PICKING WINNERS?

NEW ZEALAND’S RECOGNISED SEASONAL EMPLOYER (RSE) POLICY
AND ITS IMPACTS ON EMPLOYERS, PACIFIC WORKERS AND THEIR
ISLAND – BASED COMMUNITIES

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ABSTRACT

Over the preceding decade there has been intensifying academic and policy debate about the migration-development relationship and a resurgence of interest in circular and temporary migration. This thesis provides an examination of the first five years’ (2007-2012) operation of New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy, a managed low-skilled circular migration scheme that currently allows for 8,000 workers to be recruited annually for up to 7 months’ seasonal employment in New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture (H/V) industries.

The RSE policy seeks to deliver the triple ‘wins’ to migrants, origin and destination countries that were identified at the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in September 2006. The policy has been recognised nationally as well as internationally as an example of ‘best practice’ in the field of low-skilled managed circular migration.

The RSE policy is delivered through a system of relationships between employers, workers, and government agencies in a range of source countries, mainly in the Pacific region, and New Zealand. These relationships are examined at multiple scales: macro (national/international), meso (regional) and micro (household/individual) using concepts derived from systems theory and complexity theory. The RSE case study is situated in three contexts: theoretical (the migration and development literature); contextual (population movement in the Pacific Islands region); and empirical (labour supply issues facing producers in New Zealand’s H/V industries).

This thesis employs a critical realist perspective to explore the objectives and outcomes of the RSE policy over the first five years. Multiple methods are used to collect and analyse qualitative and quantitative data relating to RSE workers from five Pacific countries, 16 employers in New Zealand, and key industry and government stakeholders in the source and destination countries. Data from primary and secondary sources are examined via an extensive process of data triangulation, to consolidate information accumulated over a wide geographic scope and timeframe.
Key findings indicate the RSE policy is achieving its stated short-term aims of assisting New Zealand employers to meet labour shortages and increase productivity, while also contributing to development in participating Pacific countries. However, complex policies like the RSE are dynamic and there are tensions that emerge between different stakeholders’ objectives. There are important positive and negative feedback effects that contribute to this dynamism, and these require ongoing flexibility in the policy’s management.

Managed circular migration programmes that involve mutual cooperation between governments of origin and destination countries, as well as between employers and communities that send and receive the migrant workers, have a high overhead in terms of the demands on government agencies to deliver the desired outcomes. They require continued investment and oversight if they are to deliver the expected benefits to all major stakeholders on a sustained basis. In the case of the RSE policy, these costs have been outweighed by the productivity gains for employers, financial gains (in island-dollar equivalents) for the workers, and improvements in living standards at the household and community level in participating island countries.
DECLARATION

I, Charlotte Bedford, certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

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Signed: __________________________

Dated: __________________________
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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>Approval in Principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR</td>
<td>Agreement to Recruit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>The Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU</td>
<td>Council of Trade Unions (New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEEWR</td>
<td>Department of Education, Employment and Work Relations (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoL</td>
<td>Department of Labour (New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESU</td>
<td>Employment Services Unit (Vanuatu)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRWPS</td>
<td>Fiji Rural Work Permit Scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUWPS</td>
<td>Fiji Urban Work Permit Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCIM</td>
<td>Global Commission for International Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFC</td>
<td>Global Financial Crisis</td>
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<td>GFMD</td>
<td>Global Forum on Migration and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLD</td>
<td>High-Level Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>H/V</td>
<td>Horticulture and viticulture</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAU</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPD</td>
<td>International Conference on Population and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDG</td>
<td>International Development Group (New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>Individual Employment Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INZ</td>
<td>Immigration New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMU</td>
<td>Labour Mobility Unit (Solomon Islands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBIE</td>
<td>Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCIL</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour (Samoa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Solomon Islands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFAL</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Labour (Tuvalu)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAB</td>
<td>Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLCI</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industry (Tonga)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLHRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development (Kiribati)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MML</td>
<td>Meile Mei Langi</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOTEYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Training, Employment, Youth and Sport (Tonga)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memoranda of Understanding</td>
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<td>MSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development (New Zealand)</td>
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<td>NZAID</td>
<td>New Zealand Aid</td>
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<td>NZHC</td>
<td>New Zealand High Commission</td>
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<td>NZHITO</td>
<td>New Zealand Horticulture Industry Training Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pacific Access Category</td>
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<td>PACER</td>
<td>Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations</td>
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<td>PAILS</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Labour Sending Forum</td>
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<td>PBP</td>
<td>Pure Business Project</td>
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<td>PSWs</td>
<td>Pacific Seasonal Workers</td>
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<td>PSWPS</td>
<td>Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (Australia)</td>
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<td>RSE</td>
<td>Recognised Seasonal Employer</td>
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<td>SAWP</td>
<td>Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEU</td>
<td>Seasonal Employment Unit (Samoa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Strengthening Pacific Partnerships</td>
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<td>SPWPS</td>
<td>South Pacific Work Permit Scheme</td>
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<td>SSE</td>
<td>Supplementary Seasonal Employer</td>
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<td>SWTAT</td>
<td>Seasonal Worker Action Team (Samoa)</td>
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<td>SWP</td>
<td>Seasonal Worker Program (Australia)</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Temporary Employment Certificate</td>
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<td>TLMP</td>
<td>Temporary Labour Migration Programme</td>
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<td>TRSE</td>
<td>Transitional Recognised Seasonal Employer</td>
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<td>VAC</td>
<td>Visa Application Centres</td>
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<td>VoC</td>
<td>Variation of Conditions</td>
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<td>WINZ</td>
<td>Work and Income New Zealand</td>
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

In September 2013 the United Nations General Assembly will hold its second High-Level Dialogue (HLD) on migration and development. Its predecessor, the HLD held in September 2006, was the first meeting of its kind devoted exclusively to the topic of migration and development, and was attended by senior representatives from over 130 countries (UN, 2006). The second HLD proposes to (UN, 2012, p.14):

1) Identify concrete measures that enhance the benefits of international migration, while reducing its costs, for countries of origin and destination and migrants alike; and
2) Identify good practices and lessons learned since the 2006 HLD, with a particular emphasis on national, regional and global policies and programmes that have leveraged the development benefits of international migration.

New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy, implemented in April 2007 and heralded by agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank as a ‘best practice’ managed circular migration scheme (ILO, 2009; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010), could arguably be put forward at the 2013 United Nations meeting as a model for other countries to follow.

This thesis provides a timely examination of the first five years’ (2007-2012) operation of New Zealand’s RSE policy, a managed low-skilled circular migration scheme that currently allows for 8,000 workers to be recruited annually for up to 7 months’ seasonal employment in New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture (H/V) industries (Ramasamy et al., 2008; DoL, 2010a). The programme targets 18-44 year olds and, while it is open to the majority of Pacific Forum countries, recruitment from five countries - known as the ‘kick-start’ states -

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1 Hennebry and Preibisch (2012, p.e24) define ‘best practice’ as successful initiatives or model projects that make an outstanding, sustainable, and innovative contribution to an issue at hand.
2 Workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu are allowed to remain in New Zealand for up to nine months. See Chapter 4 for a review of the RSE policy.
3 Eligible countries include: Federated States of Micronesia, [Fiji – presently excluded], Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu (INZ, 2010).
was prioritised for most of the period under review: three in Polynesia (Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu), one in Micronesia (Kiribati) and one in Melanesia (Vanuatu).

The genesis for this research lies in three interrelated debates at three scales. The first is the international debate on migration and development and the potential role of managed circular migration as a win-win-win scenario that can deliver benefits to migrants, origin and destination countries (GCIM, 2005; UN, 2006; GFMD, 2008; ILO, 2010; Skeldon, 2012). The second is the regional debate in the Pacific about the need for greater access to overseas employment opportunities as youthful populations in many island countries expand and cannot find adequate work at home (World Bank, 2006a; Bedford and Hugo, 2012; IMI, 2013). The third debate occurs at the national level in New Zealand and Australia and concerns shortages of domestic labour to meet critical seasonal demands in the H/V industries.

These three interrelated debates culminated in the introduction of New Zealand’s RSE policy in 2007, followed closely by Australia’s implementation of their Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS) in 2008.⁴ Both policies have the dual intentions of alleviating domestic agricultural labour shortages, while also contributing to the economic development of participating Pacific Island states (DoL, 2007a, 2007b; DEEWR, 2008).

This study focuses on New Zealand’s RSE policy. Drawing on systems thinking and using a critical realist case study approach (see section 1.4), the research integrates data collected in five Pacific states (Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) and seven regions throughout New Zealand. The overarching aim is to assess whether the RSE policy is achieving its stated win-win-win objectives and delivering benefits to New Zealand employers, RSE workers and participating island countries. Factors that are contributing to the policy’s overall success are identified, as well as some of the tensions inherent within the scheme, as a complex mix of stakeholders interact and the policy tries to accomplish a diverse set of objectives. The RSE policy is not simply designed to provide New Zealand employers with a reliable pool of seasonal labour. It is designed with an explicit

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⁴ The PSWPS operated from November 2008 until June 2012 and allowed for a total of 2,500 visas to be allocated, over the duration of the pilot, to workers from Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu for seasonal employment in Australia’s horticulture industry (DEEWR, 2008, 2010). The pilot was replaced by the Seasonal Worker Program in July 2012 (Kovacic, 2012).
development objective: to contribute to the economic development of Pacific states via the transfer of workers’ skills, knowledge and earnings back to home communities. It is this development objective that has led to the policy being cited as a best practice model.

This research makes a direct contribution to the extensive monitoring and evaluation programme that has formed a core component of the RSE since its introduction in 2007, as well as contributing more broadly to a growing body of knowledge on migration and development, by providing the first substantive analysis of the RSE policy in the wider context of the triple ‘wins’ sought from managed circular migration policies. The findings also offer some valuable ‘lessons learned’ from the RSE to guide the future development and implementation of managed circular migration schemes in other settings.

1.2 The rise of managed circular migration schemes: benefits for all?

Over the preceding decade there has been intensifying academic and policy debate about the migration-development relationship and a resurgence of interest in circular and temporary migration. The rise of a globalised economy has led to increasingly complex flows of migrants – permanent and temporary, skilled and unskilled, documented and undocumented – moving across international borders in search of employment (Hugo, 1999; GCIM, 2005; IOM, 2008; ILO, 2010; UN, 2012). This movement has been facilitated by rapid advances in transport and communications technology, which makes “it easier than in the past for people to move temporarily for work and then return home, especially if they have the opportunity of repeating the process if they wish to” (Castles, 2006, p.13; cf. Hugo, 1999, 2003; Vertovec, 2007; Newland, 2009a; Skeldon, 2010, 2012). Associated with this movement has been the concomitant transnational flows of remittances that have “become a major global economic resource” and have spurred new thinking among policymakers regarding the development potential of managed migration schemes (Vertovec, 2007, p.2; cf. Kapur, 2004; World Bank, 2006a; de Haas, 2007, 2012).

There has been a proliferation of initiatives at the global level focused specifically on the relationship between migration and development, embodied in the first UN HLD on this subject in 2006, and followed by the annual Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) meetings held since 2007 that provide an avenue for continuing non-binding
dialogue on the migration-development nexus and the opportunities for bilateral, regional and multilateral approaches to migration management (IOM, 2012; UN, 2012). International agencies such as the World Bank (2006a, 2006b), the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, ⁵ and the International Migration Institute at Oxford University ⁶ have also paid increasing attention to various aspects of the migration-development relationship, including the impacts of circular migration on sending and receiving countries, and in some instances have advocated the economic benefits of this form of mobility.

The contemporary focus on migration and development has been driven in large part by increasing policy debate among EU member states regarding how best to manage the migration of both skilled and unskilled labour to meet a range of labour market shortages, as countries contend with ageing populations, declining fertility levels and the associated decline in their working-age populations (CEC, 2000, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; World Bank, 2006a; OECD, 2008; Castles and Miller, 2009; European Migration Network 2010; ILO, 2010; McLoughlin et al., 2011; Doomernik, 2013). While the migration of highly skilled workers to developed countries tends to be encouraged, increasing labour migration for low-skilled workers remains restricted (GCIM, 2005; Abella, 2006; Vertovec, 2007; Hugo, 2008; Castles and Miller, 2009; Skeldon, 2010; Sørensen, 2012).

By the first decade of the 21st century, a trend towards more flexible labour markets was emerging in many developed countries, as policymakers sought ways to add low-skilled migrants temporarily to their workforces to meet sectoral and seasonal labour needs, but not necessarily to add them permanently to the population. This desire for flexibility has become more evident in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) ⁷ as anti-immigrant sentiment has increased in countries across Europe and Asia (Fix et al., 2009; Wickramasekara, 2011; World Bank, 2011a; OECD, 2012; Green and Winters, 2012). Within

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⁵ See for example Hugo, 2003; Agunias, 2006, 2007; Agunias and Newland, 2007; Agunias and Ruiz, 2007; Basok, 2007; Newland and Agunias, 2007; Newland et al., 2008.


⁷ McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009, p.4) define the GFC as the bursting of the [US] housing market bubble in late 2007, the ensuing collapse in the sub-prime mortgage market and related financial markets, and the subsequent collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 which resulted in a sharp increase in risk premia [on interbank borrowing] around the world. According to Merrouche and Nier (2010, p.4) the crisis spread to a number of other advanced economies through a combination of direct exposures to subprime assets, the gradual loss of confidence in a number of asset classes and the drying-up of wholesale financial markets. The impact of the GFC on global temporary worker migration and remittance flows is discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.3).
this climate of increasingly restrictive migration policies for low-skilled workers, “circular migration has come to be viewed as a magic bullet: migrants can be brought in as long as they go home again” (Skeldon, 2010, p.27; cf. Vertovec, 2007; Doomernik, 2013).

Circular migration as a form of mobility, and its role in furthering the development of origin communities is not new. What is different about the present policy debate is the framing of circulation as a migration management tool that can serve the interests of both origin and destination countries and “tap into a natural preference of many migrants” (Newland, 2009b, p.6; cf. Mazzucato, 2009). The basic premise is that destination countries ‘win’ by adding migrants temporarily to the workforce to meet essential labour needs. Sending countries ‘win’ by increasing the circulation of human capital without the permanent loss of skills, and via the potential transfer of returning migrants’ financial and social capital back to home communities. The ‘win’ for migrants comes from enabling them to keep their home base in their country of origin while maximising their earnings potential overseas (Abella, 2006; Newland and Agunias, 2007; Hugo, 2009b; Newland, 2009a, 2009b; European Migration Network, 2010; IOM, 2011).

A number of circular and temporary labour migration programmes have been introduced in recent years, including New Zealand’s RSE policy and the Australian PSWPS. These programmes are designed to avoid the failures of past large-scale European guest worker schemes that resulted in the settlement of considerable numbers of migrant workers in host countries, by being more sector-specific, narrowly prescribed and closely monitored (Ruhs, 2006; GFMD Taskforce, 2007; IOM, 2008; Wickramasekara, 2011). Nevertheless, current programmes face numerous criticisms, including the restriction of workers’ welfare in the receiving country, the lack of transferability of workers’ skills back to origin communities, and the social and financial costs of re-migration which must be borne by migrant workers and their families8. Although destination countries and the employers of migrant workers may benefit from managed circular migration schemes, the crucial issue is whether migrant workers and sending countries also benefit from such programmes.

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1.3 Research aims and objectives

This thesis, drawing on evidence from New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, seeks to evaluate whether the triple ‘wins’ sought from contemporary low-skilled Temporary Labour Migration Programmes (TLMPs) can be achieved via effective collaboration between public and private sector interests, including migrant workers and communities, in origin and destination countries.

The specific objectives of the research are to:

1) Examine why managed circular migration schemes involving the movement of low-skilled workers from less developed to more developed countries have become a focus of research and policy attention in the early 21st century.

2) Establish the underlying factors that have driven the recent decisions by the New Zealand and Australian governments to implement temporary seasonal work schemes that draw on labour from neighbouring Pacific states.

3) Examine, through a conceptual framework that draws on systems thinking and complexity theory, the experiences of New Zealand employers, government agencies, workers, and local communities involved in the RSE over the first five years.

4) Assess whether the RSE policy is achieving its stated short-term aims, and whether the accumulated evidence from New Zealand supports the hypothesis that temporary migration of low-skilled labour can contribute to the development outcomes of migrants, in addition to source and destination countries.

5) Explore the implications of the research findings for policy related to the management of temporary and circular migration, for theory, for data collection, and for future research.

Objectives one and two are approached via an extensive review of the literature on the contemporary global debate about migration and development and the role of managed circular migration (Chapter 2), the Pacific regional mobility context (Chapter 3), and the local debate surrounding access to seasonal labour in New Zealand (Chapter 4). Objectives three and four are addressed by monitoring the RSE policy for five years with a view to providing evidence-based answers to the research questions (Chapters 7-10). The analysis is situated within a systems framework (Chapter 5) that draws on multiple methods and sources of
CHAPTER 1: Introduction

data, and extensive triangulation of findings, to examine all key components of the RSE programme (Chapter 6). Objective five links the research findings to some broader implications for migration theory and policy, as well as discussing possible areas for further research, and this objective is dealt with in the concluding chapter.

The RSE policy has been subjected to some significant challenges over the 2007-2012 period, not the least of which has been the impact of the GFC on local unemployment levels in New Zealand (The Treasury, 2010). The policy has, however, had widespread bipartisan political support as well as strong support from the local H/V industries and from participating Pacific states since its introduction in 2007. This support has ensured the policy’s survival through changes in government (in New Zealand and the islands) and through difficult economic circumstances during the five years.

Independent agencies evaluating the RSE programme have also deemed the policy to be an overall success. The RSE has received accolades from the ILO (2009) and the World Bank (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010) as a best practice scheme, and in 2011 the New Zealand Department of Labour – the lead government agency overseeing the RSE policy – was awarded a national Public Sector Excellence Award for its collaborative work with industry and other government agencies to ensure the smooth operation of the programme. The RSE policy is considered a durable solution to the H/V industries’ seasonal labour needs, and “a sustainable approach for New Zealand as part of its wider economic development assistance to Pacific governments” (IPANZ, 2011, para.2).

Why has New Zealand’s managed circular migration scheme been largely successful when the academic literature tends towards a pessimistic view regarding the likely success of such schemes? Why have the ILO and the World Bank endorsed the RSE as a best practice model? Why have participating island states remained enthusiastic about the RSE scheme despite some challenges for different countries as they try to build sustainable relationships with New Zealand employers? These are some of the questions that are addressed in the thesis within the wider context of the research objectives outlined above.
1.4 Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework for the thesis draws on two related fields of inquiry: systems theory and complexity theory. Systems thinking denotes taking a holistic view to complex events or phenomena. It allows for the object under investigation to be examined as an integrated whole, recognising the interrelationships between different components within the system which in turn influence the behaviour or properties of the whole (Gharajedaghi and Ackoff, 1985; Patton, 1990; Midgley, 2006).

Systems theory has guided the overall approach to the research, determining how the research objectives were addressed and how information gathered during the fieldwork was collated and subsequently analysed. In Chapters 2 to 4 systems thinking is used to present the research context at several scales: initially with reference to circular migration as a component of contemporary international migration systems (Chapter 2); secondly with reference to seasonal labour migration as a component of contemporary circulation within the Pacific’s regional migration system (Chapter 3); and thirdly with reference to the complex or ‘wicked’ problem facing New Zealand H/V producers as they try to meet seasonal labour needs in an industry marked by intense global competition, tight profit margins and low labour productivity (Whatman and Van Beek, 2008).

Systems directed at achieving particular social and economic outcomes, like the RSE scheme, are open, dynamic and complex - cutting across different government agencies in New Zealand, involving multiple participants (government agencies, industry representatives, employers, Pacific workers, and local New Zealand and island-based communities), incorporating two industries with varying labour needs, and involving multiple Pacific

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9 According to Laszlo and Krippner (1998, p.47) “in its broadest conception a ‘system’ may be described as a complex of interacting components together with the relationships among them that permit the identification of a boundary-maintaining entity or process”. Systems theory has its origins in the first half of the 20th century when three parallel fields of inquiry came into prominence: general systems theory (GST) (see Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972, p.450, for an outline of the central tenets of GST), cybernetics (which focuses on the role of feedback) and complexity science (Midgley, 2006). Midgley (2006, p.18) notes that a common understanding of complexity is that it results from the number of elements and/or interactions in a system being beyond the capacity of the observer to easily understand. See O’Sullivan, 2004, for a review of complexity science and its relevance to human geography.

10 A systems approach emphasises interdisciplinary thinking, and as an empirical framework concentrates on the analysis and design of the whole (looking at a problem in its entirety), as distinct from focusing entirely on the constituent parts, and allows for the integration of data collected at various scales (or subsystems) (Patton, 1990; Laszlo and Krippner, 1998; Midgley, 2006). For the purposes of this thesis, the terms systems thinking, systems approach and systems framework are used interchangeably.
countries, all with diverse political, economic, social and cultural contexts, and all with their own objectives and priorities for the RSE (DoL, 2010a; Lewis, 2011). Analysis of the RSE therefore requires a conceptual framework that can capture this diversity, and complexity theory is drawn on in conjunction with systems theory to describe certain elements of the RSE programme.

Complex systems have particular properties including: responsiveness to local context; being composed of numerous elements that interact and adapt to changing internal and external factors; positive and negative feedback that can either help to regulate the system and maintain its equilibrium (negative feedback), or shift the programme further away from equilibrium (positive feedback); and emergent outcomes that are not reducible to the system’s parts (Cilliers, 2000; Mingers, 2000; Byrne, 2001; Barnes et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2005; Walby, 2007; Page, 2009; Easton, 2010).¹¹ This notion of complexity challenges the ability of policy analysts to predict future outcomes and to implement a ‘one size fits all’ approach to complex policy problems.

Chapter 5 outlines the conceptual framework and includes a model of the RSE ‘system’ that identifies the different stakeholders groups and their relationships. This model is returned to repeatedly in Chapters 7 to 10 as different subsets of participants and their relationships are analysed. Information has been gathered on multiple aspects of the programme and at various scales: the macro high-level government-to-government relationships; the meso-level relationships operating at the level of the region, industry and community; and the micro-level relationships between employers, workers and their families.

By examining the major interactions between the macro-, meso- and micro-scales, and by working at all three scales simultaneously, the interrelationships between various participant groups can be analysed. This in turn allows for a holistic assessment of whether managed circular migration schemes like the RSE can achieve their stated aims of delivering positive outcomes to governments, employers, migrants and their home communities. As Patton (1990, p.80) notes, “this kind of systems thinking has profound implications for

¹¹ Complex systems evolve over time, in large part because they are in constant interaction with the surrounding environment – they are ‘open’ rather than ‘closed’. Simple systems, on the other hand, are governed by well-defined laws of behaviour, are relatively closed to the environment and have subsystems which are passive and do not pursue their own goals (Jackson and Keys, 1984, pp. 475-476).
program evaluation and policy analysis, where the parts are often evaluated in terms of strengths, weaknesses, and impacts with little regard for how the parts are embedded in and interdependent with the whole program or policy”.

In the context of migration studies, systems theory has been drawn on since the 1970s to conceptualise both internal and international migration (Mabogunje, 1970; Chapman and Prothero, 1983, 1985; Prothero and Chapman, 1985; Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al., 1992). A migration system is defined as “a set of places linked by flows and counter-flows [feedback] of people, goods, services and information which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places” (de Haas, 2010b, p.1593). Over the past five years there has been a resurgence of interest in migration systems as a valid theoretical approach (de Haas, 2009; Bakewell, et al., 2011; Bakewell, 2012). This is due in large part to some theoretical advancements in systems theory led by researchers coming from a (critical) realist perspective, with a focus on “emergence, causal mechanisms and the exercise of agency” (Bakewell, 2012).

This research adopts critical realism as the lens through which systems and complex thinking can be translated into research practice. Critical realism offers the appropriate philosophical ontology for the study of systems because it recognises that reality is both intransitive (existing independently of human senses and experience) and stratified (Mingers, 2000; Sayer, 2000; Wynn and Williams, 2012). The purpose of scientific endeavour therefore is “to penetrate to ever deeper levels to uncover the causal factors behind phenomena which can be analysed at any one level” (Sanderson, 2000, p.443; cf. Yeung, 1997; Sayer, 2000).

Wynn and Williams (2012, p.789) explain that “a primary objective of CR-based research is to provide clear, concise, and empirically supported statements about causation, specifically how and why a phenomenon occurred”. In this instance, a critical realist lens is used to guide analysis of the RSE, and the research aims to contribute to theory on migration systems by identifying specific cases of positive and negative feedback and emergence

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12 Some of the classic studies of circular migration in the 1970s and 1980s have recently been re-printed including the two collections of essays edited by Chapman and Prothero (1985) and Prothero and Chapman (1985). Both of these books were re-issued by Routledge in 2012.
within the RSE system that influence how the policy operates over time and may have implications for the scheme’s future management.

1.5 Data sources and research methods

The research employs a case study approach and a multi-method research strategy. Case study is particularly well suited to a conceptual framework drawing on systems thinking because of its ability to provide a detailed, in-depth examination of a single, “clearly bounded, but complex” phenomenon (Easton, 2010, p.123; cf. Patton, 1990; Stake, 2000; Barnes et al., 2003; Yin, 2003; Simons, 2009; Wynn and Williams, 2012). Moreover, case study research is considered “entirely consistent with a critical realist ontology” (Easton, 2010, p.123), because it is often used to address ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and it allows for the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods (Yin, 2003). As Easton (2010, p. 128) explains a critical realist case study approach “captures data with respect to ongoing or past events asking at all times why they happened or how they are happening... [and] the research process is one of continuous cycles of research and reflection”.

The RSE has been chosen as the case study for analysis because it provides an example of a managed labour migration policy that explicitly incorporates the development outcomes for sending countries into its objectives. It is bounded in space (the South Pacific region), time (monitored over 2007-2012) and event (introduced to address the dual issues of domestic labour shortages and Pacific leaders’ demands for greater access to New Zealand’s labour market).

Fieldwork was conducted in five Pacific countries in 2009 and 2010, with the researcher returning to each country twice to conduct key informant interviews with government officials, RSE workers and key community contacts. During 2009 and 2010 fieldwork was undertaken in seven regions of New Zealand, with repeat visits to a sample of 16 employers to collect information on their Pacific workforces.

In addition to the interviews with employers, New Zealand-based government officials, H/V industry representatives, pastoral care providers and other community contacts involved in different aspects of the RSE scheme’s operation were also interviewed. In 2011 quantitative
data was obtained from nine RSEs to assess the productivity of small groups of their RSE workers over several seasons.

Administrative data obtained from the Department of Labour is drawn on extensively in the thesis. The monthly Agreement to Recruit (ATR) data, which details the numbers of RSE workers recruited by employers across New Zealand throughout the year, allows for analysis of the RSE scheme at the national, regional and local scales. Demographic data was also supplied by the relevant labour ministries and national statistical agencies in the five kick-start states, providing further information on the characteristics of Pacific RSE workers selected for employment in New Zealand.

The researcher participated in the annual Horticulture New Zealand RSE conferences (2010-2012) as well as the annual Australian Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS) conferences (2010-2012), and workshops organised by the Department of Labour and the World Bank on various aspects of Pacific labour mobility. The researcher also formed part of the independent team responsible for the evaluation of the first two years’ operation of the RSE policy – an evaluation that won the Australasian Evaluation Society’s ‘Best Evaluation Study’ award in 2010.

The multi-method research strategy has involved an iterative process of data collection and analysis (Pratt, 1995; Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Each phase has built on the previous one, and data has been analysed through a continual process of data triangulation (Denzin, 1978). The study is primarily qualitative, however quantitative data have been drawn upon to capture different dimensions of the RSE system and to consolidate information accumulated over a wide geographic scope and timeframe (Jick, 1979; McKendrick, 1999; Brewer and Hunter, 2006).

Finally it is worth noting that the original aim of the thesis was to provide a comparative study of the New Zealand and Australian seasonal work programmes. However, after conducting a series of informal discussions with various stakeholders involved in the PSWPS in Robinvale, Victoria in 2009, and attending the annual PSWPS conferences (2010-2012) the decision was made to focus solely on the RSE scheme. This was primarily due to the low level of engagement by Australian employers in the pilot scheme between 2008 and 2012,
CHAPTER 1: Introduction

and the small numbers of workers participating – a total of 1,614 workers by the end of the pilot in 2012, out of a possible 2,500 places (Kovacic, 2012). Nevertheless, a considerable amount of material has been gathered on the Australian scheme over the past five years and, where appropriate, the Australian scheme is referred to in the thesis to make comparisons with the RSE.

1.6 Overview of the thesis

The thesis is presented in 11 chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 review the literature at the global, regional and local scales respectively, to situate the advent of New Zealand’s RSE policy within relevant international, regional and national contexts. Chapter 2 reviews the international literature on the migration-development nexus, providing some explanation as to why there has been a resurgence of interest in circular migration and why it is presented as a win-win-win scenario for migrants, origin and destination countries, as well as presenting the arguments raised in the literature both for and against managed circular migration programmes.

Chapter 3 outlines the regional context, and situates Pacific leaders’ repeated requests to New Zealand and Australia to open their labour markets to low-skilled Pacific workers within a historical context of long-standing circular migration for waged work between island countries and to countries on the Pacific rim. There is nothing new about circular migration for employment in the Pacific. Circulation of migrant labour within and between islands has played an integral role in Pacific societies for centuries, as families have sought to diversify income and minimise risk while retaining connections to traditional socio-economic systems (Brookfield with Hart, 1971; Bedford, 1973b; Chapman and Prothero, 1983, 1985; Connell, 2009). What is new about New Zealand’s seasonal work scheme is the high level of investment and bureaucratic management, and the policy’s objective of delivering positive outcomes to all stakeholders: employers, RSE workers and participating Pacific states.

Chapter 4 provides the background to the RSE policy’s development and implementation. Here the difficulties New Zealand H/V producers have faced over the preceding two decades

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13 See Ball, 2010; Maclellan, 2010, 2011; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2011; and Hay and Howes, 2012 for reviews of various aspects of the Australian pilot scheme.
as they have struggled with shortages of seasonal labour while operating in an increasingly competitive global export market are outlined. A number of initiatives were introduced in the early 2000s to address the complex problem of seasonal labour shortages and low productivity in the H/V industries, culminating in the introduction of the RSE policy in April 2007. Chapter 4 reviews the RSE policy, detailing what the policy aims to achieve and the requirements for employers wishing to register as RSEs, as well as for workers wishing to participate in the programme.

Chapter 5 explains the research framework, while the methodology used in the collection and analysis of primary and secondary data are the subject of Chapter 6. The rationale behind the use of a critical realist case study and multi-method approach that draws on various sources of qualitative and quantitative data is explained. The methods for collating primary and secondary data as well as the methods for data analysis are reviewed, with an emphasis on the extensive triangulation of findings undertaken throughout the research.

Chapters 7 through 10 discuss the research findings, with each chapter examining a different subset of participants and relationships outlined in the RSE systems model introduced in Chapter 5. The purpose of these chapters is to identify some of the benefits and challenges for the key stakeholder groups of participating in the RSE, and to link these findings back to the wider literature on migration and development. Chapter 7 focuses on employers’ engagement with the RSE policy over the first five years. Chapter 8 details the high-level relationships between the Department of Labour and the relevant labour ministries in the kick-start states, articulated via Inter-Agency Understandings (IAUs) that govern the management of the RSE scheme in the islands, and the different approaches Pacific countries have taken towards the recruitment and selection of RSE workers. Chapter 9 examines the experiences for RSE workers in New Zealand, with a focus on employers’ pastoral care responsibilities, workers’ health and welfare, and the provision of additional skills training to workers. Chapter 10 reviews the social and financial impacts of participation in the RSE on island-based families and communities, as well as identifying some possible visions for the future as New Zealand employers establish stronger connections with particular groups of RSE workers and their home communities.
Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by summarising the major research findings and discussing the implications of the research for policy and theory. Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the RSE policy will be essential if the scheme is to continue delivering positive outcomes to New Zealand employers, RSE workers and their families. The concluding chapter identifies areas for possible future research as well as considering some limitations of the present study.
CHAPTER 2: The (re-)emergence of circular migration and the ‘triple win’ scenario

2.1 Introduction

In recent years there has been resurgent interest in circular and temporary migration, particularly of the low-skilled, as a means of promoting development and creating “triple wins” for migrants, sending and receiving countries (UN 2006, p.5). Skeldon (2012, p.43) explains “the central idea is that migrants to developed countries ‘circulate’ back to their home countries after a period of time in developed-country destinations”. In this way, circular migration “appears to offer a solution to apparently intractable problems in the migration policy arena” (Skeldon, 2010, p.22).

It allows advanced capitalist societies to meet essential labour needs but with migrants who will circulate and not become a permanent part of the population. It enables developing countries to access more prosperous labour markets, and enhance skills development and transfer, as migrants will not only send remittances but will also return home. The migrants themselves benefit as they can enter the global labour market to work legally while still maintaining ties with their communities of origin. Seen from this point of view, circular migration is presented as a win-win-win scenario (GCIM, 2005; Agunias, 2006; GFMD Taskforce, 2007; Agunias and Newland, 2007; Vertovec, 2007; Newland et al., 2008; Hugo, 2009a; UN, 2009; European Migration Network, 2010; Skeldon, 2010, 2012).

There are those who remained opposed to such programmes, however, arguing that “such an optimistic ‘triple win’ scenario ignores very practical difficulties involved in designing policies and programmes specifically for circular migration as well as some of the very real costs, social as well as economic, that circular migration might entail” (Skeldon, 2012, p.44). Previous TLMPs\textsuperscript{14} have been criticised for failing to manage properly employers’ demand for workers which in turn led to permanent migration, for a lack of protection of workers’ rights,

\textsuperscript{14} Other terms that are used interchangeably in the literature to denote TLMPs include: temporary foreign worker programmes (TFWP) (Ruhs, 2002); temporary migrant worker programmes (TMWP) (Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012) temporary labour migration schemes (TLMS) (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010); and (micro) guest worker programmes (Martin 2006).
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and for failing to provide workers with skills transferable back to their home communities (P. Martin and Teitelbaum, 2001; Castles, 2006; Vertovec, 2007; Piper, 2010).

Consequently, while circular migration is increasingly portrayed as a ‘silver bullet’ for migration management “that could hit several ‘problems’ with one shot”, this optimism needs to be kept in check (Muskens and Bieckmann, 2007, p.12). As Skeldon (2010, p. 22) observes, “when a policy prescription seems too good to be true, it probably is, and some more dispassionate examination is required as to its real development potential”.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine why circular and temporary migration has re-emerged on the international agenda, within the broader context of ongoing debates about the relationship between migration and development. The chapter begins with an overview of contemporary trends in international migration, and possible future drivers of migration flows. The migration-development relationship, which “has been at the core of the migration policy debate” since the 1950s (de Haas, 2012, p.10), and the potential role of circular and temporary migration schemes are examined. This is followed by a discussion of some of the difficulties in defining circular, temporary and seasonal migration as different forms of mobility.

The former large-scale guest worker schemes of Germany and the US are reviewed to help explain why there is some opposition to contemporary TLMPs among academics and policymakers. Several characteristics of contemporary schemes are then outlined, as well as the criticisms directed towards such programmes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of whether the stated win-win-win objectives of low-skilled TLMPs can be achieved, and argues it is possible via careful programme design and management.

2.2 Setting the scene: current trends in international migration

A defining feature of globalisation\(^\text{15}\) in the early 21st century is the increased attention given to flows of all kinds of labour across international borders. While many migrants still move

\(^\text{15}\) The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2000, para. 6) defines globalisation as: “the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows. The term sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across international borders, [and] there are also broader cultural, political and environmental dimensions of globalization”. 17
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permanently with their families, patterns of repeated and circulatory migration are
becoming increasingly common, and involve a greater cross-section of groups than in
previous decades (Hugo, 2003; GCIM, 2005; Castles, 2006; European Migration Network,
2010; ILO, 2010).

The demand for skilled, as well as unskilled, migration has intensified sharply in recent years
as segmented labour markets have evolved in many advanced economies, with particular
labour markets requiring migrant workers to fill shortages that cannot be outsourced or
filled by local workers willing to take them at the going wages (World Bank, 2002; Hugo,
2003; DFID, 2007; OECD, 2008; Castles and Miller, 2009; ILO, 2010; McLoughlin et al.,
2011; Doomernik, 2013). The question is no longer whether there is a need for migrant labour at
both ends of the market, “but rather how big the demand is, and what policies are needed
to meet it” (Ruhs, 2006, p.13; IOM, 2010a).

Associated with the profound changes in both the scale and complexity of international
migration, has been the elevation of labour mobility from a purely domestic immigration
policy issue to an international development one (World Bank, 2002; Abella, 2006; ILO,
2010; IOM, 2010a, 2011; UN, 2012). Countries increasingly recognise that the immigration
policies of one country have implications for other states in the surrounding region, and this
‘neighbourhood effect’ requires bilateral and regional approaches to migration and
development issues (GCIM, 2005; P. Martin et al., 2006b; Bedford et al., 2007; IOM, 2009).
Omelaniuk (2012 p.337) observes that “the reasons for this range from cost-sharing to
better linking the interests and needs of sending and receiving States, in an effort to address
the causes of migration, not just its symptoms”.

2.2.1 Demographic change in developed and developing countries

A key driver in the contemporary, and future, demand for international migrants is the
slowing growth, and decline (which began in 2010), of the working-age population in
developed countries, accompanied by a rise in the dependency ratio of non-workers to
workers, as shown in Figure 2.1 (World Bank, 2006a). According to the UN’s 2009 Human
Development Report, “by 2050 the world as a whole and every continent except Africa are
projected to have more elderly people (at least 60 years of age) than children (below 15)”
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(UN, 2009, p.43). Declining fertility levels and ageing populations mean many developed countries require high levels of migration to maintain the sizes of their working populations (CEC, 2000, 2005a, 2005b; Castles and Miller, 2009; UN, 2009; ILO, 2010; McLouglin et al., 2011; Doomernik, 2013).

Figure 2.1: World labour force age groups and dependency rates

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Source: World Bank, 2006a, p.30

In developing countries, the size of the working-age population will continue to increase albeit at progressively slower rates (Figure 2.1). These trends will put pressure on wages and increase the incentives for those entering the labour force to move in search of employment (World Bank, 2006a; UN, 2009; IOM, 2010a). Temporary migration, particularly of the low-skilled, is seen as a potential tool for poverty reduction as well as assisting developing countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)\textsuperscript{16} (DFID, 2007; Hugo, 2009a).

2.2.2 The rise of female migrants in international flows

Another significant shift in international migration trends over the past five decades has been the global rise in the number of female migrants, both as family members and as autonomous economic migrants, from an estimated 35.3 million in 1960, to approximately

\textsuperscript{16} The MDGs provide quantified, time-bound targets to address eight broad development goals and 47 indicators in the following areas: extreme poverty, universal primary education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases, and environmental sustainability (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2010a).
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105 million in 2010 (Sørensen et al., 2002; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; UNPD, 2009; ILO, 2010). Changing labour market structures at home and abroad have led to increasing numbers of women looking for work overseas to improve their livelihoods and those of their families. This is due in part to the rising demand for women in low-skilled, highly feminised sectors, such as domestic work, health care and entertainment, as well as the increasing difficulties for men seeking employment in both origin and destination countries (Hugo, 2008; Piper, 2008; IOM, 2008; Yue, 2008; ILO, 2010). Women’s growing intra-regional and international mobility is a feature of migration within the Pacific, as women move under family migration programmes as well as in search of employment (Connell and Voigt-Graf, 2006; Khoo et al., 2008).

2.2.3 The Global Financial Crisis (GFC)

The GFC “that followed the collapse of the investment house Lehman Brothers in September 2008” is a third factor that has impacted significantly on migration flows over the preceding four years (Fix et al., 2009, p.1; IOM, 2010a). Although the GFC is not a migration ‘trend’ it is worth mentioning for three reasons: the GFC’s impact on temporary worker migration flows; the impact of the crisis on remittance flows to developing countries; as well as the ongoing impact on domestic unemployment rates in developed countries, and the ensuing rise in increasingly negative anti-immigrant rhetoric (Fix et al., 2009). In their analysis of the GFC Canuto and Timmer (2012, p.xv) observe that:

The Global Financial Crisis in 2008-09 served a harsh blow to 215 million migrants and their families around the world. Migrants faced worsening employment prospects in destination countries, often coupled with tightening entry regulations and vicious anti-immigration rhetoric. Meanwhile, migrants’ support to families back home in the form of remittances was ever more important in the face of rising costs of living.

Temporary worker migration is a component of migration flows that reacts strongly to economic conditions (OECD, 2012). As Table 2.1 indicates, temporary labour migration to OECD countries dropped sharply (17 percent) in 2009, with a further decline in 2010 (OECD, 2012). Seasonal workers, largely low-skilled workers in agriculture, make up the largest single category of temporary worker migration – “more than one in four in 2009” (OECD, 2012, p.12). The number of seasonal workers in OECD countries fell by 57,000 (9 percent)
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between 2008 and 2009. This decline was largely due to the drop in seasonal work in Spain, which went from 46,000 overseas workers in 2008 to fewer than 2,000 in 2009, as agricultural employers had little difficulty sourcing local staff (OECD, 2011). The decline in OECD countries continued in 2010, with the numbers of seasonal workers falling by another 33,000 (6 percent) (OECD, 2012).

Table 2.1: Temporary worker migration in OECD countries (000s), 2005-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Temporary Worker Migration in OECD Countries (000s)</th>
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Source: OECD, 2012, p.35

The GFC impacted directly on both the New Zealand and Australian seasonal work programmes. With the onset of the GFC late in 2008, rising domestic unemployment in New Zealand led to a tightening in the conditions for employers seeking seasonal labour via the RSE scheme, and an overall reduction in the number of seasonal workers requested by employers for the 2009/10 season (discussed in Chapter 7). In Australia, some authorities have cited the GFC as a reason for employers’ low uptake of the PSWPS in the early years of the pilot. An increase in the availability of domestic workers, as well as a rise in the numbers of working holiday makers seeking short-term employment, meant labour shortages in the horticulture industry were not as acute as before the crisis (Ball, 2010; MacLellan, 2010; Hugo, 2011).¹⁷ ¹⁸

A widespread concern held by analysts monitoring the GFC, was the negative impact the crisis would have on remittance flows to developing countries (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2009).

¹⁷ Hay and Howes (2012) argue, however, that the GFC cannot explain the persistently low uptake of the PSWPS by horticulture enterprises, as the Australian economy proved to be more resilient than expected.
¹⁸ A recent study of Australia’s Working Holidaymaker programme (Tan et al., 2009, p.vi) found that of a total of 29,182 jobs at which WHMs worked, ‘farm hand’ (including fruit and vegetable pickers) accounted for the largest share (26.1%) of the total jobs, with most farm hands (86%) located in regional areas.
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Over the past two decades there has been significant growth in officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries, from approximately US$75 billion in 1989 to US$350 billion in 2011 (Mohapatra et al., 2011; Sirkeci et al., 2012). Some analysts view remittances as “the most tangible link between migration and development” (Canuto and Timmer, 2012, p.xv), providing a ‘lifeline’ for sending communities, and contributing directly and indirectly to the income of sending households (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p.2).

Migrants’ income and employment opportunities were expected to be adversely affected by the GFC, in turn influencing the willingness and ability of migrants to continue sending money to family and community members abroad (Sirkeci et al., 2012). As Table 2.2 illustrates, this expectation was realised to an extent, with officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries dropping by 5.2 percent in 2009, down to an estimated US$307 billion (Mohapatra et al., 2011). However, remittances proved to be significantly more resilient than other types of private flows and foreign direct investment. Officially recorded remittances to East Asia and the Pacific remained stable at US$85 billion in 2008 and 2009, and by 2011, for the first time since the GFC, remittance flows to all six developing regions monitored by the World Bank had risen (Fix et al., 2009; World Bank, 2011a).

The resilience of remittance flows was partly attributed to the fact that, contrary to expectations, migrants did not return to their origin countries during the crisis. According to Sirkeci et al. (2012, p.5) “many were unwilling to return to their sending communities for fear that future migration would be difficult”. Increasingly restrictive immigration policies were imposed in several OECD countries in response to continuing high domestic unemployment rates in the aftermath of the GFC and ongoing debt crisis in Europe (Fix et al., 2009; World Bank, 2011a). The OECD (2012, p.97) observed that “while long-standing concerns about the impact of ageing populations and the need to attract skilled workers remain in the background... this has been counteracted by a souring of public opinion regarding migration in some countries.”

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19 Remittance flows to developing countries will be greater than US$350 billion as this estimate does not take into account unrecorded remittances that flow through informal channels (Irving et al., 2010; World Bank, 2011a; Canuto and Timmer, 2012). Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2009) point out that the rapid growth in remittance flows during previous decades may also be attributed to improvements in the collection of remittance data by central banks in many receiving countries. The portion of remittances transferred through formal channels has also increased, making it easier for banks to monitor flow amounts.
Table 2.2: Remittance flows to developing countries, 2008-2014

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Source: Mohapatra et al., 2011, p.15

The United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands have all introduced stricter immigration policies in response to the recession and in an effort to lower national unemployment rates (Fix et al., 2009; OECD, 2012; Green and Winters, 2012). Spain has also introduced new policies that make the process of hiring foreign workers more burdensome for employers (Mohapatra et al., 2011). In Asia, policies regarding the admission of migrant workers have tightened in Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan (Fix et al., 2009; Green and Winters, 2012).

The tightening of immigration policies in destination countries has the potential to impact significantly on the future movement of low-skilled temporary workers, as TLMPs and the agencies involved in them come under increasing scrutiny (OECD, 2012). As Green and Winters (2012, p.52) point out, the actions of governments in the months ahead “can be expected to have a significant impact on how this recession affects migration and its associated impact on development”.

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2.3 International migration and development – the global agenda

Over the preceding decade there has been a proliferation of initiatives at the international level, outlined in Figure 2.2, addressing the migration-development relationship. The contemporary focus on the interconnections between these two phenomena began with the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994. The conference brought together delegates from 179 states and culminated in the creation of a 20-year ‘Programme of Action’ on population and development. International migration was included as an integral part of the action plan, with delegates agreeing there was a need to consider a range of issues such as remittances, temporary migration and voluntary return (UN, 1995).

Figure 2.2: International migration and development – the global agenda

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Since the ICPD meeting the migration-development nexus has taken centre stage in national and international public policy debates (ILO, 2010). In 2001 the Swiss government launched the Berne Initiative, “a state-owned consultative process with the goal of obtaining better management of migration at the regional and global levels through cooperation between States” (ILO, 2010, p.5). Omelaniuk (2012 p.358) maintains, “the Berne Initiative was one of the first efforts to engage States from every region of the world in developing a common orientation to migration management, based on notions of cooperation, balance and predictability”.

The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 2005, and subsequent UN High-Level Dialogue (HLD) held in 2006, have predominantly stimulated the concentration of activity around migration and development since the mid-2000s. It should be noted, however, that while activities of the ILO are included in the timeline, the ILO, as a separate UN agency, has had an interest in migration and protecting the rights of workers since the 1940s (ILO, 2010).
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The focus on international migration formed the backdrop to the General Discussion on Migrant Workers in the 92nd Session of the ILO’s International Labour Conference (ILC) in June 2004. Participants deliberated on the challenges currently surrounding labour migration, and “the main outcome of the discussion was the adoption by consensus of the resolution concerning a fair deal for migrant workers in the global economy” (ILO, 2010, p.6). In 2005, the ILO formed a tripartite group of experts to develop the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, constituting “the first international collection of principles, guidelines and good practices on migration policy and practice” (ILO, 2010, p.6).

The Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) was also formed in 2005. The Commission was organised at the request of the UN Secretary-General and was mandated to provide the framework for a “coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration” (GCIM, 2005, p.8). The Commission’s report, presented to UN Member States and the international community in late 2005, included six broad-based ‘Principles for Action’ covering all voluntary and irregular migration, the protection of migrants’ rights, social cohesion and integration, the interconnections between migration and development, and governance of international migration (GCIM, 2005).

In response to the GCIM report, in early 2006 the UN Secretary-General established the Global Migration Group (GMG) – a group of 16 entities (including the 14 UN entities, the IOM and the World Bank) that “aims to promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration” and to encourage a coherent and coordinated approach to international migration (GMG, 2011, para.1; Pécoud, 2013).

In September 2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations held a High-Level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development. This was the first meeting of its kind and was deemed “a watershed event in building international consensus on the links between migration and development” (McKinley, 2008, p.27; cf. P. Martin et al., 2007). Senior political representatives from over 130 countries attended the meeting. Participants viewed international migration as a positive force for development, and a number of participants, including the New Zealand and Australian representatives, saw both skilled and
unskilled temporary migration schemes as a possible means of addressing labour market demand (UN, 2006).

The political will generated at the HLD led to the creation of a states-led initiative, the Global Forum of Migration and Development (GFMD), which was designed to further discussions on issues covered in the General Assembly. According to Omelaniuk (2012, p.360) “the GFMD was born in 2007 of a strong belief and agreement among the majority of United Nations Member States that an independent, informal and State-led international forum for migration discussion and exchange of experience would enhance international cooperation on migration”. The annual GFMD meetings (see Figure 2.2) are considered “an example of partnership at its best”, bringing together government and international expertise and providing a framework for the discussion of migration and development at the global level (Fernandez-Castilla, 2008, p.38; Omelaniuk, 2012).

Circular migration was presented at the 2007 GFMD meeting “as a new theme that goes to the heart of the work of the GFMD, and is high on the agenda of the European Union, [because] it provides the operational link between migration and development” (GFMD, 2008, p.76). In their background paper for the 2007 meeting, Newland and Agunias (2007, p.4) argued:

Circular migration is at the cutting edge of the migration and development debate... If the goal of the Global Forum is to extend the frontier of cooperation on migration and development in very concrete ways, then circular migration is a policy field ripe for innovation – ranging from new policy to pilot projects. And countries at every point on the development spectrum have a practical interest in exploring these policy options.

Circular migration was also addressed at the 2009 GFMD meeting, in the context of reintegration of migrants back into source communities and opportunities for development. The meeting encouraged origin and destination countries to factor circular migration into their broader development strategies with partner countries, and “to work together, and with private, non-governmental and international agencies, to link return and reintegration with development projects, particularly at local, community levels” (GFMD, 2009, p.29).
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At the regional level, the European Commission has also been reviewing its policies relating to the management of economic migration within the European Union (EU), including directives relating to the entry of seasonal workers (CEC, 2005a, 2005b, 2010) as well as migration and development policies (CEC, 2005c, 2007). In July 2010 the European Commission issued a proposal for a Directive regulating the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment (COM(2010)379 final). The Commission notes that “EU economies face a structural need for seasonal work for which labour from within the EU is expected to become less and less available... and the structural need for low-skilled and low-qualified workers is likely to continue expanding” in the future (CEC, 2010, p.1). Further, the Directive is seen as a tool for fostering development in origin countries through the circulation of migrants, the flow of remittances and transfer of skills and investment.

Despite the ongoing focus on the possible benefits of managed circular migration, opening up or increasing labour migration for low-skilled workers remains controversial in many developed countries (Hugo, 2009a; ILO, 2010; Skeldon, 2010; Doomernik, 2013). The framing of migration as a security issue has resulted in host societies becoming “increasingly fearful about the presence of migrant communities, especially those with unfamiliar cultures” (GCIM, 2005, p. 8-9; Vertovec, 2007; Castles and Miller, 2009; Sørensen, 2012).

There are concerns regarding the long-term employability of lesser skilled migrants, their integration into the destination society and their impact on the local labour market (World Bank, 2002; DFID, 2007; OECD, 2008). The GFC and rising domestic unemployment rates in many high-income OECD countries have exacerbated these concerns, and created political pressure in several countries to reduce current levels of immigration (Mohapatra et al., 2011; OECD, 2012). It is within this climate of increasingly restrictive migration policies for lower-skilled migrants, that circular migration has come to be viewed as a ‘magic bullet’ as it allows for legal entry of migrants on a temporary basis and agreed return (Muskens and Bieckmann, 2007; Skeldon, 2010).
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2.4 The migration-development nexus: an ongoing debate

Debates about the migration-development relationship, and the role of circular migration in furthering development in sending countries, are not new (Faist, 2009). Rather, “the policy and research debate on migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum, from optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, to pessimism, scepticism and relative neglect since the early 1970s, and towards more optimistic views since 2000” (de Haas, 2012, pp.10-11).

During the 1950s and 1960s, a broadly positive approach was taken towards the migration-development relationship. According to Faist (2009, p.41), “public policy emphasized the ‘labor gaps’ in the North and ‘development’ in the South”, and development was supposed to occur via the flow of “financial remittances, return migration and the subsequent transfer of human capital” back to origin countries.

The 1970s and 1980s saw a shift in rhetoric, away from the term ‘development’ towards more negative terms such as ‘dependency’ and ‘underdevelopment’ of origin countries (Faist, 2009; de Haas, 2010a). Research in the Pacific and the Caribbean, for example, cited the development of dependent economies (Connell and Conway, 2000; Connell and Brown, 2005). Labels such as ‘remittance societies’ in the Caribbean and ‘MIRAB’ economies in the Pacific – which had become heavily reliant upon Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy – were used, and these island microstates were conceived as weak, vulnerable and dependent (Bertram, 1986, 2006; Bertram and Watters, 1985; Connell and Conway, 2000).

More recently, the debate has swung back towards an emphasis on the positive aspects of migration and development, and the potential benefits of circular migration.21 Similar to the 1960s, financial remittances are once again viewed as an important tool that can contribute to the development process in less developed sending countries (Ramírez et al., 2005; P. Martin et al., 2006b; World Bank 2006a, 2006b; Hujo and Piper, 2007; IOM, 2010a; Ratha et al., 2011b; Sirkeci et al., 2012).

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21 De Haas (2012) cautions the debate may be shifting again. See for example the 2012 Special issue: migration and development buzz? Rethinking the migration development nexus and policies, International Migration, vol. 50, no. 3.
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Recent studies have pointed to the local multiplier effects of remittances, and their positive role in generating income, consumption and social protection of receiving households, fostering investment in children’s education and health, and boosting local and regional economies through purchasing of housing, land, small businesses and investment in social infrastructure and community projects (Ghosh, 2006; World Bank, 2006a; Carling, 2008; UN, 2009; Ratha et al., 2011b; Sirkeci et al., 2012). Remittance receipts at the global level, totalling an estimated US$483 billion in 2011 (Table 2.2), now exceed aid and foreign direct investment from advanced economies to developing countries, and “appear to be a more effective instrument for income redistribution than large bureaucratic development programmes or development aid” (de Haas, 2012, p.9).22 Critically, remittances provide a relatively stable source of external finance to low-income countries, and help households to spread risks and smooth consumption (de Haas, 2007).23

In addition to the supply of economic remittances, migrants are increasingly viewed as potential “agents of development” for their home societies, as they return with social and human capital, in the form of added skills and knowledge that may benefit home communities (Hujo and Piper, 2007, p.21; cf. Levitt, 1998; Piper, 2009; UN, 2010). The exponential growth in transnational phone calls and emails, and the significant rise in international travel, has meant that migrants can retain closer ties to their home area than ever before, and that social groups from right across the social spectrum have been exposed to new ideas and practices (Levitt, 1998; Castles, 2003; Hugo, 2003, 2008; Vertovec, 2004; DFID, 2007).

For many temporary migrants, including low-skilled workers, there are a number of advantages to retaining a pattern of circular migration in preference to permanent

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22 Also see Kapur, 2004; World Bank, 2006a; IOM, 2010a; Mohapatra et al., 2011; Sirkeci et al., 2012.
23 The essential argument here is that individuals and families develop economic strategies not only to maximise household earnings but also to minimise risk. Since economic conditions in developing countries are often quite volatile and because individuals and families in the agrarian and urban informal sectors usually exist close to the subsistence level, poor households face serious risks to their well-being. In the absence of other ways to insure against these risks, the migration of family members to diverse labour markets serves to reduce the overall risk to family income. The strategy of risk minimisation assumes that households are free to send members outside the community on a temporary basis, where they remit part of their earnings back to the family (Katz and Stark, 1986; Stark, 1978; Stark and Levhari, 1982, Stark and Lucas, 1988 cited in Massey, 1990, pp.9-10).
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settlement in destination countries (Hugo, 2009b; Mazzucato, 2009; Newland, 2009a; European Migration Network, 2010). These advantages include ‘earning’ in the high-income, high-cost destination and ‘spending’ in the low-income, low-cost origin which in turn enables migrants to maximise the purchasing power of their earnings. Additionally, migrants are able to retain traditional cultural, societal and language ties with home communities, as well as maintaining family links (Hugo, 2003, 2008; Newland et al., 2008).

2.5 Temporary, circular and seasonal migration: overlapping forms of mobility

Since the late 1960s circular migration has played a central role in discussions about urbanisation and development in Africa, Asia, the Pacific Islands and parts of Latin America (Skeldon, 2006; Bedford, 2009). Research on population movement in Indonesia (Hugo, 1975) and Melanesia (Bedford, 1971; Chapman, 1976; Chapman and Prothero, 1985) and Africa (Mitchell, 1985; Prothero and Chapman, 1985) during the late 1960s and early 1970s found that circular migration was an effective way of improving migrants’ livelihoods as they were able to undertake wage employment in towns while also retaining traditional social, economic and political linkages with their home and rural communities.

During the 1990s the focus shifted “from mobility and urbanisation in developing countries to population movement, labour markets and social cohesion in developed countries” (Bedford, 2009, p.6; cf. Skeldon, 2006). Circular migration, which had traditionally existed outside the realm of government policies and intervention, became of increasing interest to policymakers. Accordingly, “as states have sought to operationalize circular migration, analysts have been pushed to devise a working definition of what has historically been a flexible and intuitive concept” (Newland, 2009b, p.6).

Defining circular migration has always been problematic (Newland, 2009b; Skeldon, 2010). As Bedford (2009, p.6) explains, “in the 1970s considerable attention was focused on trying to differentiate between types of human spatial mobility in terms of distance travelled and duration of absence [daily, weekly, monthly, yearly or longer] from a place considered to be ‘home’”. Although this approach was useful for some purposes, it encouraged research that distinguished between types of mobility. However the various forms of spatial mobility – circulation, temporary migration, permanent migration or return – are not mutually exclusive. They overlap continuously (Bedford, 2009; Newland, 2009b; de Haas, 2010a).
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Skeldon (2012, p.44) argues:

The principal analytical problem lies in defining just what circular migration might be. Is it a form of migration quite distinct from other types? Is it temporary migration by another name? Is it labour migration? Is it different from seasonal migration? How does it differ from return migration? These are easy questions to raise, with less easy answers. If circular migration cannot be clearly defined, policymakers are neither going to be able to manage it nor design policies specifically for it.

2.5.1 Defining circular migration

Despite no formal legal or administrative definition of circular migration, Newland (2009b, p.9) outlines four descriptive dimensions of most contemporary working definitions:

1) The spatial dimension (geography) includes at least two poles: the place of origin and the place of destination;

2) The temporal dimension (duration) can range from short-moves – as short as several months for seasonal workers, and up to several years for temporary workers – to life-cycle moves;

3) The iterative dimension (repetition) includes more than one cycle; and

4) The developmental dimension indicates that both the place of origin and the place of destination benefit from the movement of people back and forth... [and] migrants benefit from circularity.

In addition to the descriptive dimensions outlined by Newland (2009b) another characteristic of circular migration identified by a number of analysts relates to the flexibility of movement (Skeldon, 2012). Two types of circular migration are commonly identified: spontaneous or voluntary circular migration, and managed circular migration. Spontaneous circulation occurs when migrants engage freely (without government intervention) in back and forth movements between an origin and destination area (Mazzucato, 2009; Newland, 2009b; Skeldon, 2012).

Managed circular migration is generally governed through bilateral agreements or Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) by both the origin and destination country. Such programmes, including the New Zealand and Australian seasonal work schemes, implement
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a series of institutional mechanisms that determine the number of migrants admitted, monitor their limited duration of stay abroad, and select the profiles and skills of potential migrants (Abella, 2006; GFMD Taskforce, 2007; Cassarino, 2008).

In other words participating migrants circulate, but this does not happen freely. Rather they circulate according to the conditions of their visa or employment contract, and are required to leave the destination country after a specified period with the obligation to return to their home country (and the possibility of repeated circular migration in future) (Newland, 2009a). It is this form of movement that is increasingly viewed by policymakers as a migration policy tool (Wickramasekara, 2011).

Definitions that distinguish between spontaneous and managed circulation still, however, fail to clarify how circular migration differs from temporary migration (Skeldon, 2012). The terms ‘circular’ and ‘temporary’ are used interchangeably in the literature, 24 and Wickramasekara (2011, p.12) argues it is difficult to compartmentalise temporary and circular migration because of their overlapping nature:

On the one hand, all circular migration is in essence temporary migration because migrants have to eventually return to the home country in the absence of any right to permanency in the country of destination. On the other hand, all temporary migration forms do not lead to circular migration – most may involve a single migration cycle while some programmes may lead to permanent settlement in destination countries.

Wickramasekara (2011, pp.11-12; cf. Cassarino, 2008) does, however, identify several features of circular migration that set it apart from TLMPs:

1) Repetition of movements: circular migration programmes allow for frequent [emphasis added] temporary stays abroad whereas TLMPs are based on a one-time-only temporary stay and return which usually closes the migration cycle – a single migratory cycle;

2) Circular migration programmes usually involve the same groups [emphasis added] of persons (migrants who are invited back) while TLMPs often involve different groups;

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24 With reference to the Canadian SAWP, for example, Newland et al. (2008) and the UN’s Human Development Report (2009) refer to it as a circular migration programme, while other analysts (such as P. Martin, 2006; Ruhs, 2006; Basok, 2007, and Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012) refer to it as a temporary worker programme.
3) Circular migration programmes are more resource-intensive in terms of financial and logistical resources required for implementation than TLMPs, as they aim to selectively organise the mobility of foreign workers and secure the return of migrant workers at the end of the contract period.

Seasonal migration, which generally involves migrants moving for a period of more than three months, but fewer than nine months, is the most familiar form of circular migration between high-income and low-income countries (Newland, 2009a; Holzmann and Pouget, 2010; ILO, 2010). As Table 2.1 illustrates, seasonal workers make up a significant component of the inflows of temporary workers in many OECD countries. Seasonal work programmes often involve countries within close geographic proximity (migration corridors) such as the US and Mexico, Spain and Morocco, Germany and Poland, and New Zealand and Australia’s schemes with surrounding Pacific Island states. By far the largest body of experience relating to circular migration comes from seasonal worker programmes (Newland et al., 2008; Holzmann and Pouget, 2010).

Wickramasakera (2011, p. 13) argues “many seasonal worker programmes may qualify as circular migration programmes if they involve the return of the same workers each year [emphasis added]”. The author identifies the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program (SAWP), the Spain-Morocco pilot programme in Cartaya, Spain, and the German seasonal work programme (outlined in Appendix 1) as fitting within the circular migration model as the majority of the same workers return year after year. These are differentiated from the temporary guest worker programmes of the 1950s and 1960s (discussed in the next section) that included an element of circularity, but had the unintended consequence of attracting workers who remained permanently in the destination country.

For the purposes of this thesis, both the RSE, and Australian PSWPS, are referred to as circular migration programmes.\(^{25}\) Both schemes involve annual circulation of labour, managed by limited purpose visas that do not allow the holder to transition to other permits (temporary or permanent) while at the destination. In the case of the RSE scheme, just under half (49 percent) of all first-time RSE workers return in the following season and most

\(^{25}\) The ILO (2009) also refers to the RSE as a circular migration programme in its ‘good practice’ database on labour migration policies and programmes.
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(87 percent) return to the same employer. More than 50 percent of all RSE workers have
returned at least once to work for another season (DoL, 2012a). For ease of reference,
however, other seasonal work schemes discussed in the remainder of the thesis are referred
to as TLMPs, as this is the most common terminology found in the contemporary literature
(see for example, Ruhs, 2006; P. Martin, 2006; Basok, 2007; Preibisch, 2010; Hennebry and
Preibisch, 2012).

The key to success in seasonal migration schemes lies in the fact that demand for labour is
inherently short-term and “in seasonal work, circularity has a certain logic” (Newland et al.,
2008, p.10). After the termination of the work contract there is no incentive for the
employer to offer a subsequent contract because of lack of work, or for the migrant workers
to stay as the harvest period has ended (Koettl et al., 2006; P. Martin et al., 2006a; OECD,
2008).

Further, the ‘new twist’ in the promotion of such schemes is the argument that low-income
countries will benefit by sending additional workers abroad (Ruhs and P. Martin, 2008). It is
this focus on the potential mutual benefits for countries of origin and destination that
distinguishes current circular migration schemes from the guest worker programmes of the
past which were oriented specifically towards meeting the labour market needs of receiving
countries (Abella, 2006; Castles, 2006; Ruhs and P. Martin, 2008; Newland, 2009b; IOM,
2010a).

Nonetheless, while proponents of circular migration take an optimistic view of the possible
benefits of managed seasonal worker programmes, there are those who remain opposed to
their implementation. The failure of previous temporary work schemes, such as the Bracero
programme in the United States (1942-64) and the Gastarbeiter programme in Germany
(1955-73), have generated concern within academic and policy communities about the likely
success of new programmes (de Haas, 2006; Ruhs, 2006). As Newland and Agunias (2007,
pp.5-6) observe, “concern that a circular migration programme will turn out to be nothing
more than a slow route to permanence is probably the major reason that more governments
do not pursue circular immigration schemes”. The next section briefly reviews the history of
the US and German programmes.
2.6 Early post war guest worker programmes: Germany and the US

The United States and western European nations, such as Germany, introduced guest worker programmes after World War II in response to employer requests for foreign labour. During their heyday in the 1950s and 1960s, “hundreds of thousands of migrants were recruited to work in economic sectors that included construction, agriculture and manufacturing” (P. Martin et al., 2006a, p.84). The policies were introduced without extensive debate “because of macroeconomic conditions and the assumption that employers and migrants would behave according to the rules” (P. Martin, 2006, p.9).

One of the primary assumptions of the large-scale guest worker programmes was that migrants could be rotated in and out (Massey and Liang, 1989). In Germany, 75 percent of the 18.5 million foreign workers who arrived between 1960 and 1973 left as expected. However, “Germans who assumed that the rotation principle would be honoured strictly were not prepared for the settlement of 25 percent of the guest workers” (P. Martin et al., 2006a, p.87).

With the oil crisis in 1973, the entry of low-skilled labour migrants in OECD countries largely ceased, with the exception of seasonal worker programmes in France and Switzerland (Castles, 1986; OECD, 2008). Once the Gastarbeiter programme had been terminated, many of Germany’s foreign workers recognised there were no longer possibilities of being re-recruited for their jobs in the future and settled permanently in the host society, often with support from their employers. Despite the fact many of the Gastarbeiter were unemployed, they preferred to remain in Germany where they were eligible for unemployment benefits, rather than rotating home where job opportunities were even bleaker (P. Martin and Teitelbaum, 2001; Ruhs, 2006). The settlement of foreign workers, and continued immigration via family unification, “led to the perception that guest worker programmes failed because they opened immigration doors in declared ‘nonimmigrant’ countries such as Germany” (P. Martin et al., 2006a, p.87).

\[26\] For comprehensive reviews of previous guest worker schemes in Western Europe and the US see Castles, 1986; 2006; Massey and Liang, 1989; P. Martin and Teitelbaum, 2001; P. Martin, 2006, 2009; P. Martin et al., 2006b; Ruhs, 2006.
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The Bracero programme, implemented in 1942, “started as a war emergency measure [meeting US food supplies] but continued after the end of the Second World War, with increasing dependence of US employers in agriculture on migrant workers” (Wickramasekara, 2011, p.41). The scheme, based on agreement between the US and Mexico, lasted until 1964 and involved 4.5 million people (Massey and Liang, 1989; P. Martin, 2002, 2009; Meissner, 2004). At the scheme’s peak in the late 1950s, more than 400,000 Mexican workers were recruited annually (Bruno, 2012). Similar to the German scheme, during the 22 years of the Bracero programme millions of Mexican workers rotated back and forth for agricultural work as expected. However a combination of tougher enforcement measures and easier access to Braceros in the mid-1950s led to legal and unauthorised migration rising at the same time (P. Martin and Teitelbaum, 2001; P. Martin, 2002, 2009).

The programme was characterised by widespread abuse of workers and lax enforcement of the programme rules, which ultimately lead to the scheme’s termination (Meissner, 2004). Yet the programme spawned institutionalised networks and labour market relationships between Mexican workers and US agricultural employers that have continued to facilitate irregular migration (Massey and Liang, 1989; Meissner, 2004; P. Martin, 2002, 2009). According to Meissner (2004), “ending the agreement as a legal matter did not alter the migration behaviour that had been established over the course of more than 20 years; the migrant flows simply adapted to new conditions”.

