THE HORN OF AFRICA MIGRANTS IN
ADELAIDE AND MELBOURNE

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ABSTRACT

In Australia the Horn of African migrants are one of the fastest growing migrant communities. The majority of these migrants arrived under the refugee and humanitarian resettlement program. This study focuses on the social networks of these migrants and the impact of remittances they send on them, as well as on the lives of their families back home. The study begins with an analysis of the major trends and characteristics of migration from the Horn of Africa to Australia.

The study examines different types of formal and informal social networks that migrants develop and which are used as coping strategies to address their personal, social, financial, and emotional problems. It is based on a survey of migrant settlers from the Horn of Africa. The survey also found that family and ethnic owned remittance providers play formidable roles in facilitating the cheap, fast and reliable sending of remittances from Australia to rural and remote areas (including refugee camps) in Africa. In addition to their roles in fighting poverty and improving the living and human development conditions in Africa, remittances link family and maintain social networks with those left behind, and they also are used to influence the political landscapes of their countries of origin.

Due to their lack of English language and relevant labour market skills, many of the Horn of African migrants studied are unemployed and dependent on the social welfare system. Despite high unemployment rates and dependence on the social welfare system, the majority (the employed, under employed and unemployed) of these migrants send money to support their families and friends stranded in precarious situations in asylum countries and in their country of origin. However, while they believe that their remittances have improved the lives
of their families back home, they openly admitted that sending money has affected their lives and reduced the quality of lifestyles of their families in Australia.

The study examines a number of aspects of the lives of Horn of African immigrants in Australia, especially their engagement with the labour market, housing, social networks, the social and economic cost of not recognizing overseas qualifications and work experiences, the long and short term health consequences and the economic and social costs of allowing the import, selling and consumption of “Khat”.

A number of conclusions are made regarding policies on settlement of refugees from Africa in Australia.
DECLARATION

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

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Zewdu W. Michael Wege Date
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<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABN</td>
<td>Australian Business Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMELS</td>
<td>Adult Migrant English Language Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>AML</td>
<td>Anti Money Laundering</td>
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<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Australian Quarantine Inspection Service</td>
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<td>ATT</td>
<td>African Think Tank</td>
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<td>AUSTRAC</td>
<td>Australian Transaction Reporting and Analysis Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Financing</td>
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<td>Collation for Unity and Democracy</td>
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<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DIAC</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Citizenship</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIMIA</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSMJ</td>
<td>Danish School of Media and Journalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission For Africa</td>
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<td>ECDA</td>
<td>Eritrean Community Development Association</td>
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<td>HACN</td>
<td>Horn of Africa Community Network</td>
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<td>HFS</td>
<td>Himbol Financial Services</td>
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<td>HREOC</td>
<td>Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>KADI</td>
<td>Kajokeji Australia Development Institute</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Migrant Resource Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
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<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORA</td>
<td>Oromo Relief Association</td>
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<td>RCOA</td>
<td>Refugee Council of Australia</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>Special Broadcasting Services</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Sudanese Community Association</td>
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<td>SFSA</td>
<td>Somali Financial Services Association</td>
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<td>Statistical Local Government</td>
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<td>SOMAT</td>
<td>Somali Money Transferring Association</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
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<td>SSUDA</td>
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<td>TAFE</td>
<td>Technical and Further Education</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nation Development Program</td>
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<td>United Nation Higher Commission for Refugees</td>
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1.1 INTRODUCTION

Africa is a continent of contradictions. Although the continent is endowed with rich natural resources, the majority of its people live in poverty and the development prospects of many African countries are eroded by man made and natural disasters (Adepoju, 2008; Savage and Harvey, 2008). Rapid population and labour force growth, scarce natural and economic resources, protracted civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, social and political instabilities, combined with desertification, deteriorating environmental conditions, droughts and famine have caused economic stagnation and declining living conditions. These problems have varying effects on different parts of the continent but are especially pronounced in the Horn of Africa countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan (Baxter, 1994; DFID, 2001; ECA, 2008; Adepoju, 2008).

While the level of poverty has declined across the rest of the world, sadly it has actually increased in Sub-Saharan African countries. The Horn of Africa countries are among the poorest in a poor continent (ECA, 2006; Adepoju, 2008; Cheru, 2008). In addition to poverty, the ecological systems of the countries in the region are fragile and susceptible to drought. Many of its inhabitants who have become frustrated by the deteriorating social, political, economic prospects and environmental conditions, and uncertainty surrounding the future of their country of birth, have voluntarily and involuntarily left in search of safer and better places to live and work. Emigration is therefore, seen as a way to escape crushing poverty, death due to starvation, civil wars or political persecution (Adams, 2007; Bollard et al, 2010). Most of those who have been displaced by either man made or natural disasters have moved to neighbouring countries and beyond to seek protection. In this part of the world, cross border
movement of refugees and other displaced people have been an important component of international migration (Hugo, 2009). After living a number of years in refugee camps in asylum countries, the Australian government settled a large number of refugees and other displaced people from the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea (DFID, 2001; Zlotnik, 2004; Adepoju, 2008).

In 2005 there were over 17 million Africans living and working outside their country of birth. Over 5 million of these are found in developed, high income and oil rich Arab countries. The remaining 12 million live within the continent (ECA, 2006). Over 350,000 migrants from the Horn of Africa countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan live in OECD countries, the majority having moved there as refugee and humanitarian migrants (Hugo, 2009).

Until now much of the research and policy interest in international migration has focused on remittance generated by economic migrants and its impacts on local and national development. The contribution and influence of refugee/forced migrants have been little studied in this context. As Sandera (2006) noted, this is partly due to the difficulty in identifying them and distinguishing the remittances they send from those of other migrants, but also to a perception of them as being poor and lacking jobs/income to send money to their families back home.

It is in this area that the present study seeks to make a contribution. While the dominant motives for fleeing Horn of Africa countries have been to escape conflict, civil wars and fear of persecution, it is argued that using different media and modern communication technology, modern day forced migrants have strong social networks and links with their country of birth. These social networks are not only influential in shaping the impacts on the origin community
but also impinge on the lives of settlers in the destination country. This study examines the role and importance of social networks in influencing the settlement pattern of these migrants, the different types of support they receive from their social networks and the links between social networks, remittances and remittance businesses. It also examines the positive and negative roles these migrants can play in the socio-economic and political landscape of their country of birth, and the impact of remittances on the lives and lifestyles of remittance sending and receiving families. The study looked at the general employment conditions of migrants without going into a very detailed analysis on their employment situations and based on Australian census data the study briefly looked at the overall population growth and employment situation of the Horn of African migrants in Australia.

1.2 Aims and Objectives

The overriding aim of this study is to explore the social networks of Horn of Africa migrants residing in the cities of Adelaide and Melbourne in Australia, and to examine the impacts of their networks on the lives of families back home and on the lives and lifestyle of the senders in their host country. This study has the following seven specific objectives.

1. To analyze trends in migration from the Horn of Africa to Australia, the characteristics of migrants and their settlement patterns.

2. To explore the nature and types of social networks established by the migrants.

3. To examine the role of Horn of Africa migrants in transferring skills, qualifications, cultural values, technology and capital acquired in Australia to their communities and countries of origin.

4. To explore the impacts of remittances on the lives of the senders in the host country and on the receivers in the country of birth or asylum.
5. To investigate the role of ethnic owned money transferring agencies in the remitting of money to the Horn of Africa from Australia.

6. To discuss the potential of migration and remittances in poverty reduction and in encouraging development in migrants’ countries of origin.

7. To explore the policy implications.

To achieve the above objectives, this research will raise, and seek to answer to the following research questions

- What are the roles of migrants’ remittances in influencing and shaping the socio-economic and political situation of their country of birth?
- For what purposes do refugee migrants use their social networks?
- How do the social networks of migrants operate in Australia? Can social networks influence migrant settlement patterns?
- How and why do migrants maintain transnational social networks?
- Do the migrants want to return to their country of birth? Why?
- Who sends money? Where? How often? What for?
- When the migrants send money, which money transferring channels do they use and why?
- What are the impacts of remittances on the lives of the sending and receiving families?
- Can remittances help to maintain the social networks of geographically separated families?
- Is there any relationship between migrants’ settlement patterns and their social networks?
1.3 The Migration and Development Nexus

Sustainable economic growth and development is a function of sound economic policy, good governance, stability and human resource development of a given country. These enable a country to create a conducive and supportive environment that benefits and facilitates the developmental activity of different stakeholders (businesses, industrial and agrarian communities and working groups). The flow of large amounts of remittance money *per se* cannot bring the required economic growth and development unless favourable policies are put in place (Adam and Page, 2003; Sandera, 2003; Mora and Taylor, 2006; IFAD, 2006; Adams, 2007; World Bank, 2008).

International migration is part of the transnational revolution that is shaping and reshaping states, societies and the economic and political situation of the world (World Bank, 2006). Today, there can be few people in developed and developing countries who do not have direct or indirect experience of migration and its effects (Adams, 2007). The impacts and influence of migration are enormous and not limited to people directly involved in the process. The causes, motives, scale, directions, nature and characteristics of modern day international migration are distinct from earlier human movements (Massey et al, 2005). The distinctive features of international migration in recent years are its global scope, its centrality to domestic and international politics and the enormous economic, cultural, social, demographic impacts it has on both sending and receiving countries (Castles and Miller, 1998; Massey et al, 2005; World Bank, 2006; Harzig, and Hoerder, 2009).

Worldwide, the number of people living, working and simply seeking protection and a safe place to live outside their country of birth is growing, as shown in Table 1.1. The number of international migrants grew from 155 million in 1990 to more than an estimated 213 million in
2010. In the last two decades, stocks of international migrants (people living and working outside their country of birth) have increased by 37.4 percent (www.unmigration.org viewed in March 2010). Accordingly, the number of African international migrants has also increased significantly, albeit at quite different rates. In 1960 there were only 9 million African international migrants, whereas two decades later (in 1980), there were 14 million African international migrants working and living outside their country of birth, an increase of 55.5 percent (ECA, 2006). In 1990, 1995, 2005 and 2010 there were 15, 17.9, 17.06 and 19 million estimated African international migrants respectively. In the last two decades (1990-2010), the number of African international migrants fluctuated from a 5 percent decline between 1995 and 2005 to an increase of 10.2 percent between 2005 and 2010. After the 1990s, the number of African international migrants decreased, mainly because of the end of the Cold War and the strict immigration policy and control of many developed and high income countries (ECA, 2006).

Table 1.1 Stocks of International Migrants and Refugees, and Amount of Remittance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin or Source</th>
<th>Stocks of international migrants 2010 (000)</th>
<th>Stocks of refugee &amp; asylum seekers 2009</th>
<th>Total remittance transfer 2006/2007(USD) (000)</th>
<th>Percentage of remittance to GDP 2006/07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>213,944</td>
<td>16,345,740</td>
<td>380,050</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>19,263</td>
<td>2,567,719</td>
<td>36,853</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East &amp; Horn of Africa</td>
<td>5,034</td>
<td>1,074,000</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>95,552</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>201,002</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>581,697</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>__</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>437,328</td>
<td>1,769</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from www.unmigration.org data and IFAD, 2006

In 2007 an estimated 195 million international migrants worldwide remitted over US$289
billion. In 2008 this amount increased by 19 percent to reach US$338 billion. During the same period remittance transfer to Sub-Saharan African countries increased from US$19 billion to US$21 billion (Ratha, Mohapatra, and Siwal, 2009). In 2002, Africans from around the world remitted a total of US$15 billion through official channels and in 2007 the officially recorded remittance transfer from African diasporas reached US$36 billion (www.unmigration.org viewed in March 2010).

Between 2005 and 2010, remittances from the African diasporas have increased by 140 percent. Accordingly, remittances to the Sub-Saharan African countries increased from US$4 billion in 2002 to US$19 billion in 2007 and US$21 billion in 2008 (Ratha, Mohapatra and Siwal, 2009; Bollard et al, 2010; www.unmigration.org viewed in March 2010). Between 2002 and 2010, remittance transfers to Sub-Saharan African countries increased over five fold. In 2009, the Horn of Africa countries received over US$5 billion remittance money, mainly from its refugee migrants (Ratha, Mohapatra, and Siwal, 2009). An important question is what are the impacts and contributions of such large sums of foreign financial transfers on the national, local and household economies.

Scholars differ in their views and perceptions of the impacts of migration on economic growth and development. Increases in the scale, scope and complexity of international migration has brought growing evidence of the positive contribution of migration to national and household economies, and changed the discourse on migration and development and negative perceptions of emigration. The growing empirical evidence emerging from different remittance receiving developing countries has shifted the discourse away from “brain drain” that can damage national economies to an increased awareness of the multiplier effects of international migration. This is a result of not only generating foreign hard currency but also of its
heterogeneous impacts and spill over effects on household and local economies, reducing the magnitude of poverty, diversifying risk and increasing family income (Massey et al, 2005; ECA, 2006; ECA, 2008).

One of the most challenging questions and unresolved debates on the nexus of migration and development is the question of how such a large flow of private transfer (remittances) can be used in capital investment that will bring economic growth and development at national, local and family/household levels. So far there is no easy and straightforward answer to this question. Nonetheless, much of the available literature indicates that there can be a positive contribution of migration to economic growth and development (Adams and Page, 2003; Yang and Martinez, 2006; Adams, 2007). Household surveys carried out in many developing countries have found visible and quantifiable effects of migration at the household level. Nonetheless, the impacts of migration on overall economic growth and development at the national level are not yet clear (Kapur, 2004; IOM, 2006; World Bank, 2008).

There are two reasons for the lack of indicators of the impact of remittances from international migration on economic growth and development at the macro level. Firstly, there is a shortage of basic data on migration and remittances. Nearly one third of the total remittances channelled to developing countries is transferred through informal channels and is not reported in official data reports, making the estimation of the scale of actual remittance transfers problematic (World Bank, 2006). Secondly, migration is a complex process. The circumstances under which remittances have brought economic improvement for one country may not work for another. In Lesotho and Cape Verde for instance, diasporas do not get involved in productive activities and remittances are used purely for consumption and hence have been blamed for the lack of economic growth and diversification (Montclos, 2005). In
Mexico and Guatemala however, remittances from migrants play a significant role in improving the lives of households and enhancing basic community services (Adams, 2007). The impact of migration on economic growth and development is therefore a function of many interrelated socio-economic policies and the political situation of a given country regardless of the remittance flow. The flow of large sums of foreign hard currency is a necessary but not a sufficient factor *per se* to induce economic growth and development. Moreover, remittances have social and political dimensions which are as important as their economic effects (Kapur, 2004; World Bank, 2006).

Besides the impacts of migration on economic growth and development in politically and socially stable countries, remittances from international migrants remain the lifeline of thousands of families whose assets and livelihoods are destroyed by the ongoing chaos and lawlessness in unstable and conflict prone countries. Research carried out in politically and socially stable countries, as well as in unstable and war torn ones like Somalia and Sri Lanka, has confirmed that while some families spend substantial amounts of remittance income on basic consumption, many use a portion of their remittance income for investment, acquisition of assets, and income generating and productive activities (UNDP, 2004; Montclos, 2005; IFAD, 2006; [http://www.ifad.org/remittances](http://www.ifad.org/remittances) viewed in April 2010). Nonetheless, the impacts that migration and remittance have exerted in politically and socially unstable and volatile countries differ from those in relatively stable and secure countries. Although the impacts of remittance on overall economic growth and development at a national level are not yet clear, its contribution to keeping families from disintegration and sustaining those living in poverty, or in war torn countries, is indisputably positive (UNDP, 2004; IFAD, 2006; Adepoju, 2008).

The impact of remittance on economic growth and development depends upon a number of
interrelated factors, such as the total number of emigrants working and living outside their country of birth, their employment and living status in the host country, the amount of money they send to their families, the economic condition of the remittance receiving family and the socio-political and economic situation of the country (Adams and Page, 2003). When the size of the economy is small, the amount of remittance transfer to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be greater. As shown in Table 1.1, the percentage of remittance to GDP varies from country to country depending on the size of the economy. For instance in 2006/2007 remittance transfer to Kenya was nearly fourfold that to Eritrea. However, whereas the remittance to Eritrea was close to 38 percent of GDP, that to Kenya’s was only 6.6 percent. As the size of the economy and the amount of remittance transfer vary from country to country, so do their impacts and influence on GDP (IFAD, 2006). The foreign hard currency which many developing countries receive in the form of remittances from the international migration of their citizens constitutes financial resources which they need for their national economy and international business dealings, and which they may not have access to otherwise. The large remittances to Sub-Saharan African countries come mainly from the US and other OECD countries (Kapur, 2004, Montclos, 2005; Bollard, et al, 2010).

It is believed that the transfer of such large sums of money could have profound impacts on the economic growth and development of many developing countries (Savage and Harvey, 2007). A study carried out among 71 remittance receiving developing countries found that a 10 percent increase in per capita remittances would reduce the severity of poverty in a given country by around 4 percent. Alternatively, termination or reduction of international remittances would lead to an increase in the severity of poverty (Adams, 2007). Despite the enormous positive contribution generated from international migration, scholars warn of the
danger of associating the flow of large sums of remittance money with development, or substituting migration and remittances for economic growth and development.

1.4 Global Refugee Trends

Worldwide, Asia and Africa are the major sources of refugees. The two continents produce nearly two-thirds of the world’s refugees. As shown in Table 1.2 the numbers of people running away from civil wars, political persecution, ethnic and religious conflicts, and violation of human rights, continued to decline after 1995 mainly because of the end of the Cold War and the decline of east-west ideological confrontation and proxy war of the superpowers (UNHCR, 2009). As a result, the total number of refugees and asylum seekers declined from 18.5 million in 1995 to only 15.6 million in 2000. Between 1995 and 2000, the world refugee stock declined by 18.6 percent. However, the number of refugees increased from 13.8 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2009; that is, an increase of 18.1 percent. During this period the number of refugees increased a little over the number by which it declined between 1995 and 2000 (UNHCH, 2007). The number and pattern of refugee movements vary from region to region and from country to country depending on the prevailing peace and stability (Adepoju, 2008).

As shown in Table 1.2 the trend of refugee growth in Africa has been variable. In 1990, 1995 and 2000 the number of refugees in Africa accounted for 29, 31 and 24 percent of world refugees respectively. In the world and across Africa, with the exception of refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, the number of refugees continued to decline between 2001 and 2005 (UNHCR, 2009). Despite this, the number of refugees from the Horn of Africa countries, particularly from Somalia, the Sudan and Eritrea, remained high. In contrast to this, however, between 1990 and 1995, the number of refugees in this region declined by 42.2
percent. In 1990 and 2009 refugees from the Horn of African countries constituted 44.4 and 64.4 percent of the total refugee in Africa (UNHCR, 2008). Table 1.2 shows two very important things about refugees in the region. Firstly, after the Great Lake region (comprises countries like Burundi, Rwanda, North-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Kenya), the Horn of Africa countries are the second largest refugee producers on the continent. While the total population of these countries is around one tenth of the continent's total population, it produced nearly one-third of the total stock of African refugees. Secondly, cross border movement of people in the region is dominated by the movement of forced migrants (refugees).

Table 1.2 Stocks of Refugee in the Horn Region (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>18,481</td>
<td>18,497</td>
<td>15,654</td>
<td>13,852</td>
<td>16,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4,812</td>
<td>5,383</td>
<td>3,502</td>
<td>3,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5,350</td>
<td>5,692</td>
<td>3,717</td>
<td>2,895</td>
<td>2,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>741.9</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>227.8</td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>120.2</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>206.1</td>
<td>251.3</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>376.6</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>614.8</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>475.2</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>581.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>899.4</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>144.4</td>
<td>437.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Asia, whose majority of refugees come from Afghanistan and Iraq, is the largest refugee producing continent. After Asia, Africa is the second largest refugee producing and at the same time refugee hosting continent in the world. Out of the 56 countries in the continent, 24 have had internal problems and have suffered from civil wars, conflicts with different factional groups and economic stagnation (Crisp, 2000; DFID, 2001). Twenty five African countries host more than 10,000 refugees and 11 of these countries host more 100,000 refugees. Of the
The top 20 refugee producing countries of the world, 45 percent are found in Africa (Crisp, 2000). The majority of African countries hosting refugees are either poor or have themselves suffered from protracted civil wars, social unrest or economic stagnation (DFID, 2001).

1.5 The Horn of Africa Countries

The socio-economic and political situations of the Horn of African countries are similar. The countries in this region are very poor and significant numbers of the people in the region live in abject poverty (World Bank, 2006). The environmental and ecological situation of this region is fragile and susceptible to frequent drought (Markakis, 1994). On top of this, the people of this region have also suffered from years of protracted civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts and the oppression of autocratic leaders (DFID, 2001, Maxted and Zegeye, 2001). Each one of these problems has resulted in the displacement and production of tens of thousands of refugees.

In 2000 the Horn of Africa countries hosted over 46 percent of the total refugees in the continent. The 1977-1978 Ethio-Somalia war, the 35 years of the Eritrean war of independence with Ethiopia and later the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war, plus the ongoing civil wars and conflicts between the governments of Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan and dissident political groups resulted in the production of tens of thousands of refugees fleeing their country of birth and seeking refuge in neighbouring countries (Maxted and Zegeye, 2001; Adepoju, 2008).

As shown in Table 1.3, between 1995 and 2008 the total number of refugees in the Horn of Africa region continued to decline significantly. The highest number of refugees in the region was recorded in 1995, then by 2005 the number had decreased to nearly half before it surged in 2008. Of all the countries in the region, Somalia is the major refugee producer followed by
Eritrea, the Sudan and Ethiopia in that order. Interestingly each one of the refugee producing Horn of Africa countries is also hosting and sheltering refugees from their respective neighbouring countries.

**Table 1.3 Pattern of Refugee Movement within the Horn of Africa Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>21,018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>282,800</td>
<td>367,700</td>
<td>116,700</td>
<td>160,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>305,400</td>
<td>121,100</td>
<td>15,900</td>
<td>33,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>8,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>172,200</td>
<td>137,400</td>
<td>150,500</td>
<td>259,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>33,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>48,100</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>11,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>61,100</td>
<td>71,700</td>
<td>73,900</td>
<td>35,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>41,200</td>
<td>55,600</td>
<td>76,600</td>
<td>45,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>974,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>819,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>484,600</strong></td>
<td><strong>608,569</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The pattern of refugee movement in the Horn of Africa region is very complex, and it is difficult to understand why people move from one volatile and insecure country to another. These countries have suffered from civil wars, social unrest and political instability. Despite their inability to save their own citizens from displacement, violence, human rights abuse, political persecution and hunger, they provide protection and shelter to refugees fleeing from similar situations in the neighbouring countries. As a result, many people in the region migrate from one unstable and insecure country to another (Baxter, 1994; Markakis, 1994).
As shown in Figure 1.1, refugees from each respective Horn of Africa countries seek protection and a safe place to live in one of these countries from which others ran away for similar reasons, for example while Ethiopians and Eritreans seek protection in Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Sudan, so do the Sudanese in Ethiopia and Ethiopians in Somalia.

**Figure 1.1 Pattern of Refugee Movement in the Horn of Africa Region**

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NOTE:
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Source: UNHCR, 2000

Despite the ongoing conflict, civil wars and instability in Somalia, as a result of which over half a million Somalis live in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia, tens of thousands of refugees from Ethiopia also seek sanctuary in Somalia. The figures shown in Table 1.4 do not include asylum seekers whose cases are pending, or those living in OECD and other oil rich countries. In 2008, in the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the US alone there were over 35,000 Somalis asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2008). In 2009 there were over 1.3 million refugees from the Horn of Africa countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and the Sudan. These countries
produce and at the same time host a large number of refugees. Although each of the Horn of Africa countries is equally volatile and insecure, the countries in the region harbour and shelter people fleeing from similar situations (violence and war) in their respective countries.

Table 1.4 Stocks of Refugee and Asylum Seekers in the Horn of Africa Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOTE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This figure/table/image has been removed to comply with copyright regulations. It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.unchr.org

As shown in Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 above, despite the relative peace and tranquility that Kenya enjoys in the region, the country hosted large stocks of refugees from the Horn of African countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. Kenya alone hosted more than the total number of refugees found in the entire Horn of Africa countries. Hence, Kenya serves as the hub of refugees from almost all of the Horn of Africa countries (UNHCR, 2008).

1.6 Coping Strategies of Refugees in Australia

Australia has well planned immigration policies and world class records of Overseas Departure and Arrival data (Hugo, 2009). Although Australia’s immigration polices are selective and now have an emphasis on skilled labour and business migrants (Jupp, 1999; Jupp, 2002) the refugee intake has been an integral part of Australia’s immigration policies since the end of the Second World War. Since then, Australia has admitted over 6 million migrants, both voluntary and involuntary, (Carrington et al, 2007). Australia is one of the five major migration countries of the world, the others being the USA, Canada, Israel and New
Zealand, that officially welcomes international migrants and refugees as permanent residents (Carrington et al 2007). Australia has accepted refugee and other migrants from almost all countries of the world. This makes Australia one of the most culturally, racially and ethnically diverse societies in the world (Jupp, 1999). Furthermore, its multicultural policies and the different settlement support services provided to refugees and other humanitarian migrants have made Australia one of the preferred destination countries for refugees from around the world (DIAC, 2009).

Australia’s multicultural policy encourages and supports minority ethnic and community associations and organizations which maintain and promote their culture, language and social networks of migrants, enabling them to support each other and facilitate the successful settlement process of their members. It gives immigrants the privilege of promoting their own culture and language and of solving their collective social concerns; in return it expects an overriding loyalty of immigrants to Australia, its people and its democratic values (Carrington et al, 2007). Australia’s multicultural policies also encourage and promote good community relationships (living in harmony) and social cohesion of different Australian societies. Among other things, it is intended to recognize and support the diverse social, cultural and economic contribution the immigrants make, the benefits they bring to the Australian economy, and society, and their role in facilitating international trade and transfer of value and technology (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2007).

After Australia officially accepted a small number of refugees and other humanitarian migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia, the immigrants adopted different kinds of formal and informal associations and social networks to adapt to their new way of life, and to overcome
the cultural shocks they had been through. Although there is great cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity among Africans in general and those from the Horn of Africa in particular, they also have many common values and a tradition of maintaining strong family bonds with extended family members (Adepoju, 2008), and of considering members of their ethnic groups or clans as close relatives. These traditions enable new migrants to develop a sense of place and belonging, and rapid interaction and socialization with those who have arrived before them. After arrival, many new Horn of African migrants (including those who do not have their own close friends or relatives) depend on their social networks and long term residents are also happy to support, socialize and share their settlement experiences with new arrivals. This leads to the concentration of persons from the same ethnic group in certain suburbs or cities (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2007; Carrington et al, 2007).

Although refugee and other humanitarian migrants have access to settlement support provided by formal organizations, such as the Migrants Resources Centre (MRC) services, they depend on their social networks and their communities for support that is not provided through formal organizations. The Australian government encourages minority ethnic and community groups to set up their own ethnic or community associations, and provides financial and technical support. Eritrean, Ethiopian, Somali, Ghanaian, Sudanese, Oromo and South Africans are among the few African community associations registered in Australia since 1980s (Batrouney, 1991). Africans have a high level of support from, and affiliation with, their community associations rather than an umbrella organization. Africans see their ethnic and community associations and organizations as part of their social interaction, and of their cultural and welfare systems. Being a member of an ethnic or community association or organization entitles them to receive a wide range of support, such as emotional, spiritual and
settlement they need from members of their community. Furthermore, such associations or social networks also serve as a unifying body of people from different backgrounds (Carrington et al, 2007). Ethnic or community associations can foster cohesion among immigrants themselves and create social capital between migrants and other social groups. These kinds of formal and informal associations and social networks remain the main coping strategy among refugee and humanitarian migrants (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2007).

1.7 Definitions

1.7.1 Social Networks

In some instance scholars use the concepts of social capital and social networks interchangeably. The concept of social network is very important in examining the social impact of immigration and its transferability. Social capital refers to the relationship between trust, cooperation and mutual aid fostered by norms of civic engagement and is simply defined as “social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness” (Ryan et al, 2008, p.673). The term “social networks” is defined differently by different scholars. In his book “Bowling Alone” Putman (2000), defines social networks as patterns of relationships according to which different people and organizations interact with one another. This definition is general and not limited to any particular group of people. The more specific definition of migrants’ social networks used in this study defines social networks as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants to one another through relations of kinship, friendship and shared community origin” (Massey, 1993, p.448; Palloni et al, 2001, pp.1263-4).
Research carried out among Bangladeshi poor defined social network as “a set of people or organizations connected by a set of relationships such as friendships, working together or exchanging information” (Purvez et al., 2003, p.10). Wahaba and Zenou, (2005) define it as a kind of relationship in which the different members involved give support to each other. In international migration, social networks (sometimes referred to as immigrants’ networks) comprise family, friends, community organizations and associations, and intermediaries. Koser and Pinkerton, (2001, p.10) cited Kritz and Zoltnik, (1992), as follows: “social networks are normally understood as one of a series of processes that links origin and destination countries in international migration”. Although Krissman, (2005) criticized Massey (1993) restricting social network of migrants among fellow country persons or the same community, this definition is the one adopted in this study.

In general, each of the above definitions emphasizes the different types of reciprocity that exist among the network groups, or the different types of relationship, interaction, communication or support people give to, and receive from, each other. Social network is therefore used in this study to refer to the wide range of interaction, communication, exchange of information and support services among individuals and with members of the wider society as in ethnic and community associations, churches, non-profit organizations and formal and informal social groups.

1.7.2 Remittances

Horst (2001, p.14) defines remittances as “the transfer of money or responsibility”. According to this definition remittances are not limited to the transfer of money but also extend to the transfer of responsibility based on the trust which individuals place in remittance service providers. Addy et al. (2003, p.5) simply define remittances as “the portion of international
migrant workers’ earnings sent back from the country of employment to the country of birth”. This definition restricts remittances to the transfer of money from where migrants are employed and which generates income for their country of birth. Kapur, (2004, p.1) define remittances as “a financial resource flows arising from the cross-border movement of nationals of a country.” This refers mainly to the money sent by migrants residing and working in foreign countries to their family and friends in their country of birth. Others simply define remittances as money or goods sent from one person or family to another over some distance. Savage and Harvey, (2007, p.3) also define remittances as “income (in any form) received by a household in one distinct place, from an individual or household living in another place”. This definition is broad and does not limit remittance to any particular type of migrant; according to it the sender could even be a non-immigrant. In contrast to this simple and straightforward definition, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund [IMF] defines remittances in its broadest sense as incorporating a wide range of remittance transactions that appear on a country’s balance of payment balance sheet. The World Bank classifies remittances payment in accordance to the way the payments appear on a balance of payment balance sheet: migrant remittances, employee compensation and migrants’ transfers (IMF, 2005; World Bank, 2006).

In brief, “migrant” or “worker” remittances are defined as private transfers, in-cash or in-kind (Reinke and Patterson 2005, p.3). From the above definitions, it is evident that remittances are the money migrants who work and live outside their country of birth send to their families and relatives. Although there is a belief that remittance from migrants workers also include refugee migrants, the researcher believes that none of the above definitions considers the remittances which refugee migrants send to their families and friends.
1.7.3 Remittance Businesses

The process of transferring money from the country of employment or residence to another country requires the involvement of intermediaries such as formal or informal money transferring agents, travellers, businesses or financial institutions. Such services may be provided formally through financial institutions, multinational money transferring companies, legally registered and licensed money transferring businesses and individuals, or informally by individuals and other businesses. In all of these cases the business of transferring money from one country to another requires large resources, well developed, effective and efficient networking systems, and reliable and trustworthy business partners. With regard to this the IMF defines those who transfer money or provide remittance services as:

“Anyone (natural person or legal entity) that receives cash or cash equivalent [or any value], in a professional capacity or on a commercial basis, in order to make this cash or cash equivalent [or value] payable or causes it to be payable to a third party elsewhere, whether or not in the same form, is a remittance provider” (IMF, 2005, p.10).

When referring to the business of transferring money, this study uses the above definition. Almost all money transferring businesses referred to provide only the transfer of money, not its equivalent in kind. The Somali money transferring companies included in this study are viewed in accordance with this definition regardless of their formality or informality.

1.7.4 Ethnic Group

In this study, the term “ethnic group” is generally used to refer to a migrant community or group of people who have a common culture, language and identity. Members of the same ethnic group often set up their own ethnic community associations named after their ethnic group. Ethnic associations or organizations are significant arenas for cohesion or struggle. In some literature, the term “tribe” is used to refer to an ethnic group but some treat tribes as a
phenomenon within a broader category of ethnic relations (Floya, 1992), whereas others argue that the term tribes is inappropriate and offensive (Obadina, 2009). Scholars like Obadina (2009) refer to the term ethnic group as a social construct and an elastic concept, which is subject to a number of interpretations. Obadina, (2009, p.13) defined ethnic group, “*as a large group of people with a common ancestry, a shared historical and cultural tradition (including a common language), and an identifiable historical territory*”. Others argue that ethnic groups are a form of modern social differentiation and are strongly associated with the rise and development of nation states and nationalism (Floya, 1992). In this study however, a group of people referred to as an ethnic group may not necessarily share the same ancestry but may have the same culture, language, common values and identity, and share the same history and interest that unified them.

1.7.5 Refugees, International Migrants and Diaspora

According to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the term "refugee" is defined as:

>“Someone who has well founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion: is outside his country of birth and is unable or unwilling to avail him/herself of the persecution of that country, or to return there for fear of persecution”.

The 1969 Organization of African Union (OAU) Convention’s definition of refugee

>“Shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of birth or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of birth or nationality”.

The terms “international migrants” and “diasporas” are often used interchangeably and (IOM, 2006) define diaspora as “members of ethnic and national communities, who have left, but maintain links with their homelands” (IOM, 2006 cited UK House of Commons (Sixth Report of Session 2003-4, Volume, 1) definition of diaspora as: international migrants who although
dispersed from their homelands, remain in some way part of their community of origin” (IOM, 2006, p.13). The two definitions above convey four important messages: while refugees left their country because of fear of persecution or to escape war and can not return to their country, diasporas live outside their country of birth, they can be citizens of another country. In short the definition conveys the idea of a transnational community but more importantly emphasis is on those who maintain their social networks, interest in and affiliation to their country of birth. Africa Union adopted a broader definition of diaspora:

“The African diaspora consists of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality, and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of African Union” IOM, 2006, p.15.

1.8 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter One provides essential background to the study, giving information about the geographic location and a brief historical background to the causes of conflicts and subsequent displacement of tens of thousands of people in the region and how some of them eventually migrate to and settle in Australia. It then outlines the aims and objectives of studying the social networks of the Horn of Africa migrants and explains why special emphasis is given to their social networks and remittances. It also highlights the role of social networks and geographical proximity in influencing the settlement patterns of migrants and discusses the possible reasons why the remittances and social networks of these migrant communities are poorly researched.

Chapter Two reviews the literature on the different theories of international migration, the relationship between migration and development, the impacts of remittance on economic growth and national development, the different perceptions of the impacts of migration on economic growth and development, and the role of social networks and remittances. Chapter
Three examines the trends of migration from Africa to Australia and the different push and pull factors that cause migration of Africans out of the continent. It looks into the migration of Africans to Australia and the characteristics of the Horn of Africa migrant population in Australia. It also examines the arrival and settlement patterns of Africans in Australia by looking at arrivals data, the settlement patterns and census reports. Chapter Four focuses on research methodology. It explains what types of sampling techniques are used in selecting the respondents and why. It also explains why the two non-probability sampling techniques are used and why the study focuses on the cities of Melbourne and Adelaide. Chapter Five deals with remittances and remittance transferring agents. It discusses how ethnic Somalis started remittance businesses in Australia, how Somali owned and run remittance businesses survived and compete against multinational money transferring companies, and why many non-ethnic Somali migrants prefer sending money through Somali money transferring businesses.

Chapter Six deals with how refugee migrants have maintained their social networks with the friends and family members they left behind. It discusses how refugee migrants once seen as dissidents and forced to leave their own country are now seen as development partners by that country. It examines the motives for sending money, and the positive and negative roles that refugee migrants can play through remittances in influencing the political landscape of their country of birth. It also discusses how these migrants maintain their relationships with their family members across the globe. Chapter Seven explores the education and English language skills of the migrants and their impacts on employment. It looks into how unemployed migrants are able to afford to support their families in their country of birth and in their asylum country, and where they find the money to do this. It also demonstrates how a lack of language and Australian qualifications affects their employment status. Chapter Eight deals with the
different types of formal and informal social networking groups and associations which these migrants set up to cope with the cultural and social dynamics of their new country. It discusses how some of them set up NGOs and raise funds to carry out basic community development projects in their countries of origin. It also examines the different types of support networking groups founded with the specific intention of solving personal financial problems. The final chapter, Chapter Nine, summarizes the major findings of the study in order to draw conclusions and put forward some recommendations.

1.9 Conclusion

The countries in the region of the Horn of Africa have suffered from man-made disasters such as civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, political persecution, and natural disasters such as drought and famine. These countries are not only among the poorest in the world, they are also the lowest in human resources development index. This means there are very few skilled migrants from these countries who can find skilled jobs elsewhere outside the continent. Furthermore, the end of the “open-door policy” and the introduction of strict immigration policies in Europe, North America, and other developed countries has made entry of African migrants into developed countries difficult, leaving asylum and refugee claim the only options for many economic African migrants who want to find jobs overseas and send remittance to their families. As a result, international migrations from these countries are dominated by forced migrants (refugee and asylum seekers). This is the reason why the majority of the Horn of Africa migrants living in Australia are from refugee and humanitarian backgrounds.

Unlike the forced migrants of the colonial and slave trade era, in recent years African migrants have maintained their strong social networks with people of their country of birth and among themselves. Maintaining their social networks with people left behind and among themselves
in their host country has changed the lives of tens of thousands of people living in conflict zones and has created business opportunities. Social networks and strong family and kinship bonds are the major driving forces that result in the transfer of large sums of remittance to this region. In turn remittance also links geographically separated families and enables them to maintain their social networks. Depending on who receives remittance money, remittance can be used for both positive and negative purposes. The overall tenor is that the benefits of remittance outweigh any actual or potential drawbacks.

The role of refugee migrants in sending money, and changing and improving the lives of their family and thereby the national economy of their country of birth, is currently overshadowed by the remittances and social networks of economic migrants. To date there has been little interest and research on former forced migrants’ social networks and the impacts of their remittance money on their families back home, and on their lives and lifestyle in their host country. The present study will examine the social networks and remittances from former forced migrants (refugee and asylum seekers) and analyze their impacts on the lives and lifestyles of senders in the host country and receivers back home. It is believed that studying the social networks of these migrants in their host country, and how they extend far beyond this, will help in understanding how social networks initiate remittance and help in the collection of, transfer and payment of remittances in unstable and insecure countries.
CHAPTER II
MIGRATION THEORY

2.1 Introduction
Migration has been an integral part of human history and it is as old as humans (Massey et al., 1998, Massey et al., 2005; Harzig, and Hoerder, 2009). The growing number of people traveling, working and living outside their country of birth has encouraged some migration scholars to argue that we are at present living in the age of mass migration (Castles and Miller, 2003).

The reasons for the ever increasing number of people living and working outside their country of birth are diverse and complex. The causes, motives, characteristics and destinations of international migration differ from migrant to migrant, from country to country and from region to region depending on the cultural, environmental, socio-economic and political situation (Adepoju, 2008). In peaceful and stable countries, people often move from one country or region to another in search of better employment opportunities or higher living standards, whereas in volatile, insecure and environmentally degraded countries, people often move across international borders in search of a safe and secure place to live (Massey et al., 1998; Castles, 2003; Montclos, 2005). As the growing number of people leaving their country of birth, both on a voluntary and involuntary basis, has increased, scholars have researched the causes and motives of international migration to develop theories that explain the socio-economic and political forces which are responsible for it (Massey et al., 1998).

Although some scholars such as Massey et al. (1998), Castles and Miller (2003) and Brettell and Hollifield (2007) believe in the importance of cross disciplinary cooperation, the study of international migration remains fragmented, and limited within the boundary and scope of disciplinary perspectives. As a result there is no single, coherent theory of international
migration that can explain the different types of migration, their dynamics, and the complex causes and motives of international migration in their entirety (Massey et al, 1998; Messina and Lahav, 2006). As a result the existing theories of migration emphasize on the question of causes and motives of voluntary migration, such as that of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled economic migrants and their roles, contribution and impacts on economic growth and development. The same applies to the social networks of different groups of migrants. In much of migration theory and discourse emphasized on voluntary migrants, labour force and economic variables as the main driving forces of international migration. Sadly, the existing theories of migration pay little attention to the causes and motives of forced migrants and their roles and contribution in influencing and shaping the socio-economic situation of their country of origin. As a result there are limited theories which encompass forced migrants. To overcome this problem we need to undertake more specific studies of refugee groups such is the case here.

Many theories of international migration are thus developed on the basis of economic assumptions and variables and have ignored non-economic push factors such as ethnic and religious conflicts, civil wars, political persecution, violation of basic human rights, or climatic and environmental degradation. In addition, theories of migration have ignored the roles of the state, social networks, the environment and the political situation while developing a theory of migration and explaining its causes and motives. It is estimated that over 9 percent of international migrants are forced migrants who leave their country of birth because of the aforementioned push factors (Massey et al, 1998; Meilaender, 2001; IOM, 2006). According to Castles and Miller, (1998), theories of international migration can be divided into three major categories, the neo-classical economic theories, the historical-structuralist theories and migration systems theories. This chapter summarizes the most common theories of
international migration and the impacts of migration on economic growth and development at different levels (national, local and family). Most importantly it looks into the different types of social networks of refugees and the role of these migrants in fighting poverty, promoting and creating trade links with the host country and bringing socioeconomic and political well-being to their country of birth.

2.2 Theories of International Migration

The different theories of international migration summarized in this section are developed by scholars from across social science disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, economics, geography and political science. As these disciplines vary in their scope and analytical perspectives, they often use different variables and factors to develop theories that explain the causes and motives of migration. This also makes the existing discourse and theories of international migration fragmented and lacking coherence (Massey et al, 1998; Meilaender, 2001).

Migration scholars emphasized the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to the research and communication on international migration (Massey et al, 1998). They also warned of the danger of attempting to develop a grand theory in the field. On the other hand, scholars like (Teitelbaum, 2007) argue that, like economic variables, the action and inaction of the government can facilitate or restrain the migration process. The role of the state in initiating, facilitating, selecting, controlling, restraining, and ending migration across international borders therefore needs to be reflected in any theory of international migration (Teitelbaum, 2007). With regard to this Teitelbaum (2007, p.58), notes that “Their [government’s] effectiveness, of course, varies considerably from place to place and time to time, but it would be a serious mistake to ignore them in theoretical treatments of international migration”. To
address the dynamics and complex nature of human movement, theory of international migration has to be interdisciplinary and incorporate the various perspectives, assumptions, stakeholders and factors that can possibly affect or speedup home movement.

Much of the available research shows that the causes and motives of international migration are usually initiated by a combination of both economic factors, such as wage rates differentials, better employment opportunities and lifestyles, and non-economic factors. Migration motives are usually multidimensional. There are migrants who leave their country of birth voluntarily for economic reasons, and there are also those who leave their country of birth involuntarily (forced migrants and those who follow or accompany other migrants) (Massey et al, 1998; Bloch, 2002). The point which needs to be emphasized here is that people react differently to the same push factors and events. The fundamental question that needs to be answered is why people have different responses to the same socio-economic and political causes, motives and events? Why do some people decide to leave their country of birth while the majority prefers to stay behind? There is no easy answer to this question, because the decision to migrate is made according to the individual migrant’s or family’s circumstances (Hugo, 2005). Each migrant makes the decision to migrate for a different reason and under different circumstances. Some make migration decision voluntarily whereas others are forced against their will and then migrate (Massey et al, 2005). With regard to the migration of voluntary and involuntary migrants, (Meilaender, 2001), argues that even under compelling situations where migrants are forced to migrate involuntarily there is some degree of voluntary action.
“In a sense, of course, all immigration is voluntary: one could always simply refuse to leave, preferring to die where one is...Consider, for example, contemporary debates over so called “economic refugees,” people who, though certainly poor, may not be facing real destitution or the possibility of death... Not always, of course-the “involuntary” migrants ...are in a sense, responding purely to powerful pushes, while it is also possible to imagine people leaving only because of especially enticing pulls somewhere else. But usually complex combinations of factors are at work, varying with time, place, and calling for more detail studies...rather than insertion into the prefabricated push- pull model ” (Meilaender, 2001, p.10, p.12).

