Campaigning in a Changing Media Environment: The Public as a Creator, Consumer and Distributor of Information

By
Maarten Walter Rikken

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Discipline of Media, The University of Adelaide

August 2013
Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................. 5
Statement .................................................................. 7
Acknowledgments ..................................................... 8
Chapter One: Introduction .......................................... 10
  Kony 2012 .................................................................. 19
  Thesis Structure and Overview .................................. 32
Chapter Two: International Relations ............................ 34
  Introduction .............................................................. 34
  Constructivism ......................................................... 35
  Norms and Interests .................................................. 37
  Norm Origins ............................................................ 41
  Which norms matter the most under which circumstances ...................................................................... 47
  Norms & Legitimacy ................................................... 53
  Nongovernmental Actors (World Society & Global Civil Society) ................................................. 59
  Global Civil Society (GCS) .......................................... 59
  The English School, International Society & World Society ......................................................... 62
  Pluralist .................................................................... 65
  Solidarist ................................................................... 66
  World Society and Sovereignty ....................................... 68
  Human Rights, Norms and Sovereignty ......................................................... 70
  Managing Global Problems .......................................... 78
  Conclusion ................................................................. 83
Chapter Three: New Media Environment ......................... 85
  Introduction .............................................................. 85
  Web 2.0 .................................................................... 86
  The Self ..................................................................... 88
  Theoretical Implications .............................................. 93
  Pragmatic Implications for World Society Campaigns ................................................................. 94
  Audience Fragmentation .............................................. 95
  Selective and Partisan Exposure .................................... 99
  Content Proliferation and the Creative Audience ......................................................... 106
  The Changing Environment ........................................... 108
  Conclusion ................................................................. 111
Chapter Four: International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) ................................................. 113
Abstract

The public’s capacity to create, distribute, and selectively consume information presents non-governmental campaigns with distinct challenges and opportunities. Challenges arise from an environment in which there exists an overabundance of information and the public has an unprecedented level of control in their selection. Opportunities arise from the environment’s cost effective nature and the public’s ability to participate. Together the challenges and opportunities encompass four pragmatic effects: (1) audience fragmentation, (2) partisan selective exposure (selecting news based on partisan beliefs), (3) selective exposure (selecting sports or entertainment information over political news for instance), and (4) there has been a dramatic proliferation in the amount of content available. Concerns over a healthy democracy come as the public can narrowly tailor their information consumption through partisan and selective exposure, fragmenting the public sphere and potentially limiting a person’s exposure to uncongenial information. This thesis is concerned with the potential synergy between this communication environment and non-governmental campaigns. Exploring this synergy is made difficult because of the heterogeneous nature of non-governmental campaigns. This difficulty is combated by individually analysing the effects of this communication environment on the campaign techniques of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines’ (ICBL). The five techniques are: (1) disseminating information to raise awareness and generate an issue, (2) establishing a network, (3) framing and normative grafting, (4) shaming, and (5) reversing the burden of proof from proponents of the campaign to opponents. In this communication environment non-governmental campaigns must harness the public’s propensity to participate, relinquish control, hold credibility, and formulate a
clear and concise message. The public’s once passive role in the execution of campaign techniques has shifted to that of an active and instrumental role. A consequence of this shift is an increasing interdependence between campaigns and the participation of public.

The fact that people are creating, disseminating, selecting, and collaborating in diverse projects and protests sees debate concerning the onset of change in the communication landscape steadily become displaced with the need to investigate its effects. This need is elevated by the growing array of international issues that must be met with a global and systematic response if they are to be challenged with success (e.g. global warming, global financial crisis, environmental conservation, regional conflicts, world hunger and poverty). The core contribution of this thesis also originates from this need to understand the effects of mass self-communication. This contribution is threefold: (1) developing an interdisciplinary and systematic method of campaign analysis, (2) using it to examine the broader effects of mass self-communication on the techniques used to stimulate normative change, and (3) applying it to an original case study of the Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign.
Statement

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being made available for loan and photocopying, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

I also give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University’s digital research repository, the Library catalogue and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of time.

Maarten Walter Rikken

Date
Acknowledgments

It was the people around me that made this experience so rewarding and enjoyable.

After completing an undergraduate degree in journalism at the University of Canberra with no intention of becoming a journalist I turned to an Honours degree at The University of Adelaide. It was during my Honours year that I discovered a love for independent research that has carried me right to this point in time: writing my acknowledgments. This love for research owes much to my principal supervisor and Honours supervisor, Dr. Michael Wilmore. Michael’s support and encouragement, alongside my other supervisor Dr. Chika Anyanwu, has been fantastic. For this I am extremely grateful and it goes without saying that this thesis could not have been completed without both of them. Indeed, I am also indebted to all the staff in the media discipline at The University of Adelaide for their assistance.

I would also like to thank my colleague and friend Minghua, who was both my desk neighbour and coffee buddy. Together we have embarked on a noble quest to discover the best coffee in Adelaide. I am extremely grateful for her friendship.

I came to Adelaide knowing very few people and I am leaving with many good friends. Among them are Antonio and Zelia, my current housemates, who have not only been an amazing source of support but were willing to share their love of wine with me. I

---

must also thank Matt who convinced me to come to Adelaide for my Honours degree and has been a great friend throughout my current studies. Finally, Nick and Derek have continued to be great friends, albeit from a distance.

Lastly, although separated by distance, my family has been essential. My parents, Brian and Corine, have instilled in me a love for language, research and all manner of inquisitive pursuits, all of which find a place in this thesis. To my parents, thank you. My brother, Roland, who spent the majority of the last few years living in Tokyo, has nonetheless been and will continue to be essential to everything I do. My sister, Ellen has been another crucial source of support. Her continued travels are also a constant inspiration to finish and travel again. Finally, I must thank my dear Oma without whom none of this would have been possible.
Chapter One: Introduction

On December 21, 2012 the YouTube\(^2\) video “Gangnam Style” (Officialpsy 2012) by Korean artist Psy reached one billion views. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this achievement was the mere five months required from the video’s upload on July 15, 2012 to its one billionth view in December, 2012. YouTube now attracts over 800 million unique users watching over 4 billion hours of video each month (YouTube 2012a). Another 72 hours of video are uploaded every minute, while 500 years of YouTube video are watched every day on the social network site Facebook\(^3\) and over 700 videos are shared on Twitter\(^4\) each minute. YouTube’s community also boasts strong social action with 100 million people liking, sharing, or commenting on videos every week, meaning more than 50% of all videos on YouTube witness some form of community interaction (YouTube 2012a).

The 7,000 hours of news-related content uploaded to YouTube every day (YouTube 2012b) also sees its prominence as a news provider steadily increase. This prominence was particularly evident during the 2012 U.S. election cycle when videos tagged with Romney or Obama were viewed 2.7 billion times or the 200 million views on the some 350,000 news and political videos uploaded from Syria during 2012 (YouTube 2012b).

The environment in which YouTube operated and thrived in 2012, one in which the public can participate, interact, create and control what they select, is indicative of the environment in which campaigns by groups or individuals operating to achieve a certain goal now find themselves.

---

\(^2\) https://www.youtube.com/ (Retrieved January 9, 2013)
\(^3\) https://www.facebook.com/ (Retrieved January 9, 2013)
\(^4\) https://twitter.com (Retrieved January 9, 2013)
Public participation means individuals like Sohaib Athar can Tweet$^5$ about a noisy helicopter (“@ReallyVirtual: Helicopter hovering above Abbottabad at 1AM (is a rare event)”) from his home in Abbottabad, Pakistan and inadvertently be the first to report the operation that would kill Osama bin Laden or a demonstrator in Bahrain who uploads a YouTube$^6$ video (with 2.4 million views$^7$) (Shaffeem 2011) that depicts the army firing at protestors. This participatory environment comes alongside a growing array of issues that exist beyond the state’s borders, issues that require a global and systematic response if they are to be challenged with any success. Anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and environmental concerns are all global issues that non-governmental campaigns have successfully challenged. If this success is to continue it is important to understand how the new media environment affects non-governmental campaigns.

It is for this reason that this thesis will consists of two stages. The first stage sets out to understand how non-governmental campaigns work using international relations (IR) literature and a case study of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The second stage asks whether non-governmental campaigns still work in the current media environment by focusing on new media and a case study of the Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign. Together they offer a more nuanced and subtle theorization of campaigns operating in the new media environment.

$^5$ Ibid.
$^6$ http://www.youtube.com
$^7$ As of May 22, 2013
Indeed, if taken individually, media literature can struggle to understand the complexity of the task facing modern non-governmental campaigns, while IR does little to understand the effects of the changing media environment. Similarly an analysis that invests too much into either approach, particularly in new media tools like the internet, is done to the dismay of Morozov (2012), who sees “the present excitement about the internet, particularly the high hopes that are pinned on it in terms of opening up closed societies” stemming from “selective and, at times, incorrect readings of history … [that] minimize the role of structural conditions” (2012, xii). Such analysis not only blinds us to the limitations of new media tools themselves, but paradoxically, to the actual extent of their influence. For cyber-utopians it is “their refusal to see the downside of the new digital environment” that ends “up belittling the role of the internet, refusing to see that it penetrates and reshapes all walks of political life, not just the ones conducive to democratization” (2012, xiv). Thus, a balanced approach that incorporates both media and IR literature offers not only a greater understanding of non-governmental campaigns but of media and IR theory themselves.

Campaigning in the current information communication environment means operating within the concept of mass self-communication, in which content is self-generated, emission is self-directed, and reception is self-selected (2007; Castells, M 2008; 2009). Blurring the traditional distinction between the role of the creator, consumer and distributor complicates the information landscape and affects the way in which campaigns operate and disseminate information. Difficulties in reaching the public arise from an environment in which there exists an overabundance of information and individuals have an unprecedented level of control in their selection.
The principal effects of this environment are as follows: (1) audience fragmentation, (2) partisan selective exposure (selecting news based on partisan beliefs), (3) selective exposure (selecting sports or entertainment information over political news), and (4) a dramatic proliferation in the amount of content available. A particular concern is the public’s ability to narrowly tailor their information consumption through partisan and selective exposure (Lawrence, Sides & Farrell 2010; Mutz 2001; Stroud 2008; Sunstein 2007; Tewksbury 2003; Webster 2005), fragmenting the public sphere and potentially limiting a person’s exposure to information that goes against their political predispositions (Bennett & Iyengar 2008; Gentzkow & Shapiro 2010; Katz 1996; Susnstein 2004).

Mass self-communication and the aforementioned effects form a common analytical thread throughout this project as it investigates the potential synergy between mass self-communication and campaigning. Understanding this synergy is complicated by the heterogeneous nature of “campaigning” and the resulting difficulties in systematically analysing their operation and methods. In other words, how does one study the effects of mass self-communication on “campaigning” when each campaign’s make up and operation varies so greatly?

It is because of this difficulty that this project employs an interdisciplinary mode of scholarship in its examination. By using both international relations (IR) and media scholarship this research intends to add further nuance to our understanding of the operation and success or failure of campaigns.
International relations scholarship enables us to systematically analyse the methods of nongovernmental “campaigning”. Influencing state behaviour by shifting norms – collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors – is the mark of a successful campaign in international relations scholarship (Clark, Ian 2007; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Legro 1997; Nadelmann 1990; Price, Richard 1998a; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999) of which a notable example is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The success of the ICBL in shifting international sentiment towards anti-personnel (AP) landmines demonstrates the process by which campaigns are able to alter the “security policies of states by generating international norms that shape and redefine state interests” (Price, Richard 1998a, 615). The ICBL achieved this by using five techniques: (1) disseminating information to raise awareness and generate an issue, (2) establishing a network, (3) framing and normative grafting, (4) shaming, and (5) reversing the burden of proof from proponents of the campaign to opponents.

In addition to the use of these campaigning techniques, are the innate characteristics of the campaign’s issue (Keck & Sikkink 1998), the characteristics of the campaign’s target (Burgerman 2001; Evangelista 2002; Nadelmann 1990; Price, Richard 2003; Risse & Sikkink 1999), and the characteristics of the campaign itself (Clark, AM 2001; Florini, A. M. 2000b; Reitan 2007; Risse 2000b; Sikkink 2002) of which credibility, veracity, impartiality, representativeness, accountability, transparency, independence and expertise play major roles.
The ICBL’s five techniques (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and reversing the burden of proof) will be individually examined with the effects of mass self-communication. This method of analysis helps us to understand the broader effects of mass self-communication on campaigning as well as the associated advantages and disadvantages. This analysis encapsulates this project’s research question:

How are the five techniques used by campaigns to stimulate normative change (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and reversing the burden of proof) affected by mass self-communication?

This question is principally examined through an original case study of the Australian 2011 Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign (Chapter Six). This original account of the BLE campaign, in addition to detailing the broader effects of mass self-communication on the operation and success of campaigns, makes this research well positioned to make a unique contribution to the literature. This contribution comes as literature examining non-governmental advocacy with a political perspective has a tendency to leave the media, particularly new media, absent from detailed analysis. In a review of prominent literature on the subject of non-governmental advocacy written in the years following the ICBL (1998-2003) (Burgerman 2001; Clark, AM 2001; Evangelista 2002; Florini, Ann M. 2000a; Higgott, Bieler & Underhill 2000; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002b), Price (2003) observes that, “[v]ery conspicuous by its absence in these volumes, however, is sustained attention to a decisive impact of the internet and World Wide Web ... Indeed, it is striking that mention is rarely made of the role of the
internet in these volumes with but a few passing references to its facilitative role” (Price, Richard 2003, 597). Ian Clark (2007) also observes that the non-governmental realm as a whole (termed world society) is a “somewhat skeletal concept” that is in need of “some historical and theoretical flesh” (2007, 3-4). This project aims to assist in “fleshing” out the non-governmental realm by looking at one of its most prominent members; non-governmental advocacy campaigns.

This project also differs from much of the literature examining non-governmental advocacy from a media perspective. This difference comes as such literature rarely systematically analyses the operation and techniques of a campaign (as is done in the current project through the ICBL’s five techniques). Instead analysis is largely restricted to single instances or a finite number of examples (DeLuca, Lawson & Sun 2012; Lim, M 2012), making a comparative analysis between different campaigns difficult. While this field of inquiry is entirely beneficial, it is liable to paint campaigns as sporadic and unpredictable in nature. In other words, it renders any inference to the broader effects of mass self-communication and a changing information communication environment on campaigning, beyond this single instance, more difficult. Donatella della Porta and Dieter Rucht (2002) substantiate this observation by arguing that literature studying campaigns and social movements tends to fall into one of two categories:

On the one hand, we find broad descriptions, dealing with the movement as if it were a coherent entity. These broad essays are often impressionistic, not built on close empirical observation, and tend to ignore or simplify differences across countries, action levels (from the local to the international), ideological strands within the movements, and environmental issue areas. On the other
hand, there is a plethora of case studies on individual organizations and/or specific conflicts that offer rich empirical details but often lack theoretical guidance and an assessment of whether or not the case under investigation represents a broader phenomenon (Porta & Rucht 2002, 2)

Donatella della Porta and Dieter Rucht (2002, 3) “argue that research energies should be directed at the space between these two approaches; that is, below the level of general treatises and above the level of studying single groups or protests.” This project will occupy this space with a broad analysis of campaigning through the ICBL’s techniques and a more specific application of these techniques through numerous examples and a case study of the Australian 2011 Ban Live Export campaign.

Segerberg and Bennett (2011, 199) note that the examination of single technologies is to “abstract new social media out of more complex contexts” and is “one of the important analytical fallacies in the debate about social media and contentious politics.” This debate has “the tendency to isolate social media such as Twitter and Facebook from the broader technological and social contexts in which they operate. Single technologies risk becoming fetishized and personified (Segerberg & Bennett 2011, 199). This project will avoid these “analytical fallacies” by using the broader analytical concept of mass self-communication that encompasses a myriad of technological platforms.

Bennett and Iyengar (2008, 713) also berate political communication studies for a focus “on adding new findings to established categories of study such as the ever-
popular sub-subfields of framing, priming, agenda setting, and so on.” This focus, as Bennett and Iyengar argue, inevitably results in the field becoming theoretically adrift, “seldom looking back to see where foundational modern theory needs to be adapted and, in some cases, overturned, in order to keep pace with the orientations of late modern audiences, and new modes of content production and information delivery” (Bennett & Iyengar 2008, 713). These changing modes of information production and delivery will feature prominently in this project’s analysis in addition to a focus on the theoretical shifts that such changes bring.

Finally, Katzenstein and Sil (2008) call on international relations scholarship to move beyond discrete research traditions and toward what they refer to as “analytic eclecticism”,

“distinguished by the fact that features of analyses in theories initially embedded in separate research traditions can be separated from their respective foundations, translated meaningfully, and recombined as part of an original permutation of concepts, methods, analytics, and empirics” (Katzenstein, P & Sil 2008, 110-11).

Katzenstein and Sil hope that this eclectic pursuit will provide international relations with a “meaningful practical significance beyond the academe” (2008, 111). This project will extend Katzenstein and Sil’s “analytic eclecticism” beyond the discrete research traditions of international relations to incorporate the rise of mass self-communication. This rise has seen an ever increasing proportion of content become self-generated, emission become self-directed, and reception become largely self-
selected. Incorporating mass self-communication in the analysis not only broadens our understanding of campaigns; it helps us understand how to campaign better and edges us toward Katzenstein and Sil’s desire to have meaningful and practical significance.

Before discussing the structure of the thesis, I will briefly illustrate the benefits of eclectic (or interdisciplinary) scholarship through a short examination of the Kony 2012 campaign by Invisible Children\(^8\). This analysis will focus on the campaign’s dissemination of information to raise awareness and generate an issue. In addition, we will briefly explore the characteristics of the issue, the characteristics of the campaign itself and the characteristics of the campaign’s target, in this case the United States.

**Kony 2012**

On the 5th of March, 2012 the NGO Invisible Children released a 30 minute video titled "Kony 2012" (Invisiblechildreninc 2012) in an effort to generate awareness of war crimes committed in northern Uganda and the surrounding regions by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and its commander Joseph Kony. Positioning itself as opposition to the southern Ugandan Yoweri Museveni, who took control of Uganda in 1986, the LRA became known for their violent tactics and in particular the repeated kidnapping of children. The latter is the most detestable features of the LRA as the abducted boys would be trained as child soldiers and the girls used as slaves or porters. The fear of being abducted forced children to leave their villages at night and seek safety in shelters set up by aid agencies in larger cities. This phenomenon was termed the “night commute” (Price, J). The Ugandan government has been fighting Kony since 1987 with

assistance from the United States and the International Criminal Court who issued arrest warrants for Kony and four LRA organisers in 2005.

Founded in 2004 by filmmakers Bobby Bailey, Laren Poole, and Jason Russell, the US NGO Invisible Children\(^9\) achieved unprecedented success in the dissemination of their “Kony 2012” video. Indeed, to say the video went “viral”\(^10\) would be a gross understatement, registering 100 million views in just six days on both Vimeo (Invisiblechildren 2012) and YouTube (Invisiblechildreninc 2012). The rapid speed with which the video spread across social networks earned it the title of the “most viral video in history” (Aguilar 2012; Grossman 2012; Wasserman 2012). The campaign’s success was not constrained to video platforms as messages with #Kony exploded on Twitter. Isaac Hepworth, an employee of Twitter, compiled a graph to demonstrate the number of “Tweets” (Figure 1), “i made a chart showing the growth in tweets about Kony and #StopKony. nearly 10m since the beginning of the month: pic.twitter.com/nOph8MMI”.\(^{11}\)


\(^{10}\) To go “viral” means the video was shared extensively over social media sites (SNS) like Twitter, Facebook, Google +, and blogs

\(^{11}\) https://twitter.com/isaach/status/177915615321931776/photo/1 (Retrieved July 22, 2012)
The viral success of “Kony 2012” was predicated on a number of complementary elements. First, Invisible Children had already produced films prior to the release of “Kony 2012” and in doing so were able to established followers across Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Second, social media was placed at the forefront of the campaign. #KONY2012 bombarded Twitter with clear and concise messages that were able to retain their meaning and remain emotionally charged in 140 characters. This is exemplified by the tweets: “It’s not a political issue. It’s a human issue. The online premiere of #KONY2012 hits March 5th 12pm PST. http://bit.ly/WATCHKONY2012”12 or “Invisible Children: Premiere KONY 2012 understanding that where you live shouldn’t determine whether you live. http://ow.ly/9sQkd”13 by @VansWarpedTour.

---

In an interview with the *New York Times* (Goodman, JD & Preston 2012) social media researcher Danah Boyd discussed the campaign’s ability to “create narratives that can be boiled down to 140 characters while still engaging people emotionally”. The campaign created “action messages that can be encapsulated into a hashtag. And they already have a strong network of people who are, by and large, young, passionate, active on social media, and structurally disconnected from one another” (Goodman, JD & Preston 2012). Social media expert Ethan Zuckerman (Zuckerman 2012) also observed the importance of the campaign’s clear and concise narrative:

> The campaign Invisible Children is running is so compelling because it offers an extremely simple narrative: Kony is a uniquely bad actor, a horrific human being, whose capture will end suffering for the people of Northern Uganda. If each of us does our part, influences powerful people, the world’s most powerful military force will take action and Kony will be captured (Zuckerman 2012).

Condensing a complex situation into a simple narrative of good versus evil is understandable in an information saturated environment in which a person’s attention remains a scarcity. Running concurrent to the campaign’s simplification of the message is its emphasis on action. Alluded to by Ethan Zuckerman, the feeling of joining a worldwide manhunt for this “evil” individual by simply “liking” or sharing this video across your social network is quite appealing. In an interview with the New York Times (Goodman, JD & Preston 2012) social media writer Allison Fine notes that they “are deputizing all of us to click this guy away ... We’ve seen plenty of people put up video
for advocacy, but never to say, let’s catch a guy ... You are participating in a worldwide manhunt for what appears to be a really bad guy.”

Invisible Children were also quite explicit in their desire for anyone viewing the video to then share it throughout their social network. Sharing the video across an individual’s social network not only spreads awareness through its continued dissemination but also empowers the video with the credibility of a friend’s recommendation. In addition, the campaign requested that people focus their attention on procuring the help of celebrities on Twitter with large followings, including Diddy\textsuperscript{14}, Oprah Winfrey\textsuperscript{15}, Rihanna\textsuperscript{16}, and Justin Bieber\textsuperscript{17}. Enlisting celebrities in this fashion not only helps spread awareness (Cohen 2012; Goodman, JD & Preston 2012; Grossman 2012), (Justin Bieber had 25,440,442 Twitter followers as at 24\textsuperscript{th} July, 2012) but again, it adds credibility to the campaign by virtue of their recommendation. Disseminating information and generating awareness with unprecedented speed and reach owes much to the campaign’s clear and concise message, the initial credibility attained through celebrity endorsements and social network sites (SNS), and relinquishing control to the public.

Control in this context refers to the way in which the public chooses to disseminate the video or the way in which they reinterpret and reshape the campaign’s message on Twitter or other SNSs. Operating within mass self-communication has provided

\textsuperscript{14} https://twitter.com/iamdiddy (Retrieved July 24, 2012)  
\textsuperscript{15} https://twitter.com/oprah (Retrieved July 24, 2012)  
\textsuperscript{16} https://twitter.com/rihanna (Retrieved July 24, 2012)  
\textsuperscript{17} https://twitter.com/justinbieber (Retrieved July 24, 2012)
campaigns with a number of platforms with which to disseminate information in a quick and cost efficient manner. However, it has come at the cost of control.

The Invisible Children organisation encouraged the public “to become creators and primary subjects” and, more importantly, “to become engaged in social production” (Fenton, N 2008a, 236). In doing so they ultimately forfeit aspects of control over the video’s continued dissemination. Uploading the video to YouTube does not mean people will watch it as there is always the possibility that no one views the video or, anyone that does, chooses not to share it across their social network. Furthermore, people who choose to share either the video or the campaign’s message could do so in a negative fashion or elect to discourage others from assisting the campaign. Nigerian-American writer Teju Cole is one such person who elected to portray the campaign negatively on his Twitter\(^\text{18}\) account: “From Sachs to Kristof to Invisible Children to TED, the fastest growth industry in the US is the White Savior Industrial Complex,” adding, “This world exists simply to satisfy the needs—including, importantly, the sentimental needs—of white people and Oprah”\(^\text{19}\) (Alexismadrigal 2012).

“KONY2012” (Psychicpebbles 2012), “The Alarming TRUTH about Kony 2012 (Re-uploaded)” (DanTheGreatHD 2012), and “Kony 2012 Video is Misleading” (Slubogo 2012) are YouTube videos that have 5,051,247, 1,209,776, and 4,293,956 views respectively as at 27\(^{th}\) July, 2012. Created by members of the public and then disseminated through the tools of mass self-communication, these videos evidence the campaign’s relative loss of control over their message. These self-created videos offer


\(^{19}\) Ibid. (Retrieved July 28, 2012)
the public alternative viewpoints that run counter to the campaign and as a result can affect the campaign’s message and by extension its credibility. Nonetheless, judging by the number of viewers and the overall awareness generated by the “Kony 2012” campaign any disadvantages associated with relinquishing control certainly pale in comparison to the advantages of generating awareness through an active and engaged public.

But then we must ask why the campaign’s call to action – “Cover the Night”\(^{20}\) – on the 20\(^{th}\) April 2012 was largely deemed a failure (Carroll 2012). “Cover the Night” asked people to cover their city centre with campaign posters and messages. It is here that international relations scholarship proves invaluable. IR encourages us to look at the inherent characteristics of the issue, the campaign’s target, and the campaign itself.

Keck and Sikkink (1998, 27) argue that the most successful issues that non-governmental campaigns have rallied around are “issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility; and issues involving legal equality of opportunity”. It is within the former that we find the closest resemblance to the “Kony 2012” issue. Children epitomize the vulnerable individual and the campaign presented a short and clear causal chain assigning responsibility for their harm to Kony and the LRA.

Target characteristics refer to the values and political context of the state or corporation being targeted by the campaign. In other words, the target must hold

certain characteristics for the campaign to be able to enact change. First, the target must place some degree of importance on their reputation. The absence of material might for non-governmental campaigns means that in order to have influence the government or company being targeted must be vulnerable to criticism and public backlash. While “Kony 2012” was a global campaign, its principal target was the United States. As a democratic state the U.S. is vulnerable to domestic and international backlash and as such it does place some degree of importance on its domestic and international reputation. Second, campaigns must be able to form and effectively operate within the target state (Price, Richard 2003). The political system within the U.S. protects the rights of groups to form and operate. Because the characteristics of the issue and target are satisfactory it is the characteristics of the campaign that helps to explain the campaign’s failure in inspiring people to take real world action.

The video captured the imagination of millions, quickly achieved millions of views, and then quickly attracted the criticism of millions. In the first moments of release, as the video spread through social networks, the Invisible Children campaign had all the characteristics needed to be successful. No one had any reason to doubt the organisation’s expertise, their reliability or the veracity of their information. Their impartiality and independence had not yet been widely called into question and they were seemingly representative of the needs of Ugandan children, while retaining accountability and transparency. It was also widely believed that the Invisible Children were acting in the “public interest” and/or the “common good” (Risse 2000b, 186) rather than private interests. This belief was at the heart of their moral authority and, most importantly, their credibility.
For Kony 2012 and the Invisible Children this perception of credibility was fleeting. Indeed, the video was released on the 5th of March, 2012 and articles criticising the campaign began to emerge on the 7th of March. While the grounds on which the video was criticised were numerous, a favourite was the video’s misrepresentation of the current situation in Uganda. Michael Wilkerson, writing for *Foreign Policy*, is one such critic:

But let's get two things straight: 1) Joseph Kony is not in Uganda and hasn't been for 6 years; 2) the LRA now numbers at most in the hundreds, and while it is still causing immense suffering, it is unclear how millions of well-meaning but misinformed people are going to help deal with the more complicated reality (Keating 2012).

Others pointed out the implicit “white man’s burden” (Blattman 2012) message of the video, as it called on Western outsiders to solve Uganda's problem and stripped them of agency. As Mark Kersten observes,

It is hard to respect any documentary on northern Uganda where a five year-old white boy features more prominently than any northern Ugandan victim or survivor. Incredibly, with the exception of the adolescent northern Ugandan victim, Jacob, the voices of northern Ugandans go almost completely unheard (Kersten 2012).
The absence of Ugandan voices in the video encouraged Ugandan blogger and activist Teddy Ruge to respond with the blog post “A Peace of my mind: Respect my agency 2012!” (Ruge 2012). While the Ugandan newspaper the Daily Monitor claimed that during a screening of the video in Uganda on the 17th of April, 2012 the crowd became angry and pelted the organisers with stones.

At least 10,000 people gathered at the stadium to watch the Kony 2012 video. Dissatisfied with the content, the crowd pelted the organisers with stones, injuring a police officer identified as Pamela Inenu and two musicians hired to sing at the event.

Police fired teargas at the crowd, and live bullets in the air, injuring dozens, who also lost valuables including phones and money.

The archbishop of Gulu Arch Diocese and member of Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, Rt. Rev John Baptist Odama, said the video has ill motives and geared towards igniting anger in the population to cause violence.

Bishop Odama said the chaos associated with the screening of the video is akin to a new war started since no stake holders were consulted (Lawino 2012).

Criticism also came from the dramatic oversimplification of the narrative in which the capture of the one bad guy will supposedly restore peace and prosperity to the region (Cohen 2012). While writer Evgeny Morozov simply condemns the campaign as “slacktivism”: 
"Slacktivism" is an apt term to describe feel-good online activism that has zero political or social impact. It gives those who participate in "slacktivist" campaigns an illusion of having a meaningful impact on the world without demanding anything more than joining a Facebook group. Remember that online petition that you signed and forwarded to your entire contacts list? That was probably an act of slacktivism (Morozov 2009).

Similar to “slacktivism” was criticism regarding the arrogance of the campaign in proposing to solve Central African violence with awareness. The Atlantic’s article “Solving War Crimes With Wristbands: The Arrogance of 'Kony 2012’” (Cronin-Furman & Taub 2012) argues that misguided campaigns can do more harm than good. The release of the Invisible Children’s financial statement21 was also a source of criticism, damaging its claim to act for the “common good” or in the “public interest”. The organisation spent over $8.5 million in 2011 of which only 32% went to direct services, while the rest went to staff salaries, transport, travel, and film production ('Kony 2012 Video: Invisible Children Charity Criticized For Misuse Of Funds, Exaggeration And More' 2012; Oyston 2012). In addition, the organisation received criticism relating to sources of funding, which included an anti-gay Christian organisation ('Jason Russell, 'Kony 2012' Creator, Suffered From 'Reactive Psychosis,' Family Claims' 2012b).

---

Above all else, this onslaught of criticism hurt the credibility of Invisible Children. Mass self-communication has enabled consumers to become creators, which has saturated the information environment and led information rather than attention to become a scarcity. In this environment credibility is paramount in differentiating you from the rest and acquiring a person’s precious attention. The acquisition of a person’s attention sees credibility become a key variable in the success of most campaigns. For the Kony campaign it was particularly decisive. Time magazine wrote an article on the 20\textsuperscript{th} April, 2012 just before the failure of the “Cover the Night” initiative, titled “What Do Young People Think of Kony 2012 Now?” (Ray 2012). The article observed that:

> Overall though, most students reported that they didn’t initially question the campaign. They Facebooked and Tweeted first and queried later. In this way, they all said the critical pushback against Kony 2012 was the key factor in their pausing to ask what exactly it was that they were feverishly supporting (Ray 2012).

Critically rethinking the campaign’s message \textit{en masse} was not only provoked by reports questioning the campaign, but the actions of the video’s narrator and co-founder of Invisible Children, Jason Russell. The public’s perception of Jason Russell is important in understanding the wide departure of support for the “Kony 2012” video and, by extension “Cover the Night”, because the two are inextricably linked. In an effort to make the video more relatable Jason Russell positioned himself and his son in the centre of its narrative. As a consequence the campaign became an extension of Jason Russell, so when he publically destroyed his own credibility by allegedly vandalising cars and making sexual gestures in nothing but his underwear on the
streets of San Diego (‘Jason Russell, ’Kony 2012’ Creator, Suffered From ’Reactive Psychosis,’ Family Claims’ 2012b; Harris 2012), he significantly wounded the credibility of the campaign. Megan Garber, writing for The Atlantic, makes a similar observation:

Suddenly, a Facebook Like of Kony 2012 or a Twitter mention of Invisible Children wasn’t just a vote against Kony’s atrocities ... it was also a de facto endorsement of that crazy guy who lost it on that street in San Diego (Garber 2012).

From the most successful viral media campaign of all-time to a failed call for action, “Kony 2012” illustrates the importance in looking at the characteristics of the campaign itself, and more specifically, the importance of credibility in an information saturated environment. The campaign also invokes a sense of disappointment in its failure to incorporate this torrent of attention into meaningful long-term engagement and “offline” action. It is also rather easy to avoid feeling overly disappointed with the Kony 2012 campaign if you examine it within the sole parameters of the media. From a purely media perspective the campaign fares considerably better due to the unprecedented number of views garnered by its video and its prominence on social network sites like Facebook and Twitter. Avoiding this skewed understanding requires an interdisciplinary (or eclectic) mode of scholarship in which both a media and IR perspective are employed in the analysis of campaigns. While the interdisciplinary nature of this research makes it admittedly ambitious, the understanding it offers would be unachievable from a single theoretical perspective.
Thesis Structure and Overview

This thesis incorporates international relations, media scholarship and finally, the combination of the two. For international relations (IR) the argument is situated in the relevant theoretical debates of IR literature (Chapter Two), culminating in the examination of the tactics used by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) (Chapter Four). For media scholarship the project focuses on mass self-communication (Chapter Three) and the ICBL’s five techniques with the effects of mass self-communication (Chapter Five). IR and media scholarship are then combined (Chapter Six) with the application of relevant IR and mass self-communication concepts, including the re-examined techniques, to an original case study of the Australian 2011 Ban Live Export campaign.

Chapter Two looks at a number of important IR concepts and theories, including constructivism, legitimacy and norms. Norms play a central role throughout the chapter’s analysis, with many of its key ideas discussed in relation to norms. This chapter also discusses the non-state realm or the “third system” of actors distinguished from government/state and profit seeking actors, which it defines as world society.

Chapter Three examines the concept of mass self-communication and a number of related practical ramifications: (1) audience fragmentation, (2) partisan selection, (3) selective exposure, and (4) content proliferation.

Chapter Four investigates the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and a number of interdependent concepts, including the actors that make up world society,
the characteristics needed of world society campaigns themselves, the characteristics of the campaign’s issue, and the characteristics of the campaign’s target. The chapter then examines the ICBL and the five techniques (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and shifting the burden of proof) it used in achieving the ban.

Chapter Five looks at the five techniques used by the ICBL with the effects of mass self-communication and its practical ramifications.

Chapter Six reconciles the two dominate theoretical approaches, IR and mass self-communication scholarship, in a case study of the Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign.

Chapter Seven concludes with a comparative analysis of the ICBL and BLE campaigns, and the Earth Day and Earth Hour campaigns. In the course of this chapter the symbiotic relationship between traditional and new media is examined along with some final points of consideration and future research.
Chapter Two: International Relations

Introduction

Explaining the success of the Kony 2012 campaign in capturing the attention of millions on social media and video platforms, yet failing to inspire offline action requires us to detail the characteristics and attributes of campaigns that go beyond their use of media, yet remain critical to their success. Therefore, Chapter Two situates inquiry within the field of international relations (IR) scholarship, and, in particular, the social framework present within the so-called English School of international relations scholarship and constructivist IR literature. This research has seen a shift, as the centrality of the nation state is questioned in light of increased participation from non-state actors. This shift has challenged conceptions of sovereignty, the utility of the nation state, international legitimacy and the management of global problems, such as climate change and human rights. Understanding these issues requires elucidation of a number of concepts.

This chapter will begin by providing context through a brief exploration of constructivism. This exploration is important in understanding the concept of norms and their role in motivating and explaining the actions of state and non-state actors. The concept of legitimacy will also be investigated and then related to norms. Finally, the non-state realm will be explored. The non-state realm carries two theoretical conceptions, global civil society and world society. These will be examined in relation to norms and sovereignty. The ideas addressed within this chapter provide context for Chapter Four and its analysis of the five techniques used by the International Campaign to Ban Landmine (ICBL).
Finally, there is a myriad of terms used to describe the “third system” of actors distinguished from government/state and profit seeking actors; i.e. non-state actors, transnational nongovernmental actors, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs), world society, global or transnational civil society, transnational advocacy networks, nongovernmental campaigns etc. For the purpose of this research the umbrella term of world society will be employed throughout.

**Constructivism**

Constructivism is “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction and which depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” [sic] (Adler 1997, 322). In other words, constructivism holds that the social world is constructed, not predetermined or given (Zehfuss 2002). This dictates that an actor’s interests and identity are not static and can be redefined in light of new influences such as norms. The concept has witnessed a surge of interest within international relations (IR) scholarship since the early 1990s and despite this definition from Adler (Adler 2005) this surge has come largely in the absence of a uniform definition or uniform claims, making it more of an approach than a theory.

Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999) offers two basic tenets of the constructivist approach: (1) “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors
are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (1999, 1). In other words, the environment in which actors and states take action is both socially and materially determined and actors and states can derive and understand their interests from this environment (Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998). Finally, constructivism is often best understood in opposition to rationalist IR theory which believes that an actor’s or state’s interests, behaviour and actions are instead predetermined and given by environmental and material forces.

It is the act of deriving interests and action from social means, such as norms, that renders the constructivist understanding important to this research. Constructivism does not treat interests as givens, “but as the products of normative shifts” (Clark, Ian 2007, 177) meaning norms – collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors – are of central importance to constructivism.

In their broadest sense norms exist as a “rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with” (Posner 1997, 365). Norms are most often examined in behavioural terms as they act “as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 891). A norm has two common distinctions, (1) *regulative* norms which help coordinate political conflicts by ordering and constraining behaviour and (2) *constitutive* norms which shape political actions by creating new actors, interests or categories of action (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996b). In other words, norms can operate as rules that “constitute” or define the identity of actors. In this way norms outline what specific actions will cause other actors to recognise a particular identity of an actor. While in a
“regulative” sense norms operate as standards of proper behaviour within a given identity and will dictate the proper enactment of an already determined identity (Katzenstein, P. J. 1996c). The combination of these two qualities, constitutive and regulative, establish “expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these actors will behave” (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996, 54).

Norms and Interests

The relationship between norms, interests and action is of particular interest to this research and will be explored in the following section. This relationship is well documented within constructivist literature (Adler 2005; Berger 1996; Finnemore 1996a; Herman 1996; Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996; Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996a, 1996b; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Wendt 1992).

Using norms to understand international politics rests on the simple premise that norms shape interests and interests shape action (Finnemore 1996a). Interests within the international realm dictate why states or actors undertake certain actions. Norms operate in a permissive sense by enabling such actions to take place. They do not determine or ensure such action; they just enable that action to become an option. As norms change so can the state’s interests, as new interests emerge or existing ones are redefined in light of changing norms. It is important to note that the interests of a state or actor are shaped by many factors and no single norm is likely to be the sole source of influence in shaping a state’s or actor’s interests.
Norms are a plausible explanation for international behaviour because of their ability to shape interests. Kowert and Legro (1996) provide an empirical insight into the relationships between norms and interests, noting that norms can shape interests even when these interests are contradictory to the strategic imperatives of the international community. Evidence of this can be found in the purchase of impractical weapons by developing countries, “which may face very different strategic problems or threats—will tend to buy very similar weapons.” The purchases of these weapons, they argue, “have little to do with the external threats these states face. Instead, global norms of modernity shape the interests of national elites, directing their attention toward symbols of status and power such as advanced (but often inappropriate) weaponry” (Kowert & Legro 1996, 462). In other words, international norms encourage states to buy weapons that grant them status and power even though these weapons have little or no practical use.

Norms, in the permissive sense, also shape an actor’s instrumental awareness of links between interests and behaviour. An actor will utilise norms to determine whether a policy decision or state objective is acceptable. Norms will constrain or “shape the instruments or means that states find available or appropriate ... norms shape actors’ awareness and acceptance of the methods and technologies on which they might rely to accomplish their objectives” (Kowert & Legro 1996, 463). This type of normative constraint is most prolific in the military, as actors may be aware of a wide range of weapons that could achieve their goals and objectives. However, because of international norms that regulate their use, most states would be unwilling to weather the international backlash that would result. In this instance norms are assisting actors in evaluating the situation by demonstrating what behaviour is acceptable. North
Korea and Iran’s ongoing quest to acquire nuclear weapons has seen them suffer severe sanctions and attests to the international backlash that results from behaviour that violates international norms.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) note that it is this “‘oughtness’” that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules. Because norms involve standards of “appropriate” or “proper” behaviour, both the intersubjective and the evaluative dimensions are inescapable when discussing norms” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 891). The intersubjective nature of a norm provides it with a large degree of its influence; this also renders the normative experience a collective experience. In other words, people will recognise and adhere to a norm individually through subjective interpretation, but this happens on a collective scale using shared meanings constructed through interactions with each other. It is because of this collectively generated meaning that society can recognise norm breaking behaviour because to “endorse a norm not only expresses a belief, but also creates impetus for behaviour consistent with that belief” (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999, 7). Norm-breaking behaviour within a society will generate “disapproval or stigma and norm conforming behaviour either because it produces praise, or, in the case of a highly internalized norm, because it is so taken for granted that it provokes no reaction whatsoever” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 892).

Finally, when determining an actor’s interests, constructivism does not take them for granted; it instead problematises them and relates them back to the actor’s identity (Risse & Sikkink 1999). As norms within constructivism do not simply regulate behaviour they also constitute actor identities and interests (Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998).
The relationship between interests and identities rests on a simple premise: “What I want depends to a large degree on who I am” (Risse & Sikkink 1999). In other words, before we can acquire the interests of specific actors we must first determine the social and normative context of the actor. The identity of an actor enables us to understand what interests that actor deems as appropriate and necessary.

An actor’s identity (relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self (Wendt 1992, 397) comes from their participation in “collective meaning”. The prominence of an identity or an actor’s obligation to a particular identity varies accordingly, but each identity is socially grounded in the collective representation an actor makes of themselves and of others. In other words, “Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situation” (Wendt 1992). Hence, “identities constitute interests and actions” and understanding “how interests are constituted is the key to explaining a wide range of international phenomena” (Price, Richard & Reus-Smit 1998c, 267). The United States’ change of interest in the 1980s is one such “international phenomena” that can be explained this way. The change in U.S.’s identity to a nation that valued humanitarian principles over economic investment was critical to the development of international sanctions against the South African apartheid regime. Norms can be understood to have a two pronged effect in shaping behaviour: (1) through the creation of identity and then (2) behavioural norms dictating how to enact these identities (Kowert & Legro 1996). This also works in the reverse causal direction as behavioural norms can interact strongly with conceptions of identity. An example of
this would be the foreign occupation of one’s country in which new behavioural prescriptions would drastically challenge certain identities.

In sum, norms have two aspects: a facet that guides behaviour; and a discursive aspect that forms shared understandings and meanings, facilitating social and collective action. Actors construct norms through interaction, norms then guide the actors’ behaviour; “and norms may change the definition of the actors’ preferences and even identity” (van Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007, 220).