Castles (2006, p.743) argues a principal reason for the failure of the official ‘rotation’ policy of previous schemes was that “temporary workers were being recruited to meet permanent labour demand”. There was strong demand from employers to retain experienced workers, and despite workers entering on short-term visas, “employers often encouraged migrants to stay longer, saving them the cost of recruiting and training a replacement” (P. Martin, 2006, p.13). Further, the large-scale guest worker programmes generated “distortion and dependence effects, as employers made decisions that assumed migrants would continue to be available [such as expanding production in areas where little local labour was available, and avoiding raising wages when local workers were no longer available or willing to do the work], and migrants, their families, and countries became dependent on overseas jobs” (P. Martin, 2006, p.36; cf. Plewa and Miller, 2005).
P. Martin (2006, p.14) contends that migration could have been slowed through the imposition of employer-paid levies or fees. However, “the belief that migrants were guests helped to prevent the development of policies that might have slowed growth in migrant employment”. This resulted in both the US and German programmes lasting longer and growing larger than originally intended. Thus the fundamental criticism directed towards past schemes is the ‘permanent’ character of what was meant to be temporary migration (Massey and Liang, 1989; P. Martin and Teitelbaum, 2001; Ruhs, 2002, 2006; Plewa and Miller, 2005).

2.7 Contemporary low-skilled seasonal TLMPs: measures to mitigate past failures

Despite the supposed failure of previous guest worker programmes, a new era of low-skilled TLMPs has emerged over the preceding two decades. These programmes, which are predominantly managed via bilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries, differ in their scope and purpose (P. Martin, 2006; IOM, 2008). Contemporary schemes are more sector-specific, more circular, and more narrowly prescribed than former guest worker schemes, and their management via bilateral agreements is considered an “effective way of setting out the rights and obligations of employers, migrants, private agencies and government instrumentalities in the migration process” (Hugo 2009b, p.42; cf. GCIM, 2005; Ruhs, 2006; GFMD Taskforce, 2007; IOM, 2008, Miller, 2008).

Furthermore, they are designed to avoid the failures of past programmes by not only monitoring more closely the extent and duration of the schemes, but also by linking migration to the development of origin countries (Castles, 2006; World Bank, 2006b; Newland, 2009b; ILO, 2010). Appendix 1 outlines the key features of several contemporary seasonal work schemes operating in Europe, Canada and the US, including measures to manage the demand for labour, to encourage the return of workers at the end of the contract period, and in the case of Spain’s seasonal work programme, measures to facilitate development in workers’ home communities.
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Ruhs (2006, p.16) argues that in order for contemporary TLMPs to avoid past policy mistakes, three prerequisites must be met:

1) A strong policy commitment to enforcing immigration (ensuring workers are legally employed) and employment laws (minimum wage, health and safety regulations etc.) especially against employers;
2) Active regulation of the cost at which migrant workers are made available to employers (e.g. monthly levies for employing overseas workers); and
3) More effective mechanisms (e.g. labour market tests) to encourage employers to search for local workers before demanding migrant labour.

Managing the demand for labour is critical to developing sound policies on temporary foreign workers, as “employers will always have a ‘need’ or a demand for foreign workers if by employing them they can lower their costs” (Abella, 2006, p.42). As Ruhs (2006, p.15) points out, “the employment of migrant workers is often only one of various possible ways in which employers may respond to perceived shortages of labour”. Other options include improving the wages and employment conditions to encourage local workers to fill vacancies, and investing in labour-saving technologies to improve productivity (Castles, 2006; Ruhs, 2009; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010). If the costs of employing migrant workers are low, relative to the other options, this will discourage employers from considering the alternatives.

Contemporary TLMPs attempt to manage employers’ demand for workers via a series of measures. The first is the requirement for employers to register their request for workers with the relevant authority in the destination country for approval, and undertake labour market assessments to ensure local labour is not available. The labour market assessment period varies from 14 days in Canada to a period of four weeks in Germany (European Committee on Migration, 1996; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012). In the United States a 50 percent rule applies, whereby employers must hire any qualified US worker who applies for a position during the first half of the employment contract under which H-2A workers are also employed (Bruno, 2012).

Employers must also meet specific requirements regarding wage rates and working conditions, as well as accommodation and travel arrangements. Spain’s seasonal work
programme requires the employer to cover 50 percent of the cost of the worker’s airplane ticket. Similarly in Canada and the United States, transportation costs are split between the employer and the worker. In the United States and France, employers must provide free accommodation to their seasonal workers, while in Canada the employer covers the majority of the accommodation costs. In Spain workers must be registered for social security benefits, which entitles them to free health care, and in France seasonal workers are accorded the same rights as nationals, including access to unemployment and pension benefits (Verma, 2003; Basok, 2007; IOM, ILO and OSCE, 2008; Governments of Spain and Morocco, 2008; HRSDC, 2009; ILO, 2009; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010; Hennebry, 2012).

The requirement for employers to comply with employment standards (including minimum wage requirements) and to cover additional transportation and accommodation costs, as well as recruitment fees to access overseas workers, are designed to ensure that seasonal workers are not employed at the expense of local labour. Employers’ requirements under the RSE scheme, and the measures in place to ensure employers and workers comply with immigration and employment standards are discussed in Chapters 4, 7 and 9.

In addition to managing the demand for labour in destination countries, there must also be a range of incentives and enforcement measures to encourage return (Ruhs, 2006; IOM, 2008). This includes ensuring temporary work permits are issued for a period of employment that is long enough to allow migrant workers to cover their costs and generate enough savings to make migration financially worthwhile. Minimum periods of employment have been implemented in the case of the Canadian SAWP (240 hours of work over a six week period) and France’s seasonal work arrangements with Tunisia and Morocco (minimum of four months’ work) (ILO, 2009).

Most contemporary seasonal work schemes are characterised by high rates of compliance and return. France issues three-year multi-entry work permits allowing for seasonal employment for six out of every twelve months, with fewer administrative obstacles for employers and workers (OECD, 2008). The majority of workers participating in the Canadian (80 percent) and German (90 percent) schemes are ‘named’ by their employers for work in the next season, provided they comply with the programme requirements and return home at the end of their contracts (Verma, 2003; Gibb, 2006; P. Martin, 2006). Mexican workers
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participating in the Canadian SAWP, and seasonal workers taking part in Spain’s programmes, must report to the relevant authority in their home country upon return each season. In Spain, seasonal workers who return home as scheduled may participate in future without going through a formal re-selection process. After four years of complying with the rules, Spanish seasonal workers may gain permanent work authorisation, and at this point “circularity becomes a matter of the migrant’s choice” (Newland et al., 2008, p.8 cf. IOM, ILO and OSCE, 2008).

2.8 TLMPs for low-skilled workers: current concerns

The literature identifies a number of ‘good practices’ with regards to the Canadian, French, German and Spanish seasonal work programmes (IOM, ILO and OSCE, 2008; ILO, 2009). Nevertheless, numerous criticisms have been directed towards current schemes regarding the restriction of workers’ rights in the host country, poor conditions of work, the short duration of contracts, the lack of transferability of workers’ skills back to their home communities, the high financial costs of re-migration which workers and their families must bear, and the lack of recourse to family reunification or pathways to permanent residence.27

Regardless of the type of TLMP, whether for high-skilled or low-skilled workers, receiving states are required to make policy decisions regarding the number of migrants to be admitted, the selection criteria of migrants, and the rights they are to be granted after admission (Ruhs and P. Martin, 2008). Most destination countries have not ratified the relevant ILO and UN conventions concerning the protection of migrants’ rights,28 and

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28 Two ILO conventions cover migrants’ rights: 97 (1949) and 143 (1975). Convention 97 aims at regulating migration and protecting migrants primarily through fair hiring practices, non-discrimination in wages and social benefits, and allowing migrants to unionise. Convention 143 calls for sanctions on employers who recruit migrants illegally, as well as equal treatment in wages and social benefits for all migrants including undocumented migrants. As of 2010, 49 countries had ratified Convention 97, and 23 countries had ratified Convention 143. The UN Convention, approved in 1990, on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families completes the basic framework of standards in migrants’ rights protection (Holmann and Pouget, 2010, p.16; ILO, 2010). In addition to the conventions, in 2006 the ILO adopted a non-binding rights-based Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (ILO, 2006). The framework “is intended to be a guide in the development, strengthening, implementation and evaluation of national, regional and international labour migration policies” and provides technical assistance to governments, employers, and unions in order to improve the protection of migrant workers’ rights and promote linkages between migration and development (ILO, 2010, p.131; cf. Holmann and Pouget, 2010).
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sending country governments often face the dual and conflicting interests of promoting their nationals’ rights in the destination country while maximising the economic benefits from emigration (Castles, 2000; IOM, 2008; Ruhs and P. Martin, 2008; ILO, 2010). Further, the rights afforded to migrants in the host society in turn influence migrants’ development potential back in their home communities. Böhning (2009, p.669) argues that:

Many observers seem blinded by the sheer volume of remittances without being fully aware of who ‘pays’ and who doesn’t, and that there is more to migrants’ links with their home country than cash. Lack of attention to migrants’ rights and to the fact that different baskets of rights differentially determine the development impacts back home is the biggest shortcoming of the contemporary debate on the migration-development nexus.

Concerns regarding RSE workers’ welfare, their conditions of employment and the protection of workers’ rights have been raised since the scheme’s introduction in 2007 (MacLellan, 2008; Bailey 2009; Ericsson, 2009), and continue to surface (U.S. Department of State, 2012). Several of these concerns are addressed in Chapter 9, which focuses on workers’ experiences in New Zealand and the provision of pastoral care by New Zealand employers. Chapter 10 deals with a number of other issues identified in the literature regarding the financial and social costs of migration for workers and their families, and the impacts of remittances on social and community cohesion in origin countries.

2.9 Managed migration: can low-skilled TLMPs achieve their stated aims?

The review of literature contained in this chapter indicates that analysts’ views are divided regarding the potential benefits of circular, low-skilled migration schemes. Those in favour of such programmes, including organisations such as the World Bank, UN, IOM and ILO and entities such as the GCIM and GFMD, advocate there is potential for greater cooperation at the national, regional and multilateral levels to foster the freedom of movement of unskilled workers, which in turn may contribute positively to development (World Bank, 2002). The international focus on the migration-development relationship has also retained its momentum, with a second UN High-Level Dialogue scheduled to take place in 2013, as well as the annual GFMD meetings planned through to 2014 (Figure 2.2).
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The sceptics remain critical of the argument that low-skilled TLMPs will be able to provide beneficial outcomes to all key stakeholders. While there is no question that some stakeholders may benefit – namely receiving countries and the employers who are supplied with a low-wage labour force to fill certain niches of the labour market - the issue is whether the migrants and sending countries can also benefit from such schemes (Castles, 2006; Abella, 2008; Wickramasekara, 2011). Vertovec (2007, p.7) cautions: “the ‘wins’ of the win-win-win scenario may not be as mutual as imagined”. There are potential conflicts of interest in the competing agendas of the host and sending countries that need to be addressed before the hoped for triple wins can be achieved (P. Martin et al., 2006b; IOM, 2008). These conflicts of interest may include trying to balance migrant numbers versus migrants’ rights (Ruhs and P. Martin, 2008); tensions regarding the specific characteristics of those who are selected for seasonal work in order to minimise the possible risks of overstaying (Wickramasekara, 2011); and employers’ desire to ‘name’ experienced workers season after season versus sending governments’ desire to spread opportunities to participate among origin communities.

For the more cautious optimists, the question is whether TLMPs can have positive outcomes in certain contexts. While there are sufficient examples of successful TLMPs, the critical factor is to identify the conditions that must exist in order to replicate the programmes in other countries (Agunias and Newland, 2007). The contexts in which low-skilled TLMPs are introduced vary significantly. By country, by region, by the structural conditions that necessitate the introduction of such programmes in the first place, as well as by programme design (Ruhs, 2002). The policy implications of these variations are that what works in one country may not work well in another (Abella, 2006; IOM, 2010a). Hugo (2009b, pp.67-68) emphasises that “there is no single best practice in temporary labour migration which is suited to all or even most origin and/or destination countries”.

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28 The Spain-Morocco seasonal pilot programme in Cartaya, for example, allows only Moroccan mothers under the age of 40 with dependent children to participate. The women are not permitted to bring their children to Spain during their employment. This rule was put in place to address recurrent problems of overstaying. However it has raised concerns due to the discriminatory nature of selection and the deliberate focus on separating mothers and children (Wickramasekara, 2011).

30 Programme design features include: principles for admission, programme size, the mechanisms for selection and recruitment, and the bundle of rights accorded to migrant workers (Ruhs, 2002).
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It is also important that the negative experiences of past programmes do not conceal the potential for low-skilled TLMPs to produce a win-win-win result for all stakeholders (Hugo, 2009b). It is prudent for policymakers to learn from the failure of previous programmes, but the fact that past guest worker schemes have been unsuccessful is largely due to the way in which the schemes were operationalised. It does not necessarily mean that the concept of a TLMP is inherently flawed and bound to fail wherever and whenever it is implemented (Ruhs, 2002; Hugo, 2009b). Rather the issue is how best to manage and administer such schemes (P. Martin 2006).

In order to make current and future TLMPs successful, a high level of government involvement and intervention in the labour market will be necessary to ensure migrants’ rights are protected and there are measures in place to facilitate workers’ return home (P. Martin, 2006). A cooperative framework must also be established between origin and destination countries to oversee the management of circular migration programmes and ensure the gains from circulation are achieved by all stakeholders, and not simply received by one party at the expense of others (Governments of Morocco and Spain, 2008; Newland, 2009a).

This thesis argues that, through careful programme design and management, seasonal work schemes can be beneficial to migrants and to sending and receiving countries. However, seasonal work schemes are complex. They require the formation and maintenance of strong relationships between all parties and flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, particularly as tensions emerge with the differing agendas of employers, workers, local communities, and sending and receiving states. The success of seasonal work schemes is also context-specific. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach that will automatically be successful (Hugo, 2009b).

2.10 Conclusion

A number of trends in international migration that have been examined in this chapter, have led to an increasing focus by policymakers on the need for both skilled and low-skilled labour in developed countries, with ongoing debates regarding how best to manage these flows. Circular migration has been heralded as a suitable response to addressing the need for low-
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skilled labour, as migrant workers can be added temporarily to the labour force, and workers
can circulate home with additional financial resources and skills that are of benefit to their
families and communities.

While the ‘failure’ of former guest worker schemes in Germany and the US has led some
analysts to surmise: “there is nothing more permanent than temporary workers” (P. Martin
and Teitelbaum, 2001, p.131), a new era of contemporary low-skilled TLMPs have been
introduced. These schemes include a series of policy design elements that attempt to
mitigate the mistakes of earlier programmes. Despite these features, which are primarily to
manage employers’ demand for labour and encourage circulation of workers, there are still
issues to address. In particular, workers’ welfare in the destination country, and the social
and financial costs of migration for workers and their families, require attention. This points
to the need for a considered approach to seasonal work schemes that must balance a
complex mix of variables in order to achieve successful outcomes for all parties.

The potential success, or failure, of seasonal work programmes is also dependent on the
context into which such schemes are introduced. The next chapter discusses the regional
context, with a particular focus on the history of labour mobility within the Pacific region.
The movement of Pacific Islanders for seasonal employment is not a new trend. Rather, the
advent of the New Zealand and Australian seasonal work schemes continues a long-standing
tradition of circular migration for waged work. What differentiates the RSE and PSWPS from
earlier phases of contract seasonal migration is the high level of investment by public and
private sector agencies in their operation, and their explicit intention to deliver positive
outcomes to all stakeholders: employers, migrant workers, and participating Pacific states.
CHAPTER 3: The Regional Context: Labour Migration in Oceania

3.1 Introduction

The contemporary debate about circular migration and development has a well-established and well-documented parallel in the Pacific - a region that comprises the 22 Pacific Island states and territories, Australia and New Zealand. This region, which the United Nations, among others including Hau’ofa (1987, 1994, 1998), have termed “Oceania”, had a 2010 population of approximately 36 million scattered over the equivalent of a quarter of the surface of the globe.\(^{31}\) Oceania is immense in area, extremely diverse in terms of peoples, cultures and languages (there are over 700 distinctive languages in Papua New Guinea alone) (Haberkorn, 2007/08; Hayes, 2010).

It has become conventional to accommodate this diversity by reference to three sub-regions: Melanesia (the large islands of the western Pacific), Micronesia (the small coral and volcanic islands of the central and northern Pacific) and Polynesia (the islands east of Fiji, including Hawai‘i and New Zealand, both of which have Polynesian indigenous populations) (Figure 3.1).\(^{32}\) Notwithstanding the variation in resource endowments, populations, patterns of social organisation, and economic opportunity, the region was considered by Hau’ofa (1987, p.2) to be “for all practical purposes a single economy and increasingly a single society” by the early 1980s. Since the late 1940s regional organisations have been promoting this integration, including the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (formerly the South Pacific Commission which was formed in 1947) and, since 1971, the Pacific Forum, the pre-eminent regional political organisation, with its base in Fiji.\(^{33}\)

\(^{31}\) This estimate comes from United Nations, 2011, World population prospects: the 2010 revision, Table POP/DB/WPP/Rev2010/02/F01, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York.

\(^{32}\) These labels for groups of Pacific islands have been ascribed by Europeans – they are not indigenous terms (see, for example, Leckie and Munro, 1990; Crocombe, 1994, 2001).

\(^{33}\) Histories of regional governance in the Pacific can be found in: South Pacific Commission, 1996; Crocombe, 2001; Henderson and Watson, 2005; Powles, 2006; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2007 and Ladley and Gill, 2008.
Figure 3.1: Map of the Pacific Islands and its sub-regions

Source: Map supplied by Max Oulton, cartographer, Geography, Tourism and Environmental Planning, University of Waikato, Hamilton
CHAPTER 3: The Regional Context: Labour Migration in Oceania

Underpinning contemporary regional integration, and the recently instituted managed seasonal migration policies in New Zealand and Australia, is a history of population movement within and between islands that extends back well before sustained European intervention which began in the late 18th century (Crocombe, 2001). Circulation of labour has been an integral part of the region’s indigenous societies for centuries, as subsistence-based communities have depended on a wide range of short-term and long-term absences of workers from their places of residence.34 As Epeli Hau’ofa (1994, pp. 153-154) explained:

Their was a large world in which peoples and cultures moved and mingled, unhindered by boundaries of the kind erected much later by imperial powers. From one island to another they sailed to trade and to marry, thereby expanding social networks for greater flows of wealth [and labour].

This chapter reviews four main phases in the evolution of labour mobility between countries in Oceania between 1800 and the early 21st century to provide a regional context for New Zealand’s RSE policy, and to emphasise that both ‘managed’ and voluntary circular migration for waged work has a long history in this part of the world. The review begins with the substantial labour migration between countries in western Melanesia (Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) and Australia that resulted in around 62,000 Pacific Islanders working in Queensland, mainly on sugar plantations between 1860 and 1900 (A. Graves, 1993). The second phase spans the first 45 years of the 20th century when there was considerable labour migration to commercial plantations and mining operations in some Pacific Island colonies, but less movement to countries on the Pacific rim (Moore, Leckie and Munro, 1990; Crocombe, 2001).

The third period encompasses the second half of the 20th century, characterised by accelerating population growth and urbanisation within Pacific countries, especially those in Polynesia (Connell and Lea, 1993, 1995, 1998). This was also the period when formal temporary labour migration policies, forerunners of the RSE policy, were introduced in New

34 An extensive literature exists on indigenous societies and their subsistence economies before the onset of European colonialism in Oceania. This literature is not reviewed in the thesis, however the significance of labour mobility in indigenous societies in all parts of the region is stressed in contributions to edited collections by Chapman and Prothero (1985), Moore et al. (1990) and J. Taylor and Bell (2004) as well as in numerous reports on migration, urbanisation and development in different island countries prepared by Connell in the mid-1980s (see, for example, Connell, 1987).
Zealand to regulate some flows of labour from island countries (Bedford and K. Gibson, 1986; Levick, 1998; Māhina-Tuai, 2012).

The final period spans the first decade of the 21st century during which debates at the annual meetings of the Pacific Forum repeatedly emphasised the need for greater access for Pacific workers to labour markets in Australia and New Zealand (Chan et al., 2004). The RSE and Australia’s PSWPS were both policy responses to this pressure from Pacific states for employment opportunities, as well as pressure from local industries for greater access to temporary labour (discussed in Chapter 4).

3.2 Pacific labour migration in the 19th century

In August 2012, at the inaugural conference of Australia’s Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) that replaced the four-year pilot scheme, the Vice-President of Australia’s National Farmers’ Federation presented a case on behalf of Queensland’s cane growers for the recruitment of Pacific labour. This was the first officially approved recruitment of Pacific labour to work on Queensland’s sugar plantations in more than a century.

An extensive ‘labour trade’ between islands in Melanesia and the northeast coast of Australia existed during the second half of the 19th century to assist with the development of Queensland’s sugar plantation economy (A. Graves, 1993). This mix of forced and voluntary movement of ‘kanaks’ (Melanesians) between the islands and Australia became known as ‘blackbirding’ – a pejorative term for trickery by recruiters akin to kidnapping (see, for example, Docker, 1970). Yet, as Moore (1990b, p. 144) has noted, “as the trade progressed generation followed generation into the whale boats of the labour trade vessels, lured not so much by beguiling recruiters but by the Melanesians’ desires for European goods, adventure, and the chance to better themselves within their own society on their return in three or more years”.35

35 There has been a protracted debate among historians and others about the use of Melanesian (‘kanak’) labour in Queensland during the second half of the 19th century, and disagreement over whether this was a form of forced bondage akin to slavery, or a loosely regulated system of indentured labour where most of the workers came by choice and returned to their island homes (see, for example, Parnaby, 1964; Scarr, 1967; Docker, 1970; Corris, 1973; Bedford, 1973a; Price and Baker, 1976; Newbury, 1980; Saunders, 1982; Moore, 1985, 1989, 1990b; Leckie, 1990; A. Graves, 1993; Munro, 1994; Mortensen, 2000).
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At the SWP conference in August 2012 the National Farmers’ Federation Vice-President mentioned recruiting fewer than 100 Pacific labourers to work on cane farms, a very small demand by comparison with the numbers entering Queensland from the islands at the height of the labour trade in the 1870s and 1880s (over 11,000 a year according to Mortensen, 2000). Between 1862 and 1906 around 62,000 Pacific Islanders were transported to Queensland, the great majority (just under 40,000) coming from Vanuatu, as shown in Table 3.1 (McArthur and Yaxley, 1968; Corris, 1973; A. Graves, 1993; Crocombe, 2001). This was the largest overseas migration of Pacific Islanders to any country in the 19th century and it is the only significant movement of Pacific labour to Australia on temporary contracts in the past 200 years (Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

Table 3.1: Sources of Pacific labour recruited for work in Queensland, 1862-1906

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island group</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Recruits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu (New Hebrides)</td>
<td>1863-1903</td>
<td>39,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>1871-1904</td>
<td>18,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1883-1884</td>
<td>2,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia (Loyalty Islands)</td>
<td>1866-1975</td>
<td>1,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati (Gilbert Islands)</td>
<td>1894-1895</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu (Ellice Islands)</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Pacific islands</td>
<td>various</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1863-1903</strong></td>
<td><strong>62,475</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Munro, 1990a, p.l; Price and Baker, 1976, pp.110-111

3.2.1 Development of the Pacific labour reserve

Early in the 19th century, Pacific Islanders were being recruited as crew on whaling and sealing vessels as well as providing goods for trade to the growing numbers of traders and later settlers in the region (Couper, 1973; Diamond, 1989; Howe, 1984). This intensifying engagement with Europeans as well as traders from Asia initiated new processes of (largely unregulated) intra-regional labour circulation that were to intensify with formal colonisation of Pacific Island groups from the 1870s. Munro (1990a, p. xxxix) cites estimates of between 250,000 and 280,000 Pacific Islanders and over 180,000 Asians engaged on contracts of indenture between 1840 and 1918, and suggests that “some 500,000 labourers were involved in the Pacific labour trade before the First World War”.

49
Major destinations for Pacific labour (excluding Queensland) between the 1860s and 1920s were: Fiji (27,000, 1865-1911), New Caledonia (13,000, 1867-1920) and Samoa (12,000, 1867-1913). There were also small flows of Pacific Islanders to Hawai‘i (2,400, 1864-1885), French Polynesia (2,600, 1862-1892), and a short-lived one-way movement of slave labour to Peru (3,600, 1862-1864). The major movements between countries between 1860 and 1910 are summarised in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Major migration flows between island groups and to the Pacific rim, 1860-1910

NOTE: This figure/table/image has been removed to comply with copyright regulations. It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Munro, 1990a, pp.xxiv-xli

In addition to overseas labour migration, an unknown number of Pacific Islanders were recruited to work on plantations within different island groups. There were approximately 160,000 indentured labourers working in German New Guinea and Australian-administered

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36 See Maude (1981) for a detailed examination of the Peruvian labour trade in Polynesia.
CHAPTER 3: The Regional Context: Labour Migration in Oceania

Papua between 1885 and 1914 (Newbury, 1980; Munro, 1990a, p. xlvii, citing Firth, 1976). There were also significant numbers of internal labour migrants within the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa, especially during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and some of these flows are detailed in essays in Moore et al. (1990) as well as in Connell’s (1987) 22 country reports on migration, urbanisation and development in the region.

During the second half of the 19th century there was a shift from extraction of rare commodities (sandalwood, beche-de-mer, gold, tortoiseshell, pearls and pearl shell) to mass production of agricultural commodities (cotton, sugar and coconuts) on plantations as well as extractive mining of nickel in New Caledonia. Associated with this shift was a need for large supplies of cheap labour, which were sourced from within the Pacific, and supplemented with labour from countries in Asia, especially China, Japan and India (Leckie, 1990). The partitioning of most of the Pacific into colonies from the 1870s also saw increasing regulation of labour flows overseas partly to protect labour supplies for use in local commercial development (Bedford, 1973a; J. Bennett, 1983; Leckie, 1990).

The formation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, coupled with the formation of the Condominium of the New Hebrides in 1906, saw the cessation of migration of Pacific Islanders to Australia and the shift towards internal migration of plantation labour (Parnaby, 1964; McArthur and Yaxley, 1968). A second phase in the development of Pacific labour migration was emerging by the early 20th century – focused on labour recruiting within island countries rather than to countries on the Pacific rim. This internal labour mobility was characterised by shorter periods of absence from families and villages than the three-year contracts associated with work in Australia, and a shift away from formal indenture agreements towards greater freedom to circulate between villages and centres of short-term wage employment (Bedford, 1973a).

3.3 Labour circulation in the Pacific Islands, 1900-1950

By 1900 most of the Pacific Islands were parts of the colonial empires of countries in Europe and North America. The group of islands that had provided the majority of Pacific labour for Queensland plantations was one of the last to become a colony in 1906 – the Condominium
of the New Hebrides. Small islands in the eastern Pacific: the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, became part of New Zealand’s ‘realm’ between 1900 and 1924. The only island group not to be formally colonised was the Kingdom of Tonga (I. Campbell, 1989; Crocombe, 2001).

Pacific populations in most parts of the region were declining, mainly as a result of the effects of introduced diseases (McArthur, 1967) and, during the early decades of colonial rule, international migration of indigenous peoples tended to be carefully regulated and discouraged. In some of the smaller islands in the eastern and central Pacific overseas migration in the 19th century had also contributed to absolute population decline (Bedford et al., 1980; Maude, 1981; Munro, 1990b).

Between 1900 and the Second World War in the 1940s labour migration within and between island groups in the Pacific reached its highest per capita levels as plantation economies developed and expanded in all parts of the region and extractive industries based on minerals (especially nickel in New Caledonia, gold in Fiji and phosphate (guano) in the central Pacific) increased in scale. As Table 3.2 illustrates, over 550,000 indentured labourers were recruited for work in PNG between 1910 and 1940 (Schlomowitz, 1986, cited in Munro, 1990a, p. xlvii), and a further 92,000 labour migration contracts were issued to workers in the Solomon Islands (38,000) and Vanuatu (54,000) over roughly the same period (Schlomowitz and Bedford, 1988, pp.65 and 68).

Table 3.2: Indentured labour migration in western Melanesia, 1900-1940

Source: Munro, 1990a, pp.xxxix-li

The periods spent in employment on contract declined over time as villagers developed a range of strategies for gaining access to money. In Vanuatu, for example, Bedford (1973a,
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pp. 32-33) noted that by the late 1930s more than half of all contracts for plantation work were for six months or less. This reflected the shift to a preference for more casual employment outside villages.

In the central Pacific the development of phosphate mining on Ocean Island (Banaba) from 1900 generated a sustained demand for labour from the coral atolls and reef islands that now comprise Kiribati and Tuvalu. In any one year over 1,000 I-Kiribati and 60-120 Tuvaluans were employed on Ocean Island (Munro and Bedford, 1990, p. 173). There was widespread internal circulation of labour for employment on commercial coconut plantations in the northern (Micronesia) and eastern (Polynesia) Pacific (see, for example, Moore et al. 1990; Petersen, 1990). There was also extensive migration of Japanese labour into Micronesia after the First World War when several of the island groups that had been under German administration came under Japanese control in League of Nations mandated territories (Peattie, 1988; Munro, 1990a; Willson et al. 1990; Crocombe, 2001).

The Second World War marks a watershed in the history of labour migration and many other facets of development in the Pacific Islands (Brookfield, 1972). The large-scale contact of Pacific peoples with the military forces of the US, Japan, Britain and New Zealand, and associated war-time activities of airport, sea port and road construction, new materials (including alcohol, firearms, gasoline, and electricity) and new language (English), had a profound effect on the world views and lifestyles of the island populations exposed to them (Crocombe, 2001; Macpherson, 2009; Salesa, 2012). In 1941 the European population of Melanesia totalled fewer than 30,000, half of whom were in New Caledonia. By the end of 1943 the USA had around 500,000 troops deployed in Melanesia (Brookfield, 1972). The Pacific was irreparably changed after an invasion on this scale (Brookfield, 1972; Bedford et al., 2007; Salesa, 2012). One dimension of the change was a rapid acceleration in the already significant circulation of labour within and between countries in the Pacific and to countries on the Pacific rim.

3.4 Development, decolonisation and labour migration, 1945-2000

The war caused severe economic disruption, particularly in parts of Melanesia and Micronesia where many of the pre-war centres of wage employment (small towns,
plantations and mines) were destroyed or extensively damaged in the fighting (Connell, 1985b). However, the war also provided a major stimulus to the development of towns close to where major military bases had been located (e.g. Honiara in the Solomons and Lukanville in Vanuatu). Associated with this development was increasing urbanisation in all parts of the Pacific, especially from the 1950s. Much of the movement to towns was circular from village bases, particularly in Melanesia, and a major debate about urbanisation in the Pacific emerged in the 1970s (May, 1977; Connell and Lea, 1993, 1995, 1998).

Rural-urban migration of Pacific Islanders was also stimulated by colonial powers’ increased investment throughout the region in education, medical services, transport infrastructure, and local industrial development, as a pre-condition for decolonisation (Brookfield with Hart, 1971; Brookfield, 1972; Macdonald, 1976). This investment generated new opportunities for labour migration both within rural areas as well as to local towns and industrial sites (Bedford and Mamak, 1976; Oliver, 1991).

In addition to the internal migration of Pacific labour, there was a resurgence of migration to countries on the Pacific rim (Connell, 1985a; Bedford and K. Gibson, 1986; Crocombe, 1995). This was driven in part by demand for low wage agricultural and manufacturing labour in New Zealand during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. It was also driven by rapid population growth in several parts of Polynesia, especially from the 1960s, and the ensuing search for employment opportunities overseas (McArthur, 1961, 1964; Cumberland, 1962; Pirie, 1966; Borrie, 1967; Hooper and Huntsman, 1973, 1974). During the 1960s and 1970s, as Pacific colonies transitioned to self-government and independence, different levels of access to work and residence in their former colonial powers emerged and have become major influences over the flows of Pacific peoples to countries on the rim (Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

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37 There is a large literature on circular migration and urbanisation in the Pacific that cannot be reviewed here. A review of urbanisation in PNG can be found in May (1977) while Chapman and Prothero’s (1985) collection of essays on circulation in Melanesia contain various case studies. Connell and Lea’s (1993, 1995, 1998) reviews of urban development in Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia respectively address the diverse histories of towns throughout the region.
3.4.1 Migration to the Pacific rim

At the beginning of the 1960s, after 15 years of economic growth following the end of the war, numbers of Pacific-born in Australia and New Zealand had risen significantly. The Pacific-born population in Australia had almost doubled between censuses in 1947 (4,417) and 1961 (8,450), while in New Zealand the percentage increase was much larger (640 percent) between censuses in 1945 (3,030) and 1961 (22,520). The United States took over administration of the former Japanese mandated territories in Micronesia under the auspices of the United Nations in 1947 and from the 1960s the numbers of people born in the Pacific Islands living in North America also began to quickly increase (Crocombe, 1995; C. Gibson and Lennon, 1999). Over the 30 years between 1960/61 and 1990/91 the total number of Pacific-born enumerated in censuses in Australia, New Zealand and the United States increased by more than 500 percent from an aggregate of just under 37,700 to almost 220,000 as shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Pacific-born populations in Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, 1930-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>1930*</th>
<th>1960/61</th>
<th>1990/91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3,510</td>
<td>8,450</td>
<td>75,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>22,520</td>
<td>97,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>6,690</td>
<td>46,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7,650</td>
<td>37,660</td>
<td>219,770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Australia, 1933 census, New Zealand 1936 census, USA 1930 estimate

The major flows between Polynesia and the countries on the rim were established in the 1960s, with the most extensive flows to New Zealand via a range of special arrangements and temporary work schemes as part of New Zealand’s decolonisation process. The first Pacific colony to gain independence was Samoa in 1962. A provision of the Treaty of

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39 The census data for Australia come from Australia’s *Census of the Commonwealth of Australia 1947. Part XII – birthplace*, pp. 644-645, and from a consolidated spreadsheet showing birthplaces for the population of New Zealand at different census dates between the 1880s and 2006 provided by Statistics New Zealand (Didham, pers comm, 2012).
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Friendship signed on the transfer of sovereignty back to Samoa allows for up to 1,100 Samoan citizens to enter New Zealand each year as potential residents subject to having a satisfactory job in New Zealand (Macpherson, 1981, Bedford and K. Gibson, 1986). Movement under this ‘Samoan Quota’, as it is known, was formalised in the late 1960s and continues to operate to the present day. It has played a major role in facilitating growth of New Zealand’s largest Pacific community – persons claiming Samoan ethnicity accounted for just under half (131,103) of the 265,974 people of Pacific ethnicities usually resident in New Zealand at the time of the 2006 census (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a).

Two of New Zealand’s three colonies (Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau) opted for self-government rather than full independence: the Cook Islands in 1964 and Niue in 1974 (Crocombe, 1992, 2001). Tokelau remains under New Zealand administration. The indigenous inhabitants of all three countries were granted New Zealand citizenship in 1947. Migration to New Zealand from the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau has been extensive, especially since the 1970s when regular air services to the former two were established (Crocombe, 1992), and since the mid-1960s when half of the population of Tokelau was resettled in and around Wellington (Hooper and Huntsman, 1973, 1974; Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

Australia had no special arrangements relating to migration from the Pacific at this time, and Pacific migrants entered under the same policies that applied to non-citizens (other than New Zealanders) from anywhere in the world. As Appleby and Stahl (1995) and Bedford and Hugo (2012) have shown, a significant share of Australia’s Cook Island, Niuean, Tokelauan and Samoan populations have come to Australia via New Zealand under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement.42 In the case of the United States there has been a range of special arrangements with residents of American Samoa, Guam and several island groups that were included within the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in Micronesia.43

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42 The Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, signed in 1973, allows New Zealand citizens to work and live in Australia without having to meet the standard requirements of immigration policy for entrants who are not Australian citizens.
43 See Crocombe, 1995, for a detailed discussion of Pacific migration to the United States.
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3.4.2 Temporary work schemes for Pacific labour, 1960-2002

Experience with temporary work schemes that were initiated in the 1960s had a significant influence on the design of the RSE policy. Special arrangements for temporary migration to New Zealand from two Pacific countries (Fiji and Tonga) were formalised in the 1960s and early 1970s. Early in 1967 a Temporary Employment Certificate (TEC) scheme was introduced in response to an increasing, essentially unregulated, flow of visitors from Fiji entering New Zealand and seeking work. The TEC scheme lasted only a few months - it was suspended in June 1967 because of a downturn in the New Zealand economy and rising unemployment (Māhina-Tuai, 2012).

In 1969 the Fiji Rural Work Permit Scheme (FRWPS) was introduced – the first official work permit scheme for labour from the Pacific that had provisions to ensure employers met certain conditions of employment and accommodation, and that workers returned home at the end of their permits (Levick, 1988; Māhina-Tuai, 2012). The FRWPS allowed for 200-300 male Fijian seasonal workers to enter New Zealand each year for agricultural work and later halal slaughtering. At the request of the Fijian government, work permits were issued for a period of up to four months to ensure workers circulated back to their home communities (Levick, 1988).

Small urban work permit schemes were introduced in 1971 for Tongans seeking employment (De Bres et al., 1974 and Hegarty, 1977 cited in Levick, 1988). Work permits were issued for six months to enable Tongan workers to recoup the higher costs [than the Fijians] of their airfares (Levick, 1988). In the mid-1970s a Fiji Urban Work Permit Scheme (FUWPS) was introduced as well as rural and urban work permit schemes for Samoans. However, rising unemployment linked with the impact of the oil crises of that decade, coupled with a series of controversial dawn raids in 1976 carried out by police specifically targeting the homes of Pacific Islanders with the aim of identifying and deporting overstayers, resulted in a significant tightening of immigration regulations (Bedford and K. Gibson, 1986).  

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44 Fiji and Tonga were never administered by New Zealand but both have strong links through the activities of Christian missions, the provision of education, trade and, in the case of Fiji, the training of its military forces (Bedford et al., 2007).

45 The ‘dawn raids’ have attracted considerable academic and public comment. For a recent review of the Polynesian overstayer issue see Anae (2012).
In an effort to enforce greater control over the migration of Fijians, Samoans and Tongans to New Zealand, the government incorporated all of the earlier country-specific schemes into a single South Pacific Work Permit Scheme (SPWPS) in 1977 (Bedford and K. Gibson, 1986; Māhina-Tuai, 2012). Arrangements with the three participating countries were formalised via Memoranda of Understanding, and these arrangements were extended to Tuvalu and Kiribati following a further major review of immigration policy in the mid-1980s (Bedford et al., 2007). The schemes allowed a small number of low-skilled workers to be employed in both urban and rural areas in response to specific offers of employment, for periods of up to 11 months (Levick, 1988).

The numbers of workers admitted under the SPWPS fluctuated from year to year, but averaged around 450 per annum in the early 1980s (Levick, 1988; Appleyard and Stahl, 1995). Western Samoa made little use of the scheme mainly because they had access to permanent residence via the Samoan Quota and, more importantly, had developed a range of strategies for using the visitor’s permit as an avenue for finding short-term work (Macpherson, 1981; Douglas, 1985). Similarly Tongans made relatively little use of the SPWPS, as they also “tended to use an extensive informal network of kinship contacts in New Zealand to get work in the country while visiting on short-term permits” (Bedford and K. Gibson, 1986, p.16).

3.4.3 Temporary work schemes and the link with development

An objective of the work permit schemes, highlighted in a report released in 1986 by New Zealand’s immigration minister at the time, was their potential to contribute to the development of participating island countries (Burke, 1986). The focus on the development potential of temporary work schemes had been heightened by a major inquiry in the early 1980s into the impact of remittances and aid on small island economies (Watters and Bertram, 1984; Bertram and Watters, 1985). The New Zealand government argued for a continuation of the schemes “as part of our close cooperation with South Pacific countries and our special responsibility to assist with their development efforts” (Burke, 1986, p.32). Island governments also reinforced the importance of the schemes, principally as a safety

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46 The schemes introduced for Kiribati and Tuvalu in the mid-1980s allowed for much smaller numbers to be admitted; approximately 20 workers per year from Kiribati and 80 per year from Tuvalu (Appleyard and Stahl, 1995).
valve for rising youth unemployment in the face of sustained high rates of population growth (Crocombe, 2001).

The most obvious link between the SPWPS and development in the islands can be found in Fiji. Workers from Fiji were sourced predominantly from rural areas that had been affected by natural disasters (such as hurricanes) and had few sources of cash income (Bayliss-Smith et al., 1988; Levick, 1988). Fiji’s Ministry of Labour was involved in the selection of workers to ensure opportunities to participate were spread among different villages, and workers were chosen under the premise that they would contribute to the completion of a specific community project (Levick and Bedford, 1988).

Fiji’s participation in the SPWPS was discontinued after the 1987 coup – one of the sanctions imposed by the New Zealand Government on Fiji’s military-led administration (Levick and Bedford, 1988). The arrangements with Samoa and Tonga under the SPWPS ended in 1991 as part of a further review of immigration policy and the tightening of legislation regarding entry of low-skilled migrants (Appleyard and Stahl, 1995; Bedford et al., 2002). Tuvalu and Kiribati’s work permit schemes remained in operation until 2001. Several hundred Tuvaluans sought work under the SPWPS, but many Tuvaluans did not return home (due in part to the limited opportunities for wage employment back in Tuvalu) and the problem of overstaying was one of the reasons for the complete termination of the SPWPS in 2001 (Manoa, 2003; Bedford, C. et al., 2010).47

3.4.4 Links between the SPWPS and the RSE work policy

The Burke Report also foreshadowed closer linkages between the SPWPS and the labour requirements of New Zealand’s horticulture industry, while recognising that local labour must not be penalised in the search for employment (Appleyard and Stahl, 1995). These are the hallmarks of the present day RSE policy, which has adopted many of the practices and conditions of the SPWPS.

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47 In place of the SPWPS the Pacific Access Category (PAC) was introduced which has provision for up to 250 citizens of Fiji (suspended after the military coup in 2006), 250 from Tonga, 75 from Kiribati and 75 from Tuvalu annually to become permanent residents of New Zealand (Bedford et al., 2007; Stahl and Appleyard, 2007).
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The RSE policy is not a ‘new’ approach to temporary labour migration schemes in New Zealand. Rather, the policy builds on New Zealand’s long-standing use of Pacific temporary labour to meet specific labour market needs, while also attempting to assist with the development objectives of participating island countries. Moreover, the stringent conditions in place to ensure RSE workers return home each season have been implemented to make sure New Zealand’s experience with the use of short-term labour via informal means, and the ensuing problem of overstaying, is not repeated. In effect, the RSE policy has simply re-established a work permit scheme for Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati and Tuvalu. The Melanesian countries of Vanuatu, and subsequently the Solomon Islands, are the only new additions, in recognition of the demographic pressures facing Melanesian countries in the next 50 years, and their historically limited migration outlets.

3.5 Pacific international labour migration in the 21st century

By the early 21st century there were significant differences in access to work and residence opportunities overseas for people resident in Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia. As was noted earlier, several Polynesian and Micronesian peoples have access to New Zealand and the United States through citizenship and, in the case of New Zealand, through residence quotas. The indigenous inhabitants of the three French colonies are citizens of France. Residents in a small number of countries had no special access privileges in the year 2000, and prominent among this group were PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Crocombe, 2001; J. Gibson and Nero, 2008; Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

The variable strength of international migration links between Pacific countries and other parts of the world can be seen in the distribution of people born in island countries in Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia who were living overseas around the year 2000, documented in Table 3.4. While almost 87 percent of the Pacific’s population (approximately 8 million) was resident in the countries comprising Melanesia, those born in

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48 Data for the Pacific resident populations shown in Table 3.4 were obtained from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s website (www.spc.int/) in 2010. The data, which are no longer available at the website, are for populations by island country in 2000/2001. The data for Pacific-born populations resident outside their countries of birth come from a matrix of birthplace locations between 2000 and 2002 for 226 countries that was prepared by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the University of Sussex. It was published in 2007 as the Global Migrant Origin Database and was accessed on 20 July 2012 at: (http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html)
Melanesia and living in other countries accounted for only 2.6 percent of the sub-region’s combined total population (resident plus overseas).

Table 3.4: Pacific-born diaspora around 2000: countries and country groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Resident population c. 2000</th>
<th>Pacific-born population overseas</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>% overseas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polynesia</td>
<td>604,800</td>
<td>237,800</td>
<td>842,600</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks/Niue/Tokelau</td>
<td>18,280</td>
<td>31,290</td>
<td>49,570</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa/Tonga</td>
<td>275,950</td>
<td>154,350</td>
<td>430,300</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>9,540</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>11,280</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia</td>
<td>475,600</td>
<td>151,900</td>
<td>627,500</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati/Nauru</td>
<td>93,460</td>
<td>4,640</td>
<td>98,100</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>155,200</td>
<td>88,370</td>
<td>243,570</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Micronesia</td>
<td>246,040</td>
<td>58,890</td>
<td>304,930</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanesia</td>
<td>7,032,800</td>
<td>186,900</td>
<td>7,219,700</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>798,550</td>
<td>141,300</td>
<td>939,850</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>5,398,420</td>
<td>36,400</td>
<td>5,434,820</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomons/Vanuatu</td>
<td>605,560</td>
<td>7,380</td>
<td>612,940</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pacific Islands** | **8,113,200** | **576,600** | **8,689,800** | **6.6** |

Source: SPC, 2010 and Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the University of Sussex, 2012

The comparable percentages are very different for Micronesia and Polynesia. Their resident populations accounted for just under 6 percent and 7.5 percent respectively of the total Pacific population. However their diaspora were more significant in proportional terms than that for Melanesia; the Micronesia-born population living overseas comprised just under a quarter (24 percent) of the sub-region’s total population, while the overseas-resident Polynesia-born comprised 28 percent of their sub-region’s total.

There is significant variation within the sub-regions, as evidenced in Table 3.4. However, the three that stand out as having very small diaspora in percentage terms are PNG (0.7 percent) and the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (1.2 percent), reflecting the absence of any special arrangements for access to work and residence anywhere overseas. These three countries accounted for 77 percent of the region’s total population of 10.01 million in June 2011, and are projected to account for 92 percent of the region’s 7.9 million estimated population.
growth between 2010 and 2050 (SPC, 2011a; Bedford and Hugo, 2012). The expansion of these populations over the next 40 years will result in two inevitable changes: rapid urbanisation, and increasing pressure for migration outlets as local Pacific labour markets fail to absorb the large numbers of unemployed youth (Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

3.5.1 Growing emphasis on the importance of regional labour mobility

Since the mid-2000s enhanced labour mobility between island countries and those on the Pacific rim has featured increasingly in discussions of the Pacific Forum,49 the key political organisation at the regional level (Chan et al., 2004; Maclellan and Mares, 2006; Bedford et al., 2007; Hayes, 2010). These discussions have been driven mainly by three factors:

1) Population growth and growing demand for employment opportunities for burgeoning youthful labour forces, especially in Melanesia and Micronesia;
2) The process of trade liberalisation in Oceania and calls for increased access to labour markets in Australia and New Zealand by Pacific workers; and
3) The role of migration as one strategy for adapting to negative impacts of climate change (rising sea, tropical cyclones and drought) within the region, particularly for the low-lying atolls of the central and northern Pacific (Kiribati, FSM, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu).

These three factors are briefly reviewed below, in the context of ongoing political debate among Forum countries about how to develop a deeper level of regional cooperation and integration, and the potential role of labour mobility to assist with economic growth and regional security (Bedford et al., 2007; Stahl and Appelyard, 2007; Hayes, 2010; Hugo and Bedford, forthcoming).

3.5.2 Youth ‘bulges’ in the Pacific: the problem of under- and unemployment

A primary rationale for greater access by Pacific Islanders to labour markets on the Pacific rim relates to an increasing problem of youth and adult under- and unemployment in many

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49 The Forum meets annually to discuss regional issues, bringing together the 16 Heads of Government of the independent and self-governing states of the Pacific region. Member countries include: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, [Fiji – presently excluded], Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu [New Caledonia and French Polynesia are associate members] (Bedford, 2008b; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 2009a).
CHAPTER 3: The Regional Context: Labour Migration in Oceania

Pacific states, and the possible threat this poses to regional stability (Haberkorn 2007/08; Hayes, 2010; Bedford and Hugo 2012). Melanesia is of particular concern, with negative metaphors of ‘failing states’ and an ‘arc of instability’ being used to describe countries in the region (Dobell, 2007; H. Hughes and Sodhi, 2008). As Table 3.5 illustrates, over the next 40 years the total population of the Pacific Islands is projected to almost double again (from 9 million in 2010) and to exceed 18 million by 2050. Over 90 percent of the total population will be in Melanesia, with more than 13 million in PNG alone.

Table 3.5: Pacific populations, estimates and projections, 1990-2050

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Data sources: www.spc.int/spd and www.stats.govt.nz

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The continued growth of the key young working age group (aged 15-34) in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and PNG – where there will be high annual growth rates of over two percent over the next decade - presents a major challenge for Pacific governments (Bedford, 2005, 2008a; Haberkorn 2007/08; Bedford and Hugo, 2012; IMI, 2013). As Ware (2007, p. 226) explains “youth bulges\textsuperscript{51} require fast-growing economies to provide schooling, jobs and economic opportunities for ever larger youth cohorts”. If these opportunities are not available, the concern is that a burgeoning youthful population, accompanied by high levels of unemployment, is a recipe for civil unrest (Urdal, 2004, 2006; Stahl and Appleyard, 2007; Ware, 2007).

Ongoing unrest in the region, including another coup d’etat in Fiji in December 2006, riots in the capitals of the Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006, and a constitutional crisis in Fiji in April 2009, has sharpened New Zealand and Australia’s focus on the economic challenges facing Pacific states and the implications for regional security (AusAID, 2006; Bedford et al., 2007; Lum and Vaughn, 2007; Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 2009a, 2009b; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 2010). The core argument made by Pacific leaders is that if the options available to Pacific Islanders to move within the region are expanded, migration can act as a ‘safety valve’ to reduce the pressure on national governments, by offering unemployed youth the prospect of work abroad (Bedford, 2003; World Bank, 2006b; Stahl and Appleyard, 2007; Ware, 2007).

3.5.3 Trade liberalisation and regional integration

A second factor driving regional discussions on labour mobility is future regional trade liberalisation. In 2001 the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) was ratified in the interests of greater regional economic cooperation. The PACER agreement provides a framework “for the process of trade liberalisation in the region [between island countries, Australia, New Zealand and beyond] beginning with a free trade agreement for the trade of goods between Pacific Island countries which will later be extended to the trading of services” (Hugo and Bedford, forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{51} A youth bulge is defined as large cohorts in the ages 15-24 relative to the total adult population (Urdal, 2006, p.608).
Negotiations on the regional free trade agreement now referred to as PACER-Plus, continue to the present day. As part of these negotiations, Pacific governments “are demanding that any PACER-Plus agreement should include a provision for increased labour market access to Australia and New Zealand, particularly for low and unskilled Pacific workers” (Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2008, p.3). As Maclellan (2010, p.3) explains, “Pacific governments hope remittances from offshore workers will help to compensate for revenue lost as import tariffs are removed under PACER-Plus and overseas employment can replace jobs shed by industries that are currently subsidised or protected”.

3.5.4 Climate change: the potential role of labour mobility

The third debate relates to the use of labour migration as an adaptive mechanism to combat the negative impacts of climate change. In 2008, the Pacific Islands Forum endorsed the Niue Declaration on climate change, which recognised the “threat posed by climate change to the economic, social, cultural and environmental well-being and security of Pacific Island countries” (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2008, para.1). Subsequent Forum meetings have reiterated leaders’ concerns about the effects of climate change on island environments and societies, and the need to develop appropriate adaptation strategies (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2010b, 2011).

There are a number of potential adverse effects of climate change that may force communities across the region to consider migration as an adaptation strategy. The Highlands of Papua New Guinea are prone to drought; the highly populated coastal regions of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, and the delta regions in Fiji are susceptible to tropical cyclones; the majority of Polynesia’s population lives close to the coast and are also susceptible to cyclones; and the low-lying atolls and reef islands are particularly susceptible to rising sea levels, more intense coastal erosion, and salt water wash-over during storms that contaminates the soil and fresh water lenses people are reliant on for growing food and obtaining water (Mimura et al., 2007; FAO, 2008; Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 2009a, 2009b; ADB, 2010, 2012; J. Campbell, 2010).
These adverse effects are exacerbated by rapid population growth, and associated processes of urbanisation as people move from rural areas to towns in search of employment, placing pressure on already limited urban services and infrastructure to meet basic needs (Bedford, 2005; Haberkorn, 2007/08; Mimura et al. 2007; ADB, 2012; Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

Migration is a possible adaptation strategy to climate change, and one that has long been utilised in the Pacific (Lieber 1977; Bedford and Bedford, 2010). Voluntary relocation of entire communities is unlikely to occur however, due to the heavy cultural, economic, social, political and psychological costs for those relocating, and the difficulties surrounding issues of state sovereignty and laws of communal land ownership (J. Campbell, 2010; ADB, 2012; Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

Instead, a strategy that grants migrants increasing access to the labour markets of Pacific rim countries is seen as “one of the most useful forms of adaptation” (J. Campbell, 2010, p.43; cf. Paton, 2009; Bedford and Bedford, 2010). Enabling greater access for people to move voluntarily allows them to earn an income and remit a proportion of their wages back to their home communities to offset some of the damage to local livelihoods caused by climate change (J. Campbell 2010; ADB, 2012). This strategy is one that is already being pursued by the President of Kiribati who has been trying to secure options for labour migration to New Zealand and Australia (McAdam and Loughry, 2009; Tong, 2009).

It is within this context of significant demographic and environmental pressures facing the region that the Australian and New Zealand governments have received repeated requests from Pacific states to provide some access to their labour markets. In the early to mid-2000s both New Zealand and Australia were considering strategies to address specific labour shortages in their horticultural sectors, and concerns about regional security augmented already extant labour market needs in both countries. Participation by the Australian and New Zealand governments in the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and

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52 In the 1940s Fiji’s colonial administration accepted immigrants from two islands in what was then the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (now Kiribati and Tuvalu) because of pressures on their island ecosystems (Bedford, 1967, 1968; Koch, 1978; Macdonald, 1982; M. Williams and Macdonald, 1985). A third group of Micronesians from the Gilbert Islands were relocated to the Western Province in the Solomon Islands between 1956 and 1964. These relocations have not been without problems, and tensions still exist over land issues between the relocated people and destination landowners (J. Campbell, 2010).

53 For example see: NHTWG, 2000; HVSWG, 2005; NFF, 2006; Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee 2006; Ramasamy et al., 2008; and DoL, 2010a.
CHAPTER 3: The Regional Context: Labour Migration in Oceania

Development in September 2006 (UN, 2006), and the publishing of a report by the World Bank (2006b) in the same year, which argued strongly that increased international labour mobility, particularly of the low-skilled, had a significant role to play in enhancing economic development and social stability in the Pacific, heightened the focus on temporary low-skilled migration. The ensuing result has been the introduction of seasonal work schemes by both countries that prioritise Pacific labour.

3.6 Conclusion

The extensive histories of labour mobility within Pacific countries and overseas that are briefly summarised in this chapter lend support to Connell’s (2009, pp. 58-60) argument that a ‘culture of migration’ prevails in much of the region and that movement for work has long been “an important element in household and community social and economic systems”. The swift response by Pacific Islanders to seasonal work opportunities when the RSE policy was introduced attests to a strong demand throughout the region for opportunities to earn cash incomes.

There is nothing new about moving away from home communities to work for cash -- this has been one of the options villagers in most Pacific countries have had for over 100 years. Seasonal work on contract is not new; what is new about the recently introduced schemes is the much greater involvement of a wide range of government and private sector agencies in their operation and management. In turn, the “cultures and economies of migration” that Connell (2009, p. 58) notes are “shaped by the stories, advice and experiences of those who have gone before” have played a major part in the positive response by Pacific countries to the introduction of the RSE policy in April 2007. The next chapter provides the local context for the RSE policy’s introduction, with a review of New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture (H/V) industries and the difficulties producers have faced trying to address their seasonal labour needs.

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54 According to Massey et al. (1993, pp. 452-453; cf. Reichert, 1981, Kandel and Massey, 2002) as migration grows in prevalence within a community, it changes the values and cultural perceptions in ways that increase the probability of future migration. At the community level, migration becomes deeply ingrained into the repertoire of people’s behaviours, and spending time abroad becomes a normal rite of passage for young people.
CHAPTER 4: The Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy

4.1 Introduction

A key feature of horticultural sectors across high-income countries is the increasingly competitive global market in which they operate.\textsuperscript{55} \textsuperscript{56} Over the preceding three decades, but particularly in the last 15 years, global agri-business has undergone significant transformation as a result of progressive trade liberalisation and deregulation (P. Martin, 1985; Le Heron, 1993; Stringer and Le Heron, 2008; Preibisch, 2010; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010). Growing domestic and export markets for horticultural products have stimulated investment and given rise to “industrial-style agriculture”, which has led to the consolidation of family farms and their replacement by corporate enterprises that “can produce more efficiently through economies of scale” and require large numbers of wage labourers (World Bank, 2006b, p.102; cf. P. Martin, 1985; P. Martin and J.E. Taylor, 2013).

In addition, the global rise of the supermarket industry has changed relations between growers and retailers, with a shift towards a ‘buyer-driven’ horticultural supply chain that allows retailers to place constant pressure on producers to keep costs down and increase output (Barrientos and Barrientos, 2002; World Bank, 2006b; Preibisch, 2007; Rogaly, 2008). The margins for horticultural commodities are slim, and government regulations, as well as retailer-imposed requirements such as EUREPGAP (now GLOBALGAP)\textsuperscript{57}, pose additional challenges, as they place increasingly stringent quality obligations on producers, and demand more environmentally and socially sustainable food production (Le Heron and Roche, 1996; Fitzgerald, 2003; Rogaly, 2008; Tipples and Whatman, 2010).

\textsuperscript{55} For example see: Le Heron, 1993; Le Heron and Roche, 1996; Fitzgerald, 2003; Dobbs and Rowling, 2006; Gibb, 2006; Preibisch, 2007, 2010, 2012; Rogaly, 2008; Stringer and Le Heron, 2008; P. Martin, 2009; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010; Tipples and Whatman, 2010.

\textsuperscript{56} It is acknowledged that global competition is not just a feature of high-income countries. Malaysia’s rapid economic growth and agricultural expansion, for example, has resulted in heavy reliance on agricultural labour from Indonesia (Yue, 2008).

\textsuperscript{57} The Euro Retailer Produce Working Group and Good Agricultural Practice (EurepGAP) was launched in May 2002, bringing together large EU retailers wanting to reassure consumers of the sustainability of their food sources. As EurepGAP expanded and covered more producers and suppliers its name was changed to GLOBALGAP in September 2007. Certification by GLOBALGAP enables growers to access European markets as long as they meet certain food quality and safety standards (Tipples and Whatman, 2010; cf. Rosin et al., 2008).
Agricultural work is, however, seen as low-status, low-wage, hazardous and physically demanding, requiring workers to be available at short notice and for limited periods of employment (NHTWG, 2000; Barrientos and Barrientos, 2002; Verma, 2003; Griffith, 2006; Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee 2006; Preibisch, 2007; ILO, 2010). This makes it an unattractive sector for locals who are “drawn to more stable employment elsewhere” (Abella, 2006, p.22). The unappealing nature of agricultural work, coupled with long-term demographic changes in high-income countries (including the ageing of the working-age population, urbanisation and declining family size) has led to a decrease in the availability of local labour (Brem, 2006; World Bank, 2006b; Preibisch, 2007; NFF, 2008a; Rogaly, 2008; P. Martin, 2009; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010; Hennebry, 2012).

Nevertheless, because many horticultural crops are resistant to mechanisation (due to their perishable and highly seasonal nature), and “the nature of the product and quality requirements means that just-in-time production is the only profitable form of production”, growers remain heavily reliant on low-skilled manual labour, particularly during peak harvest periods (Whatman and Van Beek, 2008, p.2; cf. Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee 2006; Preibisch, 2007; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010; P. Martin and J.E. Taylor, 2013).

To address the challenges of a highly competitive global market, and meet labour demands while still attempting to maximise profits, producers have increasingly turned to migrant labour, which provides a cheap, flexible labour force – “a flow of labour on demand, with a tap that can easily be turned on and off” (Hennebry, 2012, p. 4). Preibisch (2010, p.429) argues that flexible labour arrangements are seen as one of the only avenues by which horticultural enterprises “can exercise some degree of control over their profit margins and continue to accumulate capital in the highly competitive markets in which they sell their goods”.

New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture (H/V) industries have followed a similar trajectory to other high-income countries, with rapid expansion over the past 30 years (J. Martin, 1983; Callister, 1985; Andrews and Andrews, 1996; Le Heron and Roche, 1996; Fitzgerald, 2003;...

Dobbs and Rowling, 2006; Horticulture NZ, 2009). Meeting the labour needs of the H/V industries, while also increasing productivity, has been a key challenge. The small size of New Zealand’s domestic market means producers rely predominantly on overseas sales as their main source of income (Dobbs and Rowling, 2006). However, New Zealand’s physical distance from many of the major markets is an obstacle, and producers must compete against other countries whose costs of production and delivery to market are lower (e.g. Chile, South Africa and China) (Fitzgerald, 2003; Whatman and Van Beek, 2008; Tipples and Whatman, 2010). New Zealand’s Horticulture Industry Strategy 2009-2020, which seeks to grow industry value to NZ$10 billion by 2020, notes that people are the industry’s greatest asset. Access to and retention of suitably trained and motivated people is essential to improving production quality and productivity (Horticulture NZ, 2009).

This chapter begins with a review of New Zealand’s H/V industries and some of the challenges producers have faced in recent years as they have sought a reliable supply of seasonal labour. Since the early 2000s a number of initiatives to address seasonal labour shortages have been implemented, culminating in the introduction of the RSE policy in April 2007. Two of these initiatives, and the thinking behind them that had a significant impact on the way the RSE was formulated, are briefly discussed, before describing the RSE policy in section 4.4.

4.2 New Zealand’s H/V industries and seasonal labour demands

The H/V industries are an important component of New Zealand’s primary industry economy. Over 7,000 fruit and vegetable growers, packhouses, processors and exporters, produce goods for the domestic market as well as exporting to more than 120 markets worldwide (Horticulture NZ, 2009). In 2011 the H/V industries produced export commodities valued at $3.5 billion annually, as well as providing another $2.9 billion of produce for the internal market. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, three products dominate the export market: wine, kiwifruit and apples. Fresh fruit remains New Zealand’s largest horticultural export sector, with revenues of $1.45 billion in 2011, mostly from kiwifruit ($960m) and apples ($360m) (NZ Institute for Plant and Food Research, 2011).
Figure 4.1: Horticultural exports 2011 (year to June, $ million, fob*)

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*Fob (free-on-board) is the total value of a producer’s export goods, plus all costs involved in their packaging, packing and transport within New Zealand and loading on board the export vessel/aircraft.59
Source: New Zealand Institute for Plant and Food Research, 2011, p.3

The fastest growing H/V export sector in recent years has been New Zealand wine, which is now exported to 104 countries worldwide and is the largest single category of horticultural export, earning over $1 billion each year (Figure 4.1) (NZ Institute for Plant and Food Research, 2011). Figure 4.2 shows the annual growth in the number of wineries and the export value of New Zealand wine over the past decade. The growth of New Zealand’s horticulture export industry over the past three decades is shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.2: Growth in New Zealand wine exports and wineries, 2000-2011

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Source: New Zealand Institute of Plant and Food Research, 2011, p.9

Figure 4.3: Growth in total horticultural exports ($ millions), 1975-2011

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Source: New Zealand Institute for Plant and Food Research, 2011, p.3
CHAPTER 4: The Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy

At least 50,000 workers are needed each year at peak harvest times to work on orchards and vineyards picking and packing fruit and working in other aspects of processing and preparing fruit for export (Horticulture NZ, 2009; PickNZ, 2010). Owing to the increase in commercial fruit and vegetable growers across the country, casual workers are able to find seasonal work throughout the year. The peak months for seasonal work are November to June, with the greatest number of workers required for the pipfruit harvest and kiwifruit season between February and May. Viticulture labour demand peaks during autumn and winter (Andrews and Andrews, 1996; HVSWG, 2005; PickNZ, 2010). Figure 4.4 depicts the monthly demand for seasonal workers by region as well as the main crops grown in each region. As the Figure shows, Hawke’s Bay (pipfruit) and the Bay of Plenty (kiwifruit) require the largest numbers of seasonal workers during peak periods.

In common with the horticulture sectors of other high-income countries, New Zealand employers have historically been able to draw on several types of temporary labour to meet their seasonal needs. This itinerant labour has included “students, casual workers, people in New Zealand under the Working Holiday Scheme and a pool of unemployed or under-employed that is a feature of the labour markets of all regions in New Zealand” (Ramasamy et al., 2008, p. 173; cf. Callister, 1985). Writing on the apple industry, Hill et al. (2007, p.365-366) noted that:

Until the 1990s, labour supply was predominantly local with a significant number of experienced workers. The work had a strong social and community component, with seasonal work accommodating existing lifestyles and competitive pay levels. Often whole families provided continuity and training for employers and their worker members.

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60 For Australia see, among others: NHTWG, 2000; Hugo, 2001; Mares, 2006b, Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, 2006; World Bank, 2006b; Mares and Maclellan, 2007; NFF, 2008a; Tan et al., 2009; Ball, 2010; Tan and Lester, 2012. For the U.S. see Martin, P. 2009; Calvin and Martin, P. 2010; for Canada see Prebisch, 2007, and for Britain see Rogaly, 2008.

61 Working Holiday Schemes (WHS) are bilateral agreements that allow 18-30 year olds from partner countries to spend 12 months (or 23 months in the case of nationals from the UK) in New Zealand to undertake work of a temporary nature. New Zealand presently has bilateral agreements with 34 countries (INZ, 2010).
Figure 4.4: Main horticultural crops by region and monthly seasonal labour demand

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Sources: PickNZ, 2009; Horticulture New Zealand, 2010; Ministry of Primary Industries, 2012\(^\text{62}\)

CHAPTER 4: The Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy

With the expansion of New Zealand’s orchards and vineyards over the past thirty years however, increasing numbers of seasonal labourers have been required. Studies conducted in the mid-1980s on the labour requirements in the kiwifruit industry in the Bay of Plenty (which at the time accounted for over 70 percent of New Zealand’s kiwifruit export) argued that while the industry continued to expand rapidly, demand for workers would soon outstrip supply (J. Martin, 1983; Callister, 1985). Without advances in technology - the mechanisation of picking and packing fruit – as well as an extension of the packing season, labour shortages were predicted to become significant (J. Martin, 1983; Callister, 1985). Other forms of labour-intensive horticulture, including berry fruits and pipfruit, were also expanding at this time (Fitzgerald, 2003).

By the late 1990s, New Zealand’s wine industry was undergoing rapid growth, particularly in the Marlborough region, as the industry shifted away from the domestic market towards globally recognised wine varietals suitable for export (Beer and Lewis, 2006; Hayward and Lewis, 2008). As part of this process, small family-owned operations were consolidated into larger national and transnational corporate wineries, owned by local and offshore investors with little direct involvement in the wine production process (Hayward and Lewis, 2008).63 Associated with the shift towards corporate wineries, was an increasing reliance on contractors to manage the rising demand for seasonal workers for the autumn and winter months (Beer and Lewis, 2006; Hayward and Lewis, 2008).

A tightening of the labour market across New Zealand during the late 1990s and early 2000s led to a drop in traditional sources of labour, making employers more dependent on offshore workers (IPS, 2008; Ramasamy et al., 2008). By 2005 up to 3,000 seasonal workers were needed for the peak pruning period in Marlborough alone, with foreigners making up approximately 60-75 percent of the total workforce (Beer and Lewis, 2006).64 Winegrowers and contractors argued there was a need to keep prices down with “rhetoric of intense global competition, low margins and the necessity for low wages”, and foreign workers were

63 See Hayward and Lewis (2008) for a detailed review of the regional dynamics of the Marlborough wine industry.
64 Foreigners included those on Working Holiday visas as well as other short-term work visas and people working illegally (e.g. students working beyond their maximum work entitlements, workers who had overstayed after the expiry of their permit, and those who never held legal status as workers) (Beer and Lewis, 2006).
“ideal targets for future labour demands” (Beer and Lewis, 2006, p.103; Hill et al., 2007; IPS, 2008; DoL, 2010a).

In 2002 it was estimated there were 17,000 illegal workers across the H/V industries as a whole, and it was “common knowledge that many kiwi growers have turned a blind eye to the activities of mainly Indian and Asian gang-masters who set themselves up as labour contractors” (Courtney, 2008a, p.73; Sharpe, 2010). Illegal labour, predominantly from Asia rather than the Pacific, was fundamentally unreliable and compromised the value and reputation of law-abiding growers and contractors within the industry (Beer and Lewis, 2006; HVSWG, 2005; Sharpe, 2010; Lewis, 2011). Enforcement action was, however, often deemed a threat to productivity as growers grappled with tight timeframes during peak periods, and relied on seasonal workers from any source they could find (Beer and Lewis, 2006, p.103; Hill et al., 2007).