In the “push-pull”, “voluntary-involuntary” migration discourse, Meilaender (2001) demonstrated the dynamic and complex nature of human migration and how people react differently to the same events. He also noted how the causes of migration are not simply limited to isolated “push–pull” or “voluntary and involuntary” factors, but rather that the causes and motives of migration could be far beyond those realms, and be the result of a combination of all or part of this complex set of factors. In other words, people leave their country of birth not only because of the pull-push factors, but rather for a number of other reasons, or motives or a combination of factors (Massey et al, 1998; Meilaender, 2001). None of the available migration theories are fully inclusive and are not able to explain the complex causes and motives of migration in its entirety.

“Some people ... leave their country and move somewhere else primarily out of a desire to leave where they are (that is because of “push” factors), others move out of a desire to be in some other particular place (because of “pull” factors). These categories are limited, and I do not endorse them as a universal explanatory model. They oversimplify people’s motives, reducing them to the language of economic supply and demand” (Meilaender, 2001, p.12).

Isolating economic variables as the only major pull or push factors, therefore, does not help in understanding the dynamic and complex causes and motives of human mobility across international borders. The existing migration theories have compartmentalized the concept in accordance to their specific disciplines and failed to see the often diverse combination of factors involved (Massey et al, 1998).
2.3 Economic Theories of Migration

2.3.1 Introduction

Economic theories of migration limit the multidimensional causes and motives of international migration to mere economic ‘pull-push’ factors: demand and supply of labour and other economic variables such as wage differentials, income disparity and employment opportunities. The economic theories of migration assume that the distribution of labour can achieve equilibrium with the distribution of opportunities through international migration, hence disparities in income and wage rates are considered as its major driving force (Messina and Lahav, 2006).

In arguing why people leave their country of birth or move from one country or place to another, opponents of the economic theory of migration argue that people do so not only for economic reasons, but also for non-economic reasons such as war, political oppression, or ethnic or religious persecution, in search of ideological, political or religious freedom, or to accompany or join their family (Charles and Bao, 1999). These scholars argue that economic variables can be a necessary, but not a determining factor in initiating migration. In fact, economic variables are not always part of the equation (Massey et al, 1998; Chiswick, 2007). Furthermore, in relation to the role of non-economic factors in migration, (Massey et al, 1998, p.15) argue that:

“Migrants do not respond mechanically to wage and employment differentials, if they ever did; they are not homogeneous with respect to tastes and motivations; and the contexts within which they make their decisions are not the same”.

Generalizing the causes and motives of migration to just a few pull or push factors or motives is a simplistic argument that fails to incorporate migration caused and motivated by socio-political and family perspectives.
2.3.2 Neoclassical Economic Theory

The neoclassical economic theories of migration are divided into the neoclassical macroeconomic and microeconomic theories (Massey et al, 1998; Massey et al, 2005). These theories were developed during the period of industrialization to explain the growing demand for labour migration. The neoclassical economic theories are the inseparable companion of the ‘push-pull’ and ‘demand and supply’ factor framework. The push factors are often related to negative factors in developing countries, such as conflicts, war, social inequality, unemployment, and political unrest (Charles and Bao, 1999; Massey et al, 2005). Pull factors are often seen as those positive factors that can attract migrants. The neoclassical theories of migration look into the impacts of migration from macro and microeconomic perspectives and argue accordingly. These include employment opportunities, wage rates and living standards (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009). It is believed that wage and income differentials influence migrants to move from low-wage developing countries to high wage developed countries. These theories generally conceive the movement of people crossing international borders as an individual decision made to maximize their income (Castles and Miller, 2003).

The Neoclassical theory of migration states that the migration of people from labour surplus developing countries to labour scarce developed countries has a positive effect in both countries (Massey et al, 1998; Castles and Miller, 2003). Over time the continual migration of people will result in an increase in labour supply and decrease in wages in developed countries, and the reverse flow of large sums in the form of remittances and the return of skilled migrants will slowly minimize wage rate disparities and inequalities (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009). That is, when migration exerts downward pressure on wages in migrant receiving countries, it will push wages upward in migrant sending countries and migration will
cease when the gap is closed and equilibrium is reached (Massey et al, 1998; Massey et al, 2005).

The neoclassical microeconomic theory of migration on the other hand looks into migration on the basis of rational cost benefit analysis as calculated by individuals (Mahmud et al, 2009; De Haas, 2010). Individuals make rational decisions to migrate only when the net return of migration is higher than its costs and they deem that they can maximize their benefits through migration (Massey et al, 1998; Teitelbaum, 2007). According to this theory, the desire to maximize individual income is the major driving force behind migration. It assumes that the emigration of people will serve as a safety valve for domestic unemployment in, and generate foreign earnings for, the countries of origin. This theory anticipates an increase in domestic savings that could, in the long run, be used for investment to create jobs in these countries (Mahmud et al, 2009). Nonetheless, the reality in most labour exporting developing countries does not match the predictions of the neoclassical model that views migration as a temporary phenomenon that is likely to decline when it reaches an equilibrium in sending countries (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009).

The neoclassical theory of migration is criticized for not adequately addressing migration cause by non-economic variables, such as war, conflicts, political and social instability, or ecological and environmental disaster. The neoclassical economic theory of migration overlooks structural barriers that often restrict the free movement of people, such as the role and significance of state and political boundaries (Mahmud et al, 2009). Furthermore, this theory considers migrants’ response to wage rate differentials to be homogeneous. Although wage rates differentials can attract migrants, they do not always go to countries where wage rates are high (Charles and Bao, 1999; Massey et al, 2005). Migration can take place even
when there is no wage rate differential, or between two countries that both have low wage rates. It is therefore unrealistic to assume that migrants are homogeneous in their response to wage differentials (Mahmud et al, 2009). The neoclassical theory of migration has thus been criticized for being simplistic, incapable of explaining the actual movement of people, failing to consider the conflict induced migrations that are responsible for the movements of millions of refugees and asylum seekers and not taking account of environmental refugees motivated by environmental degradation (Castles and Miller, 1993; Massey et al, 2005; Harzig and Hoerder, 2009).

2.3.3 The New Economic Theory of Migration

This theory conceives migration as a family and household strategy intended to reduce risk and to diversify sources of family income. Unlike the neoclassical economic theory, the new economic theory of migration is intended to maximize family and household benefits rather than individual benefits (Hugo, 2005; Harzig and Hoerder, 2009). It states that the decision to migrate (who should go where) is often made not by individuals but by family, household or social groups, and that these groups select and facilitate the migration of economically active members of the family to travel overseas to work and send money to their family for consumption or investment (Hugo, 1998). The family or group will in return expect remittances and thus diversify their source of income. The primary motivation for a family or household to make the decision to migrate is the desire for diversification of risk and income that arises from a lack of credit and insurance services (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009; Mahmud et al, 2009).

Unlike the neoclassical theory of migration where individuals make the decision to migrate in order to maximize their benefits, the new economic theory of migration asserts that the
decision is made by a family or household on the grounds that the person migrating will serve the interests of their family. The migration cost is covered by the family or group who make the decision (Massey et al, 1998; Teitelbaum, 2007). Unlike the neoclassical microeconomic theory, the new economic theory states that the decision to migrate is made with the intention of reducing risk and diversifying the means of family income. With regards to this (Massey et al, 1998, p.124) noted that:

“...international migration is a strategic behaviour undertaken by families and households not individuals; and the primary motivation for movement is not the reaping of higher lifetime earnings at the place of destination, but the management of risk and the overcoming of market failure at home”.

The new economic theory of migration does not assume that decisions to migrate are made on the basis of wage rate or income disparities, nor does it assume that international migration will stop when the wage differential reaches equilibrium. Rather transnational migration takes place mainly to diversify sources and reduce risks of family income (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009). This theory focuses on how the decision to migrate is made, who makes it and why. The decision to migrate is shifted from the individual who intends to maximize their own benefit to the involvement of families and households. This theory can be criticized for ignoring and largely bypassing the situations of forced migrants. In other words, this theory pays little attention to factors that produce refugees and cause the outflow of forced migrants.

2.3.4 World Systems Theory

The world systems theory is also known as the “dependency theory” (Massey et al, 1998; De Haas, 2010) because the world capitalist system has created conditions in which developing countries and their economies remain dependent and underdeveloped. This theory emphasizes the unequal terms of trade between developed and developing countries, and how developed
nations have dictated the terms of trade and other structural conditions in developing countries. In relation to what global capitalism is doing in developing countries, Massey et al (1998) cited Frank (1969): “global capitalism acted to ‘develop underdevelopment’ within the third world” (Massey et al, 1998, p.34). The world systems theory builds its argument on the process of how the world market economy developed and expanded to the extent of initiating labour migration. This theory states that international migration is the result of globalizing the market economy and it reveals how the capitalist socio-economic system and organizations have expanded across the globe and penetrated non-capitalist social and economic societies and countries. The goal of almost all capitalist owned businesses and multinational corporations is to maximize profit and accumulate greater wealth. The desire for higher profit and accumulation of wealth can be achieved by making use of poor countries where land, raw materials, and human labour can be obtained cheaply.

“In world system theory, migration is induced by the penetration of capitalist markets and production into peripheral societies. Investments dislocate local populations, and internal and international mobility reflect the flow of capital and goods but counter its direction” (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009, p. 74).

As the capitalist market economy develops and expands the flow of capital and investment from capitalist countries to developing countries increases. The flow of capital and that of humans are indeed in opposite directions. When capital flows from developed capitalist economies to developing nations for investment, small local farmers and land owners often lose their land to foreign investors. In search of better job opportunities and better living conditions, the displaced local people often move from small and rural towns to bigger cities, and may then take international migration (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009; De Haas, 2010). This, together with unequal terms of trade between rich and poor countries, creates gloomy socio-economic conditions in developing countries that inevitably force people to look for opportunities elsewhere, either internally or overseas (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009). The world
systems theory argues that international migration is a natural outgrowth of the capitalist market economy. In the process of market economy, growth, disruptions and dislocations of people will inevitably occur and the dislocated people will be forced to move elsewhere. The direction of migration is influenced by the types of linguistic and socio-economic relationships and past economic and cultural ties. The desire to look for better employment opportunities and better living conditions influences the decision of a family or an individual to migrate (Massey et al, 2005; Harzig and Hoerder, 2009).

The world systems theory states that employment opportunities in high income countries, for low skilled and unskilled people from developing countries, are limited to low paid jobs which the natives are reluctant to accept (Massey et al, 2005). In contrast, the opportunities and job prospects for highly-skilled workers from low income countries are bright. The migration of highly skilled workers to the world’s mega cities creates a demand for low skilled workers to work in service businesses such as hotels, restaurants and cafés (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009). In world systems theory the expansion of industrialization and agricultural development, and access to markets and natural resources from around the world, are seen as factors creating an environment conducive to the transnational movement of people. The expansion and development of the capitalist economic system creates not only an easy transfer of capital for investment but also creates a mobile society of highly skilled and professional people living in developing and low income countries (Massey et al, 2005). Like all other theories of international migration, the world systems theory focuses on the expansion and development of the market economy and its inducement for migration. It ignores all types of migration induced by factors other than economic and world market systems.
2.3.5 Social Network Theory

The social network theory emphasize on the role of social networks in migrant decision making. It emanates from migrants’ networks. This theory argues that social networks increase the probability of making decision to migrate (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009). Well established social networks make international migration attractive to potential migrants. Social networks serve as sources of information about labour markets, immigration policies, living conditions and much more. According to this theory, social network and social capital have a strong influence on the direction and migratory patterns of migrants in the countries of origin and destination (Harzig and Hoerder, 2009).

The social network theory argues on the significance of how migrant’s social networks influence the destination of migration and the decision to migrate. It assumes that migrants who maintain personal contact with friends, relatives, and create friendship with non-migrants in destination countries can benefit by reducing their migration costs substantially and minimize the risk of moving to a new country (Massey et al, 1998; Brettell, 2007). When migrant networks are small, migration costs are high, thus poor families cannot afford the cost of migration and only households in the upper-middle range of the wealth distribution in the community will be likely to migrate and send money back to their families (Brettell, 2007). This may increase income inequalities. However, as migrants’ social networks expand, people from lower income groups will be able to migrate and send back money, thus reducing income inequality.

The social network theory is different from other migration theories in a sense that its argument is based purely on how social networks influence and shape migration and migrant settlement patterns (Brettell, 2007). The advance of communication and transportation
technology enables migrants to continue maintaining their relationship with people in their
country of birth, gather information about destinations, send remittances and transfer skills
that can help to improve the living conditions of people back home. Proponents of this theory
argue that migrants with good social networks have better chances of finding jobs and
accommodation, and of fulfilling their dreams (Mahmud et al, 2009). Migrants, who leave
their country of birth without any social networks and with no social capital to tap into, are the
ones who will pay more and face the risk of uncertainty associated with their migration. In
connection with this Putman noted that:

“A well-connected individual in a poorly connected society is not as productive as
well-connected individual in well-connected society. And even a poorly connected
individual may derive some of the spill over benefit from living in a well-connected
community” Putman, 2000, p.20.

Migrants who do not establish contacts often receive little support on arrival in their country
of destination and the cost and risk of their migration are probably high (Harzing and Hoerder,
2009). The social network theory assumes that when migrants expand their social networks
with migrants and non-migrants in destination countries, the cost of migration and risk for
subsequent migrants will be less for subsequent migrants (Castles, 2003; Massey et al, 2005;
Brettell, 2007).

Migrant social networks are often based on membership within a particular kin-group,
community or area. Often, it does not include every individual in a given community or area.
Migrant social networks operate selectively by granting access to the members of the networks
of certain communities (Mahmud et al, 2009). Migrants’ interpersonal and social ties have an
important role in connecting geographically separated and dispersed family members, friends,
migrants and non-migrants, in the country of birth, of asylum and of destination (Brettell,
2007). The social networks which migrants establish in their countries of destination are seen
as a kind of social capital, which they depend upon to get access to foreign employment. The social network theory is quite different from other theories solely on the basis of economic variables (Massey et al, 2005; Brettell, 2007).

Migrants with well established social networks and linkages in destination countries often receive a wide range of support pertaining to emotional, cultural and financial matters, information on the local labour market, accommodation, transportation and other services that migrants often need on arrival, before they actually settle in and find a job. Social networks are more widely used by refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants than by other migrants. This is mainly because the destinations of these migrants are influenced and shaped by the types of social networks in which they are involved and share information with people who have already settled (Castles, 2003). Based on such social networks migrants can receive services that are available for their members, such as translation and interpretation services, and create opportunities to run small businesses, such as cafés, groceries, restaurants and beauty salons.

2.4 Migration and Development

The debate over whether migration reduces wage and income disparities between migrant sending and receiving countries, and the extent of its socio-economic impact on family, local and national economics in migrant sending countries has not been resolved. The ongoing debate on the impacts of migration on development has divided scholars into two schools of thoughts. Some one school of thought believes in the positive roles migrants bring to their families, local and national economic conditions (through remittances) and the other opposes such arguments. Such ongoing debate has given rise to the emergence of two schools of thoughts: migration optimists, and skeptics or pessimists. Migration optimists believe that
migration has a positive role for the family, and the local and national economy. In contrast, migration skeptics believe that the emigration of skilled and productive migrant workers has a negative effect on the sending country (De Haas, 2010).

This deep division in views on migration and its impacts on economic growth and development, has been given momentum by the lack of accurate and reliable data on the total amount of remittance transfers, and the difficulty in tracking down the total amount of remittances transferred through informal channels (Sriskandarajah, 2005). Even official remittance transfer data are incomplete and inadequate. So far there is incomplete and patchy evidence on how international migration and remittances reduce the severity and magnitude of poverty, and improve human capital in countries of origin. Such a lack of evidence and reliable information makes estimation of the impacts of migration and remittances on the family, local and national economy difficult and complex (Adams, 2007; World Bank, 2008). The question that needs to be raised here is how remittances reduce the severity and magnitude of poverty, promote economic growth and development, and improve human capital in the origin country. The answer to this question is central in assessing the effect of international migration on origin countries. It is also necessary for developed nations to construct viable immigration and labour policies that will benefit migrants and their families, as well as the economies of the sending and receiving countries (Yang and Martinez, 2006).

Migration optimists see migration and remittances as a response to market forces. They believe that migration and development are positively correlated and that, like all other investments, the benefits and economic returns of immigration can be indirect and may not be directly quantifiable as economic growth or development. This school of thought believes that the migration of people from labour surplus developing countries to labour scarce developed
ones are perceived to be prerequisite for economic growth, and the transition to improved living conditions, income redistribution and quality of life (Charles and Bao, 1999). The continuous emigration of skilled and unskilled migrants from developing to developed countries eventually results in the flow of capital in the opposite direction. According to this school of thought, return migrants are seen as agents of change, innovation, and diffuse modernization and development (De Haas, 2010). It is believed that upon return, migrants bring a wide range of knowledge, entrepreneurial skills, ideas, new ways of life, social networks and values that can be used as the foundation for social transformation and development. Although remittances can stimulate economic growth, the major developmental role of migration is realized through return migrants. Remittance transfers from international migrants can solve problems of capital constraint that many developing countries have in accessing foreign hard currency and in carrying out capital investment projects and settling foreign business transactions (Charles and Bao, 1999; Savage and Harvey, 2007).

Contrary to this view, the migration-development skeptics’ school of thought is pessimistic about the positive contributions and roles of migration in development. According to this school of thought the emigration of highly skilled, talented, capable and productive members of the society is seen as exacerbating the socio-economic problems of the sending countries, particularly affecting the social services (health and education) sector (De Haas, 2010). The perception is that through emigration developing countries are losing the brightest, most talented and highly skilled professionals which they have heavily invested in, and are not compensated. However, although the emigration of highly skilled and professional people has been the concern of many developing countries, it does not mean that this has no positive return from their emigration. This is not to say that a “brain drain” does not occur, or that the impacts of emigration are always positive (Yang and Martinez, 2006; De Haas, 2010). The
question is whether the remittance money these highly skilled professionals send to their family or invest in their country of birth outweighs the damage inflicted by loss of the skilled and productive labour force their country needs for its development.

Migration pessimists ignore the overall contribution of remittances to improving the wellbeing of the households which receive them and argue that remittances money is mainly spent on conspicuous consumption and non-productive investment, thereby increasing income inequalities, creating a dependency syndrome, and most importantly, since remittances from migrants are rarely invested in productive activities, fuelling consumption and inflation (Charles and Bao, 1999). This school of thought blames migration for weakening traditional family or kinship ties and care structures, for loss of strong social networks and community solidarity, and for the breakdown of traditional institutions regulating village life which is seen as a threat to the security and stability of the host country (Charles and Bao, 1999; De Haas, 2010). Furthermore, because the amount of remittance money received by the country of birth is positively correlated with the number and characteristics of migrants working and living abroad, a fall in labour demand in host the country (like the 2009 economic crisis in most developed nations) would result in a decline in remittance. Hence, remittances are often seen as unpredictable sources of income (Charles and Bao, 1999; Montclos, 2005).

After examination of the clearly defined views and arguments put forward by the migration optimistic and pessimistic (or skeptic) schools of thought, one can raise the most important question of whether either is right or wrong. With regard to this question De Haas noted that:

“...the likely answer is that neither the pessimists nor the optimists were right, as the heterogeneity of real-life migration-development interaction is too high to fit them into deterministic theoretical schemes predicting the development outcome of migration (De Haas, 2010, p. 240).
De Haas (2010) noted that the contradictory views and discourse have no ready made resolution, and the question of the relationship between migration and development is far beyond scholars’ prediction and assumptions. Despite the existing contradictory views and explanations on migration and developments, the economic growth and development of a given country is a function not only of the amount of foreign hard currency immigrants send to their families, but also of a number of interconnected factors, such as good economic policy, human resources development, natural resources, peace, stability and the type of political system (repressive versus democratic) (ECA, 2008; World Bank, 2008).

2.5 Remittances and the Impacts of Migration

In studying and analyzing the impacts of migration, distinction should be made between the household, local and national economic growth and development. Accordingly, the direct and indirect impacts of migration should be carefully assessed and examined. Looking at the impacts of migration from different perspectives and at different levels helps in understanding their heterogeneity (De Haas, 2010). The impacts of migration are highly pronounced and vivid at the micro (household) level but are less clear at the macro (national) level (World Bank, 2005). As migration is often initiated by a combination of factors, its impacts should not be seen and evaluated only from the perspective of economic growth or development. Because the economic situations of households, the characteristics of migrants, the migrants’ status in their host country and the overall economic conditions of the sending and receiving countries vary significantly, the impacts and influence that migrants exert in their country of birth is also highly variable. Therefore, the contribution and impact of migration and remittances should be assessed in order to evaluate the direct and indirect economic and non-economic factors which they can bring to households’, local and national economy and development (Kapur, 2004).
It is important to ask whether large sums of international financial transfer can bring the needed and anticipated socio-economic changes, improvement of living conditions and economic growth and development across the spectrum. What is the effect of large foreign transactions on the lives of households, local communities and the national economy? Do individual transfers have positive spillover effects on the local and national economies? How can migrant sending countries motivate their own citizens to return and invest their hard earned savings in productive and job creating activities and investments? The answers to these questions are central in studying and assessing the impacts of migration across the board.

In addition, while supporting their families and friends, generating sustainable sources of income for their families and foreign hard currency for their country of birth, the diasporas communities work in numerous non-economic ways to serve as forces of social change. In an effort to bring social change and development, migrants are not only limited to contributing to economic growth but also become involved in a wide range of non-economic activities. Upon return to their country of birth they transfer skills, technologies and democratic values, and the promotion of gender equality, that contribute significantly to improving and transforming the lives of ordinary people in the countries of origin (Vertovec, 2004; Ghosh, 2006). In recognizing the multidimensional roles and contributions of migrants (both positive and negative) IOM 2006, p.17 noted that:

“Migrants are being considered more and more as agents of development who can strengthen cooperation between home and host societies and contribute to development not only through remittances investment and entrepreneurial activities but also through the transfer of newly developed skills and knowledge and through fostering democratization and protection of human rights in their counties of origin. While this shift in focus does not ignore potentially negative outcomes or possible dangers of migration, it adds new dimension to the debate and contribute additional set of facts to be concluded in any analysis of the impacts of migration on development”.
Much of the available research on the impacts of migration has emphasized its positive aspects and contributions, and has overlooked the potential negative and destabilizing effects of the diaspora community, particularly those of migrants who have left their country of birth because of their political convictions and their support of, or involvement with, opposition or dissident political groups or ethnic liberation movements. In studying the impacts of migration and remittances, distinctions should also be made according to the characteristics of migrants. Depending on how and why they left their country of birth, that is, whether their migration was voluntary or forced, their impact and contribution could be either positive or negative. The impacts of migration therefore need to be studied and analysed from both the positive and negative perspectives (DFID, 2001; Kapur, 2004).

Migration may be initiated under different socio-economic and political situations. Accordingly, whereas some migrants are inspired and motivated to leave their country of birth by the employment opportunities, living standards, better income and economic growth in their destination country, which is usually a developed country, others are forced to leave by frustration at the lack of economic growth, unemployment and poverty (in the case of voluntary migrants), or because of lack of security and stability caused by ongoing conflicts, wars and environmental degradation (in the case of forced migrants) (Adepoju, 2008). Much of the available evidence shows that, like economic migrants, forced migrants also send money to their families back home and contribute to the generation of sustainable sources of family income and foreign hard currency to the economy of their country of birth (Lindley, 2008). Since many forced migrants leave their country of birth because of their political conviction, as noted above, they become actively engaged in shaping and influencing the political conditions of their country of birth, by financing and supporting opposition political parties or the armed struggles of ethnic liberation movements struggling to topple the regime.
in power. The involvement of migrants in such activities perpetuates conflict and instability and has enormous short and long term negative impacts on households and the local and national communities (Kaspur, 2004).

2.5.1 Empirical Evidence of the Impacts of Migration

Due to a number of interconnected problems, such as lack of skilled human and financial resources, high prevalence of disease such as HIV/AIDS, absence of sound and competent economic policies, wars and insecurity, poor communication and infrastructure services, population growth, and lack of transparency and good governance, many developing countries have high unemployment rates and the majority of their people live below the poverty line (World Bank, 2008; ECA, 2008). This is particularly the case in sub-Saharan African countries. The governments of many of these countries are unable to provide basic universal health and education services to their own citizens; hence access to these services is limited to those who can afford to pay. This has negative implications for human resource development and for breaking the vicious circle of poverty (Asmellash, 2006; ECA, 2006; Adepoju, 2008).

Scholars, policy makers, development activists and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) generally agree on the positive contribution of migration to reducing the severity of poverty, to improving human resource development and the living conditions of remittance receiving households and to maximizing consumption and stimulating the local economy (Tewolde, 2002; UNDP, 2004; McKenzie, 2006; Yang and Martinez, 2006; Healy, 2007; World Bank, 2008; Adepoju, 2008; Lindley, 2008). Research carried out both in stable and in highly volatile countries such as in India, Thailand, the Philippines, Mexico, Guatemala, Jamaica, Ethiopian, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Somalia respectively, have found that remittances receiving households are better off in providing and meeting their family’s basic needs (food, clothes and
house rent), diversifying the risk and sources of their families’ income and improving the health and education of their family members, particularly mother and baby health care and the education of girls (Kapur, 2004; Montclos, 2005; Adams, 2007).

In conflict prone and unstable countries, where the day to day activities of people are interrupted and income from exports is severely affected by civil wars and lawlessness, remittances are a major source of family income and a lifeline for thousands of families. Most importantly, it is an important source of foreign hard currency for national economies (Sander and Mambio, 2003; UNDP, 2004; Ghosh, 2006). In unstable countries income from remittances is used mainly to sustain lives, and the impact of migration is therefore highly pronounced in unstable countries and low income households. Research carried out in some of the countries mentioned above shows that remittance receiving households are more able to meet their family’s basic needs, have access to better nutrition and health care services, have increased literacy and numeracy skills and a higher level of educational attainment. Furthermore, available evidence on farming families proves that those who receive remittance also improve their agricultural practices and products, living conditions and the overall well-being of households (Guarnizo, 2003; ECA, 2006; IFAD, 2006; Ghosh, 2006; Adepoju, 2008; IOM, 2008; De Haas, 2010).

Although substantial amounts of the money acquired through remittances are used to cover daily expenses and are spent on non-productive activities, there is evidence of it also being invested in the acquisition of assets and in income generating activities, such as building houses, setting up small businesses such as market halls or bakeries, manufacturing craft, buying land, or providing transport and other services (Vertovec, 2004; IOM, 2006). In areas where there is no strong financial system and no access to a credit market, remittances can
provide the required resources to run small local businesses (Adam and Page, 2007). In poor and conflict affected countries, remittances are important sources of insurance to poor families, and protect households from dispersion or breakdown because of economic hardship (Kapur, 2004). Improving the health, education and the living conditions of households is an important component of economic growth, and a very important long term tool for reducing poverty (Adams, 2007; Ghosh, 2006; IOM, 2006).

One of the most interesting impacts of migration is the involvement and participation of migrant communities in the development of basic community services in their country of birth. Immigrants can carry out basic community development projects, such as the building of schools, clinics, community centers, clean water supplies and roads, by working through hometown associations, NGOs, churches and philanthropic associations, and by organizing cultural events to raise funds for these projects. Such community development projects have a spillover effect in promoting local economic growth and development and extending the benefit of migration to households without migrants and those who do not receive remittances (Ghosh, 2006; Yang and Martinez, 2006). Research carried out in many Asian countries has found that remittances have a positive impact on the local economy. The inflow of a substantial amount of remittances maximizes the consumption of indigenous industry products, thereby significantly stimulating consumption of the local economy (Kapur, 2004).

In recognizing the diverse economic, social, and political contribution of their diaspora communities, the governments of many migrant sending countries (including the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea) have developed policies, directives and incentives to benefit and encourage them to invest and save their hard earned foreign money in their country of birth (Montclos, 2005; IOM, 2006). These include tax free import privileges to those who want to
return and invest in their country of origin, land for their business investment and house (in the cases of Ethiopia and Eritrea) and tax exemption for the first 6 to 12 months of business or investment set up (http://www.mfa.gov.et/Diaspora/Diaspora.htm) foreign ministry directives of the Ethiopian government 2005 and 2010 viewed in Sept. 2007 and Nov. 2010; Asmellash, 2006). To overcome foreign hard currency shortages, the governments of some developing countries whose exports are curtailed because of ongoing violence and instability encourage their diaspora community to save their hard earned money in a foreign currency of their choice in their country of birth. Furthermore, the governments of many migrant sending developing countries show an increased interest in establishing strong networks, and continued business partnerships and trade links with their diaspora communities. This helps to promote exports by introducing and opening new markets (Kapur, 2004; ECA, 2006; IOM, 2008; World Bank, 2008).

In countries like those of the Horn of Africa, migration decisions are often made on the basis of factors such as ongoing civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, political persecution, violation of basic human rights, and/or droughts and famines caused by climatic and environmental conditions. Most of these factors are a direct or indirect result of the undemocratic nature of the leaders in power, and their unwillingness and inability to bring peace and harmony among rival groups. This is particularly the case in the Horn of Africa countries. Diaspora communities which are the victims of such systems are not happy with the government of their country of birth and their contribution is therefore not always positive. The positive correlation between migration and development should therefore not obscure the possible dangers from, and the negative roles played by, such disappointed diaspora communities. In particular, those who have been forced to leave their country of birth because
of their political conviction, support and involvement in politics, or affiliation to certain ethnic
groups liberation movements can play negative roles by financing armed struggle or
supporting the struggle to change the regime in power (Kapur, 2004; Ghosh, 2006; Savage and
Harvey, 2007).

In studying the role of migrants beyond sending remittances, Newland and Patrick (2004)
found that in almost all parts of the world diaspora communities have contributed to conflicts
and instability by providing financial, human and material support to dissident groups engaged
in armed struggles. The diasporas assist such groups by raising and transferring funds and by
providing various training services such as computer programming, and recording and
managing financial transactions. Such migrant communities can use their remittances to
support the armed struggle of opposition political parties or liberation movements in order to
change the government of their country of birth, or lobby the government of their adopted
countries to put pressure on them to respect human rights, and democratic values and to accept
multiparty political systems (UNDP, 2004; Kapur, 2004; Newland and Patrick 2004;
Montclos, 2005; Ghosh, 2006).

Much of the available information on remittance and migration shows that remittances make
an enormous positive contribution to improving the lives and living conditions of remittance
receiving households. However, their overall impact on national economic growth and
development is not yet clear (World Bank, 2008). The flow of foreign hard currency is a
necessary but not a determining factor in economic growth and development. It can facilitate it
but cannot bring it per se (Sander and Mamibo 2003; Ghosh, 2006). Instead, sustainable
economic growth and development come from sound and investment friendly economic
policies, good and transparent governance, efficient financial systems, peace, stability, human
capital and natural resources (UNDP, 2004; Kapur, 2004; Ratha, 2005; World Bank, 2005). In describing the relationship between international migration and development (IOM, 2006, p.1) noted that:

“There is a two-way, positive and negative connection between migration and development; migration can be both a cause and a result of underdevelopment, while underdevelopment can be either alleviated or exacerbated by migration. Therefore, the phenomenon of migration cannot be categorically seen as either an obstacle to development or a strategy for its achievement”.

2.6 Transnational Migrants and Transnationalism

The term transnationalism is often used interchangeably with transnational migration, transmigrants and transnational community. The concept transnationalism was first used in the study of international relations in the field of political science, to refer to the multinational corporations, NGOs, and other international organizations operating in a number of countries (Vertovec, 2003; Newland and Patrick, 2004). The use of the concept was then extended from the study of international relations, to different social science disciplines, (such as sociology and anthropology), and has eventually been recognized as an established field of enquiry embedded in the study of international migration (Zirh, 2005; Levitt, and Jaworsky, 2007).

In classical migration studies, migration is often seen as a movement of people from one point in the country of birth to another point in the destination country. Accordingly it is defined as a change in usual places of address, often over a period of 12 or more months. Over the course of time this perception has been transformed in accordance with the dynamics and complexity of migration, and it is no longer limited to the change of physical address (Zirh, 2005; Lyons and Mandaville, 2008). Transnational migration is highly influenced by pre-existing social networks, trust, reciprocity and collective identity. It often takes place between countries which have historical or colonial, economic, cultural, linguistic or
traditional ties (Hugo, 2009). The advance of transport and communication technology has overcome the barriers posed by travel and communication costs and has enabled migrants to continue their relationships and maintain contact across two or more countries. Furthermore, migrants often have only weak ties with people left in their country of birth. As a result, they are often expected to be assimilated into the culture and society of their host country. In reality however, migration has never been one way and the movement of migrants is not ended by arriving or settling in destination countries (Baubock, 2003; Portes 2003; Zirh, 2005; Lyons and Mandaville, 2008).

Transnational migrants are people belonging to, or having ties with, more than one society. They are individuals who have left their country of birth because of economic, social, political and environmental reasons, and maintain aspects of their cultural, social, economic and political lives in at least two settings. They establish themselves in their host countries while they continue to maintain the culture, tradition, customs and identity of their country of birth. Transnationalism often refers to different types of cross border socio-economic, political and cultural activities of immigrant communities intended to maintain links, identity and relationships with their societies and countries of origin (Newland and Patrick, 2004; Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). The concept of transnationalism is not limited to a few migration related phenomena, but refers to a wider range of actions; processes and institutions where cross border socio-economic, political and cultural interactions exist. It also refers to the situation where a person who has settled elsewhere (often in a host country) engages in activities that help immigrants to maintain their relationship and continue interaction with family, friends and community in the country they came from, or to establish new relationships, partnerships and interactions in the socio-economic, political and cultural environment of their new country (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). The idea of transnationalism is highly correlated with the socio-
economic and political interaction of immigrants and the flow of information, people, culture, religion, goods, and social remittance (that is, the transfer of ideas, democratic values, skills and technology) between an immigrant’s country of birth and host country.

The question is, why do some migrants engage in transnational political, social and economic activism particularly that of their country of birth, while others do not? Depending on how and why migrants left their country of birth, and the type and characteristics of their emigration, diaspora transnational activism varies from being environmental, linguistic, and cultural to being social, political and economic activism (Portes, 2003).

Expanding the scope of its influence and activism, the diaspora community often fights for the right of its members to vote in absence and the privilege to be political candidates in election, as well as for the institutionalization of their transnational status as residents abroad, the recognition of dual citizenship, the regulation of pensions, respect for human rights and political freedom, and tax relief on some of their productive investments (Vertovec, 2003; Zirh, 2005; Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). Over time, dual citizenship has appeared as a formal reward in recognition of transnational membership, and an enabling device to tap the transnational practices and contribution of immigrants (Baubock, 2003; Portes, 2003; Newland and Patrick, 2004). By virtue of being naturalized and holding the citizenship of another country, the status of an immigrant in their country of birth will change. As a result, those immigrants who have been neglected, repressed or forced to leave their country of birth because of their views or political activism gain respect, political power and a voice in that country, in contrast to the way they had been treated previously (Portes, 2003). In such situations, immigrants from repressive and undemocratic countries often become engaged in exposing the injustices, human rights abuses and vote rigging practices of the government of
their country of birth, and serve as a voice of the voiceless people left behind (Lyons and Mandaville, 2008). Transnational migrants often show their solidarity with their people by lobbying the government of their country of destination to put pressure on the government of their country of birth to respect human rights and allow multiparty political systems (Ostergaad-Nielsen, 2003; Vertovec, 2003; Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004; Zirh, 2005).

The study of transnational migration emphasizes the transnational movements and activities of economic migrants and pays little attention to forced migrants. As well as economic insecurity, non-economic factors such as political instability, ethnic and religion conflict, wars and human rights abuse are major driving forces in transnational migration (Ostergaad-Nielsen, 2003; Newland, and Patrick, 2004). Transnational migration is a window of opportunity for all who want to escape insecurity and injustice, and its study should therefore incorporate the transnational activities of all forced migrants. This is important because the transnational activism of immigrants is highly influenced and shaped by their mode of migration. For instance, most Ethiopian diaspora in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are from a refugee background (Hugo, 2009). Through coordinated financial and political support of the Ethiopia diasporas communities around the world, the once weakened opposition political parties in the country have revived and were able to win significant seats in the 2005 national election. After the incumbent Ethiopian government loss in the 2005 election, it declared itself a winner and altered the election outcome. The government used excessive force against the demonstrators and killed around 200, peaceful protestors and imprisoned opposition political party leaders (Human Rights Watches Annual Report, 2005 and 2010).

The Ethiopian diaspora around the world staged protest rallies in major European, North
American and Australian cities and criticized the way the government handled post-election crises. In support of the opposition political parties, the diasporas and human rights activists continue lobbying the governments of their host countries to cut aid and not support the regime that doesn’t respect the rights of its citizen. This illustrates the transnational political, economic and social activities in which refugee migrants can engage in order to influence the socio-economic and political life of their country of birth. Studies carried on among the Sri Lankan, Somalis, Ethiopian and Eritrean diaspora communities show the significant roles that transnational migrants have played in the positive and negative socio-economic and political landscapes of their countries of origin (Kapur, 2004; Montclos, 2005; Ghosh, 2006; Lyons and Mandaville, 2008; ICG, 2009).

2.7 Migrant Social Networks and the Different Types of Associations

Social networks have long been seen as the main pulling and linking factor in the migratory movement of people. They influence the pattern of migration and settlements, and shape the nature of relationships which potential migrants have with former migrants, family, friends, the local community, businesses and service centers in both the host country and the country of birth (Palloni et al, 2001; Castles, 2003). International migration is costly, involving not only up front costs but also subsequent social, emotional and psychological costs. To minimize both monetary and non-monetary costs, international migration requires strong social networks and the gathering of detailed and reliable information. Social networks have a significant role in reducing the magnitude of all of these costs. The use of social networks has two impacts on making the decision to migrate; firstly, it increases the ability of a family to meet the cost of migration and secondly, it lowers the cost of migration and increases the net benefits to the household (Vertovec, 2002).
Different types of migrants use social networks to attain different goals or totally for different social and personal reasons. For instance, forced migrants and potential asylum seekers use their social networks to gather information on refugee and other humanitarian support services and on immigration policies for refugees and asylum seekers. Skilled and other economic migrants on the other hand often use their social networks to facilitate their migration, gather information about labour markets, employment conditions, accommodation and schools for their children (Koser and Pinkerton, 2001). As Palloni, et al, (2001) noted, one of the most interesting characteristics of social capital is its convertibility into different forms and resources. Through networks migrants often convert their social capital and relationships into important resources which they depend upon until they settle in and move on with their lives. Among other things, they use members of their social networks to gather information about employment, to obtain emotional and material support, to stay with until they find their own accommodation, for friendship and to learn about the local community, all of which will help in easing and facilitating their settlement and interactions in their new country (Bartus, 2000; Koser and Pinkerton, 2001; McMichael and Manderson, 2004).

Even when members of their social networks are not in a position to provide refined, up-to-date and accurate information, potential migrants often rely on and trust the information they provide (Koser, 1997; Koser and Pinkerton, 2001). Research carried out by Papadopoulos et al (2004) in UK and the Netherlands, among Ethiopians and Iranians respectively, found that their social networks provided different kinds of support including, but not limited to, providing information, facilitating and organizing the migration process, deciding the timing and direction of migration, covering the migration cost, and providing accommodation, transport and emotional support on arrival and over the subsequent settlement period. Social
networks make migration less risky for individuals and thus encourage subsequent migration (Koser, 1997; DFID, 2001; McMichael and Manderson, 2004; Papadopoulos et al, 2004).

Lack of English language skills restricts the immigrant’s participation in the labour market and interaction with the wider host society. The problem is particularly pronounced among those migrants with a low level of prior education and from a refugee background. Socializing with, or working for, or with fellow country persons, remains one of the most dependable ways of securing social interaction in the host country. Migrants in general, and forced migrants in particular, often use their social network as their referral for finding jobs. Social networks remain one of the most efficient means of job searching for immigrants (Bartus, 2000; Walmsley et al, 2007). Research carried out among the social networks of refugees in the US found that an increase in the number of tenured network members improves the employment opportunities of new migrants from refugee backgrounds (Beaman, 2008).

In order to solve the problems of unemployment, housing and training, and to carry out research on some compelling social problems and concerns of their communities, many immigrant groups setup their own ethnic and community associations, NGOs and think tanks to lobby for and influence policies or programs that will improve their well-being. An example of this is the Horn of Africa think tank (www.att.org.au viewed in Nov. 2009). While some of these associations and organizations focus on the settlement, and other social and personal problems of immigrants in the host country, others are founded to ameliorate the life and socio-economic well-being of those left behind. Furthermore, when migrants want to start a business, or to buy assets such as a house, land or a car they often use their social networks to raise money or to get access to a financial institution. For instance, research carried out in the
UK (Fadahunsi et al, 2000) found that while some Pakistani and Indian migrants use/ rely upon co-ethnic business associates to obtain credit from local banks, migrants from East African countries, who are mainly from refugee backgrounds, use their social network to raise the required capital to start up a business. In such cases, members of the social network contributed sums of money on a regular basis to raise the required startup capital which is given in the form of an interest free loan (Fadahunsi et al, 2000).

The existence of various migrant community associations and informal social networks in the host society creates a sense of belonging among new migrants as well as providing different kinds of settlement and emotional support services to their members. In the Australian context for instance, refugee and humanitarian support services provided by the Australia government expire within the first six to twelve months of arrival. Therefore, maintaining strong social networks is the most viable means to ensure subsequent support (McMichael and Manderson, 2004). Through their social networks and association migrants may receive continuous support emotionally, socially, physically and psychologically.

To ensure the continuity of settlement support programs provided through ethnic and community associations, the Australian government provides them with financial and technical support. This enables them to maintain, promote and develop their culture and language, and to help the successful settlement and integration process. Most importantly, the establishment of ethno-specific Special Broadcasting Services (SBS) for ethno-specific media services in more than 80 languages for radio services and 48 for television, together with 30 different language newspapers has helped immigrant communities (particularly those who have difficulties in reading and speaking English) to learn about their rights and obligations, and about Australian history, culture, values and its way of life (Walmsley et al, 2007). These
media services have also enabled them to follow the socio-economic and political situation in their country of birth, to organize social events, to promote their common concerns, to bridge gaps, and to create awareness and understanding between migrants and the wider Australian society (Walmsley et al, 2007). The Ambassador Newspaper (see appendix II) that is published in 4 different Horn of African migrants’ community languages is part of the government initiative to promote multiculturalism and help the migrants’ community to address their common concerns and learn about Australia in the language they can read and understand.

2.8 Conclusion

The migration of people from socially, politically, economically and religiously insecure and unstable countries to safe and secure ones is not a new phenomenon. Scholars from across the social sciences have developed different theories to explain the causes of, and motives for migration. Many of the existing theories of migration focus only on certain aspects of migration and are unable to explain its diverse and complex causes and motives of international migration. Some of the theories of migration are criticized for largely bypassing non-economic causes and motives and for focusing on economic variables as the main impetus for human movement. The available theories of migration are unable to develop a single and coherent explanation of the causes for human migration in its entirety. In the study of international migration, migrants’ social networks and non-economic factors have equal importance in initiating, influencing and shaping the pattern of migration and of settlement in the destination country.

There is ongoing and unresolved debate over the impacts of remittances on family, local and national economic growth and development, as well as on the positive and negative roles of
diaspora communities. Remittance has multiple direct and indirect effects on remittance receiving households. Its impact on poor families is obvious and direct. Diasporas communities are seen as forces of social change, promoters of democratic values, human rights activists and transferors of skills and entrepreneurial know how by the governments of both the host countries and the countries of origin. As a result they live dual lives and their activities are transnational. To promote their common goals and concerns, they frequently organize themselves into ethnic or community associations. Through these formal and informal associations they learn about the history, culture, way of life and socio-economic and political development of both their host country and their country of birth.
CHAPTER III

MIGRATION OUT OF AFRICA AND AFRICANS IN AUSTRALIA

3.1 Introduction
Droughts, famine, ethnic conflicts and civil wars over scarcity of resources and power, absence of democracy and equitable political systems, the influence of world super powers and radical religious views are cause for instability and population movement in the region (DIFD, 2001). In Africa in general, and the Horn of African countries in particular, the combination of manmade and natural disasters have been the sources of conflict and instabilities. Interestingly, Africans have responded to such disasters by moving from one place to another. As a result, Africans become one of the most mobile societies with high levels of population mobility (Adepoju, 1997; Findley, 1997). In recent years, conflict, much of it ethnic based, has been a major cause of movements along the international borders of the neighbouring countries and involves some migration to other countries, (DIFD, 2001; Obadina, 2009). It is the latter that we focus on in this chapter.