**Norm Origins**

Research into the strength or existence of a norm is liable to succumb to a number of “failures” if the research does not, first, operationalise a norm in a manner that renders it distinct from the behaviour it is intended to examine (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Kowert & Legro 1996). Second, the research can also “fail” if it only focuses on norms that have “worked” while overlooking emerging norms, prohibitions and principles that never had any influence. Understanding why something failed can be as beneficial as understanding why something succeeded. It is for this reason that research into failed or less successful campaigns can provide an important insight into normative proliferation techniques (Legro 1997). In addition to avoiding these failures, research into norms is made difficult because there is only indirect evidence of their influence or existence. Therefore scholars must follow trails of indirect evidence to verify and investigate norms.
Indirect evidence of a norm’s existence or influence comes from states or actors having to justify actions that previously needed no justification. Changing norms require states to justify actions because they “embody a quality of “oughtness” and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 892). The emerging norm against the use of anti-personnel landmines in the late 1990s and “the United States’ explanations about why it feels compelled to continue using land mines in South Korea reveal that it recognizes the emerging norm against the use of such mines. If not for the norm, there would be no need to mention, explain, or justify the use of mines in Korea at all” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 892).

A final complication in the research of norms relates to their level of internalisation. Following the indirect evidence of a highly internalised norm is complicated by virtue of their taken-for-granted qualities. These qualities dictate that adherence to a norm is expected and subsequently produces no reaction whatsoever when people abide by them. It is only when people challenge such norms that the investigation of their effects becomes easier, such challenges also grant an important insight into the evolution of societal sentiment. It is the “taken-for-granted” norms that often typify an era.

A time is marked not so much by ideas that are argued about as by ideas that are taken for granted. The character of an era hangs upon what needs no defence. Power runs with ideas that only the crazy would draw into doubt. The “taken for granted” is the test of sanity; “what everyone knows” is the line between us and them.
This means that sometimes a society gets stuck. Sometimes these unquestioned ideas interfere, as the cost of questioning becomes too great. In these times, the hardest task for social or political activists is to find a way to get people to wonder again about what we all believe is true. The challenge is to sow doubt. (Lessig 2002, 5)

To “sow doubt” is to normalise new principled ideas (“beliefs about right and wrong held by individuals” (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999)). Principled ideas held by key individuals, such as transnational operatives who are commonly termed moral entrepreneurs, are often the moving force behind normative change. Norm entrepreneurs are critical to the emergence of new norms by calling attention to issues through dramatic language and successfully disseminating information.

Henry Dunant, founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross, is a norm entrepreneur. Dunant pioneered humanitarian aid in times of war after seeing the devastation left by the battle of Solferino in 1859, (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). The Invisible Children organisation also attempts to fulfil the role of norm entrepreneur. Through Kony 2012, Invisible Children was able to call attention to an issue with dramatic language and the mass dissemination of information through social network sites (SNS). Invisible Children is a particularly successful norm entrepreneur by sole virtue of the unprecedented public engagement with the information the organisation produced on SNSs, like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Norm entrepreneurs, like
Dunant and Invisible Children, are crucial in convincing policy makers and important decision makers “to elevate the position of an issue on the domestic or international political agenda or even to decide in favour of an issue out of moral conviction” (Price, Richard 1998a, 616).

Norms can also develop through various domestic mechanisms within society. Domestic norms can be diffused by norm entrepreneurs to become international norms, either because they resonate with pre-existing international norms or they are held by successful nation states. This can also work in reverse as domestic norm entrepreneurs can cite international norms to strengthen the diffusion of new domestic norms (Price, Richard 1998a, 616). Aside from norm entrepreneurs, norms can develop through structural needs within the state or “systemic norm development”. This places norms as solutions to coordination problems, strengthening the reputation of an actor or state, the emulation of other successful states, or, finally “the development of norms as broader societal attitudes and intersubjective meanings through education and/or their coherence with other established international norms” (Price, Richard 1998a, 616).

Paul Kowert and Jeffery Legro (1996, 470) describe two umbrella processes that generate, maintain and change norms. The first process is that of the environment or the ecological process. This process results from the interaction of actors and their environment. In other words, norms can be changed or generated through changes in the environment or maintained and solidified if they remain unchallenged through no environmental changes. In the second process norms can be sourced socially through interactions and relations between the actors themselves. In other words, this process
sees norms spread through social diffusion whereby new collective understandings are spread across social networks (Finnemore 1996a; Herman 1996; Risse-Kappen 1996). The social process positions norm building as “generalisations about the way human beings, organisations, states, or other political agents interact” (Kowert & Legro 1996, 474).

If these processes are successful the norm can become socialised\textsuperscript{22} or internalised\textsuperscript{23} (Checkel, J.T. 2005). Socialisation is the “introduction of new members...into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in a society” (Barnes, Carter & Skidmore 1980, 35). The goal of socialisation is “for actors to internalise norms, so that external pressure is no longer needed to ensure compliance” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 11). Internalisation forms the last stage of the norm ‘Life Cycle’, which begins with the emergence and acceptance and ends with socialisation and internalisation (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996a; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Risse & Sikkink 1999; Sunstein 1996, 1997). The completion of this ‘life cycle’ is difficult and requires a concerted effort from many actors:

With communication over time, significant changes may occur. But the most entrenched social meanings are–by definition–not movable without concerted action on the part of many people. Hence private groups often attempt to bring about changes in meanings and the norms that produce them. Religious organizations, feminist groups, animal rights activists, and groups challenging

\footnote{\textbf{Socialisation} refers to the preparation of newcomers to become members of an existing group and to think, feel, and act in ways the group considers appropriate.}

\footnote{\textbf{Internalisation} means taking social norms, rules, and values into one’s own mind.}
"political correctness" are prominent recent examples. Often they have been highly successful; sometimes they produce norm cascades. (Sunstein 1996, 928)

Norm cascades are an integral part of the life cycle of a norm and represent a crucial step in their successful proliferation. Once a new norm has emerged, with the help of moral or normative entrepreneurs, general acceptance is required. Achieving this is dependent on the new norm overcoming a threshold or a “tipping” point. Essentially the norm must achieve a cascading effect, at which point a “critical mass” is obtained and it is subsequently adopted by the relevant state actors. This “life cycle” is reiterated by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998):

The characteristic mechanism of the first stage, norm emergence, is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms. The second stage is characterized more by a dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers. The exact motivation for this second stage where the norm “cascades” through the rest of the population (in this case, of states) may vary, but we argue that a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem facilitate norm cascades. At the far end of the norm cascade, norm internalization occurs; norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 895).
The completion of the norm life cycle is not an inevitable process. Many emergent norms fail to reach the crucial tipping point. Nonetheless, the right to vote not depending on gender or race, the belief that slavery is immoral, and the general public’s disapproval of smoking indoors all exemplify highly internalised norms that have completed the life cycle. Once internalised, these norms become taken for granted and are no longer openly debated. However, many highly internalised norms will eventually face new competing norms that will vie for support against the standards of appropriateness they have set.

These standards of appropriateness assist the international community in forming “value judgments or prescriptions for conduct” (Price, Richard 1998a, 242). Consequently, norms are an important aspect of international relations, “whose effects are potentially as important in shaping politics as raw power or rational calculation. Norms typically inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish...To disregard norms and take the interest of actors as given is thus to short-circuit an important aspect of...politics and policy” (Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996b, ix).

**Which norms matter the most under which circumstances**

In their seminal work Sikkink and Finnemore (1998) seek to clarify instances in which certain norms may prevail in specific conditions. The first point centres on the nation state and its quest for legitimacy within the international community. This quest for legitimacy is a strong driving force in a states adoption of new international norms, as “an important condition for domestic receptiveness to international norms is a need
for international legitimation” (1998, 906). This receptiveness to international norms is only heightened when the governing body of the nation state is facing periods of unpopularity or decreased domestic legitimacy. In such cases the adoption of a new and popular international norm can help increase domestic legitimacy. A corollary of which is that nation states with a significant deficit in both domestic and international legitimacy would be quicker to embrace international norms, “If states seek to enhance their reputation or esteem, we would expect states that are insecure about their international status or reputation to embrace new international norms most eagerly and thoroughly” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 906).

The new norm’s “prominence” is another favourable condition to its proliferation. Prominence in this context denotes either the norm’s quality or the quality of the states promoting the norm. This condition can explain why some norms are adopted over others and why various norms of domestic origin have been more likely candidates for internationalisation than others. Explaining a norms adoption in this manner is matter of contention among IR scholars (Clark, Ian 2007; Franck 1990; Steffek 2003) as they debate whether a norm is adopted because of its inherent quality (‘rightness’) or because of support from powerful factions of international realm. Sikkink and Finnemore use Darwin’s natural selection theory to address this debate, stating that “norms held by states widely viewed as successful and desirable models are thus likely to become prominent and diffuse. The fact that Western norms are more likely to diffuse internationally would seem to follow from this observation.” An example of which is “the pattern of adoption of women’s suffrage norms, since almost all the norm leaders were Western states” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 906).
This contention reinforces the need to examine each norm on individual merit and look at the factions that support its dissemination.

New media tools (Twitter, Facebook, and Google+ etc.) add an interesting dynamic to the notion of support and powerful factions. Kony 2012 and the enhanced capacity for people to mobilise and support issues saw people from predominately Western states, personally unaffected by an issue, exercise influence over others. More specifically, the people supporting Kony 2012 were an arguably misinformed “powerful faction” facilitated by new media tools. The inherent ‘rightness’ of the issue was not initially questioned; rather it was spread through social networks with unprecedented speed to the perceived detriment of the Ugandan people. Once the issue was called into question and subjected to mass criticism, the issue and the campaign ultimately lost traction. The campaign’s loss of momentum shows that the inherent ‘rightness’ of the issue plays a large role in its success irrespective of the relative power of the factions supporting it.

In addition to the norm’s prominence is its formulation and substance, both of which can adversely affect its ability to influence international behaviour. The ‘formulation’ of a norm refers to its clarity and specificity. A clear and unambiguous norm is more likely to succeed than a complex and difficult one. Formulating a clear and concise norm is of elevated importance in an environment characterised by Twitter messages of 140 characters or less. Condensing a complex narrative into emotive sentences and images was critical in harnessing the collective desire of people to share the Kony 2012 campaign across their social network. Put simply, the more emotive and striking the
content and the more accessible the narrative the more likely it will be noticed. Norms that have been around for a while and have weathered various domestic challenges are also believed to be more successful. The ‘substance’ of a norm refers to its inherent qualities. For example whether the norm is congruent with capitalist ideals or the powerful ideologies present at the time can play a part in its prospective success.

John Boli and George Thomas (1999, 17) identify five principles (universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, rationalizing progress, and world citizenship) that norms should underpin to be more successful internationally (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). While Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that norms protecting bodily harm to vulnerable individuals and legal equity will be more successful.

The similarity of a prospective norm to an existing norm can also contribute to its chances of success. Claims of adjacency or normative ‘grafting’ (see Acharya 2004; Cortell & Davis 1996; Price, Richard 1998a) are primarily instigated by activists who frame the issue in conjunction with successful norms. This has also been termed “issue-resonance,” “salience,” “grafting,” and “nesting”, all of which describe “a tactic norm entrepreneurs employ to institutionalize a new norm by associating it with a preexisting norm in the same issue area, which makes a similar prohibition or injunction” (Acharya 2004, 244). While norm grafting will be explored further in Chapter Four, Sikkink and Finnemore offer a good example of grafting:

Opponents of female genital mutilation made little headway, for example, when the practice was called ‘female circumcision,’ because male circumcision is often a positively valued practice. However, when they replaced the term
circumcision with mutilation and campaigned under the banner of ‘violence against women,’ the issue resonated much more strongly, and the campaign gained adherents (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 908).

Norm grafting also played a role in the Kony 2012 campaign as the Invisible Children sought to shift the issue from one of political concern to one of humanitarian concern. New media tools were central to achieving this association, exemplified by Tweets like “It’s not a political issue. It’s a human issue. The online premiere of #KONY2012 hits March 5th 12pm PST. http://bit.ly/WATCHKONY2012” 24. The campaign’s video (Invisiblechildreninc 2012) centred its efforts on portraying children as the principal victims of Kony, while also invoking comparisons to Adolf Hitler.

The timing of a new norm is the final condition to its success. The importance of timing is typically seen in the aftermath of a major event, in which outdated ideas were seen to be the catalyst or were not suited to deal with the problem: “World historical events such as wars or major depressions in the international system can lead to a search for new ideas and norms” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 909). The authors cite the cold war as an example, stating that the: “Ideas and norms most associated with the losing side of a war or perceived to have caused an economic failure should be at particular risk of being discredited, opening the field for alternatives” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 909). While timing often works to a new norms advantage, the timing of Kony 2012 worked to its detriment, as people berated the campaign for being late and out of touch with the current situation in Uganda. The unprecedented speed with which the video

---

spread throughout social network sites also adds a degree of credence to the notion that a majority of people will click “like” or share before researching the content.

Timing, grafting, formulation, substance, prominence and nation states’ quest for legitimacy within the international community all aid in the development and proliferation of new normative content by increasing either a populace’s receptiveness to new ideas or the legitimacy of new ideas. More specifically, they provide a plausible scope for world society to introduce new international norms by illustrating the conditions necessary for success. While these conditions will help they do not assure success. Success ultimately lies in the ability of world society campaigns to reshape the perception of problematic issues through the creation or reinterpretation of knowledge and meaning. In other words, it is the social construction of knowledge and meaning that enables world society to develop and support new norms. Manuel Castells (2012) argues that it is the way people think that “determines the fate of institutions, norms and values on which societies are organized” (2012, 5). If world society can get people to think in “ways that are contradictory to the values and norms institutionalized in laws and regulated by the state, the system will change ... This is why the fundamental power struggle is the battle for the construction of meaning in the minds of the people” (Castells, Manuel 2012, 5). This reaffirms the use of the constructivist approach as “constructivism highlights the dynamic role played by the social construction of knowledge in the construction of social reality” (Adler 2005, 4).

The importance of shaping knowledge is seen in Adler’s definition:

Knowledge means not only information that people carry in their heads, but also, and primarily, the intersubjective background or context of expectations,
dispositions, and language that gives meaning to material reality and consequently helps explain the constitutive and casual mechanisms that participate in the construction of social reality (Adler 2005, 4).

Because knowledge is critical to the construction of social reality, the construction of knowledge by world society is important to the successful proliferation of new norms. Favourably shaping the knowledge of society can increase their receptiveness to new norms and also provide the intersubjective context for the norm’s socialisation. This does, however, require legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy will be explored in the following section.

**Norms & Legitimacy**

Just as norms carry significance because of the effects they have on the behaviour of actors, so too legitimacy carries significance because of its effect on the behaviour of actors. Whereas norms influence behaviour through a shared understanding of “oughtness”, Max Weber (1956, 23) establishes that an action, actor or power “is legitimate where those involved in it believe it to be so; legitimacy derives from people’s belief in legitimacy...legitimacy is equivalent to ‘Legitimitätsglaube’ (a belief in legitimacy); and legitimate power is power ‘als legitim angesehen’ (that is regarded as legitimate)” (Beetham 1991, 8).

In a political sense, legitimacy confers an entitlement to the controlling body to issue commands that obligate those under governance to comply. In essence, “an actor can be said to command legitimacy ... when its decisions and actions (and I would contend
identities and interests) are socially sanctioned” (Reus-Smit 2007, 158). Actors require their actions to be socially sanctioned because legitimacy operates in a framework of norms. International norms are the “dominant language” of international legitimacy (Clark, Ian 2007). In other words, when an actor holds legitimacy they are holding a common perception that their norms are “rightful” and their right to act, rule, or govern is socially sanctioned (Reus-Smit 2007). This reasoning stems from the prescriptive (or normative) approach to legitimacy, meaning the adjective ‘legitimate’ could be granted “to governments which have been established in accordance with certain rules and principles, nowadays normally democratic principles” (Steffek 2003, 253).

The relationship between norms and legitimacy means that norms can be viewed as a “reservoir” from which actors can draw claims to legitimacy (Clark, I. 2005; 2007). Norms, once widely accepted (or socialised), as a shared understanding of proper behaviour act as a source or expression of legitimacy. With that said, an illegitimate norm would be an oxymoron as a norm must be socially sanctioned or ‘legitimate’ to be a norm. Hence, the act of seeking legitimacy is a “normative process, it is characterized by actors seeking to justify their identities, interests, practices, or institutional designs. These justifications constitute legitimacy claims” (Reus-Smit 2007, 159). Thus, once an actor achieves legitimacy there is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (cited in Reus-Smit 2007, 158; Suchman 1995, 574). Suchman’s explanation provides insight into the ability of norms to govern behaviour. This effect upon behaviour stems from a norm’s ability to render an action illegitimate due to the fact that it conflicts with a
pre-existing norm. However, this does not stop states from committing illegitimate acts, but rather imposes “costs” on such acts. These “costs” are often a strong indication that an illegitimate act has taken place. In this way “legitimacy makes political processes more efficient by reducing the costs of enforcing compliance” (Clark, Ian 2007, 16).

In Franck’s (1990) treatment of legitimacy he refers to it as the “factors that affect our willingness to comply voluntarily with commands... [which] may be direct (‘go on green; stop on red’) or indirect, in the sense of referring back to a more general underlying rule or principle” (Franck 1990, 150). A legitimate command can only come from organisations, international institutions, and norms that hold a high degree of legitimacy and as such generate a correspondingly high sense of obligation from other actors. Failure to comply with a legitimate rule will usually arouse

the concern of other states, even those not directly affected by the breach. A state’s failure to discharge its normative obligation frequently is seen by such other states as threatening their interests indirectly: by undermining the legitimacy of a rule of which they approve and on which they rely, and by weakening the fabric of the community’s rule system as a whole (Franck 1990, 150-1)

When a state’s failure to comply with a rule can undermine the international community as a whole it becomes important to distinguish between the acceptance of a rule or norm because of coercion and acceptance of a rule as binding and legitimate.
Jens Steffek (2003) argues that the distinction between “the acceptance of governance and its legitimacy” sometimes gets blurred in empirical literature. The following is a list of different motivations for an actor to follow a norm (Steffek 2003, 254):

1. Fear of punishment or coercion,
2. Cost-benefit calculations,
3. Acceptance of the norm as binding.

The first two motivations centre on monetary and coercive means, here “we see rule-compliance as a mere acceptance of commands. Individuals are motivated by perceptions of fear or calculations of self-interest, respectively, and thus react to the circumstances of a certain situation” (Steffek 2003, 254). This renders the mechanisms of compliance dependent upon threat or material incentive; thus, when these means are decreased or disappear we see a diminished level of compliance. Such mechanisms are “strictly situation-bound” and can only trigger acceptance of a command “in the presence of threats (or incentives) and a tight system of compliance control” (Steffek 2003, 254).

On the other hand, when an actor accepts a rule as binding and legitimate that actor’s compliance is less dependent on coercion or reward. In order to acquire this type of compliance from an actor, that actor must hold a “reasonably stable belief in the normative rightfulness of [the] social order” in question (Steffek 2003, 254). However, even under circumstances in which an actor has accepted a rule or norm as binding and legitimate that actor’s compliance will always remain voluntary. Nevertheless, an actor’s obligation to the rule is not voluntary. The actor’s obligation comes because
“nations, or those who govern them, recognize that the obligation to comply is owed by them to the community of states as the reciprocal of that community’s validation of their nations’ statehood” (Franck 1990, 196). Compliance in this sense does not result from coercion, but it does not entirely come voluntarily either. In other words, a “sense of obligation pulls states in the direction of compliance with norms which, on the one hand, are not coercively mandated by a global sovereign, but, on the other hand, do not obligate solely on the basis of state’s grace and favour” (Franck 1990, 196).

If members of the international community undermine a norm or rule that others deem binding and legitimate it can also have ramifications upon their domestic legitimacy. International legitimacy is a key contributor to a citizen’s perceptions of that state’s domestic legitimacy. Being labelled a “rogue state” can damage the state’s reputation and as a result it can lose both international and domestic legitimacy. This loss of domestic legitimacy comes from a citizen’s need to believe “that existing political institutions are better than other alternatives and therefore deserve obedience” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 903). The global information communication environment and traditional mass media make this need all the more important as “citizens make judgments about whether their government is better than alternatives by looking at those alternatives (in the international and regional arena) and by seeing what other people and countries say about their country” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 903). Hence, “international legitimation is important insofar as it reflects back on a government’s domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in power” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 903).
Interestingly, it is norm breaking behaviour that remains one of the most accepted ways to bring about change (Franck 1990). However, such behaviour is not without its perils, as the resulting change can only be slight, as to even acknowledge the need to explain or convince others that your actions are legitimate gives credence to the legitimacy of the previous rule. In addition, the “rogue state” must convince enough states that the old rule should be substituted with a new rule, which “will depend, in part, on whether its rationale for defying the existing rule is couched in terms which give the community a persuasive alternative rule...this persuasion [can] consist of demonstrating that the proposed alternative is more coherent than the old one” (Franck 1990, 151). The capacity to challenge in such a way renders the international society of states highly porous and able to construct legitimacy through an appeal to norms that resonate with different historical stages. In other words, it is “important at the outset to stress this historical fluidity of the norms that underpin international society, and the shifting conceptions of legitimacy to which this gives rise” (Clark, Ian 2007, 16). The fluid nature of legitimacy means that we are able to look to other sources of norms when states adopt something that seems to be counterintuitive to their own interests. The principal source of counterintuitive norms is the nongovernmental actor.

The presence of the nongovernmental actor on the world stage complicates the discussion of legitimacy. The Kony 2012 campaign is particularly notable in this regard as a result of the immense interest that surrounded its initial launch. The interest generated by the campaign and the number of people that participated would lead one to believe that the campaign’s cause was commonly perceived as “rightful” and
thus, socially sanctioned. In this way the new media empowered Kony 2012 campaign was able to add to the “reservoir” from which actors can draw legitimacy claims. While this may have been short lived, as the backlash against the campaign and its organisers was quick to strip it of legitimacy, it raises larger questions regarding the potential damage of large, yet arguably misinformed, groups of people campaigning for issue that impinge on the agency of others. It is in this sense that new media tools and campaigns that use them effectively, like Kony 2012, are another powerful dynamic that must be taken into consideration when analysing legitimacy.

**Nongovernmental Actors (World Society & Global Civil Society)**

Non-governmental or non-profit actors operate within a realm outside the nation state which has been termed, among others, both world society (Bull, Hedley 1977; Buzan 2004; Clark, Ian 2007; Manning 1962; Vincent 1986; Weller 2000; Wright 1966) and global civil society (GCS) (Germain & Kenny 2005; Kaldor 2003b; Keane 2003; Lipschutz 2005; Woodward 2006). Both world society and GCS seek to highlight “the political dimension of the non-state universe, and both carry a liberal programme aimed at constraining and / or reforming state power” (Buzan 2004, 77). The following section will briefly explore GCS and world society and in doing so provide insight into two key conceptions of the international realm.

**Global Civil Society (GCS)**

GCS, like civil society, is a concept or ‘political project’ that holds no clear definition and remains a contested ‘idea’ within IR literature (Bartelson 2006; Bowden 2006; Chandler 2007). Nonetheless there is general agreement that the rhetoric around GCS
is in “response to rising concerns about the need for a new social and economic and political deal at the global level” (Keane 2003, 2). Indeed, some writers would prefer GCS to be solely understood in terms of its rhetorical function (Bartelson 2006). Others would prefer GCS to be used as an empirical tool for analysis (Turner 1998) or as a normative ideal (Chandler 2007). GCS in the broadest sense seeks to lift the modern conceptualisations of civil society from the nation state into the global realm. Modern conceptions of civil society are formed around a balanced interdependence with the state and the rights of association and individualism. The concept carries a number of interrelated but distinct points of analysis. These are far from exhaustive. First, civil society is usually referenced to the idea of ‘civility’ within society. Civility is said to be achieved within society when there is a rule of law and an absence of coercion in human affairs (Kaldor 2003a) or when societies are characterised by market relations and capitalism in which individuals act with civility towards one another (Hamilton 2003).

Second, civil society acts within a state/civil society duality, in which civil society incorporates all facets of society that are not covered by the state. Finally, civil society can be said to capture everything between the state and the family. In other words, civil society is the “arena of ethical life” that includes “markets, social classes, civil law and welfare organisations” (Kaldor 2003a, 8). In sum, Ernst Gellner (1994) defines civil society as

that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can
nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society
(cited in Bowden 2006, 158; Gellner 1994, 1)

Gellner’s definition of civil society captures its interdependence with the state, while
illustrating its important role as a counterpoint. For Lipschutz (1996) and Buzan (2004)
the liberal conception of civil society has “always carried some cosmopolitan
assumptions about civilised communities separate from, and transcending, the
framework of states, and having distinct social and / or legal codes” (Buzan 2004, 78).
However, it was the proliferation of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and other
actors operating internationally that brought about a more pronounced global shift
(Bowden 2006). This shift has seen a number of political spaces form beyond the
parameters of the nation state, “networks of economic, social and cultural relations”
that are being occupied by “conscious associations of actors, in physically separate
locations, who link themselves in networks for particular political and social purposes”
(Lipschutz 1992, 393). GCS encourages actors to pursue political and social “purposes”
because it includes “all those organisations, formal and informal which individuals can
join and through which their voices can be heard by decision-makers" (Kaldor 2003a,
79). Operating in a space outside the nation state grants more autonomy to networks
of actors and NGOs (Lipschutz 1992) and it is these actors and networks that comprise
GCS. Keane (2003) describes GCS as:

[N]either a static object nor a fait accompli. It is an unfinished project that
consists of sometimes thick, sometimes thinly stretched networks, pyramids
and hub-and-spoke clusters of socio-economic institutions and actors who
organise themselves across borders, with the deliberate aim of drawing the world together in new ways (2003, 8).

GCS encapsulates the transnational process of debate amongst individuals, NGOs and actors who aim to influence and negotiate with “centres of political and economic authority” (Kaldor 2003a, 79). Such influence tends “to pluralise power and to problematize violence; consequently, their peaceful or ‘civil’ effects are felt everywhere, here and there, far and wide, to and from local areas, through wider regions, to the planetary level itself” [sic] (Keane 2003, 8). This expansion of civil society from the once predominantly state-based paradigm to the global paradigm has placed new strains and pressures upon the state system (Turner 1998). This pressure on the nation state is not only the result of GCS developing and maintaining transnational links and ties, but the nature of the issues they address (Turner 1998). These issues reside outside the realm of any one nation state and range from health, fair trade, human rights, refugees, and environmental concerns. These global issues and the comparative competence with which GCS can tackle them has led scholars such as Lipschutz (1992, 398) to note that “the code of global civil society denies the primacy of states or their sovereign rights.” The non-state realm’s relationship with the nation state’s most enduring norm of sovereignty will be explored further following a brief look into English School’s concept of world society.

**The English School, International Society & World Society**

The English School is best described as an established body of theoretical and empirical work that originated from a number of key scholars, namely; Manning, Wight, Bull, and Vincent (Bull, Hedley 1977; Manning 1962; Vincent 1986; Wright 1966). There are
three core concepts within the English School: *international system*, *international society* and *world society*. These concepts provide insight into the relationship between the non-state and state realm, specifically sovereignty and the influence of non-state actors upon state policy and norms.

The English School holds that when states interact they do so under a norm-governed relationship in which states feel at least a slight obligation or responsibility to one another, which the English School terms an *international society*. In other words, an *international society* is formed when “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another” (Bull, Hedley 1977; 2002, 13). It is “the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity among states, and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory” (Buzan 2004, 7). The relationship between states operating within an *international society*, in which states shape and are shaped by each other, is similar to a society of individuals which influence and shape one another (Buzan 2004).

While an *international system* is formed when “two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole” (Bull, Hedley 1977; 2002, 13). In contrast to an *international society*, states operating in an *international system* are devoid of a strong normative framework and instead just factor other states within their behaviour.
Finally, *world society* “takes individuals, non-state organisations and ultimately the
global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and
arrangements, and puts transcendence of the states-system at the centre of IR theory”
(Buzan 2004, 7). In other words, while international society refers, for the most part, to the “realm of the government and official: world society is the realm of the individual, of the non-official group or movement, and of the transnational network of non-governmental agents” (Clark, Ian 2007, 6). World society is the “non-state social world that takes a transnational form, and is distinct from the society of states” (Clark, Ian 2007, 22). World society, like GCS, carries “some parallels to transnationalism, but carries a much more foundational link to normative political theory” (Buzan 2004, 7). World society plays an important role within the English school and as Little (1995) notes this importance is becoming more and more apparent.

The social and normative elements within the English School, especially within world and international society, have provoked scholars to consolidate it with constructivism, using “their mutual concern for the social dimensions of international life” as the point of consolidation (Reus–Smit 2002, 489). More precisely, it is the mutual importance they place on the intersubjective social dimensions in the creation of norms, identities, and interests that renders the two akin. The social dimension underpinning the two bodies of work is also noted by Bellamy, who states that “it has become increasingly apparent that English School and constructivist writers had much in common, in particular their belief that states form an international society shaped by ideas, values, identities, and norms that are—to a greater or lesser extent—common to all” (Bellamy, Alex J. 2005, 2; Clark, Ian 2007, 208).
Interest in these two schools surrounds the intersubjective nature of constructivism and the pluralist-solidarist debate within the English School, which looks at the nature and potentiality of international society around shared norms. Looking at these issues helps us understand the interplay between world and international society, particularly the contentious issue of world society’s claim to legitimacy and the subsequent ramifications upon the sovereignty of the nation state.

**Pluralist**

Pluralists are strongly state-centric and “presuppose that states are de facto the dominant unit of human society and that state sovereignty means practical legal and political primacy” (Buzan 2004, 46). For pluralists the formulation of ideas, norms, and representations of the “good life” runs concurrent with the state and as such are created within individual political communities. Therefore the ideas formulated within each state are seen as being incompatible with other states and are subsequently liable to come into conflict. In other words, states, like people, can and do have different interests and values, thus any society of states is limited to helping them coexist in relative harmony (Mayall 2000). This forces international society to accept staunch limitations, in which states aspire to mere coexistence and are largely restricted to agreements around the mutual recognition of sovereignty, rules of diplomacy and non-intervention principles (Buzan 2004, 46).

Under this conception of international society the recognition of state sovereignty and non-intervention become the norm (Bellamy, A. J 2005b). Such a normative foundation
means there can be no international agreement around issues such as human rights. As pluralists “argue that substantive (or purposive) moral and political codes are constructed within specific cultural contexts and therefore cannot be universal” (Bellamy, A. J 2005b, 10). To limit international society to the creation of “practical rules” that seek to achieve mere “coexistence” through the management of state interaction only serves to inhibit their ability to deal with international problems that arise outside of their borders, such as weapon prohibition regimes, environmental concerns and internet governance. These limitations are encapsulated in Mayall’s “non-developmental” characterisation of the pluralist international society “[f]or pluralists, one of the features that distinguishes international society from any other form of social organization is its procedural and hence non-developmental character” (2000, 14).

**Solidarist**

This “non-developmental” characterisation by Mayall can be seen in stark contrast to the solidarist conception of international society, which “holds that diverse communities can and do reach agreement about substantive moral standards and that international society has moral agency to uphold those standards” (Bellamy, A. J 2005b, 10). The acknowledgement of universal moral standards greatly enhances the purview for international society, Solidarists presuppose that the potential scope for international society is much wider than the 'non-developmental character' that limits the pluralist vision, possibly embracing shared norms, rules and institutions about the functional cooperation over such things as limitations on the use of force, and
acceptable 'standards of civilisation' with regard to the relationship between states and citizens (i.e. Human rights) (Buzan 2004, 47).

Beyond international society's increased receptiveness to cooperation is the dramatic shift in its normative framework, as the pluralist conceptions of non-intervention and mutual recognition of state sovereignty are replaced by political convergence and cosmopolitan solidarity. It has been said that “solidarism focuses on the possibility of shared moral norms underpinning a more expansive, and almost inevitably more interventionist, understanding of international order” (Buzan 2004, 47). Shared moral conceptions see solidarism, like constructivism, place increased impetus on norms as a driving force behind what states should do and what they actually do, and what norms international society should subscribe to and do subscribe to. Solidarists garner evidence for their argument in the existence of a strong human rights regime that includes agreed standards of human behaviour and an expanding acknowledgment of global criminal culpability (Bellamy, A. J 2005b). It is through these international devices, such as a universal human rights doctrine and the international criminal court that solidarists are able to bolster international cooperation and subsequently better equip international society to deal with problems that originate outside of the nation state.

It is for these reasons that Mayall (Mayall 2000) views the “solidarist vision” as attractive, however he warns that it is fraught with perils. He attributes this to an inability to navigate “without maps”, which refers to the sometimes “blurred” conceptual boundaries of solidarism due to the inclusion of both state and non-state
actors. Because solidarism holds more cosmopolitan notions of individual rights it can begin to blur the borders between international and world society. By contrast the entirely state-based pluralist conception seems a lot more coherent, but becomes problematic when world society encroaches upon its state-centric conceptions. In essence, while the pluralist-solidarist debate is primarily concerned with how states should and do act within international society “world society questions are constantly dancing around its edges” (Buzan 2004, 48).

**World Society and Sovereignty**

World society has profound implications for legitimacy, international society and especially sovereignty. World society’s dynamic relationship with the nation state’s most enduring norm, being that of sovereignty, is a subject that deserves a focused examination. Within international relations, sovereignty “signifies constitutional independence of other states...all that constitutional independence means is that a state’s constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement”, and sovereignty in the eyes of Alan James “is a legal, absolute, and unitary condition” (Jackson, R 1990, 32). More specifically, “popular sovereignty...refers to a people’s capacity for self-determination by constituting such an administrative system, or by assisting to steer or transform it once established” (Lupel 2009, 3). In essence, “it is a concept or a claim about the way political power is or should be exercised” (Camilleri & Falk 1992, 11).

The history of sovereignty runs concurrent with the formulisation of the modern state system and as Thomas Paine wrote in *Rights of Man*, sovereignty is intrinsically tied to the state, “The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly
derived from it” (Paine 1987, 110). However, Paine’s statement has become problematic with the introduction of universal human rights and the growing presence of transnational groups and movements operating within world society. The dramatic shift in the international landscape since Thomas Paine and others documented international life is discussed by Mayall, “[t]he assumptions on which [Emerich de] Vattel, or even [Hugo] Grotius, based their accounts of international life have been eroded, by making sovereignty popular, and then qualifying it by the assertion of individual rights” (Mayall 2000, 27). Headly Bull (1977) also saw human rights as detrimental to the society of states and conceptions of sovereignty noting that:

Carried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organised as a society of sovereign states. For, if the rights of each man can be asserted on the world political stage over and against the claims of his state, and his duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as a servant or a citizen of that state, then the position of the state as a body sovereign over its citizens, and entitled to command their obedience, has been subject to challenge, and structure of the society of sovereign states has been placed in jeopardy. The way is left open for the subversion of the society of sovereign states on behalf of the alternative organising principle of a cosmopolitan community (Bull, Hedley 1977, 146).

When placed in the context of the pluralists and solidarist debate, sovereignty only serves to cement the rift between them. If sovereignty is viewed in what Buzan and
Jackson (Jackson, R 1990) call ‘empirical’ terms, “in which sovereignty derives from the power of states to assert the claim to exclusive right to self-government”, this seemingly does not enable the state to accommodate “shared norms, rules and institutions without endangering the very quality that defines them as states” (Buzan 2004, 48). Understanding the relationship and inherent contradictions between sovereignty, universal human rights and the transnational groups that advocate these principles is the task of the following sections. These understanding also help us to appreciate the relationship between world and international society.

**Human Rights, Norms and Sovereignty**

Robert H. Jackson (Jackson, R 1990) used the term ‘paradox of the state’ to describe a government that is a threat to its own people rather than acting as a source of security. It is indeed a concern when the principal violators of international human rights norms are sovereign states and their own citizens the victims. Through this paradox Jackson draws one important conclusion, that, “modern international human rights law is an important acknowledgement that sovereign states cannot automatically be considered civilized...Otherwise there would be no need for such a law” (Jackson, R 1990, 144). The “need” to which Jackson refers comes from the international community’s post-war sentiment concerning the atrocities committed during WWII. Since the implementation of human rights in 1945 they have “come to represent an alternative non-territorial source of sovereignty that limits state actions” (ibid.), however they remain “caught between two normative poles of international thought and action: morality and sovereignty” (Quataert 2009, 4-5).
The pluralist-solidarist debate only solidifies the tenuous relationship between morality and sovereignty, as pluralists strive to develop a theory of international society “as a discrete social realm, with relative autonomy from the actors, structures, and processes of the surrounding world society” (Reus-Smit 2005, 90). Pluralists staunchly deny that world society is impinging upon international society, and this “claim rests on the concomitant idea that non-state actors do not fundamentally alter the basic principles and dynamics of the society of sovereign states” (Reus–Smit 2002, 504). It is here that Reus-Smit expresses concern over the misleading nature of this claim, in which non-state actors are supposedly displacing the primacy of sovereign states.

The issue is not whether actors in world society are displacing the society of sovereign states; it is whether they are affecting its basic principles and dynamics. It was hard to deny this before September 11; it is now virtually impossible (Reus-Smit 2005, 91)

September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001 and the transnational ‘anti-systemic’ violence that has followed shows that international society is certainly not self-contained or autonomous from world societal influence, be that moral or immoral. Whether this fulfils Richard Little’s belief that “it will become increasingly difficult to separate the evolution of international society from a parallel evolution in world society” becomes unclear. However, Little’s concomitant belief that international society will “take on board those features which provide an international society based on common culture with its inherent advantages” (Little, R 1998, 68) becomes increasingly tangible under Reus-
Smit’s conceptions of a world society that is able to affect the basic principles and
dynamics of sovereign states.

An international society that embraces common cultural values and does not deny or
resist the influence of world society is a promising conception for this project. This
project does not believe nor require world society to displace the primacy of sovereign
states. Instead, the primary position of this project is far more modest, in that the
normative development of international society is partly influenced by world society,
which can be “best understood as a process of social integration, whereby specified
norms become common to both” (Clark, Ian 2007, 209). Or as a “common history of
past collaboration over jointly agreed goals—whereby international society has served
as the principal instrument for the realization of newly defined objectives emanating
from world society” (Clark, Ian 2007, 8).

The extent of world society’s influence over international society is examined by
Meyer et al. (1997), who contend that many features of the nation state are “highly
rationalized, articulated, and often surprisingly consensual” (Meyer et al. 1997, 145). In
this study Meyer et al. (1997) argue that there is an “observable isomorphism among
nation-states” which they then attribute to an “overarching world culture” and
specific world society processes that “produce or reconstruct the actors themselves.”
In their examination of world society influence, Meyer et al. (1997) identify “three
processes by which world-societal elements authorize and fashion national states: [1]
the construction of identity and purpose, [2] systemic maintenance of actor identity,
and [3] legitimation of the actorhood of such subnational units as individuals and
organized interest” (Meyer et al. 1997, 157).
Meyer et al. argue that new and existing nation states can be seen to consistently conform to worldwide models of both national identity and state structure. Some examples of the worldwide models to which Meyer et al. refer include education standards and structures, state goals, ministry structures, data systems, policies, tourism and museums. It is through the selection and adaption of such worldwide models that the nation-state has come close to something of a universal form or, even as “theorized or imagined communities drawing on models that are lodged at the world level” (Meyer et al. 1997, 158).

This first process places state sovereignty in a precarious position, as the nation-state is forced to depict the adoption of worldwide models as autonomous because they “are defined as sovereign, responsible, and essentially autonomous actors ... however, the policies look more like enactments of conventionalized scripts” (Meyer et al. 1997, 159). Even if a state proclaims opposition to dominant world identity models, necessity will force it to pursue many aspects of the model. Examples of this include bureaucratic authority, a central banking system and educational systems. As a result the nation state will find itself “modifying its traditions in the direction of world-cultural forms” (Meyer et al. 1997, 159). Meyer et al.’s almost pseudo conception of sovereignty stands in direct contrast to Buzan and Jackson’s pluralistic termed ‘empirical sovereignty’ and aligns more with solidarist conceptions. However, even solidarist conceptions seem modest in contrast to the influence of world models on the nation state under Meyer et al.
Justification for this increased influence becomes more apparent in Meyer et al.’s second point; if a nation state finds itself unable to implement the desired policy “(because of costs, incompetence, or resistance)” world society will provide support through existing structures. Support in this respect is proposed to the nation state as both beneficial to the world as a whole and to the individual nation state. For example, international organisations actively encourage countries to adopt certain policies that can sometimes run counter to state imperatives, like population control policies. Such policies are justified to the nation-state as beneficial for national development rather than the world. This illusion of sovereignty provided to nation states by world society supports Meyer et al.’s first proposition by positioning influence under the guise of autonomy, as “international organizations often posture as objective disinterested others who help nation-states pursue their exogenously derived goals” (Meyer et al. 1997, 159). It is important to note that any assistance provided to nation state in this fashion is positioned more as legitimising the purposes of the state by authoritative structures and bodies rather than serving the interests of dominant powers in an authoritarian manner.

Resistance to world models is complicated “because nation-states are formally committed, as a matter of identity, to such self-evident goals as socioeconomic development, citizen rights, individual self-development, and civil international relations” (Meyer et al. 1997, 159). Global compliance to structures, rules, and identities is also reinforced by Franck, who maintains that reciprocal recognition of sovereignty transfers an obligation to nation states, “Though states’ compliance with the rules may be voluntary, states’ obligation to them is not. Nations, or those who govern them, recognize that the obligation to comply is owed by them to the
community of states as the reciprocal of that community’s validation of their nations’ statehood” (Franck 1990, 196). Legitimacy and external influence is also featured in Meyer et al.’s final point.

The last process [3] sees world society rely on domestic publics to pressure national governments into conformity. This pressure occurs once the public within the nation state has, through socialisation, adopted world society’s cultural policies. This process has a two pronged effect, as nation states are not only pressured by domestic publics in pursuing identities and purposes that originate from or are legitimised by world society; the nation states also serves to further promote the domestic actors involved to other nation states.

A good example is the rise of world discourse legitimating the human rights of gays and lesbians, which has produced both national policy changes and the mobilization of actors claiming these rights ... As nation-states adopt policies embodying the appropriate principles, they institutionalize the identity and political presence of these groups. Of course, all these “internally” generated changes are infused with world-cultural conceptions of the properly behaving nation-state (Meyer et al. 1997, 160).

In this context, world society is a vehicle for legitimising domestic action through world discourse and in the event that the nation-state fails to adopt world-approved policies, domestic pressure can attempt to enforce conformity. Environmentalism represents one of the most profound examples of world society discourse enhancing the
legitimacy of a movement and spurring action. The enhanced legitimacy provided to
the ‘green movement’ through world society discourse has assisted in the
empowerment of thousands of movements to pressure nation states into the
ratification of protocols, establishment of environmentally sound infrastructure and
policies. To the extent that Meyer et al. attribute similar “mobilization agendas” in
different countries to “world culture” influences.