Variation in the labour requirements of specific sectors (e.g. kiwifruit versus pipfruit) as well as variation in the numbers of workers available in each region created additional problems as employers competed for the same labour (HVSWG, 2005; Whatman 2007). Labour was a key point within the H/V productivity system where value was being lost, with poor quality decision-making and practice by staff, absolute shortages and very high staff turnover (up to 600 percent in a season) (Whatman, 2007; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010). The lack of reliable labour also restricted employers’ abilities to build their businesses and to invest in their workforce (Hill et al., 2007; Horticulture New Zealand, 2009).

Few New Zealand employers sought to enhance labour productivity through retention, higher wages and training, or to make other structural changes, such as better occupational health and safety standards on the orchard/vineyard and provision of low-cost housing, that might attract a more permanent New Zealand labour force. Instead it was more common for employers to adopt a business model based on low-cost staff, some of who were working illegally (Swain and Maharey, 2004; HVSWG, 2005; Hill et al., 2007; IPS, 2008).

Government officials and industry representatives recognised however that the seemingly intractable, or ‘wicked’ problem facing New Zealand’s labour-intensive H/V industries – with tight profit margins, a growing demand for labour, low wages and poor working conditions,
CHAPTER 4: The Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy

poor quality work and low productivity, and a trend towards illegal use of casual workers under unacceptable working conditions – had to be addressed (Ramasamy et al., 2008; Whatman and Van Beek, 2008; Tipples and Whatman, 2010). 65

4.3 Addressing the ‘wicked problem’ of labour shortages in the H/V industries

To tackle this complex public policy issue required government and industry to work together to ‘clean up’ grower and contractor practices, and enforce change within the H/V sectors to enhance productivity (Whatman, 2007). From a policy perspective, ‘wicked’ or complex problems refer to “challenging policy areas where there is little agreement on the nature of the problem” (C. Scott, 2006, p.573). They are difficult to address precisely because of their complex nature: they are continually evolving, have multiple stakeholders with different perspectives and goals, and there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution that applies in all circumstances (Sanderson, 2000; Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002; Barnes et al., 2003; APSC, 2007; Rogers, 2008).

Several initiatives took place in the early 2000s to tackle the issue of inadequate seasonal labour supply (Beer and Lewis, 2006; Tipples and Whatman, 2010). The most significant was a three-year cross-governmental and industry project started in 2004 known as the Pure Business Project (PBP). The project was established to address some of the systemic problems facing apple growers, including barriers to securing seasonal labour, amid growing concern about the possible collapse of the industry (Whatman et al., 2005; Hill et al., 2007). 66

The PBP was carried out in the Hawke’s Bay, New Zealand’s largest apple growing region, and involved a series of workshops that brought together representatives from different

66 During the 1980s and 1990s New Zealand apples were cooperatively owned and marketed under a single entity – the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board (later known as ENZA) (Le Heron and Roche, 1996). Deregulation of the industry in October 2001 caused significant problems with increasing competition between independent growers trying to export their apples overseas. Many smaller family-owned and operated orchards were forced to exit the industry in the face of financial ruin or were incorporated into larger enterprises (Fitzgerald, 2003; Dobbs and Rowling, 2006).
government agencies,\textsuperscript{67} researchers (to facilitate the project), as well as participants in every stage of the apple producing system. Participants worked together to understand the problems facing the industry and then co-design the structural changes the industry needed to make (shifting from short-term profit to long-term sustainability, and from quantity to quality of fruit picked), as well as the necessary immigration and employment policy responses required to support the industry’s transformation (Whatman et al., 2005; Hill et al., 2007; IPS, 2008; Whatman and Van Beek, 2008). The collaborative nature of the PBP was deemed an effective means of responding to the complex problems facing the apple industry, and this approach influenced the thinking behind further initiatives across the H/V industries, including the development of the RSE policy (Tipplies and Whatman, 2010).

\textbf{4.4 The Horticulture and Viticulture Seasonal Working Group}

At the same time as the PBP was being held in the Hawke’s Bay, regional discontent with labour supply issues in the H/V industries became national (Tipplies and Whatman, 2010). In response to concerns raised by industry groups, in August 2004 Ministers, government agencies\textsuperscript{68} and industry representatives met to consider how to address seasonal labour shortages over the short, medium and longer-term.

A decision was made to form a collaborative government, industry and union partnership to “integrate the concerns and ongoing initiatives of multiple government agencies and the lobbying by different industry groups” to address seasonal labour needs (DoL, 2010a, p.3). The working group was tasked with examining five integrated areas to improve labour supply and productivity: ‘New Zealanders first’ (optimising the use of local labour); accessing global labour; labour supply and demand information; up-skilling and productivity; and improving workplace quality and productivity. The ‘Medium – Long-term Horticulture and Viticulture Seasonal Labour Strategy’ was launched in December 2005 (Cunliffe, 2005; HVSWG, 2005).

\textsuperscript{67} Government agencies included the Department of Labour, the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) responsible for placing local New Zealanders into seasonal work, and the Inland Revenue (tax) Department.

\textsuperscript{68} Impetus for a joined-up government intervention in the H/V labour markets emanated from several policy agencies: the Department of Labour, MSD, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the Ministry of Economic Development, and the Inland Revenue Department (DoL, 2010a, p.3).
4.4.1 Short-term solutions: immigration responses

The first priority was to develop short-term solutions to meet the needs of employers in the industry for the 2004/05 season. This included a high level of government intervention to increase labour market participation of local New Zealanders, as well as using overseas workers when local labour was not available (HVSWG, 2005). As Swain and Maharey (2004, p.6) argued in their case for the seasonal labour strategy:

The key role for the government is helping get the mix of interventions right. This includes increasing participation, increasing productivity, helping upskill New Zealanders, facilitating overseas labour where appropriate and assessing industry responses. It also has a role to play in supporting industry to work towards structural change over the longer-term, where they ultimately take greater responsibility for their labour needs.

A range of options for accessing overseas labour were identified, including those who had gained residence under schemes such as the Samoan Quota or Pacific Access Category (PAC), the Working Holiday Schemes, and Variations of Conditions (VoC)\textsuperscript{69} for visitors already onshore wanting to undertake seasonal work. In addition, the Approval in Principle (AIP) pilot was established for the 2004/05 season which allowed employers to recruit overseas labour subject to a reciprocal commitment also to employ New Zealanders (HSVWG, 2005; Ramasamy et al., 2008). The seasonal labour strategy made explicit mention of the possibility of linking these immigration initiatives “to the servicing of aid development objectives, especially in relation to the Pacific Islands” (HSVWG, 2005, p.13).

4.4.2 Medium and longer-term solutions

The medium (2005/06-2007/08) and longer-term strategies (2008/09 onwards) involved ongoing collaboration between industry and government to meet labour needs, with a strong focus on compliance issues, measures to attract and retain New Zealand workers, regional development planning and workforce skill development, and good employment and recruitment practices (Swain and Maharey, 2004; HSVWG, 2005). The working group also sought to shift control away from labour contractors, who were central but largely unregulated players in the H/V industries (DoL, 2010a; Sharpe, 2010). A national registration

\textsuperscript{69} Visitors already in New Zealand can apply to have the conditions of their visa varied to undertake seasonal work in the H/V industries. The maximum time allowed is six weeks’ work in a region where an absolute labour shortage has been declared by MSD (INZ, 2010).
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process for new and existing contractors was suggested to minimise contractors’ use of illegal labour.

An immediate temporary migration policy, the Seasonal Work Permit, was established for the 2005/06 season. This work permit enabled employers to recruit workers who were already in New Zealand on valid temporary permits for up to nine months to work in areas where there was a declared labour shortage. Feedback from employers in 2005 and early 2006 indicated the Seasonal Work Permit pilot was working well, and as a result of ongoing labour demands the pilot was extended for a further six months in March 2006 (Cunliffe, 2006a; Ramasamy et al., 2008).

4.4.3 Working towards the RSE policy

During 2005-06 a longer-term immigration response to employers’ seasonal labour needs was also being examined in consultation with industry – a response that was to become known as the Recognised Seasonal Employer policy (Ramasamy et al., 2008). The immigration policies that had been available (the AIP, Seasonal Work Permit, Working Holiday Scheme and Variation of Conditions) were deemed reactive solutions that failed to manage compliance risks, or encourage the H/V industries to plan ahead for their future seasonal labour needs (DoL, 2010a). Therefore a new and ‘tighter’ scheme was developed to replace the Seasonal Work Permit and AIP policy (Cabinet Policy Committee, 2006a).

On 16 October 2006 the New Zealand cabinet agreed that a temporary seasonal work policy should be implemented, beginning with workers from the South Pacific (Fiji,70 Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) and that the policy should include a mechanism to ensure that local labour was utilised before immigration options were considered (Cabinet Policy Committee 2006b, 2006c).

The Cabinet’s decision came soon after New Zealand’s participation in the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in September 2006. The decision also followed on the heels of a New Zealand government inter-agency consultation about

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70 Fiji was subsequently excluded following the military coup in December 2006 as part of the sanctions against the military regime.
possible responses to calls from Pacific Forum countries for greater access to New Zealand and Australia’s labour markets (Cabinet Policy Committee, 2006a; Cunliffe, 2006b; DoL, 2010a). The fact that two papers went forward on the same Cabinet agenda – one on the RSE policy and a related paper on Pacific labour mobility, meant “the focus on the Pacific was sharpened and made explicit in the RSE, which enhanced the scheme and increased its political support” (IPS, 2008, p.66).

The former Prime Minister Helen Clark announced the essence of the RSE policy at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Fiji in October 2006. The policy was then trialled, with support from the World Bank, in the 2006-07 harvesting season in Central Otago (Ramasamy et al. 2008). The pilot brought in 45 Ni-Vanuatu workers who were employed by a grower cooperative in Otago, and both the Department of Labour and the World Bank deemed the pilot a success (Whatman and Van Beek, 2008).

4.5 The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) work policy

The RSE policy was established in April 2007 and became operational in October of the same year, allocating 5,000 places per annum (extended to 8,000 places in October 2008) for overseas seasonal workers to plant, maintain, harvest and pack crops in the H/V industries (Ramasamy et al., 2008; DoL, 2010a). The policy has multiple aims, including to (DoL, 2010a, p.5):

- Create a sustainable labour supply;
- Transform the horticulture and viticulture industries from low cost industries to industries based on quality, productivity, and high value through improved business practices;
- Protect New Zealanders’ access to seasonal employment;
- Minimise immigration risk; and
- Contribute to New Zealand’s broad objectives in the region with regard to encouraging Pacific economic development, regional integration and stability.

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71 While the RSE was being trialled, the Seasonal Work Permit was extended for a further 12 months until September 2007, to ensure employers had access to enough temporary workers for the season (Cunliffe, 2006c).
CHAPTER 4: The Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy

The RSE is unique in New Zealand’s immigration policy initiatives in that from the outset it has involved three core government agencies sharing the responsibility for administering the programme. The Department of Labour (responsible for immigration) has overall accountability for the policy. The other two key agencies are the Ministry of Social Development (MSD - which includes Work and Income New Zealand), and NZAID, a semi-autonomous body within MFAT, which manages New Zealand’s official overseas aid programme. Inland Revenue is also involved with the development of RSE worker tax codes (DoL, 2010a). The engagement of multiple agencies at all stages of design, implementation and ongoing management of the RSE has been identified as a best practice feature of the scheme (Hugo, 2009b; ILO, 2009).

The Ministry of Social Development forecasts seasonal labour requirements and works with the Department of Labour to determine whether there is a genuine need to recruit overseas labour to work in the different regions. The onus is on employers to prove that there are no New Zealanders available to do the required tasks. Employers must list any job vacancies with their regional Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ) branch, and WINZ checks the vacancies against their records of potential labour in the region. Obtaining permission to recruit is not automatic; there is a clear ‘New Zealander first’ dimension to the policy to ensure local people are not denied opportunities to take up seasonal employment (Ramasamy et al., 2008; DoL, 2010a). The intended composition of the seasonal labour force is shown in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Composition of New Zealand’s seasonal labour force

![Diagram showing the composition of New Zealand's seasonal labour force]

Source: Department of Labour, 2010a, p.13

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72 In April 2009 NZAID was restructured and became the International Development Group (IDG) within MFAT. The IDG’s former name, NZAID, is used throughout this thesis because this was the agency in operation during the course of the fieldwork.
MFAT assisted with the negotiation of the Inter-Agency Understandings (IAUs) (dated April 2007) between the Department of Labour and the equivalent government agency in the five kick-start states (Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) that cover arrangements for recruiting workers, and making certain those selected meet the RSE visa requirements. Figure 4.6 shows the location of the five kick-start states and the Solomon Islands, which was officially engaged as the sixth kick-start state in 2010.

The IAUs provide a high-level description of the roles of the Department of Labour and the respective agencies in each of the Pacific states, and these responsibilities are discussed in Chapter 8. MFAT and NZAID officials also monitor the outcomes of the scheme in the islands in the context of its primary development objective, which in the words of a former New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs is: “first and foremost it will help alleviate poverty directly by providing jobs for rural and outer island workers who often lack income-generating work” (Peters, 2006, para.4).

Several business units within the Department of Labour are involved in the administration, operation and support of the policy. An RSE processing unit within Immigration New Zealand (INZ) deals with accreditation of employers and processing of Agreement to Recruit (ATR) applications (discussed in section 4.5.1). INZ branches, generally located within the New Zealand High Commissions around the Pacific, process the RSE workers’ visa applications. Dedicated labour inspectors and INZ compliance staff based in regions across New Zealand deal with worker compliance with visa requirements, and employer compliance with employment and other legislation as well as conditions of the RSE policy (such as provision of accommodation and pastoral care) (DoL, 2010a).

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Footnote 73: During 2012 MFAT’s worldwide operations were restructured and the first stages of visa processing were outsourced to Visa Application Centres (VACs) in selected countries, rather than being handled by INZ. In the Pacific most visas are now processed in Suva, Fiji. The previous system whereby visas in all RSE kick-start states (and the Solomon Islands) were processed in-country, except in Tuvalu, persisted through the course of fieldwork and is the system that will be referred to in the thesis.
CHAPTER 4: The Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy

Figure 4.6: Map showing the five Pacific kick-start states and the Solomon Islands

Source: Map supplied by Max Oulton, cartographer, Geography, Tourism and Environmental Planning, University of Waikato, Hamilton
The RSE Strategic Management Unit based in Wellington manages and facilitates the policy, including monitoring of the scheme. The unit includes two RSE relationship managers who work closely with different stakeholders in the regions, and at least one Pacific Island staff member to assist with building and strengthening networks with the participating island countries. At the national level oversight is provided through an RSE governance group, which includes senior staff from across the Department with a role in the RSE (policy development and advice, communications, legal matters, finance and research and evaluation) (DoL, 2010a).

4.5.1 The RSE accreditation process: employers

To achieve accreditation from the Department as a Recognised Seasonal Employer, the applicant has to meet certain standards regarding their recruitment and employment practices (including payment of minimum wage and health and safety requirements). The applicant also needs to show that they have engaged with their local WINZ branch and with the relevant industry training organisation and taken all reasonable steps to source and train local labour.

As an RSE, the employer is responsible for the following: paying workers the minimum wage for at least 240 hours of work and ensuring the hours of work average 30 per week;\(^7\) provision of pastoral care (transport to and from the port of arrival and departure, sourcing suitable accommodation);\(^5\) an induction programme, transport to and from work, onsite facilities, personal protective equipment, access to banking facilities, access to health insurance, necessary translation support, and opportunities for recreation and religious observance; and occupational health and safety requirements (Cabinet Policy Committee, 2006b; DoL 2007a, 2010a; INZ, 2010).

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\(^7\) For employment agreements that are for a period of six weeks or longer, employers must pay no fewer than 240 hours or 30 hours per week (whichever is the greater). For employment agreements that are for a period of fewer than six weeks, remuneration is payment for 40 hours per week. Workers’ wages must not be below the minimum wage unless the employer has paid the full airfare cost upfront and an agreement exists for the employer to recover half of the return airfare (DoL, 2010a; INZ 2010).

\(^5\) Workers are responsible for the costs of accommodation, food, clothing and other living expenses.
In addition, employers have to pay half of the return airfare between New Zealand and the workers’ country(s) of residence. In the case of Kiribati and Tuvalu, the cost-sharing arrangement with employers was amended following a decision by the Department late in 2007. The amendment requires RSEs to cover only half of the airfare costs between Fiji and New Zealand. This change was made to avoid airfare costs acting as a disincentive to employers recruiting from the two central Pacific atoll states.76 Employers are also required to pay the costs associated with workers’ removal from New Zealand, to a maximum of NZ$3,000 per worker, if they fail to comply with the requirements of their visa or fail to return home at the end of their employment contract (DoL, 2010a; INZ, 2010).77

Once an employer is granted RSE status, which is usually valid for two years, they lodge an ATR with the Department. The ATR contains details of the numbers of workers they require, the country(s) workers will be sourced from, and further details around the terms and conditions offered to workers (including the nature of the work – planting, maintaining, harvesting or packing crops) as well as a copy of the employment agreement (INZ, 2010). Employers are required to submit ATR applications every season, and may submit more than one so there is some flexibility with recruiting workers for different tasks and varying periods of employment.

The ATR(s) may be approved once the Department, in consultation with MSD, is satisfied no suitable New Zealanders are available to undertake the work, and there are sufficient places remaining within the national quota for RSE workers (currently 8,000 places). If suitable New Zealand labour becomes available in a subsequent season, then employers have to incorporate these workers into their labour forces before they can recruit offshore again. The scheme also reinforces the preference for recruiting New Zealanders by ensuring that the added costs and responsibilities of recruiting overseas workers make it a more expensive option.

When the ATR has been approved, the employer can initiate a recruitment drive. Some employers travel to the Pacific country from which they wish to select their recruits. Others

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76 The costs for employers wishing to recruit from Kiribati and Tuvalu, and the transport costs facing I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan workers travelling to New Zealand are discussed further in Chapters 8 and 10.
77 A condition of the visa is that workers remain in the agreed employment position. Workers who leave their employment are deemed to be breaking the conditions of their visa and become unlawful (DoL, 2010a).
rely on assistance from island-based recruitment agents or the relevant labour ministry in their chosen Pacific country(s). Employers may recruit from countries outside the Pacific if they have evidence that they have been unsuccessful in recruiting from the Pacific, or they had an existing arrangement to recruit seasonal workers from a particular country that pre-dated the introduction of the RSE (DoL, 2007a, 2010a; INZ, 2010). New ATRs, however, prioritise Pacific Forum countries.

4.5.2 The RSE accreditation process: workers

Workers in the islands, who are selected for employment in New Zealand under an approved ATR, have to apply for a Seasonal Work Visa. To obtain this they need to be over 18 years of age, hold a valid passport, a temporary entry chest x-ray certificate (screening for tuberculosis), a medical certificate, police clearance and a return air ticket. Applicants from countries with high risk factors for HIV/AIDS are also required to provide the results of an HIV test. Workers must attend a mandatory pre-departure briefing before leaving for New Zealand.

Workers are allowed to remain in New Zealand for up to seven months in any 11-month period. The exceptions are workers from Tuvalu and Kiribati who are able to remain in New Zealand for up to nine months in any 11-month period. The extended time afforded to participants from these countries reflects their distance and remoteness from New Zealand and the associated travel costs. The scheme allows for the return of experienced workers (who have an offer of employment, want to return, and meet immigration requirements) in subsequent seasons if an employer wishes to recruit them again. There is no restriction on the number of times a worker can be engaged under the RSE (DoL, 2007a, 2010a). The four main steps in the RSE accreditation process are summarised in Figure 4.7.

78 The original RSE work permit was subsequently changed to a limited purpose visa in August 2007 to reduce the risk of workers overstaying (DoL, 2010a).
The RSE policy places significant emphasis on minimising risk, particularly the risk of overstaying by RSE workers, the displacement of New Zealanders and the risk of worker exploitation (DoL, 2010a). A series of policy mechanisms have been introduced to achieve this, and they are summarised in Appendix 2. The tight management and control of the RSE sets the circular migration programme apart from the large-scale Western European and US guest worker schemes of the past that resulted in significant permanent settlement of workers and their families, often with support from their employers (P. Martin et al., 2006a). There has been very little overstaying by RSE workers in the five years the policy has been in operation (less than one percent each season) and there is a high level of compliance by key stakeholders (employers, recruiters, government officials and communities in the islands) with the requirement for workers to return home within the timeframe of their visas.
4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the background to the RSE, with a focus on the complex challenges facing the H/V industries as they compete in an increasingly global agri-business market, and producers seek a regular supply of seasonal labour to enhance the productivity of their enterprises. The problems facing the New Zealand H/V industries are not unique – they are common to the horticulture industries of other high-income countries. However New Zealand has been chosen as the case study for this research because of its decision to implement the RSE policy - a managed circular migration scheme that is designed as a ‘best practice’ model (Hugo, 2009b; ILO, 2009; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010) with the dual objectives of enhancing the sustainability of the H/V industries, while also contributing to the economic development of participating Pacific states. The next chapter outlines the conceptual framework that has been used to examine the operation of the RSE over the first five seasons, and this is followed by a discussion of the research methodology in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 5: The RSE system: a conceptual framework

5.1 Introduction

A core component of the RSE that has been identified as a ‘best practice’ feature of the scheme is the monitoring and evaluation programme undertaken by the Department of Labour (Newland et al., 2008; ILO, 2009; Chappell and Laczko, 2011). In 2009 the Department contracted an independent company, Evaluate Research, to assess the operation of the policy over the first two years (2007-2009) and to identify its short-term outcomes. The final report described the RSE as (DoL, 2010a, p.85):

A complicated policy that involves multiple and interconnected relationships, known as ‘simultaneous causal strands’. These strands must occur at the same time and in a balanced way for the initiative to be successful. The failure or dominance of one or more causal strands can impact negatively on other causal strands.

Several features contribute to the RSE policy being ‘complicated’ – a term used by Rogers (2008 cf. Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002) to describe interventions that are implemented across multiple sites or governances, require two or more simultaneous causal strands for the intervention to succeed, and have different causal mechanisms operating in different contexts (which influence whether a programme can be replicated in another setting). The complicated aspects of the RSE and their implications are outlined in Appendix 3, along with the seven causal strands identified by the independent evaluators that must be kept in balance if the policy is to be successful (Appendix 4) (DoL, 2010a).

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the conceptual framework that is used to examine the RSE, and whether the programme can keep the casual strands in balance and deliver the desired ‘wins’. The framework draws on two closely related fields of inquiry: systems and complexity theory. The first three sections of the chapter analyse the relevance of systems thinking to migration studies and, in particular, why this provides a useful framework for understanding how the RSE operates and for assessing its impacts on both sending and receiving communities. The fourth section draws on complexity theory to argue that while the majority of the RSE policy’s outcomes are predicted and intended, the programme may
also produce unanticipated outcomes. These unintended outcomes may, in turn, impact on the policy’s ability to achieve its stated aims.

5.2 Systems theory

Systems theory has its origins in the early 20th century, and was introduced as a counterbalance to ‘reductionist’ forms of science that sought to explain all phenomena by reducing them to their smallest, identifiable parts (Midgley, 2006). According to Patton (1990, p. 78) “a systems study asks ‘how and why does this system as a whole function as it does?’” Holistic thinking is integral to a systems perspective, examining the interactions between different parts of the system, and taking into account the context that surrounds and influences the phenomenon under study (Patton, 1990; Imam et al., 2006; Midgley, 2006). As Patton (1990, p. 79; cf. Gharajedaghi and Ackoff, 1985; Fawcett, 1989) explains:

A system is a whole that is both greater than and different from its parts. Indeed, a system cannot validly be divided into independent parts as discrete entities of inquiry because the effects of the behaviour of the parts on the whole depend on what is happening to other parts. The parts are so interconnected and interdependent that any simple cause-effect analysis distorts more than it illuminates. Changes in one part lead to changes among all parts and the system itself. Nor can one simply add the parts in some linear fashion and get a useful sense of the whole.

Two distinctive features of the systems approach are the concepts of feedback and equilibrium (Fawcett, 1989; Byrne, 2001; Barnes et al., 2003; Walby, 2007). A feedback loop is “a circular arrangement of causally connected elements, so that each element has an effect on the next” (Capra, 1997, cited in Walby, 2007, p. 464). Feedback can be positive or negative. Negative feedback loops initiate changes within the system that help to stabilise and maintain the system’s equilibrium. In other words, a change in one part of the system is matched by an adjustment elsewhere in the system to maintain a relatively stable state. Positive feedback loops, on the other hand, enforce small changes that escalate further change, and move the system away from equilibrium (Cilliers, 2000; Mingers, 2000; Midgley, 2006; Walby, 2007).
CHAPTER 5: The RSE system: a conceptual framework

Geographers conducting research in the 1960s and 1970s on change within Pacific societies drew extensively on systems thinking, and the concepts of feedback and equilibrium to explore the sustainability of agricultural systems, trading networks, and population thresholds for islands and communities in a range of Melanesian contexts.\(^79\) Their research contributed not only to understanding change in rural agricultural communities, but also influenced how population movement was viewed in dynamic, open systems where “the transaction is always circular, [and there is] always a mutual feedback” (Shepard, 1969, cited in Clarke, 1973, p.280).

### 5.3 Migration systems theory

In the context of migration studies, systems theory has been drawn upon over the past four decades to conceptualise both internal and international migration flows (Mabogunje, 1970; Chapman and Prothero, 1983; 1985;\(^80\) Prothero and Chapman, 1985; Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al., 1992;\(^81\) de Haas, 2010b, Bakewell et al., 2011; Bakewell, 2012). The Nigerian geographer Akin Mabogunje (1970) was the first to use systems theory to describe modern rural-urban migration in West Africa, and to examine “not only why people migrate but all the implications and ramifications of the process” (Mabogunje, 1975, p.212).\(^82\)

Essentially, a migration system is defined as “a set of places linked by flows and counter-flows of people, goods, services and information which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places” (de Haas, 2010b, p.1593). Mabogunje’s (1970)

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\(^{81}\) See Kritz et al., 1992 for research on international migration systems at global and regional scales.

\(^{82}\) Mabogunje’s (1970) original article is reprinted in E. Jones (ed) 1975, Readings in social geography, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 210-223.
CHAPTER 5: The RSE system: a conceptual framework

model, made up of five components, was designed to capture the social and economic impacts of migration “on both the rural areas where migrants originate, and the urban centres that receive them”, and a key component of the model was the feedback mechanisms which acted to increase or decrease the flows of migrants between rural and urban areas (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992, p.2; R. King et al., 2008). Mabogunje (1975, p.221) argued that by using a systems approach, rural-urban migration was no longer seen as “a linear, uni-directional, push-and-pull, cause-effect movement, but as a circular, interdependent, progressively complex, and self-modifying system in which the effect of changes in one part can be traced through the whole of the system”.

Modern systems theorists have extended Mabogunje’s ideas to international migration (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al. 1992). International migration systems consist of two or more countries – a core receiving region and a set of specific sending countries - which are linked to one another in the context of larger economic, political, and social networks, that change over time and influence the nature of migration flows (Kritz et al. 1992; Skeldon, 1997; Castles and Miller, 2009). The system is also “characterised by feedback mechanisms that connect the movement of people between particular countries...to the concomitant flows of goods, capital (remittances), ideas and information” (Bakewell et al., 2011, p.5). These feedback mechanisms shape migration systems, as financial and social (new information and ideas) remittances flow back to origin communities, and facilitate or constrain further migration (de Haas, 2010b).

Figure 5.1 provides the basic conceptual framework of a migration system. A key premise of the migration systems approach is that any movement can be seen as the result of interacting macro-, meso- and micro- structures that are intertwined in the migratory process (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Fawcett, 1989; Castles and Miller, 2009). Macro-structures refer to large-scale institutional factors such as the economic, social and political relationships between states, and include the various immigration policies implemented by

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83 Mabogunje’s model was made up of five components: the environment - economic conditions, social conditions, transport and communications and government policies; the migrant who was encouraged by various push and pull forces [as well as expectations or aspirations to migrate] to leave the village in search of employment in the city; a series of rural and urban control subsystems which calibrated the flows of migrants through the system; adjustment mechanisms which operated in rural areas to cope with the loss of migrants and in urban areas to incorporate them; and feedback loops (positive or negative) which acted to increase or decrease the flows of migrants, including the flows of information, remittances and other ‘demonstration effects’ (R. King et al., 2008, p.26).
CHAPTER 5: The RSE system: a conceptual framework

sending and receiving countries (Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al., 1992; Arango, 2000; de Haas, 2010b).

Figure 5.1: A systems framework of international migration

![Diagram showing the systems framework of international migration](image)

Source: Adapted from Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992, p.3

Micro-structures operate at the level of the individual and the household (Castles and Miller, 2009). It is at the micro-level that people make their migration decisions in the context of wider livelihood strategies, as they react to a complex web of political, economic and social factors (Massey et al., 1993; McDowell and de Haan, 1997; Collinson, 2009).

Meso-structures are the intermediate mechanisms that link the macro and micro levels and calibrate the flows of migrants through the system. Meso-level mechanisms include migrant networks - “interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas [and] offer a valuable source of capital that acts to lower the costs and risks of international migration” (Massey et al., 1998, p.186). Formal and informal networks play a critical role in channelling information, migrants and resources between sending and receiving communities (Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al. 1992; Castles and Miller, 2009; de Haas, 2010b).
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Meso-structures also include the ‘migration industry’ - groups or institutions, such as recruitment agents, travel agents, lawyers, interpreters and other intermediaries that have a commercial interest in the continuation of migration, and assume the role of mediating between the migrants and the macro-level political and economic institutions (Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al., 1992; Salt and Stein, 1997; Castles and Miller, 2009). These meso-level structures assist with the mobilisation, recruitment and actual organisation of migration, and link various countries into their regional migration system.

Structures at the macro-, micro- and meso-levels have no clear lines of division and it is their interaction within the system that ultimately shapes the dynamics of migration flows (Fawcett, 1989; Castles and Miller, 2009; Collinson, 2009; R. King, 2012). Further, “these formal and informal subsystems [in which migration takes place] perpetuate and reinforce the systematic nature of international flows by encouraging migration along certain pathways, and discouraging it along others” (Bakewell, 2012, p.6). This in turn produces a relatively stable geographic structure that links people, families and communities over space and time (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al. 1992; Massey et al., 1998; Bakewell et al., 2011, Bakewell, 2012).

There have been a number of criticisms directed towards the migration systems model. These include: its inability to explain why a migration system comes into being in the first place (Bakewell et al., 2011); its failure to acknowledge “various contextual feedback mechanisms through which ongoing migration changes the initial conditions [in sending and receiving countries] under which migration takes place” (e.g. the impact of migration on cultural change); and its limited recognition of the internal mechanisms that drive a migration system, including those mechanisms that might lead to less migration and may weaken migration systems over time (de Haas, 2010b, p.1593; Bakewell, 2012).

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84 See for example Boyle et al., 1998; Arango, 2000; R. King et al., 2008; de Haas, 2010b; Bakewell et al., 2011, Bakewell, 2012.

85 De Haas (2010b, p.1604) argues, for example, that diseconomies of scale might occur once migration systems reach a certain size. As increasing numbers of immigrants arrive at the destination, the marginal costs of having more immigrants starts to exceed the benefits for settled migrants, with growing competition for jobs and pressure on wages. These costs may decrease the willingness of settled migrants to help others in their home country to migrate, and cause the attractiveness of a destination to decline.
CHAPTER 5: The RSE system: a conceptual framework

Nevertheless the migration systems model has been repeatedly used, and over the past five years there has been renewed interest in its validity as a theoretical model due to some advances in systems theory (see Bakewell, 2012, for a discussion of the ‘re-launching’ of migration systems). R. King et al. (2008, p.20) argue that “in abstract terms the systems approach is appealing, for it emphasises the dynamics of links and flows, causes and effects, adjustments and feedback”, and as a descriptive method it allows for a series of interrelationships to be built in. The model allows for the examination of both origin and destination contexts (Bakewell, 2012); for the analysis of one migratory flow in the context of other flows (including the possible integration of internal and international migration) (R. King et al., 2008; R. King and Skeldon, 2010); for the evolution and changing composition of migration flows to be examined over time; and for the assessment of how these flows connect to other political, social and economic exchanges between countries (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al., 1992; Castles and Miller, 2009; Collinson, 2009).

5.3.1 A systems approach to the RSE work policy

A conceptual framework that draws on systems thinking is used in this thesis for several reasons. First, the context for the research problem relates to three interrelated debates at three scales: the global debate surrounding migration and development and the potential benefits of circular and temporary migration flows (Chapter 2); the regional debate about Pacific states’ need for increased access to the labour markets of countries on the Pacific rim (Chapter 3); and the local debate regarding how best to address the complex problem of labour shortages and associated low productivity in New Zealand’s H/V industries (Chapter 4). To address the research problem therefore requires a conceptual framework that can integrate information collected at all three scales and acknowledge the interrelationships between them.

Second, systems thinking helps to situate the evolution of the RSE scheme within a broader context of historic and contemporary population movement in the Pacific region, as it emphasises the co-existence of a range of cross border inflows and outflows of people (for education, tourism, trade, employment etc.) that operate simultaneously as a response to changing social and economic conditions across time and space (Bedford 1992, 2005). As Bedford (1992, p.44) notes, “geographic proximity is one factor that allows a migration...
CHAPTER 5: The RSE system: a conceptual framework

system to develop.” The countries participating in the RSE scheme are part of a regional migration system that links Pacific countries to those on the Pacific rim, through political, social, economic and cultural ties, and this thesis focuses on one of those connections – labour mobility.

Third, a systems approach provides a useful framework for examining how the RSE operates in practice, because it emphasises the interactions and interdependencies between different participant groups within the system, which in turn “can contribute to and/or challenge the stability of the whole” (Midgley, 2006, p.15; cf. Patton, 1990; Anderson et al., 2005). The RSE policy operates at several scales:

- The high-level relationships between the New Zealand government and governments of the participating island countries, articulated in the Inter-Agency Understandings (IAUs), that determine how the circular migration scheme is managed;
- The intermediate, meso-level relationships between employers, industry representatives, regionally-based government officials, accommodation, pastoral care and training providers, community organisations, formal and informal recruitment agents, and communities in both sending and receiving areas that facilitate or constrain migration under the scheme; and
- The micro-level relationships between employers, their RSE workers, and workers’ families in the islands.

There are a series of horizontal and vertical partnerships operating between these three scales, and each participant group can be seen as a ‘subsystem’ of the whole, interacting with other groups in the system but also working for their individual interests (DoL, 2010a). Figure 5.2 provides a model of the RSE system, and this model is returned to repeatedly throughout the remainder of the thesis to illustrate particular subsets of participants and relationships.
Figure 5.2: A model of the RSE system – participants and relationships

Source: Adapted from Department of Labour, 2010a, p.5
5.4 The RSE work policy: elements of complexity

In conjunction with a systems approach the thesis also draws on complexity theory to describe certain elements of the RSE system. The thesis does not argue that the RSE is a complex system in its own right. Rather, and in line with the independent evaluation, the RSE is viewed as a ‘complicated’ programme (DoL, 2010a), because it was designed with specific, intended outcomes, and there is a degree of certainty these outcomes will be achieved (Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002; Rogers, 2008). The anticipated short-, medium- and long-term outcomes are detailed in Appendices 5.1 and 5.2.

In addition, there are core elements to the seasonal work schemes implemented in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and Europe that are similar in crucial ways - including their circular nature, and their restriction to certain types and length of employment. Each seasonal work scheme is not entirely unique, and parallels and comparisons can be drawn between them (Rogers, 2008). The RSE has been closely modelled on the Canadian SAWP (Cabinet Policy Committee, 2006b) and, in turn, Australian government officials have drawn heavily on the New Zealand experience when designing the PSWPS and subsequent Seasonal Worker Program (SWP). It is for this reason that officials involved in administering seasonal work policies can have some degree of certainty that particular outcomes will be attained. Complex programmes, on the other hand, are unique, unpredictable, and outcomes are uncertain (Byrne, 1998; Cilliers, 2000; Mingers, 2000; Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002; Rogers, 2008; Page, 2009).

There are however complex elements to the RSE policy, and these may produce unanticipated outcomes in the future. Complexity theory is closely associated with systems thinking (Midgley, 2006), emphasising a ‘whole system’ perspective to understanding phenomena, and recognising the role of numerous actors within the system that are interdependent, connected and able to adapt in response to changes in their local and global environments (Patton, 1990; Reed and Harvey, 1992; Cilliers, 2000; Byrne, 2001; Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002; Barnes et al., 2003; Midgley, 2006). In complex systems space matters - the connections between people and ideas influence how events play out - and the success of a programme depends upon the coordinated actions of all stakeholders.
(Page, 2009). Four elements of complexity, and their relevance to the RSE policy, are discussed in the remainder of the chapter: adaptability, feedback, emergence, and context.

5.4.1 System adaptation

Adaptation is a key factor in a complex system and distinguishes complexity from complicated programmes. Complicated programmes can have diverse parts that are connected, but they do not adapt and are predictable (Page, 2009). The RSE is a dynamic programme that requires its participants to be flexible and adapt to changes over successive seasons as different challenges and ‘uncertainties’ emerge (DoL, 2010a). Government officials, in particular, have adopted a ‘responsive’ approach to the changing circumstances in which the RSE policy operates (DoL, 2010a). This approach is evident in several policy amendments since the programme’s implementation, which are detailed in Appendix 6.

In addition to specific policy changes, there are numerous other small, ongoing adjustments made by stakeholders operating at the macro- (government-government), meso- (regional-industry-community) and micro- (employer-worker) scales. These adjustments are discussed in Chapters 7-10, and all take place to ensure the RSE programme remains stable and there is balance between the different causal strands required to make the policy a success.

5.4.2 Feedback

Feedback loops are a feature of both systems and complexity theory. In the case of complex systems, feedback loops can contribute to, or impair, the achievement of intended outcomes, or produce outcomes that are unintended (Cilliers, 2000; Walby, 2007; Rogers, 2008; DoL, 2010a). As noted at the beginning of the chapter, positive feedback loops mean that certain actions within the system produce more of the same actions. This can lead to the occurrence of tipping points, where forces within the system reach a critical threshold and a small change may have a large ultimate effect (Rogers, 2008; Page, 2009). Tipping goes in one direction - it is not possible for the system to ‘go back’ after reaching a tipping point as the state of the system changes (Byrne, 1998; Page, 2009). Chapter 10 discusses a positive feedback loop that is emerging within the RSE system, between New Zealand
employers, RSE workers and their home communities, that may lead to a future tipping point that will ultimately change how New Zealand’s horticultural products, especially apples and pears, are marketed overseas.

Negative feedback loops result in a reduction of a particular action. This reduction creates stability within the system, dampening the reinforcement that comes from positive feedback, and helping to ensure the systems tends towards equilibrium (Byrne, 1998; Midgley, 2006; Walby, 2007). A potential negative feedback loop examined in Chapter 7 is a reduction in demand for workers over time as the productivity of workers increases with experience, and employers require fewer workers to perform the same tasks.

5.4.3 Emergent outcomes

The concept of emergence – where a number of simple, individual agents operating within a system form more complex behaviour as a collective, and the properties that emerge “are more than, and different from, the sum of their constituent parts” – is one of the most challenging aspects of complex programmes (Easton, 2010, p.121; cf. Midgely, 2006; Rogers, 2008). Social systems, which are “inherently interactive and open”, produce emergent outcomes (Mingers, 2000, p.1263). As numerous participants interact with each other and mutually affect each other, the patterns of behaviour that emerge are not constant. The system evolves rather than equilibrates – as the system’s environment changes so does the behaviour of its agents, generating novel behaviour for the system as a whole (Reed and Harvey, 1992; Cilliers, 2000; Sayer, 2000; D. Scott, 2005; Page, 2009).

Emergence takes many forms, including self-organisation which often occurs to maintain the stability of the system (Midgley, 2006; Page, 2009). As Anderson et al. (2005, p.673) explain:

Self-organizing is the process by which people mutually adjust their behaviours in ways needed to cope with changing internal and external environmental demands...agents self-organize to create the new structure and behaviours needed to meet the demands of the relationships they have with each other and the environment.

Self-organisation is evidenced in the RSE as employers choose to opt in or opt out of the scheme. Even though the policy has been put in place, not everyone is required to become a
CHAPTER 5: The RSE system: a conceptual framework

registered employer. However, more than 100 H/V enterprises have become involved in the RSE as a means of coping with labour shortages in the sector. This, in turn, has generated positive feedback within the system – as others see the productivity gains employers achieve from use of a reliable seasonal labour force they are also encouraged to participate. Whether there is continued growth, stabilisation, or a possible decline in the number of RSE employers in the future may be influenced by external economic and political factors beyond individual producers’ control.

External factors may also result in new forms of self-organisation. By the fifth season this was becoming evident with increasing numbers of employers joining together to share groups of RSE workers across crops and regions in order to reduce their costs. This was in direct response to poor weather, low crop yields and the continued pressure of the high value of the New Zealand dollar.86

While the RSE scheme has not produced unintended outcomes in the short-term, they may well emerge in the future, especially in relation to the longer-term social impacts on Pacific families and communities as they adjust to the repeated absence of RSE workers and changing allocations of labour. The experience of living and working in New Zealand (and Australia) is also raising aspirations among island-based Pacific peoples for work overseas, as the circulation of workers and financial and social capital encourages others to seek opportunities to migrate (Connell, 2009; de Haas, 2010b; Bedford and Hugo, 2012). Many RSE and PSWPS workers may be content at this stage to pick fruit and vegetables for New Zealand and Australian employers. In time, however, they may have other ambitions for their training and skill development that move beyond regular waged seasonal employment, and this may have unforeseen implications for the operation of the RSE.

5.4.4 The importance of context

Context also plays a critical role in determining the success, or failure, of a programme (Sanderson, 2000; Pawson et al., 2005; Henry, 2007). Pawson (2006, p.31) identifies four contextual layers that influence a programme’s success: “the individual capacities of the key

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86 This strategy is also designed to increase the length of employment RSE workers have in New Zealand, thus increasing their potential earnings and the financial returns to families and communities in the islands.
CHAPTER 5: The RSE system: a conceptual framework

actors; the interpersonal relationships supporting the intervention; the institutional setting; and the wider infra-structural system [political backing, resources, public support etc.”.

The RSE policy was introduced at a point in time when the New Zealand economy was strong, unemployment rates were low, growers were struggling to find suitable seasonal labour, and the H/V industries were ready to work with government to make a number of changes to enhance the productivity and international competitiveness of their industries longer-term. There was considerable support for the policy from many quarters including strong political support in New Zealand, and in the participating Pacific states as the policy was viewed as a positive response to increasing demands by Pacific governments for enhanced access to New Zealand’s labour market (Cabinet Policy Committee, 2006a).

The Australian Government’s attempt to implement a similar seasonal work scheme, modelled closely on the RSE, has produced different outcomes. This is due, primarily, to context. The geographic, economic, social and political climate into which the PSWPS was introduced in 2009, and continues to try and operate, is very different to that of New Zealand’s (Ball, 2010; Maclellan, 2010, Hay and Howes, 2012). This, in turn, has limited the number of employers able, or willing, to participate in the Australian pilot scheme and subsequent SWP (Hay and Howes, 2012). While the Australian scheme is not discussed in detail in the thesis, it is important to note the significant role context plays in determining the outcomes of complex programmes. The implication for research is that “rarely, if ever, is the ‘same’ programme equally effective in all circumstances” (Pawson, 2006, p.30).

5.5 Conclusion

The overarching conceptual framework used in this thesis to conceptualise the research ‘problem’ is that of an open, dynamic system. A systems approach allows for the integration of information gathered at multiple scales, and for the interrelationships and feedback loops between different participants in the system to be examined. Complexity theory is also drawn on to explain certain behaviours within the RSE system. The RSE programme is not entirely complex – there are predictable, intended outcomes. Nevertheless, the propensity of participants within the system to change and adapt, including to self-organise, in response to changing external factors provides evidence of some complexity.
Furthermore, the programme may produce unintended outcomes in future. How will the scheme operate in 20 years’ time? Will different problems keep emerging year after year, or will the programme remain relatively stable and become ‘business as usual’ for employers, workers and participating governments? How can the engagement of all participant groups be maintained over time? Can the causal strands be kept in balance on a long-term basis, or will one dominate to the detriment of others? These questions are not easily answered because all outcomes of the programme are not predetermined or able to be controlled.

The next chapter discusses the methodology used to approach the research questions. A critical realist stance is adopted to link the conceptual framework with the case study design and multi-method approach applied in the research, drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data to examine the RSE system and the outcomes achieved to date.
CHAPTER 6: Research methods and design

6.1 Introduction

To assess comprehensively the operation of the RSE requires a methodology that can incorporate multiple research methods and sources of data to capture the complexity of the scheme and allow for its examination as an integrated whole. The chapter begins with an overview of critical realism, its objectives and key research methods, before detailing the case study approach and multi-method research strategy adopted. The sources of secondary and primary data are outlined, including how research participants were identified and recruited, as well as the methods used to gather the data. Section 6.6 summarises how data was collated and subsequently analysed. The final section details measures taken to ensure a degree of rigour throughout the research process, and includes a brief statement on the researcher’s position within the study.

6.2 Critical realism: a philosophy for the study of complex systems

In the mid-1970s, philosopher Roy Bhaskar (1975) introduced critical realism in opposition to positivist approaches within the philosophy of science (Mingers, 2000). Sayer (2000), a main exponent of critical realism and its practical implications for research,\(^8\) argues that the critical realist position sits between empiricist and constructivist accounts of scientific explanation. He observed that “by simultaneously challenging common conceptions of both natural and social science, particularly as regards causation, critical realism proposes a way of combining modified naturalism\(^8\) with a recognition of the necessity of interpretive understanding of meaning in social life” (Sayer, 2000, pp 2-3).

\(^8\) For reviews of the critical realist approach across various disciplines see: Reed and Harvey, 1992; Sayer, 1992, 2000, 2012; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Yeung, 1997; Mingers, 2000; Sanderson, 2000; Barnes et al., 2003; Pawson et al., 2005; D. Scott, 2005; Pawson, 2006, Zachariadis et al., 2010; Wynn and Williams, 2012. See Hartwig, 2007 for a dictionary of critical realism including an explanation of all main concepts and key developments.

\(^8\) Sayer (2000, p.6) describes naturalism as the doctrine whereby the social world could be understood in the same way as natural science via certain laws of nature. Modified naturalism is a non-positivist stance that argues there are crucial differences between the social and natural worlds, and therefore social phenomena cannot be explained using naturalist scientific methods (Mingers, 2000).
Critical realism offers an appropriate philosophical ontology for the study of systems because it recognises the notion of a multi-layered social reality (Reed and Harvey, 1992; Yeung, 1997; Sanderson, 2000). The character of the social world consists of complex nested systems where different levels within the system (individuals, households, neighbourhoods, localities and so on) interact and relate to one another (Byrne, 1998).

As a philosophy, critical realism denies foundationalism, “the assumption that there is only one true and complete scientific theory, one true and complete set of beliefs about the world” (Żegleń, 2002, p.5; cf. Sayer, 1992). Instead it is a fallibilist philosophy, recognising that reality exists, but we can only ever understand it imperfectly due to the basic flaws of human intelligence, and “that our ways of knowing and understanding ‘reality’ are subject to modification and revision” (Pratt, 1995, p. 65).

6.2.1 The building blocks of critical realism: objects, mechanisms, outcomes

The fundamental aim of critical realism is explanation rather than prediction, and the hallmark of realist inquiry is its particular understanding of causality (Easton, 2010). Causality is not simply understood in terms of the relationship between discrete events (cause and effect), but rather, “to infer a causal outcome (O) between two events (X and Y) one needs to understand the underlying mechanism (M) that connects them and the context (C) in which the relationships occur” (Pawson et al., 2005, pp. 21-22; cf. Sanderson, 2000; Sayer, 2000, Henry, 2007).

In Sayer’s (2012, p. 106) words, “wherever possible, we try to get beyond the recognition that something produces some change to an understanding of what it is about the object that enables it to do this”. In the context of evaluation, “the basic evaluative question – what works? – changes to ‘what is it about this programme that works for whom in what circumstances?’” (Pawson et al., 2005, p.22).

Explained simply, objects “provide the basic theoretical building blocks for critical realist explanation... and can be human, social or material” (Easton, 2010, p.120). Objects have causal powers, or more generally “ways of acting or mechanisms” (Sayer, 2012, p.105). Whether they are “physical, like minerals, or social, like bureaucracies”, objects have certain
powers to behave in particular ways (Sayer, 2000, p.11). They also have certain liabilities, which makes them susceptible to specific kinds of change (Sayer, 2012). Whether an object’s mechanisms are ever activated, and the ensuing results, depend on the surrounding conditions (context) (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 2012).

In line with critical realists’ particular understanding of causality, there are certain research methods that enable critical realists to determine relationships between objects, their causal powers, and outcomes. Three methods are outlined in this chapter: abstraction; retroduction; and the triangulation of data from multiple sources.

### 6.2.2 The process of abstraction: necessary and contingent relations

The process of abstraction relates directly to “how we carve up, and define, our objects of study” (Sayer, 2000 p.27). The researcher must identify and isolate aspects of the object that are of interest, and exclude other parts that are not relevant (Yeung, 1997; Wynn and Williams, 2012). Critical realists maintain there are two kinds of relationships among objects - necessary and contingent - and in making abstractions it is useful to distinguish between the two (Sayer, 2000, 2012; cf. Yeung, 1997; Easton, 2010).

Necessary or internal relations are those where what the object is relies entirely on its relation to the other: a person cannot be an RSE worker unless they work for an RSE employer and vice versa. The relationship between an object and its mechanisms (ways of acting) is a necessary one: an RSE worker can pick apples by virtue of his/her strength, balance on a ladder, hand-eye coordination and so forth.

At its simplest, contingent or external relations refer to where the object can exist without the other object (Yeung, 1997; Sayer, 2012). The relationship between mechanisms and their effects is contingent; it is not fixed, but rather depends on the surrounding conditions. Whether an RSE worker actually works on a given day might depend on the weather. But the worker’s innate ability to work exists regardless of the weather.

Because mechanisms are contingently related to the surrounding context, “when we activate a mechanism for our own purposes we take care to ensure that the conditions
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under which it operates are those which will produce the desired effect” (Sayer, 2012, p.107). An apple grower recruits his RSE workers for a specific period each season to coincide with optimal harvest conditions, to enable the workers to pick as many bins of apples as possible – the desired outcome. The next stage requires additional empirical knowledge to explain why certain events or outcomes have occurred. This is the process of retrodution (Mingers, 2000; Sayer, 2000, Blaikie, 2004).

6.2.3 Retrodution: an explanatory model

Retrodution is a process that requires the researcher to move backward from an observation to the possible causes of that observation (Yeung, 1997; Mingers, 2000; Sayer, 2000, 2012).\(^{89}\) In other words, the aim of retrodution is to explain a particular outcome by identifying the mechanism(s) that, “if they were to exist and act in the postulated way”, would be capable of producing the observed outcome (Blaikie, 2004, p.972).

Retrodution is considered a “meta-process” (Easton, 2010, p.124), operating over and above deductive and inductive approaches to research,\(^{90}\) and the process is an iterative one (Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997). Both deductive and inductive cycles of data collection may occur; “deduction helps to identify the phenomenon of interest, suggests what mechanism may be at play and provides links with previous research and literature [while] induction provides event data to be explained and tests the explanations” (Easton, 2010, p.124).

Wynn and Williams (2012, p.795) point out that “in most cases there will be multiple possible sets of mechanisms which may have produced the outcomes being studied... [and] typically it is impossible to precisely identify the exact causes behind a given outcome”. A process for corroborating the existence of the alleged mechanism(s) is required, and for evaluating, comparing and then eliminating alternative explanations as to why a particular event or outcome has occurred (Mingers, 2000; Sayer, 2000, 2012; Blaikie, 2010).

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\(^{89}\) This is the same as the research method of ‘abduction’ developed by Peirce (1839-1914) and adopted by pragmatists. See: Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Maxcy, 2003; Morgan, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009.

\(^{90}\) A deductive approach starts with the assertion of a general rule or theory, and moves to a specific observation(s) which then serves to confirm or reject the rule/theory. An inductive approach works in the opposite direction. The researcher starts with a specific observation and infers the implications of his/her findings back to a general rule or theory. With an inductive stance, theory is the outcome (Bryman, 2008).
There are several means of corroborating the effects of a proposed mechanism with empirical evidence. One of these - “assessing the activation and operation of the causal mechanism from the perspectives of multiple participants involved in the observed events” (Wynn and Williams, 2012, p.801) – has been used consistently throughout the research. A continual process of data triangulation has taken place, enabling the researcher to have a degree of confidence that the mechanisms identified have resulted in the observed outcome, rather than an alternative causal factor. Data triangulation, a long-standing analytical tool used in social science research (D. Campbell and Fiske 1959 cited in Jick, 1979), is discussed further in sections 6.3 and 6.6.

6.3 Research design and strategy: a critical realist case study

Critical realism is a particularly well-suited companion to case study research, because it “justifies the study of any situation, regardless of the numbers of research units involved... with the objective of understanding why things are as they are” (Easton, 2010, p.119). Rather than being a methodological choice, case study is a choice of what is to be studied. It is defined by interest in the individual case, instead of by the methods of inquiry used (Stake, 2000), and its distinctive need arises out of a desire to understand a complex social phenomenon in its real-life context (Yin, 1999, 2003; Yin and Davis, 2007). The approach requires exploration from multiple perspectives, it is research-based and inclusive of different methods, and its primary purpose is to generate an in-depth and dynamic understanding of a particular programme, policy or system (Patton, 1990; Stake, 2000; Creswell, 2003; Bryman, 2008; Simons, 2009; Easton, 2010).

The holistic nature of the case study approach fits well with systems thinking, as it enables the phenomena under study to be examined as an integrated whole. Both the case and its context may change over time, which can add to the complexity of analysis. However one of the strengths of the case study approach is its ability to deal with this complexity by using a variety of evidence and research methods (Yin, 1999; Stake, 2000; Patton, 2002; Anderson et al., 2005). By documenting multiple perspectives, it is possible to “tease out and disentangle a complex set of factors and relationships”, explore contested viewpoints and demonstrate the influence of key actors in a programme (Easton, 2010, p.119). Through closely
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describing and interpreting events as they unfold in a ‘real life’ setting, the evolution of a programme can also be traced over time (Patton, 1990; Simons, 2009).

In this instance it is a case study of a particular seasonal migration programme - the RSE policy. The RSE case study is bounded by geography (the South Pacific region), by time (monitored over the period 2007-2012) and by event (introduced to address a particular complex problem facing the H/V industries and to meet Pacific leaders’ demands for increased access to New Zealand’s labour market). The RSE has been chosen as the ‘case’ for this research, because New Zealand is one of the first countries to design and operationalise a labour migration policy that specifically incorporates development outcomes for sending countries into its design.

6.4 A multi-method approach

Decisions about how to approach the research have been guided by practical considerations as well as the demands of the research context and questions (Greene, 2008). In terms of research practice, critical realists favour neither qualitative nor quantitative methods. Critical realism’s stratified ontology means different approaches have validity “in analysing social processes operating at different levels of social reality” (Sanderson, 2000, p.448). Broadly speaking the realist position “recognizes the value of quantitative modelling and statistical and experimental approaches in recognizing and analysing patterns and relationships between social phenomena, but sees this as, to some degree, ‘surface analysis’” (Sanderson, 2000, p.448). Penetration to ‘deeper’ levels of analysis and the understanding of actions and behaviour of individuals within a policy system is best achieved with the use of qualitative methods (Sanderson, 2000; cf. Yeung, 1997; Sayer, 2000).

This multi-method research has occurred in three broad phases, outlined in Figure 6.1, and involved an iterative process of data collection and analysis (Pratt, 1995; Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Each phase has built on the previous one, and involved the triangulation of data from various sources. The study is primarily qualitative, however quantitative data have also been drawn upon to capture different dimensions of the RSE system and to consolidate information accumulated over a wide geographic scope (seven countries) and timeframe (five years) (Jick, 1979; McKendrick, 1999; Patton, 1990; Brewer and Hunter, 2006).
Figure 6.1: Phases of fieldwork and data analysis, 2009-2011

**Phase 1: 2009**

**Primary data collection**
- NZ - 36 interviews
  - Employers; RSE workers; govt officials;
  - industry representatives; pastoral care providers; community contacts
- Pacific - 65 interviews
  - Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
  - Govt officials; community contacts; RSE workers

**Secondary data**
- Independent evaluation, RSE programme (2007-09)
- DoL monthly ATR data
- DoL RSE online surveys 2008 and 2009
- World Bank surveys (Gibson et al., 2008; McKenzie et al., 2008)

**Additional contextual data**
- Australia - Pacific labour mobility workshop, ANU, 2009

**Phase 2: 2010**

**Primary data collection**
- NZ - 39 interviews
  - Employers; RSE workers; govt officials;
  - industry representatives; pastoral care providers; community contacts
- Pacific - 55 interviews
  - Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
  - Govt officials; community contacts; RSE workers
- Australia - 11 informal discussions
  - Government officials, Approved Employers,
  - pastoral care providers

**Secondary data**
- DoL monthly ATR data
- DoL RSE online survey 2010
- World Bank surveys (Rohorua et al., 2009; McKenzie and Gibson, 2010)

**Additional contextual data**
- NZ - Horticulture NZ RSE conference 2010
- NZ - SPP workshop 2010
- Australia - PSWPS conference 2010

**Phase 3: 2011**

**Primary data collection**
- NZ - productivity data obtained from 9 RSEs, 2011

**Secondary data**
- Independent evaluation, RSE worker training programme
- DoL monthly ATR data
- DoL RSE online survey 2011
- World Bank surveys (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011)

**Additional contextual data**
- Australia - PSWPS conference 2011, 2012
- Tonga - World Bank PAILS Forum, 2011
6.5 Sources of secondary data

The RSE policy has been subjected to considerable scrutiny and evaluation by government, industry and international agencies since its introduction in 2007. Five major sources of secondary data are reviewed in this section, drawing primarily on information provided by the Department of Labour, and the World Bank.

6.5.1 The Department of Labour’s monitoring and evaluation programme

Continuous monitoring and evaluation are core components of the RSE policy, and the Department’s evaluation programme has involved several strands:

1) An independent evaluation of the first two years of the RSE scheme conducted in 2009 (DoL, 2010a);

2) An annual, online survey of RSE and non-RSE employers that has operated since 2008;

3) An independent evaluation of the NZAID-funded financial literacy and numeracy training programme for RSE workers conducted in late 2010 (Roorda, 2011); and

4) A forthcoming independent, mid-term evaluation of the Strengthening Pacific Partnerships (SPP) programme to be completed in 2013.

Published and unpublished reports from the evaluation exercises have been drawn on repeatedly in the thesis as they provide valuable information on various aspects of the scheme. The researcher formed part of the team responsible for the independent evaluation of the first two years of the RSE, and was responsible for interviews with Pacific respondents in the five kick-start states. A series of unpublished reports were written by the researcher, amalgamating information gathered during fieldwork in the Pacific for her own use and as part of her contribution to the evaluation. Some sections of these reports have been quoted verbatim in the final evaluation report (DoL, 2010a), and where the same material has been used in the thesis it has been kept in its original form.
An independent research company, Research New Zealand, has been contracted by the Department of Labour to conduct an annual online survey (2008-2012)\(^\text{91}\) to monitor the performance of the scheme by comparing the experiences of RSEs with employers who have not made use of the scheme to obtain their seasonal labour. The surveys include feedback by RSEs and other employers on recruitment of seasonal workers, pastoral care, perceptions of seasonal workers’ performance and short-term impacts and benefits for employers participating in the RSE programme (Research New Zealand, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). Table 6.1 shows the number of respondents and response rates for each of the four years, and findings from the online surveys are drawn on predominantly in Chapter 7.

Table 6.1: Department of Labour’s online surveys of New Zealand H/V employers, response rates, 2008-2011

Source: Research New Zealand online survey results, 2008-2011

The final two strands of the monitoring and evaluation programme relate to smaller projects that operate within the RSE system. The SPP programme (discussed in Chapter 8) and the NZAID-funded financial literacy and numeracy project (see Chapter 9) provide assistance in specific, targeted areas. While the thesis does not discuss the evaluations of these two projects in detail, reference is made to some of their findings in the relevant chapters.

\(^{91}\) While the online survey has been conducted for the past five years, the 2012 report was not released at the time of thesis submission. As a result, the survey data referred to in the thesis only covers the period 2008 to 2011.
6.5.2 The World Bank RSE and PSWPS surveys

In conjunction with the Department’s evaluation programme, the World Bank, in association with researchers at the University of Waikato, have conducted a prospective multi-year evaluation of the RSE scheme in Tonga and Vanuatu using “a matched difference-in-differences approach” (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010, p.7). This involved “conducting a baseline survey of households which would participate in the RSE before the workers left, along with surveys of non-participating households” (separated into households that had a member who applied for the scheme but was not selected, and those households that did not apply) (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010, p.7). These same households were then re-interviewed six, 12 and 24 months later, to see how household outcomes changed over time due to participation in the RSE (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010).

Surveying commenced in October 2007 with approximately 450 households in both Tonga and Vanuatu, and the surveys were designed to assess the short-term development impacts of participation in the RSE on individuals, households and communities (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010). Appendix 7 (Tables 7.1 and 7.2) provides some basic information on the surveys, including the numbers and distribution of households involved, and Figure 6.2 shows the location of the fieldwork sites. In addition to the household surveys a short survey was also carried out with community leaders in the villages from which RSE households were drawn (J. Gibson et al., 2008; McKenzie et al., 2008).

The RSE policy does not involve specific quotas for each of the kick-start states. This meant the survey teams were not able to know, in advance, how many workers from Vanuatu and Tonga would be selected to participate, or when individual employers would recruit them. As a result, the researchers adopted a rolling sampling methodology, adding to the samples as they received information on when, where and who RSEs were recruiting (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010).
In Tonga the survey had near national coverage, covering the islands of Tongatapu (where the capital Nuku’alofa is located), Vava’u and ‘Eua (Figure 6.2). These three islands “account for 90 percent of Tonga’s population and 92 percent of RSE workers in the first year” (J. Gibson et al., 2008, p.191). In Vanuatu, the isolated nature of many communities, and the high transport costs, meant the World Bank team were unable to survey all islands. The researchers limited the evaluation to three islands: Efate (where the capital Port Vila is situated), Tanna and Ambrym, where most of the early recruiting for the RSE took place (McKenzie et al., 2008; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010).

The RSE surveys focussed on household-level impacts including: impacts on income and expenditure, diet, food production, health, impacts on dwelling improvements and durable assets, children’s education, and business development and ownership. Broader community-level impacts were also assessed (Rohorua et al., 2009; J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2010).
The World Bank also conducted a smaller evaluation project assessing the initial development impacts of the Australian PSWPS. Basic information on the surveys is provided in Appendix 7 (Tables 7.3 to 7.5) and the fieldwork sites in Tonga and Kiribati are illustrated in Figure 6.2 (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). Survey data was collected in several phases.\(^{92}\) Two rounds of interviews were conducted in Australia with Pacific Seasonal Workers (PSWs) from Tonga, Vanuatu and Kiribati. Two rounds of survey data were also collected in Tonga. In the first round a total of 127 households were interviewed. Twenty-seven PSWPS households were selected from villages across Tonga, and in each village a household with a PSWPS applicant was also identified, along with two or three other households in the village to act as comparison groups. In the second round 125 of the initial 127 households were re-interviewed, plus 148 additional households to reflect the expansion of the PSWPS.\(^ {93}\)

The sample population in Kiribati was slightly different, due to the small number of I-Kiribati workers who had been recruited under the PSWPS (11 workers) by the time the survey was fielded. A total of 120 households were selected from across three islands (Tarawa, Abaiang and Abemama), and the sample included: 11 households with PSWPS workers, seven households with RSE workers, 18 households with individuals employed as seafarers, and 84 non-migrant households from the same communities.

The World Bank PSWPS surveys examined the process of selection into the scheme, as well as attempting to “indirectly estimate the impact on participating households by using data collected on incomes earned abroad, costs born by workers, remittances and savings sent back, and analysis of the RSE program to get a sense of the opportunity cost of participation (what workers would have earned at home had they not gone abroad)” (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011, p.7).

Reports published as part of the World Bank’s evaluation project have provided an essential source of data for the thesis, and Chapter 10 makes considerable reference to the World Bank’s survey findings.

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\(^{92}\) See J. Gibson and McKenzie (2011) for a detailed description of the sampling methodology.

\(^{93}\) The sample size expanded by more than the growth in number of PSWPS workers recruited, given the design of selecting 2-3 comparison group households per household with a member participating in the PSWPS (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011, p.6).
6.5.3 Administrative and demographic data

Two other sources of data have been used extensively. The first is the monthly Agreement to Recruit (ATR) data held by the Department of Labour that details the number of workers approved and recruited by each RSE employer and by region. The second is demographic data on RSE workers supplied by the labour ministries and national statistical agencies in Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga.\(^{94}\)

The ATR data, which provides the basis for much of the contextual information in Chapter 7, allows for longitudinal analysis of the operation of the RSE policy at the national, regional and local scales. Data have been collated to provide information on the annual number of RSE workers recruited across New Zealand; the regional recruitment patterns that reflect variations in the crops produced, the timing of the peak harvest periods, and fluctuations in domestic labour market conditions; and the recruitment patterns of individual employers. Additional demographic data on the number of RSE workers approved each year by nationality, age and gender is drawn on in Chapters 8 and 9.

The administrative and demographic data analysed in this research has formed an essential component of the examination of the RSE, and is presented throughout the remaining chapters using simple descriptive quantitative methods, including tabulation, graphs and distribution maps.

6.5.4 Documentary research

Extensive documentary research was required to establish the global (Chapter 2), regional (Chapter 3) and local (Chapter 4) contexts surrounding the introduction of the RSE. This literature is returned to repeatedly in the remainder of the thesis to ensure conclusions reached during data analysis are considered in light of the relevant literature on various aspects of managed circular migration and seasonal employment.

\(^{94}\) Although the thesis makes reference to the operation of the RSE policy over the first five years, secondary data provided by the Department of Labour and demographic data from labour ministries in participating island countries was only available for the period July 2007 – June 2011.
CHAPTER 6: Research methods and design

Because this research has occurred concurrently with the execution of the RSE policy over the first five seasons, information has not always been readily and publicly available. Government and industry stakeholders have also, at times, felt there were certain aspects of the scheme that were of a sensitive nature and not easily discussed. It was important to build trust with key respondents in order to gain information, and several government and industry informants were spoken to numerous times – not just during formal interviews but also regularly in an informal manner - to help build these relationships.

As a result of this process, over a period of five years a wealth of material has been supplied to the researcher. In some instances unpublished material has been provided that cannot be cited. However this material has offered valuable contextual information on different elements of the programme and the way relationships between various stakeholders have evolved. A number of documents relating to the development and implementation of the RSE policy were accessed via Official Information requests. In addition to the use of published and unpublished reports, information on specific aspects of the RSE was gathered from press material, newspaper articles, and email correspondence with government officials, academics working on issues of labour mobility in the Pacific region, industry representatives and RSE employers.

As part of the documentary research, the global and regional literatures on the social impacts of short-term migration for employment on individuals, families and communities was reviewed in a report for NZAID (Bedford C. et al., 2009). This report focused explicitly on the Pacific region, and material written up as part of the NZAID contract is used in its original form in the thesis.
6.5.5 The Australian PSWPS

The Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS) is not examined in detail in the thesis. However, literature spanning academic, industry and government publications\(^\text{95}\) has provided relevant information on the domestic issues facing Australia's horticultural industry and the demand for seasonal labour, as well as the country's foreign policy objectives in the Pacific region.

It has been important to monitor the development of the Australian scheme for several reasons. First, the advent of both seasonal work schemes within a relatively short timeframe (the RSE commenced in April 2007 and the PSWPS in February 2009) emphasises the common challenges facing New Zealand and Australia as they seek to alleviate domestic labour shortages, while also responding to Pacific leaders' requests to provide employment opportunities for low-skilled Pacific labour. The schemes were not designed in isolation. The PSWPS was modelled closely on the RSE and together they form part of a much broader, coordinated approach taken by the New Zealand and Australian governments towards addressing regional issues, contributing towards the economic development of Pacific states, and maintaining political stability within the region.\(^\text{96}\)

Second, although the RSE and PSWPS were designed with similar objectives in mind, the Australian scheme has not experienced the same level of engagement from horticultural growers (see Hay and Howes, 2012 for a recent review of the PSWPS). The differences in the New Zealand and Australian experiences to date illustrate the importance of context when trying to implement similar programmes in different settings, and the challenges this presents for policymakers (Sanderson, 2000; Pawson, 2006).