Among other things, the recent overseas migration of Africans is mainly caused by civil war instigated by rival ethnic conflicts. With regard to this Obadina, (2009) noted the role of ethnic conflict in the history of human migration as:

“Ethnic identity has played an important role in human history, serving as a major factor in the organization of societies, in motivating large scale migrations, and in shaping interactions among different peoples. Historically, many conflicts have pitted one ethnic group against another” (Obadina, 2009, p.14).

In ever changing social, political, economic, environmental and climatic conditions, many Africans use migration as a coping and survival strategy. Hence, migration is and has been an integral part of African family life. Africans use migration not only to escape manmade and
natural disasters but also use it as an opportunity to change and improve their way of life, diversify risk and expand sources of income. Different regions of the continent are susceptible to different types of push factors and are known for producing different types of migrants. The Southern part of the continent is known for producing large number of economic migrants mainly to South Africa, while countries in the Great Lake and Horn of Africa region are known for the large number of refugees and other humanitarian migrants (DFID, 2001; Adepoju, 2008).

In the past two or so decades, the migration of Africans to Australia has become part of the mainstream migration and settlement programs and Africans are now part of Australian society. This chapter will look into the causes of migration out of Africa, particularly from the Horn of Africa region and Australia’s past and present relationships with African countries. Emphasis is given to how pre-existing social networks and relationships with those already settled in Australia influence the direction of migration and their settlement pattern after arrivals.

3.2 The Horn of African Countries

The region of the Horn of Africa often refers to countries found in the horn-shaped geographical area of the continent. There is no precise agreement on which of the countries in the region should be included in the region of the Horn of Africa. It certainly includes countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Although Sudan is not physically found within the horn-shaped geographical area of the continent, due to its socio-economic and political similarities with the countries in the region, it is often included as part of Horn of Africa (www.harda-australia.com/id10/html viewed in May 2007; Baxter, 1994).
With the exception of the Somalis, where there are cultural, linguistic and religious similarities, the majority of the people in the region are different in their culture, language, religion and ethnicity. With only 13 percent of world’s population, Africa has more than 3,000 ethnic groups and about 2000 languages. Out of the estimated 3,000 ethnic groups found in the continent of Africa over 600 (20 percent) of them are found in the Horn of Africa countries of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan (Obadina, 2009; Jakubowicz, 2009). In this part of the world, ethnicity and ethnic politics are highly pronounced and used to control the political power and key economic resources of the countries. Sadly, the leaders of some of these countries often exploit the cultural, economic and religious differences of ethnic groups to get support, stay in power and to influence the peace and stability of their country (Maxted and Zegeye, 2001; Woodwards, 2003; ICG, 2009).

As a result, almost all of the Horn of Africa countries have suffered from ethnic and religious conflict, poverty, high unemployment rates and ecological and environmental degradation. These problems often cause civil wars, social unrest political instabilities and insecurities that have tarnished the image of these countries. Many of the Horn of Africa countries do not have a smooth and healthy relationship among themselves mainly because they shelter, train and finance the liberation movements and opposition political parties of their neighbouring countries. By meddling in the domestic affairs of their neighbouring countries, they destabilize the peace and tranquility of their people. As a result, the countries in the region suffer from ongoing civil wars and its corollary effects, such as socio-economic and political instabilities, that have resulted in the displacement and movements of large number of refugees and other humanitarian migrants across the international borders of the countries in the region. Security and stability remain frail and volatile in almost all Horn of Africa countries (Baxter, 1994; Markakis, 1994; Woodward, 2003).
Due to the ongoing civil war, social unrest, political instabilities, wars between countries, environmental degradation, drought and famine, the countries in the region are often referred to as a hotbed of conflict and instability; a region of enormous social and political unrest, and the world’s poorest, least developed and volatile countries (Markakis, 1994; Woodsward, 2003). The countries in the region are also known for hosting some of the world’s longest civil wars, namely the Eritrean war for independence from Ethiopia, and the civil wars in Somalia and the Sudan. Sadly, one of the world’s failed states, Somalia, is also found in this region (ICG, 2009). In addition to these problems, this region is drought prone and the countries in the region often suffer from repeated droughts and famines (Markakis, 1994; DFID, 2001; Maxted and Zegeye, 2001; Wasara, 2002; Shale, 2004). The strategic importance and location of the region along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has attracted the attention of world superpowers and extremist religious groups, and has remained the battle ground for groups with different interest and motives. At present, the war on terror once again has brought the countries in the region to focus and Somalia and Sudan are used by religious extremist for proxy war against others (Wasara, 2002; Shale, 2004; ICG, 2009).

3.3 Causes of Migration from Africa

The migration of Africans out of the continent has a long history and goes back to the era of the slave trade (Massey et al, 1998, Meilaender, 2001). This migration can be divided into the pre- and post-independence period. The pre-independence migration of Africans out of the continent was characterized by forced migration of slave and migrant labour for plantations and mines in colonial countries (Castles and Miller, 2003). During this period, millions of Africans were sold as slaves and forced to travel as far as South and North America, and the Arab world (Massey et al, 1998; Castles and Miller, 2003). The second wave of migration of
Africans out of the continent is associated with the aftermath of the 1960s and 1970s independence and the period of the Cold War. After independence, many African countries suffered from economic and political instabilities, the influence of Cold War (the then super powers proxy war), droughts, and the impacts of colonialism.

The way international borders were demarcated and the way colonizers transferred political power to locals were another major source of ethnic conflict and civil wars in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa region. To maintain their sphere of influence, colonizers transferred political powers to less affluent and armed minority ethnic groups. The more affluent ethnic groups opposed the way colonizers transferred political power and the way international borders were demarcated. Competition to control political power and the division of one ethnic group into two or more political administration groups, is the major source of conflict and civil wars in many Africa countries. It is believed that the migration of Africans out of the continent is largely the result of the combination of political, economic and environmental insecurity (Markakis, 1994; Sander and Maimbo, 2005).

Before the European colonial era, Africans used to move within their regions and the continent freely. The arrival and settlement of Europeans colonizers completely changed the nature and characteristics of traditional African migration patterns. With the introduction of international borders and passports, the free movement of Africans has been restricted and confined within artificially demarcated international borders, and the free movement of Africans has been controlled and replaced by forced migration (Castles and Miller, 2003).

During the colonial period, while setting and demarcating international borders, European colonizers did not pay attention to kinship, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and social composition and the dynamics of people living along the demarcated international borders. As a result,
some ethnic groups were divided into two or more countries and a majority ethnic group in one country could become a minority ethnic group in another. These were often subjected to a wide range of cultural and linguistic repression and domination. When political problems or ethnic conflicts arise in one country it often spills over into the neighbouring countries. Such problems tend to create tension and damage the relationship of the neighbouring countries and remain the major source of conflicts (Markakis, 1994).

The other major problem and source of conflict in the continent was associated with the way the colonizers transferred political power to armed minority ethnic groups. To maintain the legacy of their colonial era and sphere of influence, the colonizers handed over political power to less affluent and minority ethnic groups. To remain in power, armed minority groups continued to impose their rule and held onto key economic and political positions (Maxted and Zegeye, 2001). In protest at such authoritarian actions, rival ethnic groups and dissident political parties set up ethnic liberation movements and national resistance groups to raise arms to fight the regime in power and restore freedom to their people (DFID, 2001; Adepoju, 2008). The other major sources of instability and insecurity in many African countries related to the Cold War, when the superpowers used Africa in particular the Horn region as a battle ground for their proxy war. In their efforts to expand their ideological and political influence the superpowers gave autocratic leaders of these countries the chance to stay in power as long as they supported their politics and interests, irrespective of their human rights records and the oppressive nature of their administration (Markakis, 1994; Maxted and Zegeye, 2001; Savage and Harvey, 2007).

The combination of these factors exacerbated the socio-economic and political problems and the tensions that existed among rival ethnic groups and oppositional political parties, and
resulted in the death and displacement of millions of Africans in the continent. With regards to the displacement and migration of Africans within and out of the continent Crisp (2006) has noted that:

“The large-scale displacement of people has become a defining characteristic of sub-Saharan Africa. During the past four decades, millions of people throughout the continent have been obliged to abandon their homes and to seek safety elsewhere, often losing the few assets they possessed and suffering great hardship in the process. Even in their places where they have taken refuge, the continent’s displaced people have often been confronted with serious threats to their welfare and restrictions on their rights. For many, moreover, displacement has proven to be a protracted experience, lasting for years and even decades on end” (Crisp, 2006, p.1).

Crisp (2006) clearly showed the traumatic experience of forced migration and the insecurity migrants face even after fleeing their country, and the impact this may have on the rest of their life. In addition to the manmade disasters, many of these migrants also suffered from the ever deteriorating and degrading environmental conditions causing droughts and famine in many parts of Africa, particularly in the Horn of African countries. This remains another major source of insecurity that forces tens of thousands people to leave their country of birth. Although, Africa had only 12 percent of the world population at the beginning of 2005, it accommodated a third of the 9.5 million global refugees and nearly half of the 25 million internally displaced peoples (Crisp, 2006).

3.4 Migration of Africans Out of the Continent

A study carried out in the UK by the Department for International Development (DFID, 2001), found that out of the 55 African countries, nearly 44 percent (24 countries) have been affected by internal conflicts and suffered from protracted civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, wars between countries and deteriorating economic and environmental situations (DFID, 2001). Each of these problems has caused economic and political insecurities and forced tens
of thousands of people to seek better and safer places to live (DFID, 2001). Such problems are highly pronounced in the Horn of African region (UNHCR, 2006). In the 1980s and 1990s, the Horn of Africa countries produced two-thirds of the total refugee population of the continent, and in 2000 this region accommodated 46 percent of the continent’s total refugee population (Skeldon, 1997; Zlotink, 2006). As the majority of African immigrant communities living in developed countries came from refugee and humanitarian backgrounds, many of them first live in their respective neighbouring countries as a refugee or asylum seeker before they settle in OECD countries (Hugo, 2009).

In studying the causes of emigration of Africans out of the continent, Sander and Maimbo (2005), noted that Africans leave their country, or continent of origin, for a variety of reasons, but the overwhelming majority of them leave the continent predominantly for economic and political reasons:

“Migration from Africa to the developed world is predominantly a strategy to reduce economic and political insecurities and to improve the livelihood of the migrant and the family left behind. The prime motivator for most African migrants is still economic, although war or political insecurity are increasingly more compelling and frequent factors prompting emigration. Refugees—many of whom are displaced to neighbouring countries, especially to the Horn of Africa and parts of West Africa—are thus a key group of African migrants” (Sander and Maimbo, 2005, p.82).

The combination of economic and political insecurity plus the globalizing world economy that requires the movement of both skilled and unskilled labour, from labour cheap and abundant developing countries to labour shortages in developed countries is the other major driving force in the emigration of Africans within and out of the continent (Adepoju, 2008). Despite the growing influence of globalization and the globalized world economy, and movement of skilled and unskilled migrants within and out of the continent, African migration is dominated by large scale movements of refugees (Hugo, 2009).
As shown in Table 3.1, in 1993 the number of refugees’ world wide reached its highest peak of nearly 16 million with 40 percent living in Africa and over a quarter in the East and the Horn of Africa region. In this region, the number of refugees reached its highest peak in 1999 when it hosted 43 percent of the continent’s total refugee population. Although the number of refugees in the world and across African has fluctuated in the past decade or so, in this period the East and Horn of Africa countries continued hosting over one-third of the total African refugee population. The countries in the region are not only known as major refugee producing countries but they also host a large number of refugees in the continent. The presence of a large number of refugees is due to the ongoing civil wars, deteriorating security and environmental conditions in countries like Eritrea, Somalia, the Sudan and the DRC. A UNHCR report on the movement of refugees shows that developing countries hosted four-fifths (80 percent) of the world’s total refugees (UNHCR, 2006; UNHCR, 2008; UNHCR, 2009).

World wide the number of refugees reached low levels in 2005, while declining from 9.5 million in 2004 to 8.6 million in 2005: stocks of African refugees also declined from 3.4 million to 2.5 million (a decrease of 26 percent). Table 3.1 also shows that during the same period, stocks of refugees in East and Horn of Africa region plummeted from 1.3 million to 772,000 (a decrease of 43 percent). Despite fluctuations in world refugees in 2008 and 2009 the region hosted 45 and 48 percent of the continent’s total refugees, and over one-third of the total African refugee population for most of the last decade. This was partly due to the ongoing civil wars in Somalia and the Sudan and the Ethio-Eritrea border conflict. In the last decade, these countries have been among the top ten refugee producing countries in the continent (UNHCR, 2008).
Table 3.1 Stocks of World, Africa and East and Horn of Africa Refugee Populations 1999 -2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Stocks of world refugees</th>
<th>Stocks of African refugees</th>
<th>Percentage of world total refugees</th>
<th>Stock of refugees in East and Horn of Africa</th>
<th>Percentage of African refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16,280,100</td>
<td>6,492,400</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>1,681,100</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>15,703,100</td>
<td>6,935,300</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>1,743,700</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>14,896,100</td>
<td>5,811,500</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>1,533,300</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>13,357,100</td>
<td>4,543,600</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>1,596,600</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12,015,400</td>
<td>3,722,200</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>1,449,100</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11,480,900</td>
<td>3,593,400</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>1,388,600</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11,687,200</td>
<td>3,797,460</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>1,641,000</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12,129,600</td>
<td>3,950,200</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>1,448,800</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12,116,800</td>
<td>3,646,000</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>1,365,500</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10,594,100</td>
<td>3,715,500</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>1,364,600</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9,592,800</td>
<td>3,501,624</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>1,234,300</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9,574,800</td>
<td>3,409,800</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>1,350,500</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8,662,000</td>
<td>2,571,500</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>772,000</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9,877,700</td>
<td>2,607,600</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>852,300</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>11,391,00</td>
<td>2,498,300</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>815,200</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10,489,800</td>
<td>2,769,101</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>1,248,564</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10,396,540</td>
<td>2,805,165</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>1,336,357</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled from UNHCR data 1999-2010

Although Africa’s international migration is dominated by the movement of refugee and other forced migrants, Africa also has large stocks of skilled and unskilled migrant workers working and living in OECD, oil rich Arab and Middle East countries and within the continent. In 2005, the Economic Commission for Africa estimated as there were over 17 million African international migrants within the continent and five million Africans in OECD countries (ECA, 2006). In 2009 the total stock of African born population in OECD countries was estimated to be around 7 million (Hugo, 2009). Between 2005 and 2009, the number of
Africans working and living outside their country of birth (African international migrants) increased by 40 percent. Accordingly, 45 percent of Africans in OECD countries came from North African countries followed by migrants from South Africa (ECA, 2006; Hugo, 2009).

Large stocks of Africans in OECD countries are mainly concentrated in former colonial powers where they have close cultural and linguistic ties and geographical proximity (Hugo, 2009). Hence, countries like France (which hosted 40 percent of the Africans in OECD countries), the USA and the UK, which also have strong historical and colonial ties with the continent, have large stocks of African migrants (ECA, 2006; Hugo, 2009). According to UNHCR 2010 report, France received one out of every four applications lodged in the 44 industrialized countries (UNHCR, 2010). In recent years however, such pre-existing migration trends have changed and the migration and settlement of Africans to countries where they have little cultural, linguistic and geographical proximity (as is the case of the Horn of African migrants in Australia), are believed to be new trends. These are in response to the deteriorating humanitarian, economic and security situation in many African countries, and partly because of the globalized world economy, that increased movement of people across international borders (ECA, 2006; ECA, 2008).

Figure 3.1 shows that most African born persons in OECD countries come from almost all part of the continent. An estimated 400,000 Somalis and Ethiopians and 100,000 Eritrean and Sudanese migrants live in OECD countries. Migrants from Somalia and Eritrean are among the top ten most important source countries of asylum-seekers in the 44 industrialized countries (UNHCR, 2010). These figures did not include pending applications of the 56,681 Somalis, 31,459 Eritreans, 9,956 Ethiopians and 7,562 Sudanese migrants, who lodged asylum applications in OECD and other industrialized countries between 2007 and 2009. North
African countries are the major sources of African born international migrants, followed by South and East African countries (Hugo, 2009). Despite the presence of large stocks of African migrants in OECD countries, developing countries host four-fifths (80 percent) of the world’s refugees and the majority of African humanitarian and economic migrants remain within their regions and the continent at large (ECA, 2006; UNHCR, 2009).

**Figure 3.1 The Origin of African-born People Living in OECD Countries, 2000**

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Source: Hugo 2009

According to ECA estimates (2006), there are over 15 million Africans outside their countries of origin and 7 million (47 percent) of them live in OECD countries. As shown in Figure 3.2, former colonial West European countries, particularly those who had long histories of colonial
as well as cultural and linguistic ties, hosted large numbers of African migrants. Although North America and Australia have had few cultural or colonial ties with African countries, they have become the major destination countries of African migrants (Hugo, 2009).

**Figure 3.2 Destinations of African Migrants in OECD Countries 2009**

![Figure 3.2 Destinations of African Migrants in OECD Countries 2009](image)

**NOTE:**
This figure/table/image has been removed to comply with copyright regulations. It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Hugo 2009

By contrast, there are only a few thousand Horn of African migrants living in OECD countries. Out of an estimated 7 million Africans living in OECD countries, 71.4 percent (5 million) of them live in west European countries, particularly in former colonial masters such as Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy and Germany, where there are strong cultural, linguistic, trade and geographical proximities. Approximately 2 million of them live in USA, Canada and Australia.
3.5 Australia’s Relationship with Africa and Africans in Australia

Africans are different in their culture, language and history, socio-economic and political background. Australia’s relationship with Africa follows the dynamics of these diversities (Jakubowicz, 2009). Australia has a long history of a relationship with Africa and the presence of Africans in Australia was recorded in 1861, with around 1,590 African born persons. Most of them were children of Europeans born in Africa (Hugo, 2006). In 1911, the number of African born persons increased to 4000, and again over 96 percent of them were children of European emigrants born in South Africa, Zimbabwe and other former British colonies in Africa (Hugo, 2009). The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 effectively banned the immigration and settlement of non-white migrants from Africa, and so it was to remain for the best part of three generations (Jakubowicz, 2009). In 1921, Australia’s census report noted that South Africa born persons become one of Australia’s top ten countries of birth (DIMIA, 2002). With regard to Africans in Australia, Jakubowicz, (2009, p.2) noted that:

“Members of the African diaspora entered colonial society at many points before Federation in 1900. Some people entering were African Americans, former slaves or escapees from the USA, or sent as convicts by the British. Others were “seedies”, East African sailors who manned the windjammers, and later worked below decks on the steamers that ploughed the Africa to Asia to Australia routes. While they did not arrive in great numbers they were sufficient to add to that perceived fear of non-whites that drove the political agenda for Federation and the White Australia Policy. Africans were specifically mentioned in the debates about immigration restriction and limitations of the franchise in the first years of the Commonwealth”.

Jakubowicz, 2009 also noted that the first Africans arrived in Australia with the first European settlers in the late 18th century. Although Australia is one of the few countries that has a long history of settling refugees from around the world, particularly Europe, the migration and settlement of ethnic Africans to Australia was hampered by different factors including the then White Australian Policy (Jakubowicz, 2009).
Australia’s first contact with Africa countries goes back to the colonial era of 1885 when the Anglo-Egyptian condominiums in the Sudan were under threat from Sudanese nationalist forces. In this period Australia was still a collection of British colonies. In support of the British forces in the Sudan, Australian contingent forces were sent to Sudan (Levy, 2007; Jakubowicz, 2009). This was the first Australian historical contact with the region. After this brief contact, there were a few Australian missionaries spreading the gospel and teaching locals in some of the countries in the region. After these countries got their independence, the relationship at the government level continued and African students began studying in Australian universities, while a few Australians were working and teaching in the Horn of African countries. In an effort to fill the gap in skilled manpower, in the 1970s and 1980s the Australian governments gave scholarships to students from the Horn of Africa countries, like Ethiopia and the Sudan, as part of its development assistance program. At the time, the political situations in some of these countries deteriorated and some of the students who finished their study did not want to return to their country of birth and remained in Australia (Levy, 2007; Jakubowicz, 2009).

With the exception of a few graduates who remained here after they finished their studies, the number of ethnic Africans in Australia was very small until Australia officially admitted refugees from the Horn of Africa region in the early 1980s (Batrouney, 1991; Stahl et al, 1993 and Levy 2007). The migration and settlement of ethnic Africans in Australia is a very recent phenomena caused by the unfolding socio-economic crisis, political instabilities, droughts and environmental degradation, civil wars and war between countries. The unprecedented human sufferings and humanitarian crisis in the continent prompted the Australian government to officially admit refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia for the first time in 1983. This marked the
beginning of the official admission and settlement of ethnic Africans in Australia (Levy, 2007).

In recent years, Australia has been reasserting its presence and relationship with many African countries in many different ways. The presence of Australia’s peacekeeping troops in the Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia, and its financial aid and technical support to many African countries in training civil servants and law enforcement personnel, is part of its effort to resolve conflict in many African countries (Jakubowicz, 2009). As Australia’s involvement in the region has increased and diversified, its role and contribution in stabilizing and ameliorating the overall socio-economic and political situation of the continent has increased. The Australian government’s decision to increase the refugee and humanitarian intake from Africa has become more discernable in Australia’s towns and cities and added a new dimension to the cultural and ethnic composition of the Australian population. This increases the ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity of Australian society and helps to establish and expand trade links and economic relationships with Africa countries (Levy, 2007; Jakubowicz, 2009).

As a result of the Australian government’s decision to increase the refugee and humanitarian intake from Africa, in the last decade migrants from the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia and Congo have become among the top ten settler arrivals and the fastest growing migrant populations in Australia. Africa born persons have come from almost all Africa countries (from 51 out of the 53 African countries) accounting for less than 2 percent of the total Australia population and 5.4 percent of the overseas born persons (ABS Census, 2006; DIAC, 2009; Jakubowicz, 2009). In 2006 there were around a quarter of a million (245,000) African born and descendents living in Australia, of which around 42 percent were born in South
Africa, 13.5 percent in Egypt, 7.7 percent in Zimbabwe and 7.3 percent in Sudan (ABS Census, 2006).

As shown in Table 3.2, migrants from Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia to Australia are among the top ten largest stocks of Africa migrant population in Australia. Between 1996 and 2006 the number of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia born persons in Australia increased by over 688, 139 and 125 percent respectively. During the same period, there was a rapid increase in the number of Zimbabwe (125 percent), South Africa (86.7 percent), Kenya (86.3 percent) and Ghana (85 percent) born persons (ABS Census, 2006). The presence of a large number of South African born persons in Australia shows the existence of long-term relationship between the two countries.

Table 3.2 African Born Persons in Australia 1991-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>37,061</td>
<td>55,756</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>79,425</td>
<td>104,128</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>31,520</td>
<td>34,158</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>33,432</td>
<td>33,495</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>6,479</td>
<td>8,957</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>11,733</td>
<td>20,155</td>
<td>125.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,417</td>
<td>19,050</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>19,050</td>
<td>688.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>13,086</td>
<td>17,083</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>16,962</td>
<td>18,174</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td>5,333</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6,869</td>
<td>9,935</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>19,050</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>5,635</td>
<td>139.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,058</td>
<td>476.5</td>
<td>3,713</td>
<td>4,632</td>
<td>125.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3,072</td>
<td>4,079</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>2,769</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>2,769</td>
<td>85.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>92,316</strong></td>
<td><strong>133,646</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>161,580</strong></td>
<td><strong>220,471</strong></td>
<td><strong>65.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABS, 1996; 2001 and 2006 Censuses

Table 3.3 shows that African settlers in Australia arrived under refugee/humanitarian, skill and family reunion visa categories. However, the majority of settlers from the Sudan, Ethiopia,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Kenya and Egypt arrived under the refugee/humanitarian and family stream visa categories, while the majority of settlers from South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius were skilled migrants and their families (DIAC, 2007). The total number of refugee and humanitarian settlers Australia accepted from around the world varies from year to year. While Australia accepted around 70 percent, between 2003 and 2005, in 2009 it reduced its intake from Africa to around 32 percent (DIAC, 2009). In the last decade or so, the total number of refugee and humanitarian settlers from the Horn of African countries of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somali exceeded the combined number of settlers admitted from the entire continent (DIAC, 2008). Tables 3.3 shows that 96 percent of Sudanese were refugee and humanitarian entrants, as were 70 percent of Somalis.

Table 3.3 Top Ten African Settler Counties by Visa Type 1996/97-2008/09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Settler Arrivals Australia Wide</th>
<th>Percentage of refugee/human. arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugee/ Humanitarian Stream</td>
<td>Family Stream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>23,901</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>2,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3,114</td>
<td>2,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2,634</td>
<td>1,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,110</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,725</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The settlement of many African refugees and humanitarian migrants has been influenced by a number of interrelated factors, such as the government program to populate regional Australia,
the presence of early settlers and the social networks of new arrivals with those already living in Australia. The concentrations of African migrants, particularly the Horn of Africans in the city of Melbourne, are believed to be the combination of the following reasons. Firstly, in 1983 the Australian government settled 75 percent of the first ethnic African (indigenous peoples of Africa) refugee arrivals from Somalia and Ethiopian in Melbourne (Batrouney, 1991; Levy, 2007). Secondly, to receive settlement support and share information about employment, to get referral for jobs and private rentals and learn about Australian culture and share the settlement experience of earlier settlers, many new migrants preferred to settle close to where fellow country persons live. As a result, some Horn of African migrants moved to Melbourne from where they initially arrived and feel more comfortable in the company of their own people and where they can easily socialize and make friends (Stahl et al, 1993; Gow, 2002; Levy, 2007; Walmsley et al, 2007). Hence, the city of Melbourne remains the major destination and preferred city of many migrants from the Horn of Africa region. Earlier settlers have played a significant role in influencing and shaping the settlement pattern of new arrivals.

Table 3.4 shows that between 1996/97 and 2008/09, when Australia as a whole settled a total 133,674 settlers from the top ten African countries, Victoria received 26,783 (20 percent of total settler arrivals), whereas the share for South Australia was only 6,081 (4.5 percent). Hence, Victoria received nearly five times more than South Australia (DIAC, 2009). Victoria received a total of 8,237 settlers from the Sudan alone, while South Australia settled a total of 6,081 settlers from the top ten Africa countries. Such concentrations of African migrants in Victoria and in the city of Melbourne in particular, created business opportunities for the establishment of different kinds of migrant family owned businesses. These included restaurants, cafés, groceries, clothes shops, beauty salons and money transferring businesses.
which attracted a large number of African migrants to Melbourne (Batrouney, 1991; Walmsley et al, 2007).

Table 3.4 Settlers Arrival in Victoria and South Australia 1996/97-2008/09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Australia’s Total intake</th>
<th>Victoria intake</th>
<th>Victoria’s percentage intake</th>
<th>South Australia intake</th>
<th>South Australia’s Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>65,484</td>
<td>6,937</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>24,863</td>
<td>8,237</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>12,970</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6,660</td>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>6,534</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5,510</td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3,757</td>
<td>2,005</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>3,459</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>133,674</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,783</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,081</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.6 The Migration and Settlement of Ethnic Africans in Australia

Since the first waves of African born persons were recorded in Australia in 1850, they have arrived in Australia in different waves. Long before Federation in 1900, and the introduction of the White Australian Policy that effectively banned the migration and settlement of ethnic Africans in Australia, the African diaspora had entered colonial society at many points. The African countries with the largest resident populations in Australia are those with strong European colonial histories like South Africa, Egypt, Zimbabwe and Mauritius. Nearly 90 percent of migrants from Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Sudan arrived and settled in Australia after 1996 (Perrin and Dunn, 2007; Jakubowicz; 2009).
Until Australia officially admitted refugees from the Horn of Africa countries of Ethiopia and Somalia in the early 1980s, the number of ethnic Africans in Australia was small. Nonetheless, it is not easy to find detailed statistical information and census reports for ethnic African migrants as it is today. Most pre-1991 statistical reports including census data, did not present detailed information on migrants’ countries of origin, ethnicity, date and year of arrival and visa types, with the exception of migrants from South Africa, Egypt, Mauritius and Zimbabwe information for migrants from other African counties were clustered under others or Sub-Sahara African (Hugo, 2004).

As the socio-economic, political, and environmental situations of many African countries continue to deteriorate, the security and stability situation of ordinary people remains uncertain. The insecurity and instability that engulfed most parts of the continent has sparked conflicts and caused civil wars between rival ethnic groups and dissident political groups in many African countries (Maxted and Zegeye 2001; Sander and Mambio, 2003). The ongoing conflicts and civil wars have resulted in unprecedented human suffering and the displacement of tens of thousands of people. As a result many people crossed the international borders of the neighbouring countries to seek asylum. Table 3.5 shows that as the situation in many African countries continues to deteriorate, the Australian government has significantly increased its refugee and humanitarian intake from Africa from around 13 percent in 1996/97 to slightly over 70 percent in 2003/04 and 2004/05 (DIAC, 2009). However, after the then immigration minister Mr. Kevin Andrew publicly accused the Sudanese migrants for not integrating into the wider Australian society in 2007, the Australian government reduced its refugee intake from Africa from 30 percent in 2007/08 to 29 percent in 2009/10 (www.theage.com.au, www.heraldsun.com.au viewed in November 2007, DIAC, 2008/09 Annual Report).
### Table 3.5 Percentage of Australia’s Refugee Intakes from Africa 1996/97 to 2008/09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Arrival</th>
<th>Australia’s Total Offshore Intake</th>
<th>Percentage of African Refugee Intake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Humanitarian Program</td>
<td>Special Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>3,334</td>
<td>2,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>4,010</td>
<td>4,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>3,988</td>
<td>4,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>3,802</td>
<td>3,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>3,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>4,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>4,376</td>
<td>7,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>4,134</td>
<td>7,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>5,511</td>
<td>6,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>6,022</td>
<td>6,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>6,003</td>
<td>5,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>6,004</td>
<td>5,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>6,499</td>
<td>4,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>6,003</td>
<td>3,233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although Australia has reduced its refugee and humanitarian intake from Africa, its overall refugee and humanitarian intake from other parts of the world has increased and the number of settlers from the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia have been among the top ten new settler arrivals in 2008/09 (DIAC, 2009; Refuge Council of Australia, 2010, Fact Sheet 2, Key facts in immigration www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/02key.htm viewed in May, 2010).

### 3.7 The Horn of African Population in Australia

Although, Australia’s relationship with Africa has a long history, and it is known for settling refugees and humanitarian migrants first from Europe and later from Asia, Australia’s intake
of ethnic African refugees and humanitarian migrants is a relatively recent phenomena (Batrouney, 1991; Stahl et al, 1993; DIAC, 2008; Hugo, 2009). Australia started accepting refugees from the Horn of Africa countries after the North Africa and Middle East study group, assigned by the Australian Government Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, reported on the deteriorating socio-political condition of the Horn of Africa countries. This group reported on how the then Cold War, drought, ongoing civil wars in the region and the war between Ethiopia and Somalia had affected the lives of ordinary people in the region and beyond. The report also revealed the impact of the Cold War and political instability in the region and its effect on Australia’s interests (Report of The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, 1983).

After Australia officially admitted the first Ethiopian and Somali refugees in the early 1980s, the refugee and humanitarian intake from the Horn of Africa countries was very small. According to 1996 and 2001 census, there were 8,000 and 13,757 Horn of Africa migrants in Australia respectively an increase of 72 percent (ABS Census, 1996; ABS Census, 2001). As Table 3.6 show that after the Australian government increased its refugee and humanitarian intake from this region, particularly from the Sudan, the numbers of the Horn of African migrants in Australia increased from 13,757 in 2001 to 31,014 in 2006, an increase of 225.4 percent (ABS Census, 2006). During the same period, the number of Sudanese increased from 4,900 to 19,049 an increase of 388 percent. Hence, migrants from this region, particularly from the Sudan, become one of the fastest growing migrant groups in Australia (Perrin and Dunn, 2007; Hugo, 2009).
Table 3.6 Horn of African Migrants in Australia 1996-2006 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>164.3</td>
<td>5,633</td>
<td>320.0</td>
<td>139.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>2,058</td>
<td>3,714</td>
<td>173.9</td>
<td>4,316</td>
<td>218.0</td>
<td>109.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>2,417</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>289.2</td>
<td>19,049</td>
<td>1413.0</td>
<td>688.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,957</td>
<td>7,990</td>
<td>13,757</td>
<td>365.2</td>
<td>31,014</td>
<td>948.8</td>
<td>288.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Before the declaration of Eritrea independence, Eritreans are included in Ethiopia

In Australia, the number and growth rates of the Horn of Africa migrants vary significantly. While they are highly concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney (Perrin and Dunn, 2007) there are only a few of them in Adelaide, Hobart and Darwin. Of all Horn of Africa migrants, the Sudanese are the most numerous and account for over 61 percent of the total Horn of African migrant population, followed by migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia. Eritrea has the smallest number and estimated to constitute around 7 percent of the total Horn of Africa migrants’ population in Australia (ABS Census, 2006).

Between 1991 and 2006, when the number of migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia increased by three and two fold respectively, the number of Sudanese migrants in Australia increased by over 14 fold. In the last decade and a half (1991 to 2006), the number of Horn of Africa migrants has increased significantly. The migration and settlement of large number of refugee and humanitarian migrants from the Horn of African countries to Australia, in part reflects the uncertainty and instability of the countries in the region, and Australia’s geopolitical interest to seek influence and its commitment and initiative to international treaty (Perrin and Dunn, 2007).

The arrival and settlement patterns of the Horn of African migrants vary considerably from
State to State. Table 3.7 shows that, between 1993/94 and 2008/09 the State of Victoria received more refugees and humanitarian settlers from Horn of African countries than South Australia. For instances, in 2004/05 Victoria received 2,450 Horn of Africa settlers. During the same period, South Australia received only 524 migrants from the entire Horn of Africa countries (DIAC, 2009). In most cases the numbers of settler arrivals in Victoria are 10 times more than those who settled in South Australia. In the last decade, the Sudanese have been the single largest migrant group to settle in large numbers both in South Australia and Victoria.

Table 3.7 Settlers’ Arrivals from the Horn of Africa Countries to South Australia and Victoria 1993/94 to 2008/09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
<th>Eritrea SA</th>
<th>Eritrea Vic</th>
<th>Ethiopia SA</th>
<th>Ethiopia Vic</th>
<th>Somalia SA</th>
<th>Somalia Vic</th>
<th>Sudan SA</th>
<th>Sudan Vic</th>
<th>Total SA</th>
<th>Total Vic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35*</td>
<td>311*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28*</td>
<td>420*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>141</td>
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<td>2002/03</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>116</td>
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<td>2003/04</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>299</td>
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<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>2,450</td>
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<td>2005/06</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>854</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>3,923</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>8,443</td>
<td>2,665</td>
<td>16,105</td>
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</table>


*Show migrants from former Ethiopia which include Eritrean migrants
3.8 Horn of Africa Migrants Population in Adelaide and Melbourne

Around 75 percent of the first contingent of ethnic Africa refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia arrived and settled in Melbourne. Since then, Melbourne remains the major destination of over half of the total population of the Horn of Africa migrants (Batrouney, 1991; Stahl et al, 1993; ABS Census, 2006). For instance, Table 3.8 shows that over half of the total number of migrants from Ethiopia (51 percent) and nearly half (48 percent) of those from Eritrea and Somalia live in Melbourne. Although there are only 36 percent of Sudanese migrants currently living in Melbourne, their numbers are more than the sum total of migrants from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia (ABS Census, 2006).

The concentrations of the Horn of African migrants in Melbourne are believed to be caused by the influence of earlier settlers and chain migration thereafter. The settlement of the first contingent of Ethiopia and Somalia refugees in Melbourne has influenced and attracted the settlement pattern of later arrivals. In search of a bigger community and fellow country persons, some Horn of African migrants moved to Melbourne from where they initially arrived. Being close to migrants from their own country enables them to share the settlement experience, and information about employment, helps them to get a referral when looking for jobs and private rentals, and helps them to learn about Australian culture and way of life. Many of them have problems with the English language, and feel more comfortable in the company of their own people and where they can easily socialize and make friends (Stahl et al, 1993; Gow, 2002; Levy, 2007; Walmsley et al, 2007).

As the 2001 and 2006 census data shown in Table 3.8, the number of the Horn of Africa migrants living in the state of Victoria is nearly ten times higher than the number living in South Australia. The number of the Ethiopian, Somalis and Sudanese migrants increased in
both States between each census period, however, the number of Eritrean migrants in South Australia, declined marginally from 129 in 2001 to 123 in 2006. During the same period, the number of Eritreans in Melbourne increased by 19 percent. It is believed that it is likely some Eritrean migrants have moved to where large numbers of their migrant community live.

**Table 3.8 The Horn of Africa Migrants in South Australia and Victoria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td>835</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1,191</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>103</td>
<td>2,326</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>2,623</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>6,210</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>343</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>6,343</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>13,149</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2001 and 2006 and Victorian Community Profile, 2007

**3.9 Conclusion**

Migration of Africans out of the continent has a long history and is not a new phenomenon. The first migration of Africans was in the era of slave trade and colonial period. Traditionally, Africans migrated to countries in which they have colonial links, strong economic, linguistic, cultural and traditional ties, and geographic proximity. In recent years however, these traditional patterns of migration have changed and Africans are now migrating to countries without such ties (such as the migration and settlement of the Horn of African migrants in Australia). This has been prompted by humanitarian crises and economic insecurities.

Migration of Africans out of the continent is caused by complex and interconnected factors, such as conflict among rival ethnic groups over political power and the desire to control scarce resources, economic and political insecurities. These problems are exacerbated by the absence of good governance, the authoritarian nature of the leaders and lack of political will to share
power and create an inclusive political system that accommodates all citizens of the countries in the region. The absence of a peaceful transfer of political power has led to social and political unrest, ethnic conflict, civil wars and endless power struggles. The unfolding political and humanitarian crisis in the continent in general, and the Horn of Africa countries in particular, and Australia’s growing international influences has resulted in the increase of refugee and humanitarian intake and the migration and settlement of Horn of Africa migrants in Australia.
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

Information can often be collected directly from primary sources or from already existing sources (secondary data). The data gathering techniques used often depend on a number of factors pertaining to the nature of the research problem, the accessibility and availability of primary or secondary sources, the overall educational, social and cultural situation of the population studied and the research strategies (Layder, 1993).

This study gathered information from both primary and secondary sources, and some general problems are noted. As this study involves different groups of people with diverse social, cultural, linguistic and educational backgrounds (sometimes with little or no education), relying on one source only or using either qualitative or quantitative data gathering methods is difficult for the following reasons. Firstly, before they were admitted into Australia under refugee and humanitarian programs, the majority of these migrants, lived in remote and isolated refugee camps with little or no access to basic services, such as education, health and employment. Hence, some of them are illiterate in their own language and it was not easy to engage them in questionnaires or interviews. Secondly, some of these migrants have witnessed tragic experiences of family members or friends and are traumatized as a result, or fear political and ethnic persecution. Sadly some of them have mental health issues and are often suspicious when they are asked about their past and they are also worried about the security and wellbeing of their families and friends if someone is interested in their past. As a result many of them are reluctant to give information about their social networks or remittances they send.
In working with migrants with these kinds of backgrounds, relying on either qualitative or quantitative research methods alone does not help to obtain the detailed information on the nature and types of their social networks in Australia, or with those left behind. To obtain information on the amount, frequency and destination of their remittances, one has to gain the trust and support of influential individuals, groups and community leaders. To gather relevant information on migrants’ social networks and the impacts of remittances on their life and the lives of people they support, this study used triangulation method (mixing quantitative and qualitative techniques) and observation methods employed to collect and analyze information.

4.2 Data Collection

Data used in this study was collected directly from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources of information were collected from Ethiopian, Eritrea, Somali and Sudanese migrants living in the cities of Adelaide and Melbourne. First hand information on the Horn of Africa migrants’ social networks, the impacts of sending money (remittances) on their life and lifestyle in the host country, and its effect on remittance receiving families in the origin country, were gathered using both qualitative and quantitative research techniques. By combining the questionnaire (quantitative) method with in depth interviews (qualitative) the research was able to collect information directly from individuals, households, groups, community and religious leaders. These migrants are from non-English speaking backgrounds and many of them (including those who can speak English) have difficulties in reading. To incorporate the views and opinions of those who cannot fill out the questionnaire, interviews were also used as part of primary data gathering. Secondary data are mainly research projects done on related matters, and include ABS and DIAC settler arrival data and statistical reports and publications, Australian government census reports, and UN websites, publications,
4.2.1 Primary Data

The objective of this study is to gather first hand information from the Horn of African migrants living in Adelaide and Melbourne. The information was mainly on issues pertaining to the social networks of the Horn of Africa migrants, migrants coping strategies on arrival, the impact of remittances on the life style of the remittance sending family in the host country and its effect on the receiving family in the country of birth. In addition to these, information was also obtained on the frequency, direction (who to) and purpose of sending remittances, and its contribution to the development of the local economy/communities back home. To gather such information from a large number of respondents, questionnaires were used as the main data collection technique. Interviews were used to supplement the questionnaires and to incorporate the experience, views and opinions of those migrants who had difficulties to read and write or to participate in the questionnaire survey.

The researcher believed that by gathering information only through the questionnaire would exclude the views and opinions of those who cannot read and write, which would bias the findings of the survey. Therefore, information gathered under such circumstances may not represent the views and opinions of all migrants. By employing questionnaires and interviews the views of a large number of respondents increased the level of confidence in the findings. Furthermore, by employing personal interview techniques among individuals, households, groups and community and religious leaders, the researcher was able to gather information that might not be disclosed otherwise. Hence a total of 16 interviews were also conducted among key respondents in these two cities. It also allowed for participant observation of their social networks, living conditions and the circumstances of respondents.
4.2.1.1 Questionnaires

The Horn of Africa migrants living in the two cities are scattered across the suburbs. Distributing questionnaires to such a large group of people was the only reliable and viable means to reach out to such a geographically scattered population. Therefore, questionnaires were selected as the best means to gather as much information as possible in a short period of time. Bearing in mind the language problems of these migrants, the questionnaires were prepared in very clear English. To gather different opinions, comments and recommendations from the respondents and enrich and diversify the findings of this study, the questionnaires were designed with a few open ended questions. In the closed questions, the respondents are provided with a range of alternative answers to choose from whereas in the open-ended questions, the respondents are given the chance to freely express their views. With regard to the use of questionnaires (Wilkinson and Birmingham, 2003, p. 9) point out:

“...questionnaire is one that enables transmission of useful and accurate information or data from the respondents to the researcher. This is a complex process which involves presenting questions in a clear and unambiguous way so that the respondent may interpret them, articulate his or her response and transmit it effectively to the researcher”.

As the social networks of these migrants and the nature of migrants’ remittances and remittance businesses are interconnected and complex, respondents were given a chance to express their opinions. Such information can be attained by using open-ended questions which will enrich the findings and provide a broader prospective.

As some of these migrants fled from their country of birth because of political and ethnic persecution, they did not feel confident to reveal their social networks and who they send money to. Therefore, in dealing with such sensitive issues, it is imperative to pay attention to the most effective and efficient way of gathering such information from individuals and
groups. This is equally important as what to ask because the style of questioning and the way we ask it can affect the response. Among these migrants the way we pose a question can be interpreted in different ways (for details please refer to appendix II). As some of them still feel insecure about their family back home they look at each question with caution and scepticism. Asking the same question in different questioning styles can lead to different answers. Due to such scepticism, some of them look at some questions very suspiciously and prefer not to answer. As a result of this, some of those migrants who had such concerns returned the questionnaire without answering the questions they deemed personal, sensitive and not safe. In an effort to gather a wide range of relevant information about the social networks and remittances of the migrant communities, the questions were presented to respondents in three different ways:

1. Closed questions – where the respondents are provided with two alternative answers, that is “yes” or “no” responses. Example, do you send money? ‘yes or no’

2. Multiple-choice or pre-coded questions–the respondents are given with multiple alternative responses from which they choose the answer. For example which money transferring agents do you use? Respondents are given a list of agents or intermediaries which are used to send money.

3. Open-ended questions - the respondents are given freedom to speak their mind and give diverse opinions, and unexpected responses. Open-ended questions help respondents to raise issues of their own concern. Instead of restricting respondents to the options provided by the researcher, the open-ended question changes the sources of information from researcher to respondents (Wilkinson and Birmingham, 2003).