In other words, “world culture influences nation-states not only at their centers, or
only in symbolic ways, but also through direct connections between local actors and
world culture.” Connections between domestic and international actors can form
“axes of mobilization” that are able to implement other “world society principles and
help account for similarities in mobilization agendas and strategies in highly disparate
countries” (Meyer et al. 1997, 161). While the level of world societal influence posited
by Meyer et al. is high, it is reasonable to say that world society does have some
degree of influence over international society. The belief that world society and non-
state actors are able to shape the identities and define the interests of states by
influencing domestic and international norms (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Reus-Smit 2005) is
important to this research. So while the conceptual parameters of sovereignty will
continue to change and evolve due to external influence it seems that the “legitimacy
of global institutions and global governance itself is thus now made increasingly
dependent on the increased participation (voice) of civil society actors among other
world players” (Rooy 2004, 140). The question now is not whether world society has
influence, but the extent of this influence and a case of when, not if world society will
encroach upon the ‘sovereignty’ of the nation state.
Encroaching on the agency, and by extension, the sovereignty of Ugandans was a chief criticism of Invisible Children and the Kony 2012 campaign. The implicit “white man’s burden” (Blattman 2012) message of the campaign, and in particular, the video, was believed to have impinged upon the agency of Ugandans. While Kony 2012 demonstrates the power of new media tools in garnering mass support for issues, it also demonstrates the need to encompass diverse factions, including nations like Uganda, in that support. More specifically, in the case of Kony 2012 new media tools enabled an arguably misinformed organisation and its supporters to rally to the perceived detriment of a sovereign nation. Kony 2012 forces us to reconsider whether it may now not only be a question of when world society will encroach on the sovereignty of the nation state but who can now encroach on the sovereignty of nation states through new media tools.

The extent of world society’s influence and the nation state’s ineffectiveness in addressing problems that occur outside of its sovereign borders also forces us to question its utility going forward. The nation state’s ineffectiveness has been linked to the increasing influence of world society and its comparative “decline in significance or, as Ralf Dahrendorf puts it, the helplessness of the state” (Schmidt 2000, 137). This correlation has been the subject of numerous scholars (see for example Beck 2006; Bell 1999; Castells, M 2008; Nye, J 2004, 2008; Schmidt 2000) and led Daniel Bell to the conclusion that “the nation state has become too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems” (Bell 1999, lxxxi).
It is here that Hilmar Schmidt (2000) highlights John W. Burton’s (1972) classic study that asked, “Why study world society?” Schmidt notes that it is world society’s influence as a ‘new whole’ on the actions and behaviour of actors within the international realm that mandates such interest, noting that “there are many domestic problems that are more readily understood by examining the same kind of problem on the larger scale of relationships in world society” (Burton 1972, 5; from Schmidt 2000, 133). Some of the problems to which Burton could refer, include war, genocide, migrations, poverty, epidemics, environmental concerns, and Internet governance. Daniel Archibugi (2008) argues that the majority of which “are not new problems, although today they have an intensity and an immediacy that were unprecedented in the past” (Archibugi 2008, 85). More importantly these “problems have thrust their way to the fore on the world stage” begging the question “can they also be managed at the same global level?” (2008, 85).

**Managing Global Problems**

Nation states are the most important actors in the international realm, however in order to address global problems they will need to make changes to how they operate externally and reorganise themselves internally, “they must pursue an internal inclusion policy, that is, adapt their relationship to societal subsystems with the goal of finding the most effective ways of dealing with these global problems” (Schmidt 2000, 136). Within international relations literature there are a number of possible solutions that occupy very different ends of the theoretical spectrum. The following brief look at this non-exhaustive list of solutions is designed to provide insight into the various dimensions of thinking regarding global problems. It is not intended to provide definitive or empirical solutions.
One such solution is proposed by Archibugi, who calls for a move towards a cosmopolitan democracy in order to address problems that fall outside of the nation state:

Issues deemed to be essentially global, such as environmental matters and those regarding humankind’s survival, including the rights of future generations, are referred to transnational and not only to intergovernmental institutions. Global civil society is able to access political decisions on these matters through new permanent institutions. These institutions may be endowed with specific competencies (such as the environment, demographic issues, development, and disarmament) or with broader political mandates (such as the safe guarding of fundamental human rights and the safe guarding of future generations) (Archibugi 2008, 112).

Archibugi’s conception of global institutions based within a cosmopolitan democracy falls under what Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande (2010) term “idealistic utopian cosmopolitanism” and subsequently renders Archibugi’s position liable to utopian criticism. In contrast Beck and Grande (2010) utilise the current debate surrounding climate change to offer a realistic scenario of global governance:

The realistic scenario goes as follows: It is the antagonism between producers and recipients of climate risks which both constitutes and blocks a cosmopolitics of climate change. There is no way to resolve this dilemma.
Consequently the agnostics of climate change will prevail; there will be some kind of continuing eco-technological modernization moving towards a more or less ‘green capitalism’; the more the mainstream of the political parties agrees to keep the big tanker sailing straight head, the more absurd and unbelievable their staged differences will be ... Evolution is sufficient. There is neither room nor necessity for change (Beck & Grande 2010, 433).

Beck and Grande’s “realistic scenario” highlights one of the nation state’s primary quandaries in addressing global problems; “There is neither room nor necessity for change.” Why seek change when the consequences could be detrimental to the state and its relations? This dilemma is further compounded by the development of world society, which “seems to emphasize more than ever the failure of the state in the sense of its weak capacity for political intervention, its functional ineffectiveness, and economic inefficiency” in addressing both domestic and international problems (Schmidt 2000, 137). In other words, where world society has acted in addressing global problems, such as Third World debt, constructing a prohibition regime on anti-personnel landmines, banning cluster munitions, and raising environmental concerns to unprecedented heights, the nation state has “neither room nor necessity for change.”

Ann Marie Clark (2001) reinforces this by arguing that principled norms originating from world society “prescribe a mode of action for states that often contradicts action ruled by immediate self-interest” and such norms “would be unlikely to emerge

---

25 An example of which would be Australia selling coal overseas while instituting a carbon tax at home and signing the Kyoto agreement.
naturally out of state considerations of self-interest” (Clark, AM 2001, 136-8).
Unfortunately, only the nation state seems “to have the capacity to furnish the
resources needed to solve global problems in world society, or at least call for the
provision of these resources” (Schmidt 2000, 137). Thus a paradox is created in which
the state will neither initiate nor easily facilitate change due to a possible conflict with
state identity or parochial interests, although only it holds the human and financial
resources needed to successfully address such problems. Resolving this conflict
requires dialogue and increased societal participation, as “it is no longer the case that
any one state can solve its citizen’s problems alone ... The international coordination of
policy is becoming more and more important” (Schmidt 2000, 137).

Finally, Beck and Grande (2010) discuss the concept of *cosmopolitical realpolitik*, which
seeks to resolve the management of global problems under conditions of competing
normative models and material interests. This concept is based on several assumptions:

- “Firstly, the new historical reality of world risk society is that no nation can
  master its problems alone. Those who play the national card will inevitably
  lose.”
- “Secondly, global problems produce new cosmopolitan imperatives which give
  rise to transnational communities of risk.”
- “Thirdly, international organizations are not merely the continuation of
  national politics by other means. They can transform national interests” (Beck
  & Grande 2010, 436).
The assumptions on which Beck and Grande base their theory reinforce some important points for the current research: problems that arise outside of the nation states’ need to be addressed collectively in order to achieve success and organizations that operate within world society can influence national interests. Beck and Grande continue their explanation of cosmopolitical realpolitik by offering a contextual definition of *cosmopolitanism*, which “thus understood implies a specific approach to ensuring that one’s own (individual or collective) interests are promoted and made to prevail” (2010, 436). While the evolving definition of *cosmopolitan realism*, “calls for neither the sacrifice of one’s own interests, nor an exclusive bias towards higher ideas and ideals. On the contrary, it accepts that for the most part political action is interest-based. But it insists on an approach to the pursuit of one’s own interests that is compatible with those of a larger community” (Beck & Grande 2010, 436). Thus:

Cosmopolitical realism basically means the recognition of the legitimate interests of others and their inclusion in the calculation of one’s own interests. In this process, *interests become ‘reflexive national interests’* [emphasis added] through repeated joint strategies of self-limitation; more precisely, empowerment arises from self-limitation. Ideally, individual and collective goals, both national and global, can be achieved simultaneously (Beck & Grande 2010, 436).

The collective formulation of interests within cosmopolitical realpolitik sees it derive influence from constructivism and the English School’s international society. However, in contrast to constructivism, interests are not wholly collective rather they are self-
interests formed in collective recognition of other state’s interests. This enables cosmopolitical realpolitik to encapsulate a middle ground whereby nation states can pursue self-interests compatible with that of international society. A corollary of this conception is the function of world society within these parameters; can world society function as a source of influence within the ‘collective recognition’ of cosmopolitical realpolitik or in any form for that matter and subsequently play a role within the formulation of state interests?

**Conclusion**

The role of world society in the formulation of state interests has thus far been examined using the social construction of norms, knowledge and meaning that is prevalent in the English school and constructivist literature. Norms explain state behaviour because of their relationship with state identity, interests, and legitimacy. World society can affect state behaviour by changing norms that then influence the state’s identity and interests. There are limitations to this influence. Any belief that world society can displace state sovereignty is met with the severe disparity in material and economic might possessed by the state. By the same token one must also concede that the state is certainly not self-contained or immune from world society’s influence. This is substantiated by dramatic effect of September 11th 2001 and the ‘anti-systemic’ violence that has followed. Any arguments that suggest either the displacement of state sovereignty or the complete absence of world society’s influence should be met with scepticism. It is with this in mind that this chapter has argued that the normative development of international society is partly influenced by world society, which is “best understood as a process of social integration, whereby specified
norms become common to both” (Clark 2007, 209). This influence does not displace the sovereignty of the state but rather affects its basic principles and dynamics. Holding that world society has influence, albeit modest influence, underpins much of this project, because world society has influence and is thus worth studying. It is this assumption of modest influence that also adds value to the study of the nation state’s ineffectiveness in addressing problems that occur outside its sovereign borders. As highlighted in this chapter, the problems that have been thrust on the global stage (war, genocide, migrations, poverty, epidemics, environmental concerns, and Internet governance) often require states to take actions that run counter to self-interest. This has forced the hand of world society. The ideas explored in this chapter form the international relations portion of the interdisciplinary mode of scholarship. The next chapter (Chapter Three: New Media Environment) will now complete this scholarship by focusing on the media portion.
Chapter Three: New Media Environment

Introduction

Since becoming accessible to mass audiences in the early-mid 1990s through the World Wide Web (WWW), the internet has cemented itself alongside print, television, and radio as the fourth type of mass medium. Seemingly unsatisfied with sharing this moniker, the internet continues to envelop the once unique attributes of the other mass mediums. Now omnipresent in people’s lives, the internet enables them to create, disseminate, and select content and information in a way that is unlike any medium that has come before.

The present chapter articulates the parameters of the new media environment and forms the second aspect of the thesis. This chapter focuses on the implications of individuals wielding greater control over the creation, selection and consumption of information and content. It is this individualised control of information and the reasoning behind an individual’s choice in what information he or she selects that either aids or hinders the effectiveness of world society campaigns.

This chapter sees the inquiry situated within the field of media and communication scholarship. In particular, the concept of “mass self-communication” is central to the analysis. This concept denotes the individualised control of information generation and consumption. Both the theoretical and practical ramifications of this will be examined in reference to world society campaigns. The first section of this chapter sees the concept of Web 2.0 explored before the focus shifts to mass self-communication and
its theoretical implications. The following section will then explore the practical ramifications of mass self-communication, which can be synthesised as the following: (1) audience fragmentation, (2) partisan selection, (3) selective exposure, and (4) content proliferation.

The investigation into mass self-communication and these four distinct but interrelated effects will provide a clear conceptual framework with which to examine the tactics of world society campaigns in Chapter Five.

Web 2.0

The internet is no exception to Roy Amara’s observation that we invariably overestimate the short-term impact of new technologies while underestimating their long-term impact. Scholarly discussion surrounding the advent and utilisation of the internet typically occupies two positions; utopian and dystopian (Chadwick 2009a; Chadwick & Howard 2009b; McNair 2009; Papacharissi 2009; Pasek, more & Romer 2009). Some hail the potential empowerment of the masses (Benkler 2006; Castells, M 2001; Fenton, N 2008a; Lacy & Wilkin 2005; Nye, J 2004), while others question its importance in light of realistic quandaries such as social inequality and elite dominance (Atton 2004; Harcourt 2003; Tharoor 2005). Despite these contrasting positions, it is difficult to argue with Andrew Chadwick’s (2009) characterisation of our time as one of “informational exuberance”. Chadwick’s characterisation is seen in the sheer volume, low cost and high speed with which one can acquire diverse information. It is these characteristics that so readily lend themselves to increased participation among citizens in the gathering and production of information (Cowan & Arsenault 2008; Gregory 2008; McNair 2009).
Increased participation and the co-production of content are core tenets of Web 2.0 (Jackson, NA & Lilleker 2009). In his seminal work, Tim O’Reilly (2005) described “an implicit ‘architecture of participation’, a built-in ethic of cooperation” (O’Reilly 2005) within Web 2.0. Individuals operating within this paradigm have embraced the enhanced autonomy and “are using their newly expanded practical freedom to act and cooperate with others in ways that improve the practiced experience of democracy, justice and development, a critical culture, and community” (Benkler 2006, 9). O’Reilly’s “architecture of participation” in Web 2.0 can be seen in stark contrast to Web 1.0, in which organisations simply provided information to an audience. Web 2.0 has changed the user’s experience and organizations who wish to use it must relinquish some degree of control to the user (Jackson, NA & Lilleker 2009). User empowerment through Web 2.0 platforms remains a persistent theme in the literature.

Web 2.0 technologies have also empowered consumers to produce and distribute their own content. More recently, the viral success of these same technologies has propelled media organizations to harness the production power of traditional consumers. Almost every major news organization now offers site visitors the opportunity to upload content that, if compelling enough, will be featured online and in an ever-increasing number of television programs that feature user-generated content (Arsenault & Castells 2008, 741-42).
Web 2.0 creates an archetype in which a distributed network “of creators and contributors, the majority of them amateurs, can, using simple tools, produce information goods that may outperform those produced by so-called authoritative, concentrated sources” (Chadwick & Howard 2009b, 5). Within this archetype of increased individual control the “self” is paramount.

**The Self**

In this context the “self” means content is self-generated, emission is self-directed, and reception is self-selected (2007; Castells, M 2008; 2009). Manuel Castells has termed this “new form of socialized communication: mass self-communication” (Castells, M. 2007, 248). It is mass communication because user generated content can be accessed by a potentially global audience through the internet (many-to-many) and peer-to-peer (p2p) distribution networks (Castells, M. 2009). The convergence of broadband capacity communication technologies, particularly mobile and wireless, has seen internet communication permeate into every aspect of social life, enabling individuals to construct their own mass self-communication through horizontal networks of blogs, SMS, vlogs, wikis, and other forms of social media (Castells, M. 2007; Juris 2008; Tremayne 2007).

A principal exemplar of mass self-communication, in terms of both influence and scale, is the blogosphere\(^\text{26}\), with Blogpulse.com identifying 158.9 million blogs as at April 2011. YouTube\(^\text{27}\) is another revolutionary form of mass self-communication and represents the largest mass communication medium in the world with over 2 billion

---

\(^{26}\) The blogosphere is made up of all blogs and their interconnections.  
\(^{27}\) [http://www.youtube.com/](http://www.youtube.com/) (Retrieved April 1, 2011)
views per day as of May 2010 (YouTube 2012a), with the amount of views doubling since October 2009. YouTube is a form of mass self-communication because users generate the majority of its content and the user selects the video s/he wants to watch from the 2 billion videos that YouTube monetises per week. Even acknowledging the limitations of YouTube as a result of copyright infringement, it remains an extremely powerful tool of individual expression. WikiLeaks28, the organisation responsible for the release of various private documents is another mass self-communication platform. WikiLeaks “is a form of anonymous mass self-communication: the content is provided by individual leakers, who can with this way reach a global public and mass audience and remain anonymous at the same time” (Fuchs 2011, 6).

Mass self-communication platforms are constructed around individual initiative, interest and desire (Castells, M. 2009) and incorporate various forms of media, like photographs (Photobucket.com which has surpassed 8 billion uploads29 and flickr.com with over 4 billion uploads30) and cooperative projects such as Wikipedia (with over 23.6 million pages and 14.2 million registered users31). The collaboration of dispersed individuals in cooperative projects has become far more manageable within this communication environment,

[C]ollaborations among far-flung individuals becomes more common, the idea of doing things that require cooperation with others becomes much more attainable, and the range of projects individuals can choose as their own

---

therefore qualitatively increases. The very fluidity and low commitment required of any given cooperative relationship increases the ranged and diversity of cooperative relations people can enter, and therefore of collaborative projects they can conceive of as open to them (Benkler 2006, 9).

Websites like OpenIDEO\(^{32}\) exceed Benkler’s collaborative expectations by enabling organizations to pose challenges for the OpenIDEO community to address. The challenges come from organizations that seek to address problems for the social good, examples are “How might we use social business to improve health in low-income communities?” and “How might we increase the number of registered bone marrow donors to help save more lives?” (OpenIdeo 2011a)

After a challenge is posted at OpenIDEO.com, the three development phases – inspiration, conception, and evaluation – are put into motion. Community members can contribute in a variety of different ways, from inspirational observations and photos, sketches of ideas, to business models and snippets of code. Sometimes this can be in the form of a comment; other times, it’s building off a previous person’s work (OpenIdeo 2011b).

In addition to websites like OpenIDEO.com, Facebook, and, to a lesser extent, MySpace and Google+ have come to exemplify the power of social media and collaboration. Facebook (Facebook 2012) has more than one billion active users who share more than 30 billion pieces of content (web links, news stories, blog posts, notes, photo albums, etc.) each month. Facebook is a mass self-communication platform because it

facilitates user interaction and mass communication but it is the users who provide the content. Facebook has also seen great success in technological convergence, with more than 200 million active users currently accessing Facebook through their mobile devices as at 2011.

The social spaces of Web 2.0, including the blogosphere, Facebook, MySpace and YouTube (Castells, M 2008), are an essential part of mass self-communication and have come to represent “a new communication realm, and ultimately a new medium, whose backbone is made of computer networks, whose language is digital, whose senders are globally distributed and globally interactive” (Castells, M. 2009, 70). Irrespective of the merits of medium theory (Deibert 1997; Ellis 1999; Meyrowitz 1994), the medium, including the aforementioned, does not determine the content and effect of its messages (Bimber 1998, 136; Castells, M. 2009). Rather it is the public’s capacity to occupy a growing proportion of the information flow, through “self” creation and dissemination that represents a significant development in the information communication environment.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognised this development, when, in January 2010 she outlined how the U.S. would promote internet freedom abroad. Clinton’s proposal emphasised a number of key themes under what she termed a “freedom to connect”, including the freedom to access information, the freedom to produce content, and the freedom to connect or converse with other people (Bureau Of Public Affairs 2010). She also announced funding to help reopen internet access in countries that restrict it by adopting an instrumental approach through the
development of specific tools (Shirky 2011). While the freedoms outlined by Clinton substantiate the importance of participation and mass self-communication, Clay Shirky (2011) argues that the "instrumental" approach to Internet freedom taken by Clinton incorrectly “concentrates on preventing states from censoring outside Web sites, such as Google, YouTube, or that of The New York Times” while it “focuses only secondarily on public speech by citizens and least of all on private or social uses of digital media” (Shirky 2011, 31). Here Shirky emphasises the need to equally value the dissemination of information by media corporations with members of the public that operate through mass self-communication platforms.

The instrumental view is politically appealing, action-oriented, and almost certainly wrong. It overestimates the value of broadcast media while underestimating the value of media that allow citizens to communicate privately among themselves. It overestimates the value of access to information, particularly information hosted in the West, while underestimating the value of tools for local coordination. And it overestimates the importance of computers while underestimating the importance of simpler tools, such as cell phones (Shirky 2011, 31).

The U.S. government’s somewhat displaced emphasis on corporate rather than private forms of communication can be seen in stark contrast to the corporate sector, as companies like Google, Microsoft and Apple continue to make moves towards figuring “out how to re-commodify Internet based autonomous mass self-communication ... experimenting with ad-supported sites, pay sites, free streaming video portals, and pay
portals” (Arsenault & Castells 2008, 741). To adapt is to survive in an ever-changing communication environment, this stands for both business and theory.

**Theoretical Implications**

One resounding similarity across literature examining the new information communication environment is the profound and ever evolving nature of the changes (Juris 2008; Lessig 2002; Mokros & Friedrich 2009; Tremayne 2007). The move toward a paradigm of ‘networked individualism’ (Castells, M 2001; Volkmer 2003) has forced people “to question whether mass communication is a fleeting idea, a purely 20th-century phenomenon” (Chaffee & Metzger 2001, 365). In discussing the theoretical implications, Chaffee and Metzger (2001) question whether the proliferation of new media technologies heralds the end of mass communication while Schulz (2004) speculates about the end of mediatisation. Both authors cite the ‘demassification’ and ‘individualisation’ of mass communication as “new media technologies offer their users a higher degree of self-selection and self-determination” (Schulz 2004, 94). The self-creation of content and the decreased costs of participation are also used to understand the increasing difficulty faced by media elites in controlling the information environment.

Looking at the impact of mass self-communication on the control of media elites sees Chaffee and Metzger (2001) and Schulz (2004) highlight its theoretical implications for agenda setting. The seminal work by McCombs and Shaw (1972) into the agenda setting function of the mass media drew its conclusions from a Chapel Hill community in which “almost all the mass media political information was provided by the
following sources: Durham *Morning Herald*, Durham *Sun*, Raleigh *News and Observer*, Raleigh *Times*, New York *Times*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and NBC and CBS evening news broadcasts” (McCombs & Shaw 1972, 178). Herein lies a fundamental assumption of agenda setting theory; “people get their news from a finite number of news sources or outlets” (Chaffee & Metzger 2001, 374). Clearly, within the new media environment this is no longer the case (Messner & Garrison 2009; Papacharissi 2009), as people can now select information from an almost infinite number of sources. Filtering out information of little interest in the process and potentially isolate themselves from the wider public discourse.

Another proposed theoretical casualty of the changing media environment is cultivation theory (Chaffee & Metzger 2001), which “refers to the long-term formation of perceptions and beliefs about the world as a result of exposure to the media” (Potter 1993, 564). The analysis of beliefs and perceptions formed were primarily centred upon “violence and crime-related imagery” which, as argued, cultivated a “symbolic structure, which is then used by viewers to interpret everyday reality” (Hughes 1980, 288). The threat to cultivation theory comes from the diversity of worldviews and content offered through new media sources. This diversity makes it difficult for the media to present a homogenised viewpoint. The diversification of voices and the individualisation of content creation and selection is the crux of the theoretical shift within communication studies. The ‘demassifying’ of communication is integral to mass self-communication.

**Pragmatic Implications for World Society Campaigns**
Aside from the theoretical implications of the changing media environment there are a number of pragmatic implications that will have a significant impact on the techniques used by world society campaigns to stimulate normative change. The pragmatic implications to which I refer can be synthesised into the following: (1) audience fragmentation, (2) partisan selective exposure (selecting news based on partisan beliefs), (3) selective exposure (selecting sports or entertainment information over political news for instance), and (4) content proliferation. The investigation into these four distinct but interrelated effects will aid in the development of a framework to examine the tactics of world society campaigns.

**Audience Fragmentation**

For Elihu Katz (1996) the primary prerequisite of participatory democracy is a “central space” in which all citizens can gather and agree upon an agenda to be discussed in dispersed spaces, and returned for debate and decision in the central space. These spaces would be “cloned, by generalized media dedicated to the polity as a whole, and specialized media dedicated to the citizens’ need to know” what similarly and non-similarly minded others are thinking (Katz 1996, 23). Katz’s ideal functioning of democracy has come up against an almost insurmountable threat by what Negroponte (1995) terms as the “Daily Me”. The “Daily Me” denotes a system in which people can individually tailor their daily media consumption. “Daily Me” and the filtering of information are at the heart of audience fragmentation and have brought about genuine fears for the proper functioning of democracy.
Fragmentation exists as a key quandary in a world in which people can filter information as they see fit and for Sunstein (2007, 44), the problem “comes from the creation of diverse speech communities whose members talk and listen mostly to one another” which can lead to “considerable difficulty in mutual understanding... and groups will tend to polarize”. Webster (2005, 367) describes fragmentation as the “process by which the mass audience, which was once concentrated on three or four viewing options, becomes more widely distributed.” Webster’s definition of fragmentation is devoid of negative connotations, which place it at odds with the majority of the literature.

The discussion of fragmentation can become convoluted due to a number of other closely related concepts like specialisation and polarisation. To differentiate, specialization refers to instances when the media specialise or focus on a particular type of content (Webster 2005). Polarisation, on the other hand, is the strengthening of a person’s original position or attitude. Audience polarisation can occur through the continuous consumption of information from a very limited pool of similar sources. Sunstein (2007) uses the term “group polarization” to explain his belief that after deliberation within a group of like-minded people, individuals within the group tend to adopt a more extreme point of view. This compounds the fear that “the mass audience is being reorganized into segments prone to social polarization” (Webster 2005, 369). Sunstein (2007) is quick to highlight the role of new media in this reorganisation:

With respect to the Internet and new communication technologies, the implication is that groups of like-mind people, engaged in discussion with one another, will end up thinking the same thing that they thought before—but
in a more extreme form (Sunstein 2007, 61).

New media technologies, especially the internet are fundamental to this discussion (Bennett & Iyengar 2008; Castells, M. 2007; Lawrence, Sides & Farrell 2010). The dramatic increase in information and content producers has enabled and even encouraged “people to narrow the focus of their media consumption to pursue their individualized interests and needs” (Tewksbury 2005, 332). This enables people to wall themselves off from the greater public discourse (Sunstein 2007) giving credence to the fear that fragmented audiences are left uniformed and thus unable to discuss or address the central issues facing a nation (Tewksbury 2005).

On the other hand, Russel Neuman (1991, 172) predicted that new media technologies would “open up whole new domains of special-interest and special-purpose communications, narrowcasting rather than broadcasting.” Neuman concluded that the “outlook for a vibrant and dynamic cultural and political life in the United States is indeed positive.” As demonstrated by Neuman (1991), the social benefit of a fragmented public is diversity, but this diversity, it is argued, comes at the cost of common experiences.

In 1996 Elihu Katz wrote, “By now, we are well on the road to segmentation, and there is little hope for recovery of the centre” (Katz 1996, 23). This was written well before the dramatic proliferation of internet usage, which takes the individualisation of content to unprecedented heights. It can be argued that as we edge closer to a system of perfect individual control we risk losing the importance of the public sphere and the
ability to gain shared experience (Sussnstein 2004). The importance of encountering different opinions and information on subjects that would have otherwise been ignored cannot be overstated for the informed citizen. The informed citizen is critical to democracy, as Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010, 2) discuss:

Democracy is most effective when citizens have accurate beliefs. To form such beliefs, individuals must encounter information which will sometimes contradict their pre-existing views. Guaranteeing exposure to information from diverse viewpoints has been a central goal of media policy in the United States and around the world (Gentzkow & Shapiro 2010, 2).

It is when citizens occupy “diverse speech communities” that the “public will not be able to come together over common issues because there will not be any issues that they share in common” (Chaffee & Metzger 2001, 375). Compounding the fear of a public that is unable to come together over common issues is the loss of the inadvertent audience and the widening gap of motivation between individuals willing to engage with issues and those who are not. (Bennett & Iyengar 2008). Bennett and Iyengar (2008, 718) remind us that during the “heyday of network news...many Americans were exposed to the news as a simple by-product of their loyalty to the sitcom or other entertainment program that immediately followed the news.” This has been challenged by mass self-communication, as people are able to access any program when it suits them through web streams or by simply downloading the content through p2p technologies. Leading Bimber (1998) to suggest a model of “accelerated pluralism” which rests on new media technologies compounding the already unmotivated citizen’s preference for entertainment information over political
news. It is within this reasoning that Bimber concludes that the internet will contribute “to the on-going fragmentation of the present system of interest-based group politics and a shift toward a more fluid, issue based group politics with less institutional coherence” (Bimber 1998, 155).

Ultimately, “the principal implication is that under conditions of enhanced consumer choice, the knowledge gap between more and less motivated citizens widens” (Bennett & Iyengar 2008, 719). A corollary to the unmotivated citizen’s loss of political information is the dramatic increase in choice for the motivated citizen, who must now filter choices more rigorously. In other words, an overabundance of information sources and consumer choice will compound the gap between the politically informed and uninformed. This disparity results from people who seek political information finding it easier to acquire while those who do not seek political information will find it easier to ignore completely. The increased ease in ignoring political information ultimately fuels “the costs of political communication, while diminishing the effects” (Bennett & Iyengar 2008, 723).

The overabundance of information and the need to filter sources of interest has come to typify the new communication environment and forms the core of both partisan selection and selective exposure.

**Selective and Partisan Exposure**

Selective exposure is admittedly a disputed phenomenon that refers to the selection of news or arguments with which the individual is likely to agree based on beliefs and
predispositions (Lawrence, Sides & Farrell 2010; Mutz 2001; Stroud 2008; Tewksbury 2005; Webster 2005). More specifically, partisan selective exposure relates to the selection of media content that shares one’s political predispositions (Stroud 2008, 342). While selective exposure is exposure to select sources of information because they are of interest to that person, be they sports, entertainment, cooking, cars or anti-personnel landmines. “Selective exposure” will be used as an umbrella term for both phenomena unless stated otherwise.

Interest in selective exposure has risen in conjunction with the proliferation of the internet and mass self-communication. This interest comes as the abundance of media outlets and information sources make it arguably easier to engage in selective exposure, compounding fears of a loss of common experience among the public. This correlation is noted by Mutz and Martin, stating that “as the number of potential news sources multiplies, consumers must choose among them, and that exercise of choice may lead to less diversity of political exposure” (2001, 111). For many people this choice has become largely automated through personalised search engines and news feeds, such as Google or iGoogle, which can assist in the selection of news based on interests. Selecting news because it is interesting and fits within that person’s partisan beliefs is understandable, because as Lawrence et al. (2010, 144) note, “individuals prefer social contexts populated by others who share their core political values and avoid social discourse with people who disagree with them profoundly over politics.” Despite this simple premise, the concept of selective and partisan exposure remains contested because the opportunity to engage in selective exposure does not necessarily warrant participation.
Consequently, research has produced mixed results, as Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) found evidence to suggest that “ideological segregation on the Internet is low in absolute terms, higher than most offline media (excluding national newspapers), and significantly lower than segregation of face-to-face interactions in social networks” (Gentzkow & Shapiro 2010, 24). Conversely, Stroud (2008, 358) found that:

Of the media types evaluated in this study, 64 percent of conservative Republicans consume at least one conservative media outlet compared to 26 percent of liberal Democrats. In contrast, 43 percent of conservative Republicans consume at least one liberal outlet while 76 percent of liberal Democrats consume at least one liberal outlet. *These striking percentages document the extent of partisan selective exposure in the contemporary media environment* [emphasis added].

In addition, Tewksbury (2003, 705) observed that “online news readers do not select public affairs content as often as they select other news content.” Tewksbury’s conclusion was particularly notable as the study sourced its data during a contested US political campaign. On the other hand, Webster (2005, 379) notes in his study of audience polarisation, that this is “obviously the result of systematic preferences for types of content ... [and] far from the kind of lockstep loyalty one might expect from the application of a traditional notion of selective exposure to information.” Webster (2005) categorises “dystopian portrayals” of the new media environment (Bennett & Iyengar 2008; Chaffee & Metzger 2001; Sunstein 2007) as “more than mere fragmentation; it is polarization with a vengeance” (Webster 2005, 379).
Stroud (2008, 344) believes that the dramatic disparity in conclusions may stem from the diversity of topics that have been studied and notes that topics with political association “may be particularly likely to inspire selective exposure” stating that,

In contrast to other topics, those with strong political leanings may be particularly likely to engage in selective exposure because their political beliefs are accessible and personally relevant. The second possibility is that topics and beliefs inspiring an affective response may stimulate patterns of selectivity (Stroud 2008, 345).

There is strong evidence to suggest that one’s political predisposition represents the most prevalent driver to engage in selective exposure and for this reason it is a prominent angle for investigation. Iyengar et al. (2008) suggest that voters during the 2000 U.S presidential campaign chose to encounter information on issues they considered most important personally and partial evidence suggesting that people prefer to hear about candidates with whom they expect to agree. While Best et al. (2005, 52) argued that people most opposed to the U.S. Bush administration possessed “the greatest likelihood of supplementing their domestic online news with an online foreign source.” Sunstein (2007) argues that some political candidates who promote group polarization on their websites understand this relationship between political predisposition and selective exposure. This is achieved by operating the candidate’s website as a “place” in which the like-minded converge and discuss policies, adversaries, and candidates in an effort to promote and eventually lead people to adopt a shared understanding (Sunstein 2007). Public polarization, much like the
concept of fragmentation, remains a core concern regarding partisan and selective exposure.

The links between the consumption of congenial media and polarization can be better understood by placing the three principal explanations for polarization into a mediated context. The three explanations are: (1) Persuasive arguments and information, (2) social comparison, and (3) confidence, corroboration, and extremism.

(1) **Persuasive arguments and information.** This first explanation posits that any position held by an individual member of a group, in regard to an issue, tends to come from that individual being convinced through persuasive arguments or information. Therefore, if an individual’s position is going to move as a result of group discussion it is likely to move in the direction held by the majority of the group. This results in individuals hearing persuasive arguments that reinforce their predispositions and beliefs, causing group members to develop more polarized attitudes in the direction of the group norm or through “group polarization” to a more extreme position (Stroud 2010; Sunstein 2007). Polarization occurs in this context because group members are encountering a “limited argument pool”. This is easily translated to mass self-communication and the internet, as the individualised selection and consumption of congenial media (“Daily Me”) on the internet enables the advancement of a shared point of view that reinforces an individual’s perspective, thus producing polarization.

(2) **Social comparison** is the next explanation for polarization and rests on the valid assumption that people want to be perceived well by other group members and will
sometimes reevaluate their position to comply with the group consensus. Social comparison does not easily lend itself to the mediated context as people often select and consume information in the absence of direct social interaction. While difficult to apply to the online environment, Sunstein (2007, 68) illustrates that even in the absence of interaction; “group polarization occurs merely on the basis of exposure to the views of others” and if these views are not complemented by the exposure to competing views, “group polarization will be the inevitable consequence.” In addition, Stroud (2010) believes that people may seek out further information online in order to contribute to the group discussion or impress other group members.

(3) Confidence, corroboration, and extremism (Sunstein 2007) is the final explanation of group polarization and is substantiated by the belief that when people possess minimal information about an issue they tend to occupy the middle. However, as people become more informed about the subject and develop more confidence they will start to move away from the middle toward a more extreme position. In this sense, “agreement from others tends to increase confidence, and for this reason like-minded people, having deliberated with one another, become more sure that they are right and thus more extreme” (2007, 66). This final explanation operates in an identical process online, as people will seek out blogs, news media, YouTube content or Facebook groups that offer like-minded people a place to deliberate and reinforce the group norm. For this reason the internet and mass self-communication perpetuate the fear of a polarized and fragmented public that holds little common experience. This view is supported by the aforementioned theoretical elements linking partisan selective exposure to polarization and empirical studies demonstrating that partisan selective exposure contributes to political polarization (Stroud 2007, 2008, 2010).
There is agreement within literature that political elites have become increasingly polarized (Prior 2007; Stroud 2010). However, the notion that political elites are at the root of public polarization is profoundly challenged within the new media environment of mass self-communication. Individuals now have more control over the selection and creation of content, enabling them to engage in partisan selective exposure, not because of limited viewing or information options, but because of predispositions and beliefs. Furthermore, the option to simply ignore political information altogether through selective exposure becomes increasingly viable. As Prior (2007, 244) concluded in his study: “If we still lived in a low-choice media environment, and Switchers – people who watch the news only when media choice is low – voted again, voting behaviour would be less polarized than it is today ... greater media choice reduced turnout rates among entertainment fans.” When a large segment of the public is simply not interested in politics (Bennett & Iyengar 2008, 2010) it is no coincidence that news and information sources are increasingly catering to individual’s political preferences to maximise their audience.

The emergence of Fox News, a traditionally right wing cable news provider in the U.S., “as the leading cable news provider is testimony to the viability of this ‘niche news’ paradigm” (Bennett & Iyengar 2008, 722). This niche paradigm has come to typify the communication industry as it “has evolved from a predominantly homogeneous mass communication medium, anchored around national television and radio networks, to a diverse media system combining broadcasting with narrowcasting to niche audiences” (Castells, M. 2009, 127). Narrowcasting to niche audiences is perhaps most entrenched
within the blogosphere. Lawrence et al. (2010) note that bloggers display homophily – the principle that “contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001, 416). In other words, political bloggers are far more likely to link to politically similar blogs or websites than to ones from the other side of the political spectrum (Adamic & Glance 2005; Lawrence, Sides & Farrell 2010). Blogs, like other information sources, increase the availability of information and the need to filter, leading partisans to “gravitate to information from favoured sources, while ignoring sources or arguments from the opposing side” (Bennett & Iyengar 2008, 723). While this practice is viewed as detrimental to the informed citizen (Sunstein 2001, 2007) it is first and foremost a testament to the dramatic proliferation of content and the increasingly creative audience within mass self-communication.

Content Proliferation and the Creative Audience

The blogosphere, YouTube, and the myriad of websites that comprise Web 2.0 have spurred the dramatic proliferation of self-made content that has so profoundly altered the media landscape. As a result the “audience” has undergone a transition to the “creative audience”, that is able to exercise creativity in the creation, selection and redistribution of content. Clay Shirky notes two crucial changes that have aided this transition (1) “the build up of well over a trillion hours of free time each year on the part of the world’s educated population” and more importantly (2) “the invention and spread of public media that enable ordinary citizens, previously locked out, to pool that free time in pursuit of activities they like or care about” (Shirky 2010, 27). While this transition is significant it has not altered the complex way in which the audience interprets and constructs meaning from media messages. In the reception of media
messages Castells (2009) and Neuman (1991) argue the audience has never been passive, but rather both active and passive at the same time.

The mind is such that new information, ideas, and impressions are taken in and evaluated and interpreted in the light of cognitive schema and the accumulated information from past experiences ... The accumulated research of the past several decades confirms that the average audience member pays relatively little attention, retains only a small fraction, and is not the slightest bit overloaded by the flow of information or choices available among the media and messages (viewed in Castells, M. 2009; Neuman 1991, 114)

Irrespective of how much content exists or how it is interpreted, the “audience” will always remain the receiver of the message. The real shift becomes evident when the audience can take that message, reshape it, and send it out again to be received by another audience. This shift is occurring within mass self-communication and the websites of Web 2.0 that encourage “commons-based peer production” (Benkler 2006) or the self-production of videos (YouTube), news (blogs & Twitter), photo albums (Photobucket & flickr), music (Soundcloud.com), strong social networks and groups (Facebook). Enabling a growing portion of the population to cement their autonomy “vis-à-vis the institutions of society and the traditional forms of communication, including the mass media” and strengthen “the practices of autonomy, including user-produced content that is uploaded on the web” (Castells, M. 2009, 129).
The Changing Environment

There are two key changes that affect the operation of campaigns in the current information communication environment. First, the transmitting and receiving of information has seen an enormous reduction in cost, rendering it almost nominal. This reduction in cost has led to a dramatic proliferation in information, content and producers. Secondly, individuals are able to exercise strict control over their information consumption through the use of partisan and selective exposure or any other filter they chose to utilise. This enables people to distance themselves from the greater public discourse or focus on a small section of it. The resulting environment is one in which we have an overabundance of information and individuals have an unprecedented level of control in their selection.

Herbert Simon’s (1998) description of complex communication systems can help us understand the effect this environment is having on world society campaigns. In Simon’s communication system he stresses the need to identify two important features: (1) the goal of the system and (2) any scarce factors that will limit the effectiveness of the system. Along with the presence of scarce factors is the presence of abundant factors and when information, which has been historically scarce, becomes abundant, it is our attention and time to filter and consume information that then becomes scarce.

An environment characterised by an abundance of information and a scarcity of attention is fittingly described as a ‘paradox of plenty’ (Nye, J 2008; Simon 1998). This paradox complicates the ability of campaigns to get a cross-section of an often fragmented and polarized public to consume their campaign information. When
people are confronted by an incalculable number of information sources it becomes
easier to miss information generated by a group that does not hold their political
predispositions or fit their interests. As such the importance of the group’s reputation,
legitimacy, and credibility elevates in order to help distinguish their information from
the background clutter.

The exponential increase in “background clutter” and people vying for attention has
rendered the international environment and, by extension, politics as a “contest of
competitive credibility” (Nye, J 2008, 100). This forces governments to “compete for
credibility not only with other governments but with a broad range of alternatives
including news media, corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
intergovernmental organizations, and networks of scientific communities” (Nye, J
2008, 100). It is here that world society’s claim to universality proves invaluable and
provides a distinct advantage in the contest for credibility and attention. World
society’s claim to universality largely comes from their “representativeness”. In other
words, because they claim to represent people from all over the world regardless of
location, wealth or values they gain attention and legitimacy.

This claim increases the inherent value of their norms, as “the imported norms of
world society are qualitatively different in that they entail a claim that is seemingly
universal” (Clark, Ian 2007, 184).

World society’s universality is also attributed to its close relationship with human
rights norms. This relationship with human rights serves to legitimate world society in
the same way that “individuals and states mutually legitimate each other via principles
of citizenship, while individuals and international organizations do the same via principles of human rights” (Meyer et al. 1997, 171). Human rights norms are inherently universal as they uphold principles that relate to the basic tenets of humane treatment. For these reasons human rights norms “carry a putative capacity to trump other competing norms” (Clark, Ian 2007, 184). The link between a universalist norm and its putative capacity to stand above competing norms stems from Risse and Sikkink’s claim that “people sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and because they want to think well of themselves” (Clark, Ian 2007; Risse & Sikkink 1999, 8). Accordingly, the more cosmopolitan and universal the norm is, the greater the legitimacy one gains from adhering to its principles. The association with human rights itself also serves to strengthen the diversity of world society’s representation; human right violations occur in some of the most marginalised and underrepresented parts of the world.

Finally, world society also gains credibility and legitimacy by offering an alternative to traditional political parties. More specifically, it is world society’s lack of traditional political rationalising that cements the difference between them. The greater political ramifications of their actions and the need to rationalise their decisions accordingly do not inhibit world society organisations. On the other hand, political actors are commonly required to both justify and provide a rationale for their actions. This difference enables world society actors to concentrate their efforts on achieving a specific goal and employ direct action where needed. It is precisely this direct action in order to solve a problem that garners them credibility and legitimacy. Direct action means world society actors focus “on practical matters, specific cases, and concrete expressions of human solidarity: saving children from famine, freeing political
prisoners, stopping the lapidation of women, and ameliorating the impact of unsustainable development on indigenous cultures” (Castells, M 2008, 85). The decision to act on behalf of disperse populaces is not rationalised in a political context, but rather to do “good” in that one specific instance. World society networks that act in the absence of a traditional political rationale add credence to Castells’ belief that “people have come to distrust the logic of instrumental politics, [while] the method of direct action on direct outputs finds increasing support” (Castells, M 2008, 85).