\(^{96}\) See Bedford et al., 2007; Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 2009a, 2009b; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 2010; MFAT, 2010; Smith and McMullan, 2010; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2011; Bedford and Hugo, 2012, Hugo and Bedford, 2013.
Finally, despite the pilot scheme’s modest beginnings, the Seasonal Worker Program (SWP), announced late in 2011 to follow on from the pilot, has the potential to become a much larger programme.\footnote{The Seasonal Worker Program, implemented in July 2012, is open to workers from Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and East Timor. In addition to horticultural employment, a small-scale, three year trial of seasonal labour mobility arrangements is being undertaken with cotton and cane growers, aquaculture ventures and accommodation providers in the tourism industry. Of the 12,000 visas, 10,400 will be allocated to horticulture, and the remaining 1,600 are available for the pilot projects (Kovacic, 2012; Roddam, 2012).} This is due in part to the wider range of sectors Pacific Seasonal Workers (PSWs) may be employed in (cotton and cane, aquaculture and accommodation), and partly because of the much larger Australian economy. In turn, this may have unforeseen impacts on the longer-term operation of the RSE, and may also influence the development of future TLMPs in both countries (for example in aged care, Hugo, 2009c). As a consequence, the operation of the Australian programme is of continued relevance to an examination of the RSE policy, and is referred to in the latter chapters of the thesis.

6.6 Primary data

The main method for primary data collection was in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 70 key informants, and an additional 56 respondents identified via snowball sampling, over a period of 18 months in 2009 and 2010. Collecting this material required fieldwork in the five kick-start states as well as seven regions in New Zealand. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 detail the number and type of interview respondents in New Zealand and each Pacific country,\footnote{The total number of interviews in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 is greater than 126 because some respondents were interviewed twice and are included in the totals for both phases of the fieldwork.} while Figure 6.3 identifies the fieldwork sites.

A small number of discussions (n= 11) were also held in Robinvale, Victoria and at the annual PSWPS conference (2010-2012), with various respondents involved in the Australian pilot scheme. Robinvale is included on the map of fieldwork sites, however discussions with Australian respondents were of an informal nature and are not included in the total number of semi-structured interviews. The Australian fieldwork is briefly described in section 6.5.5.
### Table 6.2: Interviews in New Zealand, 2009-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Phase One</th>
<th>Phase Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Aug 09</td>
<td>Sep 09-Aug 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay of Plenty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawke's Bay</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson/Tasman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waikato</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Kiribati</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry representatives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoral care providers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community contacts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NZ interviews</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.3: Pacific interviews, 2009-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Phase One</th>
<th>Phase Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Aug 09</td>
<td>Sep 09-Jun 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community contacts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSE workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community contacts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSE workers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community contacts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSE workers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community contacts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSE workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community contacts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSE workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total interviews in kick-start states</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6.3 Map of fieldwork locations

Interviews with several government officials regarding Tuvalu’s participation in the RSE scheme were held in Suva, Fiji, so Fiji has been included in the map.

Source: Map compiled by Max Oulton, cartographer, Geography, Tourism and Environmental Planning, University of Waikato, Hamilton

In addition to the material gathered during interviews, in 2011 data was obtained from nine RSEs on the gross weekly wages, over a 10-week period, of small groups of their RSE workers, as well as their New Zealand permanent and casual employees. This information was used to assess the productivity of their RSE workers over successive seasons and, where the data were provided, to compare this to the performance of their New Zealand employees. Analysis of the wages data allowed for an objective assessment of the purported productivity gains for RSEs that are attributed to the use of Pacific RSE workers, and complemented the more qualitative information collected during interviews. Individual reports analysing the wages data were sent back to several RSEs for their records.
6.6.1 Participant selection strategy

The aim of interviews in New Zealand and the kick-start states was to develop a clear understanding of how the RSE operates in practice, what aspects of the policy work well and what areas need some improvement. In order to cover these relatively broad objectives, and to reflect the changing nature and complexity of the scheme, it was necessary to interview widely across the various participant groups, as shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.

To identify respondents, non-probability purposive sampling was adopted beginning with several pre-defined groups. Purposive sampling “stresses the search for ‘information-rich cases’” (Baxter and Eyles, 1997, p.513). The process is iterative “in that it is usually repeated as theoretical understanding develops” and the sample size is determined primarily by the need to involve as many experiences as possible (Pawson, 2006, p.85; Silverman, 2010). Participants identified via this strategy were key informants who were selected on the basis of their knowledge and expertise in areas relevant to the research, and who could provide insights into different aspects of the RSE (Patton, 2002; Creswell, 2003; Marshall and Rossman, 2006).

Snowball sampling was also used to identify additional respondents that were involved either directly or indirectly in the RSE. These included RSE workers, pastoral care and training providers, financial services providers, informal recruitment agents, community contacts and church leaders. Key informants and existing academic networks helped to identify these contacts and facilitated the initial introductions. This helped to break down barriers, and potential respondents seemed more willing to participate in the research if someone they knew had referred them (Streeton et al., 2004).

The disadvantage of purposive and snowball sampling is that neither can obtain a sample that is representative in statistical terms (Creswell, 2003). It was not, however, feasible due to time and resource constraints to take a random sample of all RSE worker households, or all New Zealand employers participating in the RSE to gain statistically representative groups of respondents. Moreover, Hugo (1975, p.372) argues that careful purposive sampling may be preferable to a randomly selected sample “that casts a spurious air of statistical respectability over the findings and yields little insight into the migration process”.

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In an effort to address the limitations of purposive sampling two strategies were adopted. The first was to aim for maximum variation on some key variables in terms of the range of research participants interviewed. The aim was not to generalise findings across all people or groups, but to look for information that highlighted variation while also identifying significant common patterns (Patton, 2002). In this context, a deliberate attempt was made to seek out some of the smaller, less well-represented groups in an effort to produce greater equity in the sample (Streeton et al., 2004).

The Department’s (2010a) two-year evaluation had targeted the largest RSEs, and these employers had also been the focus of academic research and media attention on the scheme (Apple and Pear Australia Ltd, 2008; Courtney, 2008a; Bailey, 2009; Ericsson, 2009). It was envisaged that the experiences of the smaller RSEs could be quite different to those of the large operations, and therefore their views needed to be represented in the research. It was only towards the end of the fieldwork in August 2010, that two of the most prominent RSEs were interviewed.

The second approach was to draw on secondary data from the Department’s annual online surveys of H/V employers and the World Bank’s surveys to determine whether the researcher’s findings were consistent with those obtained from statistically representative frames. Contact was maintained with the Department and the World Bank team throughout the field research period to ensure there were links between how data were being collected for this thesis and the strategies that were employed in the other studies. A process of continuous triangulation of findings made it possible for the researcher to adjust her purposive sample to ensure selection bias was minimised.

There were no incidences of refusal or non-response from interview respondents in New Zealand or the Pacific states, because the researcher operated through intermediaries (see below) who facilitated introductions and assisted with securing interviews. There were however some refusals from employers who were approached to provide data on the weekly earnings of their seasonal workers.

Sixteen employers were approached at the Horticulture New Zealand RSE conference in 2011 and nine provided data. Several employers who showed initial interest in participating
in the productivity study did not respond to the subsequent information request that was sent via email. Others responded to the email request but then found that the timeframe for providing the information did not suit. There were also a very small number of employers (n=2) who provided substantive material in a format that could not easily be used or compared to the data provided by other RSEs. This material was subsequently excluded from analysis of the productivity data. Table 6.4 summarises the employers approached to provide data and the reasons for non-response.

Table 6.4: RSEs approached for the productivity study, July 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>RSEs approached</th>
<th>RSEs responded</th>
<th>Reasons non-response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bay of Plenty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Crop destroyed Psa – 1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawke's Bay</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Too busy -- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson/Marlborough</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Too busy -- 1 Business sold -- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No reply -- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% response rate</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Psa is a bacterial disease destroying New Zealand’s golden kiwifruit. See Chapter 7.

6.6.2 The interview process

Interviews with key informants were primarily semi-structured and open-ended in nature. The interview guides, outlined in Appendix 8, consisted of a number of pre-determined themes to guide the general discussion and elicit information on respondents’ experiences of the RSE. The semi-structured format helped to ensure consistency of information, but was sufficiently open to allow the respondents to talk about what was of interest or importance to them, and to enable the interviewer to explore certain areas in more detail or open up new areas of inquiry (Patton, 2002; Silverman 2010).

Interviews lasted approximately one hour and they were not recorded. Extensive written notes were taken during and immediately after the interviews, including personal reflections on the fieldwork experience. The researcher, often in conjunction with a Pacific Island researcher or a male academic colleague, conducted all of the interviews. This ensured consistency was maintained throughout with respect to note taking and observations. At
the end of each interview, a debrief session was held to discuss the interview and to make sure what was deemed to be the most salient information had been captured.

It is acknowledged that by not recording the interviews the written records are interpretations of what was said, rather than a verbatim account of participants’ responses. However, the value of such an approach was the frank and honest nature of responses from participants. In many instances, turning on a tape recorder would have altered the dynamics of the interview and potentially made some interviewees reluctant to participate (Adler and Adler, 2002). Even without the use of a tape recorder, there were times when respondents asked for certain statements to be ‘off the record’, and for the researcher to cease taking notes. On many occasions interviews were also conducted in informal village settings and it was not possible to tape record. Verbal or written informed consent was gained from all participants before commencing with the interviews, and respondents were assured of anonymity.

6.6.3 Interviews in the Pacific

Over the course of the fieldwork, 120 interviews were conducted in the five kick-start states (Table 6.3). Each country was visited twice to conduct repeat interviews with key informants and to pursue new lines of inquiry that emerged as the research progressed. Research conducted in the kick-start states in mid-2009 was done in collaboration with the independent team responsible for the two-year evaluation of the RSE (DoL, 2010a). The researcher was tasked with interviewing government officials in the labour ministries of each Pacific country, and the team also included a Pacific Island researcher whose role was to interview returning RSE workers. The interview guides for the evaluation work were jointly developed by team members.

Conducting fieldwork in five countries with very different cultural and social contexts presented a number of challenges. As a young, white woman the researcher was generally in a disadvantaged position when trying to access participants, as not only was she an

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99 Interviews with government officials regarding Tuvalu’s participation in the RSE scheme included meetings with officials in Suva, Fiji.
100 Interviews focused on the utility of the facilitation measures provided by the Department of Labour to assist the kick-start states’ participation in the RSE, and some of the short-term outcomes for families and communities taking part in the scheme.
CHAPTER 6: Research methods and design

‘outsider’ of different ethnicity (M. Miles and Crush, 1993; S. Shah, 2004), but also an ‘unknown’ in terms of research ability and standing. The researcher had no prior experience of working in the Pacific and had little understanding of the different environments she was going into.

The nature of the fieldwork and data collected in the kick-start states were influenced by several factors. Gate keeping played a role in terms of gaining access to participants, while power relations were more evident during the interview process itself, as the researcher’s age, gender and other outward appearances potentially affected how respondents reacted during interviews (M. Miles and Crush, 1993; Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Ryen, 2002; S. Shah, 2004; Sands et al. 2007). While language was not a barrier when speaking to government officials and other key informants, at times it presented a barrier when trying to interview RSE workers with limited English.

To overcome these challenges, two main strategies were adopted. First, the fieldwork was conducted in consultation with the Department of Labour. Staff in the Department’s RSE Strategic Management Unit provided support throughout the research, facilitating introductions to contacts in the five Pacific countries. Prior to each trip to the kick-start states a Department official emailed staff in the relevant government agencies informing them of the researcher’s upcoming visit and the nature and purpose of the work.

The major strength of this approach was that it granted access to senior government officials and legitimised the research. While the link to a government agency may have influenced the nature of the data collected (in terms of participants’ responses), the benefits of working in association with the Department and the access it gave to respondents far outweighed this limitation. The link to the Department gave the research traction in the eyes of both Pacific Island and New Zealand interview respondents.

On at least one trip to every kick-start state the researcher was also accompanied by a Pacific Island researcher from that particular country. The Pacific researchers provided invaluable support. They all held ‘insider’ status (S. Shah, 2004) as senior and trusted members of their cultural communities, and were able to use their networks to identify potential respondents, facilitate introductions, provide guidance on culturally appropriate
behaviour during interviews, and to assist with interpreting and translation during interviews with RSE workers.

This assistance was particularly valuable when gaining informed consent from participants. As Simons (2009, p.104) notes, “it is important not to assume that the same approach to informed consent suits all circumstances”, and it may be necessary to decide on what constitutes informed consent in different settings. While during interviews with New Zealand respondents it was appropriate to request written consent, during trips to the Pacific the researcher took the lead from the Pacific colleagues she was travelling with. In many instances it was deemed culturally inappropriate to ask senior government officials or community members to sign a consent form. As the purpose and nature of the research had already been explained to the respondent, either via introductory email or in conversation prior to the meeting, consent was evident in their agreement to be interviewed.

Twenty-nine interviews were conducted with RSE workers back in their home countries. These interviews generally took place in the village or at the workers’ homes, and the researcher was accompanied by a Pacific Islander to assist with interviewing and translation. Although the use of an interpreter can affect the way information is relayed (M. Miles and Crush, 1993; Ryen, 2002), the benefits of having such assistance outweighed any limitations. The Pacific researcher was able to explain clearly to the worker the nature and purpose of the interview in order to gain informed consent, and by speaking the workers’ native language create an environment in which the participant was more willing to respond (M. Miles and Crush, 1993; S. Shah, 2004). This provided the researcher with a more comprehensive understanding of the workers’ experiences than would have been possible if trying to interview in English.

Specific groups of workers were selected for interview on the basis of their connections to certain employers, or as a means of illustrating various aspects of the RSE scheme. In Vanuatu the workers came from a remote area in Big Bay on the island of Espiritu Santo, illustrating the distances and associated travel costs facing some workers wishing to participate in the scheme. The small group of Tongans interviewed in New Zealand were employed by a Maori-owned RSE enterprise, with an employment relationship built on specific family and cultural connections. The I-Kiribati RSE worker, interviewed on the outer
island of Abemama, had spent two seasons in New Zealand and was considered one of Kiribati’s RSE ‘success stories’. In Samoa several workers from the Falealili District were interviewed because they were recruited and managed by a senior matai (chief) who formed an integral part of the researcher’s Samoan case study. Although the experiences of the different groups cannot be considered representative of RSE workers as a whole, they provided important insights into the impacts of participation in the scheme for individuals, their families and communities.

Discussions with RSE workers adopted a conversational approach, rather than following a structured set of questions (Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Simmons, 2009). These conversations provided valuable information on different aspects of village life, and the context in which workers made decisions about participating in the RSE with respect to family and community obligations. The weakness of this approach is the subsequent difficulties in recording and analysing information when it does not necessarily follow a structured set of themes (Patton, 1990). To address this limitation an effort was made to ensure that despite the informal nature of discussions key questions and areas of importance were still discussed, and each new interview attempted to build on those already done (Patton, 1990). The conversational-type interviews were also supplementary to an extensive range of more structured key informant interviews, as well as information provided by the World Bank surveys.

Interviews conducted with RSE workers were on the whole successful. However there were some instances when cultural differences and language barriers limited the researcher’s ability to gain information. On a visit to Tuvalu an RSE worker was interviewed in the offices of the government department responsible for administering the RSE. This was one of the least successful interviews during the fieldwork. The respondent had limited English, and was reluctant to speak in Tuvaluan in the presence of government officials who were there to assist with interpreting. The interview was finished in a matter of minutes.

On reflection it was clear that asking the worker to be interviewed in the presence of government officials undermined the possibility of having an open discussion. It was decided after this experience that no meetings with RSE workers would be held in government offices. Rather interviews would be conducted in an informal setting, such as
the worker’s home or village, where the worker would feel empowered to speak more freely about his/her experiences.

All of the RSE workers were given a small financial gift of approximately NZ$20 in recognition of the time they had given to be interviewed. This is common practice in the Pacific as a gesture of appreciation, as well as to cement the personal connection with respondents.

6.6.4 Interviews in New Zealand

A total of 75 face-to-face interviews were held over the duration of the New Zealand fieldwork, as shown in Table 6.2. Twenty-four interviews, including seven repeat interviews, took place with 16 different employers during the course of 2009 and early 2010. Access to New Zealand employers came via the National Seasonal Labour Coordinator of Horticulture New Zealand, who identified growers to be interviewed and facilitated introductions via telephone and email.

The researcher endeavoured to get a cross section of employers in terms of type and scale of enterprise. Table 6.5 shows the location of each employer, the type of enterprise, the size of their total workforce, and the number of RSE workers recruited each season (2007-2011). Of the 16 employers interviewed, eight were large operations each recruiting over 500 RSE workers between July 2007 and June 2011. Three of the enterprises accounted for 27 percent of the total share of 25,237 workers recruited over the four seasons to June 2011, with one grower recruiting 12.5 percent of the total. The 16 employers together accounted for 44 percent of the 25,237 workers recruited between July 2007 and June 2011. The majority (75 percent) were located in the four main RSE regions (Hawke’s Bay, Bay of Plenty, Nelson/Tasman and Marlborough), with almost half of those interviewed (43 percent) located in the Hawke’s Bay, New Zealand’s largest RSE region.
## Table 6.5: RSE employers interviewed, size of total workforce and number of RSE workers, 2007-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Industry (H/V)</th>
<th>Size of enterprise (^1) (total workforce) (^2)</th>
<th>No. of RSE workers</th>
<th>Total 07/08-10/11</th>
<th>% of total RSE workers (^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>07/08 (^3)</td>
<td>08/09</td>
<td>09/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>H - veg</td>
<td>L - 120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - kiwi</td>
<td>L - 3000+</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawke’s Bay</td>
<td>H - pip</td>
<td>L - 2000+</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - pip</td>
<td>L - 700</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - veg, pip</td>
<td>L - 580+</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - pip</td>
<td>L - 300+</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - pip, stone fruit</td>
<td>L - 250+</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - pip</td>
<td>M - 35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - pip</td>
<td>M - 30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td>V - grapes</td>
<td>L - 110+</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - pip</td>
<td>L - 250+</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson/</td>
<td>H - pip</td>
<td>L - 150+</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasman</td>
<td>H - pip, berries</td>
<td>L - 150+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - pip, hops</td>
<td>L/M - 60+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago</td>
<td>H/V - pip, stone fruit, grapes</td>
<td>L - 550+</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waikato</td>
<td>H - pip</td>
<td>L - 110+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H - fruit trees</td>
<td>M - 20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>3,117</td>
<td>2,942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Size of enterprise: small (S) defined as fewer than 10 employees; medium-sized (M) 11-50 employees; large-medium (L/M) 51-100 employees; and large (L) 101 or more employees (DoL, 2010a)

\(^2\) Figures are based on total workforce at peak harvest/pruning period including both local and RSE workers

\(^3\) RSE year runs from 1 July – 30 June

\(^4\) Total number of RSE workers recruited to June 2011 was 25,237

Source: ATR returns, RSE Unit, Department of Labour, June 2011
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Table 6.6 shows the countries employers have recruited from within and outside the Pacific. The majority (69 percent) recruit from one or two countries, while one employer has recruited from seven countries. Those interviewed recruited workers predominantly from Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu and Kiribati (due to Kiribati’s inclusion in the SPP project in 2009 – see Chapter 8). Appendix 9 provides more detailed information on individual employers regarding their recruitment methods, pastoral care and accommodation arrangements, and the links being established with particular communities in the islands.

Table 6.6: Interviewed employers’ sources of RSE labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source country</th>
<th>Number of employers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KSS and Solomon Is</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the information obtained from the 16 RSEs during interviews, material was gathered during participation in the annual Horticulture New Zealand RSE conferences in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Over 80 RSEs from across the country participate in the conference each year, including 13 of the RSEs interviewed, and the conferences have played a major role in uniting the H/V industries and their support for the scheme. The conferences are designed as an open forum for discussion between employers, with some input from government departments and private sector agencies. Many of the issues identified during individual interviews were raised and debated at the conferences as industry-wide concerns.

A small number of interviews (n= 25) were conducted with RSE workers in New Zealand. The majority were held with a group of 12 Tongans employed by a Maori-owned RSE enterprise. The workers were interviewed at their place of accommodation either after work or in the weekend. The interviews were relatively informal, and were organised and run with the assistance of a Pacific Island researcher. Information obtained during these discussions was
supported by findings in the Department’s (2010a) evaluation report regarding workers’ experiences of living and working in New Zealand.

6.6.5 Fieldwork in Australia

In June 2010 the researcher accompanied a Tongan and an I-Kiribati colleague to Robinvale, Victoria to survey a group of 31 Tongan and I-Kiribati workers for the World Bank’s PSWPS evaluation. During the trip informal discussions were held with two Approved Employers overseeing workers during the 2009/10 season. The discussions followed a similar line of inquiry to interviews with RSEs in New Zealand and focused on: recruitment and selection of workers, pastoral care arrangements, the role of the PSWPS in their business operation, some of the benefits and challenges of taking part in the pilot scheme, and plans for the future.

Attendance at the annual PSWPS conferences in 2010, 2011 and 2012 provided further opportunities to speak with a range of stakeholders involved in the Australian scheme,\(^{101}\) and material was gathered on the operation of the PSWPS to supplement the information obtained in Robinvale. Table 6.7 summarises the main respondents spoken to during the Australian fieldwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved employers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (World Bank officials, academics, pastoral care providers)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.7 Data analysis

Data was collected and analysed in three successive stages between 2009 and 2012, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. The research and analysis adopted an iterative approach, with the results of each stage used to determine the starting point for the next phase. Every stage adopted a similar framework of triangulating data from multiple sources, and the researcher

\(^{101}\) The PSWPS conferences bring together all of the major government, industry and community stakeholder groups involved in the Australian programme, as well as academics working on aspects of seasonal labour mobility.
continually went “back and forth” between empirical observations and theory in order to expand both the understanding of theory and the phenomena being observed (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.555).

Data triangulation was the key analytical tool adopted during the research (Denzin, 1978; Jick, 1979; McKendrick, 1999; Brewer and Hunter, 2006). By using multiple methods and sources it is envisaged that different kinds of data will capture different things, while at the same time consistency and convergence in the overall patterns increases the researcher’s confidence that “the research findings reflect reality rather than methodological error” (Brewer and Hunter, 2006, p.4). In this instance quantitative data was used to develop a broad overview of certain areas of the RSE scheme’s operation, as well as to explore aspects of worker productivity. Where appropriate, descriptive statistics were used to summarise data and to explore variability in productivity between groups of workers.

Qualitative data from in-depth interviews was used to develop a deeper understanding of the actions of individuals within the RSE system, and the nature of relationships between different individuals and participant groups that influence how different participants ‘experience’ the RSE scheme (Patton, 1990; Sanderson, 2000; Sayer, 2000). Jick (1979, p.609) argues that when drawing together the research findings into a coherent whole, the first-hand knowledge from qualitative data can be used to “enrich and brighten the portrait” generated from multiple sources of data, and “functions as the glue that cements the interpretation of multimethod results”.

Throughout the fieldwork the researcher wrote a series of country reports that drew together the interview material. Five of the original reports from the kick-start states fed directly into the Department’s (2010a) evaluation report and were structured to answer specific questions. These reports were then broadened to include information from interviews in New Zealand, as well as additional secondary data and contextual information which would be relevant in subsequent stages of analysis (M.B. Miles, 1979; Pratt, 1995; Patton, 2002).

As the major interview findings were drawn together, a form of progressive focusing was used to make sense of the data and to reduce interview and observational data to themes or
areas for further exploration (Pawson et al., 2005; Simons, 2009; Silverman, 2010). The researcher was able to identify gaps in the information already collected, and to determine where to focus attention during the latter stages of fieldwork. This process included obtaining the wages data from nine RSEs to explore some elements of worker productivity.

Material from the country reports and productivity reports was used in presentations at conferences in 2010, 2011 and 2012, where conference participants provided further feedback on the material presented. This type of multistage layering of data collation and analysis was seen as an important means of adding rigour to the research, which is discussed in the remainder of the chapter.

6.8 Establishing rigour in the research process

The term rigour describes procedures that enhance the scientific integrity and trustworthiness of the research findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Baxter and Eyles, 1997; Bradshaw and Stratford, 2010). In qualitative research, the criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability have become analogous to the traditional quantitative standards of validity, generalizability, reliability and objectivity (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Bryman, 2008).

Credibility relates to the degree to which the researcher has accurately reflected the phenomena being studied, and has done so in such a way that it is understandable and meaningful to participants and other audiences (Baxter and Eyles, 1997; Simons, 2009). Transferability denotes the degree to which research findings learned in one context can be applied to another (Malterud, 2001; Baxter, 2010). Dependability is primarily concerned with documenting the research context, and the “degree to which interpretation is made in a consistent manner” (Baxter and Eyles, 1997, p.517). Confirmability indicates the “degree to which findings are determined by the subjects (respondents) and conditions of the inquiry and not by the biases, motivations, interests or perspectives of the inquirer” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p.290; Bryman, 2008).

Careful research design is a key component to ensure rigour in qualitative research, and the following strategies were adopted to make certain the process was well managed and
appropriate checking procedures were in place during data collection and analysis (Gibbert et al., 2008; Bradshaw and Stratford, 2010).

### 6.8.1 Sampling techniques

The use of purposive and snowball sampling techniques allowed for a range of respondents from the main stakeholder groups to be interviewed. This ensured an adequate representation of the relevant population, given the time and resources available. From initial contacts that were provided by key informants, interviewing continued until a point of ‘saturation’ was reached where no new themes were emerging from the data (Sarantakos, 1993; Pawson, 2006). Repeat interviews were held with key informants, to clarify information already provided or to seek additional information, further enhancing the validity of the data.

### 6.8.2 Data triangulation

The triangulation of data sources and methods is considered a powerful technique for strengthening credibility (Denzin, 1978; Baxter and Eyles, 1997; McKendrick, 1999; Brewer and Hunter, 2006). Data triangulation has been used throughout the research to cross-check the relevance of issues, and to test out arguments from different angles in order “to generate and strengthen evidence in support of key claims” (Simons, 2009, p.129).

### 6.8.3 Peer debriefing

Peer debriefing is a useful strategy for enhancing the validity of the results, providing transparency to the research process, and ensuring the research findings have not been influenced by the biases of the researcher (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Gibbert et al., 2008). As Baxter and Eyles (1997, p.514) explain, “peer debriefing involves exposing data and interpretations to a respected colleague in order to point up possible sources of misinterpretation, and the ‘suppression’ of themes or voices that do not ‘fit’ the ‘storyline’”.

Peer debriefing sessions were held with academic colleagues, Pacific researchers who assisted with the fieldwork, Department of Labour officials and industry representatives. These meetings were of great benefit to the researcher, as she was able to discuss major
themes that were emerging from the fieldwork, clarify any issues and assumptions on her part, and propose and discuss alternative explanations. The meetings also acted as an informal feedback loop to policymakers in the Department of Labour.

6.8.4 The issue of transferability

A key criticism of the case study approach is its limited ability to generalise research findings from a specific case to other cases in a different context (Sarantakos, 1993; Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Easton, 2010). Yin (2003) argues however that it is inappropriate to think of case study research in terms of statistical generalization where inferences are made to a wider population. Case study research is intensive (Sayer, 2000), and concentrates on how processes work in a particular case, “what actors do in a case, why they behave the way they do, and what produces change both in actors and in the contexts in which they are located” (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2010, p.71; cf. Simmons, 2009).

In an effort to enhance the transferability of the research findings, the researcher is required to describe his/her study as completely as possible so that others can determine whether the findings can potentially be transferred to other contexts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Malterud, 2001; Gibbert et al., 2008). Chapters 2-4 of the thesis are used to describe in some depth the research context. Chapters 7-10 present a detailed account of the research findings. Through the ongoing process of data triangulation the researcher is confident that the patterns observed during fieldwork are reasonably representative of a larger group of RSE employers, workers and island-based communities.

6.8.5 Reflexivity: the researcher’s position in the study

In addition to ensuring the rigorous nature of the research, self-reflection regarding the researcher’s position in the study is deemed important (Baxter and Eyles, 1997; Mansvelt and Berg, 2010). The researcher’s social background and cultural assumptions influence what he/she chooses to study, the angle of investigation, the methods used, as well as the framing and communication of conclusions (Malterud, 2001; Eastmond, 2007; Bryman, 2008). Thus when conducting qualitative research, reflexivity requires the researcher to identify his/her values and assumptions at the outset (Creswell, 2003).
The multi-method approach used in this study reflects some of the researcher’s preconceptions. From the outset the researcher held the view that, due to her lack of knowledge on many aspects of the research topic, both qualitative and quantitative data had to be collected and analysed to ensure she had a basic grasp of the system she was trying to examine and explain. As an ‘outsider’ (S. Shah, 2004), with different cultural and social norms to many of the respondents, and with the ability to speak only one language, the researcher made no attempt to write an interpretive narrative – to document the ‘lived experience’ of those participating in the RSE programme (Pile, 1991; C. Ellis and Flaherty, 1992; M. Miles and Crush, 1993; Eastmond, 2007). The purpose of this research is to assess the operation of the policy, and to capture various dimensions of the scheme that enable it to function as it does and produce certain outcomes. To this end, the methods used reflect this aim.

Finally, while it was always the researcher’s intention to provide a broad overview of the RSE, fieldwork in seven different countries produced a very ‘big’ research topic. A vast array of information has been collated over the past five years that cannot be presented in the thesis due to word limit constraints. A decision was made early on to attempt a holistic examination of the RSE policy in relation to the win-win-win concept identified in the literature (GCIM, 2005; UN, 2006). As a result, the thesis does not portray the richness of detailed information captured on many aspects of the scheme, particularly the different island-based contexts in which the scheme operates, as well as the individual ‘stories’ of the RSEs interviewed. Appendix 9 attempts to summarise some of the material gathered on the 16 employers.

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the research methods used to study a specific example of a managed circular migration programme. The research has its genesis in a ‘theory’ put forward in the international literature that managed circular migration can deliver positive outcomes to migrants, origin and destination countries. The purpose of this research is to understand and explain how this might occur. The RSE policy provides the phenomenon of interest, and drawing on a critical realist ontology and case study design,
CHAPTER 6: Research methods and design

this research attempts to determine what causal mechanisms are at work, and what outcomes are being achieved.

The existence, and relevance, of different causal mechanisms was unknown at the outset of the research. Therefore it was necessary to examine multiple aspects of the operation of the RSE via the use of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The remaining chapters (7-10) break the RSE system down into its constituent parts, addressing a different series of participants and their relationships in each chapter, in an effort to make sense of how the policy operates as a single entity, and to identify some of the primary mechanisms that have, on the whole, enabled the policy to meet its stated objectives in the short-term.
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

7.1 Introduction

This chapter is the first of four that examine the extent to which New Zealand’s RSE policy has delivered the triple ‘wins’ that were anticipated from policies highlighted at the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (UN, 2006). Because the RSE policy is an initiative to support economic growth and productivity of the H/V industries, the first subsystem to be analysed centres on the employers and the relationships that underpin their engagement with the policy, as illustrated in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: The New Zealand employer subsystem

Source: Adapted from Department of Labour, 2010a, p.5

The employer subsystem is anchored in two key variables: the enterprise and its location and mix of crops on the one hand, and the seasonal labour force, both local and immigrant,
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

on the other. Maximisation of income is the common goal of employers/recruiters and seasonal employees, and productivity gains are a useful indicator of the achievement of this goal. In this chapter employer engagement is examined at the individual scale, via the Approval to Recruit (ATR) process, as well as at the regional level. Productivity gains are also assessed with reference to workers’ gross earnings where these relate directly to the volume of fruit picked or plants pruned.

The primary aim of this chapter is to determine whether the policy is improving labour supply and productivity in the H/V industries in light of some ongoing challenges for employers, as they contend with unexpected seasonal variations in crop production, a fluctuating domestic unemployment rate, and the high value of the New Zealand dollar. Information is drawn from a variety of sources: the Department’s monthly ATR data (July 2007 – June 2011); the Department’s annual online surveys of H/V employers (2008-2011); repeat interviews with 16 RSE employers,\(^{102}\) as well as government officials in the Department of Labour and Ministry of Social Development; and attendance at the annual Horticulture New Zealand RSE conferences (2010-2012).

7.2 Employers’ engagement with the RSE work policy

By the end of June 2011, the RSE had completed its fourth full season of operation. During the four years 34,000 individual contracts for seasonal work had been approved.\(^{103}\) Three quarters of these approved contracts were processed and almost 26,500 limited purpose visas were issued to workers under the RSE policy. Over three-quarters of these were issued to Pacific Islanders. The bulk of the remaining 6,156 visas (23 percent) were allocated to workers from countries in Asia, predominantly from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Table 7.1 shows the number of worker contracts requested and subsequently approved on ATRs between 2007 and 2011, while Table 7.2 shows the sources of workers with approved visas for the same period.

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\(^{102}\) Refer to Appendix 9 for detailed information on the 16 RSE interview respondents.

\(^{103}\) Reference is made here to ‘numbers of contracts for work’ rather than ‘numbers of workers’ per se for two reasons: there have been many workers recruited early in the scheme who have returned for subsequent seasons of work; and there are workers employed on more than one contract. This means both the number of visas approved (26,445) and the numbers arriving in New Zealand (25,237) are significantly lower than the 34,000 individual contracts for work. Elsewhere in the chapter the convention followed on the Department’s ATRs of referring to numbers of ‘workers recruited’ rather than ‘contracts for work’ is adopted for ease of communication.
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

Table 7.1: Worker contracts approved on ATRs, July 2007-June 2011

NOTE: This figure/table/image has been removed to comply with copyright regulations. It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Table W1, work applications decided by financial year
www.immigration.govt.nz

7.2.1 The use of the RSE work policy by the H/V sectors

According to New Zealand’s Census of Agriculture in 2007 there were around 10,700 farms growing horticulture and viticulture crops (Statistics New Zealand, 2010). Close to 80 percent of these were small operations, under 20 ha in area. Almost half of the farms (4,965) were growing grapes, kiwifruit, pipfruit and stone fruit, and over 75 percent of these farms were under 20 ha. The majority of RSEs are growing pipfruit, stone fruit, grapes and
Kiwi. A small number are growing berries or specialising in citrus and different types of vegetables.

By June 2011 there were 131 registered RSEs – a mix of growers (the majority – approximately 80 percent of those registered) and contractors. Few vineyards recruit their own labour, most use contractors, as do some kiwifruit producers. The bulk of orchards, on the other hand, recruit their own workers. Orchards are often “long-established, family-owned businesses, that have a history of direct relationships with workers”, as well as a tradition of providing onsite accommodation and pastoral care for seasonal workers (DoL, 2010a, p.61). Rather than viewing labour as a commodity (like machines or fertilisers) that can be purchased from a labour contractor, orchardists prefer to select their own workers in an effort to build solid employment relationships and retain workers over successive seasons.

The 131 RSEs represent a small share of H/V operations – of the 2,016 farms that were 20 ha or more in 2007, RSEs are equivalent to 6.5 percent of the total; and of the 1,149 farms over 20 ha in area growing grapes, pip, stone and kiwifruit, the RSEs are equivalent to 11 percent of the total. Although it is acknowledged that individual RSEs do not necessarily equate to individual farms, the census data provides an approximation of the possible number of potential RSEs. A small number of RSEs have several farms counted as individual enterprises in the census, and there are grower cooperatives where an RSE contracts workers out to non-RSE orchards/vineyards (discussed below). However, the figure of 1,149 farms cited above is similar in size to the sample used in Research New Zealand’s 2008 online survey of 1,161 growers and wineries.104

Most growers within the H/V industry classification are not accessing any of their seasonal labour via the RSE scheme. The majority of H/V operations are small, and make use of other sources of casual labour. Nevertheless, the ‘reach’ of the RSE policy goes well beyond the 131 registered RSEs. The use of grower cooperatives, where a contractor registers for RSE status, has overall management of the workers, and contracts the workers out to different

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104 The final sample of 1,161 enterprises selected for the online survey in 2008 comprised all eligible RSEs and employers under the Transitional RSE policy at that time with known email address contact details (n=92 and n=81 respectively), and a randomly selected sample of n=988 growers and wineries with known email addresses (Research New Zealand, 2008). Refer to Appendix 6 for an explanation of the Transitional RSE policy.
farms, is becoming increasingly popular.\textsuperscript{105} This enables smaller growers, who may not have the financial resources to register for RSE status in their own right, to benefit from the use of Pacific labour.

In addition, some of the RSEs are large operations. Nineteen RSEs (including eight who were interviewed) had each recruited over 500 workers by the 2010/11 season, with one accounting for over 3,100 (12.5 percent) of the total number of workers recruited over four years. This releases other pools of seasonal labour for smaller enterprises, and takes some pressure off demand for labour within the industry as a whole. The RSE policy should not be seen as a niche labour market solution, servicing only a few H/V enterprises, but rather as an integral part of the sustainability of the H/V sectors across the regions, delivering industry-wide benefits.

\textbf{7.2.2 Registration and approval to recruit over the four seasons}

Table 7.3 shows the total number of registered RSEs each season, as well as the number of RSEs who were approved to recruit workers each year between 2007 and 2011. When the policy was launched in April 2007, employers’ engagement with the scheme was immediate. Within two months 12 employers were granted RSE status, and by the end of the first full financial year (1 July 2007 – 30 June 2008) 68 RSEs were registered. Of these, 65 obtained approval to recruit seasonal labour under the policy. The number of registered RSEs grew rapidly in the second financial year, with an additional 43 employers gaining RSE status. The third season saw a drop in new registrations (only 12), probably due to the recession. In 2010/11 these dropped further to eight giving a total of 131 registrations since April 2007. Despite an increase in the numbers gaining registration each financial year, the number of RSEs who applied to recruit has remained relatively static at just over 100 employers and contractors since 2008/09.

\textsuperscript{105} By 2011 grower cooperatives were already established in Central Otago, Marlborough and Hawke’s Bay, and similar co-ops are planned for the Waikato and Gisborne regions.
Table 7.3: Engagement with the RSE work policy, July 2007-June 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial year</th>
<th>Total RSEs registered</th>
<th>RSEs who applied for ATRs</th>
<th>RSEs approved to recruit</th>
<th>% approved to recruit out of applicants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ATR returns, RSE Unit, Department of Labour

Table 7.4 shows the frequency of recruiting by RSEs over the first four years. Just under three quarters of the 68 original RSEs have recruited for four successive seasons – the equivalent of 38 percent of the total 131 RSEs. A further 30 have recruited for three seasons, and close to 75 percent of the RSEs have recruited at least twice. Five RSEs have never had an application to recruit approved.\(^{106}\)

Table 7.4: Frequency of recruiting by approved RSEs, July 2007-June 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. years had ATRs approved</th>
<th>No. RSEs approved</th>
<th>% of total RSEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>131</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ATR returns, RSE Unit, Department of Labour

These figures illustrate two points. First, that once employers begin recruiting labour via the scheme, they tend to continue to seek RSE workers. Participation in the RSE is time and resource intensive for employers, particularly for those who have invested financially in the provision of onsite accommodation. Consequently, once employers have made the investment, they want to continue recruiting via the policy in order to realise the productivity gains that can be achieved with an experienced labour force of return workers.

\(^{106}\) ATR applications may be declined by the Department or withdrawn by the employer. Over the four-year period 83 ATRs have been declined or withdrawn. Growers/contractors often withdraw due to seasonal variations – unpredicted changes in the weather may result in employers needing fewer workers than originally planned.
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Second, once employers have gained RSE status the success rate with approval to recruit is high. As Table 7.3 illustrates, the percentage approved to recruit each year averaged 94 percent. This is further substantiated by Table 7.5, which shows that of the 1,301 ATRs processed between July 2007 and June 2011 close to 94 percent were approved.

Table 7.5: RSEs approved to recruit, June 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATRs processed</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATRs approved</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of approved recruits/ATR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total requested</td>
<td>34,036</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. recruited</td>
<td>25,237</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average recruited/ATR</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATRs with 100+ recruited</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATRs with under 10 recruited</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of clients (approved ATRs)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total with approved ATRs</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average tot recruited/RSE</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSE recruited 500+</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE recruited 100-499</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE recruited 50-99</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE recruited under 50</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ATR returns, RSE Unit, Department of Labour

The number of contract positions taken up under the 1,218 approved ATRs was 25,237 - 74 percent of the total approved for recruitment (Table 7.5). The great majority were for small numbers of workers, with an average of 21 workers per ATR, and almost 44 percent were for fewer than 10 workers. This may reflect employers’ ability to submit more than one ATR during the course of a season to bring in small groups of workers for different tasks and varying periods of employment.

Of the 126 RSEs approved to recruit over the four seasons, nearly 44 percent recruited fewer than 50 workers in total. Most are small operations recruiting relatively few workers. The average number of recruits per RSE was much higher (200) due to the impact of the 19 who have recruited more than 500 workers each. Between them these large RSEs accounted for 70 percent of the workers recruited during the four seasons to June 2011.
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The three biggest RSE operations (their owners or HR managers were interviewed)\(^{107}\) have recruited more than 1,500 workers each. These RSEs have a significant amount of influence when dealing with government agencies in both New Zealand and the participating island states. Island governments work particularly hard to meet the recruitment requests of the large employers, in recognition of the role they play in the provision of employment opportunities for their citizens, and the possible risk of employers switching to other countries if their demands are not met (discussed further in Chapter 8).

7.2.3 The distribution of RSE workers across New Zealand

Figure 7.2 provides an indication of the geographical distribution of RSE workers across the regions on the basis of ATR approvals. New Zealand is divided into 16 regions, and ATR approvals have now been issued in 14 of these. Hawke’s Bay, New Zealand’s largest pipfruit region, is the main RSE region with almost 37 percent of total ATRs approved between July 2007 and June 2011. This is more than twice the proportion for the second ranked region, the Bay of Plenty (18 percent), which is the major growing area for kiwifruit.\(^{108}\) Marlborough (15 percent), New Zealand’s dominant winegrowing region, and Nelson (14 percent), the second major pipfruit growing area, are the third and fourth ranked regions respectively in terms of percentages of total ATRs approved. The other regions, which produce a variety of crops, account for much smaller numbers of ATRs.\(^{109}\)

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\(^{107}\) Refer to Table 6.5 for details of the number of workers recruited by the three largest RSEs between 2007 and 2011, and Appendix 9 for information on the 16 RSEs interviewed.

\(^{108}\) The number of RSE workers requested by kiwifruit producers and contractors in the Bay of Plenty has, however, steadily declined from a total of almost 2,500 workers in 2007/08 (when many RSEs overestimated the number of workers required) down to a total of approximately 1,100 in 2011/12 (DoL ATR data, June 2012). Part of the decline can be attributed to the outbreak of the Psa disease late in 2010 that is destroying New Zealand’s golden kiwifruit – see section 7.4. By 2012/13 Marlborough and Nelson may exceed Bay of Plenty as destinations for RSE workers.

\(^{109}\) See Table 4.1 for a review of main crops grown in each region.
Figure 7.2: ATRs approved by region, July 2007 – June 2011

Source: ATR returns, RSE Unit, Department of Labour
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

Figure 7.3 shows the numbers of RSE workers recruited between July 2007 and June 2011 per region and the source countries (to June 2010)\(^{110}\) as a percentage of the totals for the five main regions. These figures demonstrate that the distribution of workers across the regions varies quite markedly both in total numbers as well as by nationality, with concentrations of certain groups in different areas. Samoan RSE workers are the largest group in Hawke’s Bay, making up 31 percent of the total 7,351 RSE workers recruited in the region to June 2010. The largest concentration of Tongans recruited between July 2007 and June 2010 was in Nelson, where they accounted for 57 percent of the 1,500 recruited there over the three seasons.

The largest numbers of Ni-Vanuatu work in Hawke’s Bay, Marlborough and the Bay of Plenty, however their greatest concentration is in Otago, where they comprised 90 percent of all RSE workers recruited in the region to June 2010. This is because the region’s largest RSE, a grower cooperative, only recruits from Vanuatu and by June 2010 had employed 93 percent of the Ni-Vanuatu in the region. In the Bay of Plenty the Ni-Vanuatu (1,666 workers) make up the biggest group from the Pacific but their numbers are exceeded marginally by workers from outside the Pacific region (1,677). This reflects the widespread use of labour contractors and employers who have pre-existing relationships with workers from countries in Asia, especially Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, through previous temporary work policies (see section 7.3).

The absolute numbers of Solomon Islanders, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan RSE workers are much smaller than the other Pacific groups and they too are concentrated in certain regions. Marlborough has the largest number of I-Kiribati (109 out of 170 to June 2010), while the Hawke’s Bay has the largest numbers of Solomon Islanders (544 out of 900) and Tuvaluans (198 out of 276 to June 2010).\(^{111}\)

\(^{110}\) ATR data on the countries workers have been recruited from was not available for the 2010/11 year.

\(^{111}\) ATR data sourced from the Department of Labour, 2010.
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Figure 7.3: RSE workers approved for recruitment, by region, July 2007-June 2011

Source: ATR returns, RSE Unit, Department of Labour
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

The concentrations of Samoans and Tongans are linked in part to existing networks of New Zealand-based Pacific Islanders.\textsuperscript{112} As noted in Chapter 5, migrant networks operating at the meso-level of a migration system can play a crucial role in facilitating migration, often lowering both the costs and risks of the migration process (Massey and Liang, 1989; Massey et al., 1998; de Haan and Rogaly, 2002; Hugo, 2008; Castles and Miller, 2009). Samoans dominate both the resident population of Pacific Islanders and the Pacific RSE workers in Hawke’s Bay, for example. In Nelson, Tongans are the dominant group in the resident population, and the three RSEs interviewed in that region all had Tongan workers, many recruited by local Tongan residents. In Auckland, which has the largest concentrations of most Pacific Island populations, employers interviewed had workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu.

In all cases the resident Pacific communities provided considerable support for their kin who were engaged in the RSE. The importance of social networks as a motivating factor for participation in seasonal work was also identified in the World Bank’s RSE and PSWPS surveys of Tongan households (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010; J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). Tongan RSE households were found to be “more connected to New Zealand, with adults in the household more likely to have previously been to New Zealand, and the household having more relatives in New Zealand” (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010, p.13). Similarly, the Tongan PSWPS households were more likely to have previously visited Australia, “and perhaps even done short-term paid work on farms while visiting” (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011, p.8).

7.3 Demand for RSE workers and pre-existing employment relationships

From the outset the RSE policy has had a strong Pacific focus. When it was implemented one of the Department’s primary objectives was to ensure at least 50 percent of the seasonal work opportunities went to eligible Pacific Forum countries over the first five years (DoL, 2007b). This relatively low initial target for the Pacific was in recognition of the fact that many growers already had pre-existing arrangements with seasonal workers from other

\textsuperscript{112} Of the six Pacific countries providing RSE labour, only Samoa and Tonga have been significant sources of migrants to New Zealand (see Chapter 3). Until the mid-2000s numbers of Solomon Islanders and Ni-Vanuatu coming to work in New Zealand were very small (Bedford and Hugo, 2012).
countries. In fact, close to 77 percent of the visas allocated between July 2007 and June 2011 have been for Pacific workers as shown in Table 7.2

The remaining 23 percent of the limited purpose visas issued to June 2011 have gone almost exclusively to workers from countries in Asia (99.9 percent of the visas issued to non-Pacific workers) (Table 7.2). Contractors working with vineyards and kiwifruit orchards and packhouses have been the primary recruiters of Asian labour, especially the large packhouse operations.

Four RSEs interviewed employed both Pacific and Asian workers (see Appendix 9). Two pack pipfruit, one packs kiwifruit and one packs vegetables and they have all utilised Asian labour under previous temporary work policies. These employers considered their Pacific and Asian workers to be suitable for different tasks — the Pacific workers were better suited to the heavier outside work on the orchard, while the Asian workers were more productive in the packhouse. To attain maximum productivity gains these employers felt a mix of labour was preferable, and none wanted to recruit solely from Asia or the Pacific.

The Department of Labour has closely monitored the use of non-Pacific labour by RSEs. A small but continual growth in the numbers recruited from outside the Pacific, illustrated in Table 7.6, is a source of contention for some employers. The main Asian countries outside the Pacific supplying labour - Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia - do not have Inter-Agency Understandings (IAUs) with the Department. Their governments are not required to undertake the same rigorous end-to-end processes (including recruitment and selection and pre-departure training) and they cannot be held accountable if there are problems with visa compliance. As a consequence, policies and practices relating to the RSE scheme are not consistent across participating countries.

The use of non-Pacific workers during the recession has been a particular concern to both the Department and RSEs. In recognition of rising domestic unemployment, Ministers agreed in September 2009 that the total number of RSE workers for 2009/10 should be lower than previous years, particularly in the regions where large numbers of seasonal workers were employed (DoL, 2010b). In accordance with this decision there was a 14 percent decline in the number of work visas issued for Pacific workers, and an overall drop
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

of 10 percent in approved applications for RSE workers (Table 7.6). At the same time, however, there was almost a three percent rise in the number of visas issued to non-Pacific workers.

Table 7.6: Visas approved, Pacific and non-Pacific countries, July 2007-June 2011

![NOTE:
This figure/table/image has been removed to comply with copyright regulations. It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.]

Source: Table W1, work applications decided by financial year, [www.immigration.govt.nz](http://www.immigration.govt.nz)

The most significant growth (79.5 percent) in recruitment of workers from outside the Pacific (mainly Thai) took place between the first and second seasons, as shown in Table 7.7. Viticulture contractors have been one of the primary users of Thai workers, and in 2008 a much larger than expected grape yield required additional labour for vineyard work (Anon, 2009, 2010a). Since 2008 however, a reduction in wine prices and a fall in the value of grapes and land has squeezed the margins for both growers and contractors supplying labour, and led to a drop in recruitment of contract vineyard workers.

Employers’ pre-existing recruitment arrangements in Asian source countries have been defined rather loosely as a link with the country the RSE recruits from, rather than a link with a specific group of workers.\(^{113}\) This meant employers were able to continue recruiting the

\(^{113}\) Similar to the assessment of ATRs for Pacific seasonal workers, INZ takes into account the number of workers requested from non-Pacific countries relative to the total number of workers employed by the employer. INZ also takes into account the length of the pre-existing relationship, and whether the employer has attempted to recruit from Pacific countries. See INZ operational manual, RSE Instructions, viewed 10 January 2012, [http://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual/i34412.htm](http://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual/i34412.htm).
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same number of workers each year, or potentially increasing the numbers recruited. Several employers interviewed were very opposed to the ongoing recruitment of seasonal workers from outside the Pacific, particularly at a time of high unemployment in New Zealand. Their argument was that employers should either use New Zealand labour, or assist Pacific states by recruiting their citizens.

Table 7.7: Visas approved, main non-Pacific countries, July 2007-June 2011

![Table 7.7](image)

NOTE:  
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It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Table W1, work applications decided by financial year,  
[www.immigration.govt.nz](http://www.immigration.govt.nz)

In 2010/11 the RSE Strategic Management Unit sought a legal ruling on the definition of pre-existing relationships. The view of the Department was that only the same workers, not the same number of workers, could be employed from these countries. A contractor challenged this interpretation but the Department’s position was upheld, and over the next few years there is likely to be a gradual attrition in the numbers recruited from non-Pacific countries. The National Director of the RSE Unit has made it clear that the Department has no intention of removing the Pacific preference inherent in the RSE policy (Fabling, pers. comm, June 2012).
7.4 The operation of the RSE policy in the regions: the importance of collaboration

Making the policy operational in the regions has been challenging for industry and government officials. Different complications have emerged each season, and have included: unpredictable seasonal weather variations that impact on crop production, the timing and duration of harvest, and the availability of work (and potential earnings) for RSE workers; New Zealand’s fluctuating unemployment rate which makes it difficult for employers to balance their requirements to employ New Zealanders while also predicting, in advance, how many RSE workers they need for the forthcoming season; the bacterial disease, Psa, discovered late in 2010 that is decimating New Zealand’s golden kiwifruit orchards (Anon, 2011, 2012a; Morton, 2012); and the continued high value of the New Zealand dollar relative to the US dollar and the Euro which significantly reduces growers’ returns from their exports (Basham, 2009a, 2009b; Watson, 2011).

By October 2011 it was estimated that returns for many of the major apple varieties would be below the cost of production (Watson, 2011). As a senior employee of New Zealand’s largest apple grower observed in May 2011, and again in April 2012, many of the productivity gains linked with the RSE (examined in sections 7.4 and 7.5) have been effectively neutralised by an unfavourable exchange rate for exporters. If this situation persists into 2013, there may be a reduction in the number of seasonal workers recruited from the Pacific, especially by small growers, in order to keep costs down.

Collaboration between government officials, industry representatives and employers has been critical to the scheme’s success to date and identified as a best practice element of the policy (Hugo, 2009b; DoL, 2010a). As Newland et al. (2008, p.22) observe: “programs...
meant to encourage circular migration are unlikely to work if they are too bureaucratic, too inflexible, too costly, or too slow to respond to employers’ needs and changing economic conditions.”

The partnership between government and industry occurs through a variety of channels including: the National Labour Governance Group;\(^{118}\) the Regional Labour Governance Groups;\(^{119}\) the Department of Labour’s RSE Relationship Managers (one overseeing the North Island and a second responsible for the South Island);\(^{120}\) the annual Horticulture New Zealand RSE conferences; and the development of a Master Contractors registration system to improve the workplace practices of labour contractors (S. Jones, 2008).\(^{121}\)

### 7.4.1 The ‘New Zealander first’ principle

One of the most difficult aspects of the policy for employers and government agencies to negotiate has been the New Zealander first principle — employers’ requirement to take on local workers if available. Employers must list any seasonal job vacancies with MSD’s regional branches, Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ), before lodging their ATR applications, and each application is individually labour market tested.

Labour market testing is a common feature of managed seasonal migration schemes (see Appendix 1) to ensure employers recruit foreign workers “only after having made every reasonable effort” to recruit local staff (Ruhs, 2006, p.19). Abella (2006, p.44) argues, however, that:

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\(^{118}\) The National H/V Labour Governance Group meets quarterly, and brings together representatives from government agencies, the Council of Trade Unions and industry to work cooperatively to meet industry labour demands, and to discuss operational issues concerning access to both seasonal and permanent labour, workplace quality and productivity.

\(^{119}\) By June 2012 there were 11 Regional Labour Governance Groups made up of industry and employer representatives, as well as Department of Labour and MSD officials.

\(^{120}\) The Department’s Relationship Managers work closely with Horticulture New Zealand, attend Regional Governance Group meetings and play a significant role in determining annual RSE worker allocations for each region. They also work directly with employers to ensure their seasonal labour needs are met each year, and assist with any pastoral care issues and dispute resolution.

\(^{121}\) Contractors’ poor work practices (and use of illegal labour) were a significant stimulus for the development of the RSE policy. In March 2008 the Government launched New Zealand Master Contractors Inc (NZMCI - [www.mastercontractors.co.nz](http://www.mastercontractors.co.nz)), to help improve industry standards (S. Jones, 2008). Once registered with NZMCI, members can get assistance to become registered as an RSE through an auditing process.
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

...one has to recognize that shortages may occur not because there are no workers available who can do the job, but because of mismatches. Mismatches in turn can be on account of regional factors (workers and jobs are in different places), lack of information, or preferences (workers will not accept certain jobs even at prevailing wages).

All RSEs interviewed stressed they would prefer to employ skilled New Zealanders if available, as they are less expensive than RSE workers and employers can potentially take them on as permanent staff if necessary. Those interviewed also ensured, whenever possible, that New Zealanders accounted for at least 50 percent of their peak seasonal labour force each season (see Table 6.5)\textsuperscript{122} and all employed a small number of New Zealanders as permanent, year-round employees.

The crucial problem is retention, particularly for short-term seasonal jobs paying the minimum wage of NZ$13.00 an hour.\textsuperscript{123} This is a perennial problem facing the H/V industries in many high-income countries, and is not unique to New Zealand.\textsuperscript{124} According to Horticulture New Zealand’s National Seasonal Labour Coordinator it takes at least three years for workers to become fully proficient at orchard work (J. Bedford, 2011). Many locals and other itinerant workers do not remain in the job for the time required to gain this level of proficiency, and employers continually need to invest in training new staff.

7.4.2 The regional allocation process and availability of local labour

Over the first three seasons, the Ministry of Social Development played a considerable role in determining RSE numbers across different regions. Regional Labour Governance Groups were established to forecast each region’s labour needs, and recommendations on regional RSE numbers were then forwarded to the Department of Labour to make the final decisions

\textsuperscript{122} The grower cooperative operating in Central Otago has been the main exception to the rule of employing more than 50 percent local staff during the peak harvest period, due to a regional unemployment rate that is consistently lower than the national average (see Figure 7.5). There are very few locals available for seasonal work, and while Central Otago receives large numbers of backpackers during both the summer and winter months, the H/V industries face competition from the tourism and hospitality sectors for this labour.

\textsuperscript{123} Since the implementation of the RSE work policy in 2007, the minimum wage rate has increased annually. The rates have been as follows: from 1 April 2007, $11.25/hour; 1 April 2008 $12:00/hour; 1 April 2009, $12.50/hour; 1 April 2010, $12.75/hour; 1 April 2011, $13.00/hour. See \url{http://www.dol.govt.nz/er/pay/minimumwage/previousminimum.asp}.

\textsuperscript{124} For example see: NHTWG, 2000; Verma, 2003; Abella, 2006; Brem, 2006; Gibb, 2006; Mares, 2006b; Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee 2006; World Bank, 2006b; Basok, 2007; Preibisch, 2007; Rogaly, 2008; P. Martin, 2009; Ball, 2010; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010; Hennebry, 2012.
on individual ATR allocations in consultation with MSD (DoL, 2010b). Figure 7.4 outlines the regional allocation process.

**Figure 7.4: The regional allocation process**

Source: Department of Labour, 2010b, p.5
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

The regional allocation process proved difficult as Governance Group members struggled to agree on RSE numbers, particularly in regions of high local unemployment. Figure 7.5 shows the percentage change in the regional unemployment rates\textsuperscript{125} across New Zealand between December 2007 and 2010, and the regional trends (absolute changes in the unemployment rate (blue) and variation from the national average (red)) in the graphs. Northland and Bay of Plenty experienced the greatest change in their regional unemployment rates which rose over 100 percent over the three-year period. Northland’s unemployment rate, which rose to 8.8 percent in December 2009, was almost 3 percent higher than the national average at that time. Gisborne/Hawke’s Bay’s regional unemployment rate stayed consistently higher than the national average, peaking at 8.3 percent in December 2009. Nelson/Marlborough and Otago, on the other hand, had smaller increases in their regional unemployment rates over the three-year period. In both regions their unemployment rates remained below the national average, with Nelson/Marlborough almost 2.5 percent below the national average in December 2009.

Although there is not a direct relationship between regional unemployment rates and the extent to which ATR numbers are approved or declined, regions which have traditionally had higher than average unemployment in their rural areas – Northland, Bay of Plenty, Gisborne and Hawke’s Bay (Figure 7.5) – were subjected to considerable scrutiny by MSD. In regions with few RSEs seeking only small numbers of workers, such as Gisborne and Waikato, there was a tendency by MSD to decline ATRs in 2009/10, following the onset of the GFC in late 2008 (The Treasury, 2010). Gisborne has had the lowest success rate (44 percent) of ATRs approved between 2007 and 2011 due to a total ban on RSE recruitment in the region for the 2009/10 season.

\textsuperscript{125} The unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of persons in the working age population who, during a particular week, were: without a paid job, available for work and actively sought work in the previous four weeks; or had no job to start within four weeks of the survey week. Respondents had to have worked less than one hour during the week to be classified as officially unemployed except for Unemployment Benefit recipients who may be employed part-time up to a specified income limit (Joint MSD/DOL quarterly regional labour market reports, \url{http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/lmr/archive/regional-jun-09/index.asp}).
Figure. 7.5: Changes in the regional unemployment rates, December 2007-2010

Source: ATR returns, RSE Unit, Department of Labour
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The 2009/10 season was especially challenging for H/V employers as rising local unemployment coincided with a late start to the season and lower crop yields compared to the previous year (Anon, 2010b). Growers also reported a rise in the number of backpackers ‘turning up at the gate’ seeking work, and articles in local papers reported a possible oversupply of labour (Anon, 2010c; Basham, 2010; McNeilly, 2010; Van Kempen, 2010). Employers struggled to manage the competing demands of giving priority to New Zealanders seeking work, keeping their RSE workforce and providing job opportunities to Working Holidaymakers.\(^{126}\) RSEs requiring only a small number of workers, especially, began carefully assessing the costs and benefits of participating in the RSE, as they faced the possibility their ATR numbers would be reduced or declined.

The tensions facing Governance Groups when trying to agree on regional RSE allocations were due to the differing objectives of the Groups’ members, as well as a difference of opinion over what constituted ‘available’ versus ‘suitable’ local labour. MSD staff, mandated with assisting the locally unemployed into paid work, were reportedly setting the percentage of jobseekers on the unemployment registers deemed ‘suitable’ for H/V work too high (DoL, 2010c).

Industry representatives and Department of Labour officials on the other hand, while supporting the objective of getting New Zealanders into work, needed a reliable means of ensuring employers’ crops would be harvested. The difficulties facing Governance Group members were compounded by diversity in the size of RSE operations, with some requiring fewer than 10 workers while others requested over 800 workers for the season. In addition there was the joint ATR process that allows employers to share RSE workers across different regions.\(^{127}^{128}\) Disputes around RSE allocations at the regional level had a flow-on effect,

\(^{126}\) Employers are not required to apply to the Department for use of Working Holidaymakers, and there are no restrictions on the total number of Working Holidaymakers allowed in any given region.

\(^{127}\) Employers wishing to share workers over joint ATRs must submit a joint application to the Department of Labour specifying the number of workers and periods of work on both ATRs. RSE workers enter into individual employment contracts with each employer. Costs of recruitment and transport of RSE workers to and from New Zealand are generally shared by the RSEs, and each employer is responsible for the workers’ pastoral care during the employment period.

\(^{128}\) The Canadian SAWP has a similar system to the joint ATR process. Canadian employers may request and obtain ‘transfer’ workers once they have completed their first term of employment, subject to approval from the relevant government authorities in Canada and the supply country prior to the movement of the worker (Verma, 2003).
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delaying the processing of individual ATRs and generating uncertainty for employers as they tried to plan for the forthcoming season (DoL, 2010c).

A key criticism directed towards contemporary TLMPs is that employers will always have a demand for migrant labour if it is more cost effective than employing locals or investing in other labour-saving technologies (P. Martin and Teitelbaum, 2001; Abella, 2006; Ruhs, 2009; Calvin and P. Martin, 2010). The argument is that labour demand for low-skilled manual workers is socially constructed by the poor wages, working conditions and social status accorded such jobs (Castles, 2006; Castles and Miller, 2009). If the employment conditions and wage rates of low-status jobs were improved, then locals may be encouraged to fill these jobs, and employers might also invest in other practices to improve workplace conditions and productivity (Castles, 2006; Ruhs, 2006, 2009; P. Martin, 2009).

In the New Zealand context, MSD and the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (CTU) have adopted this stance. Both agencies support the RSE scheme as a means of addressing immediate seasonal labour needs. However, in their view, too much focus is being placed on the RSE scheme as the solution for labour supply issues, rather than addressing the more fundamental, underlying factors that make it a relatively unappealing sector for New Zealanders to work in.

A critical issue for employers relates to the suitability of local workers to perform the required tasks. In the Canadian context, Verma (2003, p.ix) argues that there “is no shortage of low-skilled Canadian workers, but rather, the shortage is qualitative in that even unemployed Canadians refuse to work in agriculture because of its low wages and difficult working conditions.” Similarly in New Zealand’s case, it is not merely a matter of the locally unemployed being available for work, but also whether they are capable of performing the requisite tasks, are incentivised to work hard, and will commit to working for the season.

Difficulties attracting suitable local labour are a fundamental problem facing H/V producers in high-income countries as they compete in a global market that forces them to keep costs down.129 The argument that producers simply need to raise wages fails to recognise this

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global competitiveness (Mares, 2006b). With reference to the United States, Calvin and P. Martin (2010, p.2) point out that most U.S. citizens “who do choose seasonal work on crop farms are generally workers with few alternatives... [and] that farmers will mechanize or reduce production before wages get high enough to induce U.S. workers into the fields”.

7.4.3 Overcoming the difficulties with the regional allocation process

Since 2009 RSEs have worked hard to develop stronger working relationships with local Work and Income branches. This intensified engagement was particularly evident during 2008/09 and 2009/10 (DoL, 2010b). Nationwide there was a 52 percent increase in the number of H/V vacancies listed with WINZ, documented in Table 7.8, and in Northland and the Bay of Plenty, regions with higher than average rural unemployment, WINZ reported significant increases in the number of vacancies listed.

Table 7.8: Seasonal H/V vacancies listed with WINZ, 2008/09-2009/10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008/09</th>
<th>2009/10</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northland</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>780.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waikato</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay of Plenty</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>142.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisborne/Hawke’s Bay</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington/Wairarapa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manawatu</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>300.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson/Marlborough</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,034</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,095</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour, 2010b, p.9

Findings from the Department’s online survey provide further evidence of employers’ ongoing efforts to use local labour. As Table 7.9 demonstrates, RSEs make greater use than non-RSEs of all three sources of labour: seasonal workers from WINZ, seasonal workers from the local community (non-WINZ) and seasonal workers under other schemes (e.g Working Holidaymakers). RSEs’ use of WINZ workers is significantly higher than non-RSEs, and has increased between 2009 and 2011. Non-RSEs are not subjected to the same requirements to
employ seasonal staff from Work and Income, and the small scale of the majority of H/V operations means many make use of family and other contacts from the local community to meet their seasonal labour requirements.

Table 7.9: Percentage of RSEs and non-RSEs that have employed workers from other sources during last 12 months, 2009 and 2011

NOTE:
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Source: Research New Zealand online survey results, 2009 and 2011

The Department of Labour also tackled the regional allocation difficulties in two ways. The first was the introduction of the Strengthening Pacific Partnerships (SPP) pilot in the 2009/10 year (discussed in Chapter 8), which enabled employers to recruit small numbers of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan workers in addition to their ATR allocations. The second was the development of a seasonal labour demand and supply model in consultation with industry representatives and MSD. The model was designed to generate consistency in the allocation of ATRs across the regions, and to restore confidence in the Governance Groups’ abilities to work in collaboration with MSD (DoL, 2010c).

By mid-2010 the RSE was realigned to give the Regional Governance Groups greater control and flexibility over ATR allocations. MSD still provides information on the local labour market but their influence has been reduced. Regional allocations are also planned well in advance of the start of the season (DoL, 2010c, 2010d). The Governance Groups have proved successful at managing seasonal labour needs over subsequent seasons, and have largely allayed RSEs’ concerns over balancing the recruitment of both New Zealanders and RSE workers.
7.5 Measuring wins for employers: data from a Hawke’s Bay orchard

The productivity gains for employers achieved via the use of a reliable, experienced labour force is deemed a key benefit of seasonal work schemes (World Bank, 2006b; Basok, 2007; Rogaly, 2008; Preibisch, 2010). Consequently, there is considerable interest among stakeholders within New Zealand in gaining quantitative evidence of the productivity gains that can be attributed to the RSE.

This section draws on data made available by an orchard that recruits around 200 seasonal workers to assist a small permanent workforce during the apple harvest. Weekly earnings were provided on all seasonal workers employed during a 12-week period spanning the height of the picking season in 2011. Wages information was obtained for seasonal workers employed in 2009 and 2010 who returned to work with the employer in 2011 as well as for new recruits for the harvest season in that year. All workers were employed on piece rates, and the wages received for a week reflected much better the real productivity of workers than a standard hourly rate. The data collected allows a comparison between RSEs and New Zealanders who were first time employees on the orchard in 2011, as well as between returnees who had worked on the orchard during the previous two years. In addition comparisons could be made between New Zealand casual workers (students, other itinerant labour, and referrals from Work and Income) and backpackers.

Weekly earnings based on piece rates can be impacted by many factors, including the weather, the size and condition of the crop, and the physical fitness of the worker. However, two critical determinants that influence productivity are regular attendance at work, and experience in performing the task at hand. According to Horticulture New Zealand’s National Seasonal Labour Coordinator, “productivity gain is defined as achieving the same result with less input or achieving a better result with the same input” (J. Bedford, 2011, p. 43). As a worker’s experience in the job increases, their productivity also rises. Attendance relates to the amount of time workers spend on the job when work is available, and it includes turnover of staff as well as absenteeism (J. Bedford, 2011).

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130 Additional data has been provided by several orchards on the comparative weekly earnings of small groups of their RSE workers, to assess the productivity of different groups of RSE workers over time. The data, analysed in Appendix 10, shows similar trends to the data discussed here.
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Over the 12-week period, 89 RSE workers, 87 New Zealand workers, and 21 backpackers were employed on the orchard, illustrated in Table 7.10. There were almost equal numbers of new and return RSE workers. The grower has been employing a core of RSE workers from Samoa since the scheme began, starting with 35 workers in 2008/09 and increasing the number to almost 90 workers by 2010/11.