In addition to this, it was noted that some of the respondents are very busy with their own
personal life and family commitments. To improve their life and support their family, some of them work full-time and study part-time or vice versa. Therefore, it was hard to find a suitable time to organize a face-to-face interview. Hence, a questionnaire was the most suitable means of gathering information from such busy groups of people, as many prefer to fill out the questionnaire in their own time instead of being interviewed. Therefore gathering information through a questionnaire suits the lifestyle of many busy respondents, and also ensures that some respondents can remain anonymous.

4.2.1.2 Interviews

Interviews with some sections of these migrant communities (women and older people) required the knowledge and understanding of the diverse culture of these communities. Interestingly after living many years in Australia, some Horn of Africa migrants still practice the cultural hierarchy that exists between different age and sex groups. As a result, the style of approaching older people, women and youth are quite different. For instance, to interview a married woman, the most practical and culturally acceptable way is first to contact the husband and to get his permission. To contact and interview an old person, it is customary to contact them through a person they know and trust. Contacting such people without an intermediary is often seen as disrespectful and can result in misunderstanding and resentment. Bearing in mind these and other cultural and language barriers, the interviews were carried out among migrant communities.

To supplement the survey questionnaire and incorporate those migrants who could not fill out the questionnaire because of English language problems, an in-depth interview was carried out among new arrivals, longer-term residents, community representatives and college students, as well as a branch manager of a Somali money transferring company. With the exception of
migrants from Somalia (who have a common language, religion and culture), many Horn of Africa migrants speak different ethnic languages to the extent to which migrants from the same country sometimes do not speak a common language, and can hardly communicate among themselves. For instance, the South Sudanese migrants in Adelaide and Melbourne speak more than 10 different ethnic languages and do not have a common language to communicate, with some of them using either Arabic or the English language. In such circumstances and among such diverse migrant groups, the ideal solution would be to prepare questionnaires in all of the different languages. However, this is a difficult and time consuming task. To accommodate those who do not speak English and participated in the questionnaire, interpreters were used as a viable solution to overcome the language barrier.

Before the 1993 Eritrean independence, many Eritreans used to live in Ethiopia and speak Amharic (one of the Ethiopian languages). As the researcher also speaks this language, it was possible to interview Eritrean, Ethiopian and Oromo interviewees in Amharic and Oromifa (the language of the Oromo people) respectively. Interestingly, the researcher also interviewed two Sudanese in Amharic, as they had been in Ethiopia as refugees for over 15 years and speak Amharic. With those who do not speak English, the researcher used an Arabic and Somali interpreter to interview Sudanese and Somali respondents respectively. Unfortunately, some Sudanese new arrivals who speak neither Arabic nor English were not included in these interviews.

All the interviews were conducted face-to-face in a friendly atmosphere at their own preferred time and place. Most interviews were made in their homes, churches, and community meeting places and sport-fields, on weekends and on weekdays. The interviewees were informed in advance as the researcher took notes while discussion was in progress. No recording device
was used, because it is likely to create suspicion, anxiety and doubt. Hence, migrants may not disclose their true story and so no such devices were used when interviewing.

In an effort to gather first hand information directly from the respondents, interviews were conducted both among individuals, households and groups. This helped the researcher to examine their individual and collective reactions from different perspectives. Respondents were interviewed separately as an individual and group to get detailed information that may not be disclosed in an isolated or in-group interviews. The researcher's background, knowledge and understanding of the respondents’ culture and language (among Ethiopians and Eritreans) made each respondent feel comfortable to give information that others deemed personal and sensitive by saying “as you know we have different problems and cultures”. Such assertions were taken as positive and the researcher felt a strong relationship with the respondents. Although as some respondents said, “we are similar and share some values”, we (the Horn of Africa migrants) are heterogeneous and quite different in our languages, cultures, ethnicities and the socio-political system of the country we came from.

Like all other data gathering techniques, using a personal interview has both advantages and disadvantages. With regards to this, researchers (Kidder and Judd, 1986; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Newman, 2004) point out the importance of face-to-face interview as a convenient method to correct or clarify questions. In addition to this, it accommodates those who can not read and write English and has a higher response rate. Despite the advantages, it was noticed that many of the interviewees were busy with their jobs, study and family commitments and were not willing to spend much of their spare time being interviewed. The other major challenge was the dispersed/scattered settlement of the respondents across the city, particularly in Melbourne, and many were available for interview only on weekends. The
dispersed settlement of the respondents in Melbourne required the researcher to travel from one end of the city to the other. Interviews have also been used to complement the shortcomings of mass administered questionnaires and to reach those groups who would otherwise be excluded.

4.2.2 Secondary Data on African and Horn of African Migrants

In this research a wide range of secondary data have been used from different sources to supplement, enrich, and validate the information gathered from primary sources. Secondary data on remittances to the Horn of Africa countries are presented in aggregate, and it is sometimes difficult to identify the amount of remittances the Horn of Africa migrants living in the two Australian cities channel to their countries of origin. Despite the difficulties of accessing and using secondary data on remittances transfer from Australia to countries in the Horn region, secondary data remained the major source of information in this study mainly because they are of high quality and generated by highly experienced researchers for their own company/research consumption (De Vaus, 1995; Bryman, 2004).

Much of the research and secondary data on the Horn of Africa migrants focused on the plight of refugees and other humanitarian migrants, the origin and destination countries of African migrants and their resettlement problems in host countries. Little is known about these migrants’ social networks and the amount of money refugee and humanitarian migrants send, particularly from Australia to countries in the Horn region. Much of the research on remittances to this region are summarized and embedded under sub-Saharan Africa countries, with special emphasis on how remittances sustained the local economy and the lives of ordinary people in conflict prone countries like Somalia. Beside clustering the transfer of remittances under sub-Saharan Africa, there is information on how remittances can change and
improve the lives of people in the conflict zone, and how Somali owned money transferring businesses operate in the conflict and remote areas, including refugee camps (Horst 2001; Sander and Maimbo, 2003; World Bank, 2005; Maimbo 2006; Gupta et al 2007; Savage and Harvey, 2007).

Although there is evidence of remittance transfer from Australia to the Horn of Africa countries since the early 1990s, it has not been adequately researched and documented, mainly because the numbers of Africans, particularly the Horn of Africans have been very small. Hence, there is little data on the transfer of remittances from Australia to Africa, in general, and to the Horn of Africa countries in particular.

The ongoing conflicts and instabilities that have rocked most of the countries in the region have resulted in limited financial services, inconsistent and incomplete reporting of remittance flows, and lack of reliable data on the amount of remittances transferred from Australia to Africa. Many Horn of African migrants use informal channels, including travellers, which rarely appear in secondary data, and it is difficult and complex to know the exact amount these migrants send to their country of birth. Secondary data are usually channeled through formal sectors and reported by the national bank or other financial institutions (Sander and Maimbo, 2003). Therefore, relying on secondary data alone does not show the total amount of money the Horn of Africa migrants send to their country of birth.

The other difficulties in the use of secondary data on the amount of money the Horn of African migrants send from Australia to their country of birth are complicated by the type and nature of money transferring agents. Due to low service charges and their availability in small and remote country towns, including refugee camps, many Horn of Africa migrants use Somalia money transferring companies. Many of these companies are owned and operated by
family or individuals. Hence, some of these businesses are small and informal and fail to keep records and detailed information of the transfer, after the transaction is actually paid to the recipient (payee). Another problem noted with these family owned money transferring companies is high agent turnover which makes it difficult to get detailed information about their business transactions. In addition, almost all of them are reluctant to disclose their annual remittance turnover, and they did not give access to their archives simply because of business confidentiality and a lack of trust. Even those who were willing to share their information on remittances are reluctant to retrieve their records, instead they prefer to give oral information and rough estimates of the total amount of weekly remittance.

This study used secondary data on remittances from the World Bank, IMF and other NGOs websites and research reports, publications, journals articles and working papers. Furthermore, secondary data on stocks of African migrants in Australia were obtained from the Australian census, and DIAC settler arrivals data, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and UNHCR websites and research publications and journals on stocks of African, East and Horn of African migrants’ population across the world. Secondary data on the destinations of Africans migrants and settlement have been gathered and summarized accordingly. To substantiate the findings of this study, different secondary data and research publications have been referred to and cited.

4.3 Mixed Methods Approach

Mixed Methods is defined as research where the researcher mixes and integrates different research methods (qualitative and quantititative techniques) to analysis data in a single study (Olsen, 2004; Brannen, 2005). Collecting data using different means from diverse sources helps to understand the problem and generalize the results of the study (Creswell, 2003).
There are different types of research methods. Which methods to use or best suit a particular study are subject to researcher experiences, judgment, and the subject to be researched. Each one of the existing social science research method has its own strength and weakness. Taking the weaknesses and strengths in each research method into considerations the researched decided to use triangulation method (combining the quantitative and qualitative research method) to collect and analysis information.

Combining quantitative and qualitative methods help to offset the weaknesses of one method by capitalizing on the strengths of the other (Olsen, 2004; Hussein, 2009). Combining two or more research method or data analysis in a single research often refers to triangulation. Triangulation is generally defined as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (Todd, 1979, p.602). Using more than one research methods to examine the same phenomenon help to enhance confidence in the findings, increase accuracy and widen understanding. In other words, triangulation method argues on how to increase accuracy using different research methods or data collection/ analysis (Todd, 1979).

In gathering information among the Horn of Africa migrants, the researcher has examined and reviewed the pros and cons of each one of the research methods and the availability of relevant secondary data. After extensively reviewing literature on the strengths and weaknesses of each method, the researcher decided to use triangulation (combing quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview) research) methods, and observation to collect and analyze information.

The migration and settlement of ethnic Africans to Australia is a relatively recent phenomenon, and their numbers are quite small (ABS Census, 2006). Research on ethnic Africans in Australia (Gow, 2002; DIMIA, 2007; DIAC, 2009; Hugo, 2009), suggests that the
migration, settlement and adjustment, employment and education of Africans in Australia is well researched and documented by scholars, government organizations, NGOs and research institutes. Much of this research however, has focused on the causes of migration out of the continent, and the post-migration settlement, employment and adjustment experience of Africans in Australia. So far there has been a lack of data and information on the social networks of Horn of Africa migrants, the frequency and amount of money they send and its impact on sending and receiving families.

As almost all Africa migrants are from non English speaking backgrounds, the majority of them have difficulties in reading, writing and speaking English. This makes relying only on questionnaire more challenging and it is difficult to incorporate the views and opinions of those who do not take part in questionnaire. Scholars like Kidder and Judd, (1986), Bailey, (1986), Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, (1996) and Babbie, (2001) agree that there is no best way of doing research and there is no single method that provides a comprehensive solution to all research problems. In support of the idea of using mixed research methods, Kidder and Judd, (1986, p. 45) also pointed out that “... any single operational measurement is imperfect and that it is therefore wiser to choose two. Two imperfect measures are better than one. Each provides a check on the other”. Accordingly, this study used triangulation methods (combined and used quantitative (mainly questionnaires) and qualitative (semi-structured interview) methods), and personal observation to collect and analyse information. Doing so increases the accuracy/reliability of the findings, and broadens our understanding and increases our confidence to make generalization.

4.4 Study Design, Area and Units of Analysis

This study was designed to gather firsthand information from the Horn of Africa migrants
living in the cities of Adelaide and Melbourne. The field work was designed to be undertaken in two different phases. The first phase was designed to gather primary data among those who reside in Melbourne, while the second among those who reside in Adelaide.

These two cities were selected, firstly, to assess the effects of geographical proximity of the two cities on the social networks and the interstate migration of these migrants after arrival. Secondly, some 78 percent of the first wave of refugees from the Horn of African countries settled in the city of Melbourne (Batrouney, 1991). This study assesses the influences of earlier settlers on the migration and settlement pattern of new arrivals. Thirdly, half (51 percent) of the Horn of Africa migrants population in Australia are concentrated in the two cities (7 percent in Adelaide and 44 percent in Melbourne).

By selecting these two cities, the researcher was interested to find out why over half of these migrants concentrated in these two cities, particularly Melbourne. Did earlier settlers have an influence on the settlement pattern of new arrivals? Why did Melbourne become the financial hub of almost all migrant owned money transferring companies and other businesses? What has Melbourne got to offer these migrants more than other cities? Determining the unit of analysis (who to ask was equally important as what to ask), is also important and will eventually affect the type and level of generalization that can be made. Generalizations made from the unit of analysis of a group may not apply to the situation of individuals and vice versa. The units of analysis of this study were individuals, households, groups, members of the social group, ethnic, religious and community associations and their representatives. This was to obtain as much information as possible from a wide range of groups of people, such as new arrivals, employed, unemployed, long-term residents, married and single person, groups, churches and community associations. Incorporating different units of analysis enabled the
researcher to examine the action and inaction of these participants from different perspectives.

4.5 Pilot Test
After a number of consultations on the content of the questionnaires, the researcher conducted a pilot test of both the survey questionnaire and semi-structured interview before embarking on the formal gathering of data. The pilot testing was conducted among groups of Horn of Africa migrants residing in Adelaide. As Wilkinson and Birmingham (2003) noted, the purpose of pilot testing is to make the questions clear and understandable, and then to make corrections if there are any problems and to identify new issues. When the participants of the pilot testing were selected, the researcher tried to make the composition and background of the participants as diverse as possible. The participants in the pilot test included new arrivals and longer term residents, professionals and college students, employed and unemployed, religious and community representatives. The comments and information obtained and collected from the participants through pilot testing were used to review, improve, and update the questionnaires and semi-structured questions.

4.6 Sampling Techniques and Sample Selection
The complex cultural, social, ethnic difference and the animosity that exists among some rival ethnic groups created mistrust and suspicion which prevent them from voluntarily registering in their own community association. In addition, the inability of their respective community associations to convince its members to register in their community association resulted in incomplete members’ information. This made the use of probability sampling virtually impossible. Babbie (2001) noted that in a situation where the use of probability sampling is not possible, an alternative option is to use non-probability sampling. Accordingly, to select respondents, this study used non-probability sampling techniques i.e. purposive/judgmental
Although some of these migrants came from the same country and are considered as fellow country persons, many of them are divided along ethnic lines, languages and politics. Mistrust, animosity, lack of common language and tolerance among rival ethnic groups exacerbated their differences and posed major problems in creating strong and unified community associations under their country of birth. Instead of being members of the community association of their country of birth, these migrants setup their own separate ethnic community associations, social and sport clubs, and churches. Sadly none of these patchy ethnic or community associations, religions institutions, organizations or social groups maintained records of their members. As one community leader noted this is partly because of their past traumatizing experiences and fear about the safety and security for their families. Although many of these associations are supposed to be free of politics and are intended to provide settlement support and other integration and social activities, the aforementioned problems keep these communities small, fragmented, and without records of their members. Non-probability techniques are more convenient, and for example snowball-sampling gives an insight into the dynamics of the migrants’ social networks within and outside their community and country of birth. This technique helped the researcher unravel the complex web of the Horn of Africa migrants’ social networks outside their fellow country persons. In snowball sampling, the number of respondents continues to increase as the first person or group continues referring to another person. The size of the sample of respondents selected through snowball sampling depends on the social networks and the interaction the persons have with other people (Bailey, 1986).

As this study did not use probability sampling, selection of a fair representation of the general
population is very important to draw any conclusions about the sample population. It is believed that this can be achieved through understanding the diverse socio-economic, political, ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the general population. As a person from this region, the researcher is aware of the social networks and values these migrants share in common. It is believed that such prior knowledge and understanding helped the researcher to select respondents by integrating purposive/judgmental and snowball sampling techniques in the one study.

The selection of respondents was started by selecting targeted groups from Ethiopian, Oromo, Eritrean, Somali and Sudanese religious and community leaders. The selection was based on who should take part in the survey, due to prior knowledge of the community and a judgment on who had useful information about the population. After the researcher carefully selected a few respondents from each community, the remaining respondents were selected using snowball sampling techniques. As the selected respondents continue referring to others the number of respondents continued to increase.

As Figure 4.1 shows, the snowball techniques used to select respondents clearly reflect the complex web of these migrants’ social networks and interactions. In selecting the sample the researcher started by selecting five persons from religious, community and club leaders and business owners from the Ethiopian, Oromo and Sudanese, Eritrean and Somali migrant communities. After the selection they were briefed on the aims of the study and how the selected respondents in turn referred to persons, groups or organizations across the cultures, country of birth and communities. Their referrals were not limited to people from their community, country of birth or church, rather they could be their neighbours, workmates, and persons they study with or knew while they were in an asylum country, church or social and
sporting club.

After each referred respondent was met in person and their consent was obtained (oral consent), the questionnaires were distributed at churches, community meetings, sport fields, schools, ethnic community shops and at any convenient place they preferred. When the questionnaire was distributed, the day they would return them was negotiated. As part of the follow-up, they were also asked whether they were willing to receive a phone call to remind them. By reminding them how to return the completed questionnaire, the response rates of this survey increased significantly. Only one percent of the respondents returned the completed questionnaire through the mail, with 99 percent collected in person at churches, community association offices and meetings, or from respondents’ homes, workplaces, schools and sport fields. Churches and communities leaders played a pivotal role in distributing, following up and collecting the questionnaires.
4.6.1 Sample Selection

Gathering information directly from the entire population being studied is impractical in terms of cost and time. A sample enables researchers to gather information from sections or groups of the population that represent or reflect the opinions or views of that population. A representative sample using probability sampling techniques can provide a more reliable generalization about the population from which the sample has been selected. Neuman (2003, p.210) noted that “the results of a well-designed, carefully executed probability sample will produce results that are equally if not more accurate than trying to reach every single person
With regards to when non-probability sampling techniques should be used, Neuman, (2003, p.213) outlined three situations. First, the researcher can use this method when focusing on special groups of the population. Secondly, it can be used when the researcher wants to employ his/her informative knowledge and experiences about the population. Thirdly, it is used in situations where it is not possible to obtain a sampling frame to select respondents randomly. As this study focused on special groups of people, and there is no complete sampling frame, the researcher adopted non-probability sampling and the use of such sampling is believed to be the most acceptable and viable means to select respondents (De Vaus, 1995).

One of the problems with the sampling frame was that, although some religious institutions, organizations, associations, social and sporting clubs maintain records of their members, they are not sufficiently complete and up-to-date to use as a sampling frame. Secondly, it was noted that many of these migrants are simply reluctant to be members of any organizations. By selecting community and religious representatives from each Horn of African migrant community, the researcher achieved a relatively good representation of the Horn of African migrants.

4.6.2 Purposive/Judgmental and Snowball Sampling

As the name purposive sampling implies, at the initial stages of selecting respondents, using his/her prior knowledge and information, the researcher selected those respondents who best fit the purpose of the study. The selected respondents in turn referred to another person (snowball sampling kick in) until the desired number of respondents was obtained. The pattern of networks (who they refer to) started to spread out of the circle of their close friends,
members of their community, ethnic group or fellow country men to persons from across the Horn of Africa country or community.

The snowball sampling techniques used in this study made a significant contribution to understanding, exploring and investigating the type and nature of social networks that exist within these migrant communities. Neuman (2004) noted that snowball sampling is a multistage sampling technique similar to the analogy of rolling snow, the size of snowball becoming bigger as it rolls on wet snow and picks up additional snow. The problem of using this sampling technique is the unpredictability of individuals selected. In some cases the referred person refused to refer on to other persons. In such cases that line was disconnected and the researcher continued working with those respondents who referred to another potential respondent.

4.7 Distribution of Questionnaires and Characteristics of Respondents

Gathering information through questionnaire survey enables the researcher to reach a large number of respondents over a wide geographical area. The questionnaires were distributed among the Horn of Africa migrants living in different suburbs of Melbourne and Adelaide.

The other problems of using questionnaires to gather information among these migrants were the uncertainty surrounding who actually filled out the questionnaire. With regards to the difficulty and condition under which questionnaires are completed (Neuman, 2000), points out that the researcher has no control over who will complete the questionnaire. It can be completed during get together or meetings by a group of people or someone other than the selected respondents. As the majority of Horn of African migrants live in large families, or shared accommodation with the extended family members, it is likely that family members or other persons may do the questionnaire. In such cases the responses may not necessarily
reflect the opinions and views of the selected respondents. Despite all the shortcomings, 595 questionnaires were distributed among the Horn of African migrants living in the two cities and 411 responses were obtained.

Determining the sample size was a concern and a challenging task. Scholars agree that there is no ready-made answer as to what the sample size should be; however, in studying a heterogeneous population like the Horn of Africa migrants a number of factors, such as the degree of variation in the population, the time and cost needs to be noted in determining the sample size. Furthermore, the larger the sample size, the more reliable and reflective the information will be. With regards to this, Neuman (2000) and Babbie (2001) point out two ways of addressing the question of sample size. One is to make assumptions, or use statistical reports about the population, and the second one is to use past experience that is ‘the rule-of-thumb’. Dooley, (1995, p.139) stated “... in the absence of precise estimates of required sample size and within the constraints noted earlier, most researchers use ‘rule-of-thumb’ guesswork to set sample size”.

Initially, it was planned to distribute one thousand questionnaires among the Horn of Africa migrants living in these two cities. This was to be found unrealistic and impractical, and some 595 questionnaires were distributed and 411 (69 percent) of them were completed and returned. Out of the 411 respondents, three-quarters (314) of them lived in Melbourne and nearly one-quarter (97) in Adelaide.

According to the 2006 Australian census report, out of the 31,014 Horn of African migrants (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudanese) living in Australia, 48.5 percent of them were female and 51.1 percent of them were male. Figure 4.2 shows that the majority of the respondents to the questionnaire (61.7 percent) were males, with females accounting for only
28.3 percent of the total respondents. This was mainly due to a lower level of literacy (higher illiteracy rates) among the Horn of Africa female migrants, which made completing the questionnaire more difficult. Moreover, in some of these migrant communities, for cultural and religious reasons, women rarely appear in public meetings and social (unless religious or family) gatherings. As part of their religious requirements, married women are not allowed to do such minor things without the consent and understanding of the husband. This makes it difficult to reach the housewives of some religious followers and is one reason for the low level of female participation in this survey as indicated in Figure 4.2.

**Figure 4.2 Sex Composition of Respondents by Country of birth**

Source: 2006 survey

Table 4.1 shows that out of the 381 respondents 159 (42 percent) of them are under 30 and 143 (37.5 percent) are between 31 and 40 years, with very few over 50 years. It was noted that of all respondents the Sudanese are found to be youngest and half being under 30 years of age. Contrary to this, two-thirds of Ethiopian respondents are over 31 years of age. Moreover, the majority (nearly 80 percent) of respondents are under 40 years of age, that is, of active working age capable of participating in a wide range of jobs in the Australian labour market.
Table 4.1 Age Composition of Respondents by Country of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Under 30</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, 2006 survey

Figure 4.3 shows that while the majority (69 percent) of respondents were granted entry into Australia under the refugee and humanitarian visa category, 10 percent of them are family members who arrived by family reunion and 11 percent under spouse visa requirements. In total 90 percent of the respondents were refugees and their family members, (69 percent being in refugee/humanitarian and 21 percent in family and spouse visa categories) and only 10 percent of the respondents arrived under student, tourist, skills and business visas.

**Figure 4.3 Entry Visa Category of the Respondents**

Source: 2006 survey

### 4.8 Fieldwork

Fieldwork has been an important part of gathering information in this survey. The researcher spent a total of three and half months undertaking fieldwork to gather information and conducting interviews. During fieldwork, the researcher participated in a range of community activities...
meetings, different religious programs and social events and interacted with community and
religious leaders. With regards to fieldwork (Neuman, 2003, p.364) noted that “fieldwork
research is appropriate when the research question involves learning about, understanding or
describing a group of interaction people”. Participating in such events enabled the researcher
to observe the different kinds of formal and informal social settings and a variety of migrant
social activities and support systems they use. Communicating and socializing with the
respondents removed some of their concern and made them more comfortable to participate in
the survey.

During fieldwork, the Ethiopian Orthodox and protestant churches, Oromo and Sudanese
church leaders and the Somali mosque at Flemington and community leaders of these
migrants, played a positive role in referring respondents and announcing the survey to
members of their community and congregation, and encouraging them to participate in the
study. In addition, the researcher also contacted members of sporting clubs and leaders, NGOs
workers, owners of different businesses such as shops and grocery, beauty and hair salons,
cafés, restaurants and money transferring companies, and gathered their views and opinion
through interviews and questionnaires.

During field work it was noted that while some migrant community associations in
Melbourne have their own office and physical addresses designated within the Adult Migrants
English Language Service (AMELS) building in Footscary, none of these community
associations in Adelaide have such facilities. To contact such community representatives and
their members, the researcher used other community leaders. Community associations run
their activities and programs by volunteers, and are dependent upon small amounts of money
they receive from the government and members’ contributions. In some cases it was difficult
to contact the representatives of some ethnic and community associations, as they were not there despite their office hours being posted on their office and voicemail was not activated to leave a message. Unfortunately, all the attempts made to talk to the representatives of some of the community associations (specifically the pro-Eritrea government, Eritrea community leaders, Harari community leaders and Ogaden Somali community leaders) were not successful because no one was in the office at the scheduled office hours.

4.9 Winning the Trust of Respondent

Traditionally the Horn of Africa migrants are more likely to trust their own family members, community, or people known to them through friends, than someone they meet by chance or on certain occasions. To get the “inside” story about their social networks and remittances, it is very important to win the trust of such a diverse group of migrants. Winning their trust is a challenging exercise that requires personal integrity and understanding of migrant cultures. The researcher’s personal knowledge and understanding of migrant cultures helped to get acceptance among community leaders, elders, pastors and members of the community. Socializing and mingling with influential members of their community and their participation in the survey, encouraged many and created a perception of “our man”. This perception created a conducive atmosphere to approach them and explain the objectives of the study and to get their full support. Such positive sentiments were exhaustively utilized and exploited to gather the “inside story” of migrants’ social networks and remittances, and how these affected their livelihood and the lives of their family in their country of birth. Some of the information they shared was because of the trust and common values which would have been much harder otherwise for “outsiders”. However, being a person from Ethiopia had some drawbacks and negative effects in approaching some sections of the migrant community.
The survey was carried out at a time of political turmoil in the region with the 2005 vote rigging and subsequent election crisis in Ethiopia, and border stand off between Eritrea and Ethiopia on one hand, and Ethiopia’s support the Transitional Government of Somalia were seen by some as an invasion and intervention in the internal affairs of Somalia on the other. Therefore, some migrants became suspicious and unhappy about some of the questions asked and started associating the research with the Ethiopian government and became reluctant to participate in the survey. Unfortunately some misguided individuals (from Somalia, Eritrea and even from Ethiopia) tried to use the researcher’s Ethiopian background to discourage respondents from participating in the research. Through relentless efforts and support from prominent figures in the community, those wrong perceptions were carefully dealt with and handled with great care and integrity. Finally, the researcher convinced those skeptical individuals that the survey was purely for academic purposes and had nothing to do with the researcher’s country of birth.

4.10 Limitations of The Study
At the beginning of this study, it was assumed that there would be difficulties with respect to migrants reading and writing in English and the scattered nature of their settlement which would yield a low response rate. However, as the data gathering process started, some unforeseen problems emerged. As the religion of some of these migrants restricts whom women socialize and communicate with, the number of female participants in the survey was below what was expected at the beginning.

The study of social networks and remittances among unemployed, culturally heterogeneous groups of people with different political and economic backgrounds is a sensitive issue. In addition a few did not know what research actually means and why it is conducted. Others
particularly the unemployed and social welfare recipients were found to be suspicious because they are not working, but at the same time they are engaged in sending money to their relatives. Asking such respondents how much and how often they send money and what their social networks are with those left behind proved to be difficult. Gathering information on such personal and sensitive matters meant that there had to be a high level of trust and a good rapport with highly respected community figures and social group representatives.

4.12 Conclusion

In examining the social networks and the impacts of remittances on remittance receiving family life in the country of birth and household livelihood in the host country, both quantitative and qualitative research approaches have been used. Questionnaires were used to reach as many respondents as possible across residents of the two cities. Interviews were used to supplement the questionnaire and incorporate the views and opinions of those who did not participate in the questionnaire. Mixed methods of data collection techniques were used to allow the weakness of one method to be compensated by the strength of the other. Individuals, households, groups and community leaders were the focus of analysis. Migrants from the Horn of Africa countries are different in their languages, cultures and religions. Irrespective of their personal and social differences, they are close and have reasonable levels of connection at the personal level. They are divided along ethnic and languages line. Their respective community associations are also politicized and influenced by the political situation of their country of birth. The reasons for selecting the two cities as the study area were mainly because of their geographical proximity and the presence of large migrant communities from this region residing there.
CHAPTER V

SOMALI MONEY TRANSFER BUSINESSES IN AUSTRALIA

5.1 Introduction

Somali money transferring businesses are one of the fastest growing money transferring industries in Australia. They have grown from informal and unrecognized part-time businesses operating under the shadow of other family businesses, like grocery stores, cafés and restaurants, or sometimes from the family home. In the last decade, the number of Somali owned money transferring businesses has increased fourfold. Accordingly, they expanded their offices and agents from Melbourne (where they first started businesses) to almost all major Australian cities. Such expansion has significantly increased the remittance collection, transfer and subsequently paying capacity and efficiency of Somali money transferring businesses. They now dominate the flow of remittances from Australia to Africa, particularly to the Horn of Africa countries and are able to compete with multinational money transferring companies like Western Union by getting a greater market share.

Thus, Somali money transferring businesses are playing a formidable role in collecting and transferring million of dollars from African migrants living in Australia back to Africa and beyond. These businesses can be referred to as one of the most successful African refugee stories in Australia. In their country of birth, where civil wars destroyed livelihoods and caused sufferings and impoverishment, the remittances they channeled to the families and national economies of these countries remain the main lifeline and major sources of foreign hard currency (UNDP, 2004; Kapur, 2004). Although the Horn of Africa countries of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Sudan have considerable social unrest and political instability, the magnitude and intensity of the problems are even more severe in Somalia (Markakis, 1994; Terrazas,
The ongoing conflicts and civil wars in Somalia have resulted in a dysfunctional and failed state where all public institutions, infrastructure, basic community services and the livelihood of its people have been destroyed, along with the safety and security of ordinary people (Grosse-Kettler, 2004; Lunn, 2008).

In the face of such instability and political uncertainty, the fate of a million Somalis remains gloomy and the only way to get out of protracted conflict and war is to flee to neighbouring countries or elsewhere. This has forced tens of thousands of Somalis to leave their country of birth and seek refugee and asylum protection in neighbouring countries and beyond (Koser and Van Hear, 2005). As a result, of the estimated 9.1 million Somali population (CIA World Fact Book), 1 to 2 million are estimated to live outside Somalia (Waldo, 2006), and over 174,000 of them live in OECD countries (Hugo, 2009). Hence, Australia remains one of the main destination countries for Somalis.

As stated in Chapter 3, the first groups of Somalia refugee settlers arrived in Australia in 1982 and 1983, 78 percent of them were settled in the city of Melbourne (Batrouney, 1991; Stahl et al, 1993). Following in the footsteps of the first settlers, the majority of new Somali arrivals and settlers continue to settle in Melbourne. Hence, the city of Melbourne remains home for the majority (61 percent) of the Somali population in Australia. The arrival and settlement of large numbers of Somali migrants in Melbourne has created untapped business opportunities. A few Somali entrepreneurs and business minded individuals used the opportunity to start money transferring businesses, first among Somali migrants and then expanding to migrants from other African countries and beyond. As the numbers of African migrants continue to grow in major Australian cities, Somali money transferring companies have expanded their services across Australian cities and towns.
This chapter will examine how Somali owned money transferring businesses started in Australia, particularly in the cities of Adelaide and Melbourne, with some discussion of their estimated annual remittance turnover and income from service charges. The recipients of remittances will also be considered. Furthermore, it also explores the historical links between the first arrivals and the settlement of refugee and humanitarian migrants in the city of Melbourne and the start of the remittance businesses in that city.

5.2 Background Information on Somali Money Transferring Businesses

There are two views as to when and how Somali money transferring businesses began. The first view believe that the practice of collecting money from Somali migrants started in the 19th and 20th centuries when seafarers, Second World War veterans, merchants living in Arab countries and students (who did not return to their country after their study) sent money to their families in Somalia, through travellers and merchants. At this time those who collected and transferred money did not charge the senders or the receivers (Hamza, 2006; Waldo 2006). The business that started in Somalia then spread out and expanded to the rest of the world, including Australia. The second view believe that the current form of Somali money transferring businesses started through the “franco valuta” import and export system in the 1970s and 1980s, and eventually transformed into a trust based “hawala” system. According to this view, the business of transferring money from abroad to Somalia was first started by Somalia merchants and traders who wanted to import goods from Arab countries to Somalia (Horst, 2001; Grosse-Kettler, 2004).

The “franco valuta” system is a system where traders import goods from abroad without having proper sources of foreign hard currency (Lindley, 2005; Van Hear, 2005). Under this system merchants collected money from Somali migrant workers who wanted to send money
to their families. When Somalia merchants first started the services of transferring money from the Arab and the Middle East countries to Somalia, it was intended to overcome the problem they faced to access foreign hard currency to import goods to Somalia. At this stage Somali traders simply collected money from Somali migrants living and working in the Gulf and Middle East countries who wanted to send money to their families. With this money they could buy goods that are imported to Somalia. The merchants paid the migrants’ family in Somalia in local currency. At this time service charges were not part of their business goals and activities in their own rights (Horst, 2001; Lindley, 2006; Hamza, 2006).

The current form of Somali money transferring business got its momentum after the collapse of the Somali central government in 1990, and the spread of Somali refugees and other humanitarian migrants to western countries such as Australia (Horst, 2001; Hamza 2006). As Somali and other Horn of Africa migrants continued to settle in Australia, those Somalis who were already involved in the business of transferring money engaged in expanding and diversifying the source of their remittances from Middle Eastern and Arab countries to Australia.

The start and expansion of Somali money transferring businesses in Australia is attributed partly to the scattered settlement of their community. To setup and expand businesses in Australia, the Somali entrepreneurs depended on their strong social networks, trust and the refugee community. By cooperating with small family owned businesses and assigning their clan members as agents, Somali money transferring entrepreneurs were able to expand their services across major Australian cities and towns. This enabled them to be efficient and run their business at minimum cost and provide cheap and fast services. Their ability to provide reliable services in conflict prone countries and remote areas (including refugee camps) made
them formidable companies in transferring money from Australia to Horn of Africa countries and beyond.

5.3 The Start of the Somali Money Transferring Business in Australia

The migration and settlement of Somalis in Australia in general and their concentration in the city of Melbourne in particular, created the opportunity to run money transferring businesses. Initially the services were intended to provide remittance services from Somalis living in Australia to their families stranded in a precarious situation in Somalia. As the socio-economic and political conditions of the Horn of Africa countries, particularly Somalia, got worse, and a large number of people continued to flee their own country of birth and seek refuge in neighbouring countries, with some given resettlement opportunities in Australia and other OECD countries. While those who settled in different Australian cities continued to support their family, those left behind also expected support from their relatives in Australia. Hence, remittance services providers expanded their services from Somalis in Melbourne and Sydney to other Horn of Africa migrant communities living in Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth, Sydney and Hobart.

Somali money transferring agents were not willing to give information about their company business practices prior to their engagement with the company. They simply preferred to say “yes, there were people who used to send money to Somalia before we started this business”. It was not clear why the agents did not want to discuss the past business practices of their company. However, information gathered from longer term residents who used remittance services revealed that the transfer of money from Australia to Somalia and later to the other Horn of African countries (excluding Eritrea), started in the late 1980s after many Horn of Africa refugee migrants settled in Melbourne.
Many Somali money transferring businesses operating in Australia are family owned subsidiary business or agents. For legal, personal and business reasons, the owners are reluctant to give information on when and how they first started their remittance business in Australia. This was due to high agent turnover, reluctance to reveal the secret of their family business, suspicion, for legal, personal and business reasons. As many of these businesses were started informally, some have only poorly maintained records of their business. Information on how and when the Somali money transferring businesses started operating in Australia was collected from long term Somali migrants who arrived as refugees in 1985, and have used the service since its beginning.

In some cases the information obtained from Somali money transferring agents was incomplete and patchy. This is partly due to almost all Somali owned money transferring businesses being agents or subsidiaries of the mother companies in Dubai, or Hargessa in Somaliland, and in most cases they run remittance businesses alongside their family businesses or as supplementary businesses and have little information about the history of the company. The persons interviewed recalled that they had been sending money to their families in Somali through some Somali money transferring agents in Melbourne since late 1985. As some Somali money transferring companies are banned or not in business today, the interviewee did not want to give detailed information about the businesses or agents involved in collecting and sending money.

The information obtained from long-term Somali residents revealed that, the service of transferring money from Australia to Somalia was first provided by individuals who worked as agents of the Al-Barakat bank. Before it was outlawed and its capital was frozen in Australia and elsewhere in connection with the September 11 terrorist attack, Al-Barakat was
one of a few successful Somali owned banks that provided banking and remittance services across the world (Grosse-Kettler, 2004, Lindley, 2005). Through its agents and business partners it transferred money from Australia, specifically from Melbourne, to Somalia and other neighboring countries in the region (Van Hear, 2000; Lindley, 2006; Hamza, 2006; Waldo 2006). Apart from the patchy information gathered from longer term Somali residents through interview, it was found that the agents working for some of these money transferring companies were reluctant to be interviewed and to give any information pertaining to the establishment and operation of money transferring businesses before they got a license. Whether those businesses and the individuals involved in transferring money at the time are still operating is unknown.

5.4 Characteristics of Somali Money Transferring Service Providers

The Somali money transferring companies operating in the cities of Adelaide and Melbourne have some common characteristics but vary greatly in terms of their size, organizational setup, area of operation, and age. While some of them are new, others have been in the business for many years, and operate only from Melbourne; others are large and have multiple agents across major Australian cities and towns and provide remittance services to many African countries and beyond. While a few of them have disappeared and gone out of business for different reasons, others have been transformed from sole proprietorship and family owned businesses to a registered Pty Ltd or share company, and have expanded their services across the world.

The numbers of Somali money transferring companies vary from city to city. In Adelaide and Melbourne alone there are over ten ethnic Somali owned or affiliated money transferring companies the most popular of which include Dahabshiil, Amal Express, Al-Mustaqbal,
Global Express, Kaah Express, Qaran Express, Olmpyic express, Tawakal Express, Hodan Global and Amana Express. While all of these money transferring companies had offices and a few agents in different suburbs in Melbourne, only Dahabshiil, Amal Express, Kaah Express, later on Qaran and Olmpyic express, opened agencies in Adelaide. Although, it is difficult to make any general statements about the business dealings, size, and area of their service coverage, most of these companies are family owned small businesses controlled by ethnic Somalis. Interestingly, 99 percent of agents and business partners of these money transferring companies are also ethnic Somalis. The head offices of most of these companies are in Dubai. In Australia almost all of them first started their business in Melbourne and they still run and control their agents and subsidiaries from Melbourne offices.

From the information gathered from both agents and migrants, it became clear that Somali money transferring companies are reliable and trusted remittance service providers to those who want to send money to cities, rural and remote area. In order to get a general view of how they operate, two well known Somali money transferring companies, Dahabshiil Pty Ltd and Amal express, are taken as examples. To minimize business set up costs or reduce their overhead and administrative expenses, Somali money transferring companies work with or rely upon already setup Somali family owned businesses. Working with already established family businesses enables them to reduce business setup and administrative costs and easily expand their business across major Australian cities.

Today the two Somali money transferring companies namely Dahabshiil Pty Ltd and Amal express have agents and business partners in Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Sydney and Perth. These two money transferring companies have more than ten agents and remittance collecting sites, or businesses partners, in Melbourne and Adelaide alone. While many Somali
money transferring companies have uniform and centralized management systems, a few of them have different (decentralized) management systems for different agents. When most of them operate their remittance businesses alongside another business such as a shop, café, grocery, restaurant, deli or cosmetic shop, a few of them provide only a remittance business.

5.5 The Registration and Operation of Somali Money Transferring Service

At the time Somali money transferring businesses started in Australia in the late 1980s, the current strict financial regulations that control the inflow and outflow of large sums of money were not in place, and running an unregistered financial business was relatively easy. After the September 11 terrorist attack, Australia introduced strict financial regulations that require all formal and informal money transferring businesses to comply with its newly developed financial regulation. Somali money transferring businesses started informally and without paying due attention to obtaining a license and the reporting requirements of their business transactions to AUSTRAC (www.austract.gov.au viewed in Aug. 2009).

The existing Australian government financial regulations put in place to control unlawful and suspicious business transactions are very tight. It requires all money transferring companies to register their business and report suspicious transactions and all their daily financial transactions to AUSTRAC online. AUSTRAC is an Australian government financial intelligence unit that reports all suspicious transactions from or to Australia to the Australia government (www.austract.gov.au). Information gathered from Somali money transferring agents shows that to run remittance businesses they are required to register their business, obtain a license and enter contractual agreements and comply with the Australian government financial regulations act. As part of the agreement they all collect and register personal
information such as the names, addresses and contact numbers of both the senders and the receivers.

In response to the growing pressure of financial regulations, and to comply with the Australian government regulations, a group of Somali money transferring companies formed Somali Financial Services Association (SFSA) in 2003, and in June 2006 Amal Express, Al-Mustaqbal, Dahabshiil, Global, Qaran Express and Sahan Express also formed the Somali Money Transferring Association (SOMTA). The Association was formed in order to make their businesses more transparent, legitimate and accountable. Its objective, as stated on its website, is to make the Somali remittance business safe and free from criminals and money launderers, by observing the strict financial regulations of the countries they operate in. The association also requires its members to comply with legal requirements such as registration, licensing and audit by independent companies (http://mirror.undp.org/somalia/presssfs.htm; viewed in Oct. 2008; www.somta.org viewed in Sept. 2008).

Somali money transferring business started in Melbourne and this remained the hub of Somali remittances businesses. The start of Somali money transferring businesses in Adelaide is part of the overall expansion and growth of Somali money transferring businesses in Australia. Amal Express was the first Somali money transferring company to register its business, in Melbourne in May 1999. Dahabshiil the largest Somali money transferring company registered its business in Melbourne in April 2002. The information obtained from long-term Somali residents in Melbourne, however, confirmed that these companies were in business long before they registered their businesses and obtained licenses.

In Adelaide Somali money transferring companies started providing their services after they had operated for over a decade in Melbourne. Kaah Express was the first to open its Adelaide
branch informally in 2000. Like all other Somali money transferring businesses, it started before being officially registered and licensed. After two years of informal operation, Kaah Express registered its Adelaide branch in October 2002 and continued its business from home until late 2004. Amal Express was the second to open its remittances business in Adelaide and it received its license from the government of South Australia in November, 2004. From the start, Amal Express operated its business from designated business premises in the city centre and it did not run any other business alongside the remittance service.

Despite its size, popularity and the number of agents it has in Australia and across the world, Dahabshiil opened its Adelaide branch in July 2005 in the city centre, close to the Migrant Resource Centre (MRC), an easily accessible and convenient location for new arrivals. Unlike the other two Somali money transferring companies, Dahabshiil started its Adelaide operation with the license and registration it obtained from the Victorian government. In addition Qaran Express, Olympic Express, and Hodan Global opened their Adelaide branches, so that the number of Somali owned and affiliated money transferring companies in Adelaide increased from two in 2004 to six in 2009.

Many Somali money transferring companies use or receive orders by telephone, internet and through social networks. When a client wants to send money to a friend or family member, they first make the deposit in their nominated agent bank account, then call agent to give detailed information about the receiver (the payee). The agent in Australia transfers this information to the head office in Dubai or Hargesa, Somaliland, after they have confirmed the deposited amount online or have received a deposit slip. The head office immediately transfers the information to the remittance paying agent in the receiving country who then notifies the receiver, with the payment being made within the same day.
As the Somali money transferring companies continue to open branches in Adelaide, the competition to attract more customers has become very intense. After Dahabshiil opened its branch close to Amal express in the city, Amal Express opened another remittance collection site in the western suburbs by collaborating with an Eritrean family owned grocery. This site targeted those individuals who for some reason cannot or do not want to go to the city. Noting the impacts of Amal Express’s expansion on their business, Dahabshiil entered into a similar agreement with another Eritrean shop owner. By working and partnering their businesses with other migrant groups (non-Somali ethnic groups) these two companies were the first to pioneer a new way of doing business. Moreover, the two Eritrean family shops working with them were the first non-ethnic Somali agents working in Adelaide.