Whether world society finds support from its propensity for direct action or its claim to universality matters little, because as long as they are devoid of formal membership and encourage diverse participation they will continue to fuel the “paradox of plenty” and the competition for attention. The internet and mass self-communication platforms only compound this competition by making it easier for people to join and contribute to campaigns or to simply start their own. Rising above the competition means effectively disseminating information to a wide cross-section of the public through mass self-communication platforms.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an overview of the media environment in which campaigns now operate. Particular attention was paid to the concept of “mass self-communication” and the broader implications of individuals wielding greater control over the creation, selection and consumption of information. Four pragmatic ramifications of mass self-communication came to the fore: (1) audience fragmentation, (2) partisan selection, (3) selective exposure, and (4) content
proliferation. This chapter, alongside the discussion of international relations in the previous chapter, completes the necessary background to the interdisciplinary mode of scholarship. It is in the next chapter (*Chapter Four*) that we will return to world society’s role in the formulation of state interests with a case study of the *International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)*. This case study will yield the five campaign techniques used to stimulate normative change (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and shifting the burden of proof).
Chapter Four: International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)

Introduction

Once a vital component of state security and warfare, the anti-personnel (AP) landmine was stripped of legitimacy by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and now stands on the brink of extinction. Operating in a media environment marked by an emerging transition to digital technology, the ICBL successfully intervened in one of the more challenging areas of state policy; national defence and security. It is precisely because of these achievements that the current chapter will use the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to examine world society’s influence.

This chapter helps address the central question of the research (how the five techniques used by campaigns to stimulate normative change—disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and shifting the burden of proof—are affected by mass self-communication) by articulating the five techniques used by ICBL to stimulate normative change.

In articulating these techniques a number of concepts are of central importance. First, the actors that make up world society and their respective theoretical categorisations will be explored. The manner in which these actors and networks have acquired and refined legitimacy will also come under investigation. The following section will look at the critical elements that lead to a successful campaign, including the characteristics needed of world society campaigns themselves, the characteristics of the campaign’s issue, and the characteristics of the campaign’s target.
The final section of the chapter focuses on anti-personnel (AP) landmines, the organisational structure and formalisation of the ICBL, before looking at the international environment in which the ICBL operated, and finally, the five techniques (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and shifting the burden of proof).

**World Society Actors**

Normative change originating from world society comes from its most active components: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), transnational networks, campaigns and social movements. Both state and non-state actors operate within the parameters of five “socio-spatial networks of social interaction” (Mann 2000, 137). State actors interact within “*national*” networks which are structured and bound by the nation state and “*inter-national*” networks which centre on interactions between national networks around alliances, war, tax, and trade treaties etc. While non-state actors occupy “*local*” networks which exist on the sub-national level and “*transnational*” networks which transcend the national context. Finally, Mann (2000) highlights “*global*” networks which encompass all of the aforementioned networks.

However, debate around the centrality of the nation state with regard to world society actors has lead scholars like Mann to question the relative importance of *national/inter-national* networks within the *global* network in light of the rising *local/transnational* networks. This question comes as the proliferation of non-state actors operating within *local* and *transnational* networks provides us with empirically
grounded evidence of a growing world society (Thörn 2007, 904). The dramatic increase in international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) from 176 at the turn of the twentieth century to 38,243 in 1996 is evidence of this growth (Held & McGrew 2002). Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are non-profit and private groups that aim to publically influence social change in some capacity. INGOs differ from NGOs by holding a more international focus and requiring their decision making structure to be spread across at least three countries (Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a; O'Brien et al. 2000). NGOs and INGOs form an integral part of the networks and collective action comprising world society. Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink (2002a, 7) distinguish three different configurations of world society collective action, (1) transnational advocacy networks, (2) transnational coalitions, and (3) transnational social movements. The difference between the three configurations comes from the varying degrees of member connection and mobilisation.

(1) Transnational advocacy networks (Brown, LD et al. 2000; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a) are a collection of actors bound by shared values, a common discourse and efficient information exchange. These networks are usually based around informal contacts that use the network to share and transfer information. They are characterised as “voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 9). Information exchange is the network’s core purpose rather than coordination of tactics or the large mobilisation of actors. Transnational advocacy networks usually form around issues that require a global and systematic response if they are to be challenged with any
success, such as women’s rights, trade unions, the rights of indigenous peoples, fights for global social justice, along with a myriad of issues concerning human rights.

(2) *Transnational coalitions* (Brown, LD et al. 2000; Chilton 1995; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a) centre on the sharing of strategies or tactics among actors and, as such, require more formal coordination than transnational advocacy networks. Successful coordination can necessitate meetings to share strategies or tactics and formally distribute or report information. The strategies and tactics form *transnational campaigns*, which have been a principal focus of research.

(3) *Transnational social movements* (Castells, M 2008; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a; Thörn 2007) are the most demanding form of collective action and remain relatively rare (O’Brien et al. 2000). Actors are linked across borders by a common purpose and share a strong sense of solidarity that enables them to coordinate and sustain social mobilisation in multiple nation states. Collective action within a social movement primarily comes in the form of protest or disruptive action (Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a). The need to mobilise on mass requires a transnational social movements to hold a higher degree of collective identity “or a sense of community, of ‘us’, sharing a set of values and norms, and ‘others’, i.e. antagonistic actors, or ‘enemies’” (Thörn 2007, 906). Social movements “rely on mass mobilisation because they do not directly control the levers of formal power such as the state” (O’Brien et al. 2000, 12) and as such are typified by protest or disruptive action to stimulate large scale social change that is often anti-systemic in nature.
All three forms of world society collective action are similar in that they exchange information and gain strength through the creation of new links among dispersed actors in civil society, the state, and organisations operating internationally. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 2) list several additional similarities: (1) values or principled ideas are central, (2) a belief that individuals can affect change, (3) the use of information in creative ways, and finally, (4) the use of sophisticated political strategies by nongovernmental actors in the targeting of their campaigns.

The growing strength of world society collective action has seen transnational relations—regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organisation (Risse-Kappen 1995, 3)—penetrate almost every issue area of world politics, from environmental issues to weapons prohibition. The penetration of non-state actors into world politics owes much to what Quataert (2009) describes as the duality of the term “transnational”. Quataert’s duality denotes transnational collective action’s simultaneous focus on both the local and the international, by moving “seamlessly from local through national and regional to international arenas and back again, all while addressing the transnational responses to local situations, on the one hand, and crediting the grassroots pressures on regional and international decision-making in matters of law and policy, on the other” (Quataert 2009, 7). Fulfilling Quataert’s transnational duality is made easier through the internet and access to cost effective instantaneous communication.
To strengthen the local while participating in the transnational requires world society collective action to form strong links of communication with domestic and international actors. The internet enables world society collective action to form mass horizontal and vertical ties (Castells, M 2008; 2009; Deibert 1997) and in this way it ultimately multiplies “the channels of access to the international system” for actors and networks alike (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 1). Mass self-communication has seen the creation of direct horizontal ties among members of the public become almost trivial. Individuals are able to directly interact with one another through social network sites and share self-created content. As the unprecedented ease in directly interacting with other members of the public grows so too does the potential reach of campaign and self-created information disseminated through such means. Traditionally, however, it is has been world society’s ability to sustain transnational links rather than create them that has been a core strength. The ability to maintain links among dispersed actors demonstrates that world society collective actions is bound more by shared values and norms than by self-interest (Florini, Ann M. & Simmons 2000c, 7). The solidarity of world society collective action makes them a formidable force in changing the behaviour of states, international organisations and corporations.

The creation, strengthening and monitoring of international norms is the principal means with which world society is able to change the behaviour of states (Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a). Throughout this process world society collective action aims to change the “perceptions that both state and societal actors may have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behaviour” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 3). If world society collective action is to change state behaviour we must question any
conception that portray them as mere state centric pressure groups (Warkentin & Mingst 2000; Willetts 1996) and instead move to view them as political actors in their own right. Political actors that are not consigned as lobby or interest groups forced to exert influence through mediators (i.e. states or international institutions such as the UN) in order to achieve their objectives and influence international politics (Warkentin & Mingst 2000).

To subscribe to an understanding of "activist efforts exclusively in terms of their influence upon government", is to ignore or devalue other "efforts directed toward societies at large ... because they are not considered to be genuinely political in character" (Wapner, Paul 1995a, 312). Wapner contends that until world society activists are understood as political actors in their own right "the meaning of activist groups in a global context is not settled and will remain problematic as long as the strictly societal dimension of their work is left out of the analysis" (Wapner, Paul 1995a, 312). The societal element of transnational activism occurs when they seek to change conditions or influence norms without directly pressuring the state but rather society. Such efforts, which take place within society beyond the purview of the state, are essential to a proper understanding of world society collective action.

Mass self-communication and the empowered “self” necessitate the incorporation of these societal elements in analysis. This is a consequence of the dramatic increase in the proportion of communication, content creation and dissemination taking place within the public sphere. Organisations and individuals of both domestic and international origin are able to directly communicate and pressure societies across the
globe with mass self-communication platforms. One notable example was the outcry in 2010 at Australia’s proposal to introduce a compulsory internet firewall that would filter content based on a blacklist of banned websites. Critiques\textsuperscript{33} of the proposal came from a myriad of sources such as business (Google and Yahoo) (Moses 2010a, 2010b), government (United States) (Malkin 2010), news media (Funnell 2010), NGO Reporters without Boarders (under the subject “Internet Enemies” Australia is listed as “Under Surveillance”\textsuperscript{34}) and NGO Electronic Frontiers Australia (EFA)\textsuperscript{35} who established the website nocleanfeed.com\textsuperscript{36}. However some of the more vehement opposition was found in the creation of Facebook pages\textsuperscript{37}, forums\textsuperscript{38}, YouTube (Cc roxon 2012) and Twitter\textsuperscript{39}, of which some example Tweets (Issa 2009) are:

1. InnerWesty RT @Kady9: @kevinruddpm your support of the internet filter makes me ashamed to be australian and ashamed to be a labor voter.

    \textbf{#nocleanfeed}

2. MitchellDudley Another intrusion of citizens privacy one would only expect of nations such as China or Iran, not Australia. \textbf{#nocleanfeed #fb}

\textsuperscript{33} Critiques submitted to government available at:

\textsuperscript{34} Available at: http://en.rsf.org/australia-australia-12-03-2012,42080.html (Retrieved October 26, 2012).

\textsuperscript{35} Available at: https://www.efa.org.au/ (Retrieved October 26, 2012).

\textsuperscript{36} Available at: http://nocleanfeed.com/ (Retrieved October 26, 2012).


\textsuperscript{38} Available at: http://forums.whirlpool.net.au/forum-replies.cfm?t=1342810 (Retrieved October 26, 2012).

\textsuperscript{39} Available at: https://twitter.com/
3. GOPSpaceRanger f**k you Australian Christian Lobby... stay the f**k away from my internet #nocalcleanfeed is this how ur gonna protect ur paedophile priests?

4. kimmar Egypt, Iran, China, North Korea, Burma, Saudi Arabia, Australia -> what do these countries have in common? #nocalcleanfeed

5. mmikeemike Just had a conversation with my work colleagues about our civil liberties eroding. They were very receptive #nocalcleanfeed #knowyourrights

Incorporating these advocacy efforts helps us to avoid prescribing a narrow view of world politics in which observation is limited to the interaction between world society actors and government. Ignoring or devaluing these elements of world society activism also fails to recognise the increasing legitimacy of world society actors in the eyes of the public. This failure rests on the simple premise that in order to successfully direct advocacy efforts at the public, world society collective action must be perceived as legitimate by that public.

**Sources of Legitimacy for World Society**

Legitimacy is crucial if states and societies are to adhere to world society’s norms or fear the penalty for non-compliance. One source fuelling world society’s legitimacy is the “disconnect” or “space” between the management of global problems (nation-state) and the space where issues arises (global) (Castells, M 2008, 82-3). This “disconnect” is at the core of four political crises affecting governance (Castells, M 2008, 82-3).
(1) *Crisis of efficiency*, holds that the majority of problems cannot be adequately managed by the state e.g., major environmental issues such as global warming, regulation of financial markets, or counter terrorism intelligence.

(2) *Crisis of legitimacy* denotes a flaw in political representation within democratic states. The nation state’s entanglement within the “global web of policy making” means that political representatives have less control over policy and encounter difficulty managing national interests. As such “election to office no longer denotes a specific mandate, given the variable geometry of policy making and the unpredictability of the issues that must be dealt with” (2008, 82-3).

(3) *Crisis of identity*, people are seeing their national and cultural identity become, “increasingly disjointed from the mechanisms of political decision making in a global, multinational network.” Leading people to claim autonomy through “resistance identity and cultural identity politics as opposed to their political identity as citizens” (2008, 82-3).

(4) *Crisis of equity*, the increased deregulation of global market forces means there is a growing disparity between nations and social groups within nations.

Similarly, Lipschutz (1992, 392) sees the emergence and strengthening of world society as a historical process arising from three changes: (1) the replacement of anarchy among states with a norm-governed system that has roots within a global capitalist
consumer culture; (2) an increasing number of world society actors are dealing with certain social welfare issues due to the functional inability of states to address them; and (3) the crumbling old forms of state centred political identity and burgeoning new forms of social and political identity that challenge Gramscian hegemony of statist world politics.

Concurrent with the emergence of these crises and the changing historical paradigm outlined by Lipschutz is the decreased ability of governments to mitigate and manage these problems on a global scale. The lack of confidence people hold in political institutions has strengthened the ability of world society activists to influence the interests, identities, and the behaviour of states by serving as the “expression of the crisis of legitimacy, transformed into oppositional political action” (Castells, M 2008, 85). Not only has the state’s inability to manage global problems strengthened world society, it has led world society actors who address such problems to “become the advocates of the needs, interests, and values of people at large, thus further undermining the role of governments in response to challenges posed by globalization and structural transformation” (Castells, M 2008, 82-3). Responding to the needs and interests of people at large, their claim to universality, their focus on direct action, and by offering an alternative to traditional political institutions (as discussed in the conclusion to Chapter Three) all provide world society with legitimacy.

Scott Turner (1998) sees world society’s legitimacy as a redefinition of the nature of legitimacy (1998, 33). Legitimacy is ultimately a function of public perception and the parameters of it are changing. This change is attributed to world society actors
bypassing the state and directly targeting public consciousness, thus, eroding the state’s monopoly of authority through diverse participation and access. Mass self-communication and the now blurred distinction between the role of creator, consumer and distributor add further credence to Turner’s refined legitimacy. The substantial reduction in the cost of transmitting and receiving information in combination with the relative ease in creating and disseminating content has increased participation and access. This development emphasises the need to focus analysis on advocacy efforts taking place within and directed at society. Examples of advocacy in which world society targets the public are provided by Wapner (1995b):

The peace movement, for example, aims not only to convince governments to cease going to war but also tries to create more peaceful societies. This entails propagating expressions of non-violence, processes of conflict resolution, and, according to some, practices which are more cooperative than competitive. ...
Likewise, the feminist movement aims not simply at enacting legislation to protect women against gender discrimination. Additionally, it works to change representation of women throughout society ... The same is true of the environmental movement. The movement is not simply about passing environmental protection legislation but rather involves changing the prevailing economic, political, moral, cultural, and social dispositions of society which support environmental degradation (cited in Turner 1998, 30; Wapner, P. 1995b, 311).

World society efforts directed at the public rather than exclusively at the state demonstrate its capacity to blur “the boundaries between a state’s relations with its
own nationals and the recourse both citizens and states have to the international system” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 1-2). Changing relations between a state and its own citizens, by virtue of increased world society participation, led Keck and Sikkink to note that “advocacy networks are helping to transform the practice of national sovereignty” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 2). Such sentiment is echoed by Beck (2006):

> What we are witnessing in the global age is not the end of politics but rather its migration elsewhere. . . . The structure of opportunities for political action is no longer defined by the national/international dualism but is now located in the “global” arena. Global politics have turned into global domestic politics, which rob national politics of their boundaries and foundations (Beck 2006, 249; cited in Castells, M 2008, 82)

Deibert (1997) offers similar sentiments about world society and sovereignty:

> By moving around and through political boundaries to influence populations, they not only undermine the connection between sovereignty and a territorially defined populace over which the sovereign authority has ultimate jurisdiction, but also challenge the idea central to the modern world order paradigm that the international states system is the legitimate arena where politics across borders takes place (Deibert 1997, 162-63).

As Beck and Deibert suggest, the presence of world society has indeed impacted upon the state’s relationship with its own citizens and by extension the nature of
sovereignty. While acknowledging the impact, this research does not advocate nor require world society to displace the sovereignty of the nation state but rather affect its basic principles and dynamics through the influence of identity and interests. World society will instead coexist with the nation state and greatly complicate what it means to hold sovereignty (Nye, J 2004, 88). This “complication” of world politics denotes a need for state actors to now share the “stage with newly empowered non-governmental actors and individuals” (Nye, JS 2002, 76). This model of enhanced world society participation means that “political actors will have to pay more attention to the politics of credibility” (Nye, JS 2002, 76). This of course serves world society actors well.

Overall, this research takes heed of the societal elements of world society’s influence by viewing them as political actors in their own right, focusing on their legitimacy, credibility, and capacity to influence state behaviour through changing norms. This more modest position avoids the principal limitation accompanying approaches proposing the radical ‘transformation’ of state sovereignty, namely: the final decision on whether to adopt a policy is dependent upon the state. In acknowledging this limitation, Risse (2000b), notes that “only states are able to guarantee the rule of law, and the rule of law is a necessary condition for the improvement of human rights on the ground” (Risse 2000b, 205). The following section will provide additional information regarding the question: how do world society actors influence or change norms, which in turn, change the interests and behaviour of states?

**Teaching and Persuading States**
In addressing this question Jeffrey Checkel (1997) usefully distinguishes two key research positions on norms; compliance with norms and the diffusion (empowerment) of norms.

Compliance research focuses on the domestic mechanisms behind norm implementation and seeks to explain why the state chooses to obey the norm and its injunctions. Exploring the factors that contribute to norm compliance provides insight into the effects of norms on domestic politics and processes. However, compliance research takes a state’s participation within certain norms as given and fails to explain how norms actually reach the domestic realm. This failure hinders research into the process behind the introduction of new normative content.

On the other hand, the “empowerment” (or diffusion) of norms explains the mechanisms that empower norms domestically. The process of norm empowerment (also termed the spread, transmission, or diffusion) can be further separated into two distinct social mechanisms that enable actors to influence or change the behaviour of other actors: coercion and persuasion.

Coercion influences others by “escalating the benefits of conformity or the costs of nonconformity through material rewards and punishments” (Goodman, R & Jinks 2004, 633). It is important to note that coercion is often not enough to change an actor’s inherent preferences but rather change their cost to benefit calculations. A state that has been coerced to change its behaviour would perceive that change in behaviour to be in its best material interests. The adoption of a norm through methods
of coercion means that the behavioural perceptions within the norm are not internalised but rather act as a constraint on behaviour (Checkel, J.T. 1997).

Consequently, in cases of coercion the state only complies with the norm or rule rather than accepting it.

*Persuasion*, in contrast to coercion, denotes that the actors have internalized the new norm and redefined their identity and interests accordingly (Goodman, R & Jinks 2004). Persuasion is a process in which a person attempts to induce a change in the behaviour or belief of another person through the use of messages or information. This process takes place in the absence of overt coercion, in other words, the person being persuaded has some degree of free choice. Norms adopted through the process of persuasion are “internalized and constitute a set of shared intersubjective understandings that make behavioural claims; their adoption is anything but instrumental” (Checkel, J.T. 1997, 477). Once “persuaded”, states are consciously convinced that a norm is appropriate and valid through a process of social learning that results in the persuaded actor or state having a “change of mind”. *Learning* in this context denotes that actors or states have adopted new interests through exposure to new information and values (i.e. international norms). Consequently, in cases of persuasion the state accepts the rule or norm rather than just complying with it.

For Checkel (2001) who bases persuasion research in social psychology there are five conditions in which persuasion is more likely to be effective and thus produce preference change.
(1) When the “persuadee” is confronted by a new issue, crisis, or severe policy failure they will be more cognitively motivated to analyse new information due to their uncertain environment.

(2) When the “persuadee” holds minimal prior, ingrained beliefs that are susceptible to come into conflict or be inconsistent with the persuader’s message.

(3) When the persuader is an authoritative member of an “in-group” to which the “persuadee” is a member or wishes to be a member.

(4) When the information conveyed to the “persuadee” is delivered within the principles of deliberative argument rather than lectured.

(5) When interaction between the persuader and the “persuadee” occurs in an insulated and private setting rather than being politicised.

While Checkel (2001) does stress that these are preliminary deductions they nevertheless provide insight into the optimal conditions for persuading actors to adopt new normative content.

The causal relationship between a state’s adoption of a norm and the social mechanisms used is not always clear, as world society actors may mobilise and protest to coerce decision makers to “instrumentally” adopt a norm and its behavioural
prescriptions or they may use international norms to persuade domestic publics to then coerce decision makers (Goodman, R & Jinks 2004, 633; Keck & Sikkink 1998). It is important to note that persuading decision makers in both causal relationships is most optimal under Checkel’s first condition in which the problem has been already identified by the state and the solution can be learnt through new norms that address the issue. However, more often than not the problem has only been identified by world society and not yet recognised by the state (e.g. weapon prohibitions, environmental concerns, human rights movements).

In situations when both the problem and the solution need to be identified and provided to the state, Martha Finnemore usefully distinguishes between learning and teaching. She notes that state interests are “defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate” (Finnemore 1996c, 2). In this context Finnemore makes a valuable distinction between a state learning and being taught a norm. This distinction rests on the premise that a states’ perception of the world is shaped by the dense network of transnational and international social relations in which they operate. Therefore, a state’s wants and needs are socialised by the international society in which they are embedded. Interestingly, Finnemore (1993, 1996c) claims that states can be “socialised to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interests by international organisations” (1996c, 5) that operate beyond their borders, i.e. UNESCO.

---

40 Socialization refers to the preparation of newcomers to become members of an existing group and to think, feel, and act in ways the group considers appropriate

41 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Finnemore’s claim moves us away from two common state-centric theoretical approaches in international relations in which the state is the starting point of analysis. First is the assumption that state preferences are unproblematic; under this assumption states and actors know what they want and these wants are easily discernable to researchers. Second, preferences are sourced, directly or indirectly, from within the state. While research using this second approach commonly has a single country research design, it still ties state preferences to functional needs and material conditions that come from within the state.

By moving away from these state-centric approaches we see that states may not always know what they want and as such their preferences are malleable and open to being taught to them by organisations outside the state, as opposed to within the state (Finnemore 1993, 1996c). This process should not be confused with emulating or imitating successful states as the problem must already have been identified in order to emulate a state’s solution. Finnemore stresses that states are receptive to being “taught” both the problem and the solution to the problem by outside actors. It is here that the difference between learning and teaching becomes apparent. Learning encompasses cases in which the impetus for change comes from within the state and is thus sourced internally. In such cases the state is ultimately self-taught, there are no active teachers. On the other hand, teaching alludes to cases in which there are active teachers who define the problem and provide the tactics for addressing the problem. In such cases, the interests of the state are shaped from the outside. The following sections of this thesis will show world society as an active teacher who holds a well-defined lesson plan for its pupils.
Teaching is not the only source of state interests. However, Finnemore’s (1993, 1996c) conception of teaching state preferences in conjunction with Wapner’s (1995a; 1995b) understanding of activists as political actors does provide increased scope for an otherwise underpowered world society to enact normative change. Teaching state preferences captures the critical pedagogical techniques of “information, persuasion, shame, and discipline” (Price, Richard 1998a, 617) that can help account for world society’s ability to stimulate and implement normative change. The following analysis will provide further elucidation of these techniques that serve as the “mechanisms to move ideas, strategies, and structures across national and cultural frontiers” (Quataert 2009, 7). This chapter will then turn to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to add further insight into these techniques.

**Issue Characteristics**

The influence of world society actors and activists can be puzzling at times. Unlike terrorists and transnational criminals (sometimes termed “uncivil society”), they employ no violence and yet remain influential (Price, Richard 2003, 580-1). Exploring this influence has been the subject of a burgeoning field of literature that sets out to examine exactly how world society achieves its goals and remains influential despite the absence of brute material might. This is not to suggest that world society is simply limited to persuading states as opposed to coercing them; product boycotts, shaming and demonstrations all force targets to calculate the costs of noncompliance. However, this relatively minor coercive element to world society’s influence certainly pales in comparison to the state’s clear monopolisation of coercive and material might. Instead, world society’s true capacity to affect change comes by bringing information
and moral concerns to light (Nelson 2002; Price, Richard 2003; Risse & Sikkink 1999). In doing so world society is able to capitalise on Castells (2008) and Lipschutz’s (1992) crises of legitimacy by representing and highlighting the needs of dispersed communities.

Unfortunately dispersed communities have a diverse array of issues of which only a few can yield a successful campaign. The characteristics of the issue remain an important ingredient to the prospective success of world society advocacy. There are a relatively small number of issues characteristics that have yielded success for world society advocacy: “issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility; and issues involving legal equality of opportunity” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 27). The former has been bolstered by successful campaigns against landmines and the recent treaty against cluster munitions, while the latter by the abolition of slavery, civil rights movements, the anti-apartheid campaign, and women’s suffrage.

Issue characteristics are arguably more important for campaigns operating in mass self-communication. This increased importance comes to the fore in Fenton and Barassi’s criticism of mass self-communication and the “self-centred” forms of communication that its platforms enable: “in an era of blogs, individual websites, and social networking sites, individual messages are often given the same importance as the messages that have arisen out of the tensions and negotiations of a collective of people” (Fenton, Natalie & Barassi 2011, 187). As a result the message of an oppositional group can be lost or easily countered and critiqued by the individual.
Fenton and Barassi (2011) cite the Cuba Solidarity Campaign (CSC). This niche organisation was founded in 1978 and sought to inform the British public of the positive reforms brought forward by the Cuban Socialist Government. For the CSC the fear of their message being lost or countered saw them stop people from posting comments on their YouTube videos:

As Tasha—the communication officer of the campaign—explained, the choice of not allowing people to post comments on their YouTube account was not motivated by a will to be undemocratic, but by the fact that they “simply couldn’t afford interactivity.”[42] This is because, according to Tasha, CSC did not have the resources to reply to individual messages that appeared beneath their videos. This was considered to be a real problem for the campaign because often individual messages would constitute a challenge to the one of the organization but the lack of time and resources prevented organizers from engaging with such discussions (Fenton, Natalie & Barassi 2011, 187).

For Fenton and Barassi this “reveals that the logic of political empowerment through self-centered participation ... promoted by social media, can represent a threat for political collectivity rather than an opportunity for political becoming through the process of individuation” (2011, 189). Fenton and Barassi’s critique reinforces the importance of issue characteristics for campaigns generally, but even more so for campaigns operating in mass self-communication. Rather than appealing to a cross

[42] The inability to afford interactivity, alluded to by communication officer “Tasha”, does not result from costs associated with the technology rather with staffing and then monitoring comments. The situation facing Tasha, in which comments can be seen as overly damaging, results from the campaign’s niche viewpoint (leading to increased scrutiny from the general public) and the relatively number of low views (an average of 70-150) received by their videos (making each damaging comment significantly more pronounced).
section of society, the CSC’s issue is highly partisan and thus more vulnerable to
critique or conflict. This can be seen in contrast to the issues promoted by campaigns
like the ICBL and Ban Live Export (BLE), which generally “speak to aspects of belief
systems or life experience that transcend a specific cultural or political context” (Keck
& Sikkink 1998, 204). “Transcendent” issues largely benefit from individual promotion
(YouTube comments, social network discussion, etc.) through mass self-
communication platforms because any conflict or critique is relatively minor and
commonly thought to go against general societal sentiment. The next section will
address the characteristics needed of the target (e.g. state or corporation).

Target Characteristics

First, the target must place some degree of importance upon their reputation
(Evangelista 2002; Price, Richard 2003). World society activism may be insufficient to
produce change unless the state’s government is in some way sensitive to their
reputation. Burgerman (2001) discusses this in relation to human rights norms, noting
that a “violator state will comply with human rights norms only if a key element of its
domestic political elite, one capable of exerting its authority over armed elements,
perceives itself to be vulnerable to human rights condemnation or has concern for its
country’s international reputation as a violator state” (2001, 5). This is equally evident
in corporations who value the reputation of their brand (Keck & Sikkink 1998).

Second, organised domestic groups must be able to form and effectively operate
within the target state (Price, Richard 2003). In other words, the political system within
the target state must enable groups to operate in some capacity. Mass self-
communication has seen this characteristic’s requirements relaxed, as people can now communicate and organise through internet enabled mobile devices and social network sites (SNS) often beyond the purview of the state. A notable example was the Arab Spring\(^{43}\), which saw the utilisation of social media to organise and communicate in states otherwise categorised as absolute monarchies or dictatorships. These domestic groups or local members of the network are “necessary to keep their issues on the international agenda and to provide information to international allies” (Burgerman 2001, 5). The importance of this target characteristic is emphasised by Nadelmann (1990, 482) who discusses the role of world society activists, stating that such groups need to "stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded organizations in other countries". Indeed, the need for world society to link up with domestic groups helps to avoid what Risse (2000b, 205) terms as “free-floating pressure”. Such pressure is unlikely to be effective without strong links to “fully mobilized domestic opposition groups” who can maintain sustained domestic pressure on repressive or violating governments.

When domestic groups receive support from world society it helps to empower and legitimise their claims against norm violating governments, while also helping to protect their physical integrity by virtue of the increased attention (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 5). For these reasons world society is “crucial in mobilizing domestic opposition, social movements, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in target countries” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 5). Establishing links with domestic opposition also helps to broaden world society’s network, thus enhancing its legitimacy and influence.

\(^{43}\) Otherwise known as the “Arab Revolution” or a series of demonstrations and protests occurring in the Arab world beginning on the 18 December 2010
The fact that these two characteristics (reputation and domestic groups) recur throughout the literature suggests that world society advocacy is most effective in western and or democratic states. In other words, states that value their reputation and enable domestic groups to operate.

Transnational movements are more likely to be effective in influencing domestic policies in democracies because these regimes offer greater opportunity to organise. In this sense, transnational actors may be less effective in enhancing representation of the groups most in need of it—those already suffering under authoritarian rule (Sikkink 2002, 312).

While this observation is clearly detrimental to the prevention of human rights violations in authoritarian states, it does not adversely affect world society advocacy targeting democratic states. Antiwar movements, environmental concerns, global financial inequality, fair trade, Third World debt reduction, and weapon prohibitions are all issue that require advocacy to largely focus on democratic states. The same can be said for the issues addressed within this research.

Nonetheless, one similarity that runs across issues addressed by world society advocacy is that they are often “unlikely to emerge naturally out of state considerations of self-interest” (Clark, AM 2001, 138) and as a result states have little incentive to cooperate. Environmental issues, such as deforestation and climate change, often run counter to the economic considerations of the state. Human rights
violations often necessitate intervention or action that runs counter to the established norm of sovereignty. Issues that disagree with “state considerations of self-interest” demand a concerted effort on behalf of world society actors to raise the moral consciousness of the issue while elevating its presence on the international agenda (Risse & Sikkink 1999). It is here that the mobilization of “popular opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad” (Nadelmann 1990, 582) becomes essential. Not only does increased awareness of the issue serve to remind liberal states of their own identity as promoters of human rights and environmental protection (Risse & Sikkink 1999), it helps world society identify target vulnerabilities that can be leveraged by strategically appealing to mass audiences (Burgerman 2001).

Target vulnerabilities come in both a “material” and “moral” form (Keck & Sikkink 1998) and can stem from: (1) issue linkage, e.g. external aid being dependent on human rights adherence (the state must value the incentive or good being withheld more than it values the action or policy being targeted); (2) prior normative commitments, saying one thing and doing another; (3) particular historical junctures, in which old ideas are blamed for current problems or the implementation of new policy enable others to push new claims or norms; and finally, (4) repairing a damaged reputation or the desire to maintain a good international standing (Keck & Sikkink 1998).

Capitalising on these vulnerabilities goes hand in hand with how the issue is framed to fit or resonate within the cultural context of the target. New norms and ideas are more likely to be influential if they resonate with existing ideas in a specific cultural or historical setting (Keck & Sikkink 1998). The new norm can be “grafted” onto an
already successful norm in operation or the information can be disseminated in a manner that appeals to the cultural context of the target. Irrespective of the method, framing is to be ignored by world society activists at “their own peril, since crassly ignoring domestic cultural sensitivities will almost assuredly doom many a campaign to failure” (Price, Richard 2003, 596). Framing and capitalising on vulnerabilities in addition to the selection of targets that value their reputation while enabling domestic groups to operate helps maximise the influence of world society.

**World Society Characteristics**

Similar to the “issue” and the “target”, world society advocacy needs certain characteristics to be effective.

(1) Expertise, reliability, and veracity: The importance of expertise in influencing policy outcomes has been well established by literature examining epistemic communities (Adler 2005; Cogburn 2005; Haas 2007). Indeed, in Clark’s (2001) study of Amnesty International (AI) she highlights the importance of deploying large amounts of specific information and expertise in the emergence of new norms. AI and world society activists alike derive authority and power from the information and images they project. If the reliability and veracity of this information is called into question their authority and influence can be significantly diminished (Sikkink 2002). Moreover, in an environment characterised by an abundance of information and a scarcity of attention (or the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Nye, J 2008; Simon 1998)), holding expertise, reliability and credibility is of paramount importance. It is precisely because mass self-communication encourages people to create, share and select what they want that we
see diverse participation and thus diverse competition. If world society campaigns are perceived to have expertise and only disseminate reliable information they have a greater chance of attracting attention and overcoming the paradox of plenty.

As a result many large world society organisations can be quite particular about which domestic organisations they link up with and will often only employ well trained research staff with very strict information gathering guidelines (Risse 2000b). This expertise assists world society organisations in exploiting target vulnerabilities, framing, and relating specific details to existing normative expectations. In other words, collating, interpreting, and framing new information in such a way that it appeals to existing norms (Clark, AM 2001, 16). This helps world society to persuade “foreign audiences, especially foreign elites, that a particular [normative] regime reflects a widely shared or even universal moral sense, rather than the particular moral code of one society” (Nadelmann 1990, 482).

(2) Impartiality and independence: World society’s position as the autonomous “third party” of international politics bolsters their legitimacy and moral authority (Clark, AM 2001; Sikkink 2002). It is vital that world society actors are not perceived to act out of self-interest or in the interests of government or industry. But rather as a disinterested third party that holds no discernable political stance and serves peoples under a myriad of differing governments. However, autonomy in this pure form rarely exists, as world society organisations need governments to effectively influence policy change and often require support from wealthy contacts to orchestrate their campaigns and programs. The reduced cost of production and increased public participation through mass self-communication does bring us closer to realising some form of ‘pure
autonomy’. In other words, mass self-communication platforms make it is easier for the people to campaign for the people. Even so Sikkink (2002, 313-14) rightly argues that a fixation upon the “pure” autonomy of world society organisations is not useful in understanding their techniques and influence. Nonetheless, impartiality and independence protect the status of world society organisations as objective providers of expert knowledge. When this status is compromised so too is their influence (Price, Richard 2003).

(3) Representativeness: This relates to the universality of world society, but more specifically, to the claim that they often speak for the repressed and the underrepresented. For the Mexican Zapatista movement in the 1990s it was their pained cry of “Ya Bastal” meaning “Enough is enough”, echoing from one of the poorest and most marginalised corners of the earth that brought forth calls of global solidarity against the forces of transnational neoliberalism. Indeed, “one of the most striking aspects of the Zapatista movement has been the ability to provoke an understanding of common struggle among diverse peoples around the world” (Reitan 2007, 195), effectively “elevating their objective beyond its identification with the national interests of their government” (Nadelmann 1990, 482) to a wider global solidarity. For the Zapatista, and world society more generally, the representation of diverse peoples and issues is a strong source of legitimacy and moral authority. It is here that mass self-communication serves as an interesting addition to the representativeness of world society. Mass self-communication provides the platforms with which to create and disseminate content and thus encourages people to participate in issues of concern. It is through this increased participation that one
expects to see diverse and representative world society campaigns. Instead, there is often a skew in representation and participation toward Western states with greater internet access. The concept of the “digital divide” is directly applicable to this problem and will be discussed in detail within “Establishing a Network” in Chapter Five.

(4) Accountability and Transparency: These characteristics are vital, as the persuasiveness of world society succeeds or fails with the reliability of its information. For Sikkink (2002) world society’s legitimacy and moral authority has reached a point in which they are also being perceived as accountable. The relationship between accountability and transparency is such that world society organisations must be transparent in order to be properly held accountable. The accountability of world society is a source of criticism as they are not democratically elected, they are not always transparent (for example, in relation to donations and contacts), and they are not always representative (digital divide issues arise and poorer nations can be excluded). Price questions these criticisms by highlighting the absence of comparable entities and asking: compared to what are world society actors “deemed to be less accountable?” (Price, Richard 2003, 590-91). The mere existence of world society organisations is a testament to the deficits of representation within global and domestic politics. Furthermore, there is no one model for world society organisations and networks, just as there is no one model for all of the private sector (Florini, A. M. 2000b, 237). Accordingly the examination of world society’s networks and organisations must be taken on a case-by-case basis when addressing their requirements for transparency and accountability.
The aforementioned characteristics all contribute to world society’s legitimacy and moral authority but in the end it is their claim to act within “public interest” and or the “common good” rather than private interests that lies at the heart of their moral authority and legitimacy (Risse 2000b, 186). Again these characteristics do not assure success. However, if a campaign is successful and its norm is diffused widely it will be the norm’s “robustness” that will determine its continued influence in the long term.

A robust norm is “influential regardless of whether the dependent variable is identity, interests, individual behaviour, or collective practices and outcomes” (Legro 1997, 34). Robustness can be gauged using three criteria: “specificity, durability, and concordance” (Legro 1997, 34). The specificity of a norm denotes how well defined it is and the ease of understanding its rules and guidelines. Are they overly complex and convoluted? Do the restraints and rules of the norm cause countries to debate what they entail or how to enact them? Assessing an actor’s understanding of norm and whether its prescriptions are simple and clear will determine its specificity.

The durability of a norm refers to the length of time the rules have been in effect and the number of challenges they have overcome. Has the norm remained legitimate over a long period of time? Do violators of the norm suffer a penalty, either socially sanctioned or self-sanctioned? Assessing the durability of a norm can be done through a historical examination of the challenges, violations, and penalties.

Finally, concordance means how well accepted the norm’s rules are within diplomatic discussions and treaties. In other words, concordance alludes to the level of
intersubjective agreement around the norm. Are the rules of the norm taken for granted by actors? Would they consider breaking the norm’s prescriptions? Do states generally agree on the acceptability of the rules? Do states diminish concordance by putting conditions upon their acceptance of the norm’s rules and prohibitions? To answer these questions scholars must review discussion surrounding the norm and its implementation among actors.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)

Introduction

The ICBL shifted international sentiment towards anti-personnel (AP) landmines and demonstrated the process by which members of world society are able to alter the “security policies of states by generating international norms that shape and redefine state interests” (Price, Richard 1998a, 615). On face value state security policy is a particularly difficult issue to demonstrate the techniques of a successful world society campaign, as conventional wisdom dictates that it should be completely autonomous from civil society. Furthermore, the adoption of any norms running counter to state security interests also run counter to state self-interests. Addressing issues that would otherwise not have emerged out of state considerations of self-interest (Clark, AM 2001) requires world society campaigns to build and shape norms through deliberate social action. Challenging governments to adopt norms that oppose their sovereign prerogatives is a truly remarkable feat for world society actors. The ICBL is one of a number of world society campaigns that illustrate their considerable strength and has seen them emerge as distinct actors within the international milieu.
Understanding how the ICBL was able to delegitimize AP landmines identifies the conditions and techniques needed to influence and change norms. The techniques are: (1) establishing a diverse network of actors; (2) bringing new concerns to light through the dissemination of information; (3) the strategic framing of information and grafting the new norm onto an established norm already in operation; (4) reversing the burden of proof from proponents to opponents; and, finally, the act of (5) shaming states that have not endorsed the norm.

Anti-Personnel (AP) Landmines

Anti-personnel landmines are specifically designed for use against human targets. They are often used to severely injure the victim rather than kill in a bid to increase the logistic and medical burden placed upon the enemy. Undetonated AP landmines form grim reminders of past conflicts and hinder recovery through reduced agricultural production, impeding reconstruction and road use, preventing the return of refugees, all the while causing causalities and perpetuating the fear and anxiety of war (Croll 1998, 129). The use of AP landmines was described as “an unchivalrous, practical necessity” by military personnel during America’s Civil War, including General Sherman, who stated that their use is “not war, but murder” (Croll 1998, x). In the face of the potential damage to civilians and their “unchivalrous” nature, AP landmines have largely been considered a practical necessity and have largely experienced “no particular ill repute” (Price, Richard 1998a) within the public.

AP landmines “have avoided undue scrutiny as a special category of ‘problem weapons’ and have been viewed as a conventional weapon with all the insulating
legitimacy implied by that term” (Price, Richard 1998a, 617). The “insulating legitimacy” that comes with being considered a conventional weapon coupled with the low cost (three to five US dollars apiece) enabled an estimated 110 million landmines to be deployed in some sixty-four countries as of 1994. Consequently, an estimated 26,000 people were killed or injured each year, the majority of them being civilians; rural people are most affected, as are children who can mistake them for playthings (Cameron, Lawson & Tomlin 1998; Green 2008; Monin & Gallimore 2002; Price, Richard 1998a).

It was the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that initially expressed concerns in the 1950s over the use of landmines when it published Draft Rules for the Protection of the Civilian Population, “which called for the military to record and map minefields during times of war ... However this was a time when Cold War paranoia was at its height” and the recommendations of the ICRC were “in terms of priority, a distant second” (Monin & Gallimore 2002, 2). The ICRC was prompted again as a result of fighting in Southeast Asia to push for landmine regulation when in 1973 it published Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects. It was not until the dramatic escalation in the use of AP landmines during the 1980s and 1990s in countries like Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Mozambique and the Soviet Union that the ICRC was again prompted into action by the “dramatic increase in the number of landmine casualties treated by their field surgeons ... In 1992 it published Mines: A Perverse Use of Technology, in essence a barrage of shocking images of mine victims from ICRC clinics” (Monin & Gallimore 2002, 2). One of the ICRC’s leading surgeons, Robin Coupland, expressed concern, calling on governments to stem the tide of what was becoming an epidemic:
If you’re going to run a campaign on an issue like this and influence policy makers you have to have four elements on which to base your campaign. Firstly, you have to provide reliable data. Secondly, you have to provide images. Thirdly, you have to be credible and, fourthly, you have to make it a public concern. Our hospitals provided most of the data about injuries in the early days of the campaign. And we also provided the images, what mines did to people. I think these images that came out of our hospitals and our rehabilitation centres were an essential component of the campaign (Monin & Gallimore 2002, 3).