Table 7.10: Comparative earnings for worker groups on a Hawke’s Bay orchard, 12 weeks during harvest, February-May 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seasonal worker group</th>
<th>No. workers in group</th>
<th>Av. weeks worked</th>
<th>Av. $ 12 weeks(^1)</th>
<th>Coefficient of variation (%)(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Return workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE (Samoa)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8,798</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>6,641</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE (Samoa)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8,081</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7,141</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Casual workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backpackers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2,655</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Average (mean) gross earning for members in the group
\(^2\)A comparative measure of the extent of variation in earnings among group members

Source: Weekly gross wage returns, orchard, Hawke’s Bay

The Table shows the number of workers in each group, the average number of weeks worked, and the average total earnings for each group and the relevant co-efficient of variation\(^{131}\) for each group’s average earnings. The key findings can be summarised as follows:

1) The RSE workers consistently had higher attendance rates than the New Zealand workers or the backpackers;

2) The RSE return workers had the highest average income over the 12 weeks followed by the new RSE workers. The first-time New Zealanders had a lower average income than either of the RSE groups, but a slightly higher one than the returning New Zealanders. The casuals and backpackers had average incomes that were a third of those for the RSE workers; and

\(^{131}\) The coefficient of variation expresses in percentage terms the relationship between the mean and the standard deviation. Where the standard deviation is low in relation to the mean, the coefficient of variation is low; where the standard deviation is high in relation to the mean the coefficient is high. The coefficient expressed as a percentage is useful because it allows for direct comparison between groups with different values for their means and standard deviations.
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

3) The low coefficient of variation (8.3 percent) for the RSE return workers indicates that there was little variability among the 43 Samoan workers in their gross earnings during the 12-week harvest period. By comparison, the 32 New Zealanders, who were return workers, had significantly more variable earnings among members of the group (coefficient of variation, 35 percent). Both groups of casual workers had much lower average earnings and considerable variation between members of the two groups – their coefficients of variation (74 percent and 81 percent) were very high by comparison with the other groups.

Table 7.11 provides data on the comparative earnings for returning and new workers – both RSEs and New Zealand regulars. RSE workers who had been employed on the orchard for three seasons had the highest average gross earnings ($9,256), 22 percent higher than the earnings of any of the New Zealand groups. The groups with the most consistent performance, as measured by gross earnings, were the RSE returnees; the coefficients of variation for their wages aggregated over 12 weeks were much lower than those for the other groups.

Table 7.11: Comparative earnings for returning and new workers on a Hawke's Bay orchard, 12 weeks during harvest, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seasonal worker group</th>
<th>No. workers in group</th>
<th>Av. weeks worked</th>
<th>Av. $ 12 weeks</th>
<th>Coefficient of variation (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RSE workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee 3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9,256</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee 2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8,797</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First time</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8,081</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NZ workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee 3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6,732</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee 2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7,178</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First time</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7,141</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Weekly gross wage returns, orchard, Hawke’s Bay

With regard to the different groups of New Zealand regulars it can be seen from the Table that there was not such a consistent pattern in their average earnings compared with that for the RSE workers. The returnees who had worked for at least three seasons had the lowest average earnings ($6,732) over the 12 weeks and the highest coefficients of variation
(35 percent). Arguably, they were the least productive of the groups of regular New Zealand workers during the 2010/11 season on this particular orchard.

7.6 Measuring wins for employers: the importance of return workers

The productivity gains attributed to the RSE are further substantiated by the Department’s online survey results. Table 7.12 shows that over three seasons (2009-2011) Pacific RSE workers were rated consistently higher in three categories of performance than Working Holidaymakers and New Zealand seasonal workers. Moreover, in 2010 and 2011 a higher proportion of RSEs rated their workers in the top category (8-10) for dependability, enthusiasm and productivity – indicating that the benefits for employers have increased over successive seasons as their workers have become more experienced.

Productivity gains tend to emerge in the second season, as workers have shifted from a learning phase in the first year, to having acquired the requisite skills to perform various tasks on the orchard/vineyard (see Appendix 11). The increases in productivity tend to continue through into the third year of experience, with the greatest gains between seasons one and two, and smaller gains in subsequent seasons (Horticulture New Zealand, 2010). Workers back for their third or fourth season are not necessarily more productive than they were in the previous year, but this may be offset by the ongoing gains in the quality of fruit picked as workers become increasingly experienced. Furthermore, workers returning to New Zealand for several consecutive seasons have considerable knowledge of living and working in New Zealand and provide significant support and training to new workers (DoL, 2010a; Cameron, 2011).
## Table 7.12: RSEs’ perceptions of workers’ performance while working on the orchard/vineyard

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Source: Research New Zealand online survey results, 2009-2011
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

Access to a reliable, experienced workforce of RSE employees also has flow-on effects for employers. Results from the 2011 online survey indicate that 75 percent of RSE respondents have extended their areas under cultivation since the scheme began in 2007, and 77 percent say participation in the RSE scheme has been a factor in this decision. In contrast, only 36 percent of non-RSEs have expanded their areas under cultivation since 2007 (Research New Zealand, 2011). 132 Additionally, “employers who are expanding their businesses on the back of productivity gains from the RSE policy claim that more work will become available for domestic labour in roles that are better suited for New Zealand workers” (DoL, 2010a, p.16).

Although there is no dispute among employers regarding the value of using return workers over successive seasons, the necessity for a high return rate of experienced workers each year varies depending on the type of enterprise. H/V operations that produce one crop, such as apples or kiwifruit, can afford some turnover in workers as returnees quickly train up new recruits. Other employers who require their RSE workers to perform tasks over a range of crops (either within their own business operations, or via joint ATRs and grower cooperatives) that necessitate the development of a wide variety of skills, place considerable emphasis on keeping as many return workers as possible.

Return rates of RSE workers also vary by nationality. The Department’s (2012a) study of return migration of RSE workers, found that over the first three seasons (2007/08 – 2009/10) workers from Kiribati (36 percent) and Tuvalu (27 percent) had much lower return rates than those from larger Pacific nations such as Tonga (52 percent) and Vanuatu (51 percent). The lower return rates of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan workers may be attributed to the significant travel costs (see Chapter 10) facing workers from these two countries. Other factors that influence workers’ ability to return include their performance on the orchard/vineyard, the recruitment practices within each of the Pacific states (discussed in Chapter 8) and their individual circumstances, such as family and community obligations and the social costs of family separation (discussed in Chapter 10).

132 Total number of RSE respondents (n=81) and total number of non-RSE respondents (n= 137), Research New Zealand, 2011.
7.7 Increased productivity of workers: some tensions

The stability and security provided to employers each season through the use of experienced RSE workers, and the associated gains in productivity, deliver clear evidence of the benefits for employers participating in the scheme. Nonetheless, the improved efficiency of workers over consecutive seasons generates its own tensions. A negative feedback loop is beginning to emerge as employers rationalise the numbers recruited each season, due to their requirements for fewer, experienced workers to perform the same tasks. Although this creates stability within the RSE system by ensuring the number of workers requested each year remains inside the annual limit of 8,000 places, it also generates tension between different parties involved in the RSE policy. It reduces the opportunities for new workers to take part in the programme, and participating countries view this negatively as it limits the potential for economic benefits to be spread more widely among island communities.

As workers become more experienced, they expect higher incomes each season in recognition of their training and skills. These can come from better performance on piece rates (and this happens with repeated return) or higher wages if they are working on hourly rates. Workers are dissatisfied if they perceive the piece rates are the same or lower than in the previous year and if the hourly rate for their wages does not increase.133

The tension around earnings is exacerbated if there is a lot of down-time during the season when work is unavailable (generally due to bad weather). Unlike the Australian pilot scheme, which guaranteed a minimum of four months’ pay at an average of 38 hours per week irrespective of hours actually worked (Evans, 2010),134 the RSE policy guarantees only a minimum of 240 hours’ paid work. If tasks on the orchard/vineyard are completed more rapidly than expected, RSE workers may find they have additional time off. The costs of down-time on employees are significant, not just in forgone earnings, but also in the ongoing requirement to pay accommodation and living costs. Griffith (2007) makes a similar point with regard to the United States’ H-2A programme.

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133 Worker dissatisfaction with wage rates has also been noted in research on the Canadian SAWP (Verma, 2003).
134 With the introduction of the Seasonal Worker Program in July 2012 the period of guaranteed employment was reduced to 14 weeks at an average of 30 hours per week (Roddam, 2012).
CHAPTER 7: The RSE in New Zealand, maximising opportunities for employers?

Workers are also becoming more discerning about the type of jobs they do, and the work and living conditions they are prepared to accept. Consistency of practices between employers in conditions both on and off the orchard/vineyard is a concern, particularly for workers being shared across joint ATRs. Workers are beginning to assess the financial gains of some work over others (whether they prefer piece rates or hourly rates) as well as the physical demands of various types of work. There are groups of workers who have made the decision either to limit the amount of time spent in New Zealand to work with only one employer, or who are choosing not to return at all, because of dissatisfaction with the scheme (Bailey, 2009).

A number of employers are finding a reduction in work ethic among return workers in their third and fourth seasons. As workers achieve their targets for income generation over successive seasons, there may be a plateauing in the desire for higher earnings that drove some of their earlier performance. Several employers argued that behavioural issues (such as absenteeism and alcohol-related incidents) increased over the four seasons as workers became more accustomed to living and working in New Zealand. These employers are combating the reduction in workers’ productivity by reducing their reliance on return workers, and are instead taking on new recruits to widen the pool of people who have experience that they can draw on.

Overall RSEs are generally positive about the benefits of taking part in the programme. The Department’s online survey has asked RSEs over the four years (2008-2011) to consider the benefits gained in relation to the costs incurred from participating in the scheme. The results show that respondents have increasingly felt the benefits of participating in the RSE outweigh the costs (up from 68 percent in the 2008 survey to 93 percent in 2011). Industry’s argument is that the RSE scheme is not merely a useful tool to increase the productivity of individual H/V enterprises. It is an essential programme that ensures the ongoing viability and sustainability of New Zealand’s H/V sectors as well as its international competitiveness.

7.8 Conclusion

During the fourth (2010/11) season over 8,600 individual work contracts were approved, with just over 7,000 RSE workers actually recruited (Table 7.1). With an annual cap of 8,000
places there are limited prospects for any significant growth in numbers of RSE workers in the years ahead. Most RSEs now have well-established connections with certain island communities and are unlikely to switch to a different source country unless they encounter real difficulties with the recruitment process in the country(s) they currently use or with worker behaviour. Pacific countries are therefore competing for a finite number of seasonal jobs in a market that is unlikely to expand in the short and medium-term (Van Beek and Gibbs, 2010).

The competition between Pacific states for limited seasonal jobs will be exacerbated by the New Zealand government’s implementation of extensive welfare reforms in 2013 that will result in large numbers of local beneficiaries seeking part and full-time employment. These reforms, discussed in the concluding chapter, will place considerable pressure on RSEs to incorporate more New Zealanders into their seasonal labour force, and will in all likelihood lead to a reduction in the number of jobs available to workers from the Pacific. This will create real challenges for Pacific governments wishing to provide as many employment opportunities as possible to their citizens, and illustrates the difficulties of implementing a policy that contains such a diverse series of objectives and complex feedback loops.

The next chapter examines the evolving relationships between governments in New Zealand and in the Pacific Islands, underpinned by Inter-Agency Understandings (IAUs) that detail the facilitative arrangements in place to assist Pacific countries to participate in the RSE. These high-level relationships, which are identified as their own subsystem within the RSE model, make a crucial contribution to employers’ successful participation in the RSE by ensuring recruitment and selection processes run smoothly and employers are able to build sustainable relationships with different island countries.

Hugo (2009b, p.53) argues that best practice involves “a high level of cooperation between the governments of sending and receiving countries” on issues such as the conditions under which migrants are accepted into the receiving country, migrants’ rights and obligations (as well as those of the employer). In addition, there must be “a mechanism to allow regular discussions between the countries on migrant issues... [and] an open channel of communication between governments” (Hugo, 2009b, p.53). Chapter 8 examines

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135 Also see Abella, 2006; Newland, 2009b; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012.
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whether these best practices are evident in the RSE scheme, and whether participating governments are achieving the purported benefits attributed to a managed seasonal work programme.
CHAPTER 8: Managed circular labour migration: benefits for participating states?

8.1 Introduction

The RSE (and the Australian PSWPS that followed it) is one of a number of managed circular labour migration policies that have emerged in recent years, following the generally positive conclusions that were reached at the UN High-Level Dialogue and the subsequent GFMD meetings about the role of migration in development of origin communities. These programmes are clearly distinguished from the often-criticised guest worker schemes of the 1960s and 1970s in Europe and elsewhere (including New Zealand)\(^{136}\) on the basis that they specify “a development content in circular migration, or at least mutual benefits for countries of origin and destination” (Newland, 2009b, p.9). In order to deliver these benefits, a high level of cooperation between sending and receiving countries is required,\(^{137}\) especially in the areas of worker recruitment and conditions of employment, and Newland (2009a, p.19) observes, such schemes are “unusually demanding in administrative terms”.

Managed circular labour migration schemes operate within a framework of agreements between labour sending and receiving countries (GFMD Taskforce, 2007; ILO, 2010; IOM, 2010a). It is this framework of agreements governing the operation of the RSE, and the associated relationships between New Zealand and participating Pacific states, that are the subject of this chapter and are identified as a specific subsystem in Figure 8.1. Information is drawn primarily from key informant interviews with government officials and community leaders in the islands, as well as attendance at conferences and workshops organised by the Department of Labour, the Australian government and the World Bank.


\(^{137}\) See Abella, 2006; World Bank, 2006b; Hugo, 2009b; IOM, 2010a; Preibisch, 2010; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2010.
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**Figure 8.1: The government subsystem – high-level relationships**

Source: Adapted from Department of Labour, 2010a, p.5

The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the RSE’s operation in the islands, and to examine how the different approaches each country has taken to recruitment and selection of workers have influenced their ability to build sustainable employment relationships with New Zealand RSEs. The main questions this chapter seeks to address are:

1) Why have some Pacific countries been more successful at building relationships with New Zealand employers than others?

2) What are the primary factors inhibiting the engagement of Pacific states, and how are these being addressed?

3) Can the RSE, which is operating in very different island contexts, deliver positive outcomes to all participating Pacific states?

4) Is it feasible for a managed labour migration scheme to operate as ‘business as usual’ with minimal investment from government? Or do such schemes by necessity of their design require continual oversight and investment by sending and receiving countries?
8.2 Facilitative arrangements: the IAUs

Since the RSE policy’s implementation in 2007, the Department of Labour (with assistance from colleagues in MFAT)\(^\text{138}\) has worked closely with the labour ministries in the islands to ensure they have the administrative systems in place to implement and manage the RSE. The Inter-Agency Understandings (IAUs), which were signed in 2007 and subsequently reviewed in early 2009, set out the policy outcomes to be achieved by the Department of Labour and relevant government agencies in each Pacific state. The IAUs also detail the facilitative arrangements in place to support citizens of the various kick-start states (and the Solomon Islands since 2010) into seasonal work in New Zealand, and enable New Zealand employers to access Pacific workers quickly.

There is some variation in the specific measures for individual countries, primarily around recruitment and selection procedures, but the fundamental aspects of the IAUs are the same for all countries. They emphasise the productivity gains for New Zealand’s H/V industries, the circulation of migrant labour, that the ‘New Zealander first’ policy is honoured in practice by employers, and that RSE workers benefit financially and non-financially (through additional skills and knowledge) from their employment in New Zealand (DoL, 2007b). In the cases of Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands, an additional outcome is to try and ensure cost does not act as a barrier for their citizens to access seasonal employment in New Zealand (DoL, 2007b, 2007c, 2010e). Appendix 12 sets out the principles and desired outcomes contained in the IAUs.

As part of the Pacific facilitation measures the Department of Labour has provided funding and support to the equivalent government agency in the islands to assist with recruitment and selection. Each country has established a dedicated administrative unit to manage various processes involved in organising RSE workers for New Zealand, and the Pacific states’ responsibilities include (DoL, 2007b, 2010a):

1) Development of a work-ready pool (through community-based selection procedures and government screening of worker candidates);

\(^{138}\) MFAT officials assisted with the negotiation of the IAUs, and they have provided ongoing support to the Department through the New Zealand High Commissions in the kick-start countries (in Tuvalu’s case consular services are provided by the New Zealand High Commission in Fiji).
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2) Oversight (and licensing) of private recruitment agents; and
3) Pre-departure orientation for workers to help them adjust to New Zealand work and life.

Each Pacific country has taken a slightly different approach to recruitment and selection of workers (see section 8.3). Although the governments of the original kick-start states have all been required to maintain a government-managed work-ready pool of labour, employers’ use of the work-ready pool has varied. The key differences in recruitment and selection and the organisation of each country’s pre-departure training sessions are summarised in Appendix 13.139

Pre-departure briefings are an integral feature of managed TLMPs and have been recognised as “an important tool for the protection of migrant workers, especially when abroad” (Asis and Agunias, 2012, p.1)140. In particular, “these educational programmes provide basic information to departing migrant workers to ease their transition into the country of destination and empower them to maximize the benefits of their overseas employment” (Asis and Agunias, 2012, p.1). In the case of the RSE policy, the labour ministries in the participating Pacific states are responsible for the provision of the pre-departure briefings. The information covered in the briefings is consistent across the five countries (and now the Solomon Islands), and is detailed in Appendix 14.

Pacific countries expanded their pre-departure briefings in the second season, following workers’ experiences during 2007/08 and feedback from New Zealand employers that workers were not properly prepared for New Zealand conditions and work (Bailey, 2009; Ericsson, 2009; DoL, 2010a). The more detailed briefings (outlined in Appendix 14) place greater emphasis on wage rates, budgeting and remittance advice, as well as ensuring worker groups have strong leadership, and that group leaders are well supported. The sessions continue to be amended by the island countries and tailored to their specific needs, primarily to reflect the shifting nature of pastoral care issues over the seasons (discussed in

139 Also see the Department’s (2010a) evaluation report, reports published by the World Bank (J. Gibson et al., 2008; McKenzie et al. 2008), and analysis of Tuvalu’s engagement with the RSE policy (C. Bedford et al., 2010) for detail on specific recruitment arrangements in the different countries.
Chapter 9). The ILO (2012a, p.16) has reported that “overall, aspects of pre-departure services are working reasonably well” in Pacific countries participating in both the RSE and the PSWPS.

### 8.3 Recruitment and selection methods

Table 8.1 shows the number of RSE visas approved for each of the kick-start states and the Solomon Islands in the four years to June 2011. Vanuatu has remained the single largest supplier of labour, accounting for 9,010 or 44 percent of the 20,289 visas issued. Tonga (25 percent) and Samoa (22 percent) have been the second and third largest suppliers of labour respectively. The Solomon Islands (5 percent) is in fourth place despite not receiving the same support from the Department of labour with their facilitative arrangements until 2010. Kiribati (2 percent) and Tuvalu (1 percent) have supplied much smaller numbers of workers to New Zealand over the four seasons.

Table 8.1: Work applications approved each year for the kick-start states and the Solomon Islands, July 2007-June 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Tonga</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
<th>Kiribati</th>
<th>Tuvalu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Each country’s ability to secure a reasonable share of the 8,000 places available annually under the RSE has been influenced in part by their recruitment and selection methods. The key differences in their recruitment methods, and some of the unique challenges faced by the various countries, are discussed below.
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8.3.1 Vanuatu

Vanuatu’s involvement in the RSE pre-dated the other kick-start states, and from the outset the scheme received significant attention in Vanuatu. A small group of 45 Ni-Vanuatu workers participated in the World Bank pilot over the 2006/07 harvest period, and the success of the pilot, along with the Vanuatu Government’s decision to invest early in support arrangements for the RSE, have ensured that Vanuatu has remained the dominant source of seasonal labour in New Zealand.\(^{141}\)

The Commissioner of Labour, working alongside personnel in the New Zealand High Commission, encouraged the establishment of a recruitment market that gives employers several choices - to either recruit directly using contacts they have in Vanuatu, including licensed labour agents and workers from previous seasons, or to recruit through the Department of Labour’s Employment Services Unit (ESU) which assists in identifying sources of labour (McKenzie et al., 2008; Connell and Hammond, 2009).\(^{142}\)

Vanuatu is the only country to have introduced special legislation to regulate recruitment activities - to make it possible for Ni-Vanuatu to be employed overseas on seasonal employment contracts, and to license recruitment agents. The licensing and regulation of recruitment agents is considered best practice in bilateral TLMPs, as it helps to protect the rights of migrant workers (Abella, 2006; Agunias and Ruiz, 2007; Hugo, 2009b; ILO, 2010; P. Martin, 2010).

Vanuatu’s Seasonal Employment Act (no. 23 of 2007) came into effect on 4 February 2008, and the Act provides for extensive engagement by the Commissioner of Labour and his staff in the development, promotion and implementation of seasonal work opportunities for Ni-Vanuatu. It is a proactive response to work schemes such as the RSE and the PSWPS, and any future opportunities whereby Ni-Vanuatu have access to overseas employment.

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\(^{141}\) In Australia the situation is different. Their Pacific Seasonal Work Pilot Scheme has been dominated from the outset by Tongan workers (Kovacic, 2012), largely because of the role that Australia-resident Tongans living in fruit-growing regions have played in recruitment. Vanuatu has participated in the PSWPS since the onset of the pilot but by August 2012 only 113 Ni-Vanuatu workers had been recruited for seasonal work in Australia (Kovacic, 2012).

\(^{142}\) The Ministry of Internal Affairs is the lead Ministry overseeing the administration of the RSE in Vanuatu. The Department of Labour, led by the Commissioner, manages the ESU which is responsible for the operational administration and delivery of services (DoL, 2010).
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Despite licensing labour agents, employers’ use of agents dropped rapidly after the first season. In April 2008 there were 22 licensed RSE agents in Vanuatu (McKenzie et al., 2008). By the end of the second season, there were six licensed agents, and only one who was still actively recruiting workers. Some agents lacked the capital and resources to market their services effectively to employers in New Zealand, while others performed poorly. Over subsequent seasons the opportunity for agents to add value has become increasingly limited as employers establish connections with particular communities, and select workers via the village chiefs. By requiring the community to do the initial selection, the New Zealand employer is in effect able to shift responsibility back to the community to ensure only appropriate people are put forward for selection.

The Commissioner of Labour has voiced concerns over the drop in use of licensed agents and the limited control over direct recruitment by employers. In early 2011 a Tripartite Labour Advisory Council (comprising government officials, employers/labour agents and worker representatives) was established to review the seasonal employment legislation, as well as strengthen recruitment and selection procedures. Technical support for the creation of the advisory council was provided by the ILO as part of a broader, regional project on labour market governance in Pacific states (see section 8.5.2). Following the formation of the advisory council, late in 2012 the Vanuatu government announced its decision to begin developing a national labour migration policy framework to govern all aspects of sending migrant workers abroad. Vanuatu is the first country in the Pacific to have initiated the development of such a framework (Anon, 2012b).

In the longer-term, the six Provincial Councils and island chiefs may play a greater role in Vanuatu’s participation in the New Zealand and Australian seasonal work programmes. There is continued talk of devolving the operations and management of the RSE to the provincial level of government, to ensure the six provinces can oversee the recruitment and selection procedures, initiate local and regional development projects and to help them move towards greater economic self-sufficiency. As part of this process, it is envisaged one licensed labour agent will be assigned to each province.

If RSE processing were to be devolved to the provincial level, this would signal the Vanuatu government’s intention to provide seasonal work opportunities to poorer, rural residents...
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throughout the country. The ‘pro-poor’ dimension of the RSE that was recommended by the World Bank as a best practice feature of managed seasonal work schemes has not been the primary focus of those involved in selection and recruitment of Ni-Vanuatu workers (J. Gibson et al., 2008; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010; Petrou and Connell, 2012). Nevertheless, the RSE is an important source of waged income for Ni-Vanuatu - the 9,010 visas approved to June 2011 represent 13 percent of Vanuatu’s estimated population aged between 20-39 years as shown in Table 8.2 – and a priority for the Commissioner of Labour is to spread access to participation more widely among outer island communities.

Table 8.2: RSE workers as % of total population in 20-39 years age group by Pacific country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>RSE workers as % of total population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


8.3.2 Tonga and Samoa

Two key factors have contributed to Tonga’s successful engagement in the RSE to date: a high-level of government support, including heavy investment in marketing their workers to New Zealand employers; and a reputation among New Zealand employers for high productivity from Tongan workers. There is strong support for the RSE at all levels within the Tongan government, from the Prime Minister through to the local district and town officers who play a key role in the selection of new workers, and clear recognition that the RSE is already providing a significant source of employment to Tongan citizens, especially those living in the outer islands. The 5,160 visas approved to June 2011 are equivalent to almost 18 percent of the estimated population of 28,811 aged 20-39 years (Table 8.2).

Tonga is the only country to have taken an explicitly pro-poor approach to recruitment of RSE (and PSWPS) workers. From the outset there has been a deliberate attempt by the
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Tongan RSE administration to ensure workers are recruited from outer islands and rural areas, and that people who already have wage-earning jobs are not selected for work in New Zealand (or Australia). Pre-screening and selection takes place at the village and district level, and RSEs may select nominees from one district, in order to establish a connection with a specific community, or select candidates from across rural districts (DoL, 2009). Reports from a small community on the island of ‘Eua, substantiate the Ministry of Labour Commerce and Industry’s (MLCI’s) pro-poor approach, with village-level selection of workers focusing on providing opportunities to families in financial hardship (Rohorua pers. comm, 2012).

Similar to Tonga, there is strong commitment from the Samoan Government towards the RSE, and officials view the policy as a real opportunity. Although the 4,459 visas issued between 2007 and 2011 are equivalent to only 9 percent of the estimated population of 49,389 aged 20-39 years (Table 8.2) – a considerably lower per capita engagement than for countries such as Tonga and Vanuatu - the RSE scheme remains popular. The division responsible for administering the RSE, initially the Seasonal Worker Action Team (SWAT) and now the Seasonal Employment Unit (SEU), is located within the Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and an RSE Oversight Committee operated over the first four seasons to ensure the smooth operation of the policy from the Samoan end.

For some employers, the choice to recruit from Samoa and Tonga has been partly attributed to their prior experience of hiring Tongans and Samoans via previous work permit schemes plus the fact there are large New Zealand-based communities from these islands. The New Zealand government...

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143 For the first four seasons the administration of the RSE scheme in Tonga was handled by the Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industry (MLCI). In 2011, following national elections and restructuring within Tonga’s government, the RSE administration was shifted to the Ministry of Training, Employment, Youth and Sport (MOTeYS), and subsequently to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2012.
144 See J. Gibson et al., 2008; Rohorua et al., 2009; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010; J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011.
145 The community on ‘Eua is made up of three villages, and comprises about 30 households, eight of which sent RSE workers to New Zealand in 2007. By 2012 six of the original eight households continued to send an RSE worker each season. For the six men, 2012 was their fifth season in New Zealand. In 2011 four families in the community also sent a seasonal worker to Australia (Rohorua pers. comm, 2012).
146 The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the New Zealand–Samoa joint ministerial consultations in November 2009 emphasised the importance to Samoa of the RSE work policy, among other immigration policies, as a significant generator of remittance income.
147 The RSE Oversight Committee was disestablished in 2012. Samoa now has a network of agencies, known as Samoa INC, that oversee the operation of both the RSE and PSWPS schemes in Samoa. The network of agencies includes, among others, Immigration New Zealand, the Australian High Commission, the Ministry of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Ministry of Health, and a number of village elders.
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Zealand-based Tongan community (50,478 at the time of the 2006 census) and the Samoan community (131,103) are viewed as having both positive and negative influences on RSE workers while in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a, 2007b).148

The Samoan and Tongan governments both strongly encourage RSEs to recruit via their government-managed work-ready pools. In 2011 Samoa’s work-ready pool had over 2,000 candidates registered, and a key challenge for Samoa’s SEU has been to balance the increasing competition for limited places in the scheme. This has been exacerbated by two main shifts in employers’ demands over the four seasons.

RSEs have shifted to selecting groups of workers chosen by village chiefs/church organisations, rather than selecting individuals, as groups tend to have more cohesion and stronger leadership, which helps with the management of pastoral care. Employers have also moved to requesting that their work groups are predominantly made up of return workers, rather than new recruits, due to the productivity gains from well-trained, experienced workers.149 These changes by RSEs have reduced the opportunity for Samoans registered on the work-ready pool to secure employment in New Zealand, and will continue to limit the utility of the work-ready pool in subsequent seasons. This is an issue that cannot easily be resolved by the SEU, as the final decision on the majority of those who go to New Zealand lies with the employers, not with those responsible for administering the programme.

Direct recruitment by employers is not the favoured approach in either Samoa or Tonga, even though both countries allow it, and there have been some RSEs who have chosen to recruit directly, either through church or community affiliations. Local agents are not licensed. They act in an unofficial capacity – facilitating connections between employers and potential workers - rather than running recruitment ‘businesses’ as such. By the fourth season officials in both Samoa and Tonga had expressed concern at the lack of oversight and control over direct recruitment, and were looking at the possibility of legislation to oversee recruitment practices.

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148 See the Department’s (2010a) evaluation report for a discussion of this issue.
149 Employers’ increasing use of return workers is a common characteristic of managed seasonal work schemes (see Appendix 1). In Canada, for example, close to 80 percent of SAWP workers are nominated by their employers to return each year (Hennebry, 2012).
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8.3.3 The Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands government was officially engaged as the sixth kick-start state with the signing of an IAU in May 2010 (DoL, 2010e). Prior to this date the Solomons were not eligible for the same facilitative arrangements as the other kick-start states. However their successful engagement in the scheme (with 1,056 visas issued to June 2011 – Table 8.1) has been attributed mainly to the fact that a number of employers already had pre-existing recruitment relationships with the Solomon Islands prior to the introduction of the RSE policy. When the RSE was implemented, these employers simply realigned their existing recruitment arrangements with the new policy. The number of visas issued for Solomon Islanders almost doubled from 160 in 2007/08 to 330 in 2008/09, before stabilising at around 280 visas for seasons three and four.

The Solomon Islands now receives the same facilitative arrangements as the other kick-start states, as well as additional assistance via the SPP programme to get their administrative systems and processes in place (see section 8.5.1). Recruitment is done entirely through an agent-based system – there is no work-ready pool. At this stage the government has not implemented specific RSE-related legislation, but officials are keen to develop some framework legislation to manage temporary labour migration, and this may be given further impetus by their inclusion in the Australian seasonal work scheme in 2011.150

8.3.4 Kiribati and Tuvalu

Kiribati (319 visas) and Tuvalu (278 visas) have supplied much smaller numbers of workers to New Zealand. The 319 visas approved for l-Kiribati workers between 2007 and 2011 represent only one percent of Kiribati’s estimated population of 29,343 people aged 20-39 years – a significantly lower percentage than the other kick-start states (Table 8.2). Kiribati is also looking towards Australia for opportunities under their seasonal work scheme. However, as of 1 August 2012 only 52 l-Kiribati workers had participated in the Australian programme (Kovacic, 2012).

150 The Australian Prime Minister announced on 8 September 2011 that workers from Nauru, Samoa, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu would have the opportunity to participate in the final season of the pilot scheme (Prime Minister of Australia Press Office, 2011). These countries have also been included in the ongoing Seasonal Worker Program implemented in July 2012 (Kovacic, 2012).
Tuvalu is the smallest of the participating countries, and due to the small size of Tuvalu’s working-age population (4,600 people aged 15-49 years in June 2008) the RSE has the potential to provide a significant source of temporary waged employment (SPC, 2008). The 278 visas approved for Tuvaluan workers to June 2011 are the equivalent of 12.5 percent of Tuvalu’s estimated population of 2,216 people aged 20-39 years (Table 8.2). Notwithstanding this opportunity, there is little evidence to date that the potential the scheme offers is being maximised (C. Bedford et al., 2010).

A number of shared issues influenced Tuvalu and Kiribati’s ability to participate in the RSE in the early years of the scheme: the lack of a clear marketing strategy to promote their citizens to prospective New Zealand employers and an expectation the Department of Labour should promote workers on their behalf; government-controlled recruitment of workers via an island-based quota system that resulted in a lack of cohesion and poor leadership among worker groups; and problems with distance and the associated costs and logistical issues of getting workers to and from New Zealand.

Kiribati and Tuvalu both have legislation relating to recruitment of their citizens for employment offshore (Government of Kiribati, 1965; Government of Tuvalu, 1966). This legislation has covered the recruitment of several hundreds of seamen working for overseas shipping lines at any one time since the late 1960s (Borovnik, 2003) and, in the past, covered recruitment of workers from both countries in the phosphate mining industry on Nauru (see Chapter 3) (MacDonald, 1982; Munro and Bedford, 1990). Special legislation was not required in order to take advantage of the RSE policy.

Based on their long-standing employment arrangements, the Kiribati and Tuvalu governments chose to adopt an island-based quota system to recruit potential RSE candidates for the work-ready pool. The island councils in each country are given a quota, and then nominate workers on the basis of a series of pre-defined criteria. This system was put in place to ensure all parts of their respective countries had the opportunity to participate in the RSE, and the benefits of employment in New Zealand might be spread.
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During the 2007/08 season the Tuvaluan recruits were selected from the eight main islands, while in Kiribati the RSE workers came from 19 of the 21 inhabited islands.\(^{151}\)

The quota system did not, however, prove suitable for the small groups of workers selected for seasonal employment in the first season. The initial groups of recruits had little social cohesion - they were not in any way ‘bonded’ by particular community affiliations and social links. This resulted in problems with low worker productivity and pastoral care, and complaints from RSEs that workers were ill prepared for work and life in New Zealand, at a time when employers were still evaluating the qualities of labour from the different kick-start states.\(^{152}\)

Distance from New Zealand and the associated transport costs for workers has been another limiting factor. In an effort to encourage more RSEs to recruit from Kiribati and Tuvalu, a change was made to the RSE policy late in 2007. The policy amendment allowed Fiji to become the ‘local’ airport for picking up I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan labour under the cost-sharing agreement for international airfares. This in effect put the cost to the New Zealand employer of recruiting from Kiribati and Tuvalu on a par with the cost of recruiting from the other kick-start states. It has, however, increased the costs incurred by individual workers.

Dealing with this additional transport cost has proved more difficult than was envisaged at the time the concession was made and, despite reducing the travel costs for New Zealand employers, it did not result in a significant increase in demand for I-Kiribati or Tuvaluan workers until the introduction of the SPP programme in 2009 (see section 8.5.1). The lack of established relationships with New Zealand employers, the poor performance of workers from both countries over the first two seasons, combined with ongoing administrative issues, as well as inefficiency and delays in getting workers to New Zealand on time, damaged the reputation of Kiribati and Tuvalu as reliable sources of labour. Employers’ requests for workers from both countries remained low (Table 8.1).

\(^{151}\) There are eight permanently inhabited islands in Tuvalu. Twenty-one of Kiribati’s 33 low-lying islands are inhabited, dispersed across more than three million square kilometres of ocean. The only urban area of any size, south Tarawa, with a land area of 15.8 square kilometres, had a population of just over 50,000 (provisional estimate) at the time of their last census in November 2010 – just under 50 percent of the total population of 103,466 at that time (Corcoran pers. comm, 2011).

\(^{152}\) See media reports by Anon, 2008a; Courtney, 2008b; Van Wel, 2008a; and R. Young, 2008 for problems with I-Kiribati workers in the first year.
8.4 Administrative capacity and employers’ demands for Pacific labour

A common obstacle facing Pacific countries participating in the New Zealand and Australian schemes is their limited institutional capacity to respond to employers’ demands for workers (Pacific Cooperation Foundation, 2009; DoL, 2010f; 2010g, 2010h, 2010i, 2010j; World Bank, 2011b). As Hugo (2009b, p.69) notes in a review of best practices in managed TLMPs, “effective administration of a temporary labour migration programme requires both sending and receiving countries having the capacity to manage such programmes – committed, properly remunerated staff and the access to and training in the hardware and software of modern migration management”.

In each country the divisions responsible for overseeing seasonal employment abroad have only a small number of operational staff, and the success of each country’s participation to date has rested on the knowledge and experience of one or two key personnel. This presents two major challenges. First, the growing number of workers recruited from each country (especially Vanuatu, Tonga and Samoa) has placed increasing pressure on the small number of staff who are responsible not only for assisting employers with recruitment and selection, but also screening and processing RSE documentation, running pre-departure training, liaising with employers and pastoral care providers while work groups are in New Zealand, and keeping Ministers informed of the recruitment situation each season (DoL, 2010g, 2010h, 2010j). In Tonga’s case, the country has also been the largest provider of labour to the Australian seasonal work scheme, placing added pressure on the small number of staff overseeing seasonal labour administration.153

The pressure facing staff is often exacerbated by short lead-times from employers and tight timeframes in which to get workers’ visas approved before they fly to New Zealand and commence employment. Delays may occur with police and health checks, as well as visa processing by INZ. In Tuvalu’s case both the blood specimens for the medical tests and the

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153 By 1 August 2012 Tonga had sent 82 percent (1,316 out of a total 1,614) of all Pacific Seasonal Workers (PSWs) recruited since the pilot scheme’s introduction in early 2009 (Kovacic, 2012).
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completed RSE visa applications must be sent to Fiji for processing, which increases the costs facing individual workers, and further delays the turnaround time for applications.\(^\text{154}\)

The second, and perhaps more critical challenge, is one of staff turnover and the loss of institutional knowledge as experienced staff move on to employment elsewhere. There is the potential for gaps to arise while new staff familiarise themselves with RSE administration, and a risk of employers’ demands not being met. This, in turn, may damage an individual country’s reputation as a ‘good’ source of labour, and result in RSEs choosing to switch to other countries to source their workers (DoL, 2010h, 2010j). The kick-start states have all experienced staff turnover within their labour ministries, and at times this has negatively impacted on their ability to respond to employers’ demands. Kiribati and Tuvalu have the added problems of distance and cost, exacerbated by a lack of adequate transport infrastructure to ensure workers always get to New Zealand by the start date of their contracts (C. Bedford et al., 2010; DoL, 2010f, 2010i).

There is considerable competition between Pacific countries to supply labour to New Zealand RSEs, particularly between the three biggest suppliers of labour – Vanuatu, Tonga and Samoa. Fear of losing RSEs to another country, and the resulting loss of employment opportunities for their citizens, is a significant concern for Pacific governments (World Bank, 2011b). New Zealand employers are, however, relatively unapologetic in their decision to switch to other countries if necessary.\(^\text{155}\) This is particularly the case with very large export operations that employ sizeable numbers of RSE workers. Timeframes are tight during harvest and employers are not willing to fall behind with production due to problems with the recruitment of their RSE workers.

In 2011/12 employers continued to shift their sources of Pacific labour in response to changing pastoral care issues in New Zealand, and concerns with the operation of the RSE scheme from the island-end. Behavioural incidents in New Zealand (damage to property, petty crime, unwanted pregnancies), workers’ poor performance on the orchard/vineyard,

\(^{154}\) Delays in the processing of RSE visa applications may become an issue for almost all of the participating countries, due to changes in the visa processing system introduced in 2012. These changes are discussed in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

\(^{155}\) Similar findings have been noted in research on the Canadian SAWP, where employers can easily switch between countries to access labour (Verma, 2003; Preibisch, 2010; Hennebry, 2012; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012).
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as well as inefficiencies in administrative processes in the islands and delays in getting workers to New Zealand on time, have been cited as reasons by employers to cancel labour supply arrangements with particular countries.

Employers’ changing recruitment practices reinforce a fundamental point about the RSE policy - it is designed as an ‘employer-driven’ programme (DoL, 2010a). RSEs are therefore entitled to obtain workers from different countries if they choose to do so. If Pacific governments are to build long-standing relationships with New Zealand employers, they require efficient administrative systems to manage recruitment and selection, medical screenings, and visa processing, as well as facilities to assist workers with the financial costs of participating in the RSE.

8.5 Capacity building in the Pacific: a collaborative approach

Capacity building in sending countries is a core element of successfully managed TLMPs (Newland et al., 2008; Hugo, 2009b; ILO, 2010). The IOM (2010a, p.1) defines capacity building as: “the process of strengthening the knowledge, abilities, skills, resources, structures and processes that States and institutions need in order to achieve their goals effectively and sustainably and to adapt to change.”

A number of priority areas for capacity building within sending countries to manage contract worker mobility have been identified in the literature, including: providing better information to labour migrants about the destination country; more effective regulation of recruitment agents; vocational training to build migrant workers’ skills; reducing the costs of labour migration; facilitating remittance transfers; strengthening information management systems for collecting migration data; and planning for reintegration of return migrants (Hugo, 2009b; IOM, 2010a, 2010b; P. Martin, 2010; N. Shah, 2010; ILO, 2012a).

These areas of capacity building have also been identified with reference to Pacific states as they seek to manage the export of temporary labour.156 To assist Pacific countries, New

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Zealand and Australian government agencies as well as the World Bank and ILO have implemented a range of initiatives, a number of which are discussed below.

8.5.1 The Strengthening Pacific Partnerships (SPP) programme

To support Pacific countries taking part in the RSE scheme the Department of Labour has focused on two things: building relationships between RSEs and staff in the island labour ministries, and improving the island governments’ institutional arrangements. The Department has effectively operated as a ‘middle man’ – ensuring lines of communication remain open between island governments and New Zealand employers, and stepping in to address problems with the operation of the policy as they arise.

A timeline of the Department of Labour’s key activities is outlined in Appendix 15. The timeline stretches from the former Prime Minister’s initial announcement of the RSE policy in October 2006, through until June 2011, and details a wide range of activities including: regular trips by Department officials to the islands to assist with the facilitative arrangements; forums and workshops held in New Zealand with all key stakeholders to review operational aspects of the policy; domestic awareness raising campaigns in the islands; and secondments for staff from the island labour ministries to New Zealand to understand better employers’ needs and workers’ conditions both on and off the orchard.

The SPP programme, implemented in June 2009, has formed a core component of the Department’s activities (see Appendix 15). The project, funded by MFAT as part of New Zealand’s aid budget in the region, initially operated for two years (2009-2011) and focused on the provision of technical assistance by the Department to the kick-start states and the Solomon Islands. Different priority areas were identified for each country and specific project plans were implemented. The project plans are not discussed in detail, but technical assistance focused on the following broad categories: improving systems for data collection; developing operating guidelines to support recruitment and selection of workers; pre-departure training of RSE workers; and targeted communications and marketing training for Pacific officials (DoL, 2010f, 2010g, 2010h, 2010i, 2010j).
Kiribati and Tuvalu received additional assistance via the SPP to help build relationships with New Zealand employers. In 2009/10 the Department began undertaking facilitated recruitment drives - accompanying a small number of RSEs to both countries to assist with the recruitment of small groups of female workers and their pre-departure training. The success of these recruitment drives, and a strong push by the Department of Labour to increase the number of small groups of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan women employed in New Zealand, has led to additional RSEs becoming involved in subsequent seasons. RSEs do not receive a subsidy to encourage their participation in the project, however the SPP workers are recruited over and above employers’ full ATR allocations, which enables RSEs to have higher numbers of workers for the peak season.

A further five years’ government funding for the SPP (to the value of $4.25 million) was approved in mid-2011, in recognition of the ongoing importance of capacity building among Pacific states. The funding continues to be administered by MFAT as part of New Zealand’s regional aid budget, as the RSE is considered a tangible way of delivering economic aid to Pacific communities. The SPP programme administers assistance in the areas outlined above, as well as providing additional training for Pacific officials and RSE workers, particularly in the area of RSE worker health (discussed in Chapter 9); support for the return and reintegration of RSE workers (see Chapter 10); and opportunities for horticulture skills development in the islands (see Chapters 9 and 10) (DoL, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d).

8.5.2 Additional capacity building initiatives: The World Bank, ILO and AusAID

The World Bank, International Labour Organization (ILO) and Australia’s aid agency (AusAID) are also involved in several capacity building initiatives across the Pacific. The World Bank’s focus is on improving Pacific states’ management and service delivery systems so that they can participate not only in offshore seasonal work, but also in other forms of temporary labour migration should the opportunities arise in future. AusAID has a number of projects to assist Pacific governments with their labour sending arrangements for the Australian Seasonal Worker Program (Kaleb, 2012). These projects, which are similar in nature to the technical assistance provided under the SPP programme, have been designed to complement other agencies’ activities (Kaleb, 2012).

157 The recruitment drives involved only the recruitment of female workers because the Department felt there would potentially be fewer pastoral care issues with small groups of women.
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The ILO is involved in a joint region-wide project with AusAID on improving labour market governance in Pacific states. The project aims to build governments’ capacity to ratify and implement the ILO’s core governance Conventions, to help protect workers’ rights and to provide more equitable working conditions (AusAID, 2012; ILO, 2012b). In addition the ILO is implementing a return and reintegration services programme for RSE and PSWPS workers. The programme, which will be completed in 2014, will result in at least 500 workers receiving reintegration services to support their in-country economic development (ILO, 2011b).

The initiatives described above illustrate the importance of collaboration in successful management of temporary migration schemes. Although the different government and international agencies are not necessarily working together directly, the activities of each agency have been undertaken to support and enhance the work of others, with the primary aim of building Pacific states’ capacity to engage in offshore temporary labour migration.

8.6 Conclusion: Is the policy delivering positive outcomes to Pacific states?

The preceding discussion on the importance of capacity building and cooperation between sending and receiving countries emphasises two key points. The first is that bilateral frameworks that govern the management of seasonal work schemes are resource intensive for all participating governments (Verma, 2003; Newland 2009a; Preibisch, 2007; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012). The RSE work policy is no different, primarily because it has a varied range of objectives and targeted outcomes.

At the time the RSE policy was introduced there was an expectation that after three years, and following the two-year independent evaluation, the scheme might have been ‘business as usual’ for the lead agencies in New Zealand and the participating Pacific states. It was envisaged the scheme would operate as an employer-driven recruitment market, where relationships were established between employers and the island countries without requiring intervention or assistance from the Department of Labour. The scheme has not, however, reached this stage, and a report by the World Bank (2006b, p.124) cautions that a scheme “in which market forces alone are allowed to determine outcomes, and in which no effort is
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made to ameliorate the social impacts and risks of labour migration, may produce an outcome in which the social costs remain very high”.

The RSE remains fragile in the islands. This is due in part to the thin layer of administrative staff in all states that are responsible for managing the complex mix of relationships between different stakeholders (government officials, New Zealand employers, recruitment agents, RSE workers, their families and communities) involved in the scheme. The institutional knowledge that staff must possess in order to oversee the scheme successfully in the islands, and ensure it meets its stated objectives, is not easily transferable, and the loss of experienced personnel can impact significantly on Pacific countries’ ability to manage operational aspects of the programme. Kiribati and Tuvalu have faced additional problems with distance and the associated transport costs, and Tuvalu in particular has struggled to build sustainable employment relationships with RSEs. Without the large-scale assistance provided by the Department of Labour it is unlikely Tuvalu would have remained in the scheme, and the country’s future engagement is at risk if the RSE becomes ‘business as usual’.

The Strengthening Pacific Partnerships initiative, in association with capacity building projects by the World Bank, ILO and AusAID, provide clear evidence of the need for ongoing monitoring of and intervention in the management of temporary labour migration policies in the islands. These initiatives carry a significant overhead cost for the government agencies involved. As a result, when assessing the benefits of the scheme for participating countries this overhead needs to be accepted as an integral operational cost. It is not a cost that will reduce in the short-term.

The second point is that there is nothing ‘fixed’ about the RSE policy, other than the fact the scheme has bipartisan support across the major parties in government and is strongly supported by employers, industry bodies, and participating Pacific countries. Different tensions continue to emerge - within island governments, between employers, their workers, and local communities in New Zealand and the islands - as participants negotiate their employment relationships over successive seasons, and respond to changing demands and expectations. It will be essential for the Department of Labour to adjust and respond to these tensions if the scheme’s three key stakeholders are to benefit longer-term.
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On balance the government agencies in New Zealand and the island states consider the scheme has been a success. However, participation in the RSE has not been without some significant costs to the various government agencies involved, as well as to employers and workers. The complex nature of the RSE also means the gains for one subsystem of relationships or stakeholders is contingent on the contributions of other participant groups. Pacific governments’ successful participation in the RSE is largely attributed to the Department of Labour’s continual investment in building the capabilities of each island country to take part in the scheme, and the Department’s central role in facilitating and maintaining relationships between Pacific governments and RSE employers.

In turn, the benefits for the RSE worker and island community subsystems are heavily influenced by the procedures and processes Pacific governments have in place to manage recruitment and selection, to monitor pastoral care while workers are in New Zealand, to assist workers with the financial costs of participating in offshore seasonal work and to facilitate the transfer of earnings back to island communities, and to encourage the investment of workers’ skills and earnings in productive activities at home. In the next two chapters, the gains for those who have engaged in the scheme either directly as seasonal workers, or indirectly as family members and communities, are examined.
CHAPTER 9: RSE workers in New Zealand: benefits beyond wages?

9.1 Introduction

Arguably the most contested dimension of managed circular migration programmes relates to the way one assesses the gains for the workers. The range of issues that need to be considered when reviewing the contributions such programmes make to the wellbeing and development of workers, their families and communities is more diverse than when assessing whether employers have made productivity gains, or whether government agencies overseeing the scheme have achieved their goals.

Whether the migration experience is positive or negative is inextricably linked to the protection of individual migrants’ welfare (Hugo 2009b; ILO, 2010). As Chappell and Glennie (2009, p.9) point out, “the migrant’s experiences during the process of movement and the conditions they experience are impacts upon development – their own development – and matter in and of themselves”.

Much of the academic literature relating to seasonal labour migrants has focused on two areas: workers’ experiences in the destination country; and workers’ earnings and their remittances as the key benefit for families and communities back home. Clearly these dimensions are highly interrelated but for ease of analysis the discussion is presented in the following two chapters. The key components of the RSE systems model that are addressed in this chapter are summarised in Figure 9.1, and relate primarily to the relationships between RSE workers, their employers and local New Zealand communities.
Chapter 9 examines various aspects of RSE workers’ experiences in New Zealand including the provision of pastoral care, workers’ health and wellbeing and the availability of additional skills training. The aim of the chapter is to determine whether the benefits of participating in the RSE outweigh some of the costs for individual migrants. Accordingly the chapter is framed around three broad questions:

1) How have employers coped with their responsibilities to provide pastoral care to RSE workers over the first five seasons?
2) What are the key aspects of RSE workers’ health and welfare in New Zealand that need to be carefully monitored?
3) What additional skills training is available to RSE workers, and are these skills transferable back to workers’ home communities?

Information is drawn from key informant interviews with RSEs, pastoral care providers, RSE workers, community leaders in the islands, as well as with New Zealand and island-based
government officials. Participation in the annual Horticulture New Zealand RSE conferences (2010-2012) provided additional opportunities to gain material of relevance to workers’ experiences.

9.2 RSE workers’ welfare and the provision of pastoral care

The protection of migrants’ health and welfare at all stages of the migration process - pre-departure, in transit, at destination and upon return - is a crucial area for collaboration between origin and destination countries (McLaughlin, 2009; ILO, 2010; Calderon et al., 2012). Labour sending countries are responsible for ensuring contracts address adequately the welfare of their citizens overseas, and “pre-departure interventions are essential for protecting the rights of migrants, but they are not sufficient on their own” (Asis and Agunias, 2012, p.8; cf. ILO, 2010; IOM, 2010a, 2011).

Trade unions in the destination country can also play a role in protecting the rights of migrant workers, and ensuring compliance with employment and health and safety standards (Verma, 2003; Abella, 2006; ILO, 2010; MacDermott and Opeskin, 2010). This is particularly important in the case of temporary overseas workers who, in many cases, have greatly reduced rights compared with citizens in the host country.\(^{158}\)

Conditions of employment (including wage rates), health and safety, migrants’ general health and wellbeing, worker’s rights and the risk of exploitation, resolving disputes and monitoring compliance are areas of concern that have been identified in the literature on the Canadian SAWP,\(^{159}\) as well as literature relating to the RSE scheme and the PSWPS.\(^{160}\) In their assessment of the Canadian SAWP, Hennebry and Preibisch (2012, p.e24) argue that the programme allows the horticulture industry “to implement a very specific set of employment practices that would not be possible with a Canadian workforce”. These practices “deliver a workforce more willing [original emphasis] to accept the industry’s

\(^{158}\) See Verma (2003) and Hennebry (2012) for a discussion of the role of unions in Canada’s SAWP and the assistance provided to migrant seasonal workers.


\(^{160}\) See MacLellan, 2008, 2010, 2011; Millbank, 2008; Bailey, 2009; Connell and Hammond, 2009; Ericsson, 2009; J. Williams, 2009; Ball, 2010; MacDermott and Opeskin, 2010; Cameron, 2011; Kumar, 2012.

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working and living conditions and one *less able* [original emphasis] to contest them” (Preibisch, 2010, p.413).

SAWP workers who have performed satisfactorily can be requested to return the following season, and approximately 80 percent of workers who travel to Canada each year are ‘named’ by their employer (Hennebry, 2012). This practice, which has been cited as a best practice feature of the Canadian scheme, helps employers recruit trained workers and offers the worker some job security (Verma, 2003; Gibb, 2006; Basok, 2007).

Offsetting this potential ‘security’, however, is the fact that overseas contract workers essentially form a ‘captive labour force’. In Canada, SAWP workers’ mobility is constrained as their work permits tie them to a single, designated employer, and to a single residential location. SAWP participants have no mechanism to request employers, types of work, or transfers between employers, and generally workers do not voice complaints about working conditions, accommodation or other pastoral care issues, for fear of jeopardising their chances of being nominated for the next season (Binford, 2002; Verma, 2003; Preibisch, 2004; Brem, 2006; Hennebry, 2012; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012).

### 9.2.1 Employers’ responsibilities: pastoral care

In the New Zealand context, the provision of pastoral care, which is the direct responsibility of RSEs, plays a critical role in maintaining the general health and wellbeing of workers during their time in New Zealand. A number of studies (see Maclellan, 2008; Bailey, 2009; Ericsson, 2009; P. King, 2009; Cameron, 2011; A. Williams, 2011; Kumar, 2012) have examined different aspects of workers’ experiences and pastoral care in New Zealand, including the Department’s (2010a) comprehensive evaluation of the first two years of the programme.162

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161 Employers’ pastoral care responsibilities are described in Chapter 4 (see p.85).
162 There are sections of material included in this chapter that are sourced from unpublished country reports written by the researcher for her thesis as well as for the Department’s (2010a) evaluation report. The Department has quoted this material verbatim in the evaluation report. The chapter also includes sections of material written by the researcher for NZAID in a commissioned report on the social impacts of short-term migration for employment (C. Bedford et al., 2009).
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The various methods adopted by RSEs for the provision of pastoral care (contracting out to third parties, employing staff specifically to handle pastoral care requirements, or carrying it out as part of their own responsibility), the role played by local Pacific Island communities, the importance of religious observation as well as workers’ participation in sport and other recreational activities are discussed in the Department’s evaluation report (2010a). This material is not repeated in the thesis, however the approaches adopted by interviewed RSEs towards managing pastoral care are detailed in Appendix 9.

There are quite significant costs to both workers and employers associated with pastoral care. A survey of RSEs, conducted by Horticulture New Zealand (2010), estimated pastoral care costs the latter NZ$465 per worker each season. Costs to the workers vary markedly depending on the accommodation provided, the arrangements relating to provision of food and cooking facilities, the costs of communicating with families in the islands, the support provided with transport to and from the workplace and the social activities that workers wish to engage in. The costs for workers participating in seasonal work schemes are discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.

There are also costs for participating island governments. By 2012 all of the Pacific states (excluding the Solomon Islands) had appointed New Zealand-based RSE liaison officers to assist with pastoral care, in recognition of the ongoing support that is required for RSE workers. In general the liaison officers perform this role in a part-time capacity however – it is not their primary source of employment in New Zealand – which raises some concern as to their ability to monitor effectively workers’ care and assist with any issues that might arise.

9.2.2 The shifting nature of pastoral care

The protection of workers’ rights and the provision of adequate pastoral care were potentially problematic areas with the operation of the RSE policy in its first year (Maclellan, 2008; Bailey, 2009; Ericsson, 2009; P. King, 2009; DoL, 2010a). Pastoral care obligations are detailed in the IAs signed between the Department of Labour and relevant labour ministries in the participating island states. However, pastoral care duties are the direct responsibility of individual RSEs, with indirect responsibilities falling on those who provide
workers with accommodation, making it a difficult area for the Department of Labour to monitor.

RSEs have reported fewer problems with pastoral care as the scheme has progressed. The Department’s annual H/V employer survey asks respondents whether they have experienced any difficulties providing pastoral care to their RSE workers. In the first season almost two-thirds (63 percent) reported problems with the provision of pastoral care. By the second season, just over one-third (37 percent) reported problems, and this has steadily declined over subsequent seasons. More than three-quarters of RSEs surveyed in season three (78 percent) and season four (77 percent) reported no problems with the provision of pastoral care (Research New Zealand, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).

The nature of pastoral care issues has also shifted. In the first two seasons problems centred around lack of adequate housing, wage rates and deductions, periods of down-time during the season when employees did not have work, lack of opportunities for recreation and religious observation, and workers’ general inexperience dealing with New Zealand work and living conditions (Maclellan, 2008; Bailey, 2009; Connell and Hammond, 2009; Ericsson, 2009; P. King, 2009; DoL, 2010a). The RSE policy was subject to a high level of media scrutiny over this period, with the few instances of ‘failure’ receiving extensive publicity (Anon, 2008a, S. Collins, 2008; Courtney, 2008b; Van Wel, 2008a, 2008b; R. Young, 2008). There were also reports by churches and community groups of worker exploitation (Anon, 2008b).

By the third and fourth seasons, many of the pastoral care issues had changed. Accommodation costs and facilities seem to be an ongoing concern, but workers now have more experience of life in New Zealand, both on and off the orchard. Return workers understand their wage rates and deductions, have established bank accounts and methods for sending money home, are prepared for the weather conditions, have established links with local churches and community groups, and are familiar with accessing local services. With close to 50 percent of RSE workers having returned from the previous year (DoL, 2012a), these workers provide critical support to new recruits. This in turn means new workers adapt to work and life in New Zealand relatively quickly.
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Issues that are now arising with return workers are arguably more complicated than those that arose in the first two seasons. Lack of experience driving on New Zealand roads and the ensuing accidents, health problems (diet, pre-existing medical conditions, sexually transmitted infections and other communicable and non-communicable diseases), increased social interactions with others in the local community and the formation of ‘bad habits’ by some workers (poor performance on the orchard/vineyard, absenteeism, getting involved with local gangs and petty crime such as shop-lifting) as well as the development of intimate relationships between members of the same work group or with New Zealanders, are current concerns.

9.2.3 The role of local communities

Local New Zealand communities make an important contribution to the general wellbeing of seasonal workers. Pacific peoples generally have strong commitments to their religious faiths and attendance at church is common practice among RSE workers. New Zealand employers have, accordingly, accepted that working on a Sunday cannot be a requirement for Pacific RSE workers and that employers must facilitate workers’ access to local churches as part of their pastoral care responsibilities.

RSE workers’ regular attendance at church provides an important opportunity for workers to socialise with other members of the congregation, and special efforts are made to integrate workers into local church communities. The importance of RSE workers in revitalising dwindling church congregations in small communities, as well as revitalising local sports teams and contributing directly to the local economy through the purchasing of goods and services has been commented on by Bailey (2009, Central Otago), P. King (2009, Marlborough), A. Williams (2011, Bay of Plenty) and Kumar (2012, Hawke’s Bay) among others.

163 Certain communicable diseases, such as hepatitis and typhoid, can be extremely damaging to the H/V industries. In 2011, an RSE worker infected with typhoid fever cost a Bay of Plenty orchard $800,000 in lost earnings as approximately 100,000 trays of kiwifruit, 30,000 of which were destined for export, had to be destroyed (Fox and Field, 2011; Morton, 2011).

164 Research on the Canadian SAWP has also noted the vital role played by community organisations and church groups in the provision of support to Mexican and Caribbean seasonal workers (Bauder et al., 2003; Preibisch, 2003, 2004; Hennebry, 2012).

165 See P. King (2009) for a useful review of various planning implications of temporary workers in rural communities.
Local Maori communities also play a growing role in supporting teams of Pacific seasonal workers. It is becoming increasingly common for local iwi to welcome formally groups of RSE workers arriving each season, and to monitor workers’ pastoral care and assist in a range of ways (e.g. providing fresh food for the workers).

9.2.4 After-hours pastoral care and disciplinary issues

Overseeing workers outside of work hours and managing disciplinary matters is one of the most challenging aspects of pastoral care. Many employers include a ‘Code of Conduct’ in the Individual Employment Agreements (IEAs) signed by workers each season, which sets out behaviour that will not be tolerated, and most RSEs send workers home for serious misconduct.166

The majority of RSEs house their workers onsite, or place workers in accommodation facilities located out of town, in an effort to moderate their activities and limit their access to shops and services where they might be inclined to spend their earnings. A common practice among employers is to restrict workers’ consumption of alcohol, or ban it completely, in the hope this will limit opportunities for workers to get into trouble, and minimise risks such as damage to property, failure to turn up for work, and being perceived negatively by the local community (DoL, 2010a). Alcohol-induced socially disruptive behaviour has been one of the main character-related issues RSEs have experienced with their Pacific RSE workers. Thirty-four percent of RSE respondents (n=70) to the Department’s online survey in 2011 reported alcohol-related incidents with their Pacific RSE employees (Research New Zealand, 2011).

All Pacific state officials and pastoral care providers interviewed fully supported the ban on alcohol. Community leaders in the islands, as well as members of Pacific communities resident in New Zealand, are encouraged to help enforce the rules, and support the swift return of workers who breach visa conditions. Penalties for drinking may involve a monetary

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166 Termination of employment may be on the grounds of ‘abandonment of employment’ when a worker has been absent for two consecutive working days without notifying the employer, or on the grounds of serious misconduct (including: possession and consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs while working, assault, being convicted of a criminal offence, damage to property, and breach of contract).
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fine, or in some instances workers are sent home and are banned from future participation in the RSE scheme.

A key criticism directed towards the RSE relates to the controls imposed by employers and their pastoral care providers over workers’ behaviour, especially those housed onsite (MacLellan, 2008; Bailey 2009; Ericsson, 2009; Cameron, 2011; A. Williams, 2011). Similar to the Canadian SAWP, the limited purpose visa issued to RSE workers ties them to a single employer. With a general preference among New Zealand employers for return workers, workers are under pressure to perform well in the hopes of being reselected, and to refrain from raising concerns either on or off the orchard. The pressure is compounded by competition between Pacific states to supply workers to New Zealand employers, and this competition has led island authorities to place significant social controls on RSE workers during their time in New Zealand.

9.3 Social sanctions imposed by island communities

Several countries have adopted a ‘zero tolerance’ policy for breach of visa conditions. For Samoan and Ni-Vanuatu workers who misbehave in New Zealand, local communities impose penalties when workers return. In Vanuatu, over the first three years of the RSE the names and photographs of offending RSE workers were added to a ‘blacklist’ of offenders published by the ESU. A local penalty might involve banning a worker’s family from being selected for work in New Zealand for a specified period.

For Samoan workers who fail to observe the rules one punishment is non-selection for the following season. If the behavioural problem is more serious it might entail a fine or even imprisonment back in Samoa. In Poutasi village, the starting punishment for being sent home in 2009 was a SAT$4,000 fine (approximately NZ$2,000), and this may have been

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167 According to the Department of Labour (2012a) just under half (49 percent) of all first-time RSE workers return in the next season, and the majority (87 percent) return to the same employer. More than 60 percent of all RSE workers have returned at least once to work in another season.

168 In 2009 estimates ranged from between 100 to 300 workers on the blacklist, the majority for poor performance, bad behaviour, and criminal activity (Bailey, 2009; RNZI, 2009). By 2013 the blacklist (and the notion of publicly shaming workers) had been discontinued. Workers who disobey the rules during their time in New Zealand are subject to a stand down period before they can return to New Zealand. This process is centrally managed by the ESU, rather than sanctions being left to the discretion of local communities.
accompanies by additional fines and punishments depending on the severity of the
misdemeanour (Ah Mu, 2009a, 2009b).

Fear of penalties for breaking the rules in New Zealand is a clear motivator for workers to
‘behave’ during their employment. RSEs evaluate their workers’ performance at the end of
each season, and workers are aware that their actions while in New Zealand not only affect
their own chances of being reselected, but also the chances of selection of others in their
local community. Leaders of island communities, and island-based recruitment agents may
also monitor workers, requesting regular reports from RSEs on workers’ performance, and
assessing workers’ behaviour once they have returned to the village. Those that have used
their time at home productively (planting crops and maintaining their gardens), have
contributed to village life and abided by the village rules, are generally more likely to be
reselected in future seasons.

Overall the sanctions imposed by Pacific states have proved to be relatively successful in
limiting worker-related disputes and misdemeanours. In particular, incidences of workers
failing to return home at the end of their contract period (overstaying) has not been the
issue some government officials feared. By June 2012 a cumulative total of 71 RSE workers
had overstayed since the scheme began in April 2007 (less than one percent of the total
number of workers arriving each season). The majority (51 percent) came from Thailand.
Indian RSE workers (23 percent) made up the second largest group of overstayers, and the
third (20 percent) were from Tonga. The other Pacific states have had minimal problems
with workers absconding (2 workers each in the case of Kiribati and Samoa, and no
Tuvaluan, Solomon Island or Ni-Vanuatu workers at June 2012) (Department of Labour
administrative data, June 2012).

9.3.1 Mechanisms for dispute resolution

For workers who experience problems in New Zealand there is a complaints procedure that
allows them to voice any concerns with their employer, union representative, Honorary
Consul and/or Department of Labour staff (DoL, 2007b). However, the primary agents
responsible for worker support and dispute resolution (the Pacific RSE liaison officers and
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the Department’s labour inspectors)\(^{169}\) often have limited capacity to respond when concerns are raised because of the large geographic areas being covered by particular individuals.

The government-appointed Pacific RSE liaison officers also perform a dual function of assisting RSE workers with complaints, while also upholding their country’s reputation as a ‘good’ source of labour. This dual function can pose significant conflicts of interest, especially in matters of dispute resolution between workers and their employers. During discussions with individual workers, some expressed concern that they had not seen their RSE liaison officer during their time in New Zealand. Other workers were anxious that if they voiced complaints they would risk losing the opportunity to be re-selected for the next season. Research on the Canadian SAWP has raised identical concerns (Verma, 2003; Brem, 2006; Preibisch, 2007; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012).

The establishment of an independent dispute resolution system to manage disagreements between workers and employers has been identified as a best practice component of managed TLMPs (Verma, 2003; Brem, 2006; Hugo, 2009b; ILO, 2010; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012). In the New Zealand context, careful consideration needs to be given to the mechanisms currently in place to support workers to ensure they have access to the appropriate channels for effective dispute resolution.\(^{170}\)

One of the key tensions in the area of dispute resolution is the role played by Pacific communities’ social sanctions. The greatest disciplining sanction is in the area of selection; who gets chosen for the following season is influenced by a series of criteria including workers’ behaviour in New Zealand, and their contribution to village activities when they return home. These sanctions are critical contexts within which disputes are likely to evolve, as tensions may arise between the interests of individual workers and the interests of the

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\(^{169}\) There are six labour inspectors located in regions across the country. Labour inspectors’ work involves ensuring minimum employment conditions are met, monitoring pastoral care and other aspects of RSE policy, and facilitating the resolution of disputes between RSEs and workers (DoL, 2010a).

\(^{170}\) In theory, RSE workers have access to the same support mechanisms as New Zealand workers that are set out in the Employment Relations Act 2000 [and which entitles them to pursue a personal grievance or dispute about their employment agreement under the Act]. However, in practice these mechanisms are not easily accessible to RSE workers (DoL, 2010, p.xix).
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group as a whole. Whether an independent disputes tribunal in New Zealand is able to intervene in the role of these sanctions is uncertain.

9.4 Migrants’ health and welfare

Closely associated with the welfare of individual migrants overseas is their physical and mental health and wellbeing (ILO, 2010; Asis and Agunias, 2012; Calderon et al., 2012). Agricultural work, in particular, is often hazardous and occupational injury and disease is a concern (Barrientos and Barrientos, 2002; McLaughlin, 2009; ILO, 2010). Numerous health concerns have been identified among Mexican and Jamaican seasonal workers participating in the Canadian programme, including respiratory tract infections, skin diseases, allergies, back problems and muscular pains. Many workers become ill during their season in Canada, or attribute long-term illnesses to work on Canadian farms (Preibisch, 2003; Verma, 2003; Russell, 2004; Verduzco and Lozano, 2004). Comparable health concerns have been observed among migrant farm workers in the United States (Villarejo, 2003; Culp and Umbarger, 2004).