5.6 Somali Money Transferring Companies’ Estimated Annual Turnover

The annual remittance turnover of Somali money transferring companies varies from company to company. The amount of money they transfer and their earnings from service charges and commission fees depends on a number of factors such as the level of trust, speed of transfer, amount of service and commission fees, the employment status of remittance sending migrants, the number of countries they operate in, and their coverage in the remittance receiving countries (the more countries they operate in the more customers they can service). They provide remittance services in major cities, small country towns and remote refugee camps. This enables them to serve both those who want to send money to families in big cities, as well as those in rural and remote area (including refugee camps) where formal financial institutions do not operate (Waldo, 2006). As shown in Table 5.1, Somali money transferring companies are leading multinational money transferring companies, such as Western Union, Thomas Cook and MoneyGram, in collecting money from Horn of Africa.
migrants living in Australia and channeling it to countries in the Horn region. Of the total number of Horn of Africa migrants living in the two cities, 48 percent send money through Somali money transferring companies and 38.1 percent through Western Union.

The amount of money each Somali money transferring company collects from the Horn of Africa migrants and transfers to countries in the region varies from month to month, and from company to company. Migrants send more in months when there are national, religious or special family events are celebrated than in others. Among Somali money transferring companies operating in the two cities, Dahabshiil and Amal Express are the biggest as they have more remittance collecting agents than their counterparts. Accordingly, their estimated annual income from service charges and commission is believed to be more.

The peak sending periods were found to be during New Year, Christmas, Easter, “Idi” or during the customary wedding seasons, usually after farmers have harvested their crops. On average during these times a Somali money transferring company in Melbourne remits between Aus$150,000 and Aus$200,000 a week, and in Adelaide between Aus$70,000 and Aus$80,000 a week. The reason for the amount of remittance being higher in Melbourne is because Melbourne has about four times as many migrants from this region as Adelaide.

Table 5.1 Market Share of Somali and Multinational Money Transferring Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Money Transferring Companies</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somali money transferring companies</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Union</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Cook &amp; MoneyGram</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawala (Bank to Bank transfer)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey
Based on the total weekly Somali money transferring companies’ remittance data, it is estimated that a transfer of between 57 to 64 million Australian dollars takes place from the Horn of Africa migrants living in Australia to their respective countries of origin. The above estimates of total annual remittances were calculated based on the assumption that each of the eight Somali money transferring companies has two agents (actually some of them have more than two agents). The eight Somali money transferring companies have a total of sixteen agents and each agent on average collects an estimated Aus$75,000 to 83,500 a week. To estimate the total amount of remittance these companies transfer from Australia to countries in the region, the calculation was based not on the amount of money they collect during peak periods but rather on the average amount they collect each week. The sixteen agents in Adelaide and Melbourne collect an estimated amount of Aus$1.20 million to Aus$1.33 million a week and between Aus$4.8 million to Aus$5.34 million a month. The eight Somali money transferring companies transfer an estimated amount of between Aus$57 million and Aus$64 million a year and earned an estimated annual income of 3.4 to 4.1 million Australian dollars from service charges and commission fees. This would be much higher (increase by half) if the estimate includes peak period remittances, and the amount Eritrean and other migrants send to their families through multinational money transferring companies, travellers, non-ethnic Somalis money transferring companies, and bank to bank transfers.

5.7 Somali Money Transferring Companies Service Charge

The Horn of Africa migrants are well aware of the service charges of different service providers. To maximize the amount of money their family will receive, most migrants sought information on the service charges and the exchange rates of each service provider before sending money. Due to differences in exchange rates, the extra three or four dollars they save
in this way could, for example, cover a child’s school fees, be used to visit a local health
centre or buy stationary for students. Table 5.2 shows that the service charge, and the
availability and proximity of the service, are found to be the two most important factors that
influence the decision about which money transferring companies to use. Accordingly, 38.4
percent of the migrants surveyed gave service charge as the most important consideration
when selecting a money transferring agent. As many migrants send money to families and
friends in remote areas (including refugee camps and small country towns) 21.2 percent
considered the proximity and availability of the service, while reliability and speedy transfer is
generally seen as slightly less important.

Table 5.2 Reasons for Choosing Particular Remittance Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for using the service</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheaper service charge</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability and security</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of communication</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity and availability of service</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:-2006 Survey

To maximize the amount of money their families receive and avoid the service charges
altogether, migrants prefer to send Australian or US dollars to their families through travellers.
This not only enables the sender to save the service charge and agent’s commission fees, but
also allows the family to receive money in dollars (foreign currency) and which they often sell
on the black market, thus gaining more in local currency than they would receive through a
bank or money transferring agent. For instance, if an Eritrean person in Adelaide or
Melbourne sends Aus$100 to his/her family through Western Union or Himbol Financial
Service (Eritrean government owned money transferring company), they receive 1800 Nakifa
(Eritrean local currency). However, if the migrants send the money through travellers or another informal channel, the family will receive close to 3,000 Nakifa.

Despite a very slight difference in their exchange rates, almost all Somali money transferring companies’ service charges and commission fees are similar. Although almost all claim that their service charge is five percent of the total amount remitted, at time when the Australia dollar is worth less than the US dollar, they actually charge more than this. However, at the time the Australian dollar worth more than the US, they pay less. Because their international transactions are usually made in US dollars, they calculate the five percent service charge in US dollars. Due to differences in exchange rates (Australia vs. US dollar) and the extra Aus$5 service charge, customers actually pay more than 5 percent. When the Aus$5 agent’s commission fees are included, those who send small amounts actually pay around 7.5 percent of the total amount of the money they send (see appendix 1 for the detail on how Somali money transferring companies calculate their service charge).

Like multinational money transferring companies, Somali money transferring companies decrease the service charge as the amount remitted increases (UNDP, 2004). In addition to the service charge calculated on the total amount of money being sent, almost all Somali money transferring company agents collect a fixed amount of agents’ commission of Aus$5 per transaction. For example, if a person wants to send Aus$400 dollars to two different individuals in separate transactions, the agent collects a total of Aus$10 commission. If however a person sends the Aus$400 in one transaction, he/she will only pay Aus$5 commission fee. The rationale for this charge is to minimize the risk of exchange rate fluctuations and to cover overhead costs. The service charges collected from senders are distributed as follows: while 30 percent of the service charge plus the 5 dollar agents’
commission goes to the agent in the sending country, 30 per cent of the service charge goes to
the paying agent in the receiving country and the remaining 40 percent goes to the mother
company for research and development and to cover administration costs.

During Christmas, Easter, Edi, and New Year many migrants send money to more than one
family and to friends. To encourage migrants to send more, some Somali money transferring
companies offer significant discounts on their service charge at these times. For instance,
Dahabshiil and Amal Express reduce their service charge to 4 percent for small amounts and 3
percent for larger transactions. This special service charge discount applies to all migrants and
the offer often begins one week before and ends one week after such holidays. When the agent
of Amal Express was asked how his company was able to provide cheap and fast transfers,
including those to remote areas, he said “the spread of Somali people across the world is a big
resource to run our business”. The spread of Somalis across the Horn of African countries and
major Australian cities enables these companies to provide, fast, efficient and low cost
remittance services to all who want to send to cities, country towns and remote areas.

5.8 Who Uses Somali Money Transferring Services and Where to Send?

After the collapse of the Somalia central government in 1991, Somali remittance companies
have been the only functioning financial service operating in Somalia. Their commitment and
experience in providing a reliable and fast remittance service in a volatile and insecure country
remains the lifeline to millions of Somalis stranded in cities, country towns and remote rural
areas where there are no financial institutions (Chalmlers and Hassan, 2008). The services of
Somali money transferring companies are not limited to migrants who want to send a few
hundred dollars to families, but are also used by international NGOs, and UN agencies
operating in Somalia to send money to their field offices (Lindley, 2005; Osman, 2006).
Somali services are open to all individuals, businesses and organizations who want to send money from Australia to countries in the Horn region (except for Eritrea), and to many other African and Asian countries. The largest of the Somali money transferring companies, Dabishiil operates in 144 countries and had 24,000 agents worldwide (www.dabishiil.com viewed in March 2008). The second largest, Amal-Express, has around 450 agents (www.amal-express.com viewed in March 2008). In Africa, Somali money transferring companies have remittance payment outlets in almost all regions of the continent: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. In Asia they have outlets in Bangladesh, India, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Singapore, Sir Lanka, and Yemen. They also have offices in many remittance collecting countries in Europe, including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK, as well as in North America, Australia, New Zealand and the Middle East, including Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to this, through their business partners, they provide remittance services in countries which do not have their own agents or representatives.

5.9 The Employment Opportunities for Somali migrants

Somali money transferring companies are highly cost efficient. They have simple, clear and straightforward business partnerships with their agents. Each agent works as an independent contractor, not as an employee of the mother company. Each agent or branch office in Australia is responsible for generating its own income and thereby covering its running costs. There is no budget allocated by the mother company to keep each agent in business. It is therefore the responsibility of the agent to run their business at minimum cost and manpower.
Often they do not employ staff to run their business, as they partner with already established family businesses or clan members. In most cases, agents employ one or two multilingual migrants during peak periods to attract customers and make communication easier. These are often Somali migrants who can speak the clients’ languages such as Dinka, Amharic or Arabic.

In this way they are able to reduce their running costs and deliver an efficient and effective service, not only in urban settings as multinational money transferring companies do, but also in remote areas and in refugee camps. The main reason why the companies prefer to work with people from their own ethnic group is the strong social bond and trust that is embedded in their culture, kinship and clan system. One of the agents describes the importance of working with people from his clan as follows:

“When your work is related to money, you need some level of trust that exceed ordinary one. The trust that will go far beyond giving and receiving money, something that ties you together, a bond that can force you to uphold family and clan value and norms”.

With the exception of a couple of cases, all Somali money transferring companies’ agents and branch representatives are ethnic Somalis. A few migrants/individuals of other ethnicity are now setting up businesses to join this lucrative market, thus heralding an imminent threat to Somalis as the dominant remittance service providers in the region. The onset of a few non-ethnic Somali money transferring companies to provide remittance services prompted a handful of Somali money transferring companies, like Dahabshiil and Amal-Express, to change the way they did business by incorporating agents from other countries (non Somalis).

As almost all Somali money transferring companies partner their business with owners of small businesses or independent contractors, the employment opportunities this industry has created in Australia is negligible and should not be expected to reduce the chronic
unemployment problems these migrants face. As the findings of this study reveal (Chapter six) the unemployment rates of Somali migrants residing in the city of Adelaide and Melbourne are around 23.3 percent. Although Somali money transferring agents are major employers in Somalia and other remittance receiving countries in the region (Lindley, 2006; Chalmers and Hassan, 2008), this is not the case for Somali migrants in Australia.

5.10 The Rise of the Non-Ethnic Somali Money Transferring Service

Though they are in their infancy and by no means developed to the scale and magnitude of competing with multinational and Somali money transferring companies, there is evidence of emerging non-ethnic Somali money transferring businesses transferring money to their respective countries. These emerging businesses have already set up in Melbourne and started providing services to migrants from their countries. Some migrants who were already engaged in the business of importing goods such as clothes, spices, cosmetics, handicrafts, CDs, DVDs, beer and other items from this region, also provide an informal money transferring service. Some travel agents such as the Ethiopian owned “Africa Tour Travel Agent”, which specializes in selling air tickets to those who want to travel to countries in the region, also provide money transferring services at a competitive rate, particularly to Ethiopia.

The setup and expansion of this kind of business is likely to have a long term detrimental effect in reducing the market share and monopoly of Somali money transferring businesses. This depends however on the competitiveness of these businesses to provide a fast and reliable service. The Somali money transferring companies have a good reputation, broad networks and the trust of their customers. They also have a good track record in delivering fast and cheap services in rural and unsecured remote areas. Competing with them might not be an easy venture in the short-term. The rise and expansion of non-ethnic Somali money
transferring businesses presents an opportunity for clients to bargain for faster and cheaper services.

An interesting point that emerged from this study is that none of the Somali money transferring companies operating from Melbourne and Adelaide has an agent in Eritrea. This is because it is the policy of the Eritrean government not to allow Somali money transferring companies to operate inside Eritrea. Anyone who wants to send money to Eritrea can do so either through multinational money transferring companies, such as Western Union, or through the Eritrean government owned and controlled Himbol Financial Services (HFS). Himbol is the name of a place which was significant in the Eritrean peoples’ struggle for independence. No convincing reason for this was obtained from the interviewed Somali money transferring agents, who merely stated “the Eritrean government does not allow us to operate in Eritrea”. The fact that only a very few foreign money transferring companies are working in Eritrea appears to be contrary to the Eritrean government view on the contribution of the Eritrean diaspora to the reconstruction and development of the country. All foreign money transferring companies operating there are obliged to work either with the HFS or with local banks. HFS has representatives in major Australian cities. As the interviewed Eritrean migrants noted, this service works in cooperation with the Eritrean diplomatic representative in Melbourne. In collaboration with the American based TMT money transferring company, HFS also provides an online service in cities where they do not have a representative, and to those who prefer to send money online ([www.ertra.com/tmt/order.htm](http://www.ertra.com/tmt/order.htm), [www.shabait.com](http://www.shabait.com) viewed Dec. 2007).

Customers using Himbol’s online service do not pay any service charge, other than three percent credit card processing and handling costs. Despite the low service charge, however,
many Eritrea migrants do not use HFS. This is mainly because their exchange rate is lower than that of other informal service providers. By providing remittance services to their expatriate community, the Eritrean government taps millions of dollars’ worth of foreign currency directly from senders, which would otherwise be collected by service providers, such as Western Union or Somali money transferring companies. The lower exchange rate of HFS and the higher service charges of multinational money transferring companies, like Western Union, push many Eritrean migrants to use informal and underground money transferring service providers.

5.11 Conclusion

The initial settlement of Somali and Ethiopian refugee migrants in Melbourne has influenced the more recent flows of Horn of Africa migrants to select this city as their home. The concentration of these migrants in one city created an opportunity for some business minded Somali migrants to set up remittance businesses there, initially to transfer money from Australia to Somalia. As the number of Somalis and other Horn of Africa migrants increased in number, the Somali money transferring businesses gained momentum and spread to the other Australian capital cities of Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth, and Sydney, and to all the countries of the Horn of Africa, except Eritrea for reasons given above. Today Somali companies are transferring millions of dollars from Australia to the Horn of Africa. The provision of services in remote areas, including refugee camps and regions of conflict, and their fast and reliable service and competitive service charges, have empowered Somali money transferring companies to compete successfully with multinational money transferring companies in these countries, and thereby exceed the market share of these companies.
CHAPTER VI

IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON SENDERS AND RECEIVERS

6.1 Introduction

There is increasing evidence that remittances can play a significant role in development in migrant sending countries (World Bank, 2008). In countries like Somalia where there are ongoing conflicts, instability and social unrest, remittances are the lifeline of families and the major source of family income, and of foreign hard currency to the national economy of the countries. They are also one of the most important tools these migrants use to influence the socio-economic and political landscape of their country of birth (Van Hear, 2003; Lindley, 2006). Similarly, the findings of this study also show that significant numbers of the Horn of African migrants send money to maintain their social networks, support their families and friends, generate foreign hard currency to the economy of their country of birth and finance the activities of opposition political parties or liberation movements in influencing the political landscape of their country of birth.

Australia has a long history of planned intake of refugees, including both humanitarian and skilled migrants. In the past decades or so, Australia has significantly increased its refugee and humanitarian migrant intake from Africa. Despite large scale immigration of Africans, and Australia’s increase in the intake of refugees and humanitarian migrants from the Horn of Africa countries (particularly the Sudan and Ethiopia) there has been limited research and information about the roles refugee and humanitarian migrants play in the socio-economic situation of their country of birth. Accordingly, little is known about remittances to their country of birth the amount they send to support their families, and how much foreign hard currency they generate to the national economy of their country of birth.
The Australian financial intelligence unit, the Australian Transaction Reporting and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) was established in 1989 to develop financial regulation and oversee Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter Terrorism Financing (CFT) activities, and ensure Australian businesses and the wider Australian community understands and complies with the legislation. AUSTRAC requires all businesses, including financial and money transferring businesses to maintain records of customer identification, report their business activities and suspicious business transactions and encourage transparent business activities. AUSTRAC gathers information on the movement of cash and other forms of payment to and from Australia. This is intended mainly to protect businesses and the wider Australian community from the harmful effects of money laundering and terrorist activities (www.austrac.gov.au).

Although Australia has a good track record in maintaining the inflow and outflow of financial transactions to and from Australia, little is known about how much of the financial outflow is generated by refugee and humanitarian migrants, and what percentage of this financial outflow from Australia is channeled to the Horn of Africa countries. Moreover, little is known about the socio-economic and political contribution of remittances generated by refugee and humanitarian migrants (www.austrac.gov.au viewed in Aug. 2009).

The survey conducted among the Horn of Africa migrants with refugee and humanitarian backgrounds generated information on how much they send, how often and for what purpose. This chapter therefore analyses the amount of remittances the Horn of Africa migrants living in the two cities (Adelaide and Melbourne) send to their families and friends in origin and asylum countries. It attempts to answer the following questions. How sending money does affect the lives and livelihoods of both remittance sending and receiving families. What are the short and long term impacts of remittance on human resources (health and education)
development? What are the motives or purpose of sending? How do remittances help to maintain social networks and how are they used by remittance receiving families. In addition, this chapter also focuses on how these migrants afford to send money while they are unemployed and dependent on the social welfare system. Which group of migrants (married, single, those with family left behind or the young) send more and why? How do these migrants use their remittance money to influence the socio-economic and political situation of their countries of origin.

6.2 Remittance from Australia to Horn of Africa Countries

While large migrant communities send large sums of money from Australia to their country of birth, Australia has also received billions of dollars from its migrants and businesses. Table 6.1 shows that in the past decade (between 2000 and 2010), while immigrants sent a total of over 21 billion US dollars from Australia to their respective countries, Australian migrants and businesses from around the world also channeled over 33 billion US dollars to Australia. Despite large scale immigration and growing numbers of migrants in Australia, the amount of financial inflow including remittances is bigger than the outflow. As shown in Table 6.1, although there were no available data on the inflow and outflow of financial transactions for Eritrea and Somalia, it is evident that between 2000 and 2010, Ethiopia and the Sudan have received a total of 2.1 and 18.2 billion US dollar from around the world (World Bank remittance fact book) (www.worldbank.org/data viewed in Feb. 2009). The problem with the above data, however, is that it is too general and it does not tell how much or what percentage of the total outflow of financial transactions from Australia is channeled to the countries in the region or what percentage was generated by the Horn of Africa migrants living in Australia.
Furthermore, Table 6.1 shows that most data on the outflow of financial transaction relates only to the total amount of remittances migrants send to their families in origin or asylum countries, with little or no attention to who the senders are (economic, skilled or refugee and humanitarian migrants) (Van Hear, 2003; Maimbo, 2006). The ongoing conflict, civil war and social unrest in most of the countries in the region has affected the way financial institutions operate, resulting in a lack of reliable data. The ongoing civil wars, instabilities and dysfunction of public services and infrastructure in some of the Horn of Africa countries cause serious security problems that force private financial service providers to operate their businesses in uncontrolled and informal ways. In such situations, obtaining reliable data is extremely difficult. This made it difficult to identify the exact amount of money the Horn of African migrants send from Australia to their country of birth.

The growing numbers of Somali and other money transferring businesses owned by migrants plus the presence of multinational money transferring companies, indicate the existence of the outflow of large sums of money from Australia to the Horn of African countries. Nonetheless, little is known about how much the Horn of Africa refugee and humanitarian migrants living in Australia send to their country of birth every year, their roles and contributions in fighting poverty, how much they donated or contributed to opposition political parties, liberation movements or to the development of basic community infrastructure like schools or clinics.
Table 6.1 In and Outflow of Financial Transactions From and To These Countries

NOTE:
This figure/table/image has been removed to comply with copyright regulations. It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.


It is believed that a lack of such detailed information is partly due to the Horn of African migrants being relatively small in number and from refugee and humanitarian backgrounds, therefore being perceived as poor and powerless to send money to their families and friends. Contrary to this perception however, this study found that, the Horn of Africa migrants send money to those family and friends left in origin and asylum countries. As Sander, (2003) noted, the other problem in identifying the backgrounds of the sender as refugee, economic or skilled migrants, is that remittances are often reported as an aggregate sum with little emphasis on the background of the senders making it difficult to distinguish refugee and humanitarian migrants’ remittances from others.
6.3 Remittances from Refugee/Humanitarian Migrants

Although Australia’s immigration policy favours the migration and settlement of skilled migrants, Australia has also welcomed and settled large numbers of refugee and humanitarian migrants from the Horn of Africa countries (Hugo 2009; DIAC, 2009). This survey found that 69 percent of the respondents were admitted under the refugee and humanitarian visa program and 21 percent were spouse and other family members. Hence, refugee and humanitarian migrants and their family members generate nearly 98 percent of the total remittance transferred from Australia to the Horn of Africa countries. The majority of these migrants send money to asylum and origin countries where their families and friends are left behind.

The survey found that the Horn of Africa countries once known for producing refugee and humanitarian migrants and causing enormous suffering on their own people, now depend on refugee migrants for their foreign hard currency needs. Lack of foreign hard currency caused by a decline in exports forced the government of some of these countries to incorporate the remittance they receive from their migrants in their annual budget as an alternative source of income. For instance, in 2005 the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments developed new policies, directives and incentives to encourage, facilitate and ensure the smooth flow of foreign hard currency from their diaspora community to their families in their country of birth (Ethiopian government foreign minister directive). Some of these countries even went to the extent of estimating their annual remittance earnings and incorporated remittance in their annual foreign hard currency earning plan (www.nbe.gov.et viewed in Jan. 2008; www.shabait.com viewed Dec. 2007).
The survey found that many of the immigrants arrive with moral obligations, as well as personal and social responsibilities to support and assist those left behind. The amount of money and the frequency of remittances vary depending on the type of family left behind, immediate family versus extended family and where they live (country of birth versus asylum country). Due to a lack of marketable skills, English language proficiency and Australian work experience, unemployment among these migrants is high. It is believed that such interrelated factors have created a perception that migrants with refugee backgrounds are too poor to send money to their families (Koser and Van Hear, 2003; Maimbo, 2006). The findings of this study however, found the opposite. As shown in Figure 6.1, 86 percent of these migrants send money to those left behind. The questions that need to be asked here are as follows. What is the employment status of these migrants? Did those migrants who send money to family and friends have jobs and their own sources of income? If not where did this money come from? The remaining section of this chapter will focus on the examination, analysis and discussion of these and related issues.

**Figure 6.1 Migrants who Send Money to Support their Families and Friends**

![Pie chart showing 86% Yes and 14% No]

Source: 2006 survey

Besides sending their own money, these migrants also send money back after selling items their friends and family send for sale here. Table 6.2 shows that nearly one-third of the respondents confirmed that they send money after selling items they receive from family and
friends such as *Khat*, home made spices or traditional and cultural dresses. Many of these imported items are in high demand and consumed among their community and are not found in local markets. Of all Horn of Africa migrants 16.3 percent of Eritreans often sell items they receive, while 27.7 percent of Sudanese and 25.4 percent of Somalis did so sometimes. Indeed, Ethiopians are the least likely to do so.

**Table 6.2 Frequency of Sending Money after Selling Items by Country of Birth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did you send money by selling imported items</th>
<th>Country of birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes very often</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, sometimes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, Not at all</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2006 survey

The employment status of the Horn of Africa migrants varies significantly. As shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, it was noted that the employment status of these migrants varies depending on their individual circumstances, years of arrival (length of residency), pre and post arrival levels of education and most importantly where they came from (country of birth). Table 6.3 shows that the employment status of the Horn of Africa migrants improved with length of residence. Accordingly, those who arrived prior to 1985 have higher employment rates. It is believed that with length of residence their English language skills have improved and they are able to attend short term training courses to acquire skills. Unemployment rates among new arrivals are shown to be very high.

With regard to the employment of migrants, (Hugo, 2009) noted that the employment of longer-term residents improves over-time as their English language skills get better. Likewise, the findings of this survey show that, while the unemployment of pre 2000 arrivals is low,
over one-third of those who arrived here between 2001 and 2006 are students studying mainly English language. Despite the low national unemployment rate at the time of this survey, 18 percent of the Horn of African migrants were unemployed. When compared with the national unemployment rates of less than 5 percent at that time (www.abs.org.au viewed in October 2006) the Horn of Africa migrants represent over three fold the national unemployment rates.

Table 6.3 Horn of Africa Migrants Employment Status by Year of Arrival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior 1985</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2006 survey

The unemployment rates among the Horn of Africa migrants are not uniform, and migrants from highly volatile and unstable countries had the highest rates. Table 6.4, shows that unemployment rates among Somalis and Sudanese migrants were 26.4 and 25.4 percent respectively, which is five times higher than the national unemployment rate. In contrast, migrants from Ethiopia and Eritrea have relatively low unemployment rates of 10.4 and 13 percent respectively. Of all the Horn of Africa migrants living in the two cities, only 54 percent of them were employed and had their own source of income, while some 41 percent are unemployed or students, and dependent on the social welfare system.
Table 6.4 Employment Status of the Horn of Africa Migrants by Country of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home duty and other</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

6.4 Who Sends Money?

The decision to send money depends on the type of person or family members left behind, and the employment and visa conditions of the migrant in Australia. As shown in Table 6.5, the survey found that the two migrant groups, longer term residents and single migrants, particularly those who came here with their families while they were very young, are the least likely to send remittances. Of all the Horn of Africa migrants living in the two cities, 86.4 percent of them send money to support their families and friends. Those who did not send money were most likely to be those who have all their family here or elsewhere in OECD or oil rich countries, and those who were born or have grown up here and have little or no connection with those left behind. With regard to those who send money, a longitudinal survey conducted by Rod and Murphy, (1997) on immigrants in Australia noted the profile of the typical remitter as

"The typical remitter is one who previously lived in a large household, was employed in low skilled occupation and had probably contributed significantly to the household income before migrating to Australia where the pattern of support to his original household is maintained. Although being employed in Australia affected the likelihood to remit, earning did not" Rod and Murphy, 1997, p.xiii.

As Rod and Murphy (1997) noted, those migrants who were the breadwinners of a family or the principal sources of family income before migration continued to play that role. To fulfill
their responsibility and support their family left behind, they often take up whatever job they could (regardless of their skills and previous positions and work experience).

The findings of this survey show that married couples from each respective Horn of Africa country (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan) are found to be the top remitters of all migrant groups. Table 6.5 shows that while 57.2 percent of the Horn of Africa migrants are married and live with their partner, single migrants account for 34.6 percent of the total respondents. Of all Horn of African migrants, 63.2 percent of Somalis and 61.4 percent of Ethiopians were married, whereas, over half (52 percent) of Sudanese respondents were found single. From personal observation and discussion with various groups, including money transferring agents, religious and community leaders’, it was found that married couples send on a more regular basis than any other migrant group, particularly when the parents of both or either partner are from a low income social group or cannot work because of their age or health. It was noted that some of the migrants who arrived here as singles are actually married and have family whom they could not bring with them. This is because they either left their spouse in their country of birth, or for some reason they did not disclose their marital status.

**Table 6.5 Marital Status of Remitters by Country of Birth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married/defacto</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/ Widow/er</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/separated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

The survey asked the respondents how much money they send, to whom and to whose family, the wife’s or the husband’s which was found sometimes to be a source of conflicts among
married couples. Community and religious leaders also point out that these issues cause friction and can be the sources of family dispute and breakup, particularly when the parents or family of one partner do not need their help because they are either here or elsewhere in OECD countries, or financially independent with their own sources of income.

The information gathered from respondents, community and religious leaders through questionnaires, interviews, discussion and observation reveals that many of the migrants who do not have jobs saved and sent their Centrelink payments, while a few of them worked in “cash in hand” jobs in family owned small businesses. An interviewed lady, who claimed herself unemployed, was interviewed while working as a waitress in a family owned café and noted that:

“I know the owner of this café. We have been in the same refugee camp. The family knows as I support my aged parents. When they are busy, sometime they call me to work for them. Although I know that cash-in-hand work is illegal and the hourly rate is very small, the work is not reliable and safe, I will continue to work for them until I find a proper job. Otherwise it would be hard to save money to support my parents”.

Those who work in the informal sector often call their job as “cash in hand” because they are paid cash and they do not pay tax. Depending on the type of work and hours they work, the hourly rates vary from as low as Aus$8 to Aus$12 an hour. In most cases such jobs are found in small family owned businesses, such as restaurants, cafés, groceries and beauty salons.

With regards to who sends money and how much, or what percentage it is of their annual income, scholars have different perceptions and understanding. While some scholars like Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) argue that economic migrants send a substantial portion of their earnings for investment, others like De Haas (2005) and Faini (2007) argue that economic migrants send a small portion of their earnings mainly because most of them are from wealthy and educated families who do not necessarily wait for their support. Unlike
skilled migrants who are often from wealthy families in a stable country, many of the Horn of Africa migrants are from highly volatile countries. Hence, many families in these countries are dependent on remittances they receive from their sons, daughters and relatives living in OECD and other high income countries (Koser, 2004; Savage and Harvey, 2007).

In contrast to the belief that most Horn of African migrants support families and friends left behind, young Sudanese TAFE students who were interviewed including those born here and came here with their family while they were very young, have opposite views on issues of sending money to support friends and family back home. One of these interviewed students stated that:

“If I got money right now, I have a lot of things to do and fulfill for myself. I am student I need a lot of things to do and I do not want to send money to anyone. I will think about sending money when I am asked to send and if there is convincing reasons to do so”.

Statements like this contrast with the values and beliefs of older migrants who expect their younger children to follow in their footsteps by helping their relatives living in abject poverty and appalling conditions in origin and asylum countries. Such statements are also a clear indication of weak social bonds and networks, and a lack of understanding and awareness about the challenging living conditions of their relatives and the culture of the interdependency of African families.

6.5 Importing and Selling “Khat” and Other Items to Send Money to Families

Another interesting finding of this study was that some migrants who are unable to send their own hard-earned money encourage their friends and family members to send them items that are widely consumed and needed by migrants. These items include homemade spices, hand made cultural and traditional clothes, artifacts, and “Khat”. Of all these imported items,
“Khat” is the most commonly and widely imported, sold and consumed. “Khat” is a shrub like a leafy green plant chewed/consumed by many Horn of Africa migrants. Due to its stimulating effect, the substance is often consumed for pleasure, entertainment socializing and spending leisure time with friends.

The scientific name of “Khat” is “Catha edulis Forsk” but also goes by many different local names such as “Qaat”, “Miraa” or “Abyssinian or African tea” (Danshi School of Media and Journalism /DSMJ, 2009; Fitzgerald, 2009). It originated from Ethiopia and spread to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, The Congo, Somalia, Madagascar, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Outside Africa it grows in Yemen and Afghanistan (Fitzgerald, 2009). The legality of using this substance and its health effect has been a matter for public interest and ongoing debate in many parts of the world (Al-Motarreb et al. 2010). The Conference organized by the Danish School of Media and Journalism in Denmark and Sweden in 2009, showed the growing public concern about the widespread, distribution and consumption of the substance and the economic, health, social costs and side effects of legitimatizing its import, sale and consumption (Fitzgerald, 2009).

Available evidence on the health, social and economic effects of “Khat” and its legality around the world varies from country to country. While consuming “Khat” is legal in countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Yemen, The Netherlands, and UK, it is illegal in Canada, Eritrea, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, France, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and US (DSMJ, 2009; Fitzgerald, 2009; Al-Motarreb et al. 2010). In Australia however, as the use of this substance is new, corresponding with the settlement of the Horn of Africa migrants, its legal status is not clear and varies from State to State. Although the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) regulation stated that
importing “Khat” without a license or permission is prohibited, it is possible to import this substance once a permit is obtained from the Office of Chemical Safety for personal use. Available evidence in Australia shows that the importation and consumption of “Khat” has increased threefold, from just 6,701 kg in 2002 to 18,380 kg in 2007. In Ethiopia “Khat” is one of a few products that generates several hundred million US dollars to the national economy (Kedir, 2005). Fitzgerald, (2009) noted that importing ”Khat” has supported local “Khat” retail businesses by raising an estimated annual income ranging between Aus$2.2 and 3.9 million http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ocs-tc-guidance-imp-khat.htm viewed in June 2009).

Once the item is imported into Australia, it is distributed to retailers across major Australian cities through the post office and is sold to consumers through a complex web of migrant social networks. Migrants do this for three different reasons. Firstly, it creates jobs and sources of income for their families. Secondly, by importing and selling this and other goods, they are able to send money to support their families and friends without spending their own earnings. Thirdly, it creates a channel of supply to the substance they are addicted to. Importing “Khat”, consuming, selling, and sending the money to family back home is a win-win situation where both parties benefit in the process.

Traditionally “Khat” is consumed or chewed while it is green and fresh usually within a day or two after it is cut. Due to distance and rigorous quarantine inspections, importing while it is fresh and green is virtually impossible. Migrants’ families in Ethiopia or Kenya pick and dry the soft leaves and buds and pack them for export. The packed “Khat” often looks like herbs or green tea. Therefore, consumers in Australia chew after soaking dried “Khat” in water. Some discussions with “Khat” consumers and religious and community leaders show that
consuming “Khat” leads to a wide range of adverse social, health and financial problems. Some interviewed consumers openly admitted that beside its financial cost, the substance could cause addiction and health problems such as depression, decaying teeth, stress, and social marginalization and carelessness when not consumed. A study published in the journal of Ethnopharmacology noted that there is a high incidence of haemorrhoids, constipation, vascular disease, gastrointestinal tract, increase in blood pressure and heart rate, sexual impotency, and behavioural problems such as anxiety, restlessness, insomnia and irritability among chronic “Khat” consumers (Al-Motarreb et al. 2010).

The consumption of “Khat” is often the source of domestic violence, family conflict and breakdown, particularly when a partner or family is against its consumption. As ABC TV aired on its 7.30 program on July 24, 2008, a group of angry Somali women in Melbourne whose husbands and family members suffered from the addiction to “Khat”, went on the street in protest at its legalization, importation, distribution and consumption and called on the Federal government to ban the importing of “Khat”. The protestors argued that using “Khat” fuels domestic violence and conflicts (http://www.abc.net.au/news/video/2008/07/24/2312765.htm?site=melbourne, viewed in July, 2008). In September 2008, the East African Women’s Federation echoed similar concerns and lodged a parliamentary petition to ask Australia’s House of Representatives to completely ban the import, distribution, production, sale and use of “Khat” in Australia (Fitzgerald, 2009; http://www.aph.gov.au/HOUSE/committee/petitions/health.htm viewed in Dec. 2008). A Somali “Khat” consumer and interviewee noted that:

“if the government listen Somali women who protested against “Khat” and banned the importation of “Khat” as requested by a group of women”, he said “we already found Australian version of “Khat” plant and we can consume locally grown “Khat” while it is green and fresh as we used to do it in Africa”. 
During field work the researcher noticed that some consumers of this substance had started growing the plant in their backyards. It is not clear whether the “Khat” plants have been smuggled into the country by consumers or is a plant they discovered from among the locally grown plants. The discovery of the Australian version of “Khat” will increase the likelihood of consumption among the wider Australian society and thereby cause unprecedented social, financial, and health problems.

Information obtained from an importer, distributor and seller of “Khat” in Melbourne shows that the total cost to import a kilo of dried “Khat” from Ethiopia or Kenya, including the cost of packing and postage, is around Aus$25. Depending on its quality (its stimulating power) and where it is sold, in Australia a kilo of “Khat” is worth Aus$100 in Melbourne and Aus$120 in Adelaide. Whether the sellers send all the profit generated from the import and sale of “Khat” to families and friends is unknown. Although sending money generated in this way does not actually fit the definition of remittances, nor it is accepted practice or a proper business arrangement, the trend reflects how these migrants use their social networks to get what they want and support each other.

With regards to the feeling it gives consumers, the Danish School of Media and Journalism quoted a consumer saying “when you chew Khat, you are on the top of the planet but after you spit it out, the planet is on the top of you” (DSMJ, 2009, P.21). From the above consumer testimony, it is evident that the mood, illusion and the feeling “Khat” creates for the consumer is more or less similar to what other light drugs can achieve. Regarding the structural similarity between “Khat” and D-amphetamine and ecstasy, Al-Motarreb et al. (2010, p.542) noted that “Khat leaves contain the psychoactive alkaloid cathinone, which is structurally similar to d-amphetamine”.

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6.6 Frequency and Amount of Money Sent
So far we have seen that the majority of the Horn of Africa migrants send money to support their families and friends. The frequency and amount of money they send varies and is subject to a number of factors such as employment status and amount of annual income, the economic situation of their family, family size in Australia, and most importantly those left behind. The question is how much do they actually send and how often? The survey found that the frequency of remittance are often erratic and the amount of money is quite small, reflecting the low levels of income and high unemployment rates of these migrants.

As shown in Figure 6.2, close to one-third (31 percent) of the Horn of Africa migrants send money to their families and friends on a regular basis, 13.4 percent every quarter and 25 percent only when they are asked to do so. It is believed that those who send money only when asked are either young respondents who came here while they were young or those who have all their families either here or elsewhere in Europe or North America, and whose family do not need their help. For families living in conflict zones in a highly unstable and volatile country like Somalia, incomes gained from remittances are the only source of income a family depends on for survival (Chalmers and Hassan, 2008).

**Figure 6.2 Frequency of Sending Money by Respondents**

![Pie chart showing frequency of sending money](image)

Source: 2006 survey
Another interesting finding is the amount of annual income and money many of the Horn of Africa migrants send to their families. It was noted that although employment status and amount of annual income has its own impact on the amount and frequency of money sent, it is not a determining factors per se. Table 6.6 shows that 15.6 percent of the respondents in the income group under Aus$10,000 a year sent Aus$3,999 to Aus$4,999 a year, 11.1 percent of respondents in the income group of Aus$40,001 to Aus$50,000 sent an equivalent amount. Similarly, while 21.4 percent of respondents in the income group of Aus$20,001 to Aus$30,000 sent over Aus$7000 a year, only 14.3 percent of migrants in the income group of Aus$40,001 - Aus$50,000 and over Aus$50,000 sent an equivalent amount of money.

Table 6.6 Average Annual and Monthly Remittances Migrants Send to Family/Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income</th>
<th>&gt;1000</th>
<th>1001-2999</th>
<th>3000-4999</th>
<th>5000-6999</th>
<th>7000-8999</th>
<th>&lt; 9000</th>
<th>Average Monthly Remittance in Aus$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10,000</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001-20,000</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001-30,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001-40,000</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,001-50,000</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50,001</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

It was noted that while those who earn more send a small portion of their income, those in low income groups send a larger proportion of their income. As the amount of their annual income increases, they send only a small portion of their earnings. Unlike economic migrants who send a substantial portion of their earnings to their family and spouses (Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003) the majority of the Horn of Africa migrants send less than ten percent of their annual income. It was noted that sending small amounts of money is common among the
unemployed and employed Horn of Africa migrants with refugee and humanitarian backgrounds. An interviewed young Somali lady clearly stated why she sent only a small amount of money.

“They (my family) live in refugee camps and they have no other sources of income other than the money I send them from here. If I stop sending, they will suffer and cannot survive. Even if it is small, I prefer to send that small amount on regular basis because when it is converted in local currency it helps them to survive for a month”.

6.7 Purposes of Sending Money

The migrants family economic situation and where they live (country of birth versus refugee camp in asylum country or conflict zone), are believed to be two of the most important factors in influencing the purpose of sending money to families and friends. The motive for sending money varies from covering basic family living, education and health cost, to physical investment (buying a house or land for future investment), and in some cases for start up capital, to support opposition political parties or liberation movement to influence the political situation. Nearly two-thirds of the Horn of Africa migrants send money to address short-term family problems mainly for non-productive purposes, such as to cover basic living costs, to pay back debt and to cover various family social and event expenses. Figure 6.3 shows that 46 percent of migrants send money to cover basic family expenses such as food, rent and clothes, and 28 percent to invest on the education and health (human development) of their family members.
With regards to how remittances from refugee migrants were used among remittance receiving families (Koser and Van Hear, 2005, pp.128-129) noted that:

“Remittances from asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants abroad can help individuals and families to survive during conflict and to sustain communities in crisis. They do so both in countries of origin and in countries of first asylum. The limited evidence available suggests that these transfers are used in a way similar to those sent by economic migrants to people at home in more stable societies—for daily subsistence needs, health care, housing and sometimes education”.

Interestingly the survey among the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants found that the bridegroom or his family must pay large sums of money or cattle as dowry to the bride and her family before the family of the bride approves the marriage. The brides’ immediate and extended family members such as parents, elder brothers, uncles, aunts or grandparents expect some sort of gift from the bridegroom or his family.

As one newly married Sudanese person explained, the dowry is significantly higher when the bridegroom is living abroad or has a brother or sister living overseas. When the migrants themselves get married or when their family members want to marry, they often organize “Iqub” and “Sanduk” the financial support network group among their close friends (as referred to in Chapter 5), to raise the needed sums of money their family will pay as dowry or
to buy cattle or precious jewelry (such as gold) for the bride and her family. To keep the family reputation and maintain the tradition of their family pride, migrants are expected to send money whenever there are such events or programs. The amount of dowry one needs to pay varies from culture to culture and ethnic group to ethnic group. For instance, among the Sudanese, a bridegroom needs to pay 50 to 100 live cattle as dowry to the bride’s family or US$4,000 to US$6,000 if it is negotiated in cash. This study found that 12 percent of these migrants send money to cover such social and family events.

From interviews, discussions and personal observations, it was learned that sending money to family is seen as a prerequisite for social inclusion, and to gain community and peer group acceptance and respect. Some of the migrants who cannot afford to send money to their family because of their employment status, family size, health and other personal and family commitments (such as paying off a mortgage) encourage their family to send them hand made traditional clothes or home made spices to sell here in return for remittances, in order to avoid peer and community pressure and stigma.

As shown in Table 6.7, when asked why they sent money to their families and friends, over one-third (36.7 percent) of the respondents clearly stated that they did so because their family do not have other sources of income and hence can hardly survive without their support. Furthermore, if they did not send money to their families, 22.4 percent of the respondents believed that they would lose their social status and respect within their peer groups and the community in the host and origin country. Poirine (2006) noted that migrants send money for altruistic reasons as well as to care for the well-being of their families. This study noted that the reasons for sending money to family and friends are not only purely altruism and feelings of responsibility per se. Rather they are the result of a combination factors such as feelings of
responsibility and moral obligation, peer and community pressure at both ends (host and origin country) to maintain their reputation and show how they care for their family.

**Table 6.7 Reasons for Sending Money to Families/friends**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for sending money</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family depend on them for their existence (do not have other sources of income)</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of social respect</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family will be ashamed and feel abandoned</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of community pressure (in host and country of birth)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

Families that do not receive support from their sons or daughters are perceived by their local community to have been abandoned by their children, while their children are seen to not respect their family and are therefore not worthy members of the community. Hence, feelings of family responsibility, peer and community pressure is believed to be one of the driving forces behind remittances. For those who do not send money, peer and social pressure is not confined to senders in the host country but also causes embarrassment and humiliation for migrant family. In contrast to this, however, it was noted that a very small number of individuals claim that they do not send money to their family. These migrants are either from wealthy families and their parents do not expect anything from them or live with all their immediate family members here in Australia. Alternatively their family members may live in OECD or oil rich Arab countries and do not expect any kind of support from them.

**6.8 Impacts of Remittances on Senders and Receivers**

Sending money has direct and indirect impacts on the senders in the host country and the receivers in the country of birth (World Bank, 2006). This study found that remittances changed and improved the lives of receiving families, while it minimized family spending and purchasing power of the sending family, thus affecting the quality of family life. In order to
send money, migrants in the host country often need to save money from what they earn. To meet their personal responsibility, family and social expectations and gain some kind of personal satisfaction, the senders need to keep saving money to send to their families, thus reducing their earnings, or needing to adjust their lifestyles or family activities. Improvement in the living conditions and human resources development of remittance receiving families in origin countries can come at the expense of the life and lifestyle of the senders in the host country.

Table 6.8 shows that nearly three-quarters of Sudanese and over half (54.7 percent) of Somalis earn less than Aus$20,000 a year. While very few (13.6 percent) of Eritreans and 9.4 percent of Ethiopians earn over Aus$50,001 a year, none of the Sudanese respondents were in this income group. Over half (52.1 percent) of the Horn of Africa migrants earn less than Aus$20,000 a year and those who earn over Aus$50,001 a year account for only 6 percent of the respondents. Over half of the migrants who earn under Aus$20,000 a year send around ten percent of their annual income, which can significantly affect their lifestyle.

