patterns. Each pattern consists of black shapes in a white rectangle, and your task is simply to estimate what percentage of the total area of the rectangle *is*, in fact, black. So you'll get the idea, I'll give you each a small set of sample pictures to practise on.

[Practice session, 2-3 minutes]


Now you're all familiar with the task, I'll pass out the exercise booklets. As well as giving you a blank booklet to fill in, I'll also be giving each of you a booklet that someone else has already completed. What I want you to do is look at the other person's estimates as you rate each picture for yourself, because at the end of the exercise you'll be asked to evaluate the other person's performance. Clearly, this isn't all we're interested in; as well as looking at people's judgements of how other people have performed at these tasks, we'll be looking to see how people may build on other people's estimates to arrive at their own. There are 2 points I must emphasize: firstly, this is an exercise, not a test. Secondly, we don't know what the correct answer to any of these exercises is, and we won't even attempt to measure the patterns until all the responses are in.

I'll pass out the booklets now. When you receive them, open the cover upwards and make sure you have an empty booklet and a completed one. One final thing before you start: you'll notice the completed booklet has had the name blacked out, and only the person's photo to identify it. The reason for the photo is that this is the closest we can come to having numbers of people interact with other people they don't know, short of trying to get them all to come in at the same time. If, for whatever reason, you don't want your photograph taken and your booklet used in the same way, write "N.P." in the photo square.


Before you start, fill in the personal details section of your booklet. Where it asks for education, write down your present educational level. For most of you, that will be "Tertiary, First Year".

When you've finished all 15 ratings, hold your hand up, and I'll give you the evaluation questionnaire.

shaded area: 98




shaded area: 98




shaded area:

98




shaded area:

98



# **spatial judgement exercises**





Name:.....


Age:.....

Sex:      M      F

Education:.....


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98




shaded area:

98




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

96




shaded area:

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
shaded area:

96



shaded area:


96





shaded area:

96



## S.J.E. Questionnaire

On the basis of this exercise,

How good at making spatial judgements:

(1) would you rate the other person?

/..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /  
 extremely extremely  
 bad good

(2) would you rate yourself?

/..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /  
 extremely extremely  
 bad good

(3) would the other person rate herself/himself (in your opinion)?

/..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /  
 extremely extremely  
 bad good


How helpful did you find it to have access to another person's responses?

/..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /..... /  
 not at all extremely  
 helpful helpful

Do you have any comments you would like to make?



\*



\*





\*

\* Actors 3, 7, and 10 excluded from final analysis.



|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

Not at all  
Confident

Extremely  
Confident



|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

Not at all  
Confident

Extremely  
Confident



|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

Not at all  
Confident

Extremely  
Confident



|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

Not at all  
Confident

Extremely  
Confident

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor1 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -.863      | 36 | -1.702  | <.05    |

|                      |       |       |           |  |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--|
| Group Info for Actor |       |       |           |  |
|                      | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |  |
| 1                    | 17    | 5.471 | 1.807     |  |
| 2                    | 21    | 6.333 | 1.317     |  |

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor2 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -1.379     | 37 | -1.952  | <.05    |

|                       |       |       |           |  |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--|
| Group Info for Actor2 |       |       |           |  |
|                       | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |  |
| 1                     | 19    | 4.421 | 2.317     |  |
| 2                     | 20    | 5.800 | 2.093     |  |

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor3 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -1.155     | 37 | -1.862  | <.05    |

|                       |       |       |           |  |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--|
| Group Info for Actor3 |       |       |           |  |
|                       | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |  |
| 1                     | 19    | 5.895 | 2.307     |  |
| 2                     | 20    | 7.050 | 1.504     |  |

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor4 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -3.097     | 37 | -5.052  | <.0001  |

|                       |       |       |           |  |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--|
| Group Info for Actor4 |       |       |           |  |
|                       | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |  |
| 1                     | 19    | 4.053 | 1.615     |  |
| 2                     | 20    | 7.150 | 2.159     |  |