9.4.1 Occupational health and safety

During the first three seasons of the RSE workers interviewed appeared to have little understanding of their rights and obligations under New Zealand’s occupational health and safety legislation, or what to look out for on the orchard/vineyard regarding protective equipment, clothing, and handling of spray-covered fruit. Although RSEs are required by law to provide workers with protective equipment (footwear, gloves and eyewear), they are not obliged to do so free of charge. This means the costs are often passed on to the worker.

A risk for Pacific workers engaged in seasonal work is that the goal of maximising their potential earnings translates into working long hours each day, with the possibility of inadequate rest and subsequent injury and illness. Although the Individual Employment Agreements signed by RSE workers must specify a minimum in terms of hours worked (240 hours over six weeks) there is no maximum. In a review of eight employment contracts (dating from 2008 to 2011) only one employer specified the maximum number of hours worked – up to 72 hours per week. Another contract broke the hours of work down into
CHAPTER 9: RSE workers in New Zealand: benefits beyond wages?

dayshifts and nightshifts, but did not state whether workers could be employed only for one of these periods, or work both shifts.

Little information is available on occupational health and safety issues or incidents reported by RSE workers. Workers may be reluctant to report health concerns, and may continue working when injured, rather than risk losing wages, or jeopardising their chances of employment in future seasons. To protect workers’ welfare while abroad this is an area that requires careful monitoring by the agencies involved in the oversight of seasonal work schemes (Verma, 2003; McLaughlin 2009; ILO, 2010; MacDermott and Opeskin, 2010; Hennebry, 2012).

9.4.2 Diet and nutrition

The financial returns from participation in seasonal work are considered the primary gain for workers and their families. As a result, authorities in the islands, RSEs and pastoral care providers strongly encourage the establishment of a savings culture among RSE workers. It is not uncommon for RSEs to provide their workers with a weekly allowance (of approximately NZ$100) for discretionary spending, and to retain the rest of their workers’ earnings (minus fees for accommodation, airfare repayments, and other deductions) in a savings account until the workers have completed the season’s employment.171

A direct result of the strong focus on saving is that RSE workers tend not to want to spend much of their weekly earnings on food. Workers have also had to adjust to the higher cost of living in New Zealand, to new forms of accommodation and the use of new kitchen appliances, as well as the availability of different food choices.

Employers have consistently raised poor diet and nutrition, and associated problems of low productivity on the orchard/vineyard, boils and oral hygiene, as concerns with their RSE workers.172 Orbit Protect,173 the insurance company that provides compulsory medical

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171 It should be noted that withholding workers’ wages and imposing sanctions on workers that are not specified in the employment contract (e.g. restricting workers’ consumption of alcohol) may contravene international norms (ILO, 2010).
172 Bailey (2009) and Cameron (2011) also raised poor diet and associated health problems as an issue among Ni-Vanuatu RSE workers.
cover to RSE workers, has also identified dental extractions and hospital admissions for 
infected boils and abscesses as some of the more common health insurance claims made by 
RSE workers (DoL, 2013).

RSEs have tried to combat diet and nutrition concerns in various ways: building 
accommodation with purpose-built kitchens and communal dining areas so workers can 
cook and eat together; housing RSE workers with extended family members in the local 
community; imposing a mandatory weekly financial contribution from workers towards food 
(generally NZ$20-30); employing chefs to prepare food for RSE workers, and providing 
cooking classes to workers.

Poor nutrition not only affects workers’ health and welfare during their time in New Zealand. 
Diet may also be a factor contributing to the exacerbation of several pre-existing medical 
conditions identified for Pacific RSE workers (including diabetes and high blood pressure). 
This is one of the more difficult aspects of health to monitor, and is a key area of concern for 
medical insurance provider Orbit Protect (DoL, 2013).

This issue can partly be addressed at the recruitment and selection stage. Authorities in the 
islands need to ensure those put forward for employment in New Zealand are healthy 
enough for the physical demands of orchard/vineyard work. Nevertheless authorities’ ability 
to monitor workers’ health comes back to the matter of institutional capacity. Medical 
facilities in countries such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, in particular, are limited.

Kiribati has an added problem of a population with a high incidence of Hepatitis B and 
HIV/AIDS (Borovnik, 2003; Oriente, 2006; Bedford and Hugo, 2012). Although it is not a 
requirement for either disease to be screened for as part of the RSE workers’ medical 
checks, an agreement was reached with officials in the Kiribati Ministry of Labour in 2010 
to allow I-Kiribati RSE workers to be tested. No formal change has been made to the RSE 
immigration policy - rather an exception has been made for this particular country.

173 A change to the RSE work policy in November 2009 made health insurance mandatory for RSE workers to 
ensure their health needs are covered, as workers are not eligible for publicly funded health care (DoL, 2010a). 
Insurance is provided by a private organisation, Orbit Protect, which has designed a specific insurance policy for 
seasonal workers. Premiums start at a cost of $2.32 (including GST) per day, see <http://www.orbitprotect.com/seasonal-worker-insurance-xidc76098.html>.
174 Under immigration policy the standard health check for temporary entrants is a chest X-ray for TB.
CHAPTER 9: RSE workers in New Zealand: benefits beyond wages?

9.4.3 Workers’ sexual health and wellbeing in the destination country

Social isolation, culture shock in the destination country, lack of control over work and living conditions, workplace and household tensions among work groups, and guilt for leaving family members behind have all been identified as some of the costs associated with migration that can affect workers’ mental wellbeing.\textsuperscript{175}

Research on the RSE scheme in Tonga and Vanuatu indicates many of those selected have been married men or women in their early thirties with children (J. Gibson et al., 2008; McKenzie et al., 2008; Connell and Hammond, 2009; Cameron, 2011). As Table 9.1 shows, of the approximately 20,300 visas approved for Pacific workers between 2007 and 2011, 41 percent were aged between 20 and 29 years, with a further 35 percent aged between 30 and 39 years. There has been very little change over the four-year period, indicating employers’ recruitment practices have remained relatively constant in terms of the age of those selected.

Table 9.1: Percentage of Pacific RSE workers approved each season by age group,
July 2007-June 2011

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-19</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total approved</td>
<td>3,477</td>
<td>5,913</td>
<td>5,083</td>
<td>5,859</td>
<td>20,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour administrative data, June 2011

The majority (85 percent) of Pacific RSE workers are men, as shown in Table 9.2. There is, however, some variation in the gender balance of RSE worker groups on the basis of source country. Of the 4,500 visas issued to Samoan RSE workers to June 2011, 95 percent were for male workers. The proportions of males in the worker groups recruited from Kiribati, Tuvalu

\textsuperscript{175} See Binford, 2002; Kim-Godwin and Bechtel, 2004; Lucas, 2005; Gibb, 2006; McLaughlin, 2009; Hennebry, 2012.
and the Solomon Islands, on the other hand, have been smaller. Males comprised 54 percent of all workers recruited from Kiribati, 64 percent of those recruited from Tuvalu and 65 percent of workers sourced from the Solomon Islands.176

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Males Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>82.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>87.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>85.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>84.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>85.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Females Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour administrative data, June 2011

A requirement of the RSE policy is that workers travel without their respective partners to minimise risks of overstaying in New Zealand and to reduce disruption to local communities and traditional agricultural and caring roles.177 This requirement generates its own social costs, as family members have to deal with the difficulties of absence from one another.

One such cost is the increased likelihood of higher numbers of sexual partners that may put men and women at greater risk of contracting sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and the possible transmission of HIV/AIDS (McLaughlin, 2009; Connell and Negin, 2010). An increasing number of RSEs are providing some form of sexual health education, often in conjunction with family planning services, in an effort to minimise the risks to both RSE workers and members of the local community.

Unwanted pregnancies may also occur, and language barriers and different cultural understandings of health behaviours can limit women’s access to health care services (Villarejo, 2003; Culp and Umbarger, 2004; Kim-Godwin and Bechtel, 2004; McLaughlin, 2009). There have been incidences of workers getting pregnant while in New Zealand, as

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176 In the case of Kiribati and Tuvalu the higher rates of female participation are due to the facilitated recruitment drives undertaken by the Department of Labour as part of the SPP programme.
177 The Canadian SAWP recruitment policies also give preference to individuals with dependants (Hennebry, 2012; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012).
well as reported cases of workers who are already pregnant when they arrive to start their seasonal contract. While this may be considered grounds for dismissal, the costs facing RSE workers to participate in the scheme mean employers are reluctant to terminate workers’ employment until they have repaid their debts and generated some savings. There have also been instances of workers forming long-term relationships while in New Zealand. These emotional entanglements are problematic, not only in terms of the possible spread of STIs, but also the threat they present to the stability of family units in the islands, and the compliance risk these relationships pose for workers while in New Zealand.\footnote{Kumar’s (2012) research with Ni-Vanuatu RSE workers also reported a growing incidence of extra-marital relationships taking place during RSE workers’ employment in New Zealand and the resulting tensions in home communities. Likewise, Rohorua (pers. comm, 2012) made reference to this issue in her discussions of Tongan RSE workers from a small community on the island of ‘Eua.}

The Department of Labour has identified RSE workers’ health and welfare as a priority area of the SPP programme. Staff are working alongside government officials in the islands to devise country-specific pre-departure health training programmes, as well as implementing various health-related training courses for RSE orchard managers and supervisors in New Zealand (DoL, 2012b, 2013).\footnote{In Vanuatu the IOM is also providing assistance to policymakers to improve management of migrants’ health and wellbeing (IOM, 2012).} In conjunction with the Department’s efforts, there are several ‘after hours’ training initiatives that are being provided to RSE workers by employers and private training organisations.

### 9.5 Additional benefits for workers: skills training and transfer

The potential for skills development and migrants’ ability then to transfer those skills back to the home country is one of the main areas where migrants, particularly low-skilled workers, may be able to gain something worthwhile from the migration experience (World Bank, 2006b). Proponents of low-skilled TLMPs argue that temporary migrants can act as ‘agents of development’ for their home societies, returning not only with remittances, but also with social capital in the form of additional skills and knowledge, that may benefit home communities (Levitt, 1998; Faist, 2008; de Haas, 2012; IOM, 2012). Although “there is nothing to guarantee that what is learned in the host society is constructive or that it will have a positive effect on communities of origin”, Levitt (1998, p.944) maintains that “certain
CHAPTER 9: RSE workers in New Zealand: benefits beyond wages?

kinds of remittance flows [e.g. the transfer of new business skills and knowledge about health and educational practices] can be purposefully stimulated”.

Whether the skills learnt on the orchard/vineyard are directly transferable back to home communities is questionable. Research on the seasonal migration of Caribbean SAWP workers has found that while workers may gain new skills during their employment in Canada, there has been little skills transfer at the end of the season (Verduzco and Lozano, 2004; Downes and Clarke, 2007). In a survey of 360 Mexican workers who were employed in Canada, two-thirds said they had learned about a new crop in Canada, but only 10 percent had tried to apply their new knowledge back in their home communities, primarily because they lacked access to land (Verduzco and Lozano, 2004).

Similar concerns have been raised with reference to the RSE scheme as most households engage in subsistence farming and grow crops that are very different from the fruits that RSE workers are picking and pruning in New Zealand. This suggests some limitations to the extent to which skills in New Zealand can be applied to crop production back in home communities (Bailey, 2009; Rohorua et al., 2009; Cameron, 2011; Kumar, 2012). However, generic skills learnt on the orchard in crop cultivation and maintenance, irrigation, basic planting skills and so forth may be applicable.

More importantly, ‘skills’ refer not only to work-related skills. RSE workers interviewed identified new skills in time and financial management, English language skills, and an improved work ethic as less tangible benefits. Other research on the RSE scheme reports similar findings (Rohorua et al., 2009; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010; Cameron, 2011; Kumar, 2012). In her reflections on the impact of participation in the RSE on a small community in ‘Eua, Tonga, Rohorua (pers. comm, 2012) observed that over five seasons the small group of six returnee RSE workers were learning new skills in New Zealand that led to visible changes in their behaviour once back in the village. In particular, they were learning the importance of time and money management and also planning ahead for the next season – planting crops for future harvest and organising full medical and dental checks in advance of their next seasonal deployment.
CHAPTER 9: RSE workers in New Zealand: benefits beyond wages?

9.5.1 New Zealand training initiatives

The potential for the transfer of workers’ skills and knowledge back to home communities is, in part, dependent on the opportunities for additional training that are provided to workers while abroad. In their recent assessment of the Canadian SAWP, Hennebry and Preibisch (2012, p.e33) argue the programme has done little “in terms of development promoting practices such as reduced remittance-sending costs or skills transfer and training opportunities.” SAWP workers “are not eligible for training or skills instruction and immigrant services organizations are not funded to provide classes for them in Canada” (Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012, p.e33).

In contrast to the Canadian experience, there has been widespread interest in the provision of additional skills training to RSE workers from government agencies, industry organisations and community groups.180

9.5.1.1 ‘Vakameasina – Learning for Pacific Growth’

In 2009 the New Zealand National government announced the establishment of an NZAID-funded pilot training programme for RSE workers. The provision of training was outsourced to private contractors, who designed the ‘Vakameasina - Learning for Pacific Growth’ training scheme. The pilot programme was conducted in two regions, Hawke’s Bay and the Bay of Plenty, between November 2009 and September 2010. Twenty-five courses (with 312 enrolments), providing approximately 20 hours of tuition each, were delivered to workers from six countries, and covered a range of areas, including: financial and personal goal setting, budgeting, pay slips and deductions, workers’ rights and responsibilities, remittances, health and safety, and more general ‘life skills’ (Scarrow, 2010; McGirr, 2011; Roorda, 2011).

Feedback has, on the whole, been encouraging from both the contract service providers and RSEs who have put groups of workers through the training (Scarrow, 2010; McGirr, 2011). Successful training outcomes have included: workers’ increased confidence on the orchard/vineyard and greater willingness to speak English to orchard supervisors; improved

180 Australia’s Seasonal Work Program also offers ‘add-on skills training’ for Pacific workers in English literacy, numeracy, IT and First Aid. Approved Employers who wish to provide this training to their Pacific seasonal employees are able to seek financial support from AusAID (Kaleb, 2012).
CHAPTER 9: RSE workers in New Zealand: benefits beyond wages?

literacy and numeracy skills; and gaining basic computing skills that enable workers to
communicate more regularly with family members overseas (Roorda, 2011). The extent to
which these skills are being transferred back to home communities has not been assessed.

Based on the initial success of the pilot programme, the Vakameasina training has been
extended for a further three years (2012-2015), with funding from NZAID. Five hundred RSE
workers are to be trained annually in five regions, and the scope of the training has also
been broadened to include general health and sexual health issues, food and nutrition and
workers’ rights and responsibilities. By June 2012, 358 workers had been enrolled for the
training, including workers from all kick-start states as well as the Solomon Islands and
Papua New Guinea. Women made up 56 percent of enrolments, and 44 percent were first
time RSE workers (Scarrow, 2012).

9.5.1.2 ‘Fruit of the Pacific’

An independent charitable trust ‘Fruit of the Pacific’ is also providing training to RSE
workers. Located in the Bay of Plenty, the trust provided training to over 100 Ni-Vanuatu
workers in 2010. Similar to Vakameasina, the training covers basic literacy and numeracy,
however the programme’s overarching focus is on providing workers with other ‘life skills’,
including leadership training and personal and community development (Fruit of the Pacific,
2010).

Two of the most successful training modules have been the nutrition and cooking classes,
and the oral hygiene programme. Both modules have resulted in the transfer of skills and
knowledge back to island communities. Cooking class participants have identified
“numerous business development ideas that came from learning new recipes” (Fruit of the
Pacific, 2010, p.6), while the oral hygiene programme led to the development of an
educational DVD to be distributed in local schools and communities in Vanuatu.

9.5.1.3 Employers’ customised training for their RSE workers

Aside from the formal training provided by local agencies, a small number of employers also
provide their own training to workers. Financial literacy and numeracy continues to be a key
focus (Pacific Islands Trade and Invest, 2012a) and sexual health training is becoming
CHAPTER 9: RSE workers in New Zealand: benefits beyond wages?

increasingly common. Driving instruction is another important area as workers’ lack of experience driving on New Zealand roads is a significant concern for employers.

9.5.1.4 In-country horticulture skills training

Beyond the New Zealand-based training for Pacific RSE workers, the opportunities for in-country horticulture-specific skills training are increasingly being acknowledged. In 2012 the New Zealand Horticulture Industry Training Organisation (NZHITO) was contracted by the Department of Labour to begin delivering in-country horticulture skills training in Pacific states (NZHITO, 2011; DoL, 2012c). The 12-week programme provides participants with formally recognised New Zealand qualifications, and includes theoretical and practical training as well as on-the-job training placements. The project was launched in Samoa in June 2012 with 30 trainees, and initial assessments of the training indicate it has been a success (DoL, 2012d). The training will be extended to Vanuatu and Tonga in 2013.

There is the potential for further in-country horticulture skills training to be offered through the Australian Pacific Technical College (APTC) (ILO, 2012a). The APTC, established in 2007, provides a network of colleges throughout the Pacific that offer Australian vocational qualifications (Chappell and Glennie, 2009; Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 2009a). As of April 2012 the APTC was not offering courses in agriculture or horticulture (ILO, 2012a), however this is an area that AusAID may explore in the future as part of their capacity building initiatives in the region.

9.6 Conclusion

On balance the evidence suggests the RSE is delivering positive outcomes to workers that go beyond the initial, short-term gains of regular waged employment. This is chiefly due to the collaborative efforts of government agencies, industry and community groups to provide additional skills training to RSE workers, and reiterates the importance of interrelationships within the RSE system. Whether or not the RSE continues to deliver positive outcomes to

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181 The APTC has training centres in Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu and PNG and offers training in tourism, cookery, hospitality, automotive, construction, electrical and manufacturing trades. The college is expected to produce 3,450 graduates by 2015. The ILO (2012a) notes that certificates attained through the APTC are at a considerably higher level than the foundation horticulture qualification that has been developed in New Zealand.
workers is very much dependent on the inputs from other stakeholder groups, especially RSE employers and the efforts they make to ensure the wellbeing and development of their workers. While the skills workers are gaining may not be directly applicable to crop production in the islands, skills are being developed in other areas that are equally important to improving the health and welfare of individual workers and their families. In particular, skills in financial management may improve the economic outcomes of individual households as families learn to make more qualified financial decisions (e.g. on the most cost effective ways for an RSE worker to remit earnings). These skills may also open up new opportunities for RSE workers to invest in small business enterprises, housing and education, which in turn may stimulate further economic activity and contribute more broadly to development in local communities (Adelman and J.E. Taylor, 1990; de Haas, 2005).

Nevertheless, there are costs associated with RSE workers’ employment abroad. The changing nature of pastoral care issues that arise over successive seasons means workers’ welfare needs to be carefully monitored. The social sanctions imposed by island-based authorities to moderate workers’ behaviour in New Zealand must also be balanced against individual workers’ rights to voice concerns. The generally successful management of RSE workers’ welfare in New Zealand to date is largely due to the considerable investment made by the Department’s staff and industry representatives in monitoring pastoral care and ensuring employers are meeting their obligations. If the RSE is to become ‘business as usual’ with reduced investment by government, workers’ health and welfare may become a more problematic area longer-term.

As the RSE scheme shifts into the sixth season, increasing attention is being paid to the ways New Zealand employers can ‘add value’ to the employment relationship with their RSE workers. This relates not only to the protection of workers’ health and welfare in New Zealand, but also to ways in which employers can contribute directly to the development of workers’ livelihoods in the islands. The next chapter examines some of the short-term impacts of participation in the RSE on families and communities in the islands including the use of remittance income, the opportunities for productive investment, and some initiatives that are being undertaken to ensure the RSE continues to deliver positive outcomes to participating island countries.
CHAPTER 10: The RSE in the islands: benefits for families and communities?

10.1 Introduction

An objective of both the RSE and Australian seasonal work programmes is to contribute to development in labour source countries, via the flow of capital into islands and regions without many cash-earning options.\textsuperscript{182} Findings from the World Bank surveys in Tonga suggest that recruitment and selection processes under both the RSE and PSWPS have tended to target workers from poorer, rural communities (J. Gibson et al., 2008; J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). Similarly Kiribati and Tuvalu’s island-based quota system for recruitment and selection has been encouraged to ensure equity of access and opportunity to people from rural communities throughout both countries.\textsuperscript{183} The focus on the recruitment of outer-islanders, rather than long-term urban dwellers or people born in the towns, is due not only to their more regular engagement with agricultural work, but also because of the difficulties gaining waged employment in village agricultural settings.

This chapter examines the short-term development impacts of participation in the RSE programme (and subsequent PSWPS) on families and communities in the islands. The chapter’s primary aim is to determine whether the gains for households and communities participating in offshore seasonal employment outweigh some of the financial and social costs. The components of the RSE systems model that relate to workers, their families and communities are identified in Figure 10.1. These include the RSE worker household, the village where the household has access to land for subsistence agriculture, and the village institutions such as the chiefly (Polynesia), ‘unimane’ (‘old man’, Micronesia) or ‘big man’ (Melanesia) systems of social control. The RSE and PSWPS workers cannot be viewed as

\textsuperscript{182} The IAUs set out a series of ‘critical success outcomes’ to be achieved by the Department of Labour. One of these is “contributing to the development objectives in the Pacific by fostering economic growth and regional integration under the RSE work policy” (DoL, 2007b, p.2). The MOUs signed between the Australian Government and countries taking part in the PSWPS state the development objectives more explicitly, noting the importance of increased remittance incomes and options for up-skilling PSWs (DEEWR, 2008).

\textsuperscript{183} Prospective recruits from the outer islands must, however, travel to the main urban centres of Tarawa and Funafuti and reside there while awaiting selection by New Zealand employers. This means they can be living in town for extended periods even though their ‘home’ communities are in the outer islands.
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independent units of labour; they are embedded in complex webs of family, household and community relationships that must be considered when evaluating the extent to which seasonal work overseas produces positive outcomes for workers and their communities (Stark, 1978; Stark and Bloom, 1985; Massey et al., 1993; McDowell and De Haan, 1997; de Haas, 2010a).

Figure 10.1: The RSE worker-family-community subsystem

Source: Adapted from Department of Labour, 2010a, p.5

10.2 Impacts of seasonal work on participating households: the World Bank surveys

Evidence from the World Bank’s surveys of approximately 450 Tongan and 450 Ni-Vanuatu RSE households suggest the programme’s short-term impacts on individuals, their families and communities have been largely positive (Rohorua et al., 2009; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010). Participation in the RSE scheme has increased household income by over 30 percent relative to the comparison groups in Vanuatu and Tonga, while at the same time increasing
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per-capita expenditure.\textsuperscript{184} RSE households are now more likely to have a bank account for household savings, have been able to purchase more durable goods, and have increased their subjective sense of economic wellbeing (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010).

In Tonga, participation in the RSE has doubled the rate of home improvement for RSE households compared to non-RSE households, and also increased childhood school attendance rates for those aged 15 to 18 years. In Vanuatu “home improvements were the most commonly mentioned use of money from the RSE” (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010, p.17). Payment of school fees was another primary use of RSE remittance income in both countries. Impacts on the community in both Tonga and Vanuatu have been modest, but positive, with the main benefits in the form of monetary contributions from RSE workers (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010).

In the case of the PSWPS, the overall development impact of the scheme in the first two years was small, due to the low number of workers taking part in the pilot. By February 2011 only 270 visas had been issued - well below the cap of 2,500 places (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). However, in line with the generally positive findings of the short-term development impacts of the RSE on participating households, J. Gibson and McKenzie (2011, p.19) argue “it seems reasonable to expect the same benefits could be realised from the Australian program if sufficient numbers get a chance to participate in it”. Furthermore, both I-Kiribati and Tongan PSWs expressed high levels of satisfaction with the Australian scheme and indicated they wanted to return to Australia the following season.

The World Bank surveys also assessed the overall development impacts of the RSE and the PSWPS programmes. To do this, the researchers used their estimates of net income gain per participating RSE/PSWPS household, along with the number of seasonal workers during the first two years of both seasonal work schemes, to calculate the aggregate impact on national income.\textsuperscript{185} The aggregate impact was then compared “to New Zealand and

\textsuperscript{184} See McKenzie and J. Gibson (2010, p.12) for a description of their measurement of household income and expenditure.

\textsuperscript{185} J. Gibson and McKenzie (2011, pp.15-16) note “this is a first-order approximation, since it ignores any multiplier effects from spending money earned abroad on goods produced by others in the local economy, and also ignores any longer-run gains from investments in human capital or other productivity enhancing investments”.

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Australian annual bilateral aid flows to these participating countries,\textsuperscript{186} and to total annual exports of the three participating Pacific nations [Tonga, Vanuatu and Kiribati]” (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011, p.16).

Table 10.1 illustrates the net impacts at the macro level of participation in the RSE and PSWPS over the first two years. Tonga has been the most successful country to engage with the PSWPS to date, with 132 workers participating in 2009 and 2010.\textsuperscript{187} The Table shows the total contribution to the Tongan economy was around A$340,000. Contributions to the economies of Kiribati and Vanuatu were much smaller (less than A$30,000) reflecting the small number of workers selected from both countries over the first two years.

Table 10.1 Net impacts at the macro level of participation in the RSE and PSWPS over the first two years

![NOTE: This figure/table/image has been removed to comply with copyright regulations. It is included in the print copy of the thesis held by the University of Adelaide Library.]

Source: J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011, p.16

Tonga’s participation in the RSE scheme over the first two seasons generated a net benefit of A$4 million. This is equivalent to 40 percent of New Zealand’s annual total bilateral aid and 47 percent of Tonga’s total annual export earnings. Vanuatu, the country supplying the largest number of RSE workers to New Zealand, gained a net benefit of almost A$8 million,

\textsuperscript{186} Research on the size of global remittance flows to developing countries indicates they are now more than three times that of official development assistance (ODA) (Ratha et al., 2012, p.1). See the World Bank’s Migration and Development Briefs (nos. 13, 16, 18 and 19) for a review of remittances and other resource flows (including ODA and foreign direct investment) to developing countries in 2010, 2011 and 2012, viewed 9 February 2013 at: <http://econ.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21125572~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html>.

\textsuperscript{187} By the cessation of the pilot in June 2012, Tonga had supplied 1,316 out of a total of 1,614 seasonal workers to Australia (Kovacic, 2012).
close to half of the total annual bilateral aid from New Zealand, and equivalent to 20 percent of their total annual export earnings. The number of I-Kiribati workers participating in the RSE scheme has been considerably lower than numbers from Vanuatu and Tonga, and accordingly their net income gain has been relatively small. Kiribati had a net benefit of just under A$190,000, equivalent to four percent of New Zealand’s annual total bilateral aid, and two percent of the country’s total export earnings (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011).

In their overall assessment of the short-term impacts of the RSE scheme on participating island households and communities, McKenzie and J. Gibson (2010, p.21) conclude:

These results make this seasonal migration program one of the most effective development interventions for which rigorous evaluations are available... The design features of the program and the low rate of overstaying have already led to this policy being heralded as international best practice. The large development impacts seen here should further foster the case for other countries to consider similar policies.

10.3 Workers’ earnings in New Zealand and Australia and remittance use

The key benefit of participation in the RSE and PSWPS schemes identified by interview respondents in all of the kick-start states is the income earned by workers to improve the wellbeing of their families and achieve their own goals. In the contemporary island household economy, cash is an essential ingredient for sustaining everyday life. Regular remittances are now considered vital for many households, and the decision to migrate is often linked to the needs and aspirations of families and households, rather than being primarily an individual choice. Kinship ties are of fundamental importance, and there is considerable pressure to ensure family obligations are met regularly, and to maintain one’s status as well as that of one’s family in the community.188 189

The Department’s (2012a) study of returning RSE workers details the gross earnings and the number of months workers were employed over the first three seasons (2007/08-2009/10).

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189 Similarly in Asia, the sense of familial responsibility and obligations to kin is highly valued. Migrants are socialised to treat out-migration as ‘for the sake of the family’, and physical separation is often justified on the basis that it is a household strategy enabling the family to fulfil a particular project. See for example Yeoh et al., 2002; Lam et al., 2002; Asis et al., 2004; Douglass, 2006; Piper and Yamanaka, 2007; Rahman, 2007, 2009; Piper, 2008; Dannecker, 2009.
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Table 10.2 shows the estimated gross earnings by financial year and source country for the three seasons. It is evident that RSE workers’ gross earnings have, on average, remained fairly consistent over time, with mean gross earnings of approximately NZ$12,700 per RSE worker. There is, however, considerable variation between countries (DoL, 2012a).

Table 10.2: Estimated gross earnings and employment duration of RSE workers, 2007/08-2009/10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RSE season¹</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Seasonal earnings ($)</th>
<th>Employment duration (months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>Kiribati/Tuvalu²</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>6,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>11,720</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>8,930</td>
<td>8,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>12,820</td>
<td>12,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>12,060</td>
<td>12,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>16,320</td>
<td>16,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All RSE workers 07/08</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12,840</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,020</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>Kiribati/Tuvalu²</td>
<td>10,390</td>
<td>6,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>10,790</td>
<td>10,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>11,430</td>
<td>12,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>12,240</td>
<td>12,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>12,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>15,610</td>
<td>15,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All RSE workers 08/09</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12,660</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,470</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>15,860</td>
<td>14,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>11,020</td>
<td>9,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>10,750</td>
<td>11,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>12,970</td>
<td>12,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>9,680</td>
<td>8,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>11,960</td>
<td>11,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>14,690</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All RSE workers 09/10</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12,630</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,220</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹The financial year of arrival
²Countries combined for confidentiality reasons

Source: Department of Labour 2010a, p.8

RSE workers from outside the Pacific, mainly from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, have had the highest average earnings (NZ$15,540) over the three seasons. Of the Pacific countries, Tongan RSE workers have consistently earned the most, with average earnings of NZ$12,677. Ni-Vanuatu (NZ$12,073) and Samoan (NZ$11,177) RSE workers have had the second and third highest average earnings respectively.

Lower earnings generally reflect shorter durations of employment, which in turn are influenced by the crops being harvested, the nature of the work being performed (picking, pruning, packing) as well as weather conditions and the state of the crop. As the Table
demonstrates, the duration of employment has stayed relatively constant over time, averaging a period of 5.4 months. Workers from outside the Pacific have, on average, had the longest periods of employment (an average of 6.1 months), and this is reflected in their higher gross earnings. Tongan RSE workers have been employed for an average of 5.4 months, while Samoan and Ni-Vanuatu workers have both averaged 5.2 months. According to the Department (2012a, p.8) “over the first three seasons, 90 percent of employment spells were between 3-7 months, well above the minimum required by the policy”.

The World Bank surveys also estimated the after-tax earnings and costs for both RSE and PSWPS workers (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010; J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). Table 10.3 provides a breakdown of the average earned by a typical RSE or PSWPS worker during the season, their recurrent weekly costs (including accommodation, food, health insurance, transport to and from the orchard/vineyard, and telephone calls to family members back in the islands) and the average remitted or taken home as repatriated savings at the end of the season.

**Table 10.3: Average earned during season, approximate costs per week, money remitted home (NZ$)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RSE workers</th>
<th>Tongan PSWs</th>
<th>I-Kiribati PSWs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average earned</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>14,970</td>
<td>16,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly expenses</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average amount remitted</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>4,610</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weekly expenses include accommodation, food, transportation, health insurance and telephone calls home
Amounts expressed in NZ$, exchange rate of A$1 = NZ$1.23
Sources: McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010; J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011

Net income was considerably higher for PSWs than the after-tax income earned by RSE workers, reflecting the longer periods of employment in Australia and the higher wage rates.\(^{190}\) However, nominal weekly costs for PSWs were greater than those facing RSE workers. J. Gibson and McKenzie (2011, p.14) point out that, “as a result, over 6 months, a seasonal worker would pay around A$1,680 [NZ$2,060]\(^{191}\) less in costs if working in New Zealand than if they were working in Australia, reducing the gap in take-home pay between the two countries”. Once their weekly costs were deducted, workers participating in either

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\(^{190}\) At the time of the World Bank’s PSWPS surveys in 2009 and 2010, Australian Approved Employers were required to guarantee a minimum of six months’ employment at A$15 an hour (pre-tax) for an average of 30 hours of work per week (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011).

\(^{191}\) J. Gibson and McKenzie (2011) use an exchange rate of A$1 = NZ$1.23.
seasonal work scheme were left with comparable amounts of money to remit to families in the islands.\textsuperscript{192}

\section*{10.3.1 Households’ use of remittances: evidence from field enquiries}

Most RSE and PSWPS workers have specific projects in mind for the use of money earned from seasonal employment. Workers interviewed reported their savings were used for a variety of purposes: to meet basic needs (such as food, clothing, basic household amenities); to invest in children’s education; renovate or build new homes; support other relatives; pay for family events; make contributions to the church; purchase land; acquire large water tanks; improve waste disposal; purchase vehicles, boats, household appliances, gardening equipment, electronic goods and solar panels; and to repay debts.\textsuperscript{193, 194}

In contrast to Wickramasekara (2011, p.93) who argues that “migration is always a difficult choice and there is no reason to assume that migrants would like to go back and return several times rather than stay and settle, or stay on until they can earn and save what they believe to be an adequate sum for comfortable living back home and return for good”, findings from this research indicate that in many instances circulation is the preference of RSE workers, their families and local communities. As one RSE worker noted:

\begin{quote}
I have no interest in travelling to New Zealand to live permanently, but rather just to work temporarily and come home when the season is over. But that would depend entirely on whether the matai [chief] of our family and my wife agree for me to go.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{192} Changes to the PSWPS in December 2010, which reduced the period of employment Approved Employers must guarantee from six months’ work to four months, lessened the possible disparity in workers’ earnings between the two programmes. This disparity has been reduced further with the introduction of the SWP in July 2012. Approved Employers are now required to guarantee 14 weeks’ work at an average of 30 hours per week (Roddam, 2012); more closely aligned to RSEs’ obligation to guarantee a minimum of six weeks’ work.

\textsuperscript{193} Households taking part in the World Bank studies and other research on the RSE and Canadian SAWP has reported similar use of earnings (Basok, 2000b, 2002, 2003; Brem, 2006; Bailey, 2009; Rohorua et al. 2009; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010; Cameron, 2011; Kumar, 2012).

\textsuperscript{194} There is an extensive international literature on remittances and their use for basic household consumption, children’s education, health, home improvements and so forth. The thesis does not attempt to review this literature, however some examples are: Connell and Brown, 2005; Ghosh, 2006; World Bank, 2006a; D’Emilio et al., 2007; de Haas, 2007; Ratha, 2007; Fajnzylber and López, 2008; Vargas-Lundius and Villarreal, 2008; Lucas and Chappell, 2009; UN, 2009; Ratha et al., 2011b; Sirkeci et al., 2012.
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More than half of the RSE workers interviewed in Big Bay, Vanuatu, were not planning to return to New Zealand for the 2009/10 season, for reasons including family obligations, building a new house, and gardening/agricultural commitments. The men were, however, keen to participate again in 2010/11 to earn additional income for the next development project at home. Similarly in interviews with Samoan RSE workers in 2009, all respondents stated they had longer-term development plans in the village (including cattle farming and small business ventures) and had no desire to migrate permanently to New Zealand.

These findings are supported by the Department’s (2012a) study of return migration of RSE workers. Of the 4,486 who participated in the RSE scheme in the first season, by the fourth season (2010/11) “60 percent of the original cohort had returned to participate in at least one subsequent season, and 23 percent (just over 1,000 workers) had participated in all four seasons” (DoL, 2012a, p.6). The majority of workers are not returning year after year, but rather are making intermittent use of the RSE programme as part of a broader household strategy to earn an income that allows families to improve their livelihoods at home (McDowell and de Haan, 1997; Skeldon, 2012). Participation in the RSE is generally viewed as a complement to other village-based activities, not a substitute for them.


[...]In the game against an uncertain world islanders retain the security of the traditional system [rooted in access to land in rural communities] while making use of opportunities for gaining access to some perceived benefits of the foreign commercial system [employment on plantations, in towns, overseas]... Maintaining this contact may not necessitate lengthy periods of residence in the village, but some circulation between their places of employment and the village is generally considered essential.

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More recent literature on migration as part of a household livelihood strategy reiterates the notion of minimising risk.\textsuperscript{196} Household members make “a strategic or deliberate choice of a combination of activities...to maintain, secure and improve their livelihoods,” and internal and international migration is often a calculated decision to diversify sources of income (de Haas, 2010a, p.244). In this sense, the contemporary seasonal work schemes keep alive a long-established ‘tradition’ in the Pacific of temporary absences from villages, especially by adult men, to earn money for investment in family and community-based activities back in their island homes. Migration as a livelihood strategy also explains a tension that can arise between employers who want the same trained workers coming back in successive seasons, and village leaders (and some of the workers themselves) who want to ensure workers have breaks from regular absences overseas so that they can attend to family and community needs at home.

10.3.2 Remittance use: investment beyond individual households?

Although money earned abroad may be used to improve the livelihoods of individual households, whether the skills and earnings Pacific workers gain overseas are translated into other productive investments at home is less certain.\textsuperscript{197} In her research on the seasonal migration of Mexican workers to Canada and opportunities for development in origin communities, Basok (2000b, 2002, 2003) argues that while workers have been able to improve their households’ living standards, build houses and send their children to school, few have been able to invest their remittances in productive activities. For Jamaican workers recruited under the US H2-A programme, there is also minimal evidence that work in the US and remittances have aided economic development in home communities (P. Martin, 2008a).

Interviews with RSE workers in Tonga and Vanuatu in 2009 indicated little financial investment in activities beyond meeting the immediate income needs of RSE households and distribution of funds to family members. One RSE worker interviewed in Big Bay had established a small convenience store that his family managed during the months he was

\textsuperscript{196} See Massey et al., 1993, 1998; McDowell and de Haan, 1997; F. Ellis, 1998; de Haan, 1999, 2002; Gordon et al., 2001; Hampshire, 2002; Rogaly et al., 2002; Deshingkar and Start, 2003; Collinson, 2009; de Haas, 2010a; Brown et al. 2013.

\textsuperscript{197} See Connell and Conway, 2000; Connell and Brown, 2005; Borovnik, 2006.
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employed in New Zealand. None of the RSE workers interviewed in Tonga had invested in small business enterprises. All were residents of villages on the main island of Tongatapu where access to land for productive investment is limited, and remittances are used predominantly to meet daily needs. A number of those interviewed were the sole breadwinners for the family, and the RSE scheme was considered a major opportunity to provide a regular stream of income to Tongan households. These findings were supported by the World Bank’s research, which found no clear evidence that the RSE had fostered the development of non-agricultural businesses among Tongan households, and only limited evidence of business development in Vanuatu (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010).

In Samoa, however, interviews with RSE workers from Poutasi Village revealed that earnings from the RSE scheme had enabled individuals to pursue business ventures. Examples of successful outcomes were the workers who: 1) invested in cows for a cattle farm and planned to use next season’s earnings for wire fencing; 2) established a taxi business to service the Falealili area; and 3) planned to extend current business operations (a store) by establishing a tourism venture (fale-style accommodation and boat transport) for surfers visiting the area. Samoan workers’ ability to invest in small business activities may be partly attributed to the lower costs for these workers to participate in the RSE (10.4.1), and a reflection of the influential role played by the highest-ranking chief of Poutasi Village (and the surrounding Falealili District) in the selection of workers for the RSE scheme, and the chief’s broader visions for development of the district (see next section).

Once households have met their immediate targets for income generation, the pattern of investment may change as return workers seek to invest in other activities (de Haas, 2007). By the third and fourth seasons return RSE workers to the island of ‘Eu’a, Tonga were using their earnings to expand existing business ventures, or to establish new enterprises. Examples included: 1) the establishment of a small convenience store; 2) a lawn mowing business; and 3) a small internet service facility with two computers available for community members’ use (Rohorua pers. comm, April 2012).

The ILO (2012a, p.23) has identified a lack of reintegration services for returning seasonal workers “that focus on contributing to the economic livelihood, income generation and

198 Fale is a traditional Samoan house/building.
employment prospects for individuals”. As part of the ILO’s capacity building initiatives in
the Pacific region the agency is devising a return and reintegration services project “that will
focus on building the capacity of governments, unions, businesses and local communities to
provide effective reintegration services” to RSE and PSWPS workers (ILO, 2011b, para.2). At
the time of writing in January 2013, no information was available on the specific nature of
the reintegration services that will be provided.¹⁹⁹

10.3.3 Remittances and community development

Despite the present lack of reintegration services that focus specifically on the in-country
economic development of return workers, remittances from seasonal employment are
having a positive impact at the community level. Six RSE workers from a small community of
30 households on ‘Eua, Tonga have participated in the RSE for the past five seasons and have
contributed to the building of a new church, a new village water supply system, as well as
making annual contributions to a scholarship fund for education (Rohorua pers. comm, April,
2012).

In Samoa the highest-ranking chief of the Falealili District has considerable authority over
land allocation and use in the district and clear objectives for community development.²⁰⁰
RSE workers selected from the district are required to contribute to a compulsory savings
scheme during their time abroad, to ensure money earned from seasonal work is used
constructively for the benefit of entire communities. When interviewed in early 2009, the
chief had plans to make available tracts of land under his matai title for commercial and

¹⁹⁹ The development impact of migration is not however restricted solely to investment in ‘productive’
enterprises. There is a large literature on the role of ‘multiplier’ effects in local communities (See Adelman and
reviews). As de Haas (2005, pp. 1274-1275; cf. OECD, 2006) explains consumption and other downplayed ‘non-
productive’ investment in housing and education can have positive multiplier effects and increase local
economic activity [as one remittance dollar spent on basic needs will stimulate retail sales and further demand
for goods and services etc.] through which the benefits of remittances also accrue to non-migrant households.
Research by Adelman and J.E. Taylor (1990) indicated that remittances produced the largest income multipliers
when they flowed into rural households whose consumption and expenditure patterns favoured goods
produced domestically, with relatively labour-intensive production technologies and few imports.

²⁰⁰ The senior matai of Poutasi Village is a highly successful businessman with a tourism operation on the south
coast of Upolu. As the highest-ranking chief, he has a particular interest in providing opportunities for
productive investment for families in the village in an effort to reduce out-migration to the main urban centre,
Apia. Poutasi Village, with a population of 379 (2006 census), is one of 10 villages in the Falealili District. The
district as a whole, with a population of 4,607, had a net migration rate of -14.4 percent at the time of the 2006
Census (Samoa Bureau of Statistics, 2008).
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recreational activities such as cattle farming, tourist activities, and a sports field. RSE workers could then choose to invest in these ventures as they saw fit.

Unforeseen events, such as the tsunami that hit the coastline of South Upolu, Samoa on 29 September 2009 (and the sinking of ferries in Tonga and Kiribati earlier in the same year), can however alter families and communities’ planned use of remittances, and short-term visions for development. The researcher visited Samoa in February 2010 and returned to the Falealili District. The matai estimated that 80 percent of families in the district lost their homes. The majority of families who survived the tsunami had moved inland, and rebuilding homes was the priority. Any earnings RSE workers might have retained from previous seasons, or were planning to earn in 2009/10 and 2010/11, were to be used primarily for this purpose. The focus on rebuilding was also at the expense of other productive activities, including the maintenance of plantations and the running of small businesses.

In Vanuatu there has been a strong community dimension to much of the recruitment under the RSE scheme. Several communities require new workers to contribute approximately NZ$200 to funds for a range of local initiatives including water supply systems, scholarship funds for education, and small business initiatives and crop production by local women (McKenzie et al., 2008; Macelllan, 2008; Connell and Hammond, 2009). Other communities, while not requiring a specific financial contribution from RSE workers, have benefited from workers’ investment in local projects. Community leaders interviewed on the remote western shore of Big Bay, Espiritu Santo, planned to build a village water supply system using earnings contributed from RSE workers, as well as investing in sandalwood plantations.²⁰¹²⁰²

According to Vanuatu’s Commissioner of Labour an issue that has now arisen for Ni-Vanuatu workers who have been to New Zealand for several seasons, is how to use their savings after they have met their immediate needs for income. Information sharing across islands is seen as a key tool in assisting households and communities to make productive use of earnings from seasonal employment. One approach, adopted by the Lolihor Development Council, an

²⁰¹ Vanuatu first exported sandalwood during the mid-1880s. Since the 1990s the Vanuatu government has promoted the sustainable growth of sandalwood plantations due to the tree’s high value as an export commodity. Sandalwood is currently sold as carving logs, oil and powder for use in Asia and Europe (Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, 2012).
²⁰² Also see Bailey, 2009; Cameron, 2011; and Kumar, 2012 for a discussion of RSE workers’ investment in community projects.
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association of 12 villages in the district of North Ambrym, has been to put workers’ monetary contributions to the community on term deposit until the Council decides on future development initiatives for the district.

The RSE scheme is currently the second biggest contributor to Vanuatu’s economy after tourism, bringing an estimated VUV$3.8 billion (approximately NZ$51 million) into the country over the past five years (Marango, 2012). The Commissioner is keen to ensure that remittance income is not solely benefiting individual households, but is contributing more broadly to local development. To this end, the Commissioner is working to establish a compulsory savings fund to which all RSE workers must contribute for the development of specific projects.203

The Commissioner’s strategy is one approach that may ameliorate a longer-term problem of widening inequalities in wealth and living standards at the village level, as money earned from waged employment is repeatedly returned to the same families and communities.204 New Zealand (and Australian) employers want the same, proficient workers to return year after year to maximise productivity. Island governments, on the other hand, want to spread opportunities to participate in seasonal work schemes widely, to ensure the financial benefits are dispersed among island communities.

This is a difficult tension to balance, especially now that the majority of RSEs have established relationships with particular island communities, and often use their return workers to select new recruits. Results from the Department’s 2011 online survey indicated nearly half (47 percent) of RSEs (n=75) wanted to recruit the same workers for the next season, and 45 percent wanted a mix of new and returning workers from the same countries they currently recruit from (Research New Zealand, 2011).

203 Caribbean workers participating in the Canadian SAWP must remit 25 percent of their wages as part of a compulsory saving scheme. A portion of the money (19 percent) is returned to the worker when he/she returns home, and the remainder may be allocated to the Caribbean government for expenses relating to the programme (Verma, 2003). Hennebry and Preibisch (2012, p.e32) argue “workers have expressed dissatisfaction with the scheme both in terms of its operation (delays in payment, low in-country exchange rates) and its paternalistic nature”.

204 Cameron (2011) and Kumar (2012) also make reference to the issue of rising inequalities at the village level in Vanuatu as a result of the same workers repeatedly being selected for seasonal employment in New Zealand.
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With an annual cap of 8,000 places and relatively high unemployment in New Zealand (7.3 percent in September 2012), there are limited prospects for any real growth in the numbers of RSE workers in the years ahead. The Australian Government’s implementation of the Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) in July 2012, to follow on from the pilot, will provide new employment opportunities to some island communities, particularly given the government’s decision to extend the number of countries participating as well as the sectors PSWs may be employed in.\footnote{As noted in Chapter 6, the Seasonal Worker Program is open to workers from Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and East Timor, and includes seasonal labour mobility arrangements in horticulture, cotton, cane, aquaculture and tourism (Kovacic, 2012; Roddam, 2012).} However the numbers participating in the pilot scheme were small – a total of 1,600 workers by the end of the pilot in June 2012 (Kovacic, 2012) - and the places available under the Seasonal Worker Program are still relatively limited (a total of 12,000 visas over four years) (DEEWR, 2012; Roddam, 2012).

There is no shortage of willing and available workers in the islands, especially in Melanesian countries with sizeable working-age populations and few migration outlets. New Zealand and Australia’s seasonal work schemes cannot satisfy the demand for wage employment fuelled by the rapid growth of youthful populations in the islands (Bedford and Hugo, 2012). Moreover, as both seasonal work programmes become more established, those selected will increasingly be drawn from specific communities, influencing the equity of remittances and development outcomes in origin communities (Kapur, 2004; Hugo, 2009; Skeldon, 2008; de Haas et al. 2009; IOM, 2010a).

If earnings from participation in the RSE/PSWPS are directed towards local projects that are of benefit to entire villages however, this may mitigate the sense of rising inequalities at the community level between those households that generate a significant source of income from participation in seasonal work (averaging at least NZ$5,500 each season), and those families that are not given the opportunity to take part.

10.4 Financial costs for Pacific seasonal workers

The New Zealand and Australian seasonal work schemes are contributing to economic development in Pacific states, but this does not mean there are no costs for participating households. Sending migrants abroad is an expensive endeavour, particularly for lower-
skilled workers. With reference to Asia, Hugo (2008, p.42) notes that, “at every stage of the process – recruitment, preparation to travel to the destination, in transit to the destination, at the destination and upon return to the home country – migrant workers are subject to making payments for services and to gatekeepers”. These costs siphon money away from migrants and their families, which in turn limits the development impacts in origin countries (Hugo, 2008; P. Martin, 2010). Despite migrants and their families viewing the costs of migration as a necessity to improve their livelihoods, it can take repeated absences over several seasons to generate enough savings to repay debts, before households can make other productive investments (de Haas, 2007; Rahman, 2007, 2009).206

10.4.1 Costs of engagement in-country

The kick-start states and the Solomon Islands share a common dimension to their geographies. They are all island archipelagos with a small number of urban centres; one each for Kiribati, Samoa, and Tuvalu, and one main town plus two or three small administrative centres in the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. Although there are significant differences in the distribution of the six countries’ populations across their islands, and major variations in the distances between their respective islands, all are struggling with the logistics of managing a recruitment system that does not result in large numbers of prospective workers spending lengthy periods in the main towns while awaiting selection for employment.

The geographic isolation of Pacific countries generally has been identified as a key constraint to their socioeconomic development (World Bank, 2005, 2006b; ADB, 2009). This remoteness also presents real challenges for families wishing to participate in overseas labour migration, due to the distances many have to travel to the main urban centres to process their visa applications and get the required health and police clearances.207 Limited transport infrastructure, and the irregularity of boat and airline services between outer islands and the main towns, compounds workers’ costs. The sea worthiness of ferries used

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206 International agencies such as the ILO, the IOM and the UN have recognised the importance of reducing the costs of labour migration for low-skilled workers. See ILO, 2006; Baggio, 2009; UN, 2009; IOM, 2010a; P. Martin, 2010.
207 See J. Gibson and McKenzie (2011) for an estimate of costs for PSWPS workers.
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for internal travel in the islands has also been called into question, with the sinking of two ferries in Kiribati and Tonga in 2009, killing more than 100 people (SPC, 2011b).

Each season RSE and PSWPS workers are required to find the money to cover their half share of the airfare to New Zealand/Australia, passport and visa fees, medical and police clearances, and internal travel within the home country. Estimates of the costs facing workers from each country vary. Table 10.4 shows the average upfront costs facing RSE workers from the six Pacific countries, relative to their earnings for the 2009/10 season.208 As the Table clearly demonstrates, there are substantial differences in the upfront costs paid by workers from the different countries, with Solomon Islanders, l-Kiribati and Tuvaluan workers facing the highest upfront costs each season. For workers from these three countries, these costs represented a significant share of their earnings in 2009/10 - 13 percent for l-Kiribati workers, 14 percent for the Solomon Islanders and 21 percent for the Tuvaluans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Av. seasonal earnings 2009/10 (NZ$)</th>
<th>Av. upfront costs (NZ$)</th>
<th>Costs as % of earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>11,020</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>12,970</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>11,960</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>10,570</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>15,860</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>9,680</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own elaboration based on interview data and Department of Labour’s (2012a, p.8) estimated gross earnings of RSE workers

The IAUs for the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu specify that the cost of transport is not to be an impedance to participation in the RSE scheme (DoL, 2007b, 2007c, 2010e) but the simple geography of these islands makes transport costs an inevitable constraint. In the Solomon Islands, the government agency responsible for the oversight of the RSE (the Labour Mobility Unit, LMU) selects most workers from communities in and around the main urban centre, Honiara, on Guadalcanal, in an effort to reduce the costs for workers.

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208 The much higher average earnings for l-Kiribati workers in 2009/10 compared with workers from other countries reflects their longer duration of employment in New Zealand – an average of 5.8 months in 2009/10, compared to 4.7 months for workers from the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. Refer to Table 10.2.
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In Kiribati and Tuvalu, the upfront costs coupled with irregular transport services in both countries, present a real obstacle for most wishing to participate in the RSE. Local banks have been reluctant to cover these costs by providing loans, and the families of the selected workers are not generally in a position to pay the fares. The impact of distance, and associated costs, has also been a disincentive for New Zealand employers wanting to recruit from either of the two countries. The Department of Labour’s facilitated recruitment drives as part of the SPP project have played a critical role in ensuring some recruitment of workers from both countries has continued.

In 2010 the Kiribati and Tuvalu governments recognised that the provision of financial assistance to their RSE workers was a necessity if they were to continue participating in the RSE scheme. Tuvalu has established a revolving credit facility whereby RSE workers can access government funds to cover their upfront costs to New Zealand. Employers deduct regular allocations from the workers’ wages as contributions towards refunding the loans, and these payments are made into a Tuvalu government account in New Zealand overseen by the Tuvaluan Consul-General. Feedback from the only RSE to recruit continuously from Tuvalu indicates the revolving fund is working well. In Kiribati the government has set up a similar interest-free credit facility that advances money to RSE recruits, with the workers’ share deducted from their wages during employment in New Zealand. Workers would have been able to access this credit facility for the first time during the 2010/11 season.

10.4.2 Finance options for workers to meet their upfront costs

Workers in the other kick-start states also have access to various loan facilities, summarised in Table 10.5. The provision of a range of finance options for new and returnee RSE workers has been a significant factor in the success of Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga’s

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209 As noted in Chapter 8, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan workers must pay their internal transport costs to the main urban centres of Tarawa and Funafuti for selection by employers and visa processing, and then cover the full cost of getting to Fiji under the cost-sharing arrangements with New Zealand employers. A detailed description of the logistical difficulties and associated costs for Tuvaluan RSE workers can be found in C. Bedford et al. (2010), while the cost constraints for I-Kiribati workers are discussed in the Department’s (2010a) evaluation report.

210 For the 2011/12 and 2012/13 seasons the costs for I-Kiribati workers travelling to Fiji have increased further. Fiji’s Air Pacific, one of only two airlines that offered flights between Tarawa and Nadi, Fiji, has had a monopoly on flights since the Fiji interim government suspended flights by the second carrier, Air Kiribati, in September 2011. Kiribati’s Minister for Transport has voiced his concerns with the Fiji interim government citing real problems for I-Kiribati RSE workers who can no longer afford the cost of flights to New Zealand (RNZI, 2012).

211 Information is not available on the provision of loan facilities to Solomon Islanders.
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engagement with the RSE scheme to date. Nonetheless, some have voiced concerns that the economic obligations placed on workers to repay their debts in as short a time as possible have served to restrict the activities of workers during their employment in New Zealand (Bailey, 2009, Ericsson, 2009).

Table 10.5: Workers’ strategies for funding upfront costs to return to New Zealand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Tonga</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Kiribati/Tuvalu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worker obtains loan from credit facility set up by government or loans from provincial/island councils</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker takes loan from micro-credit facilities established by local Pacific communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker takes loan from local bank/private finance company</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker obtains funds from church</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker has access to community contributions from earnings of previous season’s workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker has personal savings from work during a previous season</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker has funds advanced from employer to cover expenses. Funds are deducted from workers wages once worker is in New Zealand</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker leaves funds in New Zealand with employer/in bank account (to cover airfare and other costs)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table adapted from the Department’s (2010a) evaluation report

In Tonga and Samoa, churches play a central role in organising groups of RSE workers to be sent to New Zealand, and provide loans to cover workers’ costs. Rates of interest are often minimal, as long as the RSE worker is a reliable member of the church’s congregation. However, a number of authorities interviewed in both countries spoke with unease about the conditions churches may impose on RSE workers regarding the use of their earnings once they return home.
Although connections established via the church may ensure work groups sent to New Zealand/Australia are cohesive, there are concerns that workers are prioritising donations to the church over saving money for their families, especially as the gifting of money to the church accords considerable status to congregation members (with individual families’ contributions read out during services) (Connell and Brown, 2005). Macpherson and Macpherson (2011, p.307) argue the central role of the church comes at a cost: “cash, labour and goods that parishioners give to their pastors, and to the churches they serve, are not available for investment in small business or agricultural development or for postponed investments such as education and training”. Respondents identified financial literacy training for RSE workers as a useful tool to teach workers to prioritise loan repayments as well as investing in their families first, before donating large sums of money to other activities.

10.4.3 Sending money home and recent initiatives to reduce costs

Existing research has suggested that short-term migrants remit a higher proportion of their earnings to their home-based families than longer-term migrants because they usually travel without family members, and they intend to return to their country of origin (Carling, 2008; Hugo, 2009b; IOM, 2008, 2010b). Nonetheless, in order for this potential to be realised, it is imperative to reduce remittance costs, and to ensure migrants and their families have the knowledge to make qualified financial decisions (Connell and Brown, 2005; World Bank, 2006b; Hugo, 2009b; Ratha et al., 2011; J. Gibson et al., 2012; Sirkeci et al., 2012).

Participation in both the RSE and PSWPS has increased the financial literacy of seasonal workers, with many opening bank accounts in both New Zealand/Australia and their home countries (McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010). For Tongan workers participating in both seasonal work schemes, the most common methods for remitting money to families during the season have been via a Tongan-run money transfer operation, Melie Mei Langi (MML), or Western Union (J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). The Managing Director of MML, in an interview in Tonga, estimated that around 80 percent of remittances sent by Tongan RSE workers come through his business. The Tongan RSE workers interviewed in Tonga, and the Tongan PSWs spoken to in Robinvale, Victoria, all made use of MML’s services, and paid approximately A$20 per transaction. RSE workers from Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Solomon
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Islands have fewer options for money transfers, and face considerable transactions costs. For transfers through Western Union, costs range from NZ$30 to NZ$53 per transaction (World Bank, 2012).

Several initiatives have been introduced since 2008 to assist Pacific households with management of their remittance transfers. These include remittances price comparison websites that allow Pacific Islanders in New Zealand or Australia to compare costs, methods of transfer and exchange rates for remittance services to their home country (www.sendmoneypacific.org; http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/); online currency exchange services that enable members to send money home at highly competitive rates (http://www.klickex.com/);\(^{212}\) money transfer cards launched by banks in New Zealand in 2008, and Australia in 2012, that enable Pacific Islanders to send money home with minimal transaction costs (Scoop Business, 2008; Islands Business, n.d; ABC Radio Australia, 2012);\(^{213}\) remittance transfers via mobile phone (Pacific Financial Inclusion Programme, 2011), and MoneyPACIFIC, a targeted financial education programme for Pacific peoples living in New Zealand and the Pacific region (Abel and Hailwood, 2012).

Research by J. Gibson et al. (2012, p.3) “designed to measure the impact of providing financial literacy training” to Pacific Island and East Asian migrants in New Zealand and Sri Lankan migrants in Australia, indicates training is most effective for those who had “relatively low education and financial literacy at the baseline” or “relatively low frequencies of remitting” (in this instance the Pacific Island and East Asian migrants respectively).\(^{214}\)

According to J. Gibson et al. (2012, p.19) “the training did succeed in increasing financial knowledge about the components of remittance costs, and in getting people to search for more information about the costs of sending money”, but it did not result in any change to the amount remitted. Moreover, results from the Pacific Island sample indicate there has

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\(^{212}\) Tongans and Samoans based in New Zealand can send money home via KlickEx at a cost of NZ$3-10, depending on the urgency of the transaction (the quicker the transfer, the lower the transaction cost) (World Bank, 2012).

\(^{213}\) Money transfer cards use a two-card pre-paid system. One card is issued to the sender in New Zealand, and a nominated recipient in the islands holds the other and can withdraw funds via the ATM and EFTPOS networks (Abel and Hailwood, 2012).

\(^{214}\) The main focus of the training was on understanding the components of remittance costs, teaching strategies for reducing these costs, and highlighting sources of information for comparing costs and learning about new remittance methods (J. Gibson et al. 2012, pp.11-12). See J. Gibson et al. (2012) for a detailed review of their research methods and results.
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been relatively little uptake of low-cost facilities such as KlickEx, money transfer cards offered by banks and remittance transfers via mobile phone, primarily because respondents found another method of remitting was either more convenient for them or the receiver. J. Gibson et al. (2012, pp.20-21) conclude:

Thus despite simply informing remitters about remittance costs being a relatively cheap and uncontroversial intervention, it will not necessarily lower average costs from remitters switching to cheaper methods. Instead governments targeting reduced average money transfer costs may need to address other barriers, which may include excessive regulation and exclusive arrangements made by state-owned entities that deter new entry into remittance corridors, and barriers to access of financial services on the receiving country side.

10.4.4 Employment in New Zealand: debt repayments and savings

The provision of low-cost credit facilities to assist workers cover expenses associated with migration, as well as low-cost remittance transfer options, are essential if the financial benefits of seasonal migration are to be gained by individual migrants and their families. In addition, consideration must be given to the minimum period of employment workers require in each destination country to cover costs, repay debts and generate a small amount of savings (Ruhs, 2006).

Given the costs incurred by workers from all Pacific countries to participate in the RSE, the minimum period of employment is four months of consistent work. If the periods of guaranteed employment are three months or fewer, or workers have long periods of downtime during the season, then it is unlikely workers will be taking back the savings that they have come to New Zealand to obtain, and dissatisfaction with the scheme will increase.

In light of the higher costs sustained by workers from the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu, their governments are keen for workers to have longer periods of six to seven months’ employment in New Zealand, working with different RSEs through the joint ATR system. While joint ATRs provide workers with an opportunity to increase their earnings, they are not without their complications. As a nursery grower specialising in fruit tree production explained during an interview, it is not possible to get skilled, experienced workers who can easily switch from one job to the next, particularly highly specialist tasks
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that are performed on his nursery. Other employers sharing workers on joint ATRs have made similar observations – workers suited to picking apples are not necessarily going to be well suited to picking kiwifruit or citrus, or efficient at pruning grape vines. The skills workers require on the orchard/vineyard are not generic, and it can take workers several seasons to master them.

10.5 Social costs of participation in the RSE on families left behind

Longer periods of employment in New Zealand also generate their own social costs for both workers and families left behind. RSE workers, their families and community leaders in the islands all cited the social impacts of regular seasonal employment abroad as a primary concern, as families cope with changes to household production and the emotional costs of family members’ repeated absence.215 216

10.5.1 Challenges at home: impacts on village agricultural production systems

For island communities, the social costs relate primarily to the loss of active younger workers who would normally contribute to the household’s agricultural production. This is of particular significance in the Pacific due to the limited options for investment in labour-saving technologies in village agriculture (Connell, 1981). The household’s ability to adapt is also influenced by the existence of an extended family and kinship structure which allows other family members to fill roles normally assigned to the absent members (McDowell and de Haan, 1997; Hugo, 2002). In the absence of support provided by extended family members, households may be required to change their normal patterns of production and consumption, which can have longer-term dietary and health impacts. In her reflections on the village-level impacts of participation in the RSE and PSWPS in Tonga, Rohorua (pers. comm, April 2012) noted that:

215 The social impacts of short-term migration for employment are reviewed in a report for NZAID (C. Bedford et al., 2009).
216 There is a considerable literature, especially in Asia, on the social costs of migration for the family left behind, including the impacts on gender roles and the household’s division of labour, family dynamics and children’s education. See among others: Scalabrini Migration Centre, 1987; Battistella and Gastardo-Conaco, 1998; Hadi, 1999; Parreñas, 2000; Kandel and Gao 2001; Hugo, 2002; Lam et al., 2002; Yeoh et al., 2002; Asis et al., 2004; Rajan, 2004; Carling, 2005; Biao, 2007; D’Emilio et al. 2007; Elmhirst, 2007; Rahman, 2007, 2009; Toyota et al., 2007; Piper, 2008; Piper and Yamanaka, 2008; Baggio, 2009; Macour and Vakis, 2009; Resurreccion, 2009; Walla, 2010; J. Gibson et al., 2011a, 2011b; Hoang and Yeoh, 2011; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011; Ratha et al., 2011a; R. Bennett et al., 2013).
If you don’t have strong extended family with you, the [negative] impact is huge. You have money coming in every week (NZ$200-300) but there’s no one to feed the livestock, to go to the farm, to look after the children.

The World Bank’s surveys of Tongan RSE households suggested families had been able to adjust relatively smoothly to the absence of their RSE workers. This was due in part to the accessibility of banks and ATMs in Tonga and the ease with which family members could access money sent home by workers, to help offset the absent workers’ contributions to the household and agricultural activities. It was also common for other household members to take on additional tasks to cover the roles of the absent worker (Rohorua et al., 2009).

By the fifth season however, some Tongan RSE households on the island of ‘Eua were experiencing a drop in the frequency of remittances. It is unclear whether the drop in remittances was due to RSE workers spending more while they are abroad, or whether they were choosing to limit remittance transaction costs and return with more money as repatriated savings at the end of the season. However, the overall effect has been a reduction in the cash available for families to purchase food and other goods during their workers’ employment overseas, in turn making it more difficult for households to substitute for the loss of their family member (Rohorua pers. comm, April 2012).

In Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu, local communities have tried to minimise the disruption to villages and agricultural production caused by their participation in the RSE and PSWPS. In Vanuatu there is a preference for only men to be recruited as RSE workers, especially from rural areas, given the critically important roles women play in the subsistence agriculture system and in community life (cf. Cameron, 2011; Kumar, 2012). In Big Bay individual households make selective use of the opportunity to participate in the RSE scheme, sending household members for one or two seasons, but not repeatedly, to limit disruption to agricultural production and family life. Other communities, such as Lamen Bay on the island of Epi, with a total population of 440 (2009 Census, Vanuatu National Statistics Office, 2010), have placed a cap of 110 on the number of workers allowed away during any one season, to ensure that the regular cycle of village-based activities is not unduly disrupted.
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The matali of Poutasi Village, Samoa, requires RSE workers to plant extensive taro gardens before they leave for New Zealand so the crops will be ready for harvest when the men return. Workers are carefully selected to ensure the village does not suffer from a substantial loss of manpower that is needed to maintain agricultural production levels, as well as to conduct family chores and maintain the traditional village structure. In another case, a New Zealand-based Tongan recruitment agent explained that he selects only workers from Tonga who have demonstrated they work hard to maintain their village gardens and have taken some steps to prepare for their absences. Similarly, RSE households in ‘Eua are beginning to plan ahead by planting crops prior to the workers’ departure for New Zealand. Time management has been a key skill learned by workers during their employment in New Zealand. The men recognise that if they work hard during the months they are back in the village to maintain their plantations and tend to livestock, they can ensure their families will have food available for consumption during their absence (Rohorua pers. comm, April 2012).

10.5.2 Broader social costs of out-migration on island communities

In addition to the impacts on agricultural production, there are broader costs facing households, especially in countries like Samoa and Tonga where the RSE scheme is merely one of several routes their citizens have to work and live overseas. Both countries have histories of out-migration for education and employment overseas (including opportunities for permanent migration to New Zealand under the current Samoan Quota and Pacific Access Category) (Bedford, 2008a; Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

Neither the Samoan nor Tongan governments see any problem at this stage with the numbers deployed under the RSE and the sustainability of such flows at the village/district level. Nonetheless, the provision of labour to Australia and New Zealand under their seasonal work schemes needs to be considered within the wider context of out-migration from both countries. This is especially the case for Tonga, which has provided the majority of workers under the PSWPS, in addition to approximately 1,300 Tongan RSE workers sent to New Zealand each season.217

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217 Tonga has an estimated net migration loss through international migration of 1,800 per year out of a total population of 101,000 (2006 Census, Lolohea and Demmke, 2008). The numbers participating in the RSE and PSWPS therefore represent close to the current level of out-migration from Tonga.
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The RSE policy (and PSWPS) is continuing and compounding a long-standing trend of migration-induced absentee mothers and fathers, and the increasing reliance on relatives and others in the community to support the children left behind.\(^{218}\) Respondents mentioned the family tensions that occur as a result of husbands/fathers (the traditional authority figure) being absent from the family. Some respondents described children becoming less disciplined and unruly, and increasing problems with truancy and petty crime. Others noted the strain absence places on marital relationships. By the fifth season RSEs and authorities in the islands were citing increasing incidences of RSE workers forming relationships while in New Zealand, and this is one of the potential longer-term negative effects of continual absence on family and community relations.

This is not a problem that the RSE policy has to try and address. Rather it is a more general societal problem that participating island countries have to grapple with. No community leaders spoken to in Tonga had an answer as to how this negative dimension of migration generally could be addressed while allowing Pacific Islanders who would not otherwise have access to seasonal wage employment and the associated financial rewards.

10.6 RSEs’ engagement with island communities and visions for the future

The RSE scheme completed its fifth season in 2011/12, and on balance the evidence suggests that the early benefits for RSE households and communities have been sustained. Although there are costs for families as they adjust to the regular absence of seasonal workers, the overall consensus is a positive one. The monetary gains from seasonal employment are improving the livelihoods of individual households and, in some instances, are also contributing more broadly to the development of island communities.