Table 6.8 Migrants Average Annual Income by Country of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income (Aus$)</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20,000</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001-30,000</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001-40,000</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,001-50,000</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50,001</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

Sending money is also seen as rewarding thing for their hard work and years of suffering in refugee camps. An interviewed Oromo lady said that:
“When I send money to my family, I feel as I am still part of the family and making my contribution in their attempt to change and improve their life. I feel as if I saved/invested that money and my dream is fulfilled. I feel as if I have achieved something in life. I do not see sending money to my family as a problem but as my success story and achievement; more importantly I feel as the fulfillment and accomplishment of my responsibility. What would one expect of me other than doing these? If I can keep doing this, that will be the ultimate source of my pleasure and pride. Even though I could not live the life I want to live, I always feel safe and better off to say the least I am in a country where I should not worry about my basic needs”.

This is a very powerful message and a strong family commitment. Though migrants openly admit that they are unable to live the type of life they dreamed about, they are not yet ready to ignore the problem of their families and stop sending money. Rather, they see sending money as their main success story and a major benefit from their migration.

In their response to how sending money impacted on their lifestyle and the life of their families back home, respondents’ reactions were quite mixed. While the overwhelming majority of migrants admitted that although the money they send to their family has changed and improved the living conditions and human resource development of their families in the host country, a few of them believed that the money they send to their family is simply too little to bring any noticeable change and improvement. These migrants also believe that they could not afford to send enough money to change and improve the lives of their families.

Table 6.9 shows that the impact of sending money to relatives has a profound effect on the life and lifestyle of migrants in low income groups. In their responses to the question “how sending money affected their life and lifestyle”, the majority of respondents recognized the various impacts sending money has exerted on their lifestyles. Some 35.7 and 43.3 percent of respondents who earn under Aus$20,000 and between Aus$30,001 and Aus$40,000 said that sending money has affected their lifestyle very much. Interestingly, 31.8 percent of the respondents in the income group of under Aus$20,000 believed that sending money did not
affected their lifestyle at all. Presumably these are migrants who are devoted to changing and improving the living condition of their family and measure the success of their migration by the ongoing support they provide to their families.

**Table 6.9 Impacts of Remittances on Migrants Life and lifestyle in Australia by Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant Annual Income</th>
<th>Does sending money affected your life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20,000</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001-30,000</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001-40,000</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,001-50,000</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50,001</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

The question that needs to be asked here is, when 52.6 percent of migrants in the income group over Aus$50,001 believe that sending money did affect their lifestyle to a lesser extent, why 31.8 percent of migrants in the income group under Aus$20,000 (those migrants who earn four or more time less) believe otherwise? Although some migrants ignored the impact of sending money on their life, it was found that community and religious leaders strongly believed that sending money has affected their community members and these problems are manifest in so many different ways. Most of the migrants who do not recognize or acknowledge the financial pressure that sending money has created for their family here are unemployed and dependent on the social welfare system. Despite the profound effect sending money has on low income families, those migrants who deny or downgrade the impact of sending money on their lifestyles are believed to be migrants who see sending money to family and friends as a success story. This represents the fulfillment of lifetime wishes and is a measure of the success and benefits of their migration to Australia.
Among other things, sending money reduces the ability of hard working families to buy their own home or to lease a house that can accommodate their family, and tends to make them dependent on community/church and public housing. It also forces them to live in shared accommodation, cut or reduce their participation and involvement in social activities and events, and to be unable to send their children to private school or invest in the future of their children. A study carried out among refugees in NSW in 2005 found that the financial problems of many African migrant families are exacerbated by the practice of sending money to those left behind. This has forced many African migrants to share and live in very crowded housing and has exposed them to different kinds of illnesses arising from such crowded living conditions (Sowey, 2005).

Although sending money has affected their lives in some ways, nearly two-thirds of the Horn of Africa migrants in Australia believe that the overall living conditions of their families in their countries of origin have been changed and improved. These migrants also believe that their remittance receiving families are better off than their neighbours who do not receive financial assistance. Although their remittances have positive impacts on their families’ lives back home, some Horn of Africa migrants in Australia have serious financial problems. The report prepared by the African Legal Service at Footscray Community Legal Centre in Melbourne noted that credit and debt repayment problems constituted the fourth largest legal problem many African migrants in Melbourne face (Fraser, 2009).

Figure 6.4 shows that while nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of the Horn of Africa respondents believe that remittance money has changed and improved the living conditions of their families over one-third (35 percent) did not believe that their families are any better off than their neighbours, mainly because they have not sent enough money to change and improve
their lives. In contrast to the majority (65 percent) of the Horn of Africa respondents, scholars like (Görlich, Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2007) argued that remittances have a negative side effect on remittance receiving families and they often leave the labour market and spend time in leisure activities. Hence, they argue that remittances destroy family work culture and create a dependency syndrome. In contrast to this argument, the survey found that many migrants believe that their families are working hard, and using the support they receive wisely to change and improve their lives.

Figure 6.4 Migrants Perception about the Impacts of their Remittance on Family Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittance receiving family life is better off</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance receiving family is not better off</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

Given the Horn of Africa migrant annual incomes and amount of money they send to their families (refer to Table 6.6 and 6.9), the findings of this study, challenge this assertion. As the annual incomes of the majority of these migrants are small, so are the amounts of money they send to their families. Under such circumstances it cannot be argued that the small amount of money their families will receive will cover living costs and leisure expenses, or provide a reason for the family to leave the labour market. As many of these countries suffer from ongoing civil wars and conflict, the livelihoods of many people in the region have been destroyed and substantial numbers of these migrants’ families were forced to leave their usual places of residence and have been unable to find work. Hence, if migrants’ families are leaving the labour market, the likely reasons are believed to be the ongoing civil wars and
instabilities that have destroyed livelihoods and created a dependency syndrome, not remittances and the desire to spend time in leisure activities.

6.9 The Role of Remittances in Domestic Politics and its Downside

To influence and shape the political situation of their countries of origin, some politically active migrants were engaged in raising funds and making regular contributions to support opposition political parties or liberation movement activities. This makes remittance from these types of migrants a ‘two edge sword’. Depending on who receives it and for what purpose, migrant remittances can be used for community development and to fight poverty or to finance civil war and destabilize the country. Evidence shows that migrants have been the major financers of dissident/opposition groups in Somalia, Sir Lanka and Eritrean war with Ethiopia (Grosse-Kettler, 2004; Montclos, 2005; Koser, 2005; Chalmers and Hassan, 2008).

The survey found that many migrants with refugee and humanitarian backgrounds are victims of civil wars and the political system and are not happy with the incumbent regime of their country of birth. While the overwhelming majority of the Horn of Africa migrants send money to support and improve the living conditions of their families, the survey also found that a few of these migrants support liberation movements and opposition political parties of their choices. Some migrants, particularly those who have suffered from or been affected by the political system or civil war because of their political convictions or involvements work hard to raise funds to support their causes. These politically active migrants organize themselves in different groups and have strong social networks. They regularly meet to discuss (particularly through Pal talk) the political situation in their country of birth.
By their own admission, the Horn of Africa migrants noted that they are playing a positive and constructive role not only in fighting poverty, improving the living conditions and human development of their families, but also by influencing the political system and bringing social changes in their country of birth. Some interviewed believed that the causes of poverty, high unemployment rates, ongoing civil wars and social unrest in their country of birth were caused by a lack of good governance, absence of a democratic and equitable political system, and the misguided economic policies of the leaders of their countries of origin. It was noted that by raising funds and financing the activities of liberation movements and opposition political parties they are highly involved in influencing the political landscape of their home country.

The financial support of the Ethiopia diaspora community to opposition political parties, enabled the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) to win the 2005 election by an unprecedented margin in the upper and lower house of representatives. The financial support and fund raising activities of Ethiopian and Eritrean diaspora from around the world have been noted and reported by foreign based Ethiopia diaspora online media outlets. Internationally renowned media like “The Economist”, reported that the sympathizers and supporters of the opposition political party and liberation movements raised hundreds of thousands US dollars every years (www.ethiopianreview.com/articlethes/1281; www.nazret.com/php/uploadnews/search.php) viewed in Nov. 2006 and April 2007), www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10979876 viewed in April, 2008). “The Economist” in its April 3/2008 issue revealed the fundraising effort of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) among its members and supporters in the US. These media reports clearly show the level of the Horn of Africa migrants’ community attempt to influence the domestic political situation of their country of birth.
Diaspora financial support to opposition political parties and liberation movements’ activities has its own pros and cons. It helps to promote multiparty political systems, and democratic values, and solve the sources of conflict in the region (power struggle) on one hand, and on the other to destabilize or change the incumbent regime by forces or violent ways (as reported by the Economist). When diaspora financial support is used to influence or change the political system, it has detrimental effects on the peace and stability of a country (Grosse-Kettler, 2004; Chalmers and Hassan, 2008).

In addition to this, the survey among Eritrean migrants in Melbourne found two Eritrean community associations. One is pro-government and the other is against the incumbent government. The Eritrean community association that opposes the government in power raised funds to support the Eritrean refugees in Sudan. Members of the Eritrea community fundraising committee representative clearly stated why they prefer to support Eritrean refugees in Sudan as follows:

“Our community did not want to pay the 2 percent income tax and send our money to sponsor the dictator regime in Eritrea because we do not trust the government in power. We cannot prove whether the 2 percent income we pay will be used for the reconstruction or for the repression of the people of Eritrea. Therefore we preferred to support those who cannot live in their own country because of repressive government policy. We therefore prefer to support those who are languishing in refugee camp”.

Accordingly, in 2005/2006 the Eritrean community and friends of the Eritrean community in Melbourne raised over Aus$10,000 and one container of used clothes and utensils. In 2002 they raised over Aus$18,000 and over 20 containers of different kinds of household appliances, foodstuff, and clothes from Eritreans and friends of Eritreans in Melbourne. All these funds and donations were sent to Eritrean refugees living in Sudan for the maintenance of an Eritrean refugee community school, medical centre and for Eritrean doctors in Sudan. The reason for supporting Eritrean refugees in Sudan rather than the Eritrean government
development and reconstruction initiatives in Eritrea was stated as lack of trust in the
government’s use of funds, and Eritrea diaspora dissatisfaction on the way the Eritrea
government treats opposition political parties and their members. Supporting refugees in the
neighbouring country may be intended to assist and encourage dissident groups, or those who
share similar political values.

When asked whether they provide any financial support or contribution to support opposition
political parties or liberation movements, many of the respondents were unwilling to disclose
their involvement. Interestingly, a few migrants admitted that they contributed money to
support prominent opposition political leaders, party members who left their country of birth
because of their political leadership, involvements, or conviction. In justifying the financial
support they made to such individuals in exile, they often argued that their support was based
on humanitarian grounds. In reality however supporting such political figures in exile is
tantamount to supporting the political party or organization they represent. Furthermore, the
contribution of Eritrea diasporas to financing the war with Ethiopia during the liberation of
their country and the two percent income tax they pay for the reconstruction thereafter, is a
clear indication of the direct involvement of the diaspora community in propping up the
organization that promotes the causes they stand for and believe in (Montclos, 2005). With
regard to how the migrant community uses remittances to influence the political, social, and
economic condition of their country of birth (Montclos, 2005, P.14) noted that:

“Of course, the transnational influence of diasporas is not limited to ballots. At this
juncture, it is relevant to consider the economic- and maybe political power that
migrant communities exercise through remittance”.

Furthermore, Hamza, (2006) and Kapur, (2004) noted that while some Somali diasporas have
participated in trying to end the ongoing civil wars and find a lasting solution to the problems
of their country, there were also some Somali migrants who supported and financed the warring factions.

6.10 Common Features of Refugee Remittances

Despite significant variations in the amount of their annual income, remittances from migrants with refugee and other humanitarian backgrounds have some common features that help to distinguish their remittances from those of other migrants. Given their large family size, high unemployment rates, dependence on social welfare and average annual income of less than Aus$30,000, saving and sending large amounts of money is very difficult. As a result, many of these migrants send on average less than Aus$170 a month. Therefore sending small amounts of money on a regular basis and to more than one destination (often to asylum and origin countries) is one of the features that remittances from migrants with refugee backgrounds have in common.

As most of them send money to their families and friends, they rarely take part in NGO fund raising events and raise money to support basic community development projects in their country of birth. The Horn of Africa migrants with refugee and humanitarian backgrounds send money to support activities other than those in their countries of origin. As shown in Figure 6.5, 22 percent send money directly to those in asylum countries to family and friends in asylum and 12 percent send to multiple destinations (country of birth and asylum). The remaining two-thirds (47 and 19 percent) send money directly to their families and family members in their country of birth.
Those who were left behind (in their country of birth or refugee camps in asylum countries) consider that their family members and friends who migrated to Australia (regardless of their employment status and arrival date) are better off and able to send them money and help them to get out of the poverty cycle. Such expectations of family and friends force many new arrivals to start sending money before they actually find jobs and have settled in. Some have to repay debts as well as support their family left behind.

Those migrants who are sponsored by their family and friends are expected to cover their migration and travel costs for their sponsoring family member or friend (www.immi.gov.au viewed in Nov. 2007). It was found that many respondents (employed and unemployed) sponsor those who are stranded in refugee camps or asylum countries. When the person they sponsor is guaranteed a visa, the unemployed sponsors often cannot borrow money from formal financial institutions to cover their airfare and other travel costs. To cover these costs they often borrow from informal money lenders at high interest rates. The survey found that a lady living in Australia sponsored her younger sister and her husband from Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. The sponsor and her husband were working full-time but they had been sending money on a regular basis, both to her sister in Kenya and their family in Ethiopia, and
could not afford to cover their airfare. To do so, the older sister borrowed money from an informal money lender at a high interest rate. Shortly after arrival the sponsor (older sister) transferred the loan to her sister and brother-in-law and within a month the couple started the repayment.

How and when borrowed money will be transferred from the sponsor who facilitated the loan to the new arrival is often negotiated with the lender, and it is part of the deal between the lender and the sponsor. In most cases the sponsor borrowed the money with the understanding and consultation of the migrants (the new arrivals) while the migrant is overseas. As many of them are desperate to get out of an asylum country they often accept the terms and conditions of the loan without understanding them. They have little chance to negotiate or bargain on the deal and often do not know the interest rates. Like economic migrants who borrowed money to cover overseas migration costs, or family loans to finance their education (Poirine, 2006), this survey also found that these migrants start repaying the debt very soon after arrival. With regards to the debt repayment (Koser and Van Hear, 2005, p.129) point out:

“paying off debt may also be prominent, especially when there have been substantial outlays to send asylum migrants abroad...Asylum seekers and refugees may also finance the flight abroad of other vulnerable family members; this may not necessarily involve transfers of money home, but rather payments for tickets, to migration agents for documents, for accommodation and to meet other costs incurred during and after travel”.

The reason why migrants start debt repayment shortly after arrival and before they have settled in and found a job is mainly to reduce the amount of interest paid. As interest rates are often high, unless the repayments start as early as possible the interest will increase rapidly and exceed the principal and eventually the borrower will end up paying a very large sum of money. To clear their name and keep their good credit history, the sponsor who took the loan must push the new arrivals to start repayments shortly after arrival. In line with this finding
research carried out by the Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA) in regional Victoria confirmed that, to cover the travel cost of their friends and relatives, sponsors often borrow from informal money lenders (sectors) at high interest rates. The repayment causes a lot of problems and financial pressure on new arrivals.

“Travel costs and their associated debts are creating or exacerbating problems for new arrivals, including: poverty, malnutrition, housing stress and overcrowding, homelessness, separation of families across households, discontinuation of schooling, bad credit ratings and bankruptcy. This hardship is also causing relationships between proposers and SHP (Special Humanitarian Program) entrants to break down at the time when the new entrant most needs support and assistance” (RCOA, 2008, p.18).

As shown in Figure 6.6, this study found that out of the total refugee and humanitarian migrants admitted into Australia, 26 percent had transport costs covered by the Australian government, 17 percent borrowed from friends and 20 percent covered by sponsors. It was learned that over one-third of settlers sponsored by their families and friends entered both formal and informal commitments to repay their migration and travel costs, while those sponsored by the Australian government refugee and humanitarian resettlement programs were found to be free from such debt and the subsequent financial pressures such borrowing can cause.

**Figure 6.6 Sources of Money to Cover Travel and Other Related Costs**

Source: 2006 survey
When sponsored families or individuals are granted visas, they often authorize their sponsor/proposer by a verbally or signed document to pay the cost of their travel and to borrow money on their behalf to cover these costs. Unemployed sponsors sometimes persuade their employed friends to use their credit card to pay for their relative or friend’s travel costs. The sponsor enters a contract on behalf of the sponsored migrants to pay the principal plus all the service charges and interest accrued on the principal.

A man sponsored his relative who was a single mother with three daughters. At the time he was unemployed and hoped that he would find a job by the time the application was processed. When a visa was approved he had found a job only a month before, and was unable to cover their airfares and other related travel expenses. As their visa was valid for a year, the sponsor asked his relative to wait for a few more months so that he could save to cover their migration costs. As the single mother had been in a refugee camp for the last fifteen years, she was very eager to get leave as soon as possible, and asked her sponsor to borrow money to cover her travel expenses and promised him that she would pay the debt. The sponsor got an interest free loan for the airfare from International Organization for Migration (IOM) but had to pay 25 percent of the airfare for four persons. To pay this and send them some extra money to pay off her debt and buy some basic things for their travel, the sponsor borrowed Aus$3000 from an informal money lender at 25 percent interest rates. The sponsor/proposer and the migrants had no other option but to accept whatever terms and conditions the informal money lenders served them. On arrival the loan was transferred into her name and the single mother signed the contract and immediately started the repayment that lasted for three years.

In line with this finding a study carried out among refugees in New South Wales found that many refugees who want to assist their relatives to get out of refugee camps or enter Australia,
also borrow money to fulfill their commitment. After they enter Australia the sponsored relatives often join their proposers and continue living with them in already overcrowded houses (Sowey, 2005). Furthermore, a report compiled from clients cases by the African Legal Service at Footscray Community Legal Centre in Melbourne summarized some of the debt problems many African migrants have as follows:

“Some people are already in debt when they arrive in Australia. If people come to Australia on a special humanitarian visa, they must pay for the cost of their own airfare. This money is usually raised by the family in Australia, either via a bank loan, a credit card or a community loan. Our clients have told us that when they arrive in Australia they are expected to pay back the cost of the airfare to the friend or family member who acted as their “proposer” to bring them to Australia ... People were struggling to deal with numerous debts, and created a debt vortex by borrowing money to pay off other loans. If people miss one or more payments on some loans, interest rates rise to very high levels” Fraser, 2009, P.37.

This survey found that on arrival, the majority of the migrants sponsored by their relatives and friends end up repaying the debt their relatives or friends borrowed. Although some sponsored migrants encouraged their sponsors to borrow money on their behalf to cover these travel costs and agreed to pay all the debt they incurred, the terms and conditions of the loan, and the staggering amount of interest rates and the way the debt was transferred into their name, often creates friction and is the major source of financial related disputes between the sponsor and the new arrivals.

Information gathered from new arrivals through interview and personal discussion shows that in the first one or two years, migrants sponsored by their family and friends struggle to support their family on the one hand and pay off their debt on the other. Difficulties in finding jobs, entering debt repayment before they find jobs, and sending money to family left behind create financial pressure and shatter their dreams and expectations. Many interviewed migrants and religious and community leaders believe that early debt repayment and sending money before
settling in and finding a job, made many unemployed persons and students depend on churches and other NGOs to cover their basic living expenses and to pay their bills.

The survey found that the amount of money borrowed and the periods of debt repayment vary depending on the number of family who migrated. Figure 6.7 shows that the debt repayment period varies from less than a year to over four years. Those migrants who migrate with their family (the larger the family sizes the higher the amount of money they have to borrow) often borrow a large amount of money to pay for airfares and other travel costs. Accordingly, the debt repayment period for those who came with their family members (wife, children and other dependent family members) is longer than for single or couples and range from less than two years to over four years. Of all migrants who covered their migration costs, only 29 percent mostly single and couples with no children pay off their debt in less than a year. While over half (56 percent) paid their debt in one to two years, those who paid off their debt over a period of four years account for 7 percent.

**Figure 6.7 Migrant Travel and Other Debt Repayment Periods**

![Pie chart showing debt repayment periods](chart)

Source: 2006 survey

### 6.11 Conclusion

In the host country, the living conditions and incomes of the Horn of Africa migrants are
different. Some of these migrants have large families and live on the income of one person, others work part-time, and yet others are unemployed and dependent on social benefits. Regardless of their income, employment status, marital status and sex, the majority of these migrants share one thing in common, that is sending money to family and friends. This often comes at the expense of their needs and the lifestyle they want to live here. To send money to their families on a regular basis, many of them save by changing their lifestyle or giving up or substituting some of their family and personal activities. Although sending money has affected the lifestyle of many remittance sending families, they have felt able to change and improve the living conditions of their families back home.

It was learned that many of these humanitarian migrants faced serious financial difficulties in the first years of their arrival. These financial pressures were created due to early debt repayment, high interest rates and remittances. It was also noted that the debt sponsors often incurred to cover travel costs of their family members were sources of conflict that sometimes required legal action and split family members. The Horn of Africa migrants send money not only to support their family in their country of birth but also to those refugees and political organizations in exile. The motives of sending money vary from supporting day to day family life, to carrying out basic community development and shaping the political landscape of their country of birth. It was noted that as remittance money obtained from these migrants has positive impacts in improving the lives of their families when it is sent directly to families and community basic development projects, it can have negative and devastating consequences for national stability and economic growth when it is used to support the armed struggle of liberation movements, or opposition political parties that want to topple the incumbent regimes in their country of birth.
CHAPTER VII
IMPACT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE ON ACQUIRING SKILLS, AND FINDING EMPLOYMENT

7.1 Introduction

Almost all Horn of Africa migrants were not admitted into Australia on the basis of their professional skills, level of education or other formal qualifications. Their admission was largely based on their refugee, humanitarian or family reunion status. Migrants’ skills, qualifications and work experience were not put into consideration as they varied significantly. Some migrants had few or no skills or had never been to school before they migrated to Australia. As a result, their work experience varied from no employment history to diverse and rich work experience. Accordingly, their qualifications ranged from unskilled farm labourers, semi-skilled mechanics and barbers, to highly skilled professionals who had accumulated valuable expertise in a wide range of areas.

These migrants came from almost all walks of life. This survey found that a migrant’s situations on arrival more or less reflected their living conditions prior to moving to Australia. It also found their levels of education, professional skills and work experience to be positively correlated with levels of peace, stability and the socio-economic situation of their countries of origin. Migrants from relatively stable countries were relatively better educated. Furthermore, it was also noted that those from unstable countries were less educated and had a higher number of persons with little or no schooling. Collectively, however, half of the migrants had completed high school education and over one-third of them had post school education (diploma and above) on arrival, despite the ongoing civil war, instability and disruptive environment of many parts of the Horn of Africa countries, and the stereotype belief of considering refugee and humanitarian migrants as being uneducated. Although many were
perceived as being relatively well educated, many of them (including those who had post high school education) did not have skills and work experience on arrival. With regards to how past refugee life affects their participation in the labour market, (Kyle et al, 2004, P.ii) notes that:

“More recent refugee and Humanitarian arrivals are likely to have experienced greater instability and disruption in their lives before migrating to Australia. They are more likely than earlier arrivals to have spent more time in dangerous and disruptive environments before arriving in Australia, they are less likely to have worked in the year before arriving in Australia, and less likely to have worked in skilled occupations in their country. All these factors work against refugees’ chances of labour market success”.

As all of these migrants came from Non-English speaking backgrounds, a lack of English language coupled with a lack of skills and work experience remain the major problem in communicating and socializing with locals and in accessing different services. Among the Horn of African migrants, these problems remain the major obstacle in finding employment, attending short-term training programs and studying new skills and learning about Australian culture, values and ways of life.

The precarious economic and political situation plus the ongoing social unrest and instability in these migrant country of birth and the harsh environment and living conditions they had been through in asylum countries, and the location of many refugee camps in remote areas, prevented them from acquiring marketable skills and work experience which greatly affected their post-arrival life. Unfortunately, due to lack of recognition of overseas qualifications and work experience, a few overseas educated and qualified professionals suffered unemployment and difficulties in getting work in their area of expertise. Additionally, the survey found that racism, visible physical and cultural difference of these migrants made integration and searching for jobs a challenging and daunting experience regardless of their levels of education, skills, qualification and work experience.
All these problems resulted in high unemployment rates among the Horn of Africa migrants. The survey further found that unemployment rates of these migrants were nearly four times the national rates. The questions that need to be asked are: why the unemployment rates of these migrants are so high at a time the national unemployment rate was below 5 percent (at the time this data was collected), with the national economy growing and employers vigorously lobbying to import both skilled and unskilled workers from overseas? Why employers lobbying State and Federal government to bring unskilled and semi-skilled labour from overseas are reluctant to employ these migrants who are already in the country?

This chapter will look into and assess a range of issues pertaining to the education of the Horn of Africa migrants, their English language proficiency and skills on arrival, and how these factors affect their search for jobs. It also looks at how obtaining Australian qualifications and skills improved or boosted the employment opportunities of these migrants. It questions how dependence on social welfare system affects the moral and social lives of the migrants? Does prior life experience and environment have any impact on post arrival life, desires and motives to learn or work?

7.2 Migrants Levels of Education on Arrival

Depending on where they came from (unstable country versus relatively stable) Horn of African migrants’ levels of education varies from illiterate and never been to school, to highly qualified professionals in a wide range of professions. The findings of this survey show that while migrants from Somalia and Sudan were less educated, migrants from Eritrea and Ethiopia were relatively better educated. Table 7.1 shows that, while 50 percent of the Horn of Africa migrants had completed high school education on arrival, 32.1 percent of them had post school (diploma and above) education and qualifications. Due to the ongoing conflicts, wars
and abject poverty, or even a combination of these factors, 6 percent of them have not had a chance to go to school.

Table 7.1 shows that on arrival, migrants from highly volatile and unstable countries like Somalia and the Sudan had high levels of migrants with little or no schooling compared to Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants. Despite being refugees/humanitarian migrants from economically poor and politically unstable countries, the majority (82.2 percent) of the Horn of African migrants were educated and had completed high school and had post school education on arrival. The huge gaps in migrants’ levels of education give rise in unemployment and difference in labour market participation.

**Table 7.1 Migrants’ Level of Education on Arrival by Country of birth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education on Arrival</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Overall migrants level of education on arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not been to school</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Diploma</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor &amp; above</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

Despite the findings of this survey, other findings have suggested otherwise. In contrast to the information shown in Table 7.1 above Kyel et al (2004) and Allen (2006) perceived refugee and humanitarian migrants from economically poor and politically unstable countries to be poorly educated. The survey contradicts the assertion that this is so. Consistent with this finding, though, was research carried out among Bosnian, Sudanese, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali refugee migrants in West Australia by Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007) who found that those migrants who arrived from countries affected by civil war and conflict are generally
better educated and noted that “contrary to common perception that refugees arriving from economically and culturally ‘distant’ countries are poorly educated, recent refugees arriving in Australia are often well educated” (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2007, p.7). This is because relatively well educated migrants run away from political and ethnic persecution after they have been involved in politics and supported opposition political parties.

Furthermore, DIMIA noted that due to the selective nature of Australia’s immigration polices, the educational levels of all migrants (taken as a whole) were higher than that of the Australian-born population (DIMIA, 2005). Although the Australian government’s policy in accepting refugee and humanitarian migrants was based on grounds of their claim and refugee status in the asylum country, it is believed that educated refugees and humanitarian migrants presented their case persuasively and explained themselves very well. The reasons for the high rates of migrants who had not been to school (or no prior education) on arrival were believed to be associated with poverty, instability, ongoing conflict and civil wars that displaced and disrupted the normal day to day lives and activities of ordinary people in the region. As some of these migrants arrived in Australia while they are still young and in their early twenties, it is believed that the refugee camp life and their settlement in remote and isolated refugee camps had also affected their chances of improving their levels of education, acquisition of skills and preparation to enter the labour market after arrival.

Table 7.2 shows that there was a huge gap between the education levels of males and females, whereby males were dominant at almost all levels of education with females much more likely not to have attended school. Accordingly, the number of males with post school education was six times higher than that of females. On arrival over half (50 percent) of men and women had high school education, but, only 5.4 percent of females had post school qualifications. In
contrast to this, however, 37.7 percent of males had post school education on arrival. Sadly, the number of females who have never been to school was twice that of males. It is believed that the ongoing conflicts and civil war that displaced people from their usual places of residence, the patriarchal culture of these societies and the reluctance of parents to invest in girls education (Kifle, 2007), as well as the inaccessibility of schools in most rural areas attributed to such a huge educational gap between males and females.

**Table 7.2 Horn of Africa Migrant Level of Education on Arrival by Sex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in school</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Diploma</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree &amp; above</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>284</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>110</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

Research carried out among Eritrean women showed that despite the economic and social roles of women in the family, Eritrean parents were reluctant to invest in the education of their daughters (Kifle, 2007). Furthermore, research carried out on the educational and employment aspirations of young Somalis in Melbourne found that generally, women were less educated than men, and 2 out of 12 mothers or 16.7 percent of them had never been to school (Omar, 2005). Somali women were the least educated and only 8.3 percent of them did not complete primary school (Omar, 2005). Other research carried out in UK found that 55 percent of Somali refugee women had no formal education (Bloch, 2007).

On arrival the surveyed Horn of Africa migrants had different skills and qualifications in a wide range of disciplines ranging from semi skilled (certificate and diploma) to highly
qualified professionals (post graduate Masters and PhD degree holders). The latter were in the fields of computer and mathematical sciences, economics, statistics, accounting, medicine and surgery, nursing, laboratory technicians, teachers, pedagogy, community development workers, aviation science, aircraft electrician and instrument, radio program producer, agriculture, food and nutrition, chef, management, veterinary, Telecommunication, Industrial chemistry, Zoology and wild life conservation. Some of these qualifications and skills were in great demand and in short supply in the Australian labour market, but a good number of them (see chapter 6) were unemployed and could not find jobs partly because of the lack of recognition of their overseas qualifications and work experience, and employers’ reluctance to employ workers from a different cultural background.

On arrival most of the Horn of Africa migrants (including those who had overseas qualifications) first enrolled in English language courses to improve their English for employment, to learn Australia values and way of life, and to acquire new skills or upgrade their overseas qualifications to Australian standards. Despite the psychological and physical traumas many of these migrants went through both in their countries of origin and refugee camps in asylum countries, the survey found that the migrants were resilient, optimistic and positive about their future in Australia. After arrival, some 58.3 percent of the respondents (see Figure 7.2) obtained different levels of skills and qualifications from Australian educational and training institutions.

Table 7.3 shows that as time went by, the levels of education of long-term residents improved. While 48.8 and 14 percent of longer-term respondents (those who arrived before 1995) obtained their bachelor and postgraduate degree respectively, only 13.2 and 4.4 percent of those who arrived between 2001 and 2006 had obtained an equivalent qualification from
Australian colleges and universities. Over half of those who arrived between 2001 and 2006, attended short term courses and obtained certificates. With regards to the education and employment of longer-term residents, it has been more generally found that the educational and employment conditions of long-term migrants improve over-time (Allen, 2006; Hugo, 2009).

Table 7.3 Australian Qualifications Obtained by Year of Arrival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obtained Qualification</th>
<th>Before 1995 No.</th>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
<th>Total Average No.</th>
<th>Total Average %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 Survey

It was noted that not all migrants who arrived in Australia with overseas qualifications were able to obtain or upgrade their qualifications to Australian levels/standards. Among other things, lack of recognition for overseas qualifications, lack of English language skills, and responsibility to support those left behind forced many migrants to look for any job they could find to support their families. Personal responsibilities to support their families forced many of the migrants who had overseas qualifications to attend short-term training courses so that they could find jobs.

7.2.1 Horn of Africa Migrants Levels of Education by Country of birth

Depending on the prevailing level of peace, stability and social unrest of the country of birth, the Horn of Africa’s migrants’ levels of education varied considerably. The survey found that migrants from more unstable countries had low levels of education and higher rates of persons
with no schooling while migrants from relatively peaceful and stable countries were found to be better educated. As shown in Table 7.4, due to the ongoing civil wars and instability in Somalia and the Sudan, 12 percent of Somalis and 7 percent of the Sudanese migrants had no education on arrival and only 29 and 9.7 percent of them had post school qualifications respectively. In contrast, migrants from Ethiopia had the highest proportion of high school and post school education and the lowest levels of illiteracy (not in school at all). On arrival, 56.5 percent of Ethiopians and nearly 52 percent of Sudanese had completed high school education, while the Eritreans had the highest (42 percent) representation of migrants with post school (diplomas and above) qualification and the Sudanese had the lowest (25.5 percent).

The survey found that the relative stability of the country of birth was positively correlated with migrants’ education on arrival. The more unstable and volatile the country was, e.g. Somalia and Sudan in this case, the lower the educational attainment of migrants on arrival. Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, (2007) also noted that migrants from an unstable country like Somalia had high rates of illiteracy and there were few with post school education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th></th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th></th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never been in school</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor and above</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>149</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>114</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

A Sudanese migrant who lived in the conflict region (along the border) described the suffering of the people and the difficulties of sending children to school as follows:
“I used to live in a region where there was ongoing war. My parents decided to leave the area and eventually we fled to Kenya. Due to the ongoing conflict and wars I had no chance to go to school. There is no school nearby for that matter. After we moved to Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, there was no proper school for persons like me but only for young children. All my dreams and hopes were focused on getting my immediate needs and to be safe and alive. If I knew that I will have a chance to move and live in a country like Australia; I would have started learning while I was in refugee camp and my present life would have been different”.

According to this young man, by virtue of living in the region along the border, he had become more vulnerable than anyone else. The ongoing civil war not only disrupted the lives of people in the conflict zone but also forced them to flee. The prevailing circumstances did not let him to go to school while he was in his country of birth or in refugee camps in asylum countries. It is evident that while living in refugee camps the young man lost all motivation to learn and improve himself.

7.3 Migrants Level of English Language Proficiency on Arrival

Language is one of the most important tools humans use to communicate, interact and express their feelings. Fluency in English language has significant impact in socializing with others, shortening the time to fully understand the values and culture of the host society and, most importantly, finding employment (labour market participation), attending training and education and other social activities (Taylor, 2004). Proficiency in English language is believed to pave the way for successful settlement and integration. As all of the Horn of Africa migrants were from Non-English Speaking backgrounds, some interviewed migrants claimed that learning English was one of the most challenging tasks and daunting experiences, including those who had arrived here with overseas qualifications.

As shown in Figure 7.1, on arrival the Horn of Africa migrants English language competency levels varied from not at all and poor to very good and fluent. By their own admission and
self ratings, 27 percent of them admitted that they did not speak English at all, and 13 percent rated their English language skills as poor. The low English language competency hampered learning/acquiring new skills, finding jobs or meeting the competency levels that most educational and training service providers required. However, almost one fifth of these migrants did rate their English language skills as very good and fluent.

**Figure 7.1 Migrants Level of English Language Skills on Arrival**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of English language skills among migrants.](chart)

Source: 2006 survey

Given the differences in their English language proficiency, the questions that need to be asked should be how a lack of English language affected their settlement, employment and social interaction? What other impacts and challenges did it pose or create for these migrants? Table 7.5 shows that, among the unemployed Horn of Africa migrants, 22 percent of the respondents rated their English language skills as fair and good. Those migrants who rated their English language skills as very good and fluent had the highest (73 percent) employment rates. Although proficiency in English language is a common problem among these migrants, the severity of the problem is higher among those who rated their English language skills as fair, and those who have little or limited contact with people outside their family and community, such as housewives, mature migrants (the elderly) and those with no prior education.
Lack of English not only jeopardizes their employment and educational opportunities, it also limits their interaction with others outside their community. Such problems are also believed to be the stumbling blocks of integration, learning and understanding Australian culture, values and ways of life. The survey also found that being unable to speak English forced some of these migrants to settle in close proximity to fellow country persons for interpretation and translation services, emotional, social and cultural support (for details on this issue see the next chapter).

Table 7.5 Employment Status by English Language Competency of Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Level of English Proficiency</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Good &amp; Fluent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2006 survey

Community and religious leaders emphasized how a lack of English language prevented some talented, energetic and active members of their community from attaining their dream goals or to interact and socialize with others. With regards to the lack of English language, a Somalia community leader noted how some sections of the media wrongly and unfairly targeted and misrepresented Somali youth. The leader also noted how the inability to speak fluent English made members of their community, particularly the youth, victims of all sorts of media speculation:

“Not being fluent and unable to speak good English not only made us unemployed but also tarnish the image of our people and lives. When crimes are committed in the suburbs many of our youth spend or socialized, police and some section of media unfairly target and treat our youth particularly when their accent /slag are thought to be different”.
Depending on migrants prior education and English language competency on arrival, the period of studying English language varied from as little as a few months to as long as two or more years. From the interviews carried out it was noted that while some migrants, particularly those who arrived here with little prior education, were not happy with the allocation of 510 hours of learning to all migrants across the board (regardless of their prior level of education and individual learning differences). It is important to note that a few of these migrants were unaware that they could apply for an extra 400 and 800 hours after they finished the 510 hours to study basic communication skills.

7.4 Obtaining Australian Qualification after Arrival

To many Horn of African migrants (including those who arrived with some overseas qualifications) obtaining Australian qualifications after arrival was not easy. As one Somali medical doctor who went through a traumatizing experience in his country and in an asylum country noted:

“Forgetting what we went through and settling emotionally and psychologically to start a new life in a new country and pursuing a new career or upgrading an old one will not be an easy task. It requires a positive attitude about life, extraordinary commitments and ability to forget the past and concentrate on tasks at hand and look forward”.

Although the personal and family circumstances of many of these migrants did not allow them to spend another three or four years to acquire new skills and professions in universities, the survey found a few courageous and zealous individuals who were able to spend a few years studying at university to upgrade their qualifications or obtain new ones. Figure 7.2 shows that while 58 percent of the respondents gained Australian qualifications after arrival, the remaining 42 percent (including those who had overseas qualifications), were unable to do so because they had personal and family responsibilities and expectations to meet.
Many of them had spent 10 or more years in refugee camps, and did not want to spend another two or four years studying in TAFE or university. Therefore they preferred to enroll in short-term courses that enabled them to find jobs. Most of these migrants are committed to support the education of their children or orphaned relatives. A few of these migrants had health problems (including mental health) and gave up everything as a result. They also suffered financially while running away from ongoing war, conflict and persecution, and many of them lost their property and valuable personal and educational documents. As a result, they could not produce evidence of their overseas qualifications to further their study or work. Those who wanted to pursue their studies often started from the beginning either by doing a certificate or enrolling in bridging courses as a pathway to enter tertiary education.

An interviewed migrant who had overseas qualifications in library and information technology had changed his career and trained as a health worker (nurse) giving the reason he changed his professional career as follows:

“I am qualified librarian. I could not find job with my overseas qualification. I was forced to look into other field and later trained as a health worker (nurse). After I finished my study I found a job without any problems and had little competition from locals”.

Source: 2006 survey
The survey also found that the motives to obtain Australian qualifications after arrival varied from person to person. While some migrants were motivated to obtain Australian skills and qualifications to find jobs and maximize their earnings in Australia, others did so to serve the people of their country of birth upon return. Others do so to get better recognition and social respect upon their return to their country of birth. Among the young university and college students and graduates interviewed in this survey, nearly half of them have a plan to serve their people and country of birth with the skills and knowledge they acquired in Australia. From the conversation and interviews with these groups, over half of those interviewed hoped to return to their country of birth with the intention of making their contribution. It was learned that some of these migrants were highly ambitious and inspired by the political system and freedoms they enjoy in Australia. An interviewed Sudanese university graduate summed up the reason why he wanted to return to his country of birth as:

“I want to contribute my part in the nation building effort currently underway in my country. I want to make a difference by serving my people and country of birth by the skills, knowledge and experience I acquired in Australia”.

From the conversation and group discussions made with these young men, it was noted that some of these students are ambitious and want to fight corruption, promote transparency in government, democratic values and multiparty political system in their country of birth. The survey also found that the aspirations of migrants to obtain Australian qualifications are high after ten or so years of living in Australia. With regard to returning to their country of birth an interviewed Ethiopian man noted that:
“I lived here for over twelve years. When the political situation of my country improves, like anyone else, I want to go home. My frustration however is what will I take home upon my return? I have been working and supporting my family for the last 9 or so years. At the moment I do not have any skills, qualifications or money to take home to invest on my return. If I got an Australian qualification, this will be my asset and I won’t worry about money. At the moment I have neither the money nor the skills to depend on. Going back without saving money or qualifications will be embarrassing to me and my family. What is the point of going back then?”

From the above statement it was clear that before returning to their country of birth, migrants often ask themselves what they will take home with them or bring to their country of birth. It was noted that migrants are ashamed to return to their country of birth if they can not bring money to invest upon their return or have the skills and qualifications to serve their people. It was also noted that returning with some kind of qualification helped them to improve their image, acceptance, social status, and boost their employment opportunities in their home country.

7.4.1 Overseas and Australian Qualifications in Finding Employment

In Australia, obtaining qualifications from an educational institution or training establishment is perceived as a sign of possessing the required knowledge and skills to do the job (ABS, 2007). From their social networks and while searching for employment many of these migrants learnt how Australian labour markets operate, and that employers favoured Australian qualifications and work experiences. Hence, acquiring skills and qualifications from Australian educational and training institutions remains the top priority of many Horn of Africa migrants. Accordingly, this survey found a positive correlation between obtaining Australian qualifications and finding employment. Figure 7.3 shows that 56.4 percent of male and 21.8 percent of female respondents perceived that obtaining Australian skills and qualifications increased their employability. However, 22 percent of the migrants who had already obtained Australian qualifications and skills were unable to find employment.
Obtaining Australian skills and qualifications are a necessary but not the determining factor in finding employment. It tends to be a function of a number of interrelated factors such as age, fields of study, personal effort and social networks, commitment and willingness to accept jobs in regional areas.

**Figure 7.3 Employments by Qualifications and Sex**

![Bar chart](image)

Source: 2006 survey

Consistent with this finding the Australian Social Trends (ABS, 2007) emphasized the strong correlation between levels of education and chances of employment as follows,

“When considering the benefit of education, one aspect that generates much interest is labour market outcomes. People with non-school qualifications have a much lower chance of being unemployed than people who have completed school level of education only” (ABS, 2007, p.7).

Finding employment having overseas qualifications, particularly for those who were educated in their own countries (the Horn of African countries), is very challenging, because of the lack of recognition of these qualifications, work experience and employers preference to employ those with local qualifications and work experience. As shown in Figure 7.4 of all the Horn of Africa migrants who arrived in Australia with overseas qualifications, only one-third of them found employment and the other two-thirds were unable to find a job using their qualifications. Among those who found employment, many were educated in countries like the former USSR, South Africa, India and other western countries and had come to Australia
under spouse visas. Although some of these migrants had extensive work experience, including in international organizations, NGOs, and multinational companies, it was learned that some of these migrants had to re-train to upgrade their overseas qualifications to Australian standards. It was learned that finding jobs without undergoing or enrolling in re-training programs was very difficult if not impossible.

Figure 7.4 Horn of African Migrants Employments Using Overseas Qualifications

Source: 2006 survey

7.5 Challenges and Opportunities of Horn of Africa Migrants

From formal and informal discussions made with different members of the communities, religious and community leaders, survey respondents, plus personal observation, it was noted that the Horn of Africa migrants face a lot of challenges. Some of the most common challenges are lack of English language skills, marketable skills, high unemployment rates and lack of recognition of their overseas qualifications and work experience. Some of these challenges are personal and require individual and personal effort, whereas others are structural and require changes in policy and the collaboration of different stakeholders (government and private employers). There is a need for long and short term planning on how such disadvantaged migrants can be incorporated into the Australian labour market.
The other challenges these migrants face in entering the Australian labour market even after they have obtained Australian qualifications are the lack of work experience, racism and prejudice, and difficulties to obtain at least three referees who have known them for a year or so. From personal observation and discussions made with community leaders, one of the main concerns of these migrants (including those who obtained Australian qualifications) is the difficulty to get access to the labour market. As shown in Figure 7.3 above, 22 percent of respondents who obtained Australia skills and qualification were unable to find employment. Despite obtaining Australian skills and qualifications it appears that some employers are reluctant to employ inexperienced workers or invest in their training, particularly when language is an issue, culture and physical appearance is apparent. While some migrants refer to their job searching experience as the most challenging and daunting others consider employers’ requirements for Australian work experience, qualification and English proficiency (where no experience and language proficiency needed) as a hurdle placed to filter out these migrants.