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor5 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -2.376     | 37 | -3.769  | <.0005  |

|                       |       |       |           |  |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--|
| Group Info for Actor5 |       |       |           |  |
|                       | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |  |
| 1                     | 20    | 4.150 | 2.134     |  |
| 2                     | 19    | 6.526 | 1.775     |  |

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor6 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -2.732     | 37 | -4.380  | <.0001  |

|                       |       |       |           |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Group Info for Actor6 |       |       |           |
|                       | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |
| 1                     | 20    | 4.900 | 2.174     |
| 2                     | 19    | 7.632 | 1.674     |

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor7 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -3.361     | 37 | -5.737  | <.0001  |

|                       |       |       |           |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Group Info for Actor7 |       |       |           |
|                       | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |
| 1                     | 19    | 3.789 | 1.512     |
| 2                     | 20    | 7.150 | 2.084     |

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor8 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -2.263     | 36 | -3.322  | .001    |

|                       |       |       |           |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Group Info for Actor8 |       |       |           |
|                       | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |
| 1                     | 19    | 3.316 | 1.493     |
| 2                     | 19    | 5.579 | 2.567     |

|                            |            |    |         |         |
|----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor9 |            |    |         |         |
|                            | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                            | -1.269     | 37 | -1.718  | <.05    |

|                       |       |       |           |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Group Info for Actor9 |       |       |           |
|                       | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |
| 1                     | 13    | 5.923 | 2.532     |
| 2                     | 26    | 7.192 | 1.980     |

|                             |            |    |         |         |
|-----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor10 |            |    |         |         |
|                             | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                             | -4.391     | 36 | -8.582  | <.0001  |

|                        |       |       |           |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Group Info for Actor10 |       |       |           |
|                        | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |
| 1                      | 11    | 3.091 | 1.300     |
| 2                      | 27    | 7.481 | 1.477     |

|                             |            |    |         |         |
|-----------------------------|------------|----|---------|---------|
| Unpaired t-test for Actor11 |            |    |         |         |
|                             | Mean Diff. | DF | t-Value | P-Value |
|                             | -1.211     | 37 | -1.718  | <.05    |

|                        |       |       |           |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Group Info for Actor11 |       |       |           |
|                        | Count | Mean  | Std. Dev. |
| 1                      | 14    | 5.429 | 2.138     |
| 2                      | 25    | 6.640 | 2.099     |



|          | FACTOR 1 | FACTOR 2 | FACTOR 3 | FACTOR 4 | FACTOR 5 | FACTOR 6 |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| DOMINANT | .80152   |          |          |          |          |          |
| LEADER   | .75437   |          | .20972   |          | .24689   |          |
| PERSUAS  | .75149   | .29593   |          |          |          |          |
| CONFID   | .71533   |          | .43723   |          |          |          |
| CONVINC  | .71466   |          | .31009   | .29238   |          |          |
| AGGRESS  | .59498   |          | -.34240  |          | -.33780  | -.20119  |
| ASSERT   | .55924   |          | .25149   |          | .48687   |          |
| PASSIV   | .49228   | -.32914  |          | .21161   | .22297   |          |
| REASON   |          | .79672   |          |          |          |          |
| LIKEABL  |          | .79224   |          | .33123   |          |          |
| PLEASNT  |          | .78769   |          |          |          | .32994   |
| COOP     |          | .67148   |          |          | -.27129  |          |
| RESOURCE | .23901   |          | .78138   |          |          |          |
| EDUC     |          | .26720   | .67803   |          | .30812   |          |
| COMPET   | .33463   | .27277   | .58141   |          |          |          |
| HONEST   |          | .22020   |          | .74849   | -.23887  |          |
| ATTRACT  | .29248   | .25088   |          | .68885   | .21009   |          |
| INTELL   | .23296   |          | .55319   | .58032   | .23254   |          |
| FAIR     |          | .38301   |          | .51680   | -.49061  |          |
| FEARFL   | .33373   | -.22251  |          |          | .70797   | .22918   |
| MODEST   |          | .31038   |          |          | -.67228  |          |
| TENSE    |          |          |          |          |          | .86913   |
| NEGATV   |          | .29606   | .43135   |          |          | .52968   |

**APPENDIX E:**  
Appendix to Experiment 5

|            |                                  |       |     |
|------------|----------------------------------|-------|-----|
| <i>E1:</i> | <i>Rating sheet</i>              | ..... | 299 |
| <i>E2:</i> | <i>Means tables for Figure 1</i> | ..... | 300 |
| <i>E3:</i> | <i>Means table for Figure 2</i>  | ..... | 302 |

The people named on the attached list were members of tutorial groups under your supervision in 198 .