An emerging issue, and one that will be critical to the ongoing success of the RSE scheme, is the strengthening relations between RSEs, their workers and source communities, and the potential for RSEs to contribute directly to development in the islands. Anecdotal reports of increasing competition for experienced workers between RSEs in New Zealand, as well as

\(^{218}\) As noted in Footnote 216 there is a large literature on the impacts of migration on the left behind in Asia. The role of the extended family is especially important in terms of helping children cope with parental absence as well as providing care-giving duties. See Battistella and Gastardo-Conaco, 1998; Hugo, 2002; Piper, 2008 and Baggio, 2009.
possible competition from Australia with the introduction of the SWP, means employers will need to consider more substantive ways to reward and retain their experienced staff than simply providing regular wages.

### 10.6.1 Employers’ investment in island communities

Many RSEs already contribute in various ways to development of island communities. Details of the different forms of assistance given by RSEs interviewed are provided in Appendix 9. A common form of support is to supply freight containers at the end of each season for workers to send large goods home (including vehicles, large household appliances, furniture and gardening equipment). As New Zealand community and church groups begin to establish relationships with specific villages some have also provided assistance. Fundraising activities are one means of providing support, with money donated to workers to help them send goods home and for small projects in the islands.\(^{219}\)

One RSE interviewed had undertaken specific projects in the islands. The employer, an apple grower in Motueka who recruits solely from Tonga, funded several development initiatives during 2009 and 2010 including: repairing a damaged water supply system to provide clean drinking water; building a new kindergarten; building a floating jetty for landing cargo and people; and putting in an electric fence for an agricultural college. From the perspective of New Zealand’s largest RSE, the most effective way employers can contribute is through the provision of technical assistance and skills training - in crop cultivation and maintenance, fertilisers, pest management, machinery maintenance, and practical planting skills. This is a key way in which employers can add value without necessarily investing financially in projects in the islands.

Investment in joint development projects, whether financially or via the provision of technical assistance and targeted training programmes for return workers, is increasingly recognised by employers, industry organisations, and government agencies in New Zealand as the ‘next step’ in ensuring the RSE scheme continues to deliver positive outcomes. Over the past four years small groups of potential investors have undertaken scoping exercises in

\(^{219}\) A fundraising event for a group of Tongan RSE workers in Motueka in 2011, for example, was attended by over 300 members of the local community and generated more than NZ$5,000 to assist workers with the freight costs of sending large items back to the islands.
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Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga to assess the possibilities for joint projects with local communities where there are options for the planting of new crops or increased planting of existing crops that could reduce reliance on imported goods, as well as produce goods for export.

There are, however, significant structural constraints to overcome, including poor infrastructure, the relatively small scale of Pacific Island economies, and their geographic isolation and distance to markets (World Bank, 2005, 2006b; ADB, 2009). To this end, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a contestable fund in July 2012, ‘New Zealand Partnerships for International Development’, that will provide annual funding of NZ$32 million to private sector organisations (including individual RSEs or groups of RSEs) to engage in collaborative business ventures in the Pacific (MFAT, 2012). Grower cooperatives are viewed as a promising option in the islands, and MFAT officials hope to draw on the business acumen and horticulture expertise of New Zealand growers to assist in the development of commercially viable projects.

It is envisaged that collaborative ventures will provide a number of ‘wins’: 1) they will strengthen ties between RSEs, their workers and communities, and help ensure workers remain committed to returning regularly to their employer for seasonal work; 2) they will provide evidence that New Zealand is meeting its core aid objective in the region, namely “to achieve sustainable economic development outcomes in developing countries” (MFAT, 2012, p.2); and 3) joint ventures have strategic value when marketing New Zealand’s horticultural products overseas.

10.6.2 The future of the RSE: a Fair Trade brand?

Pipfruit New Zealand, responsible for marketing New Zealand apples and pears internationally and gaining access to new export markets, is currently examining the potential for fruit picked by RSE workers to be marketed under the Fair Trade brand, arguing that (G. Jones, 2012, p.45):

The outcomes from the RSE scheme are consistent with the objectives of the Fair Trade movement. Fair Trade is a global movement tackling poverty and empowering producers in developing countries through trade. The difference
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is that with the RSE scheme workers trade their labour and they take their money directly back to their families and communities.

To market successfully under the Fair Trade brand, Pipfruit New Zealand needs to show direct linkages between the RSE scheme in New Zealand and positive development outcomes in the islands. In particular, there must be tangible evidence of small business development in the islands that is a direct result of RSE earnings. The basic marketing premise is that the RSE is a much broader venture than simply a seasonal work scheme that provides New Zealand growers with the labour they need. It is a socially responsible programme that delivers returns directly to families and communities in the islands. It is evidence of grass-roots development, as opposed to the top-down approach to many aid projects, and meets consumers’ demands for increasingly environmentally and socially sustainable food production (G. Jones, 2012).

This is the next phase of development of the RSE scheme and once again its success is reliant on the strength of reciprocal relationships within the system. A positive feedback loop is emerging whereby employers want their productive and experienced RSE workers to return each year, so they are investing in additional skills training along with the provision of regular wages. Workers are beginning to use these skills and earnings to develop small business ventures in the islands. New Zealand employers are progressively looking at ways to provide further financial and technical assistance to workers (e.g. how to prepare and market products for export) to help them establish commercially viable businesses. In doing this, employers must remain mindful of the New Zealander first principle underpinning the RSE policy. It is not an either / or situation, but rather a question of retaining an appropriate balance in the composition of their workforce.

Once there are enough employers and RSE workers (and communities) forming these relationships, a certain threshold, or ‘tipping point’ (Rogers, 2008; Page, 2009) will be reached where Pipfruit New Zealand can argue the RSE scheme is Fair Trade, and market horticultural products under the Fair Trade brand. The ‘win’ for employers and the horticulture industry as a whole will be an increase in the share of New Zealand’s horticultural products on supermarket shelves worldwide. The potential ‘win’ for workers and their communities will be the creation of additional jobs and income from small
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business development, which in turn will spread the benefits of RSE beyond individual RSE households.

10.7 Conclusion

The provision of development assistance back to the islands is, without question, an important way for RSEs to add value, and the strengthening relationships between RSEs and workers’ island communities are further evidence of the essential contribution one subsystem makes to the successful engagement of another within the RSE system. Whether such investment, along with the immediate monetary gains made by individual households, can be turned into sustainable development longer-term remains to be seen. Perhaps more crucially, the numbers that can participate in the RSE and the PSWPS are just a fraction of those who wish to take part. Spreading opportunities for their citizens to participate in seasonal work is a priority for island governments as they try to mitigate the potential for future rising inequalities at the village level.

There have already been requests from island governments, as well as other industries within New Zealand and Australia facing labour shortages, to extend the seasonal work programmes to include other sectors. The Australian government has responded by expanding the PSWPS to include other areas of agriculture, as well as fisheries and tourism. The New Zealand government is facing similar pressure from the dairy and meat-processing industries, and the construction sector as it undertakes the post-earthquake rebuilding of Christchurch (Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

The final chapter addresses a number of policy implications for the future of the RSE policy, including possible expansion of the RSE scheme into other sectors, and the extent to which similar programmes may be required to open up opportunities for permanent migration longer-term. Implications of the research findings for theory, as well as areas for future research, are also discussed.
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11.1 Introduction

For island countries taking part in the RSE scheme, late April 2012 represented their fifth year of participation. Several countries marked this anniversary with events in New Zealand and their home countries (DoL 2012e, Pacific Islands Trade and Invest, 2012b). In a tribute to the workers, a contractor in the viticulture industry noted: “most contractors in Marlborough wouldn’t be in business today if it weren’t for these workers” (Pacific Islands Trade and Invest, 2012b, para.6).

The RSE has retained broad support from all key stakeholder groups over the five seasons, and from the perspective of the former RSE National Manager it has remained true to its policy objectives (Fabling, 2012). New Zealand’s Minister of Immigration (until a Cabinet reshuffle in February 2013) observed that (Guy, 2012, p.2): “Amongst the many benefits this programme has brought to those involved, I believe it has helped build stronger people-to-people, and nation-to-nation relationships... New Zealand has a broad interest in seeing the Pacific being prosperous and economically stable, and temporary work access through the RSE has undoubtedly helped this”.

This study has contributed to the contemporary literature on migration and development by providing an assessment of the first five years’ operation of New Zealand’s RSE policy in the wider context of the triple ‘wins’ sought from managed circular migration. The final chapter summarises the major research findings, and considers some of the implications of the research for theory and policy, as well as recommending several avenues for further research.

11.2 Summary of major findings

The overarching aim of this thesis was to evaluate whether the triple ‘wins’ sought from contemporary low-skilled TLMPs can be achieved via effective collaboration between public and private sector interests, including migrant workers and communities, in origin and
destination countries. Five research objectives were established and introduced in Chapter 1 and the key findings relating to each of these are summarised below.

**Objective 1: Examine why low-skilled managed circular migration has become a focus of research and policy attention over the preceding decade.**

This objective was dealt with in Chapter 2 through a review of the international literature on the migration-development relationship and the possible role of managed circular migration as a policy tool that can deliver benefits to migrants, origin and destination countries. The ‘new twist’ in the promotion of such schemes is the argument that low-income countries can also benefit by sending workers abroad (Ruhs and P. Martin, 2008). It is this focus on the potential mutual benefits for countries of origin and destination that distinguishes current managed circular migration programmes from the guest worker schemes of the past, which were designed specifically to meet the labour market needs of receiving countries.

Contemporary managed circular migration schemes are subject to criticism on several grounds, including restrictions of workers’ rights in the destination country, lack of transferability of workers’ skills back to origin communities, and social and financial costs of re-migration which must be borne by migrants and their families. The RSE policy is an interesting case study because the New Zealand government has attempted to mitigate many of these costs including contributing to the economic development of participating Pacific countries through the transfer back to island communities of workers’ earnings and skills,

**Objective 2: Establish the underlying factors that have driven the decisions by the New Zealand and Australian governments to introduce temporary seasonal work schemes that draw on labour from neighbouring Pacific countries.**

Chapter 3 reviewed the regional context, and situated Pacific leaders’ repeated requests for greater access to the labour markets of New Zealand and Australia in a historical context of long-standing circular mobility for waged employment within the Pacific region. RSE workers coming from countries in Polynesia and Micronesia, in particular, have considerable experience of work offshore, either directly or indirectly through relatives or friends abroad; they exemplify Connell’s (2009, p. 59) ‘culture of migration’ where movement for work is an “integral part of Pacific life”.

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For Melanesian workers coming from Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and more recently PNG, the situation has been different. These countries have had few migration outlets to countries on the Pacific rim. The rapid growth of youthful populations in Melanesian countries, coupled with increasing urbanisation as young people go in search of employment in towns, has been a major factor behind Pacific leaders’ calls for enhanced access to New Zealand and Australia’s labour markets. The RSE policy was introduced as a direct response to these requests, with recognition by the New Zealand government that “improved temporary work access for Pacific nationals could contribute to New Zealand’s broad objectives in the region to encourage economic development, regional integration and stability” (Cabinet Policy Committee, 2006a, p.3).

Chapter 4 provided the local context, detailing problems for New Zealand H/V producers over the preceding two decades as they have sought reliable seasonal labour while operating in a competitive, global agri-business industry that requires them to keep costs down and raise output. The RSE policy was introduced to alleviate growers’ labour shortages and to tackle the use of illegal workers. The development and execution of the policy required strong support from the H/V industries to ‘clean up’ grower and contractor practices, and a collaborative government-industry approach to formulate an immigration policy that could serve the dual objectives of enhancing productivity in the H/V industries, while also contributing to economic development in participating island countries.

Objective 3: Examine, through a conceptual framework that draws on systems thinking and complexity theory, the experiences of New Zealand employers, government agencies, workers, and local communities involved in the RSE over the first five years.

Chapters 5 and 6 outlined the conceptual framework and associated research methodology. Systems thinking allowed for collection and integration of data from multiple sources, and at several scales: the macro- (government-government), meso- (region-industry-community) and micro-scale (employer-worker) to provide a holistic assessment of whether the RSE policy is achieving its stated aims. Complexity theory was used to explore the role of positive and negative feedback and emergence that leads to new patterns of behaviour within the RSE system.

220 By June 2011 a total of 7 workers had been recruited from PNG by an RSE in the Hawke’s Bay.
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A critical realist stance was adopted to link the conceptual framework to the case study and multi-method research design. Critical realism allows for use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in an effort to determine how and why certain events take place. Critical realism provided a lens through which the first five years’ operation of the RSE was observed, with the aim of identifying a number of casual mechanisms that enable the programme to produce certain outcomes.

The case study and multi-method approach involved the collation of qualitative and quantitative data from a variety of sources. Interviews (n=126) were conducted in the five kick-start states and New Zealand with members of the key stakeholder groups and community contacts. Primary data was supplemented by analysis of the Department of Labour’s monthly ATR data, the Department’s extensive monitoring and evaluation programme, the World Bank’s RSE and PSWPS surveys, and through attendance at various workshops and conferences over the five years. Material from these various sources was drawn together and examined concurrently through a continual process of data triangulation.

Chapters 7 to 10 presented the research findings in the context of the RSE systems model introduced in Chapter 5. A different subset of participants and their relationships was discussed in each chapter with an emphasis on the interrelationships between them in order to assess whether the RSE policy is achieving its short-term goals.

Objective 4: Assess whether the RSE policy is achieving its stated short-term aims, and whether the accumulated evidence from New Zealand supports the hypothesis that temporary migration of low-skilled labour can contribute to the development outcomes of migrants, in addition to source and destination countries.

Evidence from this research indicates the RSE policy has been successful at delivering positive outcomes to employers, RSE workers, and participating island countries over the first five years. The successful engagement of each of the main stakeholder groups is, however, contingent on the contributions made by other groups. The outcomes for the core stakeholder groups, and their interdependencies with other subsets of participants, are outlined below.
11.2.1 New Zealand employers

The scheme is delivering clear benefits to New Zealand employers through substantial productivity gains from a reliable workforce of experienced RSE workers. Wages data examined in Chapter 7 (and Appendix 10) demonstrated the higher productivity of RSE workers when compared to New Zealand workers and backpackers, and the benefits for employers of the RSE workers’ growing experience on the orchard. These findings were supported by the Department’s annual online survey of H/V employers (2008-2011) where RSEs consistently ranked their RSE workers as more productive than other sources of local labour.

Access to a reliable, experienced workforce of RSE employees is having additional flow-on effects for both RSE and non-RSE employers. For RSEs there is evidence of business expansion on the back of productivity gains from the RSE policy. For non-RSEs, the increasing use of grower cooperatives enables small producers, who do not have the resources to individually invest in the RSE, to benefit from the use of RSE labour. The benefits of the RSE have been much greater than initially anticipated, and go beyond the basic ‘win’ of increased productivity and financial gain for both employers and workers, with an overall improvement in business and employment practices across the industry (Van Beek, pers. comm, August 2012).

Employers are the obvious winners in the RSE, and their gains are due in large part to the close collaboration between industry and government and the roles intermediaries such as the Regional Governance Groups and the Department’s Relationship Managers play in monitoring labour supply and demand in the regions and ensuring RSEs can access the labour they need. The support RSEs receive from Pacific states (and island communities) with their recruitment and selection of workers also makes a critical contribution to employers’ successful engagement in the scheme. Furthermore, the restrictions RSE workers face in terms of their place of work and arrangements for their pastoral care and behaviour means employers are delivered a relatively compliant workforce that is prepared to work in conditions local New Zealanders are unwilling to accept. In the context of
workers’ rights some of these restrictions may be considered an obstacle to their successful participation in the scheme.

11.2.2 Participating island governments

The RSE scheme is largely considered a success by participating island governments because of the high-level relationships they have with New Zealand’s Department of Labour underpinned by the IAUs. The Department has invested heavily in arrangements to support the engagement of the five original kick-start states plus the Solomon Islands, and the facilitative arrangements are working well. All six countries have established ongoing recruitment relationships with New Zealand employers.

There has been considerable variation in the ability of different Pacific states to gain benefit from the scheme over the five seasons, with Kiribati and Tuvalu facing particular difficulties, due in part to the constraints of distance and the associated travel costs facing their workers. Continual restructuring of government agencies responsible for administering the RSE in the islands, and loss of staff with knowledge of the scheme, raises concerns regarding continuity in the employment relationships between RSEs and island governments. Pacific states remain heavily reliant on assistance from New Zealand’s Department of Labour, through programmes such as the SPP project, to manage their institutional arrangements for sending workers offshore. A future reduction in this Department’s level of support may present a real challenge for island governments unless they have clearly established systems and processes in place to manage offshore employment.

Island governments are also competing for a limited number of RSE places each year. This competition has led to the imposition of strong social sanctions on RSE workers to ensure compliance with New Zealand law and employer expectations – sanctions that are meted out in the recruitment and selection process, during workers’ employment, and on the return home. Some of these sanctions raise questions regarding individual workers’ rights during their employment.
11.2.3 RSE workers

The main benefits for RSE workers are: 1) the opportunity to earn a wage income to improve their island-based livelihoods; and 2) the chance to develop additional work and life skills in New Zealand that may be transferable back to home communities. Workers are employed for an average of 5.4 months and earn approximately NZ$12,700 over the duration of the season (DoL, 2012a). Some workers are earning substantially more during the height of the harvest period, up to $11,000 over 10 weeks. This is a significant amount of money, even after tax and deductions, for workers to invest in their families and communities, especially those from poorer, rural areas.

RSE workers and their families are particularly reliant on the contributions of other stakeholder groups to ensure workers’ welfare is protected in New Zealand and they achieve the financial and personal development gains sought from participation in seasonal work. Notwithstanding positive outcomes to workers in the short-term, employment restrictions and social sanctions are potential obstacles to their successful engagement in the scheme, when considered in the context of a ‘rights-based’ approach to migration. The increasingly complex nature of pastoral care issues will present ongoing challenges for RSEs, their workers and others engaged in the management of pastoral care. Tensions between employers’ demands for return workers, and workers’ own ideas about the types of employment they seek and the conditions they will accept, may also generate some difficulties in future.

Some RSEs are looking for ways to reward loyal workers who regularly return, particularly those in their fourth, fifth or sixth season. If this does not come in the form of higher wages, then additional skills training is another means of remunerating and incentivising experienced staff. ‘After hours’ training is an increasingly significant component of the RSE scheme, and provides an important mechanism through which the health and wellbeing of RSE workers and their families can be enhanced.

While additional skills training is viewed positively by all stakeholders at this stage, in time it may generate its own tensions if training is directed primarily towards returning workers rather than new staff. Pacific governments and island-based communities are keen to spread opportunities to participate in training more widely among new and return recruits.
to encourage the broader dissemination of knowledge and skills among local communities, rather than skills just returning to select households that have already attained many of the financial benefits of workers’ regular engagement in seasonal employment. The introduction of in-country horticulture-specific skills training may ameliorate this possible tension by providing benefits to island communities that go beyond the gains for individual RSE workers and their households (see section 11.4.3).

11.2.4 RSE workers’ families and communities

The RSE is also delivering benefits to workers’ families and communities through significant investment in individual households, as well as in small business ventures and contributions towards broader community projects. Additional skills training in New Zealand, in-country horticulture training, and the planned implementation of reintegration services for return RSE workers, may all contribute to further small business and community development longer-term. Possible future investment by New Zealand employers in the islands, through mechanisms such as MFAT’s contestable fund, will also aid the sustainable economic development of island communities.

Nonetheless, there are social and financial costs for RSE workers, their families and communities that must be carefully monitored. The financial costs for RSE workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu in particular may inhibit their future engagement unless workers are employed on contracts that are long enough to repay debts and generate some savings. Extended periods of employment carry their own social costs for workers and their families who have to deal with long periods of separation. This is a particularly difficult tension to balance when workers are seeking to maximise the financial gains from offshore work.

RSEs’ preference for return workers may be at odds with village leaders’ plans as they try to spread the benefits of participation in seasonal work throughout island communities, reduce the social costs in those communities that regularly send workers abroad, and minimise the potential of rising inequalities at the village level. This requires some flexibility on the part of employers, and recognition that participation in periodic seasonal work is part of a broader livelihood strategy for RSE households as they seek to balance the financial gains of work overseas with family and community obligations.
11.2.5 Does evidence from the RSE scheme support the overall hypothesis?

The accumulated evidence supports the hypothesis that managed circular labour migration schemes can deliver positive outcomes to sending and receiving countries as well as to the individual migrants, but these outcomes are heavily reliant on continual collaboration between participant groups and a constant balancing of the policy’s various objectives. There is continual ‘give and take’ between groups within the RSE system as they try to manage the scheme not only in their own their interests, but also in the interests of delivering positive outcomes to other groups. Successful management of such policies is therefore time and resource intensive, and requires a number of interrelated factors that are identified below.

11.2.5.1 A high level of ongoing investment and oversight by government

Managed circular migration schemes like the RSE policy operate as a series of linked activities in different places that vary in their scope and purpose (e.g. regional Labour Governance Groups’ labour demand and supply negotiations, SPP capacity building initiatives in the islands, and RSE worker training). Constant oversight of the scheme is required to ensure these activities are operating in such a way that the policy’s core objectives are kept in balance. It is not a matter of simply implementing a labour migration policy and leaving it to run essentially on its own with minimal investment from government because everyone understands and abides by the rules and everyone is seeking the same benefit or outcome.

Such continuous bureaucratic management comes with high overhead costs. Governments in sending and receiving countries need to accept these costs as an integral part of well-managed migration schemes, and not as something that will decrease in the short or medium-term. The Canadian scheme, which has operated for over 40 years, continues to have significant investment from the Canadian and sending country governments (Asis, 2008; Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012).
11.2.5.2 A collaborative approach

Achievement of the RSE scheme’s objectives would not have been possible without strong industry support and immediate buy-in from some of New Zealand’s largest growers when the policy was introduced, as well as a high level of support from Pacific governments. The collaborative nature of the scheme was identified as a key factor in its success in the independent two-year evaluation of the policy (DoL, 2010a) and further endorsed with the Department’s winning of an IPANZ public sector excellence award in 2011 (IPANZ, 2011).221

11.2.5.3 Relationship building and management between all participant groups

The RSE policy is simply an instrument – it means little without the people who operate it on the ground, and the relationships they forge. Managing complex migration policies requires a willingness on all sides to invest in fostering and maintaining these relationships. While the government plays a crucial facilitating role, the core relationship at the heart of the RSE system is that between employer and worker. It is through this relationship that the real ‘wins’ are achieved as producers build long-standing connections with their workers and these relationships foster beneficial outcomes for both parties.

11.2.5.4 Managing employers’ demand for labour

The ‘New Zealander first’ principle is the major mechanism through which employers’ demands for RSE workers are managed. RSEs face continual pressure from Ministry of Social Development and Department of Labour officials to show evidence of genuine attempts to recruit local labour if available, and as a demonstration of that effort the majority of employers keep their RSE numbers below 50 percent of the total seasonal workforce they require each year.

11.2.5.5 Effective cooperation between sending and receiving countries

The Department of Labour continues to work closely with the participating island states to build their administrative capacity to oversee offshore labour arrangements, and to address any pastoral care issues that may arise with different worker groups. This cooperation will

221 The lack of buy-in by Australian producers was cited as a key reason for the small numbers participating in the Australian PSWPS (Hay and Howes, 2012).
be essential in future if the policy is to continue delivering positive outcomes to participating island countries.

11.2.5.6 Protection of the rights of migrant workers

The limited protection of workers’ rights and welfare in receiving countries is a primary criticism directed towards TLMPs and, in the case of the RSE, concerns about workers’ welfare and their conditions of employment continue to surface (Donnell, 2012; Field, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2012). Seasonal workers’ health and welfare in New Zealand needs to be carefully monitored, and this is a priority area for the SPP programme.

11.2.5.7 Capacity building in sending countries

Improving the institutional capacity and operational delivery systems of Pacific governments taking part in the RSE and SWP is a focus of the SPP initiative and regional assistance programmes provided by the World Bank, AusAID and the ILO. While it is important that countries taking part in the RSE are given the necessary support to continue participating in future, policymakers must recognise that capacity building needs can differ by country. The priorities of Pacific governments are not generic, and any financial and technical assistance needs to be carefully targeted to the appropriate areas for individual countries.

11.2.5.8 Minimising the financial and social costs for workers and families

The social and financial costs for RSE workers and their families are not unique to the New Zealand experience (see C. Bedford et al., 2009). What is unique about the RSE is the effort being made by public and private sector agents to minimise the financial costs for workers through for example, new methods of remittance transfers, and financial literacy and numeracy training. The social costs are harder to manage. Multi-entry visas that enable RSE workers to return home during the season may help to alleviate some of these costs. In addition forward planning by island communities to minimise disruption to agricultural production will help along with improvements in communications technology and banking services in origin communities.
11.2.5.9 Development of origin communities
The economic development of island communities has remained a core objective of the policy and is the focus of both government and industry. Evidence from the first five years indicates participation in the scheme is contributing directly to improving the livelihoods of RSE workers, their families and communities. Initiatives that foster opportunities for further development of island-based communities, such as in-country horticulture-specific skills training and RSE employer-worker joint business ventures, will be increasingly important if this objective of the policy is to be met in future.

11.2.5.10 Monitoring and evaluation
The rigorous monitoring and evaluation programme that has taken place over the first five years is cited as a best practice feature of the RSE scheme (Newland et al., 2008; ILO, 2009; Chappell and Laczko, 2011). It is imperative that this evaluation and monitoring continues if there is to be future objective assessment of whether the policy is achieving its medium and longer-term goals.

11.3 Conceptual findings and implications for theory
There has been a resurgence of interest in migration systems theory and its relevance for understanding migration in a contemporary context. The ‘re-launching’ of migration systems has been due to some advances in systems theory (in causality, emergence and the exercise of agency), and has been driven by researchers coming from a (critical) realist perspective (Bakewell, 2012). This study has clearly demonstrated the validity of systems thinking as a conceptual framework for understanding managed circular migration and the important roles of feedback and emergence in shaping the behaviour of such systems.

11.3.1 Relationships within dynamic systems
This research has demonstrated the fundamental importance of relationships within the RSE system, and placed emphasis on the maintenance of these relationships over time as a key mechanism for ensuring the RSE could operate as a relatively stable entity over the first five years. This finding reiterates Bakewell’s (2012, p.15) argument that, rather than viewing a
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migration system as a structure that persists across time and space (Mabogunje, 1970), “the stability is to be found primarily in the dynamics, where the same (or isomorphic) relationships between different elements persist over time”.

This study has also drawn attention to the importance of emergence, whereby interrelationships operating at the macro-, meso- and micro-scales are leading to novel patterns of behaviour for the system as a whole. Bakewell (2012, p.15) argues: “it is only a system when it has properties which cannot be reduced to individuals”, and there must be “evidence of system dynamics at play”.

Two forms of emergence were identified during the research. The first was ongoing self-organisation by RSE and non-RSE employers, with the increasing use of joint ATRs and grower cooperatives in response to changing economic, political and social factors. Grower cooperatives, especially, are a new form of self-organisation within the RSE system and illustrate the role of positive feedback, whereby non-RSEs are increasingly encouraged to participate in the scheme because they learn of the benefits that are attributed to the use of RSE labour. The second was the future marketing of RSE products under the Fair Trade brand. The success of this marketing strategy cannot be reduced to the actions of a few individuals; it is heavily reliant on a series of interrelationships established between RSE employers, their workers and local communities that encourage small business development in the islands, and demonstrate that the RSE system fosters a socially sustainable form of production.

A key finding is that the RSE system, as a whole, behaves in a particular manner that is quite different from, and cannot be reduced, to the behaviour of individual agents. The success of the programme depends on how individuals interact, the relationships they form, and how their interactions are organised to ensure the policy’s objectives are kept in balance. The RSE exists because of the interactions between different groups within the system that work to reproduce it. As a result, while the RSE has operated as a relatively stable programme over the first five years, it is not a static scheme. The programme continues to evolve and is susceptible to change.
11.3.2 Circular migration and development

The research confirms the overlapping nature of circular migration with other forms of mobility, including temporary and return migration and provides the first comprehensive analysis of New Zealand’s managed circular labour migration scheme. There are two distinct groups of RSE workers that this thesis argues are circular migrants: those that return to New Zealand each season (predominantly to the same employer); and those that have returned to New Zealand for more than one season since 2007/08 but not necessarily in successive seasons (and not necessarily to the same employer).

The migratory patterns of those who make intermittent use of the RSE scheme, especially, demonstrate that circulation is an important means through which RSE workers can make selective use of offshore seasonal employment opportunities to improve livelihoods at home (McDowell and De Haan, 1997). Skeldon (2012) questions whether such managed temporary migration can really be classified as ‘circular migration’ because in his view the circular migrant must be free to return home (or back to the destination country) at any time. Managed circular migration schemes like the RSE do not allow for complete flexibility in timing of movements in and out of countries of origin and destination, but there is clear evidence of ‘circulation’ of labour, especially among those who return for successive seasons.

11.4 Implications for policy related to managed circular migration

It is essential that government officials in New Zealand and the islands do not become complacent about the scheme’s operation in future seasons. Ongoing restructuring within the H/V industries due in part to the continually unfavourable exchange rate and the pressure this places on exporters (Anon, 2013); biosecurity risks such as the Psa bacterial virus that is destroying New Zealand’s golden kiwifruit orchards;\(^\text{222}\) the government’s recently introduced welfare reforms (see below); and the decision to outsource visa

\(^\text{222}\) As noted in Chapter 7 the Psa virus has affected more than 1,200 orchards nationwide and is expected to result in the loss of 470 jobs annually until 2015 (Anon, 2012a, Morton, 2012).
processing in the islands to a third party provider\textsuperscript{223} which has increased costs for RSE workers and the potential for delays in application processing, all emphasise the need for continued government supervision. Four possible policy implications from the research are summarised below.

\subsection*{11.4.1 The government’s welfare reforms and the ‘New Zealander first’ principle}

In October 2012 the New Zealand government began implementing a series of welfare reforms that will remove over 100,000 people from various forms of welfare support by 2015, and beneficiaries will be required to seek local part and full-time employment. The implication for RSEs is clear – they must abide by the ‘New Zealander first’ principle of the policy - and large numbers of beneficiaries seeking employment will reduce the existence of formal labour shortages in the regions. Not only will this make it increasingly difficult for RSEs to argue they need seasonal workers from abroad, but it will also mean non-RSEs are less likely to make the necessary investment to become an RSE in their own right. A major outcome of the welfare reforms may well be a reduction in the numbers of RSE workers recruited in forthcoming seasons.

Greater use is likely to be made of grower cooperatives by non-RSEs, who can benefit from Pacific labour without incurring the costs of registering as an RSE, and the joint ATR system for current RSEs. If RSEs and non-RSE employers are to make greater use of joint ATRs and grower cooperatives, then government officials will need to facilitate the movement of workers across regions (despite varying regional unemployment rates) and ensure there is some flexibility within the programme to allow for different employer arrangements.

Although it remains to be seen what impact the reforms will have on the H/V industries over the next two years, the ‘New Zealander first’ principle operates, in effect, to help reduce distortion and dependence effects, whereby “employers make investment decisions on the assumption that migrants will continue to be available” and migrants and their families become reliant on offshore jobs and wages (P. Martin, 2006, p.2). The RSE is not designed to

\textsuperscript{223} Immigration New Zealand’s (INZ) visa services have been reduced in four (Kiribati, PNG, Solomon and Vanuatu) of the seven New Zealand High Commission posts in the Pacific and outsourced to specialist Visa Application Centres (VACs) – third party providers who act as the collection agent for visa applications and liaise with a central INZ branch in Suva. Aspects of the service provided by VACs are already creating difficulties and delays for some employers seeking workers for 2012/13.
become the sole model for the H/V industries’ labour needs. It is simply one ‘lever’ or
option available to growers to meet their seasonal labour requirements and increase
productivity.

For several years now industry bodies have recognised that the RSE is just one contributor to
a wider strategy to improve business performance across the H/V industries and make the
industry a more attractive prospect for employment of New Zealanders (H/V Labour
Governance Group, 2010). The future of the RSE scheme is likely to depend increasingly on
a number of larger growers, who require significant numbers of seasonal workers at peak
harvest periods. These producers will retain a core, specialist workforce of experienced
Pacific RSE workers that return each year for the harvest period, and meet the remainder of
their workforce needs with local labour.

11.4.2 Expansion of the RSE into other industries?

In order for both the RSE and Australian SWP to contribute more broadly to the economic
development of participating island countries longer-term, either the numbers participating
in both countries’ seasonal work schemes will need to increase (and as suggested in Chapter
10 this is unlikely to happen) or employment needs to be offered in other sectors.

Since the introduction of the New Zealand and Australian schemes several industries have
made requests to both governments to ease restrictions on entry of temporary workers
from the Pacific. Australia has responded by including a range of sectors in the SWP
including cotton and cane, aquaculture and accommodation even though the majority (87
percent of visas) are allocated to horticulture (Roddam, 2012). In New Zealand the dairy and
meat processing industries have requested that the Department of Labour extend the RSE
policy to include their sectors and there have also been discussions between the current
Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Samoa about a possible RSE-type arrangement (on a
limited basis) for temporary workers to assist with the post-earthquake rebuilding of
Christchurch (Islands Business, 2012). Requests have also been made for a more general
extension of managed circular migration schemes into the hospitality industry and aged-care
sector (see, for example, Callister et al., 2009 (NZ) and Hugo, 2009c (Australia)).
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The feasibility of expanding seasonal work schemes into other sectors is difficult to assess. While the New Zealand government has established the Pacific Trades Training Initiative, “a scholarship to support Pacific peoples to enter trades training in 2012 and 2013” to help with the Christchurch rebuild (Joyce and Parata, 2013, para.5), this programme is presently targeted at Pacific students resident in New Zealand. There have been no indications that the programme will be extended to Pacific Islanders abroad, or that it will be linked in any way to the RSE scheme. Extension of an RSE-type arrangement into other sectors will not happen quickly, and may be difficult to achieve, particularly in light of the government’s newly introduced welfare reforms.

In this context it is also important to acknowledge that schemes like the RSE policy and the Australian SWP are only able to satisfy a very small part of the demand for wage work in the Pacific. As Connell (2009, p.173) argues “managed migration, seemingly attractive within the certainty of international migration, offers barely a Band-Aid”. They are not a solution to the growing pressure for employment opportunities from burgeoning youthful populations (Bedford and Hugo, 2012; IMI, 2013).

11.4.3 In-country skills development: wider benefits for families and communities?

An option that is receiving increasing attention from policymakers and industry training organisations is the provision of in-country skills training in the Pacific. Chapter 9 (section 9.5.1.4) made reference to NZHITO’s in-country horticulture-specific skills training, trialled in Samoa in 2012 and expanding to Vanuatu and Tonga in 2013 (DoL, 2012c, 2012d). The training provides participants with formally recognised qualifications, and candidates will be able to further these qualifications while in New Zealand undertaking seasonal employment. At this stage the training is directed at “applicants intending to come to New Zealand under the RSE for work” (DoL, 2012c, p.4). In time the training may be available to Pacific people seeking selection for residence in New Zealand under the Samoan Quota and Pacific Access Category ballots (currently open to citizens from Kiribati, Tonga and Tuvalu).^224

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^224 The PAC ballot allows up to 75 citizens of Kiribati, 75 citizens of Tuvalu and 250 citizens of Tonga to be granted access annually. The Samoan Quota allows 1,100 citizens of Samoa to be selected by ballot each year (INZ, 2010).
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The provision of in-country skills training has the potential to provide far-reaching benefits to rural communities that go beyond the gains for individual RSE/SWP households. Officials in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, both countries without residence quotas for New Zealand, view the NZHITO training as an important mechanism to assist with the reintegration of returning RSE workers. Workers’ reintegration into origin communities is considered an essential component of successfully managed migration schemes, although there are few examples in the literature of effective programmes to achieve reintegration (Asis, 2008; IOM, ILO, OSCE, 2008; GFMD, 2009; IOM, 2010a; ILO, 2012a).

There are numerous challenges to the development of more sustainable cash-earning activities in rural areas including: the difficulty of accessing loans for community-based projects; the communal ownership of land in most parts of PNG and Vanuatu; the high level of support that will be required from locally based government agencies and training organisations if return workers are to capitalise on their newly acquired skills; and the difficulties of reinforcing the idea that a life in rural communities may be preferable to moving to towns or abroad in search of employment.

Nevertheless, there is potential for the SPP programme to contribute directly to the development of appropriate reintegration services, with the support of NZHITO, and it is important that New Zealand policymakers consider adding value in this way. Capacity building initiatives undertaken by New Zealand and Australian government agencies cannot solely be about improving processes around participation in the RSE or the SWP; they must also address the explicit development objective inherent in both policies’ design.

11.4.4 Access to avenues for permanent migration

The extent to which schemes like the RSE (and SWP) may open up future opportunities for permanent migration is a key policy issue. This is particularly relevant in arguments

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225 PNG was not included in the thesis because there were no PNG workers participating in the RSE until 2011. However, PNG is part of the 2013 mid-term SPP evaluation, and material included in this chapter on PNG comes from preliminary findings from the evaluation work.

226 PNG had a total population of just over 7 million in 2012, the equivalent of 70 percent of the total population of all Pacific Island countries. Of this 7 million, 87 percent are rural-resident (Population Reference Bureau, 2012).
surrounding the ‘rights-based’ approach to migration and the social protection of workers (Castles, 2006; Ruhs, 2006; Wickramasekara, 2011; Hennebry, 2012).

Canada’s SAWP, which has operated for over 40 years, does not allow seasonal workers to obtain permanent residence, despite many of Canada ‘temporary’ workers having spent years, if not decades, returning to Canada for a greater part of each year than they spend at home.227 Hennebry (2012) argues a pathway to permanent residence is a much-needed improvement to the SAWP policy. Another of Canada’s schemes, the ‘Live-in Caregiver Program’ established in 1992, allows workers in Canada (employed on employer-specific work permits) to attain permanent residence after 24 months’ authorised full-time employment, with the possibility of bringing in other family members once permanent residence status has been obtained (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012; Michel and Peng, 2012).228

This is a policy area that is gaining more attention in New Zealand as policymakers recognise there will be employers in future who want to retain some of their highly trained RSE staff as permanent employees, as well as RSE workers who wish to migrate to New Zealand due to personal and family connections. There is potential for the RSE scheme to be more closely aligned to the PAC and Samoan Quota residency streams, especially now that direct connections are being forged between the RSE and the in-country training delivered by NZHITO. Previous experience as a seasonal worker under the RSE, coupled with additional horticulture-specific skills training, may place RSE workers who subsequently get selected in the PAC/Samoan Quota ballots in a strong position to secure an offer of full-time employment in New Zealand that meets the residency criteria. Policymakers should consider the possible linkages between these programmes; especially in the interests of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan RSE workers as their countries seek future ways to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.

227 As discussed in Chapter 2, the lack of access to permanent residence in the receiving country is a feature of low-skilled migration generally. With reference to Asia, Hugo (2008) notes that despite an increased demand for low-skilled labour in several Asian countries, where there are such programmes they rarely allow for permanent residence.

228 Despite the presumed attraction of permanent residence, the numbers applying under the caregiver programme since the mid-1990s have been relatively uneven, peaking at almost 14,000 in 2007, but declining since then. This decline is partly attributed to reported cases of employer exploitation and long waiting periods (between 5-10 years) for family unification (Michel and Peng, 2012; cf. Walia, 2010).
11.5 Implications for data collection

Access to reliable data and the sharing of information between sending and receiving countries is a fundamental prerequisite for effective management of TLMPs (Hugo, 2009b; Chappell and Laczko, 2011). In the case of the RSE, this can be achieved by drawing on existing data collection tools and monitoring approaches that have been used over the first five years.

11.5.1 Continuation of the monitoring and evaluation programme

The Department of Labour’s Integrated Data Infrastructure system, the prototype of which was used for the Department’s (2012a) report on return migration and earnings of RSE workers,229 will allow for powerful ongoing monitoring of the financial returns to workers of participation in the RSE, and whether workers’ earnings are remaining relatively static or increasing over time. The database will also provide valuable insights into employers’ recruitment patterns, and whether they are recruiting the same workers repeatedly (which limits the opportunities for new workers to participate) or the return rate is staying fairly stable at approximately 50 percent, indicating there is a good mix of new and return workers being employed.

The Department’s online survey of H/V employers provides an important annual ‘snapshot’ of the policy’s operation across New Zealand, with information on the recruitment activities of both RSE and non-RSE employers. Continuation of the survey will allow for longitudinal analysis of findings for those employers who have participated in the annual survey for multiple seasons, offering greater depth of understanding about the operation of the policy at the employer-level.

A mid-term independent evaluation of the SPP initiative commenced in early 2013, and this will offer constructive feedback on the short-term outcomes of the Department’s capacity building initiatives in the Pacific as well as identifying areas that require further attention. A second evaluation of the NZAID-funded Vakameasina training programme would be useful, and could be conducted at the cessation of the current funding round (2015). The first

229 The prototype, which is currently managed by Statistics New Zealand, integrated data held by the Department of Labour (permit approvals), Statistics NZ (arrivals/departures) and Inland Revenue (tax data) (DOL 2012a).
evaluation report (Roorda, 2011) made reference to the transferability of workers newly acquired skills to the workplace in New Zealand. If possible the subsequent evaluation should also include some measure for assessing the extent to which workers’ new skills are being transferred back to home communities.

Repetition of the World Bank’s RSE surveys in Tonga and Vanuatu in the latter part of this decade, to assess the medium-term impacts of participation in the RSE for households and communities 10 years after the scheme’s introduction in 2007, would be of immense value. While it is acknowledged there are significant costs to conducting these surveys, it would be useful to incorporate Kiribati into the sampling frame to ensure one country from each of the sub-regions – Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia – is included, and to reflect the increasing numbers of I-Kiribati workers participating in the RSE scheme (approximately 150 workers for the 2012/13 season).

Another potential addition is PNG. The numbers from PNG are very small at this stage (21 workers for the 2012/13 season), but there is scope for growth in future seasons as RSEs continue to switch between Pacific countries to source their RSE labour. Anecdotal reports indicate PNG’s administrative capacities to handle offshore labour arrangements are more advanced than any of the other island countries. The inclusion of PNG in a re-run of the World Bank-funded surveys in 2017 would be dependent on the numbers of RSE workers recruited, but it would illustrate the significant differences between countries taking part in the RSE, and the variable impacts of participation on indicators such as household income and expenditure, children’s education, asset ownership, business ownership and community-level impacts (McKenzie and Gibson, 2010).

11.5.2 Monitoring of the H/V industries

The dynamic nature of the H/V industries, and the ensuing changes to RSEs’ recruitment practices over successive seasons, means it is imperative that the ATR database is maintained. Three possible future trends in RSEs’ employment practices are: the increasing concentration of employment of Pacific RSE labour with a small number of large RSEs;230

230 Of the 16 interviewed, eight large RSEs accounted for 27% of workers requested in 2007/08. By 2010/11 they accounted for 33% of the numbers requested that year.
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growing use of the joint ATR system; and the spread of RSE labour across a growing number
of non-RSEs through grower cooperatives. Monitoring of these trends will provide an
assessment of the ‘reach’ of the RSE across the H/V industries: the numbers and types of
enterprises making use of RSE labour, the impact of RSE workers on productivity levels at the
individual and regional scales, and the overall value of the RSE scheme to the H/V industries.

Contractors are another important group, making up 22 percent of the total number of 117
registered RSEs in 2012/13 (Department of Labour ATR data, 2013). To date there is little
information available on the employment conditions or experiences of RSE workers
managed by contractors. A third area that could be examined via the ATR data is the extent
to which RSEs remain active in the scheme. Who has withdrawn during the five years and
why? Are they still accessing Pacific labour through other means, or sourcing seasonal
workers elsewhere? Have some withdrawn from the industry completely? If this is the case,
what has driven them to do so? Ongoing restructuring within the industry will impact on the
RSE policy’s operation in future seasons, and it would be valuable to know what factors are
behind H/V producers’ decisions to withdraw from the scheme, and where applicable, from
the industry in general.

11.5.3 Improving capacity for data management and protection of institutional
knowledge

Improving Pacific states’ capacity for data management with support from the World Bank is
a priority area for the SPP initiative. A new database management programme has been
designed that enables officials to: store historical data relating to registered job seekers
including RSE workers; monitor the recruitment and placement of their seasonal workers;
and store information relating to the efficiency of workers’ deployment overseas (DoL,
2012e). An assessment of the utility of the new database system, which is being
implemented in 2013, is included in the mid-term SPP evaluation. Possible future plans for
Pacific states include the development of common information systems that can be used for
a range of offshore labour contract arrangements, and integrating information held by the
labour mobility units within different island counties into a single system.
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Ongoing restructuring of government departments in both New Zealand and the islands, and the loss of personnel is a potential threat to efficient data management in future. The restructuring of the Department of Labour in 2012 and its amalgamation along with other departments into a ‘super ministry’, followed by the resignation of the RSE National Manager late in 2012, has raised concerns about their future data management processes, especially the maintenance of the ATR data. Loss of institutional knowledge is a critical challenge anywhere, and in the case of the RSE, there is an enormous amount of information held only by a small number of individuals. It is essential to recognise the value of this knowledge (and to capture it). To this end, this thesis has made a useful contribution to documenting one of New Zealand’s most innovate immigration policies in the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

11.6 Areas for future research

The complexity of the RSE and the constantly changing environment in which the policy operates means there are extensive opportunities for further research. Several are identified below along with some limitations of the present study.

11.6.1 RSE workers’ rights and welfare in New Zealand

The rights of RSE workers have not been addressed in any detail in this thesis as the focus has been on the benefits for workers that come in the form of financial returns and the development of additional skills. The gains for workers may not always be as significant as they appear if considering them in the context of workers’ rights, especially as the RSE does not grant flexible work permits (minimising possible risks of employer exploitation), or multi-entry visas (which would reduce the financial and social costs for workers). There are also stringent conditions around workers’ return which can arguably be seen as a restriction of workers’ rights. A comprehensive assessment of RSE workers’ experiences in the context of workers’ rights would be a useful addition to the examination of financial gains and community benefits, especially with regard to areas for improvement in the protection of workers’ health and welfare while they are in New Zealand.
11.6.2 Women’s participation in the RSE scheme

The role of female RSE workers has not been examined in this research. Although the numbers of women participating are relatively small (15 percent of the total number of workers 2007-2011), their experiences of work and life in New Zealand, their patterns of saving and spending, and the social costs for female migrants and family members left behind may be quite different to those of male workers, and therefore require attention. This is significant given the fact that for two countries (Kiribati and Tuvalu) women now out number men in the annual RSE intakes, as a result of the SPP initiative. More generally this is also relevant given the rising numbers of temporary female migrant workers globally, and the limited literature on women’s experiences in the context of seasonal migration.

11.6.3 The impact of the RSE across the regions

The impacts of migrant workers on local rural communities have been the focus of research on the Canadian SAWP (see for example Bauder et al., 2003; Preibisch, 2004; Hennebry, 2012), but they have not been addressed in this thesis. There are some valuable postgraduate theses addressing particular aspects of the RSE in specific regions (Bailey, 2009; P. King, 2009; A. Williams, 2011; Kumar, 2012) but to date there has been no comparative study of the impact of RSE workers on several local communities across New Zealand. Such a study would provide insights into the regional variations in the RSE’s effects on rural economies and societies, the variable experiences for RSE workers integrating into different communities, the connections being established between RSE workers and local community groups, including the links with New Zealand-based Pacific communities and local Maori, and the changing nature of these relationships over time. Included in this analysis should be an assessment of the National government’s welfare policies on the composition of local seasonal workforces and the impacts of these reforms on employers’ use of RSE labour.

11.6.4 A comparative study of the impacts of seasonal work on rural Tongan communities

Throughout the Australian pilot scheme and since the implementation of the SWP in mid-2012, Tonga has remained the largest supplier of seasonal labour to Australian employers.
CHAPTER 11: Conclusion and recommendations

Anecdotal reports indicate that Tongan PSWs are returning to their home communities with significantly more money than their RSE counterparts and are able to invest more quickly in household improvements and community projects (Rohorua pers comm, April 2012). This suggests there is potential for significant differences to emerge in the investment patterns of individual RSE / SWP households, with flow-on effects for local community development.

A comparative study of the impacts of participation in seasonal work on household and community development and service infrastructure (roads, local medical and commercial facilities, public transport etc.) in communities that solely send workers to Australia versus those sending workers only to New Zealand, would provide an interesting assessment of the variable outcomes of engagement in seasonal work and the impacts on local community dynamics. As part of this assessment it would be useful to examine the social impacts on families and communities dealing with the regular absence of seasonal workers, and the measures taken at the household and community levels to minimise some of the social costs.

11.6.5 A comparative analysis of the RSE scheme and the Australian Seasonal Worker Program

An examination of Australia’s SWP, including the numbers of Approved Employers and workers participating, their geographic dispersion across Australia and the impacts on rural Australian communities, and the programme’s management across a range of sectors (horticulture, cotton, cane, aquaculture and tourism), would provide valuable comparative research to compliment research currently being done on the RSE scheme. There is the potential for closer collaboration between the governments of both countries on their seasonal work schemes in future, especially with regards to capacity building in the islands, as well as the potential for workers to be shared between countries through contractor-type arrangements. A comparative study of the two schemes would assist with a wider objective of fostering greater policy convergence in the two countries, especially with regard to supporting development in island countries through migration programmes.

There are important ‘lessons learned’ from the RSE policy and the SWP that are of benefit to industry and government agencies involved in these programmes as well as for other
countries that have implemented low-skilled circular migration schemes or are planning to implement this form of labour migration in the future. The RSE policy has already been classed as ‘best practice’. There is scope for research into how ‘best practice’ becomes a ‘working model’ for the development of managed circular migration schemes elsewhere in the world.

11.7 Conclusion

An assessment of the first five years’ operation of the RSE policy indicates it is possible for low-skilled managed migration programmes to deliver positive outcomes to migrants, sending and receiving countries. This study has demonstrated that complex policies like the RSE are dynamic, that the ‘wins’ for each participant group are contingent on the contributions of others, and that there are some contradictions between different stakeholders’ objectives that must be carefully monitored if the programme is to deliver sustained benefits longer-term. Such policies at the operational level cannot easily attain the status of ‘business as usual’ with minimal investment from government. Rather they require constant investment, oversight and collaboration between sending and receiving countries.

Managed circular migration policies are not ‘silver bullets’ that resolve labour supply and demand tensions in a general sense. They are best targeted at specific issues and problems. Replicating schemes that work well in the particular context for which they were developed in other sectors or countries is not straightforward, and will not necessarily deliver the same outcomes. ‘Triple wins’ can be achieved, as this thesis has demonstrated, but they are not inevitable outcomes of managed circular migration policies.
APPENDIX 1: Characteristics of contemporary seasonal work programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada SAWP</th>
<th>US H-2A</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year implemented</strong></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No cap on total number of workers admitted</td>
<td>Programme is not subject to a statutory numerical limit</td>
<td>97% of workers employed in agriculture</td>
<td>Approx. 90% employed in agriculture and forestry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 90% of workers employed in Ontario</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programme structure</strong></td>
<td>Bilateral agreements formalised in MOUs</td>
<td>Nonimmigrant visa category</td>
<td>Bilateral agreements</td>
<td>Bilateral agreements operated via MOUs</td>
<td>Bilateral agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employers eligible</strong></td>
<td>Horticulture producers, producers of flowers, honey bees, tobacco and processed food</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Agriculture, catering, tourism and agro-industry</td>
<td>Forestry, agriculture, manufacturing of agricultural products, sawmills, and the hotel and catering sector</td>
<td>Agriculture (employers predominantly in horticulture).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countries eligible</strong></td>
<td>Mexico, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (nine countries)</td>
<td>58 countries (as of January 2012) are eligible to participate including NZ, Australia and several Pacific Island countries</td>
<td>Morocco, Tunisia (1963) and Poland (1992)</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia</td>
<td>Morocco (1999) Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador (2001) and Romania (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 60% of workers from Mexico (2010)</td>
<td>Since 1990s workers predominantly sourced from Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 90% of workers are Polish</td>
<td>Provincial-level programs: Cartaya, Spain - Morocco Catalonia, Spain - Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work permit type</strong></td>
<td>Employer specific</td>
<td>Employer specific</td>
<td>Previously employer specific</td>
<td>Previously employer specific</td>
<td>Work permit granted by Spanish government can be restricted to individual employers or to a geographical area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spouse and unmarried children under 21 years of age may accompany worker</td>
<td></td>
<td>2006: seasonal workers have been able to move between employers</td>
<td>May 2011: restrictions eased and workers may change employer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work permit length</th>
<th>Canada SAWP</th>
<th>US H-2A</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≥8 months</td>
<td>Initial period of ≥1 year</td>
<td>Minimum of 4 month contracts for Tunisians and Moroccans</td>
<td>8 month contracts available for particular jobs in agriculture</td>
<td>4 months per worker per year</td>
<td>≥9 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employer can apply to extend an H2A worker’s stay in increments of up to 1 year. Worker’s total period of stay cannot exceed 3 years</td>
<td>2006: new multi-entry work permit granting workers six months per year and valid for 3 years</td>
<td>Cannot hire workers for more than 8 months in total unless growing certain, specified crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market testing</td>
<td>Employers must advertise positions for 14 days to prove local labour is not available</td>
<td>Need for workers must be certified by US Department of Labour</td>
<td>Must advertise vacancies, at government-set wage rates, with local employment agencies</td>
<td>Employers must advertise position for 4 weeks to prove local labour is not available</td>
<td>Quota system. Numbers annually adjusted by province and sector according to needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growers who apply for H-2A workers are required to abide by the ‘50% rule’ - employers must hire any qualified US worker who applies for a position during the first half of the work contract under which H-2A workers are also employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment contracts</td>
<td>Canada SAWP</td>
<td>US H-2A</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employers must offer minimum 240 hours of work over 6 week period, and pay higher of the minimum wage, prevailing wage or piece-rate wage paid to Canadians doing the same job. Employers must also pay overtime. Employers are required to provide approved, on-site housing and meals/cooking facilities (employers may recover 7-10% of housing costs), and contribute to provincial health insurance and workers’ compensation insurance programmes.</td>
<td>Employers must offer to pay the highest of 3 wages: federal or state minimum, prevailing wage, or Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR). AEWR is the minimum wage, determined on an annual basis, which must be paid by agricultural employers to H-2A workers. Employers must provide a ‘three-fourths’ guarantee – they must guarantee to offer workers employment for at least three-fourths of the employment contract. Employers are required to offer free housing to H-2A workers.</td>
<td>Seasonal workers are entitled to the same rights as national workers. Duration of work, wages, paid overtime, paid holidays and social security contributions must be the same as those specified for nationals. Recruitment fees vary depending on length of contract. Fees are borne by the employer. Migrants are not charged any recruitment fees. Employers provide free accommodation.</td>
<td>Contracts must specify certain wages and working conditions, including housing, meals and travel arrangements. Employer pays a recruitment fee per worker.</td>
<td>Migrant workers are covered under their national social insurance system which reduces costs to employers.</td>
<td>Employer must offer minimum wage in accordance with prevailing regulation of local Spanish territory. Workers must be registered in Social Security Scheme from first day of employment and have access to free health care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives/enforcement to return</td>
<td>Canada SAWP</td>
<td>US H-2A</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upon return to Mexico at end of contract period Mexican workers must present a sealed employer's evaluation of their performance to Mexican authorities</td>
<td>Employers' noncompliance with programme requirements, including workers’ return at the end of the contract period, cited as a key problem</td>
<td>Moroccan and Tunisian workers must sign document stating commitment to return home at end of contract and present themselves at French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII) mission on return</td>
<td>Employers can request workers by name for the next season, and do so for approx. 90% of workers</td>
<td>Workers must sign binding commitment to return to country of origin, and report to Spanish consulate in home country within one month of returning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employers can request workers by name for the next season, and do so for approx. 80% of workers</td>
<td>In 2009 a Temporary Worker Visa Exit Program Pilot was established. Under the pilot, H-2As who were admitted to the US at certain designated ports of entry were required to depart the country from one of the designated ports and provide certain information to authorities. The pilot was discontinued in September 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If workers return home, they can participate in future without going through re-selection process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to other permits</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – after a total of 4 years’ seasonal work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of ‘best’ practice identified in literature</td>
<td>Employers actively involved in programme design and administration, and sending country involved in recruiting and monitoring workers</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>OFII missions arrange travel, visa procedures, purchase airplane tickets, schedule mandatory medical checks for Moroccan and Tunisian workers</td>
<td>Access to pension benefits (upon meeting certain conditions) that are transferable back to home country</td>
<td>Right to transition to other work permits after 4 years’ (and adherence with programme rules)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High rate of voluntary return of workers to home countries</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seasonal workers entitled to same employment rights as nationals</td>
<td></td>
<td>Workers have free access to public health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of ‘best’ practice identified in literature cont.</td>
<td>Canada SAWP</td>
<td>US H-2A</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual review/impact evaluations of seasonal work scheme are conducted by the Canadian government, together with employers, industry representatives and sending country government representatives</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Workers eligible for unemployment benefits after contributing to scheme for minimum of 24 weeks’ work in previous 2 years</td>
<td>Transnational cooperation has been established between German and foreign trade unions of participating countries and seasonal workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements</td>
<td>Provincial-level programme in Catalonia has emphasis on co-development. National Training Institute in Colombia is involved in developing training programmes for migrants to support income-generating activities back in home communities. Farmers’ union in Catalonia also assists seasonal workers to develop skills and help them establish small businesses and agricultural enterprises upon their return home. Workers receive technical assistance and co-financing</td>
<td>Provincial-level programme in Cartaya, Spain has achieved circularity by only allowing mothers under age of 40 with dependent children to participate. If women return home as scheduled they are guaranteed a job in the next season</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 2: Risks and related policy mechanisms for the RSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Description of risk</th>
<th>Policy mechanism to address risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overstaying by workers</td>
<td>Workers may be tempted to extend their stay in NZ, legally or illegally.</td>
<td>Workers must not be charged recruitment fees, minimising any debts they need to incur before arriving in NZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Workers may be re-employed in subsequent years, providing specific conditions are met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A limit of a 7-month stay in any 11-month period means workers retain strong links to their home country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Travel costs are shared with the employer so that the cost for the worker is not so great as to make overstaying attractive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A guarantee of 240 hours’ work is given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The ATR requires employers to pay the costs associated with workers’ removal from NZ, if workers become illegal and are deported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Workers must not change to another permit after their RSE permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement of NZ workers</td>
<td>Fewer opportunities for New Zealanders to be employed. Employers use RSE policy to avoid employing New Zealanders.</td>
<td>A cap of 8,000 RSE workers per year. Regional governance groups (consisting of representatives from MSD, DoL and industry) established to provide advice on forecast numbers of workers required and available New Zealanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employers lodge their vacancies with MSD before attempting to recruit from offshore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MSD advises on the availability of New Zealanders for ATR applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of workers</td>
<td>Workers may be exploited by employers. Employers lack incentive to address wage and conditions issues.</td>
<td>Employers must retain their RSE status to be eligible to access offshore workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Worker applicants must be provided with a signed contract of employment clearly setting out the terms and conditions before they can be issued with a visa to enter NZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrant workers must be paid NZ market rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of workers by offshore recruitment agents</td>
<td>Offshore recruitment agents may exploit nationals.</td>
<td>Workers must not be charged recruitment fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>These fees must be borne entirely by employers (uniquely for immigration policy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The IAU with each of the Pacific kick-start states requires offshore recruitment agents to be regulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RSE employers may not use a recruitment agent who seeks a commission from workers in exchange for securing an employment agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Description of risk</td>
<td>Policy mechanism to address risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health risks</td>
<td>Risks to NZ public health.</td>
<td>Worker candidates who stay longer than 6 months or who have tuberculosis risk factors must produce a chest X-ray certificate. Workers from countries with a high prevalence of HIV must provide the results of an HIV test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppression of wage growth</td>
<td>May deter wage growth to attract domestic labour (inherent risk of any immigration policy).</td>
<td>Employing RSE workers is more expensive than employing NZ workers. Paying a portion of the airfare, providing pastoral care and so on, ensures there is a cost differential to employ RSE workers. Some employers identified RSE workers as costing $1.50-$2.25 per hour more than other labour units. The number of RSE workers is capped below the total labour requirement to encourage productivity gains and wage growth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour, 2010a, pp.11-12
APPENDIX 3: Complicated features of the RSE policy and their implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy feature</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple participants – industry, workers, Pacific states, and NZ government</td>
<td>Multiple and potentially conflicting participant perspectives, priorities, and experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two industries – horticulture and viticulture</td>
<td>Differences between industries in respect of age, histories, relationship with labour, timing of labour demand, and industry cohesion. Differences in regions – location, temporal demands for labour, community composition and reactions, and historical experiences. Numerous sectors within the horticulture industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Pacific countries</td>
<td>Each Pacific government has its own priorities and objectives for participating in the RSE. The NZ government has separate relationships with each Pacific country, articulated in an IAU with each country. Each Pacific country has its own cultural and political context. Workers from each country have distinctive cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy cuts across NZ government agencies</td>
<td>The policy cuts across several agencies’ areas of responsibility: ▪ Immigration and employment (DoL) ▪ Labour market (MSD) ▪ Foreign policy and development assistance (MFAT and NZAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy is implemented across different regions or communities in NZ</td>
<td>Communities differ in respect of: ▪ Their response to newcomers ▪ Existing Pacific residents ▪ The availability of short-term housing for workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on short-term results, in addition to long-term changes</td>
<td>Immediate demand for workers in the 2007/08 season meant the RSE policy was implemented in a short time-frame. The RSE policy aims to support the Medium-Long-Term Horticulture and Viticulture Seasonal Labour Strategy’s objective to transform the industries’ business model from low-cost industries to industries based on quality, productivity, and high value. However, there is a need for short-term results (that is, trained return labour to meet immediate labour needs). The desired long-term change will not happen if the short-term results are not achieved. Need to be sensitive to, and monitoring for, new issues and risks associated with years two to five of the RSE policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour, 2010a, p.9
**APPENDIX 4: RSE work policy’s simultaneous causal strands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simultaneous causal strands</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Policy is based on circular migration of trained workers who return to an employer season after season.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pacific countries enable employers to access suitable labour through their facilitative arrangements (for example work-ready pools) and ensure workers are prepared for work and life in New Zealand through effective pre-departure orientation briefings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Workers benefit financially, and non-financially, from their New Zealand employment. This has a positive impact on their families and communities, which in turn assists Pacific countries to progress towards economic development goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>For employers, migrant labour must result in increased productivity. Increased productivity together with certainty of labour supply enables employers to invest in their businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Employers’ improved business practices and increased business investment enables structural change to occur at the industry level in the longer-term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>RSE systems set up to ensure New Zealand workers have first access to seasonal work opportunities work effectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>RSE policy continues to exert pressures on labour practices to ensure improved workplace experiences, enhanced productivity, and Pacific and domestic worker, union and government support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour, 2010a, pp.85-86
### APPENDIX 5.1: RSE policy outcomes - New Zealand participants and affected parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>RSE employers</th>
<th>NZ workers</th>
<th>NZ government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable supply of skilled labour (S/M)</td>
<td>Reliable workforce of skilled and productive return workers (S)</td>
<td>Access to seasonal employment opportunities protected (S)</td>
<td>Immigration risk successful managed (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal employment practices eliminated (S/M)</td>
<td>Employers incentivised to improve business and employment practices (S)</td>
<td>Improved management practices &amp; labour relations (S/L)</td>
<td>No displacement of NZ workers (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour contracting becomes more 'professional' (M)</td>
<td>Increased ability to plan (S)</td>
<td>Improved practices by labour contractors (M)</td>
<td>Illegal employment practices eradicated (S/L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability and corporate social responsibility brand values strengthened (M/L)</td>
<td>Investment in business (S/M)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainable seasonal work immigration policy (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry transformation - internationally competitive industry based on quality, productivity and high value (L)</td>
<td>Business efficiency gains (reduced worker turnover) (S/M)</td>
<td></td>
<td>RSE self-managed by industry (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employer-Pacific community long-term relationship (S/M)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic growth, improved governance and regional integration in the Pacific (L)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** S = short-term outcomes - outcomes expected in first two seasons of RSE policy  
M = medium-term outcomes - outcomes expected beyond first two seasons of RSE policy  
L = long-term outcomes - outcomes expected after 5 or more years of RSE policy

Source: Department of Labour, 2010a, p.7
### APPENDIX 5.2: RSE policy outcomes – Pacific participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pacific RSE first-time workers and return workers</th>
<th>Pacific workers’ families and communities</th>
<th>Pacific countries*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In New Zealand</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful adjustment to NZ life and work (S)</td>
<td>Economic and wellbeing benefits from increased income (S/M)</td>
<td>Effective work-ready pool and pre-departure orientation (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New work-related skills (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit financially after repaying airfare, other debt and living costs (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Progress towards achievement of economic development goals (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comply with work visa and return home (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Return workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained workers immediately able to maximise earnings (S/M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective workers learn about work and life in NZ from return workers (S/M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: S = short-term outcomes - outcomes expected in first two seasons of RSE policy  
M = medium-term outcomes - outcomes expected beyond first two seasons of RSE policy  
L = long-term outcomes - outcomes expected after 5 or more years of RSE policy  
* Outcomes for Pacific countries are identified at the country level only

Source: Department of Labour, 2010a, p.8
## APPENDIX 6: Changes to the RSE policy, July 2007 – November 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy change</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ wages allowed to go below the minimum wage for repayment of workers’ share of their airfare.</td>
<td>To enable employers to be reimbursed for workers’ share of the airfare.</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction of the Transitional Recognised Seasonal Employer (TRSE) policy, to run from August 2007 to August 2009. Employers only eligible for one non-renewable TRSE permit.</td>
<td>To allow employers who were working towards RSE status to employ temporary migrants who were already in New Zealand (providing there were no suitable NZ workers to fill the positions). To enable employers to work toward becoming RSE employers.</td>
<td>August 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE worker visa changed from a work permit to a limited purpose entry visa/permit.</td>
<td>To reduce the risk of workers trying to extend their stay.</td>
<td>August 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes to the Variation of Conditions policy to allow visitors to work for up to 6 weeks in shortage areas and to allow working holiday makers who work for 3 months in the seasonal industries an additional 3-month stay.</td>
<td>To provide employers with improved access to working holidaymakers and visitors.</td>
<td>August 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers recruiting from Kiribati and Tuvalu required to pay 50 percent of the workers’ return airfare from Fiji to New Zealand (rather than from the workers’ origin country).</td>
<td>To avoid cost of airfares acting as a disincentive to employers recruiting from Kiribati and Tuvalu.</td>
<td>December 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers allowed to move between RSE employers.</td>
<td>To maximise worker earnings and help employers better manage unexpected down times.</td>
<td>August 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Labour allowed to request information about payments made by workers to employers.</td>
<td>To help the Department of Labour gather information about the true costs for workers of participating in the RSE policy.</td>
<td>August 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap on RSE worker numbers increased from 5,000 to 8,000 per year.</td>
<td>To address labour shortages</td>
<td>October 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary Seasonal Employment (SSE) permit to replace TRSE. Approved SSE employers can employ specified number of SSE work permit holders at any one time for a specific period in a particular region (following labour market testing). To apply for an SSE work permit, people must be in NZ lawfully. SSE permit is valid for 6 months and allows workers to move from one approved SSE employer to another.</td>
<td>To provide employers with more flexible ways of meeting their labour requirements, providing NZ workers are not available.</td>
<td>August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy change</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for deductions from RSE worker wages are the same as those for NZ workers. The Department of Labour requires all deductions to be declared by the employer as part of their application to recruit RSE workers and workers to agree to the deductions before accepting employment.</td>
<td>To increase transparency around the types and amounts of deductions from workers’ wages.</td>
<td>August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cap was retained at 8,000 workers per year, but the RSE year was changed from 1 April – 31 March to 1 July – 30 June.</td>
<td>To prevent RSE workers being counted twice in the same year.</td>
<td>August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers who have a pre-established relationship with migrants outside the Pacific (as evidenced by an Approval in Principle granted after April 2007) are allowed to recruit workers from outside the Pacific.</td>
<td>To reduce the barriers to recruitment outside the Pacific.</td>
<td>August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers required to arrange health insurance for their workers, and RSE workers to pay for health insurance.</td>
<td>To ensure RSE workers’ health care needs are covered because they are not eligible for publicly funded health care in NZ.</td>
<td>November 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour, 2010a, pp.82-83
APPENDIX 7: World Bank RSE and PSWPS surveys

Table 7.1: World Bank surveys of short-term development impacts of participation in the RSE scheme, Tonga

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total no. households, individuals &amp; communities surveyed</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Individuals(^1)</th>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Households included in each survey round</th>
<th>Islands in survey &amp; total population(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Oct 2007-Apr 2008</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>2,335</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>Households with RSE workers; Households with unsuccessful RSE applicants; Households with no applicants</td>
<td>Tongatapu (72,000); Vava’u (15,000); Eua (5,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 2 Apr-Jul 2008</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>2,304</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 3 Oct-Feb 2008</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 4 Oct 2009-Mar 2010</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Only baseline data was available on the number of individuals. Data on individuals for rounds 2-4 is an estimate only, calculated using ratio of households in each round to the baseline.