The other challenge faced by the Horn of Africa migrants with overseas qualifications has been the difficulty to produce evidence of their qualifications, as many of them lost their personal belongings while fleeing from conflict and war. Hence, it is not easy to fulfill the higher education entrance requirement or to enroll in higher level training programs. As a result nearly a quarter of them start their professional career by enrolling in short term courses or training programs. This tends to serve two goals. Firstly, short-term training programs enable them to find a job. Secondly, the certificate they obtained from these programs helps them to fulfill the entrance requirement to enroll in TAFE or university. Some interviewed migrants who had already obtained a diploma or degree from TAFE and university started their professional careers (particularly those in the health sector) by obtaining certificates III
or VI in areas where employment is readily available. The other most important opportunities that many of these migrants openly admit, is being safe and secure, being able to send money to support their family and the better future for their children.

### 7.6 Barriers to the Employment of the Horn of Africa Migrants

Despite the continuous growth of the Australian economy and low levels of national unemployment, the Horn of Africa migrants had the highest unemployment rates and low levels of income. A number of factors contribute to these migrants’ higher unemployment rates and lack of participation in Australian labour market, particularly in the first few years of arrival. One could argue that they go far beyond the traditional and commonly known factors, such as lack of English language skills, marketable skills, and information (Colic-Peisker, 2003; Kyel et al, 2004; DIMA, 2005; Allen, 2006).

Oromo and Somali community’s leaders in Melbourne believe that the high unemployment rates among these migrants are partly due to the government reluctance to recognize overseas qualifications and work experience, and limited incentives to employers who employ inexperienced workers and new arrivals. Failure to recognize overseas skills, qualifications and work experience makes employers to lack the confidence to employ overseas educated and qualified migrants; particularly those educated in Africa and arrived under refugee and humanitarian programs. These community leaders believe that the existing job networks are designed and developed to assist non-migrant job seekers. They are not designed or developed with the intention of addressing the problem of refugee and humanitarian job seekers. Insufficient or inadequate job networks (like Australian Refugee Association) that specialize in addressing and understanding the employment needs and problems of refugee and
humanitarian migrants are seen as structural problems contributing to the high unemployment rates of these migrants.

Migrants with low levels of English proficiency have higher welfare dependency (DIMIA, 2005). The findings of this survey noted that the majority of the unemployed migrants, who tend to be young, healthy and a mixture of longer resident and new arrivals, is found to have difficulty in English. It was also noted that a few of the social welfare recipients who claim themselves to be unemployed are found working in family owned and informal sectors in “cash in hand” jobs. The other barriers contributing to high unemployment among these migrants are cultural differences on how to sell and promote ones own skills and talents, lack of information on how the Australian labour market operates, and racism (favoring locals over immigrants).

The survey among the Horn of Africa migrants found that being unemployed and being dependent on the social welfare system has created enormous moral and social pressures among more men than women. With regard to the importance of finding employment (DIMIA, 2005, p.25) noted that:

“Employment helps to give a person identity, social contact and shared sense of belonging...employment is a way in which people develop the skills of collaboration and a route to self-development and realization of personal potential”.

Therefore, finding employment has an enormous moral and social impact on migrants' well-being. By virtue of being unemployed, and being dependent on social welfare benefit, where each family member receives payment into their bank account or paid into mother’s (not father’s) account depending on the age of the children, the Horn of Africa men feel marginalized and their patriarchal and traditional family roles diminished by the Australian social welfare system that treats all family members on equal grounds.
It was also noted that unemployment has quite a different personal and social impact among men and women. From the formal and informal discussions on unemployment, it was learned that unemployed men feel that their traditional family role is diminished with their family bread winner and decision making roles taken away. With regards to dimensioning traditional roles of men in their family an interviewed community leader noted that:

“As family head, we are expected to provide our family with basic needs. While some of us used to work at different posts in government, others run their own business. When we left our country we lost our jobs, business and social and family status. Our role as family head and bread winner diminished and was overlooked by our own family because we are all dependent on Centrelink and we do not have the power and role we used to have”.

It seems that among male migrants finding a job will help reinstate their traditional roles, moral and social values in the family and reduce the stigma they encountered by diminished traditional roles. However, the feelings and sentiments of unemployed Horn of Africa female migrants are quite different to men, as they feel more independent, empowered and liberated from male dominance and the patriarchal system which they were accustomed to at home.

Furthermore, it was noted that many of the Horn of Africa migrants arrived in Australia with great hopes, dreams and expectations. However, their inability to find jobs ultimately erodes the positive expectations of these migrants and makes them lose self-confidence. With regards to this (Fagen, 2006, p. 70) noted that “A refugee starts at the bottom rung of the new social hierarchy. They find that their competency is not recognized and they are instead reduced to being only this, a refugee”. Such sentiment is high and embarrassing, particularly when they are professional, fit and ready to work and their profession is in great demand in the Australian labour market but cannot find jobs.
7.7 Conclusion

By their own admission, migrants claimed that a lack of English language has affected their economic as well as social interaction and integration in their lives. Refugees from poor and war torn countries are often perceived as poor and less educated. Nonetheless, the findings of this survey prove otherwise. On arrival the Horn of Africa migrants’ level of education was much better than commonly anticipated as “poorly educated” with over 82.2 percent of them having completed high school and post school education. Despite their relatively better academic performance, sadly many of them lack the skills and work experience to find jobs.

Those migrants who arrived here with some qualifications tended to be much more successful in upgrading their skills/qualifications, in re-training or in enrolling in new courses than those who arrived without any qualifications. Although obtaining Australian qualifications drastically improves the chances of employment and earnings, it does not always result in employment. Ability to obtain a job remains the function of a number of interrelated issues such as, but not limited to, field of study, age, personal and social network and communication skills. Those migrants who have lost their documents often start their career development from scratch as they have no evidence, and it takes them longer to even enroll in TAFE or university.

Compared to the national unemployment rate, that of the Horn of Africa migrants was close to four times higher. The reasons are many and diverse, however the most common were lack of English language, marketable skills, lack of recognition of overseas qualifications and work experience and racism. Lack of recognition of overseas educated and qualified refugee
humanitarian migrants eroded the confidence of employers to employ them. Furthermore, the absence of support to employers who are willing to employ new arrivals and inexperienced migrants with refugee and humanitarian backgrounds exacerbated the problem. Sadly, the financial support these migrants receive from Centrelink without a time limit has also created reluctance to find a job. The findings of this survey show that being unemployed and dependent for an extended period (sometimes up to 10 or so years) both in asylum and countries of origin creates moral and social issues which have affected men’s feelings and perceptions of their roles in the family.
CHAPTER VIII
THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS OF THE HORN OF AFRICA MIGRANTS

8.1 Introduction

There are considerable linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences among the Horn of Africa migrants, which have been exacerbated by the domestic socio-economic and political problems of their countries of origin. Bringing together such a heterogeneous and diverse group of people under one community association is not easy and most migrants organize their formal associations and informal social network groups along ethnic lines.

While most informal social network groups are set up to solve the financial and emotional problems of members, the formal associations, such as NGOs, ethnic and community associations, are set up to raise their collective concerns and address their community integration and settlement problems, as well as to promote the culture, language and other social and traditional values of their communities. The formal associations and informal social network groups of these migrants are influenced by the socio-economic and political problems in their country of birth, and are generally founded on the basis of their ethnicity, languages, kinship and conjugal relationships, and also the political and religious convictions of the migrants.

Despite the existence of vibrant and dynamic inter-personal and community interactions and social networks within and across the Horn of Africa migrant communities, there is also division, animosity, mistrust and suspicion among them, particularly among rival ethnic groups. Negative feelings and perceptions toward each other in the host country tend to originate from the social-economic and political divisions of their country of birth.
The Horn of Africa migrants are interdependent and have complex family and clan relationships. They define family broadly and it is not limited to husband, wife and children. Rather it includes extended family members of kinship and conjugal relationships. Even after they are exposed to western culture and lifestyles, many Horn of Africa migrants still define family in cultural and traditional ways. As (Findley, 1997) noted, African families are interdependent and their relationship is symbiotic. As a result, the decision of one family can affect or influence the decisions of others (Ocholla-Ayayo, 1997).

This chapter examines how Horn of Africa migrants form and utilize different types of formal and informal associations and social network groups as a coping strategy, to address personal and collective problems, promote their culture and languages, and provide different types of settlement support services. They also share information and facilitate the migration of those left behind, and keep contact with people in their country of birth. This chapter also looks into the ways migrants participate in the socio-economic and political development of their communities in their countries of origin.

8.2 Different Types of Social Networks and Informal Associations

The Horn of Africa migrants have different types of informal social network groups and formal associations through which they provide a wide range of support services to their members. Some of these informal social networks and formal associations are founded on the basis of gender, ethnicity and religion, and others are based on common interests and country of birth. The types of informal social groups and associations these migrants form in Australia are similar to those they had while in their country of birth and in refugee camps in an asylum country. When they migrated to Australia, they brought the tradition and support network system with them.
In some cases the purpose of informal associations and social network groups overlap. In time of death and grief, the different social network groups (the emotional and financial support network groups as well as ethnic community association and religious institutions) provide emotional as well as financial support to the grieving family. Among other things, the support services provided to members of social network groups include (but not limited to) raising and donating money in time of grief (death of member of the social group or their family members), accident or when a member of the social group plan to travel overseas to pay dowry, get married, or buy a house, car or travel to visit family and friends left behind. The tradition of coming together and pooling resources to support and solve individual problems help these migrants to cope with their new life in Australia.

In most cases the informal social network groups are founded on the basis of trust and reciprocity and governed by customary law (commonly accepted social values). They do not have legal documents or contractual agreements that stipulate the rules by which all members of the group abide. Therefore, there are few means to use Australian legal system, to re-enforce group decisions, norms and values against wrongdoers. These social network groups often use different social pressure and sanction against group decisions and norms violators or offenders.

In contrast to the social groups and informal associations described above, the survey also found politically motivated and orientated social groups. Members of such social group are often like minded individuals who have similar political convictions and share common political values or have been previously convicted because of their political activities or involvement (being a member or supporter of opposition political parties or liberation movements), and were subsequently forced to leave their countries of origin. Members of such
social groups often raise money to support opposition political parties or liberation movements of their choice. Despite their engagement in the political situation of their countries of origin, members of such groups often align themselves with human rights activists who defend the human rights situation of their countries of origin. The findings of this survey presented the detailed information obtained from members of the financial, emotional and political social network groups.

8.2.1 Financial Support Social Network Groups

The financial support social network groups are popular and common among all Horn of Africa migrant communities. These groups have different names among different communities. For instance, among Ethiopians the financial support network group is called “Iqub”, “Ayutoo or Hagbad” among the Somalis, “Hujo” among the Oromos and “Sanduq” which means box among the Sudanese. Although they have different names among different communities, the objectives and the services they provide are the same i.e. providing interest free informal loans through group savings. By contributing a fixed amount of money on a regular basis, the financial support groups generate a fund which revolves among members. It is a traditional way of group savings where people of more or less similar levels of income pool their financial resources together to help one another or do something important in their life. With regard to this Aredo (1993, p14) noted that:

“These are essentially savings schemes that are usually used to build up the initial capital necessary to establish oneself in petty trade, or to save in order to invest in livestock. They may also be used in times of crisis for credit when a large sum of money is needed (typically to pay medical costs)”.

The financial support network groups are often formed among close friends, extended family members or trusted individuals. These support groups are often formed on the request of one or more members of Sadaq/Huja/Iqub (the financial support network group). To raise the
required amount of money, members of the group pool their financial resources together and contribute fixed amounts of money on a regular basis (often every month or fortnight). The money collected from all members is given to a member of the group on the basis of need not as a gift but as an interest free loan. This type of informal loan does not require collateral, pay slip or the signing of documents. Among the group, such a practice is based on trust and reciprocity. The process continues and the payment revolves among members of the group until every member of the group receives an equivalent amount of money they have contributed. For instance, the financial support network group or Saduq/Hujo/Iqub of Ethiopian and Eritrea background, which had 20 members, was formed after three members of the group planned to buy a car to enter the taxi business, to travel overseas to visit family and to make a deposit to buy a house. To help their friends plan all members of the group agreed to setup Saduq/Hujo/Iqub to raise the money for their friends. Most members of the group were self-employed (taxi drivers, café, grocery and restaurant owners), and only a few were public and private sector employees.

Due to reciprocity, they often joined such a social group when one of their close friends asked them. If a person refused to join Saduq/Hujo/Iqub, they may not get similar support from their peers or social groups at their time of need. Here reciprocity plays a very important role in forming and running such support network groups. Members of social groups often participate in activities or programs with the understanding that they will receive similar support when needed. Putman (2000) argues that trust and reciprocity are the basis upon which social networks are founded.

Saduq/Hujo/Iqub are often formed through the verbal consent of members and without signing contractual agreements. Members of Saduq/Hujo/Iqub are often governed by the
principle of trust, customary law of migrant country of birth and widely accepted group norms. In the event of unforeseen incidents (such as death or accident), they often settle the matter through agreement based on the traditional and customary laws of their respective countries of origin. As one community leader affirmed “trust is the core value and principle many of these migrants rely upon to sustain this century old tradition of support network system in Australia”.

Traditionally, such support network groups do not compile evidence of payment by receipt, and neither are members requested to sign documents or receive receipt upon payment or receiving money. The study among the Horn of Africa migrants in the two cities, however, found that some financial support network group organizers compile evidence by ticking lists of names and requesting signatures of the recipient upon payment. One member of a financial network group noted such practices:

“As our society continues growing in number and integrated and accustomed to Australian ways of life, we noticed changes in attitude on relying upon trust. As a result, some financial support network group leaders forced to keep records and evidence of receipt and payment particularly when the payment is over Aus$2,000”.

Such initiatives are found to be new developments in the traditional support social network group, with organizers protecting the interests of its members. The size of the financial support network group varies from as small as 6 persons to as many as 20 or more. The life of these groups varies from three months to two years depending on its size and frequency of the contributions. Accordingly, the fortnightly contribution and the total amount of money members of the support network groups raise varies from as little as Aus$50 and 500 to Aus$1200 and Aus$40,000 respectively.

For the unemployed and those who have difficulty in getting loans from formal financial institutions, such support network groups are the only way of gaining access to the amount of
money they want without paying high interest rates to informal lenders. Forming such a support network group is a coping strategy these migrants have adapted in Australia. Research carried out among ethnic minority enterprises in London also found that East African migrants use informal and personal networks to raise money to start businesses (Fadahunsi et al, 2000, Carswell, 2000).

When members of a social group fail to repay or simply refuse to repay part or all of the money received the social group can not afford the legal costs or do not have signed documents to sue them in a court of law. In such situations, members of the social group often use social pressure and sanctions to maintain group norms and values. Violating group norms and failure to repay or to make fortnightly contributions has negative effects, including multidimensional sanctions such as isolation, denial of membership to other social groups and emotional support in time of grief, and the loss of group trust and respect. Such customary re-enforcement can affect members social values and confidence in their personal life. Such social pressure and the fear of losing the respect of peers sustain the function of such informal institutions (social group). “...once joined no one is tempted to defect later when they realize that their own contribution is outweighing their personal and social benefits” (Dercon et al, 2006, p.686). Hammer (2007) also noted that violators are often denied recognition as a person, and members of the group often avoid and refuse to socialize with such individuals. Footscray Community Legal Centre has compiled growing evidence from members of African migrant communities who give money to members of their communities without written documents and later faced difficulties in getting their money back (Fraser, 2009).

8.2.2 Emotional Support Network Groups
The emotional support network groups are widely used among these migrants in time of death
and grief. They have different names among different migrant communities. For instance they are called “Idder” among Ethiopians, “Affosha” among the Oromos, and “Qaaran” among the Somalis. Some scholars call such support network groups “group-based funeral insurance” (Carswell, 2000; Dercon et al, 2006). When members of the emotional support group or their family members die, members of the group often gather at the victim’s house to pay their tribute to the deceased, and provide financial and emotional support to the grieving family. The support of the emotional network group is limited to members of the social group and their family members.

The emotional support network groups are formed to cover funeral expenses or to transport the remains of the deceased person to his/her country of birth, if that is the will of the deceased person, and share other related expenses of the grieving families. To cover the funeral costs and other related expenses upon the death of a group member, members pay regular contributions and payments often made from such group savings. In addition to this, members nominate a few members of the group to entertain the grieving family and provide free labour (to prepare food, make coffee or tea to serve those who come to visit the family) for up to three days. The amount of financial support, material and free labour provided to a grieving family varies from group to group and depends on the size of the network group, membership status of the deceased person, where the person died and the relationship of the deceased person to a member of the emotional support network group.

The financial and emotional support provided to grieving families is intended to share the financial burden, to show sympathy and solidarity and to minimize the emotional and financial stress associated with the loss of a loved one. Commenting on how the death of a family
member causes financial pressure on an African family, Dercon and his colleagues (2006) noted that:

“...funerals are very expensive in terms of mortuary costs, costs of food and other items, since funerals last for at least 7 days. Households may also expect condolence visits for several months, adding substantially to the costs of catering for these visitors” (Dercon et al, 2006, p.687).

The funeral costs, extended grieving period and the tradition of catering for all visitors with food, deplete the financial resources of a family. The number of days these migrants gathered in a deceased person’s or relatives home for grievance varies from culture to culture and religion to religion, but commonly ran from three to seven days depending on where the person died and age, and the social status of the person in the community. The more friendly, sociable and popular the person, the longer the grieving period. Findley (1997) noted that the death of a person among African families is a big family and social event where all family members and relatives from near and far gather in the grieving family’s home for days to pay their respects. If the person died elsewhere, families are often informed through the emotional support network group (Idder or Afosha) leaders. While most of the emotional support network groups are still informal and not registered and have no license for the services they provide, some do register their services and activities with their local city councils and get recognition for what they are doing.

8.2.3 Political and Human Rights Activist Networks

Although the social network groups or informal associations of most Horn of Africa migrants focus and work on the cultural, financial, social and emotional well-being of fellow country persons in the host country, the findings of this survey show that there are also some politically active groups of migrants working on the political and human rights situations of their countries of origin. The majority of the Horn of Africa migrants in Australia are from
refugee and humanitarian backgrounds who have escaped the ongoing conflict, war and political persecution in their countries of origin (Allen, 1996; Hugo, 2009). Most of these migrants are not happy with the political and human rights situation of their countries of origin. Although many of these migrants have changed their citizenship and consider Australia their home, some migrants maintain their social networks and remain active in the domestic political situations of their countries of origin.

These politically active individuals have their own social network groups where they regularly meet to make membership contributions or raise money for the political parties/liberation movements of their choice, to discuss and share information on the human rights, socio-economic and political situations of their countries of origin and the political activities of the organizations they support. The fund raising efforts of the Ethiopia, Eritrean, Ogaden Somalis and Oromo diaspora communities from around the world, for opposition political parties and liberation movements, were reported both by the Ethiopian diaspora owned websites and well known international media like the Economist; [www.ethiopianreview.com/articlethes/1281; www.nazret.com/php/uploadnews/search.php and www.economist.com/world/africa/display story.cfm?story.cfm?storyid=10979876] viewed in Nov. 2007

Politically motivated social network groups operate under different names. Some of them operate under NGOs and others under human right activist/support groups within or under a community association. Members of the political network groups are politically conscious and usually the better educated members of the community. When the incumbent regime violates basic human and political rights of their people in their country of birth, they often lobby the Australian government to put pressure on their home governments and organize the diasporas community to denounce the violation and abuse of their peoples rights. Public rallies
organized by the Ethiopian, Eritrean, Oromos and Ogaden communities in Melbourne, Adelaide and Canberra in 2006, 2007 and 2008 against the Ethiopian government on vote rigging, the invasion of Somalia and human rights violation in Oromia and Ogaden were orchestrated by such social groups. Through such activism, members of such network groups often argue that peace, stability and peaceful co-existence among rival ethnic groups can be attained by respecting human rights and introducing multiparty political system regardless of their political orientation, ethnic or religious back ground.

8.2.4 Different Uses of Social Networks

In addition to the above, migrants also use their social networks for a wide range of purposes. As shown in Figure 8.1, the Horn of Africa migrants use their social networks from celebrating personal or family occasions, national holidays and religious events, to gather information about Australia’s immigration and family reunion policies, settlement and other services. Of all respondents while 52 percent of them use their social networks to celebrate social, national and religious events, sadly only 8 and 10 percent use them to find employment and share or exchange information on employment respectively. In contrast to this finding Palloni et al (2001) noted that most migrants in OECD countries use their social networks to find employment and/or share information about labour markets.
Before their migration to Australia, nearly all the surveyed individuals had relatives and close friends or at least knew someone who lived in Australia. Figure 8.2, shows that while 28 and 21 percent of them gather information about Australia from their siblings (brother or sister) and cousins respectively, 21 percent of them have contact with their friends who have settled and lived in Australia before them. Although there are a number of formal and informal sources of information about Australia, the majority of the Horn of Africa migrants rely on informal sources (family and friends) for information. Firstly, the information provided by their families and friends is more suited to their needs. Secondly, they trust this information. Thirdly, it is believed that accessing formal sources of information, such as books, newspapers and other online resources may be limited due to language barriers, education levels and the situation in asylum countries.
As shown in Figure 8.3 nearly 45 percent of the Horn of Africa migrants obtained information about Australia from friends and relatives, while a quarter (26 percent) of them obtained information from international organizations like UNHCR and IOM working closely with the Australian government on refugees and humanitarian migrants. Only ten percent of them obtained information from the Overseas Australian High Commission.

**Figure 8.3 Horn of Africa Migrants Sources of Information about Australia**
With regards to the trustworthiness of information received from friends, relatives and social networks Koser and Pinkerton (2001, p.15) observe that:

“For information to be trusted, its source needs to be trustworthy. One of the principal reasons why asylum seekers seem unlikely to attach weight to information disseminated by formal institutions is that these are not trusted. Interestingly, this does not appear to arise from a concern that institutions in destination countries will provide misinformation in order to deter asylum seekers, rather the issue is a lack of trust of any formal institution.”

After arrival, family and friends were found to remain the major source of information about Australian culture, way of life, services and employment, particularly among migrants who arrived in Australia prior to 2001. The Australian embassy in collaboration with IOM organized a three day information and orientation program to all refugees and humanitarian entrants who arrived after 2001. The orientation program included basic information about Australia, its people, history, culture, and way of life, values, their rights and obligations. Migrants indicated that such orientation and information sessions helped new arrivals in their settlement, jobs search, expectations and other aspects of their lives.

8.3 Community Affiliated Associations and Non-Profit Organizations

There are different types of associations and non-profit organizations affiliated to the Horn of Africa migrant community. In addition to the main support roles, ethnic and community associations are also used as a forum to discuss their common concerns on issues pertaining to unemployment, housing, discrimination, domestic violence and family breakdown. Through their community associations, they often address their problems to policy makers, service providers, politicians and governments. In contrast to the community associations, the non-profit organizations are formed to provide settlement support services that are not provided by main stream service providers and to raise money from the wider Australia society to carry out basic community development projects in their countries of origin. While some of these
associations and organizations are short lived and phased out after completing their set objectives/goals, others are formed as the need for such services and support arises. As a result, the number of these associations and organizations fluctuate from time to time.

8. 3.1 Non-Profit Organizations and Development Activities

As the number of migrants from the Horn of Africa region continues to arrive and settle in Australia, the need for awareness on the Australian way of life, and laws on family breakdown, violence, employment, housing and financial management, parenting and how to deal with youth have become apparent. As many of these needs are not provided for by mainstream settlement service providers, long-term residents who have gone through the process and acknowledge the problems have setup the first NGO called Horn of Africa Community Network Groups (HACNG). An interview with one of the founding members revealed that HACNG was founded in Melbourne to provide settlement support services that most Horn of Africa migrants needed. Later on, some members shifted their focus from supporting those who had already arrived in Australia to those who had been left in precarious situations in countries of origin with little access to basic community services such as schools, clinics and pure water supply.

The non-profit organization focusing on the development of basic community services and infrastructure attracted the attention and support of many Australians. As nearly all migrants want to carry out some kind of community development projects in their communities or regions, agreeing on where to carry out such projects remains a challenge. Hence, getting financial support for projects carried outside their community or region is not easy. This is mainly because most of these migrants are from underdeveloped and war ravaged regions and they want to help their own. This survey found that the non-profit organizations affiliated to
the Horn of Africa migrants raise funds or get their financial support from the wider Australian society and the public. As one of the south Sudan not-for-profit organization founders noted:

“Although the community development projects carried out by not-for-profit organizations benefit the people in the migrants country of birth, the Horn of Africa migrants participation in raising funds are insignificant. Instead of supporting community development projects that have a positive contribution in improving and benefiting the lives of local residents, almost all migrants focus on the support of their families and friends”.

The activities and success of the not-for-profit organizations depend on the level of commitment of its members and its capacity to raise funds to carry out a given project. Although these NGOs formed to carry out basic community development projects, such as building schools, clinics and clean water supply in remote and war torn regions, it was learned that the organizations were unable to mobilize the support of all migrants from the regions.

The South Sudan non-profit organization founder noted that:

“Although we carry out all our development projects within the South Sudan, some South Sudanese migrants do not take part in the fund raising activities particularly when the project is outside the region where they came from”.

Almost all of the not-for-profit organizations found in this survey tended to grow out of the pressing social needs of the Horn of Africa migrant communities in Australia and in their countries of origin. The number of NGOs operating in Adelaide and Melbourne vary significantly, with the majority based in Melbourne. As each of these organizations was founded with distinct objectives, listing all their activities and objectives is cumbersome and out of the scope of this study, and a short summary and description of a few selected organizations is listed. HACNG is the first NGOs formed in Melbourne to provide settlement support service to migrants from the Horn of Africa countries. Africa Think Tank (ATT) was founded by a group of scholars from the Horn of Africa countries, to carryout research and provide advice on the needs of the Horn of Africa migrant communities. It is intended to
bridge the gap by providing information to support policy makers and government service providers on the training, development, employment, education, housing, youth health and capacity building efforts of the different stakeholders (www.att.org.au). Other non-profit organizations such as South Sudan Development Association (SSUD), Tomorrow Foundation and the Kajojeji Australia Development Institute (KADI), Eritrean Community Development Association (ECDA), Oromo Relief Association (ORA), the Somali Development Organization (SDO) and others were founded to raise funds from the Australian society and carry out various development activities in their countries of origin.

Among the not-for-profit organizations founded by the Horn of Africa migrants, those carrying out various community development projects in South Sudan such as South Sudan Development Association (SSUDA), the Tomorrow Foundation and KADI are by far the most successful NGOs, both in raising funds from the wider Australian community and in carrying out community development projects such as primary schools, clinics and potable clean water in different parts of South Sudan. NGOs like SSUDA, for instance, encourages volunteers to join them to travel to South Sudan to see the development projects and to promote cultural awareness and understanding between Australians and South Sudanese (www.ssuda.org.au viewed in Apr. 2008).

Unlike the not-for-profit organizations founded by the South Sudanese migrants, the government of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia do not allow the NGOs formed by the diaspora community to carry out basic community development activities in their countries of origin. As a result some of these organizations provide humanitarian and education support to refugees and their families outside their country of birth. For instance, the Somali Development Organization in partnership with the Australian Heart Foundation provides free
medical treatment to Somali children who have no access to such treatment but suffer from serious heart and heart related illnesses. Like wise the ECDA also provides financial and material support raised from its members and the Australian society to Eritrean refugees in Sudan.

8.3.2 Ethnic and Community Associations

Although this survey found some community associations based on country of birth, the majority of the Horn of Africa migrants were organized under ethnic based community associations. They do so mainly because such associations organized in the name of their country of birth, often do not incorporate and reflect the cultural and linguistic diversity of all ethnic groups from that country. As a result it is not uncommon to see migrants from the same country being members of different ethnic community associations such as Dinka, Nuire, Bari, Oromo, Ogaden and Harari community associations.

Unlike Ethiopian and Somali migrants, interestingly the Sudanese organized their community associations on the basis of ethnicity and at the same time their country of birth. Individually, the different Sudanese ethnic community associations such as Dinka, Bari, Nuer, and Agnuak work on their language, culture and some distinct ethnic rituals. However, on issues they share in common, such as social, national, training and employment, housing and health problems, they work together under the umbrella of the Sudanese Community Association (SCA) in their respective States to raise their collective voice and to address their common concerns. The SCA serves as an umbrella or mother organization where the different ethnic community associations from South Sudan work together for the betterment of their community.

By allowing the different ethnic community associations to handle minor ethnic specific cases,
the South Sudanese migrants are able to recognize their diversity and maintain their unity. Sadly other Horn of Africa migrants do not have the South Sudanese type of community association arrangement, and are scattered and divided along ethnic lines. For instance migrants from Ethiopia are divided along political and ethnic backgrounds. With regards to this Gow (2002) noted that there is a bitter political division among Ethiopian migrants in Melbourne and some ethnic groups like the Oromos for example, do not even accept and acknowledge that they are Ethiopian. Although they are technically from Ethiopia and their homeland (fatherland as they call it) is not recognized and known as an independent state, they prefer to call their country of birth “Oromia” not Ethiopia (Gow, 2002). Unlike the Oromos, the Tigray and Harari believe in their Ethiopian roots, but they have their own ethnic community association because they do not want to be assimilated, dominated or influenced by the languages and cultures of other ethnic groups specifically the Amharas in the Ethiopian community association.

Due to complex political situations and ethnic relationships in Ethiopia and Somalia, the community associations of these migrants in Australia reflect the socio-economic and political problems of their country of birth. This is mainly due to a lack of appreciation of ethnic and cultural diversity, and the lack of willingness and commitment to incorporate the interests of different ethnic groups by the Ethiopian community associations. This has forced the Oromo, Tigray, Harari and Ogaden Somalis to disassociate themselves from being members of that association. The 2007 conflict between the Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups within the Ethiopian community association in Melbourne and Adelaide which led to the spilt in the Ethiopian Orthodox church and the closure of the Ethiopian community radio respectively, was the result of the deep rooted ethnic and political problems between migrants from that country.
In contrast to this, the survey found that the Eritrea community associations are not divided along ethnic lines but divided on the basis of their religion, political conviction and their relationship to the current Eritrean regime i.e. supporter and opponent of the incumbent Eritrean government. The division of the Horn of Africa migrant community associations along ethnic and political lines in the host country reflects the complex political problems and ethnic relationships in their countries of origin.

8.3.2.1 Ethnic Community Churches

The Horn of Africa migrants are heterogeneous in their religion, with the exception of the Somalis. Most of the Horn of Africa Christian migrant communities have their own ethnic community churches where they worship in their own languages and socialize with members of their own ethnic group. For example, in the Oromo community church, the program, announcements and teachings (preaching) are made in their own language, ‘Afan Oromo’. To attend such an ethnic church program, one needs to speak or understand the language. Unlike Christians, the Muslims worship together regardless of their ethnic and linguistic differences.

Some of these ethnic community churches provide emotional, social, spiritual and material support to members of their church and ethnic community. Such support services make the settlement experience of new arrivals rewarding and successful. Churches also provide mediating and counseling services when there are disputes or conflicts within family or among church members. Ethnic community churches also serve as meeting places where migrants with different political interests and social backgrounds meet to worship and socialize. When members of the church are grieving for a lost relative, they encourage and mobilize the congregations to provide financial and emotional support to the victim’s family. Furthermore, they also link new arrivals with long term residents through volunteers who visit them at their
home to give them emotional and spiritual support and help them to get around, particularly if the new arrival has no close friends, relatives or has arrived alone.

8.4 Social Networks and Settlement Patterns of Horn of Africa Migrants

The settlement patterns of new arrivals are influenced by the types of social networks they have had with someone already living in Australia. This has resulted in an uneven distribution of migrants across major Australian cities. In Melbourne and Adelaide, the Horn of Africa migrants are clustered within certain suburbs. For instance, in their research among the Sudanese migrants in Sydney, Perrin and Dunn (2007) found the concentration of a large number of Sudanese migrants in the suburb of Blacktown. Before deciding where to live (which cities or suburbs), or while looking for long-term accommodation, migrants often look into affordability and access to public transport. When they are new and have a language problem, they often consider presence of fellow country persons in the area and other facilities such as church where they can worship with other fellow country persons in their own language. Settling where fellow country persons live is seen as an important coping strategy. The settlement of the first contingent of Ethiopian and Somali refugees and humanitarian migrants in the city of Melbourne and the social networks and relationships new arrivals have with them has influenced the settlement pattern of later arrivals from this region.

As shown in Figure 8.4, 55 and 15 percent of the respondents confirmed that they received various settlement support services from friends, and relatives and ethnic/community associations respectively. The settlement support provided by friends and family may be exaggerated because of the snowball sampling techniques used in the survey where respondents often referred to their close friends, family members, their sponsor or persons that they sponsored.
The majority of the Horn of African migrants settled in the city in which they had relatives and close friends. Out of the total respondents, 295 or 78.4 percent of them arrived and settled in the city they had close friends and relatives. For instance, of all the 250 Horn of African migrants settled in the Victoria, 211 or 84.4 percent of them had relatives and close friends in Melbourne. The 2006 census data show that of all the Horn of Africa migrants living in Melbourne, nearly two-thirds of them are concentrated in five Local Statistical Government areas as shown in Table 8.1. For instance, of the over 6,130 Sudanese migrants living in Melbourne (ABS, 2006), 44.5 percent of them are concentrated in the areas of Greater Dandenong, 33 percent around Brimbank-Sunshine-Keilor and 16.7 percent around Maribyrong-Moonee-Valley. Accordingly, of the total Eritrea and Ethiopian migrants living in Melbourne, over 55 percent of them are clustered in inner Melbourne, Brimbank-Shunshine-Keilor and Greater Dandenong.
As shown in Table 8.2, the Horn of Africa migrants in Adelaide are also clustered in the Statistical Local Government of Port Adelaide-Enfield, Charles Stuart, and West Torrens city councils. This concentration of a large number of migrants in these areas is partly attributed to the settlement pattern and influence of long-term residents, the presence of a large migrant community and the social networks new arrivals have with long-term residents. Housing affordability, access to public transport and other major services such as mosques, Islamic College, and churches also play a part. Although the communities are clustered more in some statistical local areas than in others, they are scattered across the suburbs of Adelaide. Accordingly, while 42.8 and 37 percent of Eritrean and Somalis are concentrated in Charles Stuart council area, 46 percent of Sudanese are concentrated in the Port Adelaide-Enfield statistical local area.

Settling in close proximity with fellow country persons is seen as an opportunity to do business, maintain social networks to socialize, worship together, and support each other. Research carried out by Bittman et al, (2007) and report on the social costs and benefits of...
migration to Australia found that in Australia four out of five new arrivals, particularly those from non-English speaking backgrounds, settled and clustered in large cities where they can socialize with fellow country persons.

Table 8.2 Settlement of Horn of Africa Migrant in Top Five Adelaide Suburbs by Country of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOTE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This figure/table/image has been removed to comply with copyright regulations. It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: South Australia Ethnic Community Profile, 2007

8.5 Accommodation Problems and Family

Unlike the west, Africans define family in a broader and general way (Findley, 1997; Ocholla-Ayayo, 1997 and Adepojou, 1998). Among Horn of Africa migrants, family is not limited to wife/husband and children but includes kinship or extended family members like grandparents, uncle, aunts, nephews, nieces, cousins (including second, third and so on), conjugal relationships (father, mother, brother and sister-in-laws). As a result it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between close family and members of the extended family or kinship. In his study of the African family Ocholla-Ayayo (1997, p.60) noted what constitutes a family in Africa as follows:

“Among African people, the family has a much wider circle of members than the word denotes in Euro-American usage...In traditional settings, the family includes parents, children, grandparents, uncles, aunts, brothers and sisters—all of whom may have their own children and other immediate relatives”.
The way these migrants relate and see their relationships is complicated, especially when they run away with members of their extended family or clan. The strong personal relationship they develop over time and the time they spend together in good and bad times, creates a bond where they see each other as brother and sister or cousin. Two interviewed Somali and Sudanese migrants in Melbourne sponsored members of their clan (distant relatives) and preferred to call them “brother”. These migrants have the tradition of calling members of extended family or distant relatives (kinship or clan) brother/sister or cousin, and it is therefore difficult to draw a line and separate siblings and close relatives from extended family.

When their sponsored friends and relatives are guaranteed a visa to settle in Australia, the sponsors often share their accommodation with the new arrivals until they find their own place to live. In most cases the lease of their first accommodation expires within six or twelve months. When their agreement expires, they move from partly subsidized and relatively cheaper public housing to more expensive private rental properties. To save money, they often share accommodation and live in overcrowded situations. In most cases families of six or even ten live in three bedroom homes. Research carried out among Horn of Africa humanitarian migrants in Western Australia noted that:

“...many humanitarian entrants were having difficulty securing government and/or private housing after the six-month lease expired. Respondents reported lengthy waiting times for government housing and difficulties securing accommodation for large families that are common to this group (families of ten are not uncommon). Some families had resorted to leasing two separate dwellings to house their families. Barriers accessing private housing included cost, lack of referees and racism. Unless housing issues are addressed, African humanitarian entrants are at risk of homelessness and related social issues” (Office of Multicultural Interests, 2009, P. 37).

The most common reason for sharing accommodation (houses/unit) with family or fellow country persons are: Firstly, the soaring price of private properties and difficulty in finding affordable rental accommodation in the area the migrants want to live. Secondly, landlords are
reluctant to lease their property to unemployed, welfare dependent and large families with children, because they fear damage to property. Thirdly, they want to save money to support family left behind. As a result, large numbers of migrants from Horn region, including married couples, live in shared accommodation. Table 8.3 shows that the overall living arrangements of the Horn of Africa migrants vary significantly. While 62 percent of the respondents live with their families, only 12 percent of them live alone. It was also found that 71 percent of Ethiopian and 70.8 percent of Eritreans live with family. Sudanese had the lowest proportion with family (47.9 percent), as many more lived with friends and relatives. This is probably because many of Sudanese lost their immediate family in the civil war and arrived in Australia alone or with their relatives.

Table 8.3 Living Arrangement of Horn of Africa Migrant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Live with</th>
<th>Ethiopia No.</th>
<th>Ethiopia %</th>
<th>Eritrea No.</th>
<th>Eritrea %</th>
<th>Somalia No.</th>
<th>Somalia %</th>
<th>Sudan No.</th>
<th>Sudan %</th>
<th>Average No.</th>
<th>Average %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:-2006 survey

Table 8.4 shows that home ownership among the Horn of Africa migrants is very small. Of all the respondents, only 15.8 percent lived in their own houses/units with 38.8 and 37.3 percent living in private rental and public or community housing respectively. When we look further into each migrant group, 56.8 percent of the Somalis lived in public and community housing (as shown in Chapter Six they also have the highest unemployment rates), compared to 27 percent of Australians who live in rented and 65 percent in privately owned (fully owned and purchased) houses (ABS, 2007). Home ownership among the Horn of Africa migrants was
very small among the Somalis and Sudanese, while more Ethiopians and Eritreans owned their own homes.

Information obtained from the residents of Melbourne and Adelaide showed that the chances of getting public housing in Melbourne was better with waiting periods shorter than in Adelaide. When this information was collected, the waiting period to get public housing in Melbourne was under two years, while in Adelaide it varied from a minimum of two to a maximum of five years depending on individual circumstances. Those who lived in public housing in Adelaide noted that they waited for over two years after their application was approved even when identified as a high priority need.

### Table 8.4 Migrants Types of Accommodation and Home Ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of accommodation</th>
<th>Ethiopia No.</th>
<th>Ethiopia %</th>
<th>Eritrea No.</th>
<th>Eritrea %</th>
<th>Somalia No.</th>
<th>Somalia %</th>
<th>Sudan No.</th>
<th>Sudan %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private rental</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public house/unit</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own house/unit</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared accomm.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>149</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>397</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2006 survey

An interviewed person who moved from Adelaide to Melbourne said that his application for public housing in Melbourne was approved in less than a year. Among other things, one of the reasons many Horn of Africa migrants prefer to live in Melbourne is believed to be presence of large community and the shorter waiting period to get public housing.

### 8.6 Barriers to Integration

Lack of English language, unemployment, cultural shock and misunderstandings on both sides, housing problems (particularly for large families), and racism were found to be the
major barriers of successful settlement and integration. Of all these problems, English language and cultural difference are seen as the major barriers that hold back migrants from interacting and socializing with the wider Australian society. An interviewed community representative said that:

“We understand the importance of learning and speaking English for successful settlement and integration. We want to be good at it, because we have a lot of stories to tell and feelings to share. This is our country and we want to be part of it. Like everyone else, we do have different skills and talents. We want to use our talents and acquire new skills. We want to work and take part in the nation building effort. We do not want to be seen as a stranger and outsider. Because of language we were wrongly-judged and reported as bad people and criminals by some misinformed media. We know language is central to all of these and we need to be good at it”.

From the above community representative’s assertion, it was noted that migrants are aware of the power and importance of learning English, not only as a tool of communication to share ones feelings, stories and thoughts, but also as a unifying power of people of different races, backgrounds and faiths. Lack of English language not only slowed down the pace of integration but it also held migrants back from achieving their dreams, using their talents, and acquiring skills to find jobs. Furthermore, some Horn of Africa migrants believe that the former immigration minister’s (Mr. Andrew’s) remark and statement on the integration difficulties of Sudanese migrants had a negative reaction placing another hurdle on the integration of not only Sudanese, but also that of other African migrants. In contrast to what the then immigration minister said, this survey found that 81 percent of the Horn of Africa migrants believed that they have good social interaction with the wider Australian society.

Depending on the age, sex, personality and religious orientations of individual migrants, the reasons for not interacting and socializing with the wider Australian society vary from migrant to migrant. Figure 8.5 shows that, of the 19 percent of migrants who did not interact with the wider Australian society, 40 percent of them could not socialize/interact because of cultural
differences and 30 percent because of lack of English. Some of these migrants were older people with conservative cultural and religious views.

**Figure 8.5 Reasons for Not Interacting and Socializing with Others**

![Bar chart showing reasons for not interacting and socializing with others.](chart)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Difference</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loneliness</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health problems</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: - 2006 survey

Those who socialize and interact with the wider Australian society do interact with people from different backgrounds. Figure 8.6 shows that while 32 percent of migrants socialize and interact with work or class mates, 27 percent do so with their neighbours. As over half of these migrants have strong social networks and bonds with the people they work, study or live with, it seems that, access and proximity are the most important factors in determining who they interact and socialize with.

**Figure 8.6 Who the Horn of Africa Migrants Socialize and Interact with**

![Pie chart showing who the Horn of Africa migrants socialize and interact with.](chart)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School or workmate</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious people</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government &amp; NGOs staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: - 2006 survey
8.7 Conclusion

The Horn of Africa migrants are heterogeneous in their language, ethnicity and culture. Despite their differences they have a number of things in common. Among other things they share the culture of valuing large family sizes and consider members of the extended family as their family members. After fleeing their countries of origin many of these migrants were resettled in refugee receiving countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA and some European countries. By virtue of their settlement in these countries they have become a transnational society with a wide range of transnational and national social networks.

When the ongoing civil wars, political turmoil and environmental disasters in the Horn of Africa displaced millions of people and made them refugees and asylum seekers, their family and social bonds remained strong despite being separated from their home countries. The social networks of these migrants have different forms and uses. Some are purely social and are used for a wide range of social and personal activities, whereas others are political. These migrants use their social networks to cope with life, to gather information, to solve personal, financial and emotional problems, to socialize, find employment and to solve the political problems of their countries of origin.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

9.1 Introduction

As part of the international community response to alleviate the unfolding humanitarian crisis and human suffering in Africa, the Australian government for the first time in the early 1980s officially admitted migrants from the Horn of Africa countries. These have included refugees, women at risk, family reunion and other humanitarian entrants. The main focus of attention in their migration has been an immediate response to tragic circumstances. The long-term consequence of the migration and settlement in Australia has been little investigated. It is in this latter area that this study seeks to make a contribution.

The study has shown that the Horn of Africa migrants in Australia have not only engaged in the contribution of the Australian economy, social and civic services (Hugo, 2011) but also have made contributions to the economies of their home countries. The study has also shed light on how migrants from this region have used social networks to maintain their contacts and relationships with those left behind, and also to cope with a new way of life in Australia. Moreover, it has shown how the remittances and investment generated from these migrants has helped to change the perceptions of the regimes in their country of birth, who were once forcefully evicted and labeled them as sources of instability and social unrest. They are now call them “development partners” and encourage them to invest their hard earned money in their countries of origin.

This study has contributed to the small body of knowledge on the Horn of Africa migrants in Australia on issues pertaining to their integration, employment, social networks and support network systems. It has also shed light on labour market participation of migrants, the impact
of remittances on both the senders and receivers and the role of family owned money transferring businesses. The findings of this study also show how many migrants sell imported items and send money back home. This chapter presents a summary of the major findings and discusses the implications for refugee and humanitarian immigration policy and how migrants are influencing development in their countries of origin.