The grim statistics coupled with calls to action provoked a dynamic transnational campaign against AP landmines in the 1990s. The campaign would involve over one thousand NGOs from more than sixty countries all seeking to form a comprehensive ban on landmines. The movement resulted in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its coordinator Jody Williams receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for “helping to establish an international convention that bans antipersonnel landmines” (Mekata 2000, 143). The international treaty to ban landmines has resulted in the number of landmine causalities falling to between 15,000 and 20,000 and the number of nations producing them falling from 50 to 13 (Green 2008). This tremendous shift in sentiment towards the use of AP landmines, which nations once regarded as an “unavoidable component of the world’s armed forces, much like firearms and artillery shells”, (Price, Richard 1998a, 617) is a truly remarkable feat in such a short time frame.
It must be noted that the characteristics of the issue were vital to the campaign’s success. The issue involved bodily harm to vulnerable individuals with a clear causal link to AP landmines. But the campaign’s success goes beyond issue’s characteristics to its techniques and the question of how the ICBL was able to redefine the utility of AP landmines? Addressing this question helps determine the method, and the plausibility of world society using norms to change international behaviour. Throughout this examination the ICBL’s use of media will also come under focus. The first technique is establishing a network.

**Technique (1): Establish a Network: Operational Structure of the ICBL**

The ICBL originated from a number of NGOs who were directly involved in areas devastated by AP landmines. The extent of the devastation during the late 1980s and early 1990s led a number of representatives from a diverse range of NGOs, working in countries like Afghanistan and Cambodia, to start moving towards a ban. Members of the Women’s Commission on Refugee Women and Children, Human Rights Watch (Asia Division), Physicians for Human Rights, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Medico International of Germany and, Handicap International were the first NGOs to raise concern. These NGOs deemed the AP landmine illegal due to its inability to discriminate between a combatant and a civilian. ICBL coordinator Jody Williams described the landmines as the eternal sentry; “once peace is declared the landmine does not stop killing—a unique feature that has earned the landmine the moniker the ‘eternal sentry’ ... it is this long-term impact, coupled with its indiscriminate nature, that, in the view of the ICBL, makes the AP mine illegal”
(Williams & Goose 1998, 21). This was sufficient motivation for a number of NGOs to take joint steps in formalising the ICBL.

The formalisation process began in London, May 1993 when the international campaign was initiated by issuing a “'Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines' and hosting the first NGO-sponsored international landmine conference” (Williams & Goose 1998, 22). The ICBL’s goal was clear and concise: “First, the world needed an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of AP mines. Second, resources for humanitarian mine clearance and for victim assistance had to be increased” (Mekata 2000; Williams & Goose 1998, 146).

The latter comes from the extreme disparity in the cost of production and placement compared to the massive cost of mine clearance, in terms of time, money, and patient rehabilitation. This problem is only compounded by the fact that it is mostly underprivileged people that experience the worst of AP landmine devastation. A “prosthesis costs about $1,000 [US] ... and needs to be replaced every few years, often thirty times in a lifetime. While it costs from $3 to $20 to make an antipersonnel landmine, the average cost of removing a mine is $300 to $1,000” (Mekata 2000, 144). Furthermore, the removal of AP landmines is an extremely risky and time intensive process because in most cases the mines are removed individually.

Achieving the goal of the campaign meant encouraging its network of over 1,200 NGOs in some 60 countries to work “at the national, regional, and international levels to build public awareness and create the political will necessary to bring about a
landmine ban” (Williams & Goose 1998, 22). It is not surprising that world society networks operate best when they are dense. The density of the network equates to the size and total number of organisations within the network and how well connected they are through the regularity of their meetings and information exchanges (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 206). While the sheer size and density of the ICBL network is a testament to its strength, the network’s diversity was also important to its success. The ICBL’s network cut across a number of diverse disciplines and brought together an assortment of NGOs working towards a common goal (Williams & Goose 1998, 22). However, a diverse network does not necessarily have to accommodate diverse opinions on the use of strategies. Indeed, while the ICBL “did not accommodate diverse opinions on strategies to eliminate landmine use, it did appeal to disparate, yet deeply held norms in order to build one of the largest, most diverse NGO coalitions ever” (Wexler 2003). The ICBL’s ability to entice disparate groups is exemplified by its relationship with the environmental movement, which it courted by frequently describing and thus framing landmines as a pollutant to the environment (Wexler 2003, 571).

As a concept, diverse networks operating with no unified ideology are best understood by looking at the anti-globalisation movement; “a movement that ... is better described by what it opposes than by a unified ideology ... In spite of its extreme internal diversity, there is indeed a shared critique of the management of the world by international institutions made up exclusively of national governments” (Castells, M 2008, 85). The anti-globalisation movement, much like the ICBL, does not share a unified ideology but rather identifies itself by the values and institutions it stands against. The absence of a unified ideology for many world society social movements
and networks can be seen in stark contrast to traditional political parties formed around coherent constitutional and institutional frameworks.

For the ICBL it was the call to ban AP landmines that served as the impetus for unity. Holding a vast coalition of diverse yet unified organisations enabled the ICBL to be “tremendously flexible in its day-to-day work” because it was “operating without a ‘secretariat’—no central office or bureaucracy—member organizations were free to pursue the achievement of the campaign’s goals as best fit their own mandate” (Williams & Goose 1998, 22). The operational structure of the ICBL is based upon an autonomous, segmented and polycentric network (Gerlach 2001). The network uses multiple hubs on a global scale with each hub acting locally in pursuit of their own objectives while simultaneously contributing to the collective goal, albeit, in different ways.

The notion of an autonomous polycentric network that maintains solidarity in the face of a common enemy becomes interesting from the perspective of critical theorists. Jürgen Habermas (1998, 2001) sees social movements, networked NGOs and world society, as being devoid of ‘ethics’. In this context ethics “refers to how we understand ourselves—not as citizens of the world, but as members of our particular community” (Day & Masciulli 2005, 697). For Habermas it is this “ethical-political self-understanding of citizens of a particular democratic life that is missing in the inclusive community of world citizens” (Habermas 2001, 107). If world citizens were to organise themselves on a global level in spite of this, they would be unable to “generate any normative cohesion from an ethical-political self-understanding that drew on other traditions and
value orientations, but only from a legal-moral form of self-understanding” (Habermas 2001, 108). In other words, world society lacks solidarity based upon common “ethical” understandings, a common history, and a common culture but rather is dependent upon legal norms with an exclusively moral content of which Habermas cites human rights. However, Habermas does not view human rights as universal moral rights, which is evidenced “by the fact that, in spite of their claim to universal validity, human rights have thus far managed to achieve an unambiguous positive form only within national legal orders of democratic states” (Habermas 1998, 192). Habermas argues that “human rights belong structurally to a positive and coercive legal order” (Habermas 1998, 192) without which individual legal claims cannot be actionable.

Accordingly, world society’s ability to form and maintain solidarity around global issue is significantly hindered, diminishing the effectiveness of the ICBL and other world society advocacy networks. In addition, world society cannot take action against claims of human rights violations. Habermas views the solidarity of world society and its advocacy networks as purely reactionary, “insofar as it generates a kind of cosmopolitan cohesion in the first instance through feelings of indignation over the violation of rights, i.e. over repression and injuries to human rights committed by states” (Habermas 2001, 108). While this reactionary character does generate cohesion it is ultimately fleeting as “the political culture of a world society lacks the common ethical-political dimension that would be necessary for a corresponding global community and its identity formation” (Habermas 2001, 108-9).

Because the ICBL derives solidarity from the mass organisation of autonomous groups it is better seen as an instrument for coordination than as an organisation in a strict
sense. Through the mass organisation of autonomous groups the ICBL seeks to maintain and strengthen the autonomy of individual groups and movements while preserving strong information exchange. For that reason, Habermas’ argument can be seen to support the organisational structure of the ICBL, which sees individual groups within the ICBL network base their solidarity on their own “ethical” and “political culture” in order to maintain long term existence. The ICBL then uses the network to promote transnational solidarity in a reactive fashion at times of peak importance, such as conferences and campaign activities.

In sum, the ICBL’s theoretical categorisation is that of a transnational advocacy network (Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a), which maintains unity and achieves success through its “commitment to a constant exchange of information—both internally among members of the ICBL as well as with governments, the media, and the general public” (Williams & Goose 1998, 23). This constant flow of information enables them to efficiently wield their influence through strong coordination and the use of pedagogical techniques such as “information, persuasion, shame, and discipline” (Price, Richard 1998a, 617). The following section will explore the characteristics of the international environment in which the ICBL successfully implemented the ban.

**Characteristics of the International Environment**

The international environment in which the ICBL operated is important in understanding the success of the campaign. Richard Price (1997, 1998a, 1998b) cites four important environmental conditions that provide context to the campaign.
(1) The End of the Cold War and Multilateralism. The end of the Cold War saw the expansion of a number of prohibitive norms and regimes regarding the use and possession of chemical and nuclear weapons. These regulatory frameworks facilitated the creation of an international space for communication that was not available during the Cold War. A relatively open communication environment was particularly fruitful for the creation of regulatory norms. As a result, the international arms control became “characterized by a historically unprecedented degree of transparency and intrusiveness to ensure compliance with these regimes governing weapons of mass destruction” (Price, Richard 1998b, 341). While many of these prohibitive norms set precedents for the ICBL, it was higher levels of transparency and intervention that provided the ICBL with a more conducive environment for norm proliferation.

Multilateralism also helps the introduction of new norms. The expansion of multilateralism affirms the importance of dialogue and open communication within the international realm (Alonso 2000; Buzan 2004). Dialogue involving world society actors and multiple states not only increases the representativeness of norms but also increases the likelihood that if a norm is adopted it is done so by multiple states.

(2) Whether democratization helped facilitate the relative strengthening of civil society (White 1994) or as some argue, civil society itself assisted in the process of democratization (Scholte 2002). The fall of authoritarian regimes across Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Union, Latin America, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, and the recent Arab Spring, has strengthened civil society’s ability to operate with relative freedom within these countries (Price, Richard 1998b, 343). Exercising this freedom has improved world society’s capacity to monitor norm
compliance, as “democracy creates a structural space for the role of civil society in verifying compliance” (Price, Richard 1998b). This of course stands in contrast to the significantly diminished capacity of civil or world society to act as a normative watchdog in authoritarian states. Domestic groups are also able to operate much more effectively in a democratic state (discussed in “Target Characteristics). Finally, democratization assists regulatory weapon norms by decreasing security threats faced by democratic state from other democratic states. In other words, democratic states are less likely to attack each other, making a state’s compliance to the AP landmine norm more viable. This is not to suggest that democratization is responsible for the adoption of regulatory frameworks (for example the United States has not adopted the ban on AP landmines).

(3) Technology: The internet has made it easier for world society contingents to monitor norm compliance (Castells, M 2008) and further complicate the ability of governments to monopolise information (Nye, J 2004). The media and communication paradigm in which the ICBL operated was vastly different to that of today. During ICBL the proliferation of the internet was in its infancy; in 1996 internet users as a percentage of population (The World Bank 2011) for Australia was at 3.3%, the United States was at 16.7%, and the United Kingdom was at 4.1%. These relatively low rates of internet use do not allow for mass engagement with the issue through interactive websites or information sources. Consequently, the internet was primarily used to facilitate communication between concerned supporters, provide instantaneous updates on governments and monitor landmine use. Instead the ICBL used traditional
media sources to inform and engage the majority of the population and were assisted by newsworthy norm entrepreneurs like Diana, The Princess of Wales.

To offer a comparison, in 2009 internet users as a percentage of population stood at 72%, 78.1%, and 83.2% for Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom respectively. The implications surrounding this dramatic proliferation in internet use will become the focus of examination in the following chapters.

(4) Trends in Warfare: From the perspective of powerful states the deployment of AP landmines by insurgents and guerrilla combatants was seen as detrimental to the weapon’s legitimacy. Similar to the view that chemical weapons were condemned as unfair, cheap equalisers, and weapons of the weak “because they ... undermine the exclusive advantages of centralized high-technology state violence, both within the state and among the hierarchy of states” (Price, Richard 1998b, 344). In other words, powerful states may seek to maintain a technological advantage over weaker states by hindering the legitimacy of low-cost weapons. Under re-defined state interests the ban on AP landmines can then be perceived as advantageous by increasing the technological superiority of powerful states in warfare. Indeed, such is the strength of the prohibitive norm on AP landmines that dominant states have even sought to re-categorise weapon technology previously defined as an AP landmine. This practice is exemplified by “US proponents of the Gator mixed anti-tank/anti-personnel mines system” seeking to “redefine the latter component not as an AP mine but as a ‘submunition’” (Price, Richard 1998b, 344).

Technique (2): Dissemination Information (Raising Awareness)
In order to change the perception of AP landmines the ICBL came armed with a clear and concise objective; to ban their use and production. This unambiguous normative formulation enabled the campaign to effectively communicate its succinct message to disperse populaces. Through the dissemination of information the ICBL was able to drastically shift the perceived validity of AP landmines, effectively delegitimizing their use.

The dissemination of information is one of the most effective tools for world society campaigns. This was especially true for the ICBL as the information and images at their disposal were extremely powerful; more than 80 percent of victims were civilians, the majority of casualties occurred long after conflict had ceased, and the injuries caused by AP landmines were horrific in nature. To disseminate this information the ICBL and its member organisations employed: TV, radio, documentary films, comic books, international conferences, and articles within elite media outlets (Akashi 1996) written by humanitarians (Warkentin & Mingst 2000). As the proliferation of the internet remained in its infancy, the campaign understandably focused on traditional media sources. A particularly powerful element was campaigns’ use of visually confronting television commercials, including a graphic public service announcement by the U.N. Mine Action Service that aimed to raise awareness about mine clearance (Huus 2005).

A number of themes persisted throughout the information disseminated by the campaign; namely, the absolute abundance of deployed AP landmines and their inability to determine civilian from combatant. When a campaign can raise awareness of an issue through information dissemination they are effectively setting the agenda.
Agenda setting is to accord objects “saliency in the media content or in people’s consciousness” (Rutherford 2000, 76). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was a major part of the ICBL’s push to bring AP landmines to the fore of international consciousness (Maslen 1998). For the first time in the ICRC’s history it launched a major public advertising campaign. This campaign aimed to not only disseminate information, of both a specialist and non-specialist nature, but it also sought to portray AP landmines as an issue of humanitarian concern that far outweighed military utility (Warkentin & Mingst 2000).

In order to cement the issue as one of humanitarian rather than military concern the ICBL had to humanise the issue. A tactic designed to achieve this was the USA’s Adopt-a-Minefield Program by the United Nations Association, in which “‘Parents’ would ‘adopt’ an active minefield and raise funds to return the land to the local population” (Warkentin & Mingst 2000, 249). Humanising the issue transformed AP landmines from “acceptable military defence hardware to indiscriminate, unacceptable weapons of human rights violation and mass murder” (Berhe 2005, 382).

Shifting the landmine debate from a military and political context to a humanitarian context also provided the ICBL “with the diplomatic space to play important roles in disseminating information about landmines to the media, policymakers, and the public” (Rutherford 2000, 94). In other words, the ICBL displaced the issue from the strict and often private realm of government into the far more accessible and open public realm. Humanitarian evidence provided through real life testimonies was also crucial in cementing this shift. One such testimony occurred in January 1991 when “the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children called for a ban in its testimony before the United States Senate about the plight of landmine survivors in
the Cambodian border refugee camps” (Rutherford 2000, 87; Williams & Goose 1998, 20). The act of embedding the issue within a humanitarian discourse also enhanced the resonance of the shocking statistics provided by the ICBL because they were now associated with real people.

By bringing the AP landmine issue to light the ICBL was fulfilling the conceptual role of “norm entrepreneur.” Norm entrepreneurs, like the ICBL, “are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even “create” issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 897). Calling attention to the issue of AP landmines was assisted in no small part by Diana, The Princess of Wales, who served as a norm entrepreneur for the ICBL (Koh 1998). In this role, Diana was able to mobilise an enormous amount of popular opinion and international political support.

Celebrities wield a large amount of social influence and of course Diana was no exception, in fact, very few have ever attracted as much public and media attention as Diana (Brown, WJ, Basil & Bocarnea 2003). This fact was seemingly well known to proponents seeking to ban landmines, when, in January 1997, Diana was taken to Angola and other mine affected areas as a guest of British NGOs who were clearing landmines in the region (Rutherford 2000). The famous image of Diana wearing a protective vest and mask garnered a great deal of attention, especially in Britain, for movement to ban landmines. It was estimated in 1997 that visits by Diana to mine affected communities brought the issues as much attention as a US$2 million public

---

44 NGOs: British Red Cross and Halo Trust
relations campaign (Short 1999). However, the culmination of Diana’s involvement in the campaign was her call upon the “British government to ban landmines as the only humanitarian option” (Rutherford 2000, 100). Diana’s call to ban landmines on humanitarian grounds further elevated the issue into a moral argument and “once the landmine issue was placed squarely on the political agenda as a humanitarian issue, British policy for continued landmine use would be unsustainable” (Rutherford 2000).

Diana’s ability to garner attention and her use of dramatic language to transfer the issue from a political to a humanitarian problem cements her as an extremely successful norm entrepreneur. Central to this success was the media coverage she attracted to the issue, which of course helped generate public support for the campaign to ban landmines. Diana was so successful in this respect that many placed her as the sole face of the campaign (McGuigan 2000), even to the extent that the Prime Minister of Norway believed that the final treaty should be titled the Diana, Princess of Wales Treaty. To complement Diana’s involvement, the ICBL and its proponents were very “media friendly” (Short 1999) and would use the media to publish landmine victim stories and the names of governments who have supported the ban and shame those who were yet to support it (Price, R. & Hope 1999).

The clear formulation of the norm and its universal characteristics (bodily harm against vulnerable civilians) were critical in attracting media attention and global support. In essence the ICBL’s goal was to disseminate information and illustrate the severity of the crisis. The primary catalyst for normative change is often informing people of the issue’s severity and that the issue warrants the moniker “crisis”. The “case of AP landmines confirms the often argued thesis among international relations scholars that the
perception of a crisis or shock is a crucial factor in precipitating ideational or normative change” (Price, Richard 1998a, 622). In other words, the most crucial factor to the success of the ICBL was the “transnational dissemination of information about the scope of landmine use and its effects, thereby helping to define the use of AP land mines as not only a problem but as a global crisis” (Price, Richard 1998a, 622).

Acquiring the status of “global crisis” for the AP landmine issue goes beyond disseminating information to how the issue was framed and grafted onto previously prohibited weapons that share similar characteristics.

**Technique (3): Framing and Normative Grafting**

*Framing* and its use by world society campaigns and NGOs have received a lot of attention in the literature (Joachim 2003; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Rutherford 2000; Scheufele 1999). Framing is a form of persuasion, defined as “the selection of elements within a particular issue to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1989; Rutherford 2000, 78). The use of framing by world society constitutes their need to shape the public’s perceptions of issues by altering the way they are presented. Effectively framing an issue and bringing it to the attention of the public and policy makers is a principal objective of world society actors (Clark, Ian 2007). The challenge then, for NGOs and networks, is “to ‘align’ or ‘extend’ their frame in such a way that it ‘resonates’ with the experiences and the empirical context of the targeted audience” (Joachim 2003, 250).
AP landmines had long been the sole province of state security discourse and were framed around the long enduring norm of state sovereignty. AP landmines were seen as “a part of the war machine that served to preserve the state from its enemies” (Larrinaga & Sjolander 1998, 370). Therefore, the challenge for the ICBL was to generate counter-attitudinal messages and then frame them in a way that resonates with the target’s cultural context and any applicable pre-existing norms. Due to the indiscriminate nature of AP landmines they were framed as a weapon that cannot differentiate between civilian and combatant. Thereby linking the issue with a cornerstone principal of humanitarian law; the protection of civilians (Goodman, R & Jinks 2004).

As well as framing the issue in terms of humanitarian law, delegitimizing AP landmines—a long considered “conventional” weapon— required the new norm promoted by the ICBL to resonate with a pre-established norm. As success “hinged crucially on the grafting of moral opprobrium from other delegitimized practices of warfare” (Price, Richard 1998a, 628). Discrimination (or non-combatant immunity), which was in part introduced by ICRC (Bugnion 2004), was the normative framework targeted by proponents of the landmine ban. The protection of civilians in times of war (the norm of discrimination or unnecessary civilian suffering) is well established within humanitarian law. The indiscriminate nature of the AP landmine renders it particularly susceptible to association with other weapons that cause mass suffering and cannot determine civilian from combatant. A principal example of which is chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons are known to cause unnecessary civilian suffering and the successful association of AP landmines with the similar chemical weapon ban proved
to be particularly important to the success of ICBL. Proponents of the ban worked “hard to frame their issues in ways that make persuasive connections between existing norms and emergent norms” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 629). Proponents framed this connection by repeatedly pointing “out that land mines have killed and maimed more people than nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons combined” (Price, Richard 1998a, 629). The ban upon chemical weapons enabled the ICBL to seek a feasible precedent, as the “persuasiveness of a normative claim in law is explicitly tied to the ‘fit’ of that claim within existing normative frameworks; legal arguments are persuasive when they are grounded in precedent” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 915).

The association of AP landmines with other banned weapons not only made the ban desirable but empirically plausible. By offering new “comparative humanitarian and legal assessments; chemical weapons provided a referent for other prohibition candidates through the grafting of normative justifications from one weapon category onto another” (Price, Richard 1998a). This association was also invoked through repeated reference to other banned weapons, as Kofi Annan did in his speech at the Diplomatic Conference on Landmines, stating: “Now we must bring to the struggle against land-mines the same determination and the same sense of mission that brought an end to chemical weapons. We must make land-mines, too, a weapon of the past and a symbol of shame” (Annan 3 September 1997).

By framing the use of AP landmines as not only a violation of international law through association, but as an indiscriminate weapon that causes mass and unnecessary civilian suffering, the ICBL essentially provided a reinterpretation of the current validity of AP
landmines. Reframing the issue serves as “an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’ political strategies, since, when they are successful, the new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 897). Strong military and humanitarian evidence not only helped realise this frame, with NGOs like the ICRC providing the majority of this evidence, it was instrumental in reversing the burden of proof.

Before moving on to the next section I will briefly expand on the United States’ failure to become party to the treaty and the concept of a time lag between the campaign and action on behalf of some states.

First, the United States resistance to becoming a party to the treaty runs counter to its already de facto compliance to nearly all of the treaty’s provisions. Zach Hudson, Coordinator of the United States Campaign to Ban Landmines, notes that the "U.S. has not used antipersonnel landmines in 19 years and is the world’s largest individual donor for mine action. It is already compliant with other core components of the Mine Ban Treaty. There is no real reason for the U.S. not to join.” While the United States largely observes the International Campaign to Ban Landmines’ (ICBL) norm, it is this author’s opinion that it ultimately feels that officially becoming party to the treaty would impinge on its sovereignty and send a message to others that it can be told what to do by world society. In this sense its decision is understandable.

Second, the time lag between campaigns and outcomes can be attributed to life cycle of a norm (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Sunstein 1996) and the need for the new norm
to reach a norm cascade or tipping point in which a critical mass of states have adopted the norm. It is on reaching this tipping point that a new norm will usually be widely adopted. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) note that the exact motivation for this cascade varies but they argue “that a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem facilitate norm cascades” (1998, 895). The time to reach this point will vary and can account for the lag between campaign and outcome.

Technique (4): Reversing the Burden of Proof

Rhetoric, exemplified above by Kofi Annan, not only provided enhanced resonance with other weapon taboos, but also helped the AP landmine norm gain “prescriptive status” (Price, Richard 1998a, 631; Risse & Sikkink 1999, 29). Prescriptive status means that actors “regularly refer to the ... norm to describe and comment on their own behaviour and that of others; the validity claims of the norm are no longer controversial, even if the actual behaviour continues violating the rules” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 29). Achieving prescriptive status also requires consistency in an actor’s “verbal utterances” and for their words and deeds to ultimately match up (Risse & Sikkink 1999). Once a norm obtains a prescriptive status the dominant discourse shifts in favour of the new norm, placing opponents of the new norm on the defensive and claims against its validity are pushed to the margins. A shift in the dominant discourse enhances the effectiveness of the fourth normative technique used by the ICBL: revising the utility of AP mines and reversing the burden of proof.
The ICBL along with the ICRC were cautious in simply condemning the military utility of AP landmines and risk being portrayed as a utopian advocacy group that were seeking world disarmament. Instead, the ICRC sought legitimate and empirically grounded military reports in order to illustrate that the AP landmine’s military utility did not outweigh its humanitarian cost. The report “Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-personnel Mines” (ICRC 1996) written by a retired member of the British Army examined the actual military utility of AP landmines employed in conflicts since 1940. The report found no cases “in which the use of anti-personnel mines played a major role in determining the outcome of a conflict” (ICRC 1996, 7). Overall the report concluded that:

The limited military utility of AP mines is far outweighed by the appalling humanitarian consequences of their use in actual conflicts. On this basis their prohibition and elimination should be pursued as a matter of utmost urgency by governments and the entire international community (ICRC 1996, 73)

The report’s conclusions “were drawn up by a meeting of active and retired senior military commanders from a variety of countries and were unanimously endorsed by all participants in their personal capacity” (ICRC 1996, 8). These conclusions were widely disseminated by the ICRC. Once the issue had achieved legitimate military backing the campaign had opened a “legitimized political space for entrepreneurs to shift the burden of proof from mine opponents to mine proponents, who in the new context must make the case that AP land mines are not only marginally useful but also irreplaceable or even decisive” (Price, Richard 1998a, 633). Legitimising anti-mine rhetoric opened a space for ban proponents to question the mines military utility and
ultimately shift justification from “what previously required no justification: the assumption that mines have military utility and thus pass the test of military necessity” (Price, Richard 1998a, 632). One of the ICBL’s greatest assets in the debate against the mine’s military utility was the inherent simplicity of their argument; AP mines are unable to discriminate between civilian and combatant.

It is important to note that world society’s efforts alone are often insufficient to produce normative change without the assistance of nation states. Sympathetic nation states assisted the ICBL with the dissemination of information, rhetorical support, and by enabling world society actors to accompany official state delegations to conferences and meetings. The relationship between the state and world society is reciprocal as world society’s legitimacy, moral authority, universality, and expertise can provide the state with legitimacy by association. The importance of sympathetic nation states to the success of the ICBL is discussed by Clark (2007):

The two most dramatic successes of the NGO sector during the 1990s are...the Ottawa Convention on Landmines, and the campaign to establish the International Criminal Court. Both witnessed intensive campaigns involving large numbers of INGOs...In addition both displayed interesting examples of cooperation between INGOs and sympathetic states, in order to maximize support...it is commonly acknowledged that this was vital to their respective success (Clark, Ian 2007, 189-90).
With the assistance of sympathetic nation states, the ICBL witnessed a dramatic swing of support that enabled two important mechanisms to come into play: *emulation* and *shaming*. These mechanisms played an important role in the resulting norm cascade (Sunstein 1997), which saw the number of states adopting the norm go from 30 to over 120 in less than two years. A norm cascade is dependent upon reaching a “threshold or “tipping” point, at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 895). This “tipping point” occurred when prominent (or “critical”) states such as France, Britain and South Africa supported the ban in the spring of 1997. France and Britain were deemed critical states because they were both producers of AP landmines. South Africa was also deemed critical, especially for Africa, because they had attained a high degree of “moral stature” under Nelson Mandela (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). The adoption of the norm by these states aided in the process of *emulation*.

*Emulation* is an important mechanism in achieving a norm cascade. Although the exact motivation may differ, the adoption of a norm because of emulation represents a combination of a pressure to conform, a desire or need to enhance international legitimacy, and or the desire of state leaders to augment their self-esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). All of which are motivations to follow other successful nation states that have adopted the norm and as the number of states adopting the norm climbs so too does the pressure to emulate.

State emulation was also seen during the initial discussions surrounding the precise definition of an AP landmine. It was during these discussions that the US attempted to add a loophole to the definition “saying that an AP mine ‘near’ an anti-tank mine is
actually an anti-handling device” the campaign strongly resisted and asked the question: “When is an AP mine not an AP mine?—When it’s American.” In an impressive show of resistance to a superpower, “governments repeatedly said ‘no’ to US demands. And each ‘no’ empowered others to say ‘no’ and to hold firm in their intention to give the world a mine ban treaty with no exceptions, no reservations, and no loopholes” (Williams & Goose 1998, 44). On the 17th of September 1997 the US finally withdrew its demands.

**Technique (5): Shaming**

*Shaming* is a powerful technique employed by campaigns and is defined as the "process by which citizens publicly and self-consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or engaging in those actions" (Wexler 2003, 563).

The ICBL’s capacity to shame increased exponentially as more and more states “tipped” towards the ban. States that had not yet agreed to the treaty become subject “to a normative process of shaming, and relegation to an outgroup, which they often resent” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 27). The state’s relegation to an ‘outgroup’45 is usually sufficiently disturbing to the state’s international image and or domestic legitimacy to warrant a concession to the agreement (Risse & Sikkink 1999). The ICBL used the cascade of state adoption to shame nations that had not yet agreed to the ban, making “it intolerable to be left outside the club of responsible international citizens once they

---

45 The process of shaming nations that have not become a party to the treaty is still carried out through the ICBL website at: http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Not-Party (Retrieved 23/10/11)
judged that the balance had tipped such that resistance signalled outlier status” (Price, Richard 1998a, 635). Despite the risk of being singled out the US did not become a signatory to the treaty, making it a primary target for the shaming efforts of the ICBL. The shaming of the US not only centred on its decision to remain a treaty holdout but how this decision ran contrary to the US’s previous rhetorical support for the notion of a ban.

As such the ICBL focused on “the Clinton administration's rhetoric about landmine leadership by using it to show hypocrisy and a lack of commitment” (Wexler 2003, 574). It is important to note that although the U.S.’s support was largely rhetorical it was sufficient to increase the political space for pressure as it had legitimised the mere concept of a ban. Indeed, prior normative commitments, even if they were made rhetorically, are a key vulnerability. The ICBL capitalised on this by publically condemning the leadership of the US, with Jodie Williams stating on the CNN television program Crossfire (CNN October 10, 1997): "Clinton just missed an opportunity to be a true world leader on this issue. You cannot be outside the Ottawa Process which has just negotiated a ban treaty and still call yourself a leader. You're either in the process or you're not. You can't lead from the rear” (Wexler 2003, 575). The ICBL also shamed the US by likening them to other treaty holdouts, like Iran, Iraq, and China. This technique was aimed at damaging the legitimacy of the U.S. by categorising it as a rogue state with weak humanitarian values. By 1997 the U.S. had agreed to make numerous concessions, regarding production and use, and appeared willing to accept the ban once it had developed alternatives, although as of 2013 the U.S. has still not joined the ban treaty.
The U.S.’s unwillingness to join the treaty notwithstanding, this does not diminish the importance of supportive rhetoric from nation states that might oppose an immediate and comprehensive ban, like the US, Russia and China, in delegitimising AP landmines. As rhetorical “support for an international prohibition in principle (albeit, once alternatives are developed) provides much in the way of delegitimizing AP land mines and fostering the prescriptive status of the norm, especially compared with a situation in which opponents simply reject as ridiculous the idea of an international ban” (Price, Richard 1998a, 636).

It is the ultimate goal of any campaign that their norm achieves an “aura of fear” that causes people to have an “intrinsic revulsion” towards breaking it. Sentiment of this kind alerts us that the norm has attained a “taken-for-granted” quality. This quality is particularly evident in the discourse surrounding chemical and biological weapons, in which non-use though generational tradition has become an institutional fact. During “US Senate hearings over Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the early 1980s, it was remarked ... that gas weapons surely were reprehensible since even Hitler did not use them against Allied armies or cities” (Price, Richard 1998b, 353). This example helps illustrate that the robustness of any prohibitory norm comes, in part, from an implicit pull towards compliance through customary obligations.

For the state to recognise customary obligations wide-spread norm conforming behavioural and *opinio juris*; “the belief by states that the practice is undertaken as an obligation of international law” (Price, Richard 1998b; 2004, 107) must be evident. In other words, the ban must represent a "general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation” (Goldsmith and Posner 1999). Price maintains that “the level of *opinio juris* in favour of banning AP landmines is very substantial.” This belief stems the rhetorical practice undertaken by states, “that already parallels the case of torture, where violations generally are carried out surreptitiously, accusations are denied, and allegations are made of adversaries engaging in the dubious practice” (Price, Richard 2004).

Price’s (2004) belief that the rhetorical practice of states regarding AP landmines already resembles that of torture, in which states seek to hide its use and would fervently deny any allegations, seems to imply that states adopted the norm as a result of coercion. Coercion in this context denotes influence by “escalating the benefits of conformity or the costs of nonconformity through material rewards and punishments” (Goodman and Jinks 2004, 633). Persuasion, in contrast to coercion, denotes that the actors have internalized the new norm and redefined their identity and interests accordingly (2004). We then must ask if states were coerced or consciously persuaded that the ban on AP landmines is appropriate and valid. States that have adopted the norm as a result of shame have largely been coerced to do so. However, coercion is often not enough to change an actor’s inherent preferences but rather change their cost to benefit calculations. If states seek to hide the practice or would deny allegations they have determined that the norm is not worth breaking as the consequences (i.e. international condemnation and shame) are great. Shame, however, is only one of the techniques prosecuted by the ICBL and when placed in the context of the entire campaign it is only one coercive element. Reversing the burden of proof (changing states minds through evidence), disseminating information (convincing the public and government that a ban in warranted), framing and
normative grafting (convincing states and public alike that this is as bad as other banned weapons) all have persuasive elements.

The Ban

In the case of AP landmines few can deny that world society has actively participated in the wide dissemination and acceptance of a new normative framework. To put this into a wider historical context, envisage the citizens of ancient Rome coming together and telling the Roman armies that they must stop using concealed spikes and stakes. The mere notion of this seems outrageous and emphasises the significance of world society’s achievement in moving states towards a ban on AP landmines.

The evolution of any prohibitory norm will always leave future generations astounded when they try to envisage what was considered ‘normal’ in past eras. In his analysis of prohibitory norms Ethan Nadelmann illustrates that, “Just as few people during the eighteenth century could have imagined the emergence of a global antislavery regime, few in the nineteenth century could have envisioned a global ban on ivory sales.” Accordingly, “few in this century can imagine that activities which are entirely legitimate today may evolve into targets of global prohibition regimes” (Nadelmann 1990, 523). For Nadelmann the ban on AP landmines would be one such inconceivable global prohibition regime. Members of world society shifted the perception of AP landmines by successfully framing this issue as a crisis and placing it at the fore of the international agenda. The sense of urgency that came as a result of the perception of a crisis was instrumental in getting people to consider an outright ban as a possibility.
Even if this ‘possibility’ was only acknowledged rhetorically it enabled proponents of the ban to place opponents on the defensive by instigating and perpetuating politicised debates over the mines utility. These discussions forced opponents of the ban to validate the mines utility in the face of mounting military evidence condemning the mine as a humanitarian disaster that carries little or no strategic advantage. As a result, mine proponents needed to justify an issue that previously needed no justification. Supporters of the ban set the agenda through the dissemination of information and education campaigns that informed the public and policymakers about the indiscriminate nature of the weapon. The AP landmines inability to determine combatant from civilian coupled with the grafting of previously delegitimised weapons was, for many states, what enabled the ban to gain critical mass and “As the number of crucial states supporting a ban reached critical mass, concerns of reputation and identity fostered emulation, which became an increasingly powerful mechanism through which the new norm was adopted” (Price, Richard 1998a, 640).

The norm’s true strength will resonate once its origins slip from memory and justification preventing their use is no longer required and the ban is taken-for-granted. John English (1998) succinctly illustrates the ramifications of world society’s move to ban landmines, “the landmine process reveals a new texture in the international system where negotiating tables have new players and shapes, where linkages and networks transcend state limits, and, even perhaps, where moral sensibilities have a voice.” Nonetheless, English believes that the process of elimination will be slow, “Landmines will not disappear with a bang but with a slow
suffocation during which the weight of moral sensibility will gradually smother them.”
(English 1998, 131).

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted world society’s capacity to serve as a political actor in its own right and that states are receptive to being “taught” both the problem and the solution to the problem by world society. The characteristics needed of the target, the issue and world society itself were also introduced before discussing the five tactics (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and shifting the burden of proof) used by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to stimulate normative change. While the success of the ICBL owes much to the techniques it so masterfully employed, the way in which it actually employed them now stands as a remnant of an incredibly distant media environment. The campaign’s focus on traditional media sources (TV, radio, documentary films, comic books, international conferences, newspaper articles, and visually confronting TV commercials) was a consequence of a relatively low rate of internet users as a percentage of population. The next chapter will instead focus on the new media environment by examining how mass self-communication affects the ICBL’s five techniques.
Chapter Five: Campaign Techniques and Mass Self-Communication

Introduction

The media landscape has undergone significant change following the formation of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in 1993. Joseph Nye explains that in 1993 “there were about 50 websites in the world; by 2000, that number had surpassed 5 million ... [one] decade later, China alone had over 400 million internet users” (Nye, Joseph 2011, 115). Mass self-communication, content proliferation, and a significant reduction in cost necessitate the re-evaluation of the ICBL’s five techniques (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and reversing the burden of proof).

The ICBL’s techniques will be used as a platform for analysis in order to combat the heterogeneous nature of campaigning. In doing so this chapter is able to provide a broader understanding of how mass self-communication affects modern campaigns. The principal effects of mass self-communication come from the proliferation of content and information, the increased importance of credibility, a loss of control, increased participation, and a growing proportion of debate taking place online. This chapter concludes that in order to disseminate information successfully, the campaign must harness the public's propensity to participate, relinquish control, hold credibility, and formulate a clear and concise message.

Chapter Six will then extend the application of these five techniques to a detailed case study of the 2011 Australian Ban Live Export campaign.
Disseminating Information: Introduction

Successfully disseminating campaign information means adapting to an environment in which the majority of content is self-generated, emission is self-directed, and reception is self-selected. The shift towards the “self” forms the crux of the dilemma facing world society campaigns. However, the way in which one approaches this dilemma, as an obstacle or an opportunity, depends largely on one’s point of focus: people or tools.

Mass self-communication was not implicit in the proliferation of personal computers or the internet and it was even valid to assume that people would continue passively consuming information as they did with television. In other words, analysis must move away from the tools themselves and seek to provide insight into the human desires that shape them and their uses. The use of a “social technology is much less determined by the tool itself; when we use a network, the most important asset we get is access to one another” (Shirky 2010, 14). People want to interact with one another and by creating and sharing content they are fulfilling that need. This need to share ideas and interact with one another is observed in Alexander Wendt’s two basic tenets of constructivism: “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt 1999, 1). It is human interaction that determines and shapes the environment, not material forces. People will shape the environment to suit their own needs and for this reason they have taken the internet and made it social.
These social desires are now seen across all platforms, as “new technologies — whether massively multiplayer online games such as World of Warcraft or Second Life; social-network websites such as Facebook or MySpace; collective information sites like YouTube, Wikipedia, or eBay; or dating sites like Match.com or eHarmony — just realize our ancient propensity to connect to other humans” (Christakis & Fowler 2009, 257). In order to harness these social desires and successfully engage the public the message must be clear and concise. The formulation of the norm must facilitate easy dissemination and remain understandable. For the ICBL the simple formulation of “ban landmines” was a key element to their success. If world society campaigns formulate a clear norm they can approach the dissemination of information as an opportunity to engage the public and use this desire to interact and share information to their advantage.

Disseminating Information: Viral Videos

The social capacity of information technology has been bolstered by the development of broadband in mobile and wireless internet devices and the emergence of Web 2.0. The latter has enabled people with no computer expertise to easily create, modify and share content. Video platforms, like YouTube and Vimeo, are examples of Web 2.0 and serve as key assets in the dissemination of campaign information. Crane and Sornette (2008) discuss three classifications of video content: viral videos, quality videos, and junk.

Viral videos are those with precursory word-of-mouth growth resulting from epidemic like propagation through a social network ... Quality videos are similar to viral videos, but experience a sudden burst of activity rather than a bottom-
up growth, and because of the “quality” of their content, subsequently trigger an epidemic cascade through the social network ... Lastly, *junk videos* are those that experience a burst of activity for some reason (spam, chance, etc) but do not spread through the social network. Therefore their activity is determined largely by the first-generation of viewers (Crane & Sornette 2008, 2)

Viral videos offer individuals and groups a way to spread campaign information to a massive audience through a “viral process of viewing and chain distribution via e-mail” (Powell 2010, 96) and social networking sites. It is this process of chain distribution that makes viral videos particularly good at getting a cross-section of the public to consume your campaign information. The nature of the “viral process” means users will view a video and due to its appealing characteristics share it via email, post it on their Facebook page or “Like” it on their YouTube account. This supplements the video’s credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the user’s friends and contacts by virtue of that user’s recommendation.

When a campaign’s video goes “viral” they are serving a social function by facilitating interaction between users and their friends who are reciprocally spreading campaign information. Viral videos are abundant on video platforms like YouTube and Vimeo and are exemplified by the often-cited “Obama Girl” and the video “I Got a Crush . . . on Obama” (Barely Political 2007) which went viral during the 2008 U.S. Presidential campaign or the video “Self-taught African Teen Wows M.I.T.” (THNKR 2012). The latter achieved 2.8 million views in the ten days between November 16, 2012 and November 26, 2012. The video aimed to raise awareness about youth projects in Sierra
Leone through Global Minimum Inc’s campaign “Innovate Salone”. In addition, there are a number of commercial videos that have gone viral to great effect; most notably is the “The Force: Volkswagen Commercial” (Volkswagen 2011) with over 51 million views (4th of March 2012) and the series of videos created by Old Spice “Old Spice | The Man Your Man Could Smell Like” (OldSpice 2010a) and “Old Spice | Questions” (OldSpice 2010b) with over 40 million and 22 million (4th of March 2012) respectively.

While viral videos can be a powerful way to spread campaign information they often weaken the level of control a politician or group has over the dissemination of information. Individuals are able to easily modify and create videos to instead reflect negatively upon the politician or the norm being promoted. This was exemplified by the video “McCain’s YouTube Problem Just Became a Nightmare” (Bravenewfilms 2008) which also went viral (with over 9 million views) during the 2008 U.S. Presidential campaign. The video shows John McCain contradicting himself repeatedly.

Lim and Golan (2011) examined the presumed influence of political parody videos on viewers and the individuals’ willingness to then engage in online activism as a response to this influence. The study found that a perception of influence from political parody videos “was a good predictor in explaining participants’ willingness to take a corrective action—the likelihood of engaging in political social media activism” (Lim, JS & Golan 2011, 723). The authors conclude that “[v]ideo sharing websites such as YouTube will play an important role in the democratic process for years to come by providing a

highly unregulated platform for political video distribution (Lim, JS & Golan 2011, 724). Political parody videos led Gueorguieva (2007, 8) to highlight the weakened “level of control that campaigns have over the candidate’s image and message since anybody, both supporters and opponents, can post a video and/or create a page on behalf of the candidates because of the user-driven content of social networking sites.” It is for this reason that mass self-communication is able to amplify “the diffusion of the message beyond anyone’s control” (Castells, M. 2011, 780). Mass self-communication and the potential viral diffusion of messages through its platforms “is highly positive if you do want to diffuse the message, but devastating if you do not want to diffuse the message (if, say, the message is a video recording of your wrongdoing)” (Castells, M. 2011, 780).