\(^2\)Tonga 2006 census data

Sources: J. Gibson et al., 2008; Tonga Statistics Department, 2008; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010

Table 7.2: World Bank surveys of short-term development impacts of participation in the RSE scheme, Vanuatu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total no. households, individuals &amp; communities surveyed</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Individuals(^1)</th>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Households included in each survey round</th>
<th>Islands in survey &amp; total population(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Oct 2007-Apr 2008</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>Households with RSE workers; Households with unsuccessful RSE applicants; Households with no applicants</td>
<td>Efate (65,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 2 Apr-Jul 2008</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanna (29,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 3 Oct-Feb 2008</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ambrym (7,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 4 Oct 2009-Mar 2010</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Only baseline data was available on the number of individuals. Data on individuals for rounds 2-4 is an estimate only, calculated using ratio of households in each round to the baseline.

\(^2\)Vanuatu 2009 census data

Sources: McKenzie et al., 2008; McKenzie and J. Gibson, 2010; Vanuatu National Statistics Office, 2010
Table 7.3: World Bank surveys of short-term development impacts of the PSWPS, Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of workers surveyed</th>
<th>Source countries of workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late 2009</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Tonga (42), Vanuatu (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Tonga (56), Kiribati (11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011

Table 7.4: World Bank surveys of short-term development impacts of the PSWPS, Tonga

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total no. households surveyed¹</th>
<th>Households included in each survey round</th>
<th>Islands in survey &amp; total population³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar-Apr 2009</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Households with PSWs;</td>
<td>Tongatapu (72,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-Sep 2010</td>
<td>275*</td>
<td>Households with unsuccessful PSWPS applicants;</td>
<td>Vava’u (15,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Households with no applicants²</td>
<td>Ha’apai (7,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eua (5,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Data unavailable on the number of individuals and communities participating
²Second round of survey included 125 of the original 127 households plus an additional 148 households to reflect expansion of the PSWPS
³Tonga 2006 census data

Sources: Tonga Statistics Department, 2008; J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011

Table 7.5: World Bank surveys of short-term development impacts of the PSWPS, Kiribati

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total no. households surveyed¹</th>
<th>Households included in survey²</th>
<th>Islands in survey &amp; total population³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul-Aug 2010</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Households with PSWs (11)</td>
<td>Tarawa (46,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Households with RSE workers (7)</td>
<td>Abaing (5,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Households with seafarers (18)</td>
<td>Abemama (3,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-migrant households (84)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Data unavailable on the number of individuals and communities participating
²Sample population was different to Tonga due to the small number of l-Kiribati who had been recruited under the PSWPS
³Kiribati 2005 census data

Sources: SPC, 2007; J. Gibson and McKenzie, 2011
APPENDIX 8: Interview guides

8.1: Interview guide: RSE employers

Background information

Name
Location of property
Type of enterprise (family farm, private company etc.)
Crops produced
Brief description of jobs workers perform on the orchard/vineyard (thinning, pruning, harvesting) and skills required for these jobs

General labour requirements

1. In total, how many workers do you employ each year? Number of full-time staff?
   Number of seasonal/causal staff?
2. Where did you source your seasonal labour from before the RSE was introduced?
3. Numbers of local New Zealanders / employment beneficiaries (WINZ)/ and other migrants (AIP scheme, WHMS, VoCs)?
4. Did you have any difficulties finding local workers? If yes, can you elaborate? (Probes: process for employing workers from WINZ and some of the challenges)

Sources of seasonal labour once the RSE was introduced in 2007

5. When did you start participating in the RSE scheme?
6. Numbers of RSE workers each season (and as a percentage of total workforce)?
7. Countries RSE workers are sourced from, and numbers from each country?
8. Length of time you have recruited from each country?
9. Why did you choose to recruit from this country(s)?
10. Do you recruit any female RSE workers? If yes, percentage of your total RSE workforce?

Recruitment of RSE workers

11. How are workers recruited? (Probes: through government work-ready pool, recruitment agent, return workers)
12. Have you visited the country(s) you recruit from?
13. Have your methods of recruitment changed since season one? If yes, then how, and what differences have the changes made?
14. Are you satisfied with the arrangements for recruitment of your workers?
15. If not, what improvements need to be made? (Probes: screening and selection of workers, visa processing, satisfactory completion of police clearances and medicals, pre-departure training, workers arriving in NZ on time)

231 Interview guides provided general themes for discussion in the first and subsequent interviews. Not all areas were discussed at one time.
Periods of employment for RSE workers

16. What is the average duration of employment for your RSE workers (start and end date of contracts)?
17. What jobs are performed by your RSE workers during the season?
18. Wage rate – are workers paid via piece rates or hourly wage? (get breakdown of different rates)
19. Do you share your workers with another employer via a joint ATR? If yes, get details on joint ATR arrangement (name of other employer, duration of contracts etc)

20. For new workers: How long does it take new workers to pick up the requisite skills to perform various tasks on the orchard/vineyard?
21. Are your new RSE workers meeting your expectations? If yes, how are they adding value? (Probes: speed with which tasks are performed, productivity levels compared to locals/other workers?)
22. If not, what improvements need to be made? (Probes: better pre-departure training, more detailed on-the-job training before workers start, improved team leadership, ensuring workers have good English language skills to communicate with orchard/vineyard supervisors and understand instructions?)

23. Are your return workers performing the same jobs as your new recruits? If not, what jobs are your return workers now performing?
24. Are return workers meeting your expectations? If yes, how are they adding value (Probes: work-ready as soon as they arrive, extent of retraining required, productivity levels compared to previous year, productivity compared to new RSE workers / locals /and other migrant workers, impacts on new RSE workers – helping them to adjust to work and life in NZ?)
25. Are return workers rewarded in any way for their experience (higher wage rate, team leader/supervisory role?)

26. Have there been any reported occupational health and safety issues? If yes, how have they been addressed?
27. Have there been any other issues (e.g. lack of adequate clothing, poor diet) with workers’ adjustment to NZ work conditions? If yes, how have these been resolved?

Pastoral care

28. How do you manage pastoral care (Probes: own responsibility, employ a pastoral care worker, contract out to third party, other?)
29. Overall, how well do you think workers are adjusting to life in NZ?
30. For new workers, how prepared were they for NZ work and living conditions in their first season?
31. Have there been any difficulties in the provision of pastoral care? If yes, what problems? (Probes: accommodation, workers’ unfamiliarity with wage rates and deductions, workers’ diet and general health, after hours’ activities, alcohol consumption and disciplinary issues)
32. How have these difficulties been resolved?
33. Who helps workers generally to deal with any problems that arise? (Probes: other workers, head of the worker group, pastoral care provider, liaison officer, church leader?)

34. Have the pastoral care issues changed over time? (i.e. are problems in season three different to those in season one?)

35. What, if any, improvements can be made to the RSE scheme to assist employers with their pastoral care responsibilities? (Probes: better pre-departure training, closer monitoring by labour inspectors and Pacific liaison officers, ‘after hours’ training for workers to help them adjust to NZ work and living conditions?)

RSE worker training

36. Do you think RSE workers are learning skills on your orchard/vineyard that can be used back in their home communities? If yes, can you identify specific skills that are transferable and how they might be used?

37. Apart from the skills that workers are learning on the job, what other general life skills do you think the workers are gaining from their time in NZ?

38. Are you providing your workers with any additional ‘after hours’ training? If yes, what additional training are you providing and why?

39. What benefits have you seen from this training (Probes: improved financial literacy – workers can understand wage rates and deductions, have improved methods for saving and sending money home, better communication with orchard supervisors, improved diet and fewer health problems)

40. What further training do you think would be beneficial to RSE workers?

Investment in workers’ home communities

41. Apart from providing your RSE workers with regular waged employment, have you thought about making any other contributions to workers’ home communities?

42. If yes, what sorts of contributions do you plan to make? (Probes: providing shipping containers and helping workers to send large goods home, fundraising activities for workers to help with the freight costs, direct investment in small development projects in the islands)

43. What do you see as the main challenges of providing additional development assistance to workers’ home communities? How might these be addressed?

Future plans

44. Can you give me an indication of the number of workers you expect to employ next season?

45. Do you intend to recruit the same RSE workers next season? If yes, what future benefits do you see in having the same workers?

46. If not, why not? Where do you plan to recruit workers from next season?

47. Do you expect your RSE numbers to increase, stay the same, or decrease in the next three to four years?

48. What is the overall impact (positive or negative) of the RSE on your business?

49. Has involvement in the scheme led to any changes in business practices? (Probes: changes in training provided to all workers, improved workplace practices, business expansion?)
50. What are the biggest challenges you face as an employer with regard to being involved in this scheme?
51. What do you see as the future benefits of ongoing participation in the RSE?
52. Additional comments?
8.2: Interview guide: Industry representatives

Background information

Name and organisation
Position of responsibility
Main services provided by the organisation
Brief overview of industry being represented

Overall impressions of the RSE scheme

1. How does the RSE scheme operate at the regional level? (Probes: role of the labour governance groups, regional ATR allocations, regional unemployment rates and labour demand and supply, sharing of workers across regions via joint ATRs and grower cooperatives)

2. What is working well so far with the RSE? (Probes: employers able to meet labour needs for season, employers’ use of return workers and the associated productivity gains, cultural interaction/exchange between Pacific Island workers and employers)

3. What isn’t working well with the RSE and why? (Probes: workers not prepared for NZ work and living conditions, problems with accommodation availability, performance issues with some worker groups, difficulties for employers trying to balance recruitment of New Zealand workers and RSE labour)

4. What has been the impact of rising local unemployment in 2009/10 on RSE employers? How are RSE employers handling their requirements to recruit New Zealanders first? And what effect is this having on their RSE recruitment plans?

5. What is the overall impact of the RSE scheme on industry – is the policy working well? Why? Why not?

Future of the RSE

6. What are your views on the longer-term sustainability of the RSE scheme? (Probes: how do you see the scheme operating in the next two years? In five years time?)

7. What are the longer-term benefits to industry of participation in the RSE? (Probes: growth of industry through reliable labour supply, improvement of employment conditions, wage rates and ethical treatment of workers, reduction in use of illegal labour, RSE as a marketing brand/tool – socially sustainable production)

8. What are the greatest challenges facing the industry in the next five years? Can the RSE help to address these challenges?

9. What changes need to be made to improve the operation of the scheme?

10. Additional comments?
8.3: Interview guide: Department of Labour officials

Background information

Your department’s involvement in the RSE
Your role in the RSE scheme
Length of time in your position

Overview of the RSE scheme

1. Rationale behind the scheme – why implemented at this time? (Probes: pressure from industry, pressure from Pacific governments, fewer costs than permanent migration?)
2. Involvement of other government agencies (e.g. MSD, NZAID) - for each agency, what is their role in the programme and how do they work together with your department?

Overall impressions of the scheme

3. What is working well so far with the scheme? (Probes: employers able to meet labour needs for season, productivity gains for employers, building capacity of Pacific states to manage overseas contract labour arrangements?)
4. What has enabled you / your department to make these achievements? (Probes: flexible approach to policy implementation? good working relationship with industry and employers, good working relationship with other government departments in NZ and in the Pacific, high level of communication between stakeholder groups?)
5. What are some of the issues currently with the scheme’s operation? (Probes: costs of participation for employers and workers, difficulties for employers managing the New Zealander first principle, accommodation problems, pastoral care issues, Pacific states’ limited capacity to manage arrangements for sending works overseas?)
6. Are these the same issues as those in season one? If not, what new or different issues have emerged? And why?
7. How are these problems being resolved?

Future of the RSE

8. What do you see as your department’s role in the operation of the RSE in the next two to three years? In five years time?
9. Policy documents indicate that in the future the RSE will operate as ‘business as usual’ - an employer-driven recruitment market with limited investment from government. Do you expect this to happen? What indicators would you need to see to know that different sectors could self-manage the RSE?
10. If the RSE is not likely to become ‘business as usual’ – what will stop it from doing so?

11. What do you see as the medium to longer-term objectives of the RSE scheme (Probes: increased investment in H/V businesses, improved industry performance, improved practices by labour contractors, RSE self-managed by industry and Pacific labour ministries, improved economic outcomes in participating island countries)
12. What might act as barriers to the achievement of these objectives in future? How can these barriers be resolved?
13. What further improvements can be made to the scheme (Probes: recruitment/selection process, pre-departure training, employment conditions, living conditions and accommodation, pastoral care, costs for workers of sending money and goods home?)
14. Any additional comments?
8.4: Interview guide: Pacific government officials

Background information

Your department’s involvement in the RSE
Your role in the RSE scheme
Length of time in your position

Overview of the RSE scheme

1. Total number of workers recruited in seasons 1 and 2 – as expected?
2. What annual number would your government like to achieve and why?
3. How would you describe the general level of interest in the RSE scheme among local communities?
4. Can you explain the different methods of recruitment available to RSE employers?
5. How are workers selected for the work-ready pool? (Probes: community-level selection, distribution across island groups, or selected from certain islands/communities?)
6. If employers recruit via other methods (e.g. labour agents or direct recruitment with the assistance of return workers), how is this recruitment monitored?
7. Are you able to provide me with a summary (spreadsheet) of worker groups recruited by NZ employers in seasons 1 and 2? (info included: age, gender, home community/island)

The facilitation measures

8. How are the facilitation measures working to date? (Probes: recruitment and selection, pre-departure training, visa processing, medical and police checks etc.)
9. Are there any issues with the facilitation measures? If yes, how can these be overcome?
10. What changes have been made to RSE processes in season 2? Why? (Probes: changes to selection for the work-ready pool, pre-departure training, medical and police checks, communication with employers, monitoring pastoral care in NZ)
11. Are there any additional changes planned for season 3? If yes, what changes and why?
12. What support have you received from the Department of Labour over the past 12 months? How effective has this support been? What additional support would you like?

Workers’ experiences in NZ

13. General feedback on workers’ adjustment to employment and living conditions in NZ?
14. How is workers’ pastoral care monitored during their time in NZ?
15. What are the main challenges for workers while they are away? (Probes: limited English skills, homesickness, difficulties adjusting to NZ weather, difficulties managing money, access to alcohol, other behavioural issues?)
16. How are these challenges being addressed?
17. What general ‘life’ skills do you think RSE workers are gaining during their time in New Zealand?
18. What impact are these skills having on individual workers? (Probes: learning how to budget and save money, improving English language skills, improved work ethic and time management)

Impacts of the RSE on local island communities

19. Average amount of money workers are returning with at the end of the season?
20. How is this money being spent? (Probes: housing, children’s education, investment in land/agricultural production, starting a business, social/community responsibilities)
21. Are workers required to contribute to specific communities projects? If yes, can you provide examples of particular projects?
22. Have workers been able to use any of the skills learned during their time in NZ (either horticulture specific skills or other generic ‘life’ skills) in their home communities?
23. If yes, can you provide specific examples? If not, why not?
24. Are there any plans for additional government or community initiatives to help workers make use of / further develop their skills when they return home? (Probes: horticulture training, training in basic mechanical maintenance, market gardening)

25. Are RSE employers establishing ongoing relationships with individual communities?
26. If yes, how widespread is it? What do these relationships look like (how are employers assisting communities – helping them to send goods home? Investing in small development projects?)
27. Are there any negative outcomes for communities of participation in the RSE? If yes, what are they and how might they be resolved?

Future of the RSE

28. Overall impressions of the scheme to date - has the scheme met the expectations of your government? The expectations of local communities?
29. What medium to longer-term impacts (positive or negative) do you expect the scheme to have on local communities?
30. What improvements could be made to the RSE scheme to make it work better for workers? For communities?
31. Additional comments?
8.5: Interview guide: RSE workers

Background information

Name
Country of origin
Gender: M / F
Age group: 15-24; 25-44; 45-64;
Marital status
Number of children
Name of village
What type of work, if any, were you doing before you began participating in the RSE?

Becoming involved in the RSE

1. How did you first hear about the RSE?
2. When was your first year participating in the RSE?
3. How were you selected for employment? (Probes: selected by community leaders, put forward by another worker, selected by a recruitment agent)
4. Did you attend a pre-departure training session before your first contract in New Zealand? If yes, can you tell me a bit about what the training involved? Did you find the information helpful for work and life in New Zealand?
5. Can you tell me the employer(s) you worked for?
6. How many months’ employment did you have in NZ?
7. What jobs did you perform during your employment (Probes: thinning, picking, pruning, packing)

Experience of living and working in NZ

8. Tell me about your experience working in NZ (Probes: did you enjoy working for your employer? Was the work easy/difficult? Which jobs did you enjoy the most?)
9. What about living in New Zealand? (Probes: accommodation, climate, costs of living, availability of different foods – shopping and cooking, staying in touch with family, ‘after hours’ activities)
10. Were you able to go to church? Participate in other recreational activities?

11. If worker has been to NZ for more than one season – how did your experiences of working and living in NZ this season compare to last season?
12. Are there any negatives about being in New Zealand? (Probes: working conditions, English language, homesickness, problems with general health, difficulties staying in touch with family, NZ way of life)

13. How many days did you work each week? How many hours each day?
14. How did your employer pay you – were you paid piece rates or an hourly wage?
15. Were you happy with the amount of money you made in NZ? If not, why not? (Probes: wage rates too low, too many deductions, too much down time during the season, cost of living in NZ, costs of sending money home)
16. If worker has returned to NZ for more than one season – have you earned less, more or about the same this season as last season?
17. What difference, if any, have your savings made to life back home? (Probes: more money to meet daily needs, for home improvements, children’s education, for small business ventures, contributions to the community/church)
18. What skills (horticulture specific and generic ‘life’ skills) have you learned during your time in NZ?
19. Did your employer provide you with any additional ‘after hours’ training? If yes, what training and what skills have you learned?
20. Have you found any of these skills useful when you have returned home? If yes, how? In what way have you used these skills?

Future intentions

21. Do you plan to return to New Zealand next season? If yes, do you plan to work for the same employer? If planning to return but not to the same employer, why not?
22. If you are not planning to return, why not? (Probes: didn’t earn enough money, didn’t like work in NZ, didn’t like employer, didn’t like living in NZ, cost of living in NZ too expensive, found separation from family too difficult, family/community obligations back at home)
23. What are your long-term plans? (Probes: do you plan to keep returning to New Zealand? What are your future plans for the use of money earned in New Zealand?)
24. What advice would you give to other workers who are planning to work in NZ?
25. Are there any changes you would like to see to the RSE scheme? (Probes: changes to pre-departure training, employment contracts, pastoral care, handling of disputes, reduced costs of communicating with family, reduced costs of sending money home, longer/shorter periods of employment, availability of ‘after hours’ training)
26. Additional comments?
8.6: Interview guide: pastoral care providers

Background information

1. Gain clarification about how pastoral care is provided - i.e. is pastoral care worker an employee of the RSE employer? Or does pastoral care provider contract services to RSE employer? Other?

Involvement in the RSE scheme

2. When did you become involved in the RSE?
3. Why did you decide to become a pastoral care provider?
4. What are your responsibilities as a pastoral care provider? (Probes: transport of workers to and from airport, provision of accommodation, oversight of workers after hours, dispute resolution, organising recreational / out of work activities, additional support for workers – provision of food, clothing, vehicles etc.)
5. How many workers are you responsible for? And from what countries?
6. Thinking about your first-time RSE workers, how well prepared are they for work and life in NZ?
7. What improvements could be made to the pre-departure briefings to assist workers to be better prepared for NZ conditions?

Managing pastoral care

8. In your first season as a pastoral care provider, what were the main issues you had to deal with? (Probes: problems with accommodation, workers’ unfamiliarity with food and shopping, use of household appliances, lack of adequate clothing, workers’ general health, disputes over wage rates and deductions, lack of recreational activities available to workers, problems with alcohol and behaviour)
9. Have any new or different problems emerged since the first season? If yes, what problems and why?
10. Compared to your first season, have you had more or fewer issues with workers’ behaviour and the management of pastoral care? What are the reasons for the increase / decrease?
11. Have you made any changes to the way you manage pastoral care since the first season? If yes, why and what difference have these changes made?
12. Are you planning to make any further changes to your pastoral care arrangements? If yes, what changes and why?
13. What improvements could be made to the RSE scheme to make your job easier?
14. Additional comments?
8.7: Interview guide: community contacts in the islands

Background information

1. Name
2. Role in local community
3. How did you become involved in the RSE scheme?
4. What services do you provide / what is your involvement in the programme?

The RSE scheme in your local community

5. Number of RSE workers participating in the scheme this season from your community/district? Gender breakdown? Average age of workers?
6. What number would you like to see participating from your community, and why?
7. What do you think are the main benefits for RSE workers participating in the programme? (Probes: opportunity to earn a decent income, development of new skills)
8. What are the biggest challenges facing RSE workers during their time in New Zealand? (Probes: managing their money, access to alcohol, managing their time outside of work hours, lack of opportunities for religious observance and recreation, influence of local PI communities (NZ family and friends))
9. On average, how much money are workers returning with at the end of the season?
10. How is this money being spent? (Probes: housing, children’s education, investment in land/agricultural production, starting a business, social/community responsibilities)
11. Are workers required to contribute to specific communities projects? If yes, can you provide examples?
12. Have workers been able to use any of the skills learned during their time in NZ (either horticulture specific skills or other generic ‘life’ skills) in their home communities?
13. If yes, can you provide specific examples? If not, why not?
14. What are some of the impacts (positive and negative) of the RSE scheme on local communities? (Probes: positive impacts - household improvements, improvements in sanitation, waste disposal, small business development; negative impacts – social costs for families dealing with absent workers, loss of young men/women from the village and impacts on agricultural production, community activities and church life)
15. How can the more negative impacts be addressed?

Improvements to the scheme and future plans for the community

16. What improvements could be made to the scheme to help workers adjust to New Zealand conditions?
17. How can the scheme be improved so that it provides more positive outcomes at the community level? (Probes: financial literacy training for workers, additional skills training for workers, giving new and return workers to participate in scheme, ensuring workers contribute to agricultural production and community activities during their time at home)
18. How do you see the RSE scheme fitting into your broader longer-term plans for development of your community/district?
19. Additional comments?
APPENDIX 9: Information on the 16 RSEs interviewed in 2009 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sources of RSE workers</th>
<th>1st season recruiting</th>
<th>How labour is recruited</th>
<th>Accommodation &amp; pastoral care</th>
<th>Links to island communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>Kiribati, Tuvalu</td>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>Majority of employer’s workforce are I-Kiribati resident in NZ</td>
<td>Workers housed in local community and get significant pastoral care support from resident I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans</td>
<td>No direct links to communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixture of men and women</td>
<td></td>
<td>Employer recruits through existing contacts</td>
<td>RSE’s HR manager also assists with pastoral care</td>
<td>But employer assists I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans successful in the PAC ballot by providing offers of employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bay of Plenty</td>
<td>Malaysia, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Is, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu</td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>Workers from Samoa, Vanuatu and Tonga recruited via island governments</td>
<td>Accommodation and pastoral care contracted out to another company</td>
<td>No direct investment in islands</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Majority are male, but small groups of women under SPP</td>
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<td>Solomon Islanders via direct recruitment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan women under SPP project</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysians via pre-existing employment relationship</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Hawke’s Bay</td>
<td>Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Is, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu</td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>Samoan and Tongan workers recruited via island government (RSE also has NZ-based Samoan and Tongan employees)</td>
<td>Housed onsite in cabins. Different island groups housed together on separate orchards</td>
<td>No direct investment in island communities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very small number of women (approx. 2% of RSE workforce)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ni-Vanuatu workers initially recruited via labour agent and now with government assistance</td>
<td>RSE and Tongan govt. jointly employ a Tongan pastoral care worker who provides assistance to RSEs across region</td>
<td>Employer views provision of technical assistance as key benefit that can be provided to workers and communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Sources of RSE workers</td>
<td>1st season recruiting</td>
<td>How labour is recruited</td>
<td>Accommodation &amp; pastoral care</td>
<td>Links to island communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 cont.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Islanders via direct recruitment</td>
<td>Other permanent employees of RSE also provide pastoral care support</td>
<td>Employer has travelled to Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu as part of a small team to scope out possible joint ventures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tuvaluans recruited in 2007/08 via government, and more recently Tuvaluan women via SPP</td>
<td>RSE employs three cooks for the different groups (workers pay for this)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I-Kiribati women via SPP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hawke’s Bay</td>
<td>Kiribati, Philippines, Tonga, Vanuatu</td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>Started recruiting from Vanuatu on recommendation from another RSE. Initially used a labour agent, but now recruits directly with government assistance</td>
<td>Housed in motels and backpacker hostels</td>
<td>No direct investment in island communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Small number of women (approx. 15% of RSE workforce)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 50% of Ni-Vanuatu workforce shared with another employer on a joint ATR</td>
<td>Permanent employee provides pastoral care</td>
<td>Employer has travelled to Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu as part of a small team to scope out possible joint ventures, and is considering establishing a vanilla plantation in Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>I-Kiribati shared on joint ATR and recruitment handled by Kiribati government</td>
<td>Pastoral care worker also accompanies those on joint ATR to Marlborough and provides ongoing pastoral care during workers’ employment with second RSE</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tongans recruited through government</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Filipinos via pre-existing employment relationship</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Hawke’s Bay</td>
<td>Indonesia, Solomon Is, Vanuatu</td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>Small numbers of Ni-Vanuatu, Solomon Is and Indonesians all recruited via pre-existing employment relationships that preceded RSE scheme</td>
<td>Employer has 10 houses for accommodation – some onsite and a number in local community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Sources of RSE workers</td>
<td>1st season recruiting</td>
<td>How labour is recruited</td>
<td>Accommodation &amp; pastoral care</td>
<td>Links to island communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 cont.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some women (approx. 20% of RSE workforce)</td>
<td>Once RSE scheme started, employer initially used labour agent in Vanuatu, and now recruits with assistance from government</td>
<td>Solomon Is workers recruited via NZ-based Solomon Islander</td>
<td>Pastoral care support provided by RSE’s HR manager and team leaders of RSE groups</td>
<td>RSE has links with Vanuatu through a hardwood forestry venture, but no direct investment in RSE workers’ communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hawke’s Bay</td>
<td>Samoa, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu 100% male RSE workforce</td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>Samoans recruited directly via village chief</td>
<td>Purpose-built onsite accommodation</td>
<td>Pastoral care provided by team leaders of RSE groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hawke’s Bay</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>Samoans recruited directly via village chief</td>
<td>Backpacker and motel accommodation. Small number from Savai’i (second main island in Samoa) housed with extended family</td>
<td>No direct investment. But regularly visits Samoa and is investigating possible joint ventures in Samoa (small tourism venture, and grower cooperatives to produce fruit/vegetables for local markets). RSE’s support would be ‘in kind’ via horticultural expertise and technical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Sources of RSE workers</td>
<td>1st season recruiting</td>
<td>How labour is recruited</td>
<td>Accommodation &amp; pastoral care</td>
<td>Links to island communities</td>
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</table>
| 8        | Hawke’s Bay  | Vanuatu 100% male RSE workforce | 2008/09               | Employer had connection with Vanuatu via a permanent employee  
Labour agent used in first year, and subsequent recruitment has been done directly by employer | Onsite caravans. Pastoral care handled by RSE’s HR manager. Alcohol-free policy onsite  
Employer has implemented a compulsory savings scheme (devised by another RSE – see below) for the workers | No direct investment in islands |
| 9        | Hawke’s Bay  | Samoa Some women (approx. 20% of workforce) | 2007/08               | Prior to RSE, small group of Samoans employed from another grower in the region  
Once RSE started, employer began recruiting directly from a particular village based on church connections | Initially onsite caravans and workers now housed in prefabricated onsite cabins  
Pastoral care support provided by employer and his wife who closely oversee workers throughout the season  
Employer has devised a compulsory savings scheme for the workers. Workers are paid 30hrs per week across entire contract period, and balance of savings over and above minimum wage that workers earn on piece rates goes into savings | No direct investment. But employer and his wife visit the village from where the workers are recruited  
RSE provides a shipping container at the end of the season to help workers send large household items home, and facilitates bulk purchases of large goods (e.g. chainsaws, fridges, freezers etc.) |
| 10       | Marlborough  | Kiribati, Vanuatu Small number of women | 2007/08               | Majority of workers shared on joint ATR with RSE in Hawke’s Bay  
Recruitment of Ni-Vanuatu workers initially through labour agent and employer recruits directly | Backpacker hostel  
Majority of workers on joint ATR. Pastoral carer who oversees workers during the first part of their contract continues to manage their pastoral care | No direct investment. But employer focuses his recruitment of Ni-Vanuatu workers on specific communities on the islands of Malo and Santo, and travels there each year to do his recruitment |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sources of RSE workers</th>
<th>1st season recruiting</th>
<th>How labour is recruited</th>
<th>Accommodation &amp; pastoral care</th>
<th>Links to island communities ¹</th>
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<tr>
<td>10 cont.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Small group of I-Kiribati workers initially taken on from another RSE in 2007/08. Subsequent recruitment of I-Kiribati workers via government</td>
<td>Owners of the backpacker hostel also ‘keep an eye’ on the workers</td>
<td>Employer also organises a shipping container to send workers’ large goods home each season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nelson/ Tasman</td>
<td>Tonga 100% male RSE workforce</td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>RSE has used Pacific labour for many years (including Fijians and Indian Fijians in 1950s and 1960s for work with hops and tobacco)</td>
<td>Onsite accommodation. Pastoral care handled by orchard manager and NZ-based Tongan recruitment agent</td>
<td>RSE has invested directly in Tonga with several small projects: repairing a damaged water supply, building a new kindergarten, building a floating jetty for landing cargo and putting in an electric fence for an agricultural college</td>
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<td>Workers recruited via NZ-based Tongan recruitment agent who travels to Tonga each season to select workers. Recruitment agent also runs his own pre-departure training course</td>
<td>Workers required to attend compulsory weekly meetings with pastoral care provider. Weekly interdenominational church service, and pastoral carer also organises some sporting and community events for the workers. Zero tolerance policy for alcohol, but workers allowed to drink kava on Saturdays</td>
<td>RSE also organises containers at the end of the season to send workers’ goods home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nelson/ Tasman</td>
<td>Tonga Small number of women</td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>Recruitment via Tongan government</td>
<td>Onsite accommodation. RSE is part of a consortium of five employers who use a NZ-based Tongan to handle pastoral care</td>
<td>No direct investment. RSE views upskilling of workers and money workers’ earn as primary investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Sources of RSE workers</td>
<td>1st season recruiting</td>
<td>How labour is recruited</td>
<td>Accommodation &amp; pastoral care</td>
<td>Links to island communities*</td>
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</table>
| 13       | Nelson/Tasman | Tonga | 2008/09 | Labour recruited via NZ-based Tongan and Maori recruitment agents. RSE relationship built on family connections | Onsite purpose-built accommodation (and access to two other properties for accommodation if needed) | Pastoral care handled by team leader of RSE workers with high level of support from NZ-based recruitment agents  
Remittance transfers back to Tonga organised by team leader  (bulk transfers to reduce individual transaction costs).  
Weekly attendance at local church  
Local iwi welcome and farewell workers each season | No direct investment. But RSE relationship is built on adult education/learning, building connections between Pacific Islanders and Maori, and the development of new skills for workers while in NZ |
| 14       | Waikato | Kiribati, Samoa | 2008/09 | Samoans initially recruited via government, but now direct recruitment through return workers and village contacts.  
I-Kiribati taken on from another employer | Workers split between Waikato and Hawke’s Bay | No direct investment in islands |

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*Notes:  
1. See section for details on links to island communities.
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<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sources of RSE workers</th>
<th>1st season recruiting</th>
<th>How labour is recruited</th>
<th>Accommodation &amp; pastoral care</th>
<th>Links to island communities¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 15       | Waikato| Kiribati, Samoa        | 2007/08               | Samoans recruited directly via village chief  
I-Kiribati women via SPP project | Backpacker hostel  
Pastoral care handled by HR manager. Workers are debriefed at start of season re: employer’s expectations for workers’ behaviour during their contract, and pastoral care provider also runs sexual health/family planning training for the workers  
RSE purchases food in bulk from supermarket and stores it for the workers | No direct investment. But RSE is considering several development projects in Samoa including mango and vanilla plantations  
RSE organised a container of goods to be sent to Samoa to help with the tsunami recovery in late September 2009 |
| 16       | Otago  | Vanuatu                | 2007/08²              | RSE employs a locally based staff member in Vanuatu to oversee all recruitment. Selection is done via return workers or village leaders | Hostel and rental accommodation  
Accommodation providers are also responsible for pastoral care. Many of the accommodation providers have visited the islands workers are recruited from, and the RSE tries to ensure return workers and workers from the same communities/islands are housed with the same pastoral care providers each season | No direct investment. However RSE selects workers from across Vanuatu and is particularly supportive of recruiting workers from communities that have a specific development project in mind, in an effort to ensure workers’ earnings provide benefits beyond individual RSE households |

¹Information contained in the appendix is from interviews in 2009 and 2010, and RSEs may have subsequently engaged in direct investment in island communities  
²RSE participated in World Bank RSE pilot in 2006/07
APPENDIX 10: Worker productivity in the H/V sector, July-November 2011

10.1 Introduction

During the second half of 2011 data was obtained on wages earned by RSE and non-RSE employees over three seasons (2008/09, 2009/10 and 2010/11) from nine registered Recognised Seasonal Employers (see Chapter 7). These data are examined in this appendix with a view to substantiating the evidence presented in Chapter 7 of significant productivity gains for employers through the use of RSE labour.

Before reviewing the evidence the approach that has been adopted to measuring worker productivity is outlined. This is followed by a summary of the gross earnings per worker provided for 10 weeks at the height of the harvest or pruning seasons by eight of the nine RSEs. One provided data that was in aggregate form and not amenable to the statistics generated below. Employers were requested to provide data on earnings for four groups of workers employed to pick fruit or prune plants: Pacific RSE recruits, New Zealand regular employees, New Zealand casual workers and backpackers. Four of the eight employers provided data only on Pacific RSE workers. The bulk of the data collected, therefore, were for workers from the Pacific. Comparisons between measures of earnings by these four groups are possible but it is important to note that some groups are better represented in the data than others.

10.2 Measuring productivity

The basic hypothesis that guided the productivity study is that workers recruited for seasonal work under the RSE policy will have higher average earnings for the same tasks performed over similar periods than local workers or backpackers who are employed on comparable piece rates. The higher earnings for RSE workers will reflect their greater productivity (output per day worked) and timely completion of key tasks on the orchard/vineyard.

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232 Payment on piece rates directly reflects workers’ productivity; the more bins picked or trees/vines pruned, the greater the income earned.
The direct productivity gains for the enterprise come from timely removal of the crop from the tree/vine as well as from more skilful selection of the individual pieces of fruit that are picked. These two dimensions of improved productivity are measured by regular attendance at work and employees’ experience at completing the tasks at hand. Pacific Islanders and others employed under the RSE policy seek to maximise their earnings in New Zealand by working six or seven full days a week and the policy allows employers to recruit the same workers in successive years.

The data on earnings provided by most of the respondents was gross weekly wages before any deductions. Weeks where holiday pay was included in the remuneration were not included – the earnings in those weeks reflected more than the number of tasks completed and paid for at the prevailing piece rate. Attention is focused on the weekly wages data to assess worker productivity during the 2011 season (cross-sectional comparisons) as well as changes in productivity for specific groups of workers between 2009 and 2011 (longitudinal comparisons).

Two sets of basic descriptive statistics have been used in the analyses. The first includes the maximum, minimum and median (mid-point) gross earnings per worker over a particular period. These positional statistics give indications of the range of earnings within groups as well as differences in earnings between groups. The second set of statistics includes the arithmetic average (mean) for gross earnings per worker and the standard deviation (average difference around this mean) of the earnings of each worker in the group during the period. These, in association with the co-efficient of variation, give measures of the variability in productivity within and between groups.\(^{233}\) The average number of weeks for which wages data are available for each group is also given as a measure of consistency and regularity of performance. If all workers in the group worked every week the maximum for this measure would be 10. Numbers fewer than 10 indicate some gaps in earnings for particular workers during the period.

\(^{233}\) As noted in Chapter 7 the co-efficient of variation expresses in percentage terms the relationship between the standard deviation and the average. The higher the percentage value for the co-efficient of variation the greater the variability in gross earnings, as measured by the standard deviation per worker around the average. The advantage of this measure is that it allows for direct comparison between groups with different values for their averages and standard deviations. It is useful in this study as a measure of the extent to which there is a high degree (or otherwise) of consistency in performance of worker groups as measured by their gross earnings for the 10 weeks surveyed.
10.3 RSE and non-RSE workers: an overall comparison

Wages information was obtained for over 700 workers, but the data for 140 of these people was not amenable to the statistical analysis outlined above. Of the 563 workers for whom 10 weeks of gross weekly wages were available, 418 (74 percent) were Pacific RSE workers while the remaining 145 (26 percent) included New Zealand regular employees (57), New Zealand casual labourers (55) and backpackers (33). Table 1 compares the various indicators of productivity for all RSE and non-RSE workers surveyed, while Table 2 contains the same measures for the different groups of non-RSE workers: the regular and casual New Zealanders employees and the backpackers. In these tables the total earnings are in New Zealand dollars and are aggregated for a 10-week period during the 2010/11 season, usually between mid-February and late April.\textsuperscript{234}

Table 1: Weeks worked and earnings for RSE and non-RSE workers, 2011

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Weeks worked & RSE & Non-RSE \\
\hline
Mean & 8.4 & 7.1 \\
Median & 8 & 7 \\
Minimum & 5 & 4 \\
Maximum & 10 & 8 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Weeks worked for RSE and non-RSE workers, 2011}
\end{table}

Source: Productivity survey, 2011

The greater productivity of the Pacific RSE workers is evident in every indicator in Table 1. They have a significantly higher rate of attendance at work (average weeks worked just under the maximum of 10 compared with 7 weeks for the non-RSE workers), higher maximum, minimum, median and average earnings, and there is much less variability in earnings between Pacific RSE workers than there is among the non-RSE workers. The

\textsuperscript{234} There is some variability in the timing of the peak season by crop, but most of the RSEs that responded to the request for wages data are apple growers and their peak harvest season is consistent across the country.
average earnings for non-RSE workers were 60 percent lower than those for Pacific RSE workers and the co-efficient of variation (cv) for the non-RSE workers was significantly higher (32.9) than that for the RSE workers (18.4).

The high level of variability in earnings for non-RSE workers is a reflection of the mix of regular and casual employees among this group. It can be seen from Table 2 that the New Zealanders who come in successive seasons (the New Zealand regulars) have higher earnings and much more continuity in their work performance than the casual labour that turns up at the farm gate seeking work during the peak harvest and pruning seasons. The median and average earnings for New Zealand casual labour are less than half the earnings for the New Zealand regulars, and the backpackers have by far the lowest earnings.

**Table 2: Weeks worked and earnings for groups of non-RSE workers, 2011**

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Source: Productivity survey, 2011

Backpackers also have the least reliable performance measured by attendance in the workplace over the 10 weeks. On average the 33 backpackers completed fewer than 5 weeks work each on average during the 10-week survey period. It is acknowledged that the numbers of workers in these groups of non-RSE workers are quite small, but the data on their earnings come from four orchards and there are consistent patterns in earnings for Pacific RSE and non-RSE workers across these orchards.
10.4 RSE and non-RSE regular workers: a comparison by relative experience

The 563 workers for whom comparable earnings data were obtained for the 2010/11 season comprised a mix of new and experienced workers. To get a preliminary measure of the impact of experience on earnings, the RSE and non-RSE regular workers were divided into two groups: those who had worked as pickers/pruners on the same orchard or for the same contractor for three or more successive seasons, and those who had worked under three seasons. The comparable measures of productivity for RSE workers and the New Zealand regular workers are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Weeks workers and earnings for less and more experienced workers, 2011

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Source: Productivity survey, 2011

There are clear differences between the more experienced and less experienced pickers in terms of their productivity. Table 3 suggests the most productive workers in 2011 were the RSE recruits from the Pacific who had worked for three or more seasons (average of $7,350 gross earnings compared with $6,444 for regular New Zealanders). There is less variability in the Pacific worker earnings (cv, 16.1 percent) than among the earnings of the New Zealand regulars (26.8 percent). The maximum and minimum weekly earnings for Pacific RSE workers are also consistently higher than those for New Zealanders who return over successive seasons.
10.5 Pacific RSE workers: earnings by source country

Payment of workers via piece rates is motivated by employers’ desire to get the tasks at hand completed as quickly as possible. In this environment the question invariably arises: which Pacific country provides the most productive workers? In this section the comparative earnings of all Ni-Vanuatu, Samoans, Solomon Islanders and Tongans during the 10-week period are compared.

The data for the largest two groups – Samoans and Ni-Vanuatu as shown in Table 4 – come from four and five RSEs respectively. The much smaller numbers of Tongans and Solomon Islanders come from two orchards each. The Solomon Islanders (the smallest group) had the highest median ($7,458) and average ($7,359) gross earnings during the 10 weeks. The next most productive group in terms of aggregate earnings was the Samoans, followed closely by the Tongans. The lowest median and mean gross earnings went to the Ni-Vanuatu (but they had the largest maximum earning for an individual – $11,378). The Ni-Vanuatu also had the greatest variability in individual earnings with a cv of just over 24 percent compared with one half this size for the Tongans (11.8 percent).

Table 4: Weeks worked and earnings for different Pacific worker groups, 2011

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</table>

Source: productivity survey, 2011

A similar pattern is present when workers from different Pacific countries with limited experience of seasonal work in New Zealand are compared. Table 5 shows the various statistics for the Pacific RSE workers who were either in their first or second seasons of
employment in 2011. The Solomon Islanders and Samoans had much higher median and mean gross incomes that the Ni-Vanuatu, for example. The Tongans were close to the average for all Pacific workers with this level of seasonal work experience.

Table 5: Weeks worked and earnings for Pacific worker groups with 1 or 2 seasons of experience, 2011

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Source: Productivity survey, 2011

When the earnings are compared for the more experienced Pacific workers there is greater convergence in their median and average earnings. All groups had received over $7,000 dollars for the specified 10 weeks of work as shown in Table 6. The Ni-Vanuatu had the highest average earnings in this case ($7,563), followed by the Solomon Islanders ($7,483), Samoans ($7,275) and the Tongans ($7,052). The same order existed for the maximum earnings by any individual from the different groups: Ni Vanuatu, Solomons, Samoa and Tonga. The Ni Vanuatu have the greatest experience as RSE workers, commencing with the RSE pilot in 2006/07, and this experience is reflected in the higher wages for workers who have returned for three or more seasons.
Table 6: Weeks worked and earnings for Pacific worker groups with 3 or more seasons of experience, 2011

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Source: Productivity survey, 2011

It is apparent from the data provided by the different RSEs that some of the variability in earnings between the Pacific groups is due to systematic differences in the amounts paid to workers by particular employers (due to hours worked, the nature of the crop, and possible minor variations in piece rates between orchards). In order control for this, the earnings for three groups (Ni Vanuatu/Solomons, Samoans and Tongans) who are employed by one of the RSEs are compared in the next section. The data for the Ni-Vanuatu and Solomon Islanders are aggregated because of small numbers within sample of workers for whom wages data are available.

10.6 Pacific RSE workers: earnings from a particular RSE by source country

The data on weekly earnings for 118 RSE workers provided by a Hawke’s Bay RSE who recruits from several Pacific countries permits a within-orchard comparison of productivity for different groups. The various measures detailed in Table 7 indicate that the most productive group in 2011 were the 53 Tongans who had the highest median ($6,844) and average ($6,891) earnings and the least variability (cv, 10.9 percent) between workers in their aggregate wages for the 10 weeks. A Ni-Vanuatu worker had the highest maximum earnings ($8,615), but the 28 workers in the combined Ni-Van-Solomons group had more variable earnings than the Tongans (cv, 16.0 percent). The workers with the lowest maximum, minimum, median and average earnings were the 37 Samoans.
Table 7: Weeks worked and earnings for Pacific workers on an RSE’s orchard, Hawke’s Bay, 2011

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Source: Productivity survey, 2011

Table 8 shows the statistics for the more experienced workers - those who have worked three or more consecutive seasons for this particular employer. The 34 Tongans hold their preeminent position in terms of median ($7,039) and average ($7,052) earnings and the lowest within-group variability (cv, 9.8 percent). The combined Ni-Van-Solomons group still have the highest maximum earnings, and the greatest within-group variability (cv, 14.5 percent), but they have been surpassed by the Samoans in terms of median and average earnings.

The productivity differences by Pacific source country are not great among the more experienced workers. The difference between the mean earnings for the Tongans ($7,052) and the Ni-Van-Solomons group ($6,720) is only $330 over the ten weeks. The minimum earnings per worker in the three groups are also reasonably similar, ranging from $5,222 for Samoans to $5,629 for the Tongans.
Table 8: Weeks worked and earnings for experienced Pacific workers on an RSE’s orchard, Hawke’s Bay, 2011

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Source: Productivity survey, 2011

Most RSEs have been building relationships with specific Pacific countries and it seems that while there are variations in aggregate earnings by source country, these are not consistent across all orchards/vineyards. The differences for experienced workers in median and average earnings (as shown in Tables 8 (one RSE) and 6) are not significant, suggesting that there is little variation in productivity among workers from the major Pacific source countries.

10.7 RSE and non-RSE workers: earnings over three years by source country

The final dimension of productivity that is examined briefly is the extent to which earnings increase over time with experience for the same groups of workers. The aggregate earnings for 115 experienced Pacific RSE and 13 New Zealand regular workers, over the 10-week reference period during the 2009, 2010 and 2011 seasons, are compared in Table 9. The groups shown in this table only comprise those workers for whom three years of weekly earnings were available.

The measures for 115 Pacific RSE workers indicate that their productivity has increased over time. Maximum, minimum, median and average earnings in 2011 were higher than in either of the previous two years. Not only had their aggregate earnings increased over time, but
the workers’ performance was also becoming more consistent; the co-efficient of variation had fallen from 19.9 percent in 2009 to 16.9 percent in 2011.

Table 9: Changes in earnings over time, Pacific RSE and New Zealand regular workers, 2009-11

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Source: Productivity survey, 2011

In the case of the small group of New Zealand regulars who came from three orchards, the reverse had happened with their minimum, median and average earnings between 2009 and 2011. These earnings had fallen and become more variable across the group. The co-efficient of variation had increased from 16.3 percent in 2009 to 22.4 percent in 2011. These are not the productivity gains RSEs are seeking from workers during the peak harvest/pruning periods, and in light of these findings it is not surprising RSE employers place such value on their Pacific RSE workers, especially those returning over successive seasons.
APPENDIX 11: Orchard/vineyard and packhouse work

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Sources: Horticulture New Zealand [www.hortnz.co.nz]; Beer and Lewis, 2006
APPENDIX 12: Principles and desired outcomes, Kiribati IAU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Kiribati IAU (signed 20 April 2007)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Equity of access and opportunity</td>
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<td>Transparency of process and decision making</td>
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<td>Accountability</td>
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<td>Development focused</td>
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<td>Mitigation of risk</td>
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<td>Outcomes to be achieved by New Zealand Department of Labour</td>
<td>Achieving objectives of the RSE work policy.</td>
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<td>Avoiding: overstaying and exploitation of workers;</td>
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<td>displacement of NZ’s workforce; and suppression of wage growth in the</td>
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<td>H/V industries.</td>
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<td>Securing at least 50% of the available places under the RSE work</td>
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<td>policy, over the first 5 years, from eligible Forum countries. To help</td>
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<td>achieve this goal specific Forum island countries will be assisted to</td>
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<td>establish facilitated arrangements.</td>
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<td>Contributing to the development objectives in the Pacific by fostering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>economic growth and regional integration under the RSE work policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes to be achieved by Kiribati MLHRD</td>
<td>Kiribati secures a fair portion of seasonal work opportunities under the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kiribati workers are able to generate savings and relevant experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>which may contribute to the development of Kiribati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kiribati cooperates effectively with NZ to maintain the integrity of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the arrangements implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The cost of transport does not act as a barrier for Kiribati nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to access opportunities under the RSE work policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical success factors – facilitative arrangements will be effective if:</td>
<td>RSEs establish productive relationships with Kiribati and obtain a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>supplementary workforce to sustain their industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objectives are achieved and principles are adhered to.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both participants have specific and timely information to enable Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to effectively participate in this scheme, and actively participate in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>monitoring and evaluating resulting measures of success and outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kiribati nationals enjoy fair access to the RSE work policy, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reasonable treatment by RSEs, adjust to NZ conditions, derive income and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>skills, have successful re-entry into their home community and heighten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the prospect of return employment in New Zealand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitative arrangements</td>
<td>Will assist RSEs to recruit from Kiribati, enable Kiribati nationals to access opportunities under RSE, allocate responsibilities and actions to the Participants for mitigating risks and ensure compliance and outline cooperation between the Participants for information sharing, marketing and other matters important to the success of the RSE policy. (Details of the facilitative arrangements, including specific information to be covered in the pre-departure orientation, are appended to the IAU as Schedule 1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour, 2007b
### APPENDIX 13: Recruitment and selection methods in the six Pacific states, 2007 - 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pacific state</th>
<th>Recruitment and selection</th>
<th>Work-ready pool</th>
<th>Pre-departure orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
2) Direct recruitment. Employers must obtain license to recruit directly | 2007/08: workers selected via island-based quota system  
2008/09: workers may also be selected by return workers or group leaders  
2009/10: SPP programme – small groups of women selected  
2010/11: SPP programme – increasing number of women recruited | Run by MLHRD with input from NZ High Commission on immigration requirements  
2009/10: SPP programme – Department of Labour facilitated recruitment drives with NZ employers. Department assisted with recruitment and selection as well as pre-departure training  
2010/11: SPP programme – facilitated recruitment drives |
| Samoa        | 1) Work-ready pool via SWAT  
2) Direct recruitment by employers  
Informal agents, village chiefs and church organisations play key role in recruitment  
Legislation to license agents drafted in 2008 but not passed in first four seasons | 1,000 names on work-ready pool in 2007/08. 2,200+ names by 2008/09  
Shift in 2008/09 to registering groups, not individuals, on work-ready pool  
All RSE worker applications – via work-ready pool or direct recruitment - are screened by SWAT  
2010/11: SWAT restructured. Loss of staff. Problems for employers seeking RSE workers via the SWAT and a shift to direct recruitment  
2011/12: Samoa to receive additional support via the SPP programme - to get new systems and processes in place to support SWAT | Compulsory pre-departure training for all RSE workers administered by SWAT  
Occupational Health and Safety staff in Ministry of Labour involved in first season only – not asked to participate since then  
INZ, via High Commission in Apia, involved to training to explain immigration requirements |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pacific state</th>
<th>Recruitment and selection</th>
<th>Work-ready pool</th>
<th>Pre-departure orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tonga</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) ‘Option One’: work-ready pool via MLCI. Pre-screening and selection at village and district level for prospective workers</td>
<td>5,000+ names registered in 2007/08. Reduced to 4,000 names by end of 2008 after a major review by MLCI to re-check eligibility of all candidates</td>
<td>Mandatory training for workers selected via MLCI’s work-ready pool. Voluntary for those selected via Option Two</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) ‘Option Two’: direct recruitment by employers</td>
<td>Work-ready pool has remained most common method of recruitment for employers 2007/08-2010/11</td>
<td>MLCI’s pre-departure briefing organised on employer-specific basis. INZ are not involved in briefing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit focus on spreading opportunities to participate in RSE scheme across Tonga - workers selected from all islands</td>
<td>Only those recruited via Option One are screened by MLCI. MLCI does not hold information on workers recruited directly by employers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tuvalu</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Work-ready pool via MFAL. Island-based quota system for recruitment of workers. Workers nominated by island councils with final selection made by MFAL in Funafuti</td>
<td>2007/08-2008/09: workers in work-ready pool selected via island-based quota system</td>
<td>Run by MFAL. No NZ High Commission or INZ officials based in Funafutí</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Direct recruitment by employers</td>
<td>2009/10: SPP programme – small groups of women selected</td>
<td>2009/10: Department of Labour facilitated recruitment drives with NZ employers. Department assisted with recruitment and selection as well as pre-departure training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE visas must be processed by INZ in Suva, Fiji</td>
<td>2010/11: SPP programme – increasing number of women selected</td>
<td>2010/11: SPP programme – facilitated recruitment drives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All recruitment over first four seasons via work-ready pool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific state</td>
<td>Recruitment and selection</td>
<td>Work-ready pool</td>
<td>Pre-departure orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>1) Direct recruitment facilitated by ESU</td>
<td>2007/08: approximately 1,000 names on work-ready pool</td>
<td>Pre-departure briefings organised by ESU and run on employer-specific basis. INZ involved in briefing to explain immigration requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Direct recruitment via licensed agents, return workers, or community contacts</td>
<td>2008/09 onwards: work-ready pool not used. Selection and recruitment facilitated by ESU, with input from community contacts/village chiefs regarding workers to be selected</td>
<td>Vanuatu Department of Labour’s legal officer attends to check employment contracts and explain to workers in Bislama (pidgin-English)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special legislation passed to operationalise recruitment</td>
<td>2008/09: decrease in use of licensed agents. Rise in direct recruitment by employers (via return workers, community contacts, locally-based staff)</td>
<td>Licensed agents may run their own pre-departure training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct recruitment by employers in first two seasons targeted certain islands – particularly Tanna, Ambae and Efate. 2009/10 onwards ESU trying to spread access more widely</td>
<td>ALL RSE worker applications are screened by ESU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>1) Recruitment via licensed agents is the sole option. Licenses are granted by MFA and renewed annually</td>
<td>2006/07: A scam took place involving a locally-based recruiter selling prospective (unconfirmed) jobs with a New Zealand employer</td>
<td>The Solomon Islands Department of Labour, in collaboration with MFA, provides a one-day pre-departure training programme. The Solomon Islands Small Business Council also attends to discuss budgeting, saving and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No specific legislation currently in place to manage overseas labour recruitment</td>
<td>2008/09: Labour Mobility Unit (LMU) set up within the MFA to manage RSE administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruitment and selection by LMU focuses on central areas of Honiara and Guadalcanal. The government’s attempting to restrict internal movement of potential RSE applications from outer islands into the main urban centres</td>
<td>2010/11: Additional assistance provided via the SPP programme to get LMU’s end-to-end processes in place (recruitment and selection, information management etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by researcher, 2009 and 2010
## APPENDIX 14: RSE Pacific facilitation measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worker selection</th>
<th>Worker preparation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government of each kick-start state is responsible for:</td>
<td>The government of each kick-start state is responsible for pre-departure orientation to improve the ability of Pacific workers to quickly adapt to New Zealand conditions and be productive in their jobs. The original pre-departure briefing outlined in the IAUs signed in 2007 was to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Selecting worker candidates for the work-ready pool based on agreed community-based selection procedures (such processes differ across the five states).</td>
<td>• Cover climate, clothing and footwear requirements, taxation, insurance, accident compensation, budget advice, travel arrangements, and emergency contact details.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Screening all worker candidates (whether recruited via work ready pools or agents or directly by employers) including health, security and immigration history checks.  
| • Maintaining a work-ready pool of citizens who have been screened or in the case of Vanuatu, the licensing of recruitment agents. | The pre-departure orientation was amended in season two (and updated in the IAUs in 2009) and now includes information on: |
| • Facilitating employers’ access to workers, including maintaining a valid and up-to-date database of candidates and overseeing (or regulating) recruitment agents to ensure the integrity of selection processes. | • Climate, clothing, footwear, taxation, insurance, health and well being, accident compensation, hourly and contract rates, legal deductions from wages, banking, remittances, budget advice, travel arrangements, and emergency contact details. |
| | • Compliance, including the consequences of overstaying. |
| | • Promoting a good work ethic and the upholding of the country’s reputation as a reliable source of seasonal workers. |
| | • Supporting group leaders. |

Source: Department of Labour, 2010a, p.28

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235 All RSE policy applicants must comply with the health requirements for a limited purpose visa (regardless of intended length of stay) under the RSE Limited Purpose Entry Policy. For Pacific countries, this means providing a temporary entry X-ray certificate and completing a section of the application form that asks whether applicants are HIV positive or have any medical condition(s) that currently requires or may require renal dialysis, hospitalization or residential care during their intended stay in New Zealand. All kick-start states provide X-rays for tuberculosis, blood tests for HIV, sexually transmitted infections, and liver function; urine tests for diabetes; and tests for hepatitis B.

236 Security checks involve police checks for criminal convictions. Immigration checks identify previous deportees.

237 NZAID funded the development of an internet-based database for the work-ready pool and sent a trainer to each country to train local staff in its use.

238 Accident compensation legislation covers workers, but they are not eligible for free medical services.
## APPENDIX 15: Department of Labour’s activities, October 2006 – June 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-Oct-06</td>
<td>Former Prime Minister Rt Hon. Helen Clark announces RSE policy at Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ retreat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Oct-06</td>
<td>RSE policy launched at press conference by former Minister for Social Development and former Minister of Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Nov-06</td>
<td>Department of Labour RSE Project team is set up, reporting to Steering Group within Workforce Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15 Dec 06</td>
<td>RSE Kick-Start State Forum: Pacific officials from kick-start countries (Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu), plus Nauru, meet with NZ officials, H/V industry and employers to commence discussions on facilitative arrangements under the RSE policy which will maximise opportunities for Pacific nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jan-07</td>
<td>World Bank pilot in Central Otago with Seasonal Solutions commences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-Feb-07</td>
<td>IAU bilateral discussions: team of NZ officials from DoL and MFAT travel to the Pacific kick-start states to complete bilateral discussions to agree upon roles and responsibilities for implementation of RSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Apr-07</td>
<td>RSE Unit established - comprising of a Relationship Manager and two Immigration Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9–20 Apr 07</td>
<td>RSE Roadshow for employers and Pacific community throughout NZ. RSE Team and HortNZ travel to Wairarapa, Canterbury, Nelson, Hawke’s Bay, Northland/Kerikeri, Auckland, Waikato, Bay of Plenty, and Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Apr-07</td>
<td>Step 1 - RSE forms available to employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Apr-07</td>
<td>RSE work policy signed off by government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Apr-07</td>
<td>RSE IAU’s signed by each Pacific kick-start state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Apr-07</td>
<td>RSE National Coordinator appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Apr-07</td>
<td>The RSE policy transitional (TRSE) phase begins. During this time the RSE policy worked alongside existing temporary work policies available to the H/V industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Apr-07</td>
<td>Employer packs available to accredited employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Apr-07</td>
<td>First employer accredited – Mr Apple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Apr-07</td>
<td>RSE launch – held at parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-May-07</td>
<td>Step 2 - ATR forms available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-Jun-07</td>
<td>Step 3 – RSE visa application forms available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-07</td>
<td>Pre-departure packs for Pacific workers, designed by DoL, are provided to the kick-start states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-07</td>
<td>Marlborough contractor, Vinepower recruits first 20 RSE workers from Tonga. Tongan workers are in the vineyards by early August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-07</td>
<td>Two months after the launch, 37 employers submitted application for RSE accreditation - with 12 granted RSE status, including contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Jul-07</td>
<td>RSE Principal Advisor Pacific region appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Milestone</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Aug-07</td>
<td>Seasonal Solutions, Central Otago, uses their pilot season experience to get approval to recruit 232 workers from Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Sep-07</td>
<td>Pacific circuit trip begins which includes high-level discussions with the Pacific states, the introduction of the RSE Principal Advisor as well as ‘Training the Trainers’ pre-departure programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Sep-07</td>
<td>Early feedback loops signal that the H/V industries require more lead in time to transition small/med-sized growers into RSE. A transitional RSE policy (TRSE) is presented to government and approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Oct-07</td>
<td>Mr Apple recruits over 113 workers from Samoa — and is the first employer to trial a 100% direct recruitment method as well as the first to recruit women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Oct-07</td>
<td>Early October Seasonal Solutions travel back to Vanuatu to run pre-departure training and bring the first of the 232 ni-Vanuatu workers back to NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Nov-07</td>
<td>TRSE policy becomes operational and Blenheim contractors Fore Vintage make a decision to source their first 45 RSE workers from Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jan-08</td>
<td>By the end of January the first Kiribati workers arrive in NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jan-08</td>
<td>Taylor Corp travels to Tuvalu to recruit 48 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Feb-08</td>
<td>Ten months after the RSE policy is launched the first group of RSE workers from Tonga return home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12 Feb 08</td>
<td>RSE Kick-Start State Forum 2: Key stakeholders from the Pacific, H/V industries and government departments gathered to talk about the experiences of implementing RSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-08</td>
<td>Front-Liners’ Forum – DoL front-line staff (labour inspectors, labour market knowledge managers, and compliance teams) brought together to connect with policy makers, as well as staff from the Pacific Division, Research and Evaluation, and the RSE Unit. Staff take action points from the kick-start state forum and turn them into a workable plan for the upcoming year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-08</td>
<td>By March the momentum of RSE rippled into other complementary projects such as the NZ Master Contractors initiative [to improve workplace practices and compliance amongst contractors] and the Pacific Island Trade and Investment Commissions (PITIC) financial literacy pilot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Apr-08</td>
<td>End of the first year of RSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-08</td>
<td>Australia New Zealand Institute of Insurance and Finance (ANZIF) discussions held in Wellington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-08</td>
<td>Roadshow presentations for Pacific communities throughout NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 May 08</td>
<td>RSE kick-start forum 3: key stakeholders gathered again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-08</td>
<td>Solomon Islands delegation travels to Wellington to discuss RSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Sep-08</td>
<td>IAU review begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Sep-08</td>
<td>New Director RSE appointed in Wellington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Milestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Oct-08</td>
<td>Election of a new government – Hon. Dr Jonathan Coleman appointed as Minister of Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Feb-09</td>
<td>Review of pre-departure orientation material is complete and revised booklets and DVD’s are sent out to Pacific states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Feb-09</td>
<td>RSE Operational Incidents Group is formed to conduct a weekly review of operational risks and incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Feb-09</td>
<td>RSE Governance Group established to oversee RSE led by the Acting Deputy Secretary, Workforce Division, DoL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-09</td>
<td>RSE Principal Advisor Pacific travels to the Pacific to provide training on new pre-departure orientation materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-Mar-09</td>
<td>RSE Relationship Manager leaves the RSE team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Apr-09</td>
<td>Summary of evaluation findings from first season of RSE policy (2007/08) released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-09</td>
<td>IAU reviewed and signed for Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-09</td>
<td>Internal DoL workshops held to review the RSE end-to-end processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-09</td>
<td>Introduction of new Supplementary Seasonal Employer (SSE) policy (replacing TRSE) and changes to RSE announced by Minister of Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-09</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs visits Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-09</td>
<td>Rt. Hon. John Key travelled to the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-09</td>
<td>Discussions with Canadian officials involved in the Canadian Seasonal Workers’ Agricultural Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-09</td>
<td>SPP workshop held in Wellington with Pacific states, industry and other government departments to inform individual project plans and provision of technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-09</td>
<td>NZAid (MFAT) provides funding for the Strengthening Partnerships Program (SPP) – provision of technical assistance to the kick-start states for RSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-09</td>
<td>Two new RSE Relationship Managers appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-09</td>
<td>RSE National Coordinator leaves the Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-09</td>
<td>Supplementary Seasonal Employer (SSE) Policy introduced replacing TRSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Aug-09</td>
<td>First RSE Pacific teleconference – agreed to meet monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Aug-09</td>
<td>MOU with NZAid signed for technical assistance (SPP) to the Pacific states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Sep-09</td>
<td>Significant challenges around adapting to prevailing labour market conditions [rising unemployment due to global economic recession – 150,000 registered unemployed in September 2009]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Sep-09</td>
<td>RSE: SPP trips to Vanuatu and Tonga to confirm project plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Oct-09</td>
<td>Personnel changes (new agency heads in Tonga and Samoa, new MFAT staff at key posts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Oct-09</td>
<td>Visit by World Bank Managing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Milestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Oct-09</td>
<td>RSE: SPP trips to Kiribati and Tuvalu to confirm project plans and finalise facilitated recruitment drive arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 09</td>
<td>MFAT (formerly NZAID) funded RSE worker pilot training programme, run by independent contractors commences. Twenty five courses (with 312 enrolments) delivered in Hawke’s Bay and Bay of Plenty between Nov 09 and Sep 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Nov-09</td>
<td>Visit by Vanuatu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Nov-09</td>
<td>RSE: SPP trip to Solomon Islands to discuss the IAU and confirm project plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Nov-09</td>
<td>The requirement for RSE workers to hold a return ticket to their country of origin when applying for a limited purpose visa is removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Nov-09</td>
<td>Inland Revenue - from 30 November 2009 Immigration New Zealand (INZ) and Inland Revenue (IR) will offer a joined-up service to RSE workers for the issuance of IRD numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Nov-09</td>
<td>Compulsory medical insurance – implementation of new requirements as at 30 November 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Dec-09</td>
<td>IAU reviewed and signed for Tuvalu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Dec-09</td>
<td>Re-specification of existing funding agreement with Horticulture NZ to support capacity building of smaller employers (previously focused on now discontinued TRSE policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Dec-09</td>
<td>RSE: SPP trip to Kiribati for facilitated recruitment drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Dec-09</td>
<td>RSE: SPP trip to Samoa to confirm project plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03-Dec-09</td>
<td>Teleconference with officials implementing Australian PSWPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jan-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP first group of workers arrive from Tuvalu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jan-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP trip to Tuvalu for facilitated recruitment drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jan-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP first group of workers arrive from Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Feb-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP trip to Tonga to confirm project plan and begin action items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Feb-10</td>
<td>New Deputy Chief Executive Immigration is appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondments from Kiribati and Tuvalu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP second group of workers arrive from Kiribati and Tuvalu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP trip to Vanuatu to confirm project plan and begin action items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Mar-10</td>
<td>Launch of ‘National H/V Labour Governance Group 2010 Strategy’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Mar-10</td>
<td>RSE Principal Advisor leaves the Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Mar-10</td>
<td>Establishment Director RSE visits Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Mar-10</td>
<td>Relationship Manager South Island leaves the Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Apr-10</td>
<td>IAU signed with Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Apr-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP travel to Samoa to confirm project plans and start action items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Milestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondment from Tonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-10</td>
<td>DoL hosts Samoan officials during visit to NZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP Domestic Awareness workshop in Tuvalu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Jun-10</td>
<td>Establishment Director RSE – end of contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP travel to Solomon Islands to confirm project plan and start action items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-10</td>
<td>New Relationship Manager South Island appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jul-10</td>
<td>DoL attendance at Australian PSWPS Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Aug-10</td>
<td>IAU reviewed and signed for Tonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Aug-10</td>
<td>New National Director RSE is appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09-Aug-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP Workshop in Auckland to inform the second year of funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep/Oct/Dec 10</td>
<td>National Director RSE travels to the Pacific (Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu &amp; Vanuatu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Sep-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondment of Kiribati Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Nov-10</td>
<td>Immigration Manager (RSE Processing Unit) leaves the Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Dec-10</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondment from Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jan-11</td>
<td>RSE: Communications for Success training in Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Feb-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP Domestic Awareness workshop in Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>Official from Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australia joins the RSMU on secondment for 3 months [to learn more about the practical implementation of the RSE policy – to provide guidance on the PSWPS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondment from Tonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondment from Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Mar-11</td>
<td>Department of Labour restructure completed – RSE Strategic Management Unit (RSMU) is now part of Settlement, Protection and Attraction Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Apr-11</td>
<td>Visa training for Vanuatu MFAT buddy post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Apr-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondment from Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Apr-11</td>
<td>As from 1 April 2011, the new RSE tax rate (10%) comes into effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Apr-11</td>
<td>As from 1 April 2009, the new RSE tax rate (15% plus 1.7% ACC) and a new minimum wage rate apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14 Apr 11</td>
<td>Front-Liners’ Forum - Wellington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Apr-11</td>
<td>Vanuatu celebrates 4 years of RSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-11</td>
<td>Pre-departure ‘Get ready pack’ reviewed for next season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-11</td>
<td>IAU reviewed and signed for Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-May-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondment from Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Milestone</td>
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<tr>
<td>09-May-11</td>
<td>World Bank Pacific Islands Labour Sending (PAILS) Forum held in Tonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-May-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP planning workshop in Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-May-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP Domestic Awareness workshop in Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-May-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP planning workshop in Tonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-Jun-11</td>
<td>ICE Expo (horticultural trade show) in Hawke’s Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06-Jun-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP planning workshop in Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09-Jun-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP secondment from Tuvalu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Jun-11</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs travels to Vanuatu and Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Jun-11</td>
<td>RSE is announced as a category winner in “Excellence in Working Together for Better Services”, Institute of Public Administration of New Zealand (IPANZ) Awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Jun-11</td>
<td>RSE: SPP planning workshop in Samoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A. Masoe, pers. comm, RSE Strategic Management Unit, Department of Labour, 2011
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