9.2 Major Findings

9.2.1 The Horn of Africa Migrant Population in Australia

The first immigrants from the Horn of Africa countries arrived and settled in Australia in the 1960s and 1970s when a few Ethiopian and Sudanese students who had studied in Australian universities stayed behind after completing their studies, because of the political situations in their countries of origin. A second wave of Horn of African migrants started arriving and settling in Australia in 1983 after the Australian government officially admitted the first small handful of Ethiopian and Somali refugees. Apart from a small number of migrants who arrived under tourist, student and other visas categories, nearly all of the subsequent Horn of African migrants were refugee and humanitarian settlers, or family members under the family reunion visa program. The majority of these migrants were young, predominantly males and from rural and farming backgrounds. Due to lack of English language, culture, low levels of education and religious reasons a few female Horn of Africa migrants took part in social gathering and activities.

Three decades after the Australian government officially accepted a few refugee and humanitarian migrants from this region; tens of thousands have arrived and made Australia their home. While language remains the major barrier to integration, most Horn of Africa migrants believe they have settled in well and interacted effectively with the wider Australian
society. This study found that the overwhelming majority of respondents (with the exception of the Sudanese) are married and under 30 years of age. Although the majority of them are married, some of them have left their partners and children behind and arrived in Australia alone.

The Horn of Africa migrants are concentrated and settled in major Australian cities, Melbourne alone hosted over forty two percent of the total Horn of Africa migrant population in Australia and has remained a preferred destination of new arrivals. This is mainly because of the influence of earlier arrivals in this city, which has generated a large migrant community. This ensures a higher probability of getting jobs through friends and social networks, getting support from different types of associations and organizations, and the presence of wide ranges of ethnic businesses such as cafés, restaurants, video and CD shops, groceries, and travel companies. As the number of these migrants increases, so as their participations and contributions in Australian labour markets, economy, social life and activities.

**9.2.2 Remittances**

Shortly after arrival, the Somalis were the first Horn of African migrants to start remittance businesses informally among themselves in Melbourne and Sydney. Gradually they expanded the services to other cities like Adelaide and to other migrants from the Horn of Africa (except Eritrea). The business of transferring money from Australia to Somalia and later to other countries in the region was started informally in the late 1980s by an agent of the Al-Barakat bank, Dahabshiil and other Somali family owned small money transferring companies operating from Melbourne and Sydney. At the start Al-Barakat Bank was dominant and popular until its capital was frozen and its business activities banned in Australia and elsewhere after 9/11. Consequently, the little known Somali owned money transferring
companies like Dahabshiil, Amal-Express, Muxtabal express, Global Express, Olympic, Kakha Express, Qaran Express, and Tawakal Express came to dominate the business of transferring money from Australia to countries in the region. It was found that nearly half of the money the Horn of African migrant respondents send from Australia to the Horn of Africa and beyond is channeled through Somali money transferring companies.

The relatively cheap service charges, and ability to transfer money to volatile and remote areas, including refugee camps, makes Somali money transferring companies attractive and the preferred service providers for most Horn of Africa migrants, except Eritreans. Somali money transferring companies are banned in Eritrea, and so Eritrean migrants send money either through Himbol (the Eritrean government owned financial organization) or multinational companies, like Western Union/MoneyGram or, through informal channels, such as travellers, business people and individuals working informally. Although Himbol’s service charge is very small and attractive as compared to other multinational companies, its exchange rate is low and remittances receiving families receive less in local currency. As a result many Eritrean migrants prefer to send through travellers or informal agents so that their families can receive the maximum amount in local currency.

The spread of Somalis in major Australian cities and across remittance receiving Horn of African countries created an opportunity to provide a cheaper and faster remittance services. The clan based social networks and the tradition of taking collective liability when a member of their clan working as an agent, business partner or family owned businesses misused the money they collected to transfer from their clients was found to be the social fibre that created the opportunities to run low cost successful remittance businesses. Somali business entrepreneurs exploited such cultural values as collateral and reinforcement of customary law
to nominate their agents and run their businesses. Such assurance forced almost all Somali money transferring companies to prefer to work mainly with people from their own ethnic group or clan, who own and run their own family businesses, such as grocery stores, cafés, and restaurants as their trusted agents and business partners. By working with already established family businesses they reduced overhead, setup and administrative costs and were able to provide cheap, fast and reliable services. Many migrants, particularly the Somalis, see Somali money transferring companies as the only viable remittance channel and the life blood for their families left behind.

Most Somali owned money transferring service providers started their businesses informally without proper registration and licenses. However, after the September 11 terrorist incident, the Australian government developed strict financial regulations and licensing requirements. These require all financial institutions to comply with the Australian government financial regulations and report their daily activities and suspicious transactions to the Australian Transaction Reporting and Analyses Centre (AUSTRAC) online. Somalis first registered their businesses in 1996 and all the surveyed Somali money transferring companies now have licenses and ABN numbers.

Although the business of transferring money from Australia to Horn of African countries has been dominated by multinational and ethnic Somali owned money transferring companies, the survey found a few emerging non-ethnic Somali owned money transferring businesses. Most of these are family owned businesses engaged in the import and export trade, travel agents, and origin area government affiliated financial organizations setup to collect foreign hard currency from their diaspora community. The service charges of these money transferring
businesses are found to be smaller than the Somali owned ones and most of them operate in Melbourne.

9.2.3 Impact of Remittances
The majority of Horn of Africa migrants living in Adelaide and Melbourne left many of their immediate and extended family members in precarious situations in their countries of origin or refugee camps in asylum countries. On arrival in Australia, the majority of them have accepted their moral obligations, personal and social responsibilities to support those left behind. While most migrants send their own money, the study also found that some migrants serve as a conduit by selling commodities in Australia that their families and friends send them from Africa. This includes “Khat” the mild narcotic plant widely used by Horn of Africa migrants, as well as handmade traditional clothes and homemade spices. To meet their family and friends’ expectations, and to fulfill their moral and social responsibilities, almost all Horn of Africa migrants (the employed and unemployed, students and housewives, new arrivals, married and single) send money from their earnings or by selling things sent to them for sale.

Although sending money to support family and friends is a personal decision by migrants as an act of altruism and family responsibility, it was noted that sometimes it happens because of family, peer, and community pressure, to conform to group norms to achieve acceptance. Hence, sending money to those left behind is the result of a combination of personal responsibility, plus family, peer, and community pressure.

Migrants send money to different destinations for different purposes. While the overwhelming majority of the Horn of African migrants send money to cover the basic living expenses of their families left behind, such as food, rent, health and education expenses, a few also finance special family events such as wedding and funeral costs, investments, family business startup
capital, pay dowry, debts, and finance and support the activities of political parties or liberation movements. Not surprisingly, the frequency and amount of money migrants send to their family depends on their socio-economic situation in Australia and also that of the receiver back home. It is also dependent upon the family left behind (immediate family verses extended family members), and the amount of debt incurred when they traveled to Australia. Those who left their immediate family (wife, children or parents) behind and arrive here with some debt, tend to start sending money shortly after arrival and before they actually settle and find jobs which can be a considerable burden.

The survey found that sending money tended to have a negative effect on the sending family. However, it has positive effects in changing and improving the living conditions and human resources (health and education) of the remittance receiving families. Nonetheless, generally, migrants could not send enough money for business startup or investment, which enables their family to generate their own income. This tends to make the remittance receiving families dependent on remittances they receive until they can improve their education and get jobs to become more independent.

The motives to maintain strong social networks with those left back home were found to be mixed. While some migrants use their social networks to share information on personal and family issues, others use them for economic or political reasons. The study found that those migrants, who left their country of birth because of their involvement in politics or being members of certain ethnic groups, have vested interests in the political situation of their country of birth. These groups actively follow the economic and political situation of their country of birth and raise money to finance the political activities of opposition political parties or liberation movements. The governments of some of the countries in the region are
well aware of the economic and political weight and influence these migrants have on their regime. Through remittances and lobbying their governments, these migrants put pressure on the regime to respect human rights, the rule of law and the fulfillment of their dream (multiparty political systems).

To minimize the influence and involvement of migrants in domestic politics, the governments of some Horn of Africa countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea have developed new policies and directives that benefit migrants’ businesses and those who want to return to their country of birth to invest or do business. These include tax exemption on imported items for their businesses and personal use, land for building residential houses and businesses and opening savings accounts in foreign currency. Contrary to this, opposition political parties and liberation movements also work hard among these migrants. As many of these migrants have suffered at the hands of the regime in power and left their country of birth as a result, they support opposition political parties and raise funds to finance their activities.

9.2.4 Education, Unemployment and Barriers of integration

On arrival, the majority of the Horn of African migrants had completed high school and had post school levels of education. The survey found that the peace and stability of the country of birth was positively correlated to the level of education of migrants on arrival. Those from highly volatile and unstable countries, like Somalia and Sudan, had a higher proportion with no prior education and elementary schooling. Overall, despite having relatively good levels of education on arrival, the majority of them lack skills and work experience to enter the Australian labour market. As a result, unemployment rates among these migrants remain high and well above the national rates.
Another major problem the overseas educated and qualified migrants had was the lack of English language skills and recognition of their qualifications. Sadly, there is little support or incentives for employers to employ migrants with little or no Australian work experience. Employers lack confidence to employ those whose skills and qualifications are not recognized by government. In addition, they are reluctant to employ migrants with visible physical, cultural and linguistic differences. To be able to support those left behind and to leave the welfare system, many qualified and professional Horn of Africa migrants have had to work in unskilled and low paying jobs. As a result many of them are underutilized, disadvantaged and vulnerable to racism and discrimination. The other major problem for those who arrived with no overseas qualifications or skills, but were strong enough to do any physical job, was the lack of English language skills. Generally, lack of English was found to be a major challenge to employment and led to a reduced pace of integration and successful settlement.

To improve their career and employment prospects, and overcome the problem of lost documents and recognition for their overseas qualifications, many Horn of African migrants enrolled in short term training courses at TAFE and other training providers. They use the certificate to fulfill enrolment/entry requirements to pursue their studies in Universities. An interesting finding was that those studying and those who had already graduated, had future plans to go back to serve the people of their country of birth. The desire to use and transfer Australian skills, knowledge, work culture and values to their countries of origin has positive effect in bridging gap and fostering strong relationships. They believe that peaceful co-existence among rival ethnic groups in their countries of origin will be achieved by introducing democracy and a multiparty political system and an Australian style federal system where each state has political power, autonomy and a say in their governance. Such
values and skills transfer in the form of social remittances are other important contributions that these migrants can use to bring social change, awareness, and development.

Given the high unemployment rate, and the fact that many of the employed migrants were working in casual and part-time jobs on low pay, the annual income of over two-thirds of the Horn of Africa migrants was less than Aus$30,000. Given the low income, family size and monthly remittances sent to families and friends, it is very difficult for migrants to save money to buy a house in Australia, or send large sums of money for investment or business start ups back home. Hence, sending money has affected their lifestyle or the way they want to live.

9.2.5 Migrant Coping Strategies

A major finding from the survey was that the Horn of African migrant families are interdependent. To cope with the new life in Australia, they have different types of informal social network groups and formal associations. These were used as coping strategies, and included community associations, emotional support network groups like *Idder* (or group burial insurance as some call it) and financial support networks groups (*Iqub* or interest free revolving loan). In times of mourning or death of family members or a member of the network group, emotional support network groups (*Idder*) provide financial support to cover the funeral costs of the deceased person and provide emotional support to the grieving family. The amount of financial support and the types of emotional support provided varies from group to group and depends on the size of the network group, membership status of the deceased person or his/her relationship to members of the network group. Being a member of such social networks helped migrants in sharing the financial and emotional burden of the grieving family.
Another interesting finding was the financial support network group, where members of the group often pool their financial resources together to solve the financial problems of their members. Money received from such social networks is an interest free group loan not a free gift. Fortnightly or monthly group’s contributions revolve among members of the group. Every member of the group pays back the equivalent amount of money he/she receives. It comes to an end when all members of the group have received the equivalent amount of money they had put in. These kinds of support network groups are often formed by close friends, trusted and like minded individuals.

One interesting coping strategy related to the role of community associations and religious institutions. These social groups were formed to promote integration, tolerance, harmony, maintain their culture, languages, identity and successful settlement experiences and peaceful co-existence with fellow Australians. However, migrants from the same country are divided along ethnic lines, language and religion and end up being members of different ethnic community associations. Although there were good interpersonal relationships at the individual level, the survey found deep divisions and animosities among rival ethnic groups. The division along ethnic and linguistic lines tended to reflect the socio-economic and political problems of their country of birth and had an influence in shaping migrants’ relationships in Australia.

Horn of African migrants affiliated NGOs have been formed to raise awareness about the appalling living situations of their people and to raise money to carry out community development projects back home. The survey found that while almost all of the Horn of Africa migrants send money to change and improve the lives of their families; very few of them supported the NGOs carrying out community development projects in their countries of origin.
Disagreements on where such community development projects should be undertaken tend to discourage most migrants from participating in fund raising activities. Among the Horn of Africa migrants, the South Sudanese were successful in setting up more NGOs and raising funds from the wider Australian society.

Ethnic community religious institutions provide opportunities to worship together in their languages and provide spiritual and counseling services to its members. Most of these social settings grew out of the social, cultural, linguistic, spiritual, employment and housing needs of the migrants. Most of the informal social network groups and formal associations and NGOs affiliated to the Horn of Africa migrants were located in Melbourne.

9.2.5.1 The Influence of Social Networks on Settlement Patterns

It was found that, before they migrated to Australia, nearly all the surveyed migrants had close friends, relatives and established social networks here, or at least knew someone living in Australia. Most of them maintained their social networks and relationships with those in Australia and received information or financial and sponsorship support. On arrival, most of them had a good knowledge of, and information about, the Australian way of life, the different settlement support services, and the labour market long before they actually moved to Australia.

The arrival and settlement of the first contingent of Ethiopian and Somali migrants in Melbourne influenced and attracted the settlement pattern of subsequent migrant arrivals. As a result, the majority of these migrants are concentrated in Melbourne. Besides the influences of the early settlers, the survey found that the availability of different types of NGOs,
associations, social groups, different organizations and ethnic businesses and service providers gave individuals an option to access their chosen social group or association/organization.

9.3 Theoretical Implications

To explain the causes and motives of international migration and the role of social networks in facilitating migration, scholars from across the social science disciplines have developed migration and social network theories. Many of these theories have focused their analytical perspectives on economic, labour market, wage differentials and historical and colonial relationships (Massey et al, 1998; Castles and Miller, 2003; Harzing and Hoerder, 2009).

As a result, migration theories have been criticized for ignoring or overlooking non-economic variables and push factors, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, civil wars, lack of political freedom and violation of human rights, or climatic and environmental problems. The migration and settlement of tens of thousands of Africans in Australia happened not due to Australia’s historical and colonial ties with the Horn of Africa countries, or lack of skilled manpower, or the voluntary decisions of migrants for economic reasons. Rather, it happened because of the prevalence of forced migration and Australian government’s determination to uphold its international obligations and willingness to admit refugees and humanitarian migrants from this region. Migration theory is incomplete as it fails to acknowledge the conditions under which forced migration takes place.

In addition, while the remittances obtained from forced migrants are the major sources of foreign currency and the life blood of people living in some conflict zones and countries, the migration discourse pays little attention to remittances generated by these forced migrants. The findings of this study show that, in their country of birth, forced migrants can be powerful
development partners, sources of foreign hard currency, and formidable forces in fighting poverty and bringing about social and political changes. They are also powerful in lobbying the Australian government to put pressure on the government of their countries of origin to respect human rights. Migration theories fail to explain such forced migrants contributions.

Migration theories tend to suggest that it is only economic and skilled migrants that send money to their families back home. Contrary to these assumptions, however, the findings of this study show that forced migrants also send money to their families and friends in multiple destinations (country of birth and asylum). The majority of forced migrants send money because they have been through such hardships and feel that they have moral, personal, family and social responsibilities to help those left behind. Unlike the economic migrants, forced migrants have enormous family, friend and peer pressure to support their friends and family (including extended family members) stranded in precarious situations in refugee camps and in their home countries. Whenever there is a problem back home or in refugee camps, they often receive phone calls, emails and letters from family members and friends urging them to send money to help those in need. They are under enormous social pressure and face isolation if they do not comply. The remittance discourses in migration theory ignore and overlook such social pressure and the personal and moral responsibility these migrants have when sending money.

The causes and motives of international migration should not be looked at only from the economic, geographic proximity and historical perspectives. As the decisions to migrate are often made for both economic and non-economic reasons (Hugo, 1998), migration theories scholars from across social sciences need to look into the complex and multidimensional causes and motives of international migration, and their roles and contributions from forced,
economic, skilled and family migration perspectives and should not be limited to economic and labour market perspectives.

9.4 Policy Implications

This study found that the majority of migrants from the Horn of African countries (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan) are admitted into Australia under refugee and humanitarian visa programs, predominantly through the offshore resettlement program. They are mainly concentrated in major cities, where most settlement support services of different NGOs, voluntary and church affiliated organizations are located. The settlement of the first contingent of the Horn of African refugee and humanitarian migrants in Melbourne and Sydney has influenced the settlement pattern of subsequent arrivals of migrants from this region.

Diversifying the settlement pattern of refugee and humanitarian migrants from major cities to regional areas has enormous importance in solving the unemployment problems of these migrants, and at the same time overcoming shortages of manpower in regional areas and strengthening the local economies (Hugo, 2011). To pursue a policy of populating regional Australia to migrants from refugee and humanitarian backgrounds, the Local, State and Federal governments, employers in regional areas, community and religious leaders, need to develop an action plan to educate migrants and improve their awareness on the availability of opportunities in regional areas, and of the importance of finding secure long term jobs. Doing so would minimize the concentration of a large number of unemployed migrants in major cities. It would also enable the government to expand the program and develop a policy that supports the settlement and retention of refugee and humanitarian migrants in regional areas.
With regard to the socio-economic and civic contribution of refugee and humanitarian migrants in Australia, Hugo (2011) notes that the migration and settlement of refugee and humanitarian migrants in Australia is much more than an increase in numbers and change in the demographic composition of the Australian population. These migrants are participating in the labour force, and contributing to the economic, social and cultural diversity of Australian society (Hugo, 2011). Outside Australia, the remittances these migrants send are the lifeline of tens of thousands of families in conflict zones and are sources of foreign hard currency and investment to the national economy of their countries of origin.

The migration and settlement of refugee and humanitarian migrants from the Horn of Africa countries in Australia has an enormous impact in sustaining and improving, not only the lives of those who settle in Australia, but also the lives of families left behind and the national economy of their countries of origin. Through remittances and lobbying, these migrants are able to fight poverty and improve the economic conditions and human rights of their families and communities in their countries of origin.

It can be argued that introducing strict financial regulation keeps Australia safe from money laundering and financing of terrorism. However, imposing strict financial regulations and requirements on small and family owned money transferring companies will drive them out of business and allow multinational money transferring companies to control the market which will push the price of service charges higher. This will have a negative effect on both the senders and the receivers. The financial regulation policy should recognize the role and contribution of small money transferring businesses in fighting poverty and maximizing the income of remittance receiving families.
Australia has complex policies in recognizing overseas skills and qualifications. Its policy in recognizing the skills and qualifications of refugee and humanitarian migrants is blurred. While the Australian government and employers recognize the skills and qualifications of overseas trained migrants and employ them to fill skilled manpower shortages, and spend million of dollars to select them, many refugees and humanitarian migrants with similar overseas qualifications and proficiency in English language are unemployed and suffer from a lack of recognition of their overseas qualifications and work experiences.

Bringing overseas trained and educated migrants under skilled migrant visas and employing them while many overseas educated and trained refugee and humanitarian migrants are already in Australia shows the inconsistency and lack of uniformity in recognizing and employing overseas trained and educated migrants. To address this problem the Australian government needs to reassess its policy and develop a system where by overseas trained and qualified migrants with good English language proficiency given an equal opportunity to get recognition to work in their fields of qualification.

For most of the Horn of Africa migrants, particularly for the unemployed and those who have English language problems, housing remains a major problem. After the temporary accommodation provided on arrival expires, most families have difficulties in finding affordable private rental accommodation because owners are unwilling to lease their property to unemployed migrants with large families. Compared to Melbourne, access to public housing is very tight and limited in Adelaide. In some cases access to public housing because of long waiting periods were found to determine where migrants settled and lived. The policy of limiting public housing to only those who are homeless, victims of domestic violence, life threatening factors and natural disasters or those who have health issues needs to be
reassessed. To ensure the speedy settlement and integration of these migrants, the aforementioned policy related issues need to be revisited both by the State and Federal governments.

9.5 Suggestions and Recommendations

Horn of Africa migrants vary in their culture, language, and ethnicity, as well as the socio-economic and the political situation of the country from which they came. Although the severity and magnitude of such differences is highly pronounced among migrants from different countries, it was also noted that migrants from the same country are also heterogeneous. Such differences are often carried on and expanded even after they have left their country of birth and become Australian citizens. Many of these migrants are exposed to different problems and have had varying experiences from their countries of origin, asylum countries and even after they have settled in Australia. As the severity and magnitude of the problems they are exposed to and survived varies so does the levels of their settlement needs, health problems, family circumstances and cultural shock, along with their resilience to cope. Some of these migrants have never been to school and suffer from physical and psychological trauma, are frustrated by the lack of progress in learning the English language, pace of integration, housing coupled with difficulties in finding jobs which can lead to mental stress.

The settlement support services and programs need to address these complex individual and social problems. A “One size fits all” kind of approach should not be used. Any policies, programs and settlement support services designed to benefit these migrants need to take into account the individual differences, culture, linguistic, ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds and history of these migrants. Based on the findings of this study the following suggestions and recommendations are made.
Lack of English language is identified as one of the most challenging and daunting tasks that affect the success of migrant settlement, integration and socialization with the wider Australian society and, most importantly, affects their employment and labour market participation. Therefore, the current practices of allocating 510 hours to all migrants regardless of their prior levels of education and English on arrival needs to be revised. Attending an English language class should not be used as a requirement or re-enforcement to receive Centerlink payment. The time to study English language needs to be determined and tailored on a case by case basis of individual need and level of English language on arrival.

Regulating the in and out flow of money has significant importance in counterterrorism and money laundering, but strict licensing and registration requirements may put small remittance service providers out of business, minimize competition and give rise to a higher rate of service charges. This may push the cost of service charges further and create conducive conditions for big multinational and other well established money transferring service providers to dominate the market. This may hurt both the senders and receivers and undermine the role and contribution of these migrants in fighting poverty. Thus government policies and regulations need to consider the contribution of such money transferring businesses when developing financial regulations and policies.

In the US, Canada and some European countries “Khat” is classified as an illegal drug (Fitzgerald, 2009; Al-Motarreb et al, 2010). Consumption and possession of “Khat” is treated accordingly. In Australia, however, different States have different laws. The State of Victoria allows the importing of “Khat” for “cultural purpose”, the South Australian law does not. Although the South Australian law banned importing this substance directly from
overseas, consumers in South Australia get it from Melbourne. Interestingly some migrants in Adelaide and Melbourne have already started using locally grown similar plants while they are fresh and green. Lack of uniform laws across different States and the discovery of a local version of the plant has not spared Adelaide residents from consuming the substance and its health, economic and social costs. The State and Federal Governments of Australia need to carry out further analysis on the substance and place laws in unison.

➢ The concentration and settlement of the Horn of African migrants in major capital cities, particularly in Melbourne, is partly because of access to different services and the availability of a large number of migrants, and their associations and NGOs or organizations that provide settlement support services and the extensive migrant networks. The majority of the Horn of Africa migrants come from farming and rural backgrounds. Given their background and experience in farming, the Australian government needs to strengthen and expand the program of settling migrants in regional Australia. Settling these migrants in regional Australia, would reduce not only the concentration of these migrants in major Australian cities, but also solve manpower shortages in regional area, reduce the unemployment problems among these migrants and reduce housing and other problems in big cities.

➢ To overcome the shortage of skilled manpower, The Australian government needs to reassess its policy in recognizing the skills and qualifications of overseas trained and educated humanitarian migrants. High unemployment rates of these migrants in good and booming economic times are attributed to a number of interrelated factors. Employers’ lack of confidence and reluctance to employ overseas trained and educated refugee and humanitarian migrants are exacerbated by Australian government’s reluctance in
recognizing the overseas qualifications of humanitarian migrants, lack of English language skills, discrimination, employers’ lack of knowledge and awareness of migrants skills, experience on what they are capable of doing. Looking for overseas trained and untrained persons while there are already humanitarian migrants in Australia who can fill the positions of some of the skilled and unskilled manpower is a waste of human resources. Both the Federal and State governments need to revise their policies on recognizing overseas qualifications of humanitarian migrants with good proficiency of English language and give them an opportunity to work and demonstrate their skills and what they can achieve.

- To reduce the unemployment rates and dependence on the social welfare system, the Australian government needs to educate and improve the awareness of employers and give incentives to encourage them to employ migrants with overseas qualifications and work experience, or willing to train and employ those who do not have skills, particularly those from refugee and humanitarian backgrounds. The incentive could be in the form of cash, tax relief or other packages including (but not limited to) recognition to their community support.

- The existing job networks are designed to address the needs of local (Australian born) job seekers. The existing job network providers may not have the skills and capacity to deal with the physical and psychological problems their clients went through in the past. To address the complex social, personal, cultural, linguistic and psychology problems of refugee and humanitarian migrants and provide effective job network services, State and Federal governments need to consult and work closely with employers, settlement support service providers, community and religious leaders, and migrants, to assess the current job network services and identify the problems and setup job network service that specialized in
addressing the above problems and providing job network services to migrants from refugee and humanitarian background.

9.6 Suggestions for Further Study

The Horn of Africa migrants have very vast and complex social and family structures, social networks, kinship and conjugal relationships and different types of age and gender based groups and support systems. This study is just a beginning to understanding the Horn of Africa migrants social networks and the impact of remittances on both senders and receivers. There are many issues that need to be studied and researched and are as follows

- The social and economic cost of not recognizing the skills and qualifications of overseas educated and qualified refugee and humanitarian migrants.
- The role, contribution and levels of influence and involvement of refugee and humanitarian migrants in influencing the social, political and economic landscape of their countries of origin.
- The impact of remittances on the lives of remittance receiving families back home in more detail.
- The long and short term financial, health, family and other social and community costs of letting the importation, sale, planting and consumption of “Khat”.
- The roles and contribution of Australian educated migrants and returnees in transferring the skills they obtained in Australian and bridging the cultural gap, promoting trade, investment and Australia’s positive image in migrants’ countries of origin.
- The financial (revolving fund) and emotional social network to go beyond solving short term members’ financial and emotional problems.
Exercising the roles and contribution of Horn of Africa migrants affiliated NGOs in facilitating and promoting settlement and carrying out development activities in both host and origin countries.

- The economic, social and cultural contribution and bridging roles refugee and humanitarian migrants have in Australian and back home.

- The roles of family and ethnic owned money transferring businesses in fostering competition and reducing service charges.

9.7 Conclusion

After the Australian government officially accepted the first contingent of Ethiopian and Somali refugees in the early 1980s, tens of thousands of migrants have become Australian citizens and made Australia their home country. As a result, they have become one of the fastest growing and emerging migrant communities in Australia.

The findings of this survey bring new ideas and understanding to our knowledge about the Horn of Africa migrant social networks and the impact of sending money on their lives. An important contribution is a better understanding of the formal and informal associations and social networks systems these migrants use to cope with their lives in Australia, and to deal with their emotional and financial problems. Some of the support network systems that these migrants use in Australia are *Idder* (the emotional support network group) and *Iqub* (the revolving fund or financial support network group). This survey found that these migrants brought with them these century old traditional support network systems which they used in their countries of origin. More importantly, the findings of this study identify the need to revisit the theory of migration and challenged the stereotype perceptions about the contributions, roles and causes of migration of forced migrants.
The migration and settlement of Horn of Africa migrants in Australia resulted in the transfer of tens of millions of dollars from Australia to the countries in the region. This in turn has created an opportunity for the rise and expansion of Somali and other ethnic owned money transferring businesses in Australia. The formal and informal money transferring businesses play an important role in providing cheap, fast and reliable money transferring services (hawala) to remote and insecure areas in the region. These often where the livelihoods of the people are destroyed by the ongoing conflicts and civil wars, and remittances from these migrants remain the major sources of family income.

The findings of the survey also showed that, while the Horn of Africa migrants use the money they send to fight poverty, improve the living conditions of their families and maintain social networks with those left behind, they also lobby the Australian government to put pressure on the regimes in their countries of origin to respect human rights. Through remittances, lobbying the Australian government and human rights activism, these migrants play important roles in fighting poverty, in pressuring the regime to respect human rights.

Due to lack of skills and English language, lack of recognition of overseas qualifications and work experience, unemployment rates among these migrants are found to be fourfold that of the national unemployment rates. In Australia, even many of those who have jobs they are employed in low paying unskilled jobs and categorized in low income social groups. In contrast to this, however, in their countries of origins, some are seen as development partners, powerful forces of social change and formidable forces in fighting poverty and generating foreign hard currency. The foreign hard currency these migrants generated has influenced the perceptions of policy makers and politicians and generates policies that have benefited their returns and investment.
Despite the high unemployment rates and dependency of the social welfare system and low levels of income, the majority of the Horn of Africa migrants send money to their families and some support opposition political parties or liberation movements. Although the majority of these migrants believe that their remittance money has changed and improved the living conditions of their families back home, many of them openly admit that sending money has affected their lives and the lifestyles of their families in Australia. Remittance receiving families’ improvement in living conditions tends to come at the expense of some of remittance sending migrants lifestyle and living conditions.

The theories of migration tend to focus on the economic causes of migration or the push and pull factor of voluntary migrants. Sadly, these theories of migration’s discourses have ignored the social and economic behaviour of forced migrants and their contribution. Contrary to this however, Hugo (2011) noted the positive economic, social and civic contributions refugee and humanitarian migrants in Australia. The findings of this study also show that through remittance, transfer of values and skills (social remittance), human rights activism, lobbying the government of host country, and by participating in businesses and labour markets, forced migrants play positive roles in both the destination and origin countries. Therefore, the findings of this study challenge the old and stereotypical perception about refugee and humanitarian migrants and enlighten us on the need to revisit and expand the scope of migration theories, particularly those relating to forced migration and their socio-economic contribution in both the destination and origin countries. They also play positive roles in fostering development, bridging cultural gaps, promoting trade positive images between Australia and countries in the Horn of African region.
Appendix I: Questionnaire

Please circle the number or tick the box

Part I: Survey

Section I: General information

A. Sex
   - Male [ ]
   - Female [ ]

B. Age
   - 1. Under 20
   - 2. 21-30
   - 3. 31-40
   - 4. 41-50
   - 5. 51-60
   - 6. Over 61

C. Marital status
   - 1. Married
   - 2. Never Married
   - 3. Separated
   - 4. Divorced
   - 5. Widow/widower
   - 6. De facto

D. Country of Birth
   - 1. Eritrea
   - 2. Ethiopia
   - 3. Somali
   - 4. Sudan
   - 5. Australia
   - 6. Other, please state [ ]

E. When and where did you arrive in Australia? Year [ ] State/city [ ]

F. Under which visa category did you enter into Australia?
   - 1. Refugee/Humanitarian
   - 2. Family reunion
   - 3. Marriage
   - 4. Student visa
   - 5. Skills migration
   - 6. Other (please specify) [ ]

G. How did you enter Australia?
   - 1. Sponsored by relatives or friends
   - 2. Arrived here by boat
   - 3. Sponsored by spouse
   - 4. Arrived here legally and applied for protection
   - 5. Sponsored by Australian government resettlement program
   - 6. Other [ ]

H. What is your current residential status?
   - 1. Citizen
   - 2. Permanent resident
   - 3. Work or student visa
   - 4. Temporary Protection visa TPA (if your answer is 1 go to section II)
   - 5. Spouse visa
   - 6. Others, please state [ ]

I. Do you plan to apply for Australian Citizenship? Yes [ ] No [ ] Not decided [ ]

Section II: Your source of information about Australia

1. Do you have relatives/friends who arrived and lived in Australia before you?
   - Yes [ ] No [ ] If yes, where did they live in Australia when you arrived? [ ]
2. Before you migrated to Australia, did you have any contacts/networks with friends or relatives residing here? Yes ☐ No ☐

3. What was your source/s of information about Australia? (you can circle one or more)
   1. Friends/ Relatives  2. Overseas Australian High Commission  3. UNHCR

4. Which one of these sources of information would you trust most and why?

5. What kinds of information did you gather from friends in Australia? (circle one or more)
   1. Immigration policy information
   2. Information on education, employment, language and culture
   3. Information on access to labour market
   4. Information on family reunion and sponsorship
   5. Others________

6. What was your overall expectation about life in Australia?

7. In the first week of your arrival, who helped you most to get familiar with the environment and different services? (you can circle one or more)
   1. Friends and relatives  2. Volunteers  3. Migrants Resources Centre
   4. Your community members  5. Others________

8. Did you get any orientation/information about Australian culture before you came here? Yes ☐ No ☐ If yes, who provided the information _____________________?

Section III : Your social networks and interactions in Australia

   4. Friends from own community  5. Alone
   6. Other African migrants

2. What kind of accommodation do you live in now?
   1. Private rental  2. Public house/unit
   3. Own house/unit  4. Shared accommodation

3. Have you lived in another state/s in Australia? Yes ☐ No ☐

4. If yes why did you move to your present state? (you can circle one or more)
   1. To join friends and family
2. To join a large community from your country for socializing
3. To look for better employment opportunity
5. Why do you prefer to live in Adelaide/Melbourne?
   1. Because of its life style      2. Good weather condition
   3. Presence of family and friends  4. Job opportunity
   5. Presence of large community   6. Others__________
6. Do you think that you have interacted with the wider Australian society? Yes ☐ No ☐
   If you have not, what are the major obstacles of integration?
___________________________________________________________________________
7. Did you speak English before you came here? Yes ☐ No ☐
a. If yes, how did you rate your English when you first came?
b. How do you rate your English today?
8. Do you have any future plans to move to another state/city? Yes ☐ No ☐
   If yes where? _____ why? _________________________________________________
9. Have you ever participated in any community or social event organized by other
   community associations? Yes ☐ No ☐
   If you have not, what is/are the reason/s? (you can circle one or more)
   1. Language  2. Cultural difference  3. Discrimination/racial segregation
   4. Loneliness 5. Health problem     6. Other, please specify___________
10. If you have had contact/interaction with Australians who are they? (you can circle one or more)
    1. Neighbours       2. School or workmates
    3. People from church or mosque       4. Volunteers
    5. Government and non-government officials
    6. Others ______________
11. What are the bases of your interactions and social networks with others?
    6. Common interest/social clubs    7. Other_______________
12. How do you characterize your relationships and interactions with Australians?
1. Friendly  
2. Close but superficial /surface  
3. Subordinate and boss type  
4. Distant not friendly  
5. Hard to describe  

13. Do you have contact and interaction with other African refugee communities?  
   Yes ☐  No ☐  

14. How do you rate your social networks and contacts with other African communities?  
   1. Close friendly  
   2. Friendly but superficial  
   3. Subordinate and supervisor type  
   4. Distant (not friendly)  
   5. Hard to describe  

15. What are the major problems you and/or your close friends or partner have encountered in interacting and socializing with Australians?  
   ___________________________________________________________  
   ___________________________________________________________  

16. Do you have any common community centers to gather together to share and exchange information and practice your culture? Yes ☐  No ☐  

**Section IV: Your Transnationals Networks**  
1. How do you maintain your relationship with your home community?  
   (you can circle more than one)  
   1. By visiting once in a while  
   2. Through telephone/email  
   3. By sending money back home  
   4. Through trade/business  
   5. By sponsoring relatives/friends to join you  
   6. By participating in a political rally when there is a political problem back home  
   7. By raising funds when there is a disaster/problem  

2. Do you have contact with other family members/friends living in other part of the world other than your country of birth and asylum country? Yes ☐  No ☐  
   If yes Please state countries you have regular contact and network____________________  

3. How do you maintain your relationship with them  
   1. By visiting them or vice verse  
   2. Through telephone  
   4. By taking part in some social and family events like wedding, funeral ceremony or meeting  
   4. Mail/email  
   5. Others please specify ________________  

5. Do you have any organized associations or social clubs with other diasporas elsewhere to carry out any development project/s back home? Yes ☐  No ☐  
   If yes, please specify the type of association or social club, and their objectives ________  
   ___________________________________________________________  
   ___________________________________________________________
6. Do you have a short or long term plan to return to your country of birth?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]
   If yes please specify the reasons____________________________________________________

7. Do you participate in any social, political or community development activities back home?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]
   If yes please specify the details____________________________________________________

**Section V: Educational and employment information**

1. What was your level of education when you entered into Australia?
   1. Not in school at all
   2. Elementary
   3. Secondary
   4. College
   5. University

2. Have you improved your level of education and/or obtained Australian qualifications since you entered Australia? Yes [ ]
   If yes, please specify your Australian qualification___________________________

3. Do you have any overseas qualifications? Yes [ ] No [ ]
   If yes, please specify the type of your qualification___________________________

4. Before you migrated to Australia, did you have any employment experience?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]

5. If you were working, please indicate the type of work you had
   1. Unskilled labour including housekeeping
   2. Run own business
   3. Semi-skilled
   4. Skilled
   5. Professional
   6. Self-employed

6. What is your current employment status?
   1. Unemployed
   2. Student
   3. Employed
   4. Out of workforce

7a. Did your overseas qualification and work experience help you to find jobs here?
   Yes [ ] No [ ] If yes, where did you gain from?______________________________

b. If you have obtained an Australian qualification, do you think that it has helped you to get a job? Yes [ ] No [ ]

**Section VI: Remittance**

1. Do you send money overseas to friends or relatives? Yes [ ] No [ ]
   1a. If yes, where do you send it and who to? (you can circle more than one)
      1. To brothers and sisters back home
      2. To brothers and sisters in asylum country
3. To mother and father back home  4. To relatives and friends in asylum country
5. To relatives and friends back home  6. To mother and father in asylum country

1b. If not, how do you support your relatives/friends back home or in asylum countries?
   1. By running joint business  2. By sending start up capital
   3. By selling the goods they sent to you and sending the money back
   4. By sponsoring them to join you  5. Others___________________________

2. For what specific purpose do you send money overseas? (you can circle one or more)
   1. For living (food, rent and entertainment)
   2. For education and/or health
   3. For start up capital (buy ox, seed, fertilizer or run small business)
   4. To buy land or house for future investment
   5. For social and family events (like wedding, funeral etc)
   6. To pay back family for investment in education
   7. To pay migration and travel cost  8. Other________

3. In your opinion, other than sending money, what are the other means in which you support people back home?
   __________________________________________________________________________

4. Instead of sending your own money, have you ever encouraged your relatives/friends to send handcrafts, traditional clothes or locally produced items for you to sell in order to send them money?  1. Yes very often  2. Yes, sometimes  3. No, not at all

5. When you send money to relatives or friends, which money-transferring agents do you use?  1. Western Union money transferring agents
   2. Thomas Cooks money transferring agents
   3. Amael Pacific  4. Money Gram money transferring agents
   5. Dahabshiil  6. Others________

6. Why do you prefer this money-transferring agent?
7. If you don’t use the more traditional and conventional money-transferring agents like Western Union and Thomas Cook, why do you use small ethnic money transferring agents? (you can circle one or more)
   1. Cheaper service
   2. Reliable, secured and faster
   3. The service is provided at remote area in country of receiving
   4. Ease of communication (speaking local language) and knowledge
   5. Others__________

8. How often do you send money overseas?
   1. Regularly once a month
   2. Every quarter
   3. Twice a year
   4. Once in a while
   5. Whenever there is a need and request for help
   6. Never at all

9. Do you have ability to control the money you send back home? Yes □ No □
   If yes, how do you control it?__________________________________________

10. So far, have you privately invested or participated in any local development project?
    Yes □ No □

11. How did you cover your travel costs when you moved to Australia?
    1. By borrowing money from friends/relatives to repay them later
    2. Your friends/relatives borrowed to cover your travel costs and you paid them back
    3. Your friends/relatives paid your travel costs
    4. You sold your property and valuables to pay your travel costs
    5. The Australian Government paid your travel costs

12. If you or your friends borrowed money to cover your travel cost, how long would it take you to repay them?
    1. Less than one year
    2. 1 to 2 years
    3. 3 to 4 years
    4. Over 4 years

13. Do you think that your family live a better life than their neighbours because of your financial support? Yes □ No □

14. What would happen if you did not send money to relatives/friends back home? (you can circle more than one)
    1. Family will lookdown/be ashamed of you
    2. You fear the pressure when you return home
    3. You will lose social respect among colleagues here and back home
    4. Your family cannot survive
    5. Others______________
15. Do you think that sending money to relatives and friends overseas has affected your livelihood here?
   Yes, very much ☐ Yes, to a lesser extent ☐ No, not at all ☐

16. In your opinion which of these migrant groups send money most to relatives/friends?
   1. Married couples
   2. Employed and longer residents
   3. Unmarried persons
   4. Those who left their family behind
   5. Young boys and girls who born were here
   6. Newly arrived migrants and unemployed

17. Roughly in which one of these income categories do you place your annual income?
   1. Less than Au$10,000
   2. 10,001-20,000
   3. 20,001-30,000
   4. 30,001-40,000
   5. 40,001-50,000
   6. Over 50,001

18. What percent of your annual income do you send?
   1. Less than 5 percent
   2. 6-10 percent
   3. 11-15 percent
   4. 16-20 percent
   5. over 21 percent

**Part II : Semi-structured interviews**

1. Did your expectation coincide with the reality you confronted when you arrived here?
2. Do you have relative/s or close friend/s here?
3. What kind of support networks do you have?
4. What is the basis of your relationship /interaction with other African migrants?
5. Do you think that you have settled in well and interacted with other Australians?
6. How did you get into Australia? Who sponsored you and paid your airfare?
7. Other than sending money, how do support relatives and friends?
8. For what purpose do you send money?
9. Does sending money affect your lifestyle?
10. Do you think that the money you send have changed/improved your family living condition?
Appendix II: Lists of African and Horn of African affiliated associations and organization in Adelaide and Melbourne

Afar Community Association of Victoria
African Communities Council
African Community Organization of South Australia
African Communities Resource Centre
African Heritage Association of SA Inc.
African Women’s Support Groups SA Inc
African Communities Elderly Association of Victoria Inc
African Think Tank community
Barri Community Association of Victoria
East African Women’s Federation
Eastern and Central African Communities of Victoria
Eritrean Community Development Association (ECDA),
Eritrean Community in Australia Inc (Youth)
Eritrean Community in Australia Inc
Eritrean Community in Victoria
Ethiopian Christian Fellowship
Ethiopian Community in Victoria Inc
Ethiopian Community Women Group
Ethiopian Orthodox Community
Geelong Sudanese Community Association Inc
Hararian Community Association of Victoria
Horn of Africa Relief & Development Association
Nuer Community Association of SA
Oromo Community Association of SA
Oromo Relief Association (ORA)
Oromo Community Association of Victoria
Oromo Community Church
Ogaden Somali Community Association of Australia
Somali Cultural Association Inc
Somali Community Council
Somaliland Community Association of Australia Inc.
Sudanese Communities Council in Australia Inc
Sudanese Community Church
Sudanese Lost Boys Association of Australia
Sudanese Cultural and Social Society of SA
Sudanese Youth Association
Sudanese Women in the West
Tigrian Community Association in Victoria Inc.
South Sudan Development Association (SSUD),
Tomorrow Foundation
The Kajokeji Australia Development Institute (KADI),
The Somali Development Organization (SDO)
Appendix III: Horn of Africa Migrants Affiliated Ethnic Newspaper
(the Ambassador)

Publications and Research - Subscriptions Available for Melbourne's First Horn of African Newspaper

Contributor: Khalid Osman
Source: Khalid Osman, Editor, The Ambassador Newspaper
Posted: 22-08-2005

The Ambassador Newspaper is the first Horn of African Newspaper in Australia, bringing community news and information to Melbourne's fastest growing community.

An award winning publication, The Ambassador has been recognised for its contribution to multiculturalism and its vital role in the provision of key resettlement information.

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Contact Name: Khalid Osman, Editor, The Ambassador Newspaper
Contact Phone: (03) 9387 4340 / 0415 653 421
Contact Email: OsmanK@ames.net.au
Appendix IV: Service charges and exchange rates of Somali Money transferring companies

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