Viral videos are sporadic in nature and are extremely difficult to orchestrate. Kevin Allocca, YouTube’s trends manager, notes that every minute more than 72 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube and of that only a tiny percentage goes “viral” with more than one million views (TED 2011c). Kevin observes three things that make a video go “viral”: (1) tastemakers; celebrities that share the video via SNS like Twitter, (2) communities of participation; this process can be accelerated by tastemakers but it is more about massive online communities that share an inside joke or create content inspired by the original video “this community participation is how we become a part of the phenomenon -- either by spreading it or by doing something new with it”, and (3) unexpectedness; videos must be truly unique and unexpected to stand out (TED 2011c). These are the characteristics of a kind of media environment “where anyone has access and the audience defines the popularity” (TED 2011c). It is also a “remix” culture in which people no longer just enjoy something, they participate.
Nonetheless, consultants, such as the viral factory\(^{48}\), offer assistance in creating a viral video, with the process being described as “turning brand messaging into cultural currency by creating content that people actively seek out and share with their friends”. It is the desire to actively search for and share a viral video that makes it one of the most powerful means of communicating to the public in the era of mass self-communication.

**Disseminating Information: Social Network Sites (SNSs)**

Social network sites and the internet networks that support them constitute the foundation of world society and represent its extreme diversity (Stichweh 2003). This diversity has been spurred by internet capable mobile devices that make it easier to adapt SNSs to individual needs. SNSs have become firmly integrated into people’s everyday life and claim a global registered user base of more than 2.5 billion. These large networks are able to strengthen communication within world society, which is “built around the media communication systems and Internet networks, particularly in the social spaces of Web 2.0” (Castells, M 2008, 90). Boyd and Ellison (2008, 211) define social network sites (SNSs) as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other user with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.” There are a myriad of websites that fit within these conceptual parameters, some examples are: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, MySpace, Bebo, Orkut, Friendster, QQ, Linkedin, Hi5 and Hyves.

Research into SNSs is difficult because of the different websites (Facebook, Google+ etc) and the varying motivations for using SNSs (Hargittai 2007). Nonetheless, SNSs do share a number of similarities, including the visible articulation of a user’s social network and the fact that most SNSs aim to support and strengthen a user’s pre-existing social network rather than to meet strangers (Boyd & Ellison 2008). Typically, a user’s social network is made up of varying “ties” with both “strong” and “weak”. The “strength” of an interpersonal tie was defined by Granovetter (1973, 1361) as “a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.”

Strong ties are close friends with whom the user is likely to share multiple interests and activities. These ties require a relatively large amount of time and attention to sustain and reciprocally offer users within the network extensive support. Such networks of strong ties “tend to be homogeneous and insular, reinforcing beliefs rather than introducing new ideas” (Donath 2007, 237).

Weak ties, on the other hand, are people with whom the user feels less responsibility towards and are known from a specific context or may share a common offline element. Although these acquaintances are relatively distant and heterogeneous they provide the user with diverse opinions, ideas and experiences. The acquisition and maintenance of weak ties in a cheap and efficient manner is a remarkable attribute of SNSs.

By creating and maintaining “larger, diffuse networks of relationships” users are able to “potentially draw resources” (Ellison, Steinfeld & Lampe 2007, 1146) from people
that they would not otherwise have come across. For world society campaigns these weak ties may prove invaluable in the dissemination of campaign information. This is especially true when the public has a tendency to use partisan and selective exposure in their information selection. Therefore, as SNSs become firmly entrenched in everyday life their value as a source of information grows exponentially as does the inherent value of weak ties for world society campaigns. Indeed, the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism discusses the increasing value of weak ties in their 2011 report “Navigating News Online” (2011): “if searching for news was the most important development of the last decade, sharing news may be among the most important of the next.” As does Joshua Benton, director and founder of Harvard’s Nieman Journalism Lab, who noted in an interview with The Economist that “this year [2011] you’ll see more and more news sites where referrals from social networks exceed those from search engines ... Facebook is beginning to join Google as one of the most influential players in driving news audiences” (Standage 2011, 11).

Weak ties assist world society campaigns in the dissemination of information by (1) aiding in the spread of diverse information across social networks and (2) by providing credibility and legitimacy to their information by virtue of the user’s recommendation. A “weak ties” recommendation can result from them “Liking” or “Posting” something on their Facebook “Wall” or “Tweeting” something to their followers or “Liking” and “Favouriting” something on their YouTube account. Whether the information redistributed by a weak tie is a music video, a movie review, a new book, a newspaper article, or a campaign website, “people can use their beliefs about another person’s knowledge and credibility to assess new ideas that come from that source” (Donath 2007, 245). People often “care more that people they know recommend a book than
about how it is generally received” (Donath 2007, 245). Due to heterogeneous nature of weak ties the information they chose to share is able to bridge the partisan divide. This provides world society campaigns with a remarkable opportunity to disseminate campaign information to a wide cross-section of the public.

SNSs fall within mass self-communication by enabling the user to become an active link in the distribution of campaign information. SNSs empower individuals to spread information that they deem notable within their extended social network. Whether this is the creation of “Group” or “Event” on Facebook or the modification of a video on YouTube, it ultimately diversifies content and ideas and encourages participation. Diverse participation in campaigns, especially throughout SNSs, is the raison d’être of world society and a key ingredient for successful norm proliferation.

It is both exciting and worrying, but as technology and mass self-communication platforms continue to evolve and adapt to an ever changing environment, the dissemination of campaign information via SNSs will see new opportunities arise as well as new challenges and complications. One such complication is what Eli Pariser (2011) terms “the filter bubble”. 49

The filter bubble is a personalised filter inbuilt within search engines like Google or SNSs like Facebook, which looks at the things that the user seems to like—the actual stories or people that the user clicks on the most—and attempts to make predictions.

---

49 This brief look at the “filter bubble” is designed to provide insight into what future complications and challenges to campaigns may look like. Because of the ever changing nature of the information communication environment it is of course non-exhaustive and may change itself.
about what that user would like to see. This is designed under the simple premise that the more personally relevant their information offerings, the more efficiently directed their advertisements become. This affects people by altering their search results in Google (which uses a person’s internet address to identify them), the people and stories that appear on their Facebook “newsfeeds” or the books they are recommended on Amazon. Pariser notes that “together, these engines create a unique universe of information for each of us—what I’ve come to call a filter bubble—which fundamentally alters the way we encounter ideas and information” (Pariser 2011, 9).

Three underlying features of the filter bubble render it unprecedented: (1) people are alone in it, (2) it is invisible to users, and (3) people do not chose to enter it. The invisible manipulation of a person’s information has the same consequences as partisan exposure, selective exposure, and audience fragmentation; less chance for encounters that bring new insights, information, and arguments into a person’s information diet.

This is the first time that an information source is able to quickly deduce who the user is, what they like, and what they want. Pariser believes that the commercial value of these deductions has given rise to “persuasive, embedded filtering” that is affecting the way individuals experience the internet and ultimately the world around them. While embedded filtering is a genuine concern, its deductions do come from the user’s ‘clicks’. In other words, it is the user who creates their own filter bubble by clicking on select stories or select friends, be they conservative, liberal, or otherwise. This compounds the effects of selective and partisan exposure by filtering a person’s searches and friends to suit these predispositions and threatens the potential power of weak and politically diverse ties by limiting their presence on people’s “newsfeeds”.
Aside from the commercial incentives of targeted ads there are personal benefits to individually catered searches and SNS “newsfeeds”. The incalculable number of information sources available online (“paradox of plenty”) makes it difficult to easily find quality sources. As a result people are understandably more inclined to welcome assistance in finding what they want. When this is coupled with the fact that human editors or cue givers are expensive and automatic embedded filtering is cheap people will increasingly “rely on a mix of non-professional editors (our friends and colleagues) and software code to figure out what to watch, read, and see.” For Pariser “this code will draw heavily on the power of personalisation and displace professional human editors” (Pariser 2011, 51-2). When a person’s media consumption reflects their interests they begin to lose out on what made the internet originally attractive: universality and diversity. Tim Berners-Lee, who created the World Wide Web, notes that the web was built on egalitarian principles of which “some of its most successful inhabitants have begun to chip away at” and if left unchecked “the web could be broken into fragmented islands ... [losing] the freedom to connect with whichever Web sites we want” (Berners-Lee 2010, 80-2).

Ideally addressing this problem requires people to hold a wide array of interests and to actively demonstrate these interests through the selection of diverse websites and Facebook friends. Not only would this provide people with diverse range of information and ideas it would also make it harder for embedded filtering to pigeonhole individuals. However, in reality people often have an information habit that is difficult to break and follows quite rigid parameters (Pariser 2011). Embedded
filtering is an issue that reinforces a central reality; Google and Facebook are companies that seek profit and will do whatever is necessary to maximise revenue.

It also leaves us questioning the viability of campaigns disseminating information to a diverse audience. When Facebook filters friends from your newsfeed who fail to share your predispositions and Google filters searches to match your interests, should campaigns simply cut their losses and focus on the people sympathetic to their cause? In response to this question Tim Berners-Lee rightly stresses that the web is under our control and is certainly not finished:

People seem to think the Web is some sort of piece of nature, and if it starts to wither, well, that’s just one of those unfortunate things we can’t help. Not so. We created the Web, by designing computer protocols and software; this process is completely under our control. We choose what properties we want it to have and not have. It is by no means finished (and it’s certainly not dead). If we want to track what government is doing, see what companies are doing, understand the true state of the planet, find a cure for Alzheimer’s disease, not to mention easily share our photos with our friends, we the public, the scientific community and the press must make sure the Web’s principles remain intact—not just to preserve what we have gained but to benefit from the great advances that are still to come (Berners-Lee 2010, 82).

Affirmation of the embryonic nature of the web, and in particular SNS, is provided by the continuously shifting way in which people find or are delivered information. The expanded processing capacity of smartphones to that of “the most powerful desktop
PCs only a few years ago” (Kushida, Murray & Zysman 2011, 18) has contributed to the erosion of Microsoft Windows’ total share of internet-connected devices. The way in which people acquire information has also shifted. Links to information through SNSs, like Facebook, Google+, and Linkedin, in addition to information sources like Wikipedia are becoming increasingly popular. This comes at the expense of indexed searching tools like Google (TED 2011b). It is for this reason that people should proceed with caution in condemning something as “dead” and avoid reaching premature conclusions. Technology moves fast and adapts to the needs and demands of the users.

**Disseminating Information: Four Cs (Control, Credibility, Clear and Concise)**

Disseminating information through mass self-communication requires the campaign to possess credibility, relinquish control, and formulate a clear and concise message.

Joseph S. Nye observes that “the world of traditional power politics is typically about whose military or economy wins.” Politics in an information age “may ultimately be about whose story wins” (Nye, J 2008, 100). The winning “story” is sometimes best devised by the very people the “story” is intended to win over. Relinquishing control enables the public to sell the “story” to themselves and can be extremely effective in the dissemination of campaign and product information.

Video game developers have pioneered the movement towards solidifying community engagement by relinquishing control over certain aspects of information dissemination through fan site packs or kits. These packs are accessible on the game developer’s
primary website\textsuperscript{50} and offer users the tools necessary to build their own fan sites, “the pack includes basic game information, wallpapers, screenshots, avatars, and banners, as well as special textures, backdrops, and logos” (Fallen Earth 2011). Enabling users to build their own fan sites, albeit with certain tools, sees developers sacrifice control over information dissemination.\textsuperscript{51} In return, the game’s developers gain strong community engagement with highly efficient and cost effective information dissemination. People are able to customise the website to appeal to different nations, demographics or niches, essentially providing the game developers with tailored access to difficult markets.

Fan made websites reciprocally attain credibility from the game developers by virtue of their “fan site packs” as they provide the user with official logos, banners and other features. Engaging the online community in this way builds relationships and forges a community rather than simply providing them with information (Diani 2001). Fan site packs enable the public “to become creators and primary subjects” and, more importantly “to become engaged in social production” (Fenton, N 2008a, 236). Forming part of Henry Jenkins’ (2013) “participatory culture”, fan communities who construct websites or write fan fiction “were among the first to experiment with ways they could pool knowledge, build on each other’s expertise, and trade insights within networked communities” (Jenkins 2013, xxv). Such fans view media socially and as a result media companies have come to value networked audiences who can create and disseminate information of their behalf (Jenkins 2013). This method of information


\textsuperscript{51} With the search “Diablo 3” (an upcoming Blizzard game) in Google, four of the top five websites are fan made websites (examples: http://www.diablofans.com/, http://diablo3x.com/, http://diablo.incgamers.com/ (Retrieved June 23, 2011))
dissemination makes excellent use of the public’s desire to interact and share, enhancing the credibility of game developers who employ such methods.

The correlation between successful campaigns and their ability to relinquish control through mass self-communication platforms is evidenced by the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). The CMC played an instrumental role in the establishment of the Convention on Cluster Munitions\textsuperscript{52} (CCM). The CMC is comprised of some 350 member organisations and originated soon after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq which saw forces utilise cluster munitions extensively. The organisational structure and purpose of the CMC was modelled on the Nobel Peace Laureate International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The CMC took a strong and unambiguous stand against cluster munitions from the outset demanding an “immediate moratorium on the use of cluster munitions, an acknowledgement of states’ responsibility for the explosive remnants they produced, and a commitment to provide resources to areas affected by unexploded submunitions” (HRW 2010, 108). The CMC exerted influence by actively participating in treaty conferences, lobbying state delegates in the hallways, providing documentation and reports to delegates, raising public awareness through active campaigning, and finally, providing victims of cluster munitions with a voice that served to humanize the issue of cluster munitions. The latter “brought a humanitarian dimension ... that helped ensure politics and misguided military claims did not trump civilian concerns” (HRW 2010, 124).

\textsuperscript{52} The CCM obligates each state party to never undertake the following; (a) Use cluster munitions; (b) Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions; (c) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
More specifically, the CMC actively encouraged engagement among supporters by providing the tools and information needed to participate. The CMC’s website provides “Campaigning Tools” (CMC 2011), which includes: CMC flyers, action plans, CMC chronology, action cards, website construction tools, fact sheets, maps, website building kit, real life stories, slide show presentations on the campaign, treaty petitioning tools, and a media guide. The media guide illustrates ways to attract attention through traditional media and SNS (CMC 2010). The CMC, like numerous game developers, has seized the public’s desire to participate by providing the tools and information to do so, thus relinquishing control to an engaged and enabled public.

Campaigns, politicians, and commercial products all willingly enter the contest of competitive credibility in order to vie for the public’s attention. While this usually bodes well for world society because of its diverse participation, universal norms, and representativeness, credibility is impossible to verify objectively. Credibility is a variable attributed to communicators or sources of information by recipients (Schweiger 2000). It is a perceptual variable in which an individual deems something more or less credible. In other words, credibility is not attached to specific websites or information sources but is a “property that is judged by the receiver of information” (Flanagin & Metzger 2007, 321). While this does make credibility difficult to measure, it has not prevented the steady increase of credibility being ascribed to online sources.

Blogs, one of mass self-communication’s foremost exemplars, are notable recipients of this increasing credibility. Johnson et al. (2007) observed that users judged blogs as moderately credible for news and information, which is more credible than any mainstream source. Online sources, including blogs, can be deemed credible for a
number of reasons including writer information and hyperlinks to verify information (Johnson, KA & Wiedenbeck 2009), professional site design (Metzger 2007), and transparency:

For full disclosure, organizations must make sure to provide a detailed description of the organization and its history, use hyperlinks to connect to the organization’s Web site, provide logos and visual cues to establish the connection, and list the individuals who are responsible for maintaining the social networking site profile (Waters et al. 2009, 103).

Aside from these attributes it is the motivation of the user that remains the primary determining factor in ascribing credibility. Motivated users will spend more time verifying information and will often deem blogs and online information more credible due to the time spent checking the information and sources (Flanagin & Metzger 2000, 2007; Johnson, TJ et al. 2007; Metzger 2007; Metzger, Flanagin & Zwarun 2003). This is consistent with discussion around audience fragmentation, as enhanced consumer choice will widen the knowledge gap between the motivated and less motivated.

In spite of this growing knowledge gap, world society campaigns are able to gain credibility and effectively disseminate information if they relinquish control, formulate a clear and concise message and utilise SNSs effectively. The latter is vital because of the credibility users prescribe to friends and contacts within their network. A person’s social network typically includes “friends” with varying levels of motivation. As a result some “friends” may be more motivated to spread campaign information across their
network, which keeps the unmotivated informed by virtue of them checking their preferred SNS. The same principle applies to SNS users who may be more focused on entertainment news as opposed to political news. Those focused on entertainment news often follow public entertainment figures that are able to inform their follows of an issue. Public figures who alert their followers to an issue also ascribe credibility to that issue or campaign by virtue of them posting or "Tweeting" information out to followers\(^53\). This was particularly prevalent in the case of Kony 2012.

In essence, mass self-communication has enabled world society campaigns to empower a person’s most trusted social allies, their friends and contacts, to spread information on their behalf.

**Shaming**

Publicly drawing attention to the negative aspects of a perpetrator’s character or actions as a way of condemning or punishing them for engaging in those actions is a powerful technique at world society’s disposal. Shaming was effectively used by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) with the help of celebrities such as Princess Diana and Kofi Annan, the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) public advertising campaigns, and ICBL coordinator Jodie Williams television appearances. These efforts drew attention to and condemned nations that continued to use anti-personnel (AP) landmines. The ICBL’s shaming efforts rested on strong rhetoric damning the humanitarian values of treaty holdouts. This led holdouts to be relegated to an ‘out-group’ of nations who were then perceived to have weak

---

\(^{53}\) This was exemplified by the recent gay marriage legislation passed in New York which saw a myriad of public figures “Tweet”, as can be seen here: http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/06/25/the-11-best-tweets-about-new-york-gay-marriage/ (Retrieved June 27, 2011)
humanitarian values. In addition, the ICBL was active in alerting the domestic public of any nation that had failed to adopt the ban.

Shaming in this way requires resources. The ICBL and its member organisations had access to resources that are not commonly available to individuals and smaller campaigns, such as experts, strong organisation, financial backing, access to traditional media, and celebrity support. This is the core difference between the utilisation of shaming by the ICBL and shaming within mass self-communication: increased individual participation. Individuals and smaller organisations can now create images, videos, or blogs that shame a nation or corporation and disseminate them widely with minimal resources using the platforms of mass self-communication.

The proliferation of YouTube videos during the Arab Spring\textsuperscript{54} is evidence of individuals and smaller organisations using mass self-communication to shame offenders. Video content created by protesters and civilians served in documenting the protests and the numerous acts of violence committed by or against them. The amateur footage, which is occasionally uploaded by traditional media outlets\textsuperscript{55}, shows incidents in nations such as Egypt (Khaleelmedia 2011), Libya (TheCHAOUIII 2011), Yemen (Telegraphtv 2011), Bahrain (RussiaToday 2011a), and Syria (AssociatedPress 2011; RussiaToday 2011b). These videos shamed authorities for engaging in actions against protestors by drawing attention to the actions (i.e. violence against civilians). Shaming efforts undertaken during the Arab Spring included other mass self-communication platforms such as the

\textsuperscript{54} This describes a number of demonstrations and protests in the Arab world that started in Tunisia on Saturday, 18 December 2010.

\textsuperscript{55} Namely RussiaToday (http://www.youtube.com/user/RussiaToday) & The Associate Press (http://www.youtube.com/user/associatedpress?blend=1&ob=4) (Retrieved January 30, 2012)
Facebook group “We Are All Khaled Saeed”. This Facebook group attracted a great deal of attention in Egypt after the beating and death of Khaled Mohamed Saeed at the hands of police. In addition, the Occupy Movement\(^\text{56}\) produced a myriad of content that purported to shame police in what protestors believed to be excessive force (Bendrik79 2011; Katie Falkenberg 2011; LibertyPlazaRev 2011) and more recently Turkey has uploaded videos that also shame police for excessive force (Özgültekin 2013). The revolutionary aspect of this process does not lie in the relative ease in capturing these events through mobile devices with video capabilities, rather the unprecedented ease in dissemination. Shaming the state in this way adds a degree of credence to Castells’ belief that “mass self-communication provides the technological platform for the construction of the autonomy of the social actor, be it individual or collective, vis-à-vis the institutions of society” (Castells, Manuel 2012, 7). Shaming and disseminating information is only strengthened by the next technique: establishing a network.

To determine whether shaming has been enhanced by mass self-communication we need to ask two questions. (1) Are government authorities more or less likely to assault protestors when protestors have the shaming capabilities of mass self-communication technologies? (2) If protestors are assaulted is the government authority more or less likely to be internationally shamed for their actions? These questions are complex, however the above examples of the occupy movement and instances within the Arab Spring do help in our consideration of them. Mass self-communication has given citizens the capacity to shame the actions of authorities and

\(^{56}\) Beginning on September 17, 2011 the Occupy movement is an international protest movement directed against economic and social inequality.
then easily disseminate this internationally. This capacity increases the amount of evidence available to activists that a government authority committed a shameful action. It is because of this enhanced capacity to capture and disseminate evidence through mass self-communication that shaming is enhanced. This does not stop and will not stop the actions of government authorities but by the same token one could say the lock on their door is a failure if they get burgled. A door lock, like mass self-communication technologies and shaming, is a deterrence.

**Establishing a Network**

Since the eighteenth-century social movements have centred their campaigns on interactive engagement among participants. Religious movements, popular rebellions, and electoral campaigns have been built around interactions between temporarily connected claimants and the representatives of their claims (Tilly 2004). Eighteenth-century social movements were supported by a burgeoning communication environment in which (one-to-one) private correspondence was on the rise by virtue of a commercial postal service and one-to-many mass communication was possible through the distribution of pamphlets (Haven 2011).

The core tenets of interaction and information dissemination are retained by modern networks and social movements, however, the scale has shifted. Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google, remarks that if all human communication from the dawn of time to 2003 was recorded it would amount to about five billion gigabytes. This is now being created every two days through tools like tweets, blog posts, Facebook status updates, and emails (Pariser 2011). The internet provides world society campaigns with a low
cost and instantaneous method of communication that complements highly flexible, loose and autonomous organisational structures (della Porta et al. 2006). Seemingly shaping world society operations on its own “web-like” image, the internet enables central activity hubs to link to other autonomous yet interconnected centres (Klein, N 2000; 2002). Much like other “astonishing advances in communication technology like the printing press, [and] the telephone” the internet does not take us away from the old and fundamental human tendency to share and interact; it instead “draw us closer to it” (Christakis & Fowler 2009, 257).

The dual themes of “multiplicity and polycentrality; interactivity and cross-border participation” (Fenton, N 2008a) make the internet a particularly strong tool for world society campaigns. Polycentrality refers to the presence of multiple hubs or centres of coordination in a segmented network of individuals and organisations. The relative ease in communicating between hubs encourages a shift from hierarchal or even formal leadership towards a loose organisational structure in which activists are able to simultaneously speak on behalf of one campaign while holding multiple affiliations. This enables networks to respond to domestic events with minimal resources and bureaucracy. The response to local events can take various forms, however, it commonly concerns “the sharing of experience and tactics on a transnational basis to inform and increase the capacity of local campaigns” (Fenton, N 2008a, 234). While interactivity and cross-border participation increase the legitimacy of networks by helping participants feel more involved and thus connected.

Ostensibly use of the internet is an incredible technological advance for campaigns as it provides a series of opportunities. These include: unfettered information
dissemination throughout their network, improved rates of participation, the ability to forge alliances and create coalitions across different movements, and a large resource pool of participants, techniques and information to draw upon. The latter is a testament to the internet’s strength in the construction and maintenance of weak or “thin ties” (Bennett 2003a), which provide new ideas and techniques due to their geographical and ideological diversity. The resulting campaign is large, flexible and “more adaptive and resistant to attack than coalitions forged through leader-based partnership among bureaucratic organizations” (Bennett 2003a, 146). Such networks can co-exist because their hubs operate independently of one another and can avoid internal conflict that would be present in a more centralised or hierarchal coalition.

People who participate in networks free of centralised or hierarchal control do so because they want to and it is mass self-communication with the self-generation, self-selection, and self-direction of content that provides them with the ability to do so. Networks of people who choose to participate out of interest or social responsibility are exemplified by the communities of Wikipedia\textsuperscript{57}, OpenIDEO.com\textsuperscript{58}, rndiy.org\textsuperscript{59}, our.windowfarms.org\textsuperscript{60}, Linux\textsuperscript{61}, RepRap\textsuperscript{62} and Mozilla’s Firefox\textsuperscript{63}. Individuals who willingly collaborate through the tools and platforms of mass self-communication

\textsuperscript{57} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (Retrieved November 28, 2011)
\textsuperscript{58} Discussed earlier and available at: http://www.openideo.com (Retrieved November 28, 2011)
\textsuperscript{59} “R&D-I-Y is a web platform with 18,000+ global citizens collaboratively innovating for environmental stewardship and quality of urban life.” Available at http://www.rndiy.org/ (Retrieved November 28, 2011)
\textsuperscript{60} A community of people developing window farms through open-source contribution. Available at: http://our.windowfarms.org/ (Retrieved November 28, 2011)
\textsuperscript{61} Linux is an open source operating system https://www.linux.com/ (Retrieved November 28, 2011)
\textsuperscript{62} RepRap was the first of the low-cost 3D printers, and the RepRap Project started the open-source 3D printer revolution. It has become the most widely-used 3D printer among the global members of the Maker Community”: http://www.reprap.org/wiki/RepRap (Retrieved September 10, 2012)
\textsuperscript{63} Mozilla’s Firefox is an open source web browser http://www.mozilla.org/ (Retrieved November 28, 2011)
encouraged Joichi Ito, Director of MIT Media Lab, to discuss the changing nature of leadership. Ito remarks that for some people a concept of leadership that is devoid of traditional or hierarchal control is no longer leadership (IBM 2011). In an environment in which individuals or organisations contribute to a project, not because they are being paid or coerced, but because they want to, cannot be led in a traditional top-down manner.

Tremendous assets like Firefox\textsuperscript{64}, Linux, and Wikipedia which compete with corporations like Google and Microsoft are being run by organisations where the people doing the organising have very limited control (IBM 2011). Citizens engaging in social production through mass self-communication platforms are altering their relationship with the public sphere by becoming creators and primary subjects (Benkler 2006). It is in this sense that optimists credit the internet with the powers of democratisation. Castells is one such optimist:

\begin{quote}
Possibilities created by the new multimodal, interactive communication system extraordinarily reinforce the chances for new messages and new messengers to populate the communication networks of society at large, thus reprogramming the networks around their values, interests, and projects. In this sense, the construction of communicative autonomy is directly related to the development of social and political autonomy, a key factor in fostering social change (Castells, M. 2009, 414)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{64} Firefox is the second most widely used web browser with an estimated 25% market share and $130 million in revenue (2012).
Of course, even optimists like Castells (2009) argue that the effects of technology on society are of an indeterminate nature and that technology per se does not necessarily produce political or cultural change. Nor does the expanded capacity for international communication automatically produce world society movements or campaigns (Della Porta & Kriesi 2002, 5). Nonetheless, judging by the aforementioned characteristics one would be forgiven for thinking that the internet is perfectly suited to assist world society campaigns. However, many of the internet’s strengths can be directly correlated with weaknesses or vulnerabilities.

First, because the task of joining and leaving polycentric networks has become menial, internet based communication has led campaigns to face difficulties in controlling their message and achieving coherent collective identity frames (Bennett 2003a). The resulting campaign can be characterised as fleeting and momentary as the individuals and organisations that now comprise it are able to leave and join others with relative ease. This is of course opposed to the view that campaigns should be formed with committed and loyal members (Tarrow & McAdam 2005). This problem is distinct to the internet and the mere mouse click required to “join” a campaign. Whether people join or “Like” via a Facebook group, register on a website, or sign an online petition the commitment required is minimal. This is especially true in contrast to older “physical” mechanisms required to join a campaign, such as physical petitions or a person’s presence at a meeting.

Second, aside from the advantages to easily enabling diverse organisations to campaign together, namely diverse ideas and tactics, the network may also harbour
profound intellectual contradictions. Such contradictions may be relatively sustainable within the campaigning process but can hinder the execution of the campaign’s final goal, whether that is the wording of a treaty or the enactment of a specific policy. Furthermore, individual organisations that join a polycentric network and employ open cooperative communication to set agendas and organize action can face challenges to their own internal direction and goals (Bennett 2003a). Challenges to the individual goals of organisations can be compounded when they are absorbed as an important hub within a polycentric network, as they may be forced to transform internally to meet the demands of other members of the network.

The weaknesses and vulnerabilities that come with the use of the internet can certainly be detrimental to a campaign’s success, but they exist in “constant creative tension” (Bennett 2003a) with the internet’s strengths. This “creative tension” can tip either way as the weaknesses of the internet can be overcome and almost neutralised by its strengths. Unfortunately, it is not these weaknesses that pose the real challenge to campaigns, but rather state control, censorship, material inequality, and corporate dominance. It is these problems that stand as the central quandary to the optimistic vision of a world in which the majority of its populace has the ability to actively participate in global issues.

In as early as 2000, Sassen (2000; 2005) discussed the “significant implications attached to the fact that the leading internet software design focus in the last few years has been on firewalled intranets for firms and firewalled tunnels for firm-to-firm transactions” (Sassen, Saskia 2005, 372). This change in focus identified by Sassen came with early developments in e-commerce, encouraging moves towards stricter
identity verification, trademark protection, copyright, and billing. For Sassen, these changes “represent, in some sense, private appropriations of a ‘public’ space” (Sassen, Saskia 2005, 372). This commercially driven push to privatise and control aspects of the internet has been equally matched by the state.

The OpenNet Initiative (ONI) maintains that the “number of states that limit access to Internet content has risen rapidly in recent years” and outlines the strategies used by governments to control and censor content on the internet: (1) technical blocking, which involves “three commonly used techniques to block access to Internet sites: IP blocking, DNS tampering, and URL blocking using a proxy.” (2) Search result removals, which requires “companies that provide Internet search services cooperate with governments to omit illegal or undesirable websites from search results.” (3) Taking down the website and removing any inappropriate or illegal content; however this is only possible when “regulators have direct access to and legal jurisdiction over web content hosts” (OpenNet Initiative 2011). (4) Finally, self-censorship rests on the “threat of legal action, the promotion of social norms, or informal methods of intimidation” (2011). The state does this to secure “intellectual property rights,” protect “national security,” preserve “cultural norms and religious values,” and shield “children from pornography and exploitation” (2011).

The state’s push for control comes despite a commonly held belief at the height of the dot-com boom “that the internet changes everything, including regulation” (Ang 2005, 65).

---

65 The OpenNet Initiative (ONI) is a collaborative partnership of three institutions: the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University; and the SecDev Group (Ottawa). Available at: opennet.net (Retrieved December 8, 2011)
1). This belief was shared by John Perry Barlow, during his seminal speech titled “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” in Davos, Switzerland at the World Economic Forum in 1996, declaring that no rules or governance should be applied to the internet.

Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.

We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.

Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions.

Barlow’s speech “articulated a powerful vision: a new frontier, where people lived in peace, under their own rules, liberated from the constraints of an oppressive society
and free from government meddling” and depicted an “era when it was widely believed that cyberspace might challenge the authority of nation-states and move the world to a new, post-territorial system” (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, 13-4). Such declarations and any supporting sentiments have not stopped and will not stop policymakers from attempting to control and regulate the internet, “National governments have been able to assert control over the local effects of offshore Internet communications. They have done so not by going after computer sources abroad, but rather through coercion of entities within their borders” (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, 66). Any medium that enables people to engage in transnational communication and information dissemination will inevitably become the subject of regulation.

Material inequality is the next obstacle to the formation of truly representative world society networks or campaigns. State regulation of the internet can often be circumnavigated through the use of simple mechanisms, material inequality cannot. Any claims for the enhanced capacity and influence of world society networks via the emancipatory powers of the internet must be placed in the context of material and social inequality.

This phenomenon is encapsulated by the term ‘digital divide’ which denotes an inequality in computer and internet access among varied demographics. The concept has attracted increased attention and “is undoubtedly one of the most important social equity issues facing the information society” (Eastin & LaRose 2000, 0). The term “digital divide” is commonly used in political or popular discourse to mean having access or not having access (Selwyn 2004) or as access discrimination based on race
and class (Eastin & LaRose 2000), when the issue is actually far more complex. This complexity is discussed by Warschauer, the “digital divide is marked not only by physical access to computers and connectivity, but also by access to the additional resources that allow people to use technology well” (2002, 0). The factors that contribute to the digital divide range from language and literacy to content, education and a lack of motivation of which van Dijk and Hacker (2003, 315-16) list as:

1. Lack of elementary digital experience caused by lack of interest, computer anxiety, and unattractiveness of the new technology (“mental access”).
2. No possession of computers and network connections (“material access”).
3. Lack of digital skills caused by insufficient user friendliness and inadequate education or social support (“skills access”).
4. Lack of significant usage opportunities (“usage access”).

The “digital divide” often means that the people who are most affected by the social injustice being campaigned against will have little or no input. Shashi Tharoor once remarked that “the enormous gap in access means that seventy percent of the world’s internet users live in the 24 richest countries and that 400,000 citizens of Luxemburg can count on more international bandwidth than Africa’s 800 million citizens.”

To consider the internet as an unproblematic force for social change is to ignore the political and economic determinants that shape the technology; it is to pay little attention to how technological ‘advances’ may be shaped or

---

66 Shashi Tharoor (Under-Secretary General for Communication and Public Information, United Nations) Keynote speech to the Global Forum on Media Development in Amman, Jordan, October 2005
determined by particular social and cultural elites (corporations, governments); 
and it is to ignore the obstacles to empowerment that legislation, inequalities 
of access, limits on media literacy and the real world situation of 
disempowerment necessarily place on groups and individuals (Atton 2004, 24).

The digital divide and the associated difficulties in acquiring a truly diverse and 
representative network accord with the prior discussion surrounding information 
dissemination and selective exposure. Nonetheless, it can be said with confidence that 
in spite of the internet’s weaknesses, its emergence has made the political 
environment more volatile, less predictable, and less amenable to traditional forms of 
control (Lacy & Wilkin 2005). Information can flow faster and more easily from group 
to group and individual to individual. Thus, as the internet’s speed and reach increase, 
while its costs decrease, its ability to decentralise information will dramatically begin 
to outweigh its centralising effects. In this sense, the benefits of the internet and mass 
self-communication to world society campaigning are hard to dismiss.

Indeed, for Thomas W. Malone (IBMSocialMedia 2011) new information technologies 
and the significant reduction in the cost of communication means that more people 
have enough information to make sensible decisions for themselves. More importantly 
these decisions can be made without waiting for someone above them in a hierarchy, 
who supposedly has more information than they do, to tell them what to do. The shift 
in the conception of top down leadership and the increased availability of information 
represents one of the most profound changes to world society networking and society
more generally. British politician, Paddy Ashdown substantiated this belief in a speech at TEDxBrussels (TED 2011a), stating:

In fact, our governments, vertically constructed, constructed on the economic model of the Industrial Revolution -- vertical hierarchy, specialization of tasks, command structures -- have got the wrong structures completely. You in business know that the paradigm structure of our time, ladies and gentlemen, is the network. It's your capacity to network that matters, both within your governments and externally.

... In the modern age, where everything is connected to everything, the most important thing about what you can do is what you can do with others. The most important bit about your structure -- whether you're a government, whether you're an army regiment, whether you're a business -- is your docking points, your interconnectors, your capacity to network with others. You understand that in industry; governments don't.

Framing and Normative Grafting

It is fair to say that if enough people have knowledge of a campaign’s existence the campaign has successfully generated an issue through information dissemination. People either have knowledge of the issue or they do not, even though the degree of knowledge may vary greatly. Strict control over the medium or the manner in which information is disseminated is often unnecessary in raising general awareness. Thus, the enhanced capabilities for individual expression and content creation within mass self-communication aptly serve in spreading awareness. In this communication
environment the campaign often surrenders control with regard to the presentation of meaning or the interpretation that is conveyed to the public. This loss of control comes as the content, information, and communication platform employed by individuals may differ from that of the campaign. While the individualised dissemination of information to raise awareness and generate an issue is essential to the success of world society campaigns, this lack of control can be instead seen as a hindrance to the technique of framing and grafting.

Framing is the promotion of select elements or interpretations of an issue, while norm grafting denotes the association of a new norm with a pre-existing norm in the same issue area. Norm grafting in mass self-communication could, for example, be achieved through rhetoric on platforms such as Twitter, in which a prospective norm is mentioned in likeness or association to another similar yet successful issue or norm. In contrast to the processes of raising awareness and generating an issue through information dissemination, framing and grafting require a comparatively controlled message that maintains a coherent and consistent interpretation or frame. This was exemplified by the ICBL’s ability to frame AP landmines as a humanitarian issue and graft the proposed ban on AP landmines to a similar norm prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The main challenge for world society campaigns when framing or grafting, is “to “align” or “extend” their frame in such a way that it “resonates” with the experiences and the empirical context of the targeted audience” (Joachim 2003, 250).

---

67 As Kofi Annan did in his speech at the Diplomatic Conference on Landmines discussed in Chapter 4 (p84-85)
Campaigns operating in an environment marked by mass self-communication face more difficulty in controlling their message due to its volatile and sporadic nature. Individuals, be they proponent or opponent, can reshape the campaign’s message and resend it via any number of differing mediums and platforms. Castells (2011, 780) contrasts this “removal of control over message distribution ... with the traditional network power of the mass media, which reformats the message to be suitable for the audience in accordance with their corporate” or campaign strategy. Individuals are also able to easily compare or even check any world society campaign message with that of an opposition group. This means that it is becoming more and more difficult to maintain a consistent and coherent frame for many issues. Such difficulties are often compounded for corporations who are particularly susceptible to counter messages that threaten the image of their brand.

Naomi Klein describes the practice of “culture jamming” as the parodying of “advertisements and hijacking billboards in order to drastically alter their messages” (Klein, N 2000, 280). While culture jamming finds its roots in the destruction of billboards, commonly tobacco billboards, it has seen a shift in focus from mere “pranksterism” to politics. Culture jamming or “adbusting” now serves as a vehicle for world society activists to exhibit their contempt for the actions of multinational corporations. The proliferation of relatively accessible technologies such as the internet and Photoshop, makes the reframing, creation, and dissemination of ad parodies immeasurably easier (Klein, N 2000).
Operating in an environment that is less amenable to traditional forms of control has encouraged resurgence in “adbusting”, as individuals seize upon the enhanced opportunity for expression. One such opportunity was seized by Adbusters (www.adbusters.org) and Greenpeace (www.greenpeace.org) when they created a counter-image campaign for Coca-Cola (Bennett 2003b). The image featured Coke’s iconic polar bears – a mother and her cubs – huddled together on a melting ice flow, which as the advertisement implied was happening as a direct consequence of the gases (HFCs) employed by Coke in its cooling and bottling process. The collaboration of the two agencies also produced a rogue version of the company’s actual website which demonstrated the negative impact this process was having on the environment. The counter-images and mock website threatened to hijack and undermine the company’s brand environment during the Olympic games which represents its biggest commercial event. This led Coca-Cola to make a wise business decision and commit to changing the chemicals used during the manufacturing process (Bennett 2003b).

Another example of world society targeting multinational corporations came from the massive offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico at the hands of BP and Transocean in 2010. The oil spill prompted the creation and dissemination of a number of counter-images and videos that attacked BP for the spill and its failed clean-up efforts. One of the more notable counter-videos came from UCBComedy who posted a video on YouTube depicting a comedic “coffee spill” at BP headquarters which mocked BP’s inability to manage the spill and garnered over 12 million views (UCBComedy 2010). These examples highlight the ability of individuals operating within mass self-communication to exploit the frailties of multinational corporations and promote
change or damage the company’s brand. Such instances result from inexpensive access
to technologies and the difficulties faced by corporations, governments, and
campaigns in maintaining control over the information environment surrounding their
message or brand. For Castells, “[t]his is why the rise of mass self-communication,
which increases the ability of the audience to produce its (our) own messages,
potentially challenges corporate control of communication and may change power
relationships in the communication sphere” (Castells, M. 2011, 783).

This information environment is characterised by open access and encompasses
forums, social networks, blogs, video platforms, comments, photo uploads, and social
news platforms. Open access means that smaller campaigns or organisations that
would otherwise not have the resources to frame an issue or graft norms within
traditional media now have a voice. However, it is when we look at the larger
campaigns or organisations that we see changes, as the once commanding and often
lone voice of their vast advertising and media budgets is met with the empowered
voice of millions of consumers and campaigners. These are the same consumers and
campaigners that have unprecedented control over their information selection. This
control enables them to filter out unwanted or uncongenial messages and crosscheck
claims to an unprecedented extent. As a result, the task of reaching them with
targeted advertisements or campaigns messages is just that much more difficult. In
spite of these challenges, framing and normative grafting are still crucial in overcoming
partisan and selective exposure. Framing an issue so it will appeal to specific sections
of the public or grafting a prospective norm to a well-established norm will always help
attract attention from a cross section of the public.
Reversing the Burden of Proof

One of the more potent effects of mass self-communication has been its ability to blur the line between public and private communication, providing the general public with a myriad of open avenues for dialogue with policymakers. US Senator Ron Wyden told the *New York Times*, “It’s going to be a new day in the Senate ... The way citizens communicate with their government is never going to be the same” (Weisman 2012). Wyden made this remark after lawmakers were contacted by over 14 million people to protest the enactment of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). Wyden’s comments come with the increasing adoption of mass self-communication platforms, notably Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and personal websites, among policymakers. The use of mass self-communication platforms has seen an increasing proportion of political communication shift from private correspondence (WikiLeaks) into the far more open and accessible public realm. U.S. President Barack Obama is a testament to the viability of public engagement through mass self-communication platforms such as Facebook68, Google+69, Twitter70, and YouTube71. President Obama used Google+ and YouTube to orchestrate “Your Interview with the President - 2012” (Whitehouse 2012) which saw President Obama answer live questions. Engagement through an open forum means that the dialogue between the two parties is open to others, making any response from a policymaker clearly visible and thus more powerful. Even if the policymaker chooses not to reply, both the question and issue have been disseminated by virtue of the open forum.

---

68 http://www.facebook.com/#!/barackobama (Retrieved February 1, 2012)
69 https://plus.google.com/u/0/110031535020051778989/posts (Retrieved February 1, 2012)
70 http://twitter.com/barackobama (Retrieved February 2, 2012)
71 http://www.youtube.com/user/whitehouse?blend=1&ob=0 (Retrieved February 1, 2012)
In other words, because the forum is open it does not matter if the policy maker responds because the debate is openly visible. Therefore, even if most of the evidence and questions are coming from the public, it is the debate and questioning itself that informs people and legitimates the issue. Nonetheless, if a response or acknowledgement is obtained from a policymaker it can grant legitimacy and assist in shifting the dominant discourse towards your prospective norm. The importance of supportive rhetoric from policymakers cannot be overstated and played a critical role in delegitimizing AP landmines. Nations who may have been opposed to an immediate and comprehensive ban, like the US, Russia and China, did show some rhetorical support for the ban in the discussion for alternatives. As rhetorical “support for an international prohibition in principle (albeit, once alternatives are developed) provides much in the way of delegitimizing AP land mines ... especially compared with a situation in which opponents simply reject as ridiculous the idea of an international ban” (Price, Richard 1998a, 636). Due to the amount of people that can apply pressure and ask questions through mass self-communication platforms, the attainment of a response has been made easier.