Would you please consider, for each person named and the tutorial group of which that person was a member, the following scenario:

If that tutorial group were convened in your absence, after the last tutorial of the year, to discuss and prepare a joint response to a psychological question, how influential do you think the person named would have been within the group in its execution of this task?

Please record your rating for each person on the 7-point scales provided, together with any clarifying remarks you might wish to make.

.....

PERSON 1

/. . . . . / . . . . . / . . . . . / . . . . . / . . . . . / . . . . . / . . . . . /  
NOT AT EXTREMELY  
ALL

.....

| age status: |           | Element 1   | Element 2   | Element 3   | Totals:      |
|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| E<br>median | Element 1 | 46<br>4.304 | 26<br>3.885 | 33<br>5.515 | 105<br>4.581 |
|             | Element 2 | 50<br>4.6   | 38<br>4.763 | 25<br>5.84  | 113<br>4.929 |
| Totals:     |           | 96<br>4.458 | 64<br>4.406 | 58<br>5.655 | 218<br>4.761 |

| competence: |           | Element 1   | Element 2   | Element 3   | Totals:      |
|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| E<br>median | Element 1 | 35<br>3.514 | 28<br>4.464 | 42<br>5.548 | 105<br>4.581 |
|             | Element 2 | 38<br>4.079 | 45<br>5.022 | 30<br>5.867 | 113<br>4.929 |
| Totals:     |           | 73<br>3.808 | 73<br>4.808 | 72<br>5.681 | 218<br>4.761 |

| competence:<br>age status: |         | level 1     |             |             | level 2     |             |             |
|----------------------------|---------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                            |         | level 1     | level 2     | level 3     | level 1     | level 2     | level 3     |
| Fmedian                    | level 1 | 12<br>3.167 | 13<br>3     | 10<br>4.6   | 11<br>3.909 | 9<br>4      | 8<br>5.75   |
|                            | level 2 | 12<br>3.167 | 20<br>4     | 6<br>6.167  | 27<br>4.704 | 10<br>6     | 8<br>4.875  |
| Totals:                    |         | 24<br>3.167 | 33<br>3.606 | 16<br>5.188 | 38<br>4.474 | 19<br>5.053 | 16<br>5.312 |

| competence:<br>age status: |         | level 3     |             |             | Totals:      |
|----------------------------|---------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
|                            |         | level 1     | level 2     | level 3     |              |
| Fmedian                    | level 1 | 23<br>5.087 | 4<br>6.5    | 15<br>6     | 105<br>4.581 |
|                            | level 2 | 11<br>5.909 | 8<br>5.125  | 11<br>6.364 | 113<br>4.929 |
| Totals:                    |         | 34<br>5.353 | 12<br>5.583 | 26<br>6.154 | 218<br>4.761 |

| competence:<br>age status: |         | level 1     |            | level 2     |             | Totals:     |
|----------------------------|---------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                            |         | level 1     | level 2    | level 1     | level 2     |             |
| Extra                      | level 1 | 7<br>2.714  | 4<br>4.5   | 19<br>4.895 | 10<br>5.9   | 40<br>4.725 |
|                            | level 2 | 6<br>2.167  | 3<br>6.667 | 7<br>6.143  | 8<br>6.25   | 24<br>5.25  |
|                            | Totals: | 13<br>2.462 | 7<br>5.429 | 26<br>5.231 | 18<br>6.056 | 64<br>4.922 |

**APPENDIX F:**  
Published version of chapters 4 & 5

Mohr, P. B. (1986). Demeanor, status cue or performance? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 49(3), 228-236.

NOTE:

This publication is included in the print copy  
of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.



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