Increased participation through mass self-communication platforms makes it easier to shift debate to the open realm because a large number of people are already “there” so to speak. It is also far simpler to move a debate that may have originated in the private realm to the public realm via mass self-communication platforms than it was with traditional means of communication. Debate that takes place openly, whether it is between the public and policymakers or just between the public, lets people observe the arguments and evidence from both parties and make up their own mind. Access to information that enables people to make decisions themselves aligns with the
changing notion of leadership discussed earlier and is a profound development for society more generally.

Once the dominant discourse has shifted in favour of the new norm or the norm has gained some degree of legitimacy through open debate, world society campaigns need evidence. The ICBL’s success in reversing the burden of proof from ban proponents to ban opponents was an important step towards the treaty. The ICBL’s success was the result of evidence from military experts claiming that the military benefit of AP landmines did not outweigh the associated humanitarian cost. The ICBL disseminated this evidence via conferences and traditional media sources.

On the other hand, reversing the burden of proof through mass self-communication comes via individually created content on smart phones, digital cameras, and mobile internet devices. This content is then disseminated via open platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube of which an admittedly contested example is the death of Neda Agha Soltan. Neda was allegedly shot in the chest at the hands of Iranian Basij militia (government paramilitary) while watching protests regarding the outcome of Iran’s 2009 presidential election. Her death was captured in a number of graphic amateur mobile-phone videos that were posted on YouTube (Ifnorth 2009), LiveLeak.com (Agharazi 2010; DeathTokhamenei 2009; Dwenc 2009) and other SNSs. The video quickly went viral and attracted a lot of attention across both traditional media and SNSs. It also firmly placed the burden of proof on the Iranian government and disputed its claim that it was not responsible for Neda’s death. Dr Arash Hejazi who can be seen in the video aiding Neda, further substantiated the video’s claims
noting that protestors were able to grab an armed man on a motorcycle, "People shouted 'we got him, we got him'. They disarmed him and took out his identity card which showed he was a Basij member. People were furious and he was shouting, 'I didn't want to kill her'" (‘Iran doctor tells of Neda's death' 2009). The identity card was later published on the internet.

In spite of counter claims made by Iranian officials (Erdbrink & Branigin 2009; Gorman 2009; Malcolm 2009), the video turned Neda's death into one of the most widely witnessed deaths in history (Mahr 2009). It is the counter claims made by Iranian officials that reaffirm the positive effect of mass self-communication on reversing the burden the proof. The very fact that Iran denied the allegations reveals that it recognised that the burden of proof had been shifted to them or at least recognised the allegations. If not for the video spread throughout mass self-communication platforms there would be no need to mention, explain, or justify the death of Nada at all. The anonymous producer of the video won the prestigious Polk journalism award (Mcfadden 2010), of which the curator, John Darnton, noted: “We don’t know who took it or who uploaded it, but we do know it has news value. This award celebrates the fact that, in today’s world, a brave bystander with a cellphone camera can use video-sharing and social networking sites to deliver news” (Mcfadden 2010). The fact that individuals can force a government to prove that it did not commit an act is a truly remarkable feat for world society actors operating through mass self-communication platforms.

**Viability of Techniques**
Inventor Nikola Tesla observation that the “practical success of an idea, irrespective of its inherent merit, is dependent on the attitude of the contemporaries. If timely it is quickly adopted; if not, it is apt to fare like a sprout lured out of the ground by warm sunshine, only to be injured and retarded in its growth by the succeeding frost” (Kacperpostawski 2011). World society campaigns must make any prospective norm timely in the eyes of their contemporaries.

This research argues that the dissemination of information to raise awareness and generate an issue, establishing a network, framing, normative grafting, shaming, and reversing the burden of proof from proponents of the campaign to opponents can assist in this process. These techniques once prosecuted by the ICBL find themselves largely rooted in an increasingly out-dated media environment. Mass self-communication has been established throughout this chapter as the basis for the continued examination of these techniques. Understanding mass self-communication and the current information communication environment helps us mitigate any challenges it presents and evaluate the continued viability of these campaigning techniques.

Indeed, these techniques are still viable. They have just undergone change. This change has come as a consequence of the now instrumental role the public plays in executing each of these techniques. From sharing information on social networks to the creation of videos to shame perpetrators; the public is now instrumental in actually executing campaigning techniques within mass self-communication. The instrumental role of the public encourages campaigns to harness the public’s desire to interact,
participate and engage. Harnessing these public attributes sees the advantages of the current information communication environment become more apparent.

The advantages include the capacity for campaigns to serve a social function by facilitating *simple* interaction between people who then reciprocally spread campaign information; to enter the public domain from multiple sources (SNSs like Facebook and Google+, or information dissemination tools like blogs and YouTube); to spread information to a more diverse public through SNS’s weak ties, and to do it in a cost efficient manner. Maintaining a clear and concise message in the dissemination of campaign information, relinquishing control to the public in its modification, creation, and continued dissemination, while also holding credibility, all augment the campaign’s capacity to harness these advantages.

Reduced cost (in accessing and creating content) and the proliferation of information sees these techniques also change as a result of an individual’s unprecedented level of control in their selection of information. A corollary of which is the importance of understanding the reasoning (be that partisan or selective exposure) behind an individual’s selection of information. Individual control makes it relatively easy to ignore certain types of information, which ultimately fuels the cost of communication, while diminishing its effectiveness. Alleviating some of the difficulty in reaching the public comes through the creation of *diverse* networks. In this context a network denotes an individual’s social network or a campaign’s network of both individuals and organisations.
For an individual it is the relative ease in maintaining a social network consisting of both strong and weak ties through SNSs that helps realise increased diversity. For a campaign it is the changing nature of leadership as a result of people participating out of interest or moral responsibility coupled with increased access to information that sees their networks more readily comprised of autonomous and diverse organisations and individuals. Stronger and more diverse networks counter partisan and selective exposure by appealing to a wide spectrum of the population by virtue of the network’s diversity.

Finally, it must be noted that certain issues are particularly good at reaching people irrespective of any challenges posed by mass self-communication. In this respect, the anti-personnel (AP) landmine issue certainly exhibits desirable characteristics, namely a direct causal link between mines and victims, a simple normative formulation of “ban AP landmines”, and the fact that it involves bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, specifically children. While not everyone would place these values above a purported belief in national defence, it can be assumed that the needless death and maiming of thousands of people would cut across fragments of the population engaging in selective or partisan exposure. In this way important issues are still able to draw attention irrespective of any political or ideological divides.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the effects of mass self-communication on the five techniques (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and shifting the burden of proof) used by the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines’ (ICBL) to stimulate normative change. This chapter also saw a number of shifts pertaining to modern campaigns come to the fore: the proliferation of content and information, the increased importance of credibility, a loss of control, the public’s now instrumental role in executing the campaign’s techniques, increased participation, and a growing proportion of debate taking place online. To successfully disseminate information in this environment while harnessing the public’s propensity to participate means relinquishing control, holding credibility, and formulating a clear and concise message. The next chapter will continue the discussion of mass self-communication and the five techniques with a case study of the Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign.
Chapter Six: Ban Live Export (BLE)

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the 2011 Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign in Australia. The campaign was run by two organisations; Animals Australia and RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) Australia. Described by Australian independent senator, Nick Xenophon as proof that "people power" (Farr 2011) works, the BLE campaign cost the live export industry (worth AU$700 million a year) at least “326 jobs, left at least 274,000 animals stranded and 58 per cent of affected farmers out of pocket” (Kelly & Rout 2012). By challenging Australia’s economic imperatives and its relationship with its biggest neighbour, Indonesia, the BLE campaign provides a unique insight into world society’s influence on the nation state.

This chapter connects the two major strands of scholarship, namely international relations (IR) and mass self-communication. Informing these debates through a case study provides the scholarship with real world value and insight into the interactions between world society campaigning techniques and mass self-communication.

The approach to this case study is undertaken in two stages. The first stage investigates the background of the Ban Live Export campaign (BLE), the steps towards the initial suspension and the subsequent restrictions imposed by the Australian government. Following this background information we will then examine the characteristics of the BLE campaign, the characteristics of the issue, and the characteristics of the target, in this case Australia.
The second stage focuses on the campaign’s techniques: (1) disseminating information to raise awareness and generate an issue, (2) establishing a network, (3) framing and normative grafting, (4) shaming, and (5) reversing the burden of proof from proponents of the campaign to opponents. The application of these techniques follows our discussions in Chapter Five concerning the effects of the current information communication environment.

**Background**

**Campaign Timeline 1**

Indonesia has imported over 6 million live cattle from Australia in the last 20 years. In 2010 live exports to Indonesia represented 60% (521,002 cattle) of all live cattle exports from Australia (Jones 2011). The export of live cattle to all countries in 2010 amounted to AU$684 million, while cattle exports to Indonesia alone were worth AU$437.4 million in the 2009/10 financial year (Ban Live Export 2011a). The cattle sent to Indonesia are sourced from the north of Australia and are not accustomed to
human handling. Indonesian abattoirs commonly employ rope casting to trip the animal onto its side and follow with multiple throat cuts to an often fully conscious animal. This is possible as Indonesia has no enforceable animal welfare regulations or penalties (Jones 2011). These conditions were documented by ABC1’s (Australia Broadcast Corporation) program *Four Corners* and the story 'A Bloody Business' (Ferguson & Doyle 2011) on the 30th of May, 2011.

The ABC described the program as “an explosive exposé of the cruelty inflicted on Australian cattle exported to the slaughterhouses of Indonesia” and featured graphic footage from Animals Australia’s72 March 2011 investigation into Indonesian slaughterhouses (Ban Live Export 2011b). Animal Australia’s investigation visited 11 abattoirs in four Indonesian cities and documented the treatment of Australian cattle up to the point of slaughter. The investigation provided evidence that was used by the RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) to conduct a full scientific assessment (Jones 2011). In the resulting scientific report by RSPCA Australia, Dr Bidda Jones made a recommendation, which sums up the campaign’s goals:

> Unless the slaughter of Australian cattle could be restricted to locations where a skilled, permanent workforce was employed, stunning was effectively used, and training and auditing programs and enforceable animal welfare legislation were in place, it is difficult to see how their treatment could be reliably and sustainably improved. Fundamental change to both cultural and legislative approaches to animal welfare in Indonesia is needed in order to achieve that

goal. This, at best, would be a long-term undertaking. The continued suffering of millions of Australian cattle while such change was attempted against all the known impediments is totally unacceptable. The only practical and ethical solution is for the export of cattle to be replaced by the export of meat products. It is time to accept the evidence and act accordingly (Jones 2011, 6).

After the story aired, Australian advocacy organisation GetUp! (2011) joined the campaign and registered its fastest growing petition. The petition called for the immediate halt of live exports to Indonesia and a complete end to live exports from Australia within 3 years. The immense public response to the story temporally crashed the websites of Animals Australia, RSPCA Australia73 and GetUp!. In addition, the public outcry prompted calls from members of parliament (Coorey 2011; Minister for Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2011a; Siewert 2011) and the Australian Veterinary Association (AVA) (Australian Veterinary Association 2011) to suspend live exports. On the 8th of June, 2011 Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard responded to public demand and announced the suspension of live cattle exports to Indonesia. Proponents of a ban supported this announcement and continued to apply pressure through protest marches (AAP 2011a), virtual protests74, and emails to members of parliament.

On the other hand, opponents of the ban expressed the economic (AAP 2011b; Farr 2011) and diplomatic (AAP 2011c) consequences of the suspension of live export to Indonesia.

74 http://www.banliveexport.com/virtual-protest/ (Retrieved February 16, 2012)
On the 6th of July 2011 the Australian government resumed live exports to Indonesia. However, it did so with strict limitations. In lifting the ban Federal Agriculture Minister Joe Ludwig (‘Government lifts live cattle export ban’ 2011a) implemented a "supply chain assurance regulatory model" to help meet animal welfare standards. Ludwig noted that the model "enables those specific companies [and] individuals seeking to export live animals to Indonesia to apply for the permit, meet the regulatory framework that's in place and then they will receive the permit and the trade can resume at that point [sic]" (‘Government lifts live cattle export ban’ 2011a). This required each abattoir in Indonesia to be independently audited to meet animal welfare standards before they can receive live export from Australia. Furthermore, exporters must now track their animals and show they are slaughtered in approved Indonesian abattoirs (Scott 2011).

Even after the ban was lifted the Australian live export industry continued to face uncertainty (‘Uncertainty after live export ban lifted’ 2011) amid pressure from members of government and animal welfare groups trying to ensure animal safety (Willingham 2011a). Parliament introduced two bills to end the live export trade on the 8th of August (Animals Australia 2011a), however, these bills were voted down, with many calling, in vain, for a conscience vote. The 16th of August, 2011 marked the arrival of the first cattle shipped to Indonesia under the new export regulations (Brown, M 2011) with exporters stressing that they have invested heavily to comply with the new standards.
However, the new standards failed to incorporate “upright restraint, pre-slaughter stunning nor do they prohibit traditional roping slaughter where animals are forcibly tripped onto their side for the throat cut” (RSPCA 2011a). These failures prompted Labor MP Tony Zappia to submit a 'notice of motion' to the Australian Labor Party (ALP) caucus on the 24th of August 2011. Zappia’s notice of motion would set in place restrictions ensuring that Australian animals are only being exported to countries that can guarantee that the animal would be stunned before slaughter (Animals Australia 2011b). On the 11th of October, 2011 the bill was considerably weakened from mandating stunning to the encouragement of stunning in foreign abattoirs, this was despite pressure from more than 60,000 letters, emails, and phone calls (Animals Australia 2011c; Willingham 2011b). Furthermore, a review commissioned by the Australian government into the live export trade, released on the 21st of October, 2011 again disappointed animal welfare groups by failing to address the mandatory stunning of the animals prior to slaughter (Animals Australia 2011d). Aside from this omission the review did seek to improve conditions for live exports requiring Australian exporters to ensure that:

- animals will be handled and processed at or better than the internationally accepted standards for animal welfare established by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE);
- they have control of the movement of animals within their supply chain;
- they can trace or account for animals through the supply chain;
- and, they conduct independent verification and performance audits of their supply chains against these new requirements (Minister for Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2011b).
Finally, in response to the omission of mandatory stunning from the review, Independent MP Andrew Wilkie introduced a new bill into parliament on the 31st of October, 2011. The new bill aimed to make it mandatory to stun Australian animals in overseas abattoirs (AAP 2011d; Animals Australia 2011m). In spite of this push, the Australian Labor Party reaffirmed its support for the live export industry in a vote against the phasing out of live exports and mandatory stunning on December 4th 2011. In its vote the Labor Party cited the severe economic ramifications of a ban and a reluctance to stun animals in Indonesia because of Islamic slaughtering customs (‘Labor rejects push to ban live exports’ 2011b; AAP 2011e).

**Techniques**

The BLE campaign did not achieve what they set out to achieve, namely banning live exports. In addition, they did not make stunning mandatory prior to slaughter. To all intents and purposes they failed as a campaign. However, by examining indirect evidence of changing norms in Australia the achievements of BLE campaign become more apparent. Indirect evidence of an emerging ban live export norm comes from the justification of actions that previously needed no justification. Changing norms – collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors – requires actors to justify their actions because norms embody a quality of “oughtness” that involves standards of “appropriate” or “proper” behaviour. It is through this “shared moral assessment” that norms prompt justifications for action and “leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 892).
Live exports to Indonesia had continued unabated for many years. The BLE campaign not only forced the live export trade to justify its operation but its very existence. It also forced many consumers to justify the purchase of meat following the airing of the Four Corners program, as many retailers reported a 15 percent drop in meat sales (‘Mix messages on red meat sales’ 2011a; Zappone 2011). This drop in meat sales owes much to the campaign’s success in grafting the emerging norm against live exports, and meat more generally, to animal cruelty. Norms shape interests and interests shape action. This means that as the BLE campaign began to shift norms they also started to shift the values and interests of the Australian government. Preliminary evidence of this shift is found in the temporary ban on live exports by the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Herald Sun journalist, Miranda Devine describes the ban and in doing so points out an obvious shift from firm economic interests to a considerably more compassionate approach:

So to appease emotional politicians, the Government opted to destroy a $700 million industry and 10,000 jobs, ruin the livelihood of farmers in the Top End and get us offside with our most important neighbour (Devine 2011).

This temporary shift in policy reflects the burgeoning emergence of a new norm banning live export. Norms operate in a permissive sense by enabling certain actions or decisions to become an option, and in this instance, they enabled compassion to gain ground on economics. This is an achievement in any context for a world society campaign. On a macro level the campaign’s success against the economic imperatives of the state provides us with an indication to the extent of the Australian public’s contempt for animal cruelty. It is then a credit to the BLE campaign that they were able
to leverage this contempt through the successful grafting of the emerging BLE norm to
the norm of animal cruelty. Nonetheless, this is not to suggest that compassion
prevailed over economics, because the lifting of the ban and the continuation of live
exports evidently says otherwise. However, the changing norm forced policy makers to
re-evaluate their interests, as new, more compassionate options became apparent and
thus, more acceptable.

Throughout this process the BLE campaign’s core members, Animals Australia and
RSPCA Australia, embraced the role of moral or normative entrepreneur as they
sought to normalise their principled ideas (“beliefs about right and wrong held by
individuals” (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999)). The
principled ideas held by moral or normative entrepreneurs are often the driving force
behind normative change. They achieved this by drawing attention to new issues
through dramatic language and the successful dissemination of information. This
renders norm entrepreneurs critical to the emergence of new norms.

For the BLE campaign the preliminary emergence of the new norm against animal
cruelty was assisted by a number of additional factors that ran concurrent to their role
as normative entrepreneurs. These factors include the similarity of the new norm to
existing domestic and international norms, the adoption of the norm to strengthen
one’s domestic and international legitimacy, and the state’s wish to emulate other
successful states. Other factors include the characteristics of the international
environment, the target (in this case Australia), and the issue itself. This chapter will
explore the significance of these factors in conjunction with the role of Animals Australia and RSPCA Australia as normative entrepreneurs.

More specifically, this chapter focuses on the tactics employed by proponents of the ban to shift sentiment around live exports, encourage the emergence of a new norm and continue to advance the norm’s development. These tactics include: (1) the dissemination of information to raise awareness and create a sense of crisis, (2) establishing and enhancing the network, (3) framing the issue, (4) shaming government and industry, and (5) aiding in the delegitimisation of live exports and reversing the burden of proof.

**Issue Characteristics**

Not all issues are created equal. The inherent characteristics of a campaign’s issue play an important role in determining its success, often irrespective of the merits of the campaign itself. There are a relatively small number of issues characteristics that have proven successful for world society: “issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility; and issues involving legal equality of opportunity” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 27). The nature of these issues means they are able to transcend specific cultural or political barriers. A corollary of this trait is the increased likelihood of such issues being able to reach people in spite of fragmentation, polarisation, selective, and partisan exposure. This section will now outline the characteristics of the issue promoted by BLE campaign and whether this issue shares any similarities with others in which world society has had success.
The BLE campaign falls within the larger issue area of animal welfare and most resembles Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) first issue characteristic; bodily harm to vulnerable individuals. However, animal welfare is complex and continues to change with evolving societal attitudes. As a result, determining whether an animal can amount to a “vulnerable individual” requires an understanding of the classification and moral standing of animals in Australia.

Animal welfare is a “compromise between regarding animals as having no direct moral standing and treating animals as morally equivalent to humans” (Garner 2006, 162). This means that, “what we do to animals matters to them directly, and therefore that it is possible to wrong them. Such a view is based predominantly ... on the recognition that animals are sentient, having the capacity to experience pleasure and pain” (Garner 2006, 162). Animal welfare does not postulate the moral equality of animals with humans. Indeed, a core tenet of animal welfare is that humans are morally superior to animals. Because of this tenet humans can use animals on the grounds that a benefit to humans or other animals is accrued. The unnecessary suffering of an animal with no benefit to humans or other animals is deemed morally illegitimate and often prohibited. However, complications arise because the definition of “unnecessary suffering” is a “political question, determined, amongst other things, by public opinion, itself” (Garner 2006, 163). This, by extension, also renders the definition of animal welfare as variable, attributed to the changing moral and ethical standards of individual societies (Ohl & van der Staay 2011). Aside from these difficulties, animal welfare is generally preserved if the animals are kept free from:
• hunger, thirst or inadequate food;
• thermal and physical discomfort;
• injuries or diseases;
• fear and chronic stress, and were
• free to display normal, species-specific behavioural patterns (Ohl & van der Staay 2011, 2-3)

While animal welfare standards follow the ebb and flow of public and political sentiment, the actual concept of animal welfare is a well-established norm within Australia and many western countries. Its status as a norm is supported by a number of factors, including the overwhelming public support for the BLE campaign, the numerous legislative acts in force around the world and Australia that protect animals from cruelty75 and the fact that animal welfare is no longer seen as new or “cutting edge”:

Animal welfare is clearly not as "sexy" or "cutting edge" as animal liberation or animal rights. To talk of animal rights or liberation is to be perceived as modern, radical and daring. The term animal welfare once regarded as far-fetched and revolutionary-is, by contrast, now perceived as dull, conservative, and inadequate. Part of the problem is that animal welfare has become a victim of its own success. Everyone now claims to support it (Garner 2006, 161).

By placing the relatively modest conception of “animal welfare” in contrast to what Garner describes as “radical and daring” points of view, in this case animal rights or liberation, we are able to track the development of norms. The key difference between animal rights and animal welfare lies in the belief of animal rights advocates that no use of animals by humans is ever justified. Organisations like the Animal Rights Advocates (ARA)\(^{76}\) argue that animal welfare perpetuates the supremacist belief that animals exist for human purpose and thus “necessary” suffering is acceptable. Organisations like the ARA fight to abolish the property status of animals, which as they argue, trivialises the “lives of animals because they are viewed merely as expendable, replaceable property of a worth measured only by human standards of money or utility” (Animal Rights Advocates 2012). On the other hand, animal welfare agencies fight to ensure that animals are treated humanely and do not suffer unnecessarily.

The comparatively modest desires of animal welfare organisations coupled with the normative status of animal welfare makes such issues more acceptable and thus more likely to garner public support. The two organisations that comprise the BLE campaign, RSPCA\(^{77}\) and Animals Australia\(^{78}\), both seek to prevent animal cruelty by exposing suffering, promoting the care and protection of animals, and lobbying government to effect changes in laws to protect all animals. Both organisations are regarded as animal welfare agencies. The same classification can be extended to the issue advanced by the BLE campaign as mandatory stunning for Australian cattle in foreign abattoirs

---

\(^{76}\) ara.org.au (Retrieved March 9, 2012)


\(^{78}\) http://www.animalsaustralia.org/ (Retrieved March 10, 2012)
acknowledges the continued use of animals by humans and only seeks to minimise suffering. Banning live export in favour of the exportation of meat products slaughtered in Australia also acknowledges the continued use of animals by humans and only seeks to abolish unnecessary suffering.

A key difficulty with the BLE campaign’s issue is the fact that Australia’s animal welfare standards are exceptional in contrast to Indonesia. Australian law requires the stunning of animals prior to slaughter and, as a sovereign nation Indonesia has no duty to uphold Australia’s comparatively strict animal welfare standards. For Australian beef exporters, who abide by the Australian animal welfare standards while in Australia, the issue pits economics against morality and questions the extent of their expected duty of care once the animal has exported.

Irrespective of these inherent complexities, the characteristics of the issue make it particularly effective at generating support in Australia to the benefit of the BLE campaign. This strength comes from the issue’s association with generally accepted norms around animal welfare. Because of this association the issue is not ridiculous or farfetched and cannot be simply dismissed by government or campaign opponents. More specifically, the issue holds a short and clear causal chain assigning responsibility to abattoirs in Indonesia, the Australian government, and beef exporters in Australia. Public and government support of animal welfare standards that position animals as sentient beings firms up the issue’s correlation with what could be considered a “vulnerable individual” (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, more “radical” scholars continue to argue that the principles of equality should be applied to animals

79 There are some exceptions to this as a result of ritual slaughter.
(Armstrong & Botzler 2008; Hauser, Cushman & Kamen 2006; Singer 2008). This makes an interesting claim to the second issue characteristic outlined by Keck and Sikkink (1998) around legal equality of opportunity.

The characteristics of the BLE issue are more complex than the ICBL (International Campaign to Ban Landmines) and the banning of anti-personnel landmines. This complexity comes from the difference in the “vulnerable individual” being targeted. For the ICBL the “vulnerable individual” was of course human, enabling the issue to more readily cut across political and partisan barriers. While for the BLE campaign it can be safely said that animals do not hold the same place in society as humans. As a result, the BLE campaign arguably faced more difficulty in transcending political predispositions. Nonetheless, animal welfare, in contrast to animal rights or liberation, has adequate support within society as a norm, of which Australian legislation and initial public support for BLE campaign can attest.

**Target Characteristics**

Political leader Mahatma Gandhi made the keen observation that the greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated. It is within Gandhi’s observation that we find the first target characteristic for successful world society activism: (1) the target state or corporation must place some degree of importance on its reputation. Reputation in this context can be either domestic or international. This target characteristic is important because world society activism is often insufficient to produce change unless the target wishes to mitigate any damage to its legitimacy and reputation.
Fortunately for the BLE campaign Australia does value its domestic and international reputation when it comes to matters of animal welfare. Australia is one of nine donor nations to the OIE (Office International des Epizooties), World Organisations for Animal Health (WOAH) and one of eight major contributors to the WOAH’s World Animal Health and Welfare Fund (Civic Consulting 2007, 73). Australia also played a leading role in the development of a number of regional animal welfare reforms like the “Regional Animal Welfare Strategy: Asia, the Far East and Oceania” (RAWS) (Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2011) which ensure the implementation of science based animal welfare standards across the region. Australia’s continued pressure on Japanese whaling is another testament to its support for animal welfare. This pressure culminated in the Australian government formally instigating legal proceedings against Japanese “scientific whaling” before the International Court of Justice in 2010 (Alford 2010; Freeland 2010). In addition to Australia’s ongoing commitment to animal welfare internationally, is the introduction of animal welfare legislation across all Australian states and territories. These examples demonstrate Australia’s commitment to animal welfare norms and its wish to mitigate any damage to its reputation that would arise from claims that it acts against these norms.

The second target characteristic is the ability for domestic groups to form and effectively operate within the target state. This characteristic helps avoid “free-floating pressure” by enabling domestic groups operating within a global network to apply pressure from within the state. Australia fulfils this target characteristic as a highly
developed democratic state that enables people to freely rally around issues of concern.

Both target characteristics open world society advocacy to criticism, as states that value their reputation and enable domestic groups to operate are most commonly developed democratic nations. This adds credence to the belief that world society activism, such as the BLE campaign, would have very limited success in less developed or non-democratic states. It also provides insight into why the BLE campaign decided to target Australia as opposed to Indonesia which was actually responsible for the animal welfare violations.

Indonesia may not conform to these target characteristics to the same degree as Australia but like Indonesia the issue of banning live export and implementing mandatory stunning runs counter to Australia’s economic imperatives and was unlikely to emerge out of state considerations of self-interest. Challenging governments to adopt norms that run contrary to their sovereign or economic prerogatives is a truly remarkable feat for world society campaigns. Forcing the Australian government to suspend live export, which earned $996.5 million in 2009, is one such remarkable feat. The first step was to raise awareness and place the issue on the national agenda through the mobilization of “popular opinion and political support” (Nadelmann 1990, 582). Pressuring Australia to recognise the issue also reminded them of their own identity as promoters of animal welfare norms. Moreover, by raising awareness of the live export issue the BLE campaign was able to leverage a number of target vulnerabilities.
The first point of leverage for the BLE campaign was Australia’s prior normative commitments to the concept of animal welfare. This normative commitment was now in direct conflict with the cruelty being inflicted to Australian animals in Indonesia. Another point of leverage was a historical juncture in which there was a noticeable change in public and government attitudes towards the export of live animals. This shift started in 2003 with a “broad-ranging investigation” into Australia’s live export industry by Dr John Keniry (Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2013). The investigation made a number of recommendations to improve animal welfare conditions around infrastructure, staffing, and abattoirs in foreign markets. Furthermore, the 2009-2010 Australian Budget increased investment in animal welfare overseas with the Live Trade Animal Welfare Partnership (Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2012). The final point of leverage comes from Australia’s desire to maintain a good international standing in matters concerning animal welfare norms and a related desire to repair any damage to that reputation.

In a campaign’s fight to see their norm emerge and successfully take hold, their greatest opponent will often be the economic or military imperatives of the state. Most campaigns will lose this fight. This is why Ann Marie Clark (2001) argues that principled norms originating from world society “prescribe a mode of action for states that often contradicts action ruled by immediate self-interest” and such norms “would be unlikely to emerge naturally out of state considerations of self-interest” (Clark 2001, 136-8). While norm emergence is indeed a feat, it is another matter entirely to see that norm accepted and adopted. It is then vital that world society campaigns not only leverage all possible characteristics of the target and issue, but make the state
reassess the importance of these imperatives in light of the emerging norm. The state’s competing imperatives will always be the greatest challenge faced by world society campaigns, however, as the ICBL and the remainder of this chapter will argue, they can be overcome.

**BLE Characteristics**

The BLE campaign\(^{80}\) is the combined efforts of Australia’s two foremost animal protection organisations — RSPCA Australia\(^{81}\) and Animals Australia\(^{82}\). The latter of which represents some 40 member societies\(^{83}\). The BLE campaign’s relatively small network stands in stark contrast to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines’ (ICBL) over 1200 members or the some 350-member organisations of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). However, unlike its bigger counterparts the BLE campaign shares a unified ideology and coherent collective identity, meaning the organisations within the BLE campaign know what they want and how to achieve it. The BLE campaign’s collective identity comes from the close similarities between its two member organisations — RSPCA Australia and Animals Australia — both of which promote animal welfare and protection. When a campaign comprises of similarly minded organisations discussion is often more productive and they are able to swiftly implement strategies with high precision. Furthermore, the selective membership of the BLE campaign enables it to avoid linking up with organisations that may jeopardise its expertise, reliability and veracity.

---


\(^{83}\) [http://www.animalsaustralia.org/about/member_societies.php](http://www.animalsaustralia.org/about/member_societies.php) (Retrieved March 23, 2012)
Like many world society organisations, RSPCA Australia and Animals Australia, derive the majority of their authority, legitimacy and power from the information they disseminate and promote. If the veracity of the information was called into question so too would any legitimacy or authority they derive from it. The RSPCA has had a long-standing presence in Australian animal welfare. It was first formed in Victoria in 1871 as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and later formed its national body as RSPCA Australia in 1980. This well-established presence aids its legitimacy while its expertise and reliability comes from its scientific principles and research. The RSPCA produces a quarterly “Science Update”\(^84\) and employs five scientist led by the RSPCA's Chief Scientist, Dr Bidda Jones. The scientific capacity of RSPCA Australia played an instrumental role in the initial stages of the BLE campaign by producing the report “The Slaughter of Australian Cattle in Indonesia: An Observational Study” (Jones 2011) using information from the investigation by Animals Australia. This scientific approach runs alongside the RSPCA’s long-standing reputation as a champion of animal cruelty prevention through the active promotion of animal care and protection.

Animals Australia does not have the same enduring reputation as the RSPCA and instead derives its legitimacy and authority from its strong track record\(^85\) of action and investigation. This propensity for action has made it a reliable source for information regarding animal abuse. Indeed, it was Animals Australia that provided the powerful footage to the ABC program *Four Corners* "A Bloody Business" which went on to win the 2011 Golden Walkley award\(^86\) for excellence in journalism.

\(^{85}\) http://www.animalsaustralia.org/about/track_record.php (Retrieved March 24, 2012)
World society organisations stand to gain much by contrasting the state and corporate world’s propensity to act in self-interest with impartiality and independence. Acting in the interests of the “issue” enables world society organisations to carefully position themselves as the autonomous “third party” of world politics and in doing so significantly strengthens their legitimacy, authority and representativeness. Animals Australia is no exception as they strive to portray themselves as an organisation that acts in the sole interest of animals. Any perception that Animals Australia is impartial and independent is strengthened by the fact that it is a self-described non-for-profit charitable organisation funded through “community support” and its member societies. “Community support” in this context denotes funding through public donations in the form of a one off donation or by paying a fee to become a member of Animals Australia.

An aspect of potential concern for Animals Australia comes from their numerous member societies87 and the varying interests of the corporate donors and sponsors that support some of them. Another concern is the views harboured by some of Animals Australia’s member societies, (namely Animal Liberation88 (AL), AL South Australia89, AL Queensland90, and AL ACT91), which fall outside the more modest parameters of animal welfare promoted by Animals Australia. These concerns can potentially damage the impartiality and independence of Animals Australia through the manipulation of its interests.

87 http://www.animalsaustralia.org/about/member_societies.php (Retrieved March 26, 2012)
RSPCA Australia is generally trusted to be an impartial and independent organisation throughout communities in no small part because of its 141 years of operation. South Australian Agriculture Minister Gail Gago discussed the public perception of the RSPCA in response to a proposed amendment that sought to change its role, stating “the community’s perception is that the RSPCA is independent of government and independent of industry” (Royal 2012) and can deliver animal welfare in an impartial manner. RSPCA Australia is liable to succumb to a number of minor criticisms because of its government funding and corporate sponsors.92 Interestingly, Liberal MP Nigel Hallett recently called this funding into question due to the RSPCA’s involvement in the BLE campaign ('MP calls for RSPCA funding to be cut’ 2011c). This call was rejected and the government continues to support the RSPCA. While the continued support from government does raise concerns about autonomy, the idea that organisations, like Animals Australia and RSPCA Australia, must operate with “pure” autonomy is unrealistic and not necessary in understanding their techniques and influence (Sikkink 2002, 313-14).

Finally, to speak for the repressed and underrepresented relates to the universality of a world society organisation. For the BLE campaign the interests of animals are paramount. The mere existence of organisations like RSPCA Australia and Animals Australia is a testament to the deficits of animal representation within global and domestic politics. It is precisely the importance of this role that renders organisation like Animals Australia and RSPCA Australia accountable for their actions. Despite

---

animal welfare being the central issue of the BLE campaign, considerations must also be given to the economic impact of their actions on the live export industry and its workers. But again we must questions this “accountability” by asking: compared to what are world society actors “deemed to be less accountable?” (Price, Richard 2003, 590-91). The lack of any comparable organisations in animal welfare makes it difficult to claim that the BLE campaign should have considered the economic impact of a ban over advancing its issue. Suspending the live export industry was an essential step towards a possible ban and was clearly deemed a necessity in changing the industry and preventing continued animal welfare abuses.

The next section will show how the BLE campaign was able to capitalise on these characteristics and vulnerabilities by shifting sentiment towards live exports. It will look at the following techniques: (1) establishing a network, (2) disseminating information to raise awareness and generate an issue, (3) framing and normative grafting, (4) shaming, and (5) shifting the burden of proof from proponents of the campaign to opponents.

**Establishing a Network**

Changing the embedded practices of a AU$700 million industry required the concerted efforts of numerous individuals of which networking forms an integral part.

Comprising two organisations, Animals Australia and RSPCA Australia, the BLE campaign demonstrates that a network need not contain an array of professional or staffed organisations to have influence. This is not to question the effectiveness of
large-scale world society campaigns operating with communication networks and idea exchange among thousands of staffed or professional member organisations. Instead, it suggests that the use of mass self-communication platforms enables smaller campaigns to wield surprising influence. Mass self-communication has diminished the need for autonomous local organisations to inspire movement and action in any one area. Instead, it has seen national organisations inspire movement on a national scale through the diverse platforms and networks of mass self-communication.

The BLE campaign operated on a national level with two professional and ideologically unified organisations. This places it at odds with massive transnational and ideologically diverse networks like the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The BLE campaign network holds common ethical-political dimensions and derives solidarity from a unified ideology (Habermas 2001). In addition, the absence of independent professional organisations working at local levels means the relative importance of coordination between “hubs” drops significantly. Consequently, the focus shifts from communication and polycentrality towards an increased emphasis on interactivity and public participation. Interactivity is a core feature of mass self-communication and provides the campaign with legitimacy because of the public’s sense of involvement. This shift towards interactivity and participation enables the BLE campaign to harness the public’s desire to participate and engage with the issue through mass self-communication platforms.

Self-generation, self-selection, and self-direction are the characteristics of mass self-communication that lead to engagement among the public. The public’s desire to participate and contribute is particularly evident in morally charged issues like animal
welfare. Mass self-communication provides the public with avenues, such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube or Google+, with which to express their concern. Networking amongst individuals rather than staffed professional organisations means utilising communities of people who chose to participate out of interest or moral responsibility. Individuals and groups motivated by interest and moral responsibility are extremely active and effective campaigners; they really want to see change rather than a paycheck or a promotion. Liveexportshame.com\(^{93}\) and its active forum\(^ {94}\) in conjunction with the abundance of communities that have formed on Facebook\(^ {95}\) exemplify communities of individual participation. It is because the BLE campaign was only comprised of two organisations, Animals Australia and RSPCA Australia, that the BLE campaign did not harness mass self-communication in the establishment of the network per se but rather in the establishment of support across Australia. The BLE campaign encouraged people to participate through mass self-communication tools. These tools include writing letters, simple sharing mechanisms, Facebook profile pictures, virtual protests, video creation, and the dissemination of campaign information among a person’s social network. These tools will be discussed in detail in the following section “Disseminating Information”. Effectively utilising these communities means embracing the changing conceptions of leadership discussed by Joichi Ito (IBM 2011). Ito feels that the different individual motivations behind creating and joining these communities means that people cannot be led in a traditional

manner and must instead be encouraged to participate through low cost and ease of access. These attributes are an important part of mass self-communication and the modern information communication environment more generally. Another attribute of mass self-communication that supports public participation is the multitude of avenues with which a campaign can enter the public domain and promote involvement. Thus, while the majority of the BLE campaign’s network is devoid of traditional or hierarchal control it witnessed exponential growth in both size and influence. Substantiating this growth is the fact that GetUp\(^6\), a not-for-profit and independent grass-roots community advocacy organisation, which supported the BLE campaign, registered its fastest growing petition ever at 248,465\(^7\) signatures between June 2011 and April 2012 (GetUp! 2011).

**Disseminating Information (Raising Awareness & Framing)**

The Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on banliveexport.com offers a response to the question “Why didn’t investigators take this footage directly to the government?” This question alludes to the Indonesian investigation footage that was taken by Animals Australia and used in the *Four Corners* report “A Bloody Business”. The campaign’s FAQ highlights previous instances in which footage depicting animal cruelty was taken directly to the government and nothing was done. The need to engage with the public directly in order to successfully pressure the government is well understood by the BLE campaign, as the their FAQ states: “The RSPCA’s and Animals Australia’s experience is that only when the public are made aware of the cruel treatment of Australian exported animals via the media, does the government take notice” (Ban Live Export

---


2011c). Other than highlighting the Australian government’s wish to mitigate any damage to its reputation it demonstrates the importance of informing the public of the issue and raising general awareness.

Disseminating information in an environment characterised by low cost access and strict personalised control remains contingent upon possessing credibility, relinquishing aspects of control, and formulating a clear and concise message. The BLE campaign was no exception and possessed all four Cs (control, credibility, clear and concise). Nevertheless, this chapter’s analysis will largely focus on the campaign’s role in maintaining public interest and making effective use of existing awareness. This shift in analysis results from the substantial awareness raised by the award winning

Four Corners report ‘A Bloody Business’ that aired on the 30th of May, 2011. While this initial awareness remains indispensable it does not diminish the central role played by the BLE campaign and its respective members, Animals Australia, RSPCA Australia, and GetUp! Even ignoring the fact that Animals Australia provided the crucial footage to Four Corners, it was the various websites of the BLE member organisations in addition to GetUp! that formed the primary source of information regarding live exports. This claim is evidenced by the immense strain placed on each of the organisation’s websites after the airing of the report, causing each website to crash (RSPCA 2011b).

Four Corners can only provide so much information on the problem itself, while the BLE campaign and its members were able to continue and update the flow of information, raise additional awareness, and push for solutions long after the Four

---

98 The program was awarded the 2012 Logie for ‘Most Outstanding Public Affairs Report’.
Corner’s report had aired. *Four Corners* and the BLE campaign reveal the symbiotic nature of the relationship between traditional and new media. The nature of this relationship means the two are not mutually opposed but rather complementary.

Traditional media programs like *Four Corners* may still hold a greater share of legitimacy but new media and mass self-communication platforms offer dynamic ways to interact with users and distribute information. Capitalising on the symbiotic relationship between mass self-communication and the initial awareness generated by *Four Corners* required the BLE campaign to formulate a clear and concise objective; to ban the practice of live exports and upgrade welfare standards. This unambiguous normative formulation enabled the campaign to effectively communicate its succinct message across a broad spectrum of communication platforms. Communicating the clear and concise message of ‘ban live export’ ran alongside the campaign’s focus on interaction and participation. The campaign was able to exploit the public’s propensity for interaction by encouraging people to spread the message across their social network. Simplicity assisted this process.

Nowhere is this simplicity more evident than in sending politicians an email or letter through the campaign’s website (Ban Live Export 2011d). Because the letter is already written people only need fill out their name, location, and email address (Image 1 & 2). This simplicity resulted in over 100,000 emails and letters being sent to Julia Gillard as early as the 8th June 2011, just nine days after the airing of the Four Corners program “A Bloody Business” (Ban Live Export 2011e).
This simplicity was also evident in disseminating campaign information throughout a person’s social network. Images 3 and 4 are found in the “Share with Friends” (Ban
Live Export 2011f) section of the BLE website and provide the visitor with a simple interface, encouraging participation through a straightforward ‘click and share’ model.
Image 5

Image 5 also facilitates engagement and participation through simplicity. In this section of the campaign's website, people are provided with Facebook profile pictures and simple instructions to help spread awareness of the issue by “tagging” their friends in the photo. People are also able to order a “free live export action pack” (Animals Australia 2011e) (Image 6), which includes physical items used to spread awareness. Finally, the interactive nature of the BLE website is cemented with the “Share this campaign:” section (image 7) available on almost all sections of the BLE website.

Image 6

99 “Tagging” denotes linking a Facebook friend to a photo, meaning the photo will also appear in their photo section of Facebook in addition to their newsfeeds.
On the 17th of June, 2011 the BLE campaign launched “virtual protest” (Ban Live Export 2011h) which facilitated interaction through the submission of YouTube videos (Image 8). This feature provided contributors to the “virtual protest” with a feeling of solidarity as members of a community, while simultaneously pressuring Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard. The virtual protest relinquished control to the public and harnessed their propensity to contribute and share via the submission of videos, but so did the campaign’s emphasis on the spread of their own videos. Image 9, from the “Free Stuff” (Ban Live Export 2011i) section of the BLE website, illustrates the campaign’s simple sharing mechanisms. Links to SNS Facebook and Twitter are visible at the bottom of each video.
By facilitating simple interaction between people and their friends the BLE campaign is serving a social function that reciprocally spreads campaign information and awareness. This social process enabled some of the campaign’s videos, particularly “Brian’s Story - Indonesian Live Export Investigation” (Animals Australia 2011f), to experience a “viral process of viewing and chain distribution via e-mail” (Powell 2010, 96) and social networking sites. The “viral” process means that people are encouraged
to send the video via email, use the share function on the BLE website, or simply post the link to their Facebook profile because of the video’s appealing characteristics.

The video “Brian’s story” was available on both YouTube (Animalsaustralia 2011), with 38,509 views by April 20th 2012, and Vimeo (Animals Australia 2011f), with 218,121 views by April 20th 2012. The video on Vimeo was actively promoted by both the BLE campaign’s website (Ban Live Export 2011i) and the organisation GetUp! (2011). This active promotion helps explain the massive discrepancy in views between the video posted on YouTube and the one posted on Vimeo. More specifically, it demonstrates that the campaign’s promotion and simple sharing process was critical to the spread of the video on Vimeo (with 218,121 views). In this context, the video posted on YouTube (with 38,509 views) requires active users to search and find the video themselves with search tools like Google, as it was not actively promoted by the BLE campaign. Once the video was found on YouTube an active user, if they wished could then choose to share the video.

In contrast, the video on Vimeo remains passive in this context. The video is passive because it is being actively promoted to people by the campaign, who are then encouraged to simply share it on their social network. Once a person has shared the video on their social network it is then disseminated to other passive users in the network, be it via Facebook or Twitter. In other words, the video on Vimeo is passive because it was actively promoted by the campaign, meaning the user is ‘given’ the video through social networks or via the campaign website. While the YouTube video is not actively promoted by the campaign, thus the user must be individually active in finding the video through other search methods.
The different types of people who predominantly use YouTube or Vimeo are also indicative of the inherent characteristics of the video platforms and the users they attract. Vimeo boasts a more ‘passionate’ audience of film enthusiasts and places significant emphasis on video sharing across different social networks and platforms. Image 10 (Lab35 Films 2012) illustrates the Vimeo video page with the “share” (highlighted blue) feature placed on the top right hand side of the video.

Image 10

Image 11 (Lab35 Films 2012) shows the share feature after the user has “clicked” it. Once the share feature has been “clicked” the user is presented with a screen that overlaps the video itself and illustrates the numerous sharing options.
Vimeo’s sharing features render it a suitable platform with which to engage the *passive* user, as its emphasis on sharing makes it easy for users to ‘give’ the video to other *passive* users within their social network.

The success of the video (Brian’s story) actively promoted by the BLE campaign reinforces the centrality of the campaign’s websites amid the video’s chain distribution on social networks. By posting a video to their Facebook “Wall” a person is essentially recommending that video to their “Friends”. Once the video has been shared by a user, it has been legitimised by that person and is presented to the majority of that person’s contacts regardless of political predispositions or selective exposure tendencies. It is for this reason that the importance of social network sites (SNS) to the BLE campaign cannot be overstated. SNSs enable people to become an active link in the distribution of campaign information, empowering them with the ability to spread information that they deem notable throughout their social network. The BLE
campaign’s information was certainly deemed notable, to which the creation of hundreds of Facebook “Pages” devoted to the issue of live exports\(^{100}\) will attest.

Indeed, such was the strength of the campaign’s use of SNS that Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA) begun to run workshops around Australia in 2011 “to train farmers and graziers to use social media, to defend their businesses against animal rights campaigns” (Trevaskis 2012). Troy Hadrick, an American cattle rancher and advocate for the use of social media by farmers, stressed the importance in becoming an active member of the conversation (Courtney 2011). While MLA chairman Don Heatley conceded that the MLA was ill prepared in dealing with social media during the BLE campaign, stating that “Social media drove this issue like you would not believe. We weren't ready. We weren't well enough organised in that sense of using social media. As an industry we must grasp this medium, get with it and get on with it. We must use it to our advantage, not have others use it to our disadvantage” (Courtney 2011). The impact of SNSs throughout the BLE campaign owes much to how the issue was framed by the campaign.

The BLE campaign framed the issue of live exports as cruel, urgent, and humanitarian by personifying the animals with names and stories. Images 12-14 demonstrate the campaign’s use of names like Brian, Bill, Arthur, and Tommy to humanise the issue and individualise the animal’s “Story”. These images appear on all pages of the BLE

campaign’s website and once the visitor has selected an image by clicking on it they are taken to a page with a video depicting the graphic “Story” of the animal in question. Image 15 shows the page that depicts the graphic “Story” of the animal once the visitor has clicked on “Story”. This page exhibits the similar click and share characteristics used throughout the site.
The way in which the BLE campaign has framed the issue also helps in overcoming certain characteristics of the live export issue itself, namely that they are campaigning for the protection of animals not people. As previously discussed there are a relatively small number of issue characteristics that have been particularly successful for world society campaigns. One of which is “issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 27). Framing the issue as humanitarian seeks to dispel the perception of the animals as faceless and nameless “things” and instead seeks to humanise them as “Brian” or “Tommy”. This perception helps portray the animals used for live exports as “vulnerable individuals”, giving them a sense of individuality and ultimately presenting them as sentient beings that are able to feel pain and suffering. This sentiment helps explain retailers reporting a 15 percent drop in meat sales once the issue became prominent ('Mix messages on red meat sales' 2011a; Devine 2011; Zappone 2011). In their study Small et al. (2007) found that when asking people for donations to feed starving children it was better to tell people the story of one child (identifiable victim) rather than the bigger picture (statistical victim).
or even the combination of the two (identifiable victim with statistics). In the study the identifiable victim raised $2.38 on average, the statistical victim raised $1.14 and the identifiable victim with statistics raised $1.43. Small et al. note that “charities struggle to raise money to feed the thousands of starving children in third world countries ... Yet, people often become entranced by specific, identifiable, victims” (2007, 143). The BLE campaign’s desire to frame the animals as identifiable victims with names is understandable because as Small et al. note, “when an identifiable victim is made into a cause, people appear to be quite compassionate and generous” (Small, Loewenstein & Slovic 2007, 143).

This humanitarian frame also assists the issue in transcending political predispositions by broadening the scope of the issue’s appeal to more than just those concerned with animal welfare. In addition to broadening the scope of the issue, the humanitarian association provides the issue with more resonance once people have been informed of it. This resonance comes because people generally care more for people than animals. Nonetheless, it is important to note that framing enables the issue to transcend political predisposition insofar as the issue and the campaign are inclined to attract and maintain public attention to begin with.

Surviving in an environment characterised by a scarcity of attention is often dependent on the use of dramatic language and strong visual imagery that elevate the urgency of the issue and help create a sense of crisis. The swift suspension of live exports by the Gillard government on the 8th of June, 2011 just 9 days after the story broke on Four Corners, owes much to the public perception that the issue was in need of immediate attention. The BLE campaign like the “case of AP land mines confirms the often argued
thesis among international relations scholars that the perception of a crisis or shock is a crucial factor in precipitating ideational or normative change “ (Price, Richard 1998a, 622). In generating this perception of urgency the BLE campaign used dramatic language in website URLs, www.liveexport-indefensible.com, and in their sample tweets available on the website101 (Ban Live Export 2011f):

1. Dudley fought for his life til he couldn't fight anymore. *Keep fighting for him.*
   http://BanLiveExport.com #BanLiveExport

2. I just saw the *terror* in Tommy's eyes http://BanLiveExport.com #BanLiveExport

3. Australia let Bill down. He needed *protection*. He got *torture*.
   http://BanLiveExport.com #BanLiveExport

4. Brian pleads 'Why?' and there is no answer. *No excuse. Indefensible.*
   http://BanLiveExport.com #BanLiveExport

5. Stop Australian animals being sent to *hell* http://BanLiveExport.com #BanLiveExport

Furthermore, the campaign’s “Judgement” (Ban Live Export 2011j) page (Image 16) is an effective combination of dramatic language and strong visual imagery in an effort to

101 Available under “Retweet the campaign!” at: http://www.banliveexport.com/1/#shareWithFriends (Retrieved April 27, 2012)
oppose restraint boxes. The page displays a graphic video and asks the visitor to assign the amount of time they need to deem the video ‘cruel’. The time is shown on a sliding graph below the video and ranges from one second to six months. Image 16 shows strong visual imagery, dramatic language, user interaction, and simple sharing tools. As of the 27th of April, 2012 there have been 33,307 people who submitted their judgement with one second being the average time selected. Once the user has submitted their judgement they are then given the option of sending Julia Gillard a sample letter (as seen in images 1 and 2). The Judgement page effectively uses mass self-communication by encouraging participation, attracting attention through strong visual imagery and language, and enabling simple sharing amongst the user’s social network.

![Image 16](https://example.com/image16)

Capturing the public’s attention through strong imagery and language on mass self-communication platforms not only helped create a sense of crisis and urgency, but also helped move the issue to the top of the government’s agenda. The effect of the
campaign’s strong imagery and language can be seen in Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s statements on the issue of live exports:

There were truly shocking images here, images of incredibly gross cruelty, and those images have shocked our nation and people rightly, including people in the industry, want us to [get] something done. That’s what the suspension is about and the process will now go through [emphasis added] (Office of the Prime Minister 2011).

The Prime Minister’s statements are indicative of the campaign’s dissemination of powerful language and shocking images. Indeed, the use of disturbing images can almost be seen as mandatory in a visually saturated and attention scarce environment. However, even images as provocative and powerful as the ones used by the BLE campaign can falter as a consequence of credibility. The current information communication environment links the credibility of information with its source. In other words, the information’s credibility is estimated according to the credibility of the person or organisation that delivers it. This is a by-product of social media and the overwhelming amount of content and information that now confronts people.

Information has become a social process filtered by a person’s contacts. It is then fitting for campaigns to empower a person’s most trusted social allies, their friends and contacts, to spread information on their behalf. In facilitating the social dissemination of their information the BLE campaign incorporated social elements in their website and emphasised the use of SNSs like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and
Vimeo. The campaign’s emphasis on simplicity and the “social” runs alongside their high credibility, their formulation of a clear and concise message, and their willingness to relinquish control over the form and continued dissemination of the information once it is in the hands of the network.\(^{102}\)

In contrast, the ICBL did not necessarily encourage direct public participation in the process of information dissemination. Instead, they primarily sought to inform the public of the issue and only encourage public participation in the form of protests once the information had already been disseminated. On the other hand, the BLE campaign saw the public as instrumental in the dissemination of information. The BLE campaign’s strong emphasis on social engagement and interaction in the process of information dissemination made the public instrumental to its success. Shifting the once passive role of the public in the dissemination of campaign information to that of an active role represents a profound change to campaigning in the era of mass self-communication.

**Normative Grafting**

On the 14th of August, 2011 the BLE campaign was able to translate online interest into real world action when some 20,000 people took to the streets to protest live exports (Animals Australia 2011h; RSPCA 2012). Mobilising offline action is an impressive achievement when the task of joining or supporting a campaign has been rendered menial and its supporters have been characterised as fleeting and momentary (Bennett 2003a; Tarrow & McAdam 2005). The principal catalyst for this

---

\(^{102}\) Please refer to Appendix Three for Google metrics regarding the increase in BLE relevant search terms.
offline action was the BLE campaign’s strong claim of adjacency (or normative graft) to animal cruelty. This catalyst was also one of the campaign’s strongest attributes.

Normative grafting describes a tactic employed by norm entrepreneurs, such as the BLE campaign, “to institutionalize a new norm by associating it with a pre-existing norm in the same issue area, which makes a similar prohibition or injunction” (Acharya 2004, 244). Consider the prospective success of the ban live export issue if it had been campaigned under the banner of ‘inferior meat quality due to stressful slaughter’ as opposed to the morally charged banner of ‘animal cruelty’. This consideration begs two questions. First, what is importance of the live export issue’s association with animal cruelty? Second, how did the BLE campaign achieve this association?

Animal cruelty is a particularly powerful and provocative element of the well-established animal welfare norm and any act of animal cruelty is confronted by an increasing lack of tolerance from the Australian people. This lack of tolerance has seen campaigns like BLE and Oscar’s Law\(^\text{103}\) find ever mounting support. Siobhan O’Sullivan (2011a) observes that the Australian “community seems increasingly unimpressed by animal suffering” (O’Sullivan 2011b). O’Sullivan cites the BLE campaign and the some 5,000 people that rallied on the steps of Victoria’s Parliament House on September 18, 2011 in support of Oscar’s Law\(^\text{104}\). Concluding that “the crowds, the letters, the emails and the petitions all suggest one thing: the community is not impressed by animal suffering” (O’Sullivan 2011b).

\(^\text{103}\) Oscar’s Law is a campaign that seeks to abolish “Puppy Factories” used to breed puppies for sale in pet shops. More information is available at: http://www.oscarslaw.org/ (Retrieved May 9, 2012)
\(^\text{104}\) http://www.oscarslaw.org/ (Retrieved May 9, 2012)
The Australian public’s distaste for animal cruelty has seen all aspects of animal welfare, especially the slaughter of animals, come under scrutiny. The Hawkesbury Valley Abattoir, north of Sydney, felt the brunt of this increased scrutiny when it was shut down in February 2012 after footage of animal cruelty emerged (Kelly & Rout 2012). The abattoir’s closers led to calls for security cameras to be placed in all Australian abattoirs. This scrutiny comes with Australia’s already relatively harsh penalties for animal cruelty, ranging from one to five years in prison105. The Australian public’s revulsion towards animal cruelty made grafting the prospective BLE norm to animal cruelty particularly powerful. In other words, any effort to delegitimize live exports required the grafting of moral opprobrium from other acts of animal cruelty.

Successfully grafting the norm meant overcoming the difficulties of maintaining a coherent and consistent message in a volatile and often unpredictable information communication environment. Developing a clear and concise message is important in this regard as they are: (1) difficult to misinterpret, (2) easy to understand, (3) able to retain remnants of their core meaning as they pass through various recipients and disseminators, (4) easily disseminated and suit the 140 character environment of SNSs, and (5) able to convey strong meaning in limited words. Clear and concise message serve modern campaigns nicely in an attention scarce environment characterised by limited attention and a broad spectrum of messages and content.

“Ban Live Export”, “Cruel, immoral, indefensible” (Animals Australia 2011i), “Urge government to ban the cruel live export trade” (Animals Australia 2012), and example Tweets like “MLA calls Arthur’s treatment 'best practice'. I call it cruelty. http://BanLiveExport.com #BanLiveExport” (Ban Live Export 2011f) are all clear and concise messages disseminated by the BLE campaign that make an association with animal cruelty. It is in the dissemination of these messages that the many avenues afforded to campaigns by mass self-communication come to be indispensable.

Flooding the public domain with clear and concise messages increases the public’s exposure to the campaign both as result of the messages’ direct dissemination to individuals and the public’s ability to then share messages throughout social networks. This assists in the process of associative learning. Associative learning denotes a process by which an association between a stimulus and or behaviour is learned (Shanks 1995). While this concept is predominantly used in commercial marketing, it offers an important insight into the advantages of solidifying the association between live exports and the pre-existing norm of animal cruelty.

One form of associative learning is classical conditioning, which refers to “the process of using an established relationship between a stimulus and a response to bring about the learning of the same response to a different stimulus” (Quester et al. 2007). The evocative and powerful nature of “animal cruelty” makes it an attractive norm with which to gain an association, especially through classic conditioning. For example, hearing a popular song (unconditioned stimulus) usually invokes a positive emotion (unconditioned response) and when repeatedly played in conjunction with a product (conditioned stimulus) the product itself can come to elicit the same positive emotion
(conditioned response). For the BLE campaign the classical conditioning would involve the strong imagery and language of “animal cruelty” as the unconditioned stimulus and the strong emotional response it elicits as the unconditioned response. “Live exports” then represents the conditioned stimulus and the same strong emotion becomes a conditioned response.

Invoking this conditioned response is made easier by both mass self-communication and animal cruelty as they complement a number of factors used in the associated learning process. Firstly, the “importance” (Quester et al. 2007) that the person places upon the information can make the learning process more effective. Animal cruelty can be deemed important information for a significant portion of the public. The second factor is “repetition” (Malaviya, Meyers-Levy & Sternthal 1999; Quester et al. 2007), the more times a person is exposed to the information the more likely they are to learn. Mass self-communication offers campaigns the unprecedented ability to saturate the information environment with their message via multiple platforms, all highly integrated into a person’s life, at a relatively low cost.

Thirdly, some words possess “imagery” (Quester et al. 2007), which relates to their ability to conjure visualisations of a concept or relationship. “Animal cruelty” conjures powerful imagery and meaning in both the written form and through pictures depicting acts of animal cruelty\(^\text{106}\), both of which were used by the BLE campaign. Imagery not only has “ample potential for drawing information stored in long-term memory into working memory” (Burns, Biswas & Babin 1993, 71), but as MacInnis and

\(^\text{106}\) Example media photos available here: www.animalsaustralia-media.org/upload/photos/indonesian-live-export-investigation/ & more examples of powerful pictures can be found here: http://liveexport-indefensible.com/ (Retrieved May 17, 2012)
Price (1987, 486) conclude “there is little doubt that imagery seems to play an important role in information processing”. Learning words with high imagery is substantially easier as they are stored in the memory on the basis of their pictorial and verbal dimensions (Robertson 1987). Pictures are images and, thus, have high imagery. Strong visual and written imagery is particularly applicable in an environment in which short yet powerful messages are prevalent. Mass self-communication platforms like Facebook and Twitter are mediums that require campaigns to use concise messages to convey meaning to the public, whether they are written, include a link to an image, or purely visual. Finally, association was also invoked through repeated reference to the cruelty of the live export trade in campaign speeches107 (Animals Australia 2011j, 2011k) and press releases (Animals Australia 2011h).

Flooding the public domain with clear and concise messages, strong visual imagery and graphic video footage via Facebook, Twitter, Google+, YouTube, Vimeo, and campaign websites all assisted in the creation of a public association between live exports and animal cruelty. Normative grafting through mass self-communication platforms again reaffirms the enhanced capacity for campaigns and individuals to participate and contribute in a cost effective manner. This association contributed to the delegitimisation of live exports and helped the campaign avoid the awkward realisation that people only care enough to ‘click’ or ‘Like’ rather than participate in offline action.108

107 Speech by camping manager of Animals Australia, Lyn White to crowds at the Ban Live Export National Rally & Speech by Lyn White, Sydney Ban Live Export Rally, 14.08.11
108 By avoiding the realisation that people only care enough to ‘click’ or simply ‘Like’ the campaign on Facebook, the BLE campaign supports research that finds a positive correlation between online activism and offline action (Rintel 2013). An example of such research is Christensen (2011) who argues that “it is not possible to determine a consistent impact of internet campaigns on real–life decisions, there is no
Shaming

The delegitimisation of live exports following its association with animal cruelty increases the effectiveness of shaming. In other words, the period of time following a new normative graft is the optimal time in which to shame opposition, as newly deemed “perpetrators” find themselves in the precarious position of continuing to engage in an act that is now considered deplorable by normative association. The BLE campaign was quick to capitalise on this new association through the dissemination of damning facts and figures via factsheets (Ban Live Export 2011c) on its website and SNSs. In addition, the campaign used traditional media such as television (Ban Live Export 2011k) and radio (Ban Live Export 2011m) advertisements to shame opposition. The advertisements stated that “every year millions of animals are subjected to the misery of Australia’s live export trade … hundreds of thousands of Australians have voiced their opposition to this cruel industry and you can too at banliveexport.com, however only one person in Australia can really put an end to this terrible trade. Julia Gillard, please Julia if you can’t hear the animals, hear us”.

But perhaps the campaign’s most deliberate shaming effort is the video “Industry Spin” (Ban Live Export 2011n) on the BLE website. The video features footage and audio from a Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA) promotional video. The majority of the video (2011n) features audio from MLA stating that they are “setting the evidence of the substitution thesis. If anything, the internet has a positive impact on offline mobilisation” (Christensen 2011). Similarly Breuer and Farooq (2012) found that “the low-effort online activities typically offered by entertainment orientated SNS contribute little to increase political participation. In turn, targeted campaigning by e-advocacy groups has the potential to increase the political engagement of individuals with low levels of political interest and can help to produce the switch from online to offline participation among individuals with high levels of political interest” (Breuer & Farooq 2012, 2)
benchmark for animal welfare” while the footage from the Animals Australia 2011 Indonesian investigation is being played to contradict the MLA audio. It is a powerful video that shames and condemns the industry by drawing attention to the negative aspects of their actions. In a continued theme all videos available on the website, including the television and radio advertisement, are easily shared and disseminated via SNSs. While sharing campaign content is important this is by no means the extent of the public’s participation in the shaming of the live export industry. Rather their involvement goes far beyond being an active link in the dissemination of campaign created material to the self-creation and self-dissemination of content.

The enhanced capacity for individuals to shame perpetrators through mass self-communication saw the creation of community based websites like www.liveexportshame.com and its active forum (Live Export Shame 2011). The campaign also spawned numerous videos on YouTube (Edgarsmission 2011; GranAmor2011 2011; Jembisctwa 2011), some inspired by the campaign’s “Virtual Protest” (Ban Live Export 2011h) and others (AngryAussie 2011; KasliShelley 2011) in the absence of direct encouragement, as well as hundreds of Facebook “Pages” created to spread awareness and shame the live export industry. Shaming live exports was not only socially sanctioned but socially encouraged, as the individual’s participation in the public discrediting of live exports places the individual in an “in” group with likeminded friends. This is especially prevalent on SNSs, like Facebook, in

which the individual can publically support the campaign while simultaneously condemning the practices of the live export industry. This takes place through the sharing of videos and the “Liking/Sharing” of supportive content posted on Facebook by friends or the campaign itself.

Reversing the Burden of Proof

Similar to processes of normative grafting and shaming, in which a previously acceptable act now carries shame as a result of association, reversing the burden of proof helps instigate a “shift” in which opponents of the norm are now placed on the defensive and claims against its validity are pushed to the margins. The BLE campaign was able to shift the burden of proof to an industry that has operated with near impunity over the past decade and in the process has exported more than 4.6 million live cattle to Indonesia with little or no ill repute.

This shift owes much to the graphic footage of animal cruelty revealed on the Four Corners report “A Bloody Business”. Exposing the industry’s dubious practices opened a legitimate space for the BLE campaign to shift the burden of proof to the live export industry, who in the new context must now prove that live exports are not only important but warrant such cruelty. The ensuing public outcry and government suspension unequivocally implied that the industry’s value did not outweigh the animal cruelty seen in the footage. As a result the industry must now guarantee the supply chain treats animals humanely all the way up to the point of slaughter. Exporters must now track their animals and show they are slaughtered in independently audited and approved Indonesian abattoirs (Scott 2011). While Four Corners was critical in forcing the industry to implement these changes it does not
detRACT FROM self-created content disseminated via open platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The videos, pictures, and messages disseminated through these means were important in sustaining awareness of the issue and satisfying the public’s desire for additional information.

Irrespective of what one deems the principal catalyst for reversing the burden of proof by looking to other aspects of the campaign’s use of mass self-communication we gain a more nuanced understanding. For this reason we now look to the campaign’s use and promotion of open communication forums when dealing with policy makers.

Support the campaign

Thank you for wanting to do even more to help protect animals from suffering in the live export trade. Here are some other important and easy ways to support the campaign today:

- The Government’s latest position on live exports is to accept ‘international standards’ for animal welfare. These standards still permit brutal slaughter of fully conscious animals. Click here to visit the Animals Australia website and show your Government representatives the brutal reality of live export.
- Send Julia Gillard a quick note on facebook and twitter to remind her you want live exports banned:
  
  On her facebook page: facebook.com/juliasgillard
  On twitter: @JuliaGillard
  Other ways: Julia Gillard’s web form
- Make your voice heard -- join virtual protest!
- Get active for animals on facebook and twitter, and help spread the word

Facebook, YouTube (virtual protest), and Twitter (Image 17) are the open or semi-open methods of communication promoted by the BLE campaign when communicating public concern to Julia Gillard. An open or semi-open forum is indicative of mass self-communication and has had a profound impact on campaigning. The use of open or
semi-open forums in political communication has also seen a growing proportion of political communication shift from closed correspondence to a more open and inclusive discussion. As a result the public’s questions and concerns are presented and thus disseminated in an open forum. This open dissemination has a pedagogical effect on those who see the messages while increasing the pressure on Julia Gillard to respond. The ability to view the public’s questions and messages on this scale is unparalleled across communication platforms. This is particularly evident when placed in contrast to private methods of communication, such as writing a letter, sending an email or making a phone call.

Persuading individuals to use these open or semi-open platforms comes by virtue of their inherent simplicity. The fact that Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are already highly integrated into public life means the campaign’s encouragement to “click” is readily accessible to most of the population.

Pragmatically, one must concede that the use of Twitter in this context is not entirely open; rather it is semi-open, as Julia Gillard ultimately decides whether or not a “Tweet” is displayed on her profile. Policy makers like Julia Gillard are able to exert control over what appears on their profile via Twitter’s “Retweet” function (also termed “retweeting” or “retweeted”), which is “the act of forwarding another user’s Tweet to all of your followers”. In other words, not everything Tweeted

110 While Julia Gillard does Tweet herself, it is common for famous Twitter profiles to be controlled by a third party. However, when Julia Gillard does Tweet they are signed “JG”. Profile available at: twitter.com/#/JuliaGillard (Retrieved May 30, 2012)

111 “Retweet (noun): A Tweet by another user, forwarded to you by someone you follow. Often used to spread news or share valuable findings on Twitter. Retweet (verb): To retweet, retweeting, retweeted. The act of forwarding another user’s Tweet to all of your followers”. Available in Twitters glossary at: https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/104-welcome-to-twitter-support/articles/166337-the-twitter-glossary#r (Retrieved May 30, 2012)
@JuliaGillard is displayed on her profile, rather the tweets that Julia Gillard decides to “retweet” to her some 228,546\textsuperscript{112} followers. This is not to suggest that messages are hidden unless retweeted, in fact they are openly displayed on the profile of those who originally tweeted @JuliaGillard. In this way, the questions and messages directed @Julia Gillard are disseminated to the followers of those who originally tweet.

Akin to the semi-open nature of Twitter, Facebook also enables Julia Gillard’s office to control what is posted on the Prime Minister’s “Wall”\textsuperscript{113}. However, Facebook circumnavigates this practical necessity by featuring what your friends are saying about Julia Gillard on her own page. Image 18 is of Julia Gillard’s official Facebook\textsuperscript{114} page and we see that “Cam ... posted about Julia Gillard in his link” this was done by either mentioning “Julia Gillard” in a Facebook post or using Facebook’s “@” function by typing “@Julia Gillard” in a person’s Facebook post or status update. The 3,201 people “talking about this”, displayed in the top left of Image 18, refers to the number of people who have used the “@Julia Gillard” function or simply used the name Julia Gillard in a post. This function means people’s opinions, messages, and questions appear on Julia Gillard’s profile and the "newsfeeds" of a person’s extended social network.

Finally, YouTube differs from both Facebook and Twitter in that it is an open form of communication. This means that the videos containing messages and questions directed at Julia Gillard can be found openly through YouTube's search function, search

\textsuperscript{112} As of Wednesday 30 May, 2012.
\textsuperscript{113} http://www.facebook.com/juliagillard (Retrieved June 1, 2012)
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid
engines like Google, or because the video was actively promoted on the campaign’s virtual protest. Aside from Facebook and Twitter’s self-imposed limitations on openness, it is certainly advantageous for a campaign to promote open forms of communication that everyone can see, rather than closed forms in which only two parties can see.

The Ban

New norms compel actors to justify or explain actions that were once deemed acceptable and in no need of justification or explanation. Prompting actors to justify their actions leaves an extensive trail of indirect evidence that can be used to determine the strength or existence of a new norm. In conjunction with the *Four Corners* report ‘A Bloody Business’, the BLE campaign forced the live export industry to
not only justify its actions but its very existence in the face of widespread public criticism. The live export industry rested on its economic strength and defended live exports by illustrating the financial ramifications of a permanent ban.


"What happens to the people who own the live cattle boats? Do they keep them at sea for a week, a month?"

"What happens to the people who tell their bank manager, 'Well I pay my bills by selling cattle to the live cattle trade'?"

"The bank manager would say, 'Well, have you got a business any more'?"

"What do the meat workers in Indonesia do? Do they go back to work?"

David Crombie, former president of the National Farmers Federation, stressed the economic implications for the northern cattle industry in an ABC Rural report ('Survey reveals severe effects of live export ban' 2011b)

"The 326 jobs, and 58 per cent affected farmers, is probably pretty right, but the really big issue is the hidden costs,"
"It's uncertainty in Indonesia about our reliability as a trading partner, uncertainty in Australia and the effect that the suspension has had on land values and security across the north, and the effect on cattle prices throughout Australia."

Northern Territory chief minister Paul Henderson also pointed out the economic ramifications of the possible ban on the Northern Territory in an ABC news report ('Labor rejects push to ban live exports' 2011b)

"You cannot drive through the Northern Territory, you cannot go through Alice Springs, you cannot go through Tennant Creek, you cannot go through Katherine and not have a live export industry,"

"The amendment if this gets up would see thousands of people thrown out of jobs."

Finally, Northern Territory Cattlemen's Association (NTCA) president Rohan Sullivan noted in an interview with The Age newspaper (AAP 2011b)

"If we stop exports to Indonesian, we are walking away from the millions of dollars that Australian producers have invested in infrastructure, training and improved animal husbandry.

"There is no Plan B for this industry."
"If live exports to Indonesia are closed, families will be bankrupted and for what purpose?

"Nor should it be forgotten that the pastoral industry is one of the few employers for Aboriginal people in remote areas,"

This and similar sentiment contributed to the suspension being lifted and trade with Indonesia resuming under stricter regulations. Understanding this change is helped by Jens Steffek’s (2003) distinction between norm compliance as a result of mere acceptance and compliance due to the norm being seen as binding and legitimate (Kratochwil 1984). For Steffek there are three different motivations to follow a norm:

1. Fear of punishment or coercion.
2. Cost-benefit calculations.
3. Acceptance of the norm as binding.

The first two motivations centre on the “mere acceptance” of a norm as a consequence of threat or material incentive. If a state or actor follows a norm out of fear or calculations of self-interest the threat or material incentive becomes inextricably linked to their compliance if one diminishes so too does the other. The third motivation means that the actor or state has accepted the norm as binding and legitimate and as such the actor’s compliance is less dependent on material incentive or coercion. This motivation comes through a reasonably stable belief in the norm’s inherent “rightfulness” (Steffek 2003, 254). Differentiating between these normative
motivations helps our understanding of the Australian government’s suspension of live exports and its choice to resume trade a little under a month later.

In light of these motivations, this thesis argues that it was the government’s decision to resume the live export trade that resulted from cost-benefit calculations not the initial decision to suspend trade. In other words, the suspension comes from the binding acceptance of an emerging norm making similar injunctions to animal cruelty and the resumption of trade was the result of cost-benefit calculations. The campaign forced the government to re-evaluate its interests in light of the emerging normative association of live exports with the binding and already accepted norm of animal cruelty. This reassessment caused the temporary suspension of live exports only for the government to then be economically coerced to resume trade through threats of job loss and industry hardship.

Not achieving their namesake goal (banning live export) makes the concept of ‘success’ particularly interesting for the BLE campaign. In this context it is important to differentiate between implicit and explicit success. Explicitly, the campaign is a failure by this namesake measure. Implicitly, however, the initial ban along with the introduction of strict regulations is a truly remarkable feat for any world society campaign. The campaign was able to strip the live export industry of any insulating legitimacy they once possessed and instead exposed them as complicit in the acts of animal cruelty. The five elements discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter all contributed to this shift, they are: (1) establishing a network, (2) disseminating information to raise awareness and generate an issue, (3) framing and normative
grafting, (4) shaming, and (5) reversing the burden of proof from proponents of the campaign to opponents.

Australia has little to no tolerance for animal cruelty and as such it is a strong pre-existing norm in Australia. Therefore by grafting live exports to the norm of animal cruelty the campaign was well on the way to delegitimizing the industry. Clear and concise messages and strong visual imagery also helped the campaign to frame live exports as cruel and something of humanitarian concern. Grafting and framing the issue in this way helped the campaign capture the public’s attention and propensity to share content through mass self-communication platforms. This propensity to share and create content also played a vital role in shaming the industry. While the use of open or semi-open forums of communication for information dissemination and discussion served to inform others of the issue. Finally, it was the establishment of a strong and diverse network that facilitated the sharing of content from the campaign to the public and among individuals themselves.

**Conclusion**

Persuading an actor or state to adopt a norm is more likely when a new issue, crisis, or severe policy failure confronts them. This confrontation makes the actor or state more receptive and motivated to analyse new information due to their uncertain environment (Checkel, J.T. 2001). In most cases the problem and its solution are initially identified by world society and are not yet recognised by the state or actor. In such situations Finnemore (1996c) distinguishes between a state *learning* and being *taught* a new norm. Learning implies that the state’s motivation for learning comes
from within the state. Teaching on the other hand implies that the state has been
taught about the problem and its solution from outside. It is this process of teaching
the state that captures the critical pedagogical techniques of “information, persuasion,
shame, and discipline” (Price, Richard 1998a, 617) used by campaigns.

This chapter has argued that the BLE campaign taught Australia about the live export
problem and then provided Australia with possible solutions, such as a total ban or
increased animal welfare standards. This was facilitated by mass self-communication
and the campaign’s techniques (disseminating information, networking,
framing/normative grafting, shaming and reversing the burden of proof). The
campaign ultimately consolidated Australia’s existing normative position regarding its
distaste for animal cruelty. However, the Australian government’s decision to resume
trade attests to comparative weakness of this normative position when pitted against
the state’s economic imperatives.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

The core difference between the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign (see Appendix One for comparative analysis table), and by extension their respective media environments, is the instrumental role the public now plays in modern campaigning. Success has always required public engagement and the ICBL was no exception, with mass participation in protests and rallies. For the ICBL, public participation came principally at the request of the ICBL itself or at that of one of its member organisations. When called upon the public were used to strengthen the technique rather than to actually execute it. The ICBL’s use of traditional media to disseminate information means that information was disseminated to the public irrespective of their participation. In other words, placing an advertisement in an elite newspaper or on a popular television station sees the information disseminated to the public without their participation per se. The campaign’s information is disseminated to the public inadvertently by virtue of people watching their favourite television program or buying their favourite newspaper. On the other hand, if a campaign posts information to their website or to a SNS they require the public to share the information (e.g. “Liking” or “Favouriting”) for it to have any substantial reach.

The ICBL’s efforts to shame treaty holdouts through television appearances, graft landmines to chemical weapons through conference presentations, reverse the burden of proof through military reports or raise awareness and frame landmines as indiscriminate through International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) advertising campaigns, all occur irrespective of public participation. Instead, public participation in
terms of people telling their friends about the campaign or at the very least seeing the advertisements serves to strengthen the technique but is not essential in actually executing it. Indeed, the ICBL’s massive network of NGOs and professional organisation’s attest to the campaign’s need to have thousands of autonomous centres of control that can organise and coordinate public activities. In contrast mass self-communication sees the public become instrumental in actually executing the techniques.

While the BLE campaign’s relationship with traditional media, like Four Corners, is certainly symbiotic, the campaign’s use of new media sees public participation as instrumental in actually executing the five techniques. Mass self-communication means the public is able to participate whenever and however they want as opposed to being called upon by the campaign. Campaigns going forward must understand this change and seek to seize it as opportunity rather than an impediment. In addition to relinquishing control, holding credibility and maintaining a clear and concise message, campaigns should provide the public with tools and direction through fan website construction packs, visually striking images, and quality videos to name but a few.

For the BLE campaign, information dissemination beyond the Four Corner’s report would never have achieved the necessary reach if people did not actively share the video on their respective social network. If the public does not share the information it is not disseminated. The public’s instrumental role in the dissemination of information can be seen in the BLE campaign’s focus on serving a social function by facilitating interaction while people reciprocally spread campaign information. Framing the issue as humanitarian through the personification of animals in videos, on the website, and
through “suggested” tweets requires the public to participate and share this information or the frame has limited reach. Establishing a network of two core organisations only becomes viable through mass self-communication, as autonomous publics are able to independently raise awareness, share information and create content for the benefit of the campaign. People who chose to participate out of interest or moral responsibility are actively seeking and are motivated by the desire to see change. Shifting the once passive role of the public in world society campaigning to that of an active and essential role represents a profound change in the era of mass self-communication.

A consequence of this change is an increasing interdependence between campaigns and public participation. It can be difficult to achieve the goals of one’s campaign if the public does not feel the campaign merits its participation or its content merits sharing on social networks. For the ICBL this reliance on the public was largely circumnavigated through advertising on traditional media and celebrity endorsement. However, even this approach now sees diminished results, as information is far easier to ignore through a fragmented, niche information environment that sees people engage in selective exposure. The public’s capacity to easily ignore select sources of information ultimately fuels the cost of “communication, while diminishing the effects” (Bennett & Iyengar 2008, 723). Nonetheless, mass self-communication has reduced the cost of information dissemination meaning more campaigns have a voice irrespective of their budget. While this reduction in cost is certainly advantageous to campaigns with a limited budget it also places them in a paradox in which the cost of communication has gone down while the competition along with the importance of credibility has gone up.
Operating in a volatile information communication environment requires an understanding of how to best harness its advantages and minimise its disadvantages. This requirement sees us return to the central question of the thesis:

How are the five techniques used by campaigns to stimulate normative change (disseminating information, networking, framing/normative grafting, shaming and shifting the burden of proof) affected by mass self-communication?

Underlining the core effects of this environment is the instrumental role the public now play in executing the campaign. The diminishing effectiveness of traditional media also augments the need to engage the public on mass self-communication platforms. To further explore these effects and the active role of the public we turn to a brief comparative analysis of two separate campaigns: Earth Day\textsuperscript{115}, which began on April 22, 1970 and then again in 1990, 2000 and then annually from 2010, and Earth Hour\textsuperscript{116}, which begun in 2007 and continues annually.

Earth Day

An increasing number of discernible environmental problems throughout the U.S. in the 1960s, particularly air and water pollution, and the publication of Rachel Carson's bestseller Silent Spring in 1962 saw environmental concerns begin to enter the public consciousness. This emerging environmental awareness came at a time of heightened unrest due to the civil rights movement and anti-war protests. The public’s propensity

\textsuperscript{115} www.earthday.org (Retrieved November 27, 2012)
\textsuperscript{116} www.earthhour.org/ (Retrieved November 27, 2012)
to express concern over government policy and an increasing distaste for the
degradation of the environment culminated in “Earth Day”. Earth Day saw some 20
million Americans take to the streets on April 22, 1970 in a myriad of demonstrations
across the country. This impressive exhibition of solidarity led to a number of
environmental protection laws, including:

Clean Air Act of 1970, the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in December 1970, and the passage of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, now known as the Clean Water Act ... the Safe Drinking
Water Act (1974), the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (1976), the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (known as Superfund) (1980) and
major amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(1972) (Freeman III 2002, 125).

Driving this dramatic convergence of people was a strong grassroots volunteer effort,
many of whom were relatively new to the environmental movement while others had
been involved in a number of smaller movements in the late 1960s. These smaller
movements had begun to attract attention from the national press, as environmental
issues began to permeate through editorials and cartoons. In addition to its mounting
prominence in the press, the public was also being provided with a growing range of
books on provocative environmental subjects (Lewis 1990). It was Gaylord Nelson, a
U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, who decided to harness this escalating sentiment by
announcing a national teach-in — open lectures from experts, with discussion and
questions from the audience — on the environment. Senator Nelson’s announcement “received coverage in *Time* and *Newsweek* and on the front page of the *New York Times*” (Lewis 1990, 10). Nelson recruited Republican Congressman Pete McCloskey, as his co-chair and Denis Hayes, former President of the Stanford student body as the national coordinator, who set out to gather funds and assemble a national staff of 85, primarily volunteers, to promote events around the country (Earth Day Network 2011). Nelson and Hayes decided to locate the teach-ins in public spaces rather than university campuses and encouraged participation from other organisations like labour unions and the League of Women Voters.

One of the event’s principal means of promotion was a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* in early February 1970, which announced the location of demonstrations to be carried out on April 22, 1970. This advertisement helped spark the interest of numerous major broadcasting networks. As a result, when April 22 came “Newspapers such as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* had given full page coverage the day before to the roster of scheduled events, and television networks also had provided enough coverage to the give the impending day something of the aura of a national holiday” (Lewis 1990, 11). Moreover, New York City mayor, John V. Lindsay closed Fifth Avenue down for two hours to promote the event. The event achieved “a rare political alignment, enlisting support from Republicans and Democrats, rich and poor, city slickers and farmers, tycoons and labor leaders” (Earth Day Network 2011)

Earth Day’s success was predicated on a number of complementary elements, including: growing concern for the environment, a clear causal chain to corporations
and government, and the freedom of domestic groups to operate in the U.S. Perhaps most importantly however was comparatively large reach of the traditional media sources used in the campaign’s dissemination of information. The reach and influence of these media organisations was then strengthened by an established network of grassroots volunteers who organised events across the country. The information communication environment in which Earth Day 1970 operated again reaffirms the role of the public in strengthening the campaign. For Earth Day 1970 the information was disseminated to the public irrespective of their participation but the campaign was then strengthened through grassroots public participation in teach-ins and protests across the U.S.

The campaign was resurrected on its 20th anniversary, April 22, 1990. Denis Hayes, who again organised the event, aimed “to come out of Earth Day 1990 with a strengthened, broadened environmental movement that has clear-cut plans for where it wants to go” (Hayes 1990, 304). Earth Day 1990, with a budget 15 times larger than its predecessor at $3 million (Lewis 1990), became a global movement, mobilizing some 200 million people in 141 countries (Earth Day Network 2011). From its humble beginnings in 1970, Earth Day 1990 had “20 staff members and a board of 115 directors who are some of the country's most prominent politicians, religious leaders, celebrities, business executives and labor leaders” and used “marketing techniques like licensing the Earth Day 1990 logo to everyone from makers of coffee mugs to clothing manufacturers” (Strom 1990). As an internationally established movement, Earth Day 2000 and 2010 aimed for stronger corporate partnerships, often to the frustration of original participants and organisers. Denis Hayes, in an interview with the New York
Times on Earth Day 2010 argued that this “ridiculous perverted marketing has cheapened the concept of what is really green ... It is tragic” (Kaufman 2010).

The waning interest in the ensuing campaigns, particularly in the U.S., was rooted in their inability to engage the public in the same way as Earth Day 1970. Earth Day 1970 was a grassroots movement that used largely autonomous individuals to organise events around nationally organised teach-ins, thus strengthening the campaign through public participation. The following Earth Days were able to disseminate information and raise awareness successfully largely because of their increased monetary support and endorsements from celebrities, corporations and politicians. However, public participation was comparatively diminished and did not strengthen the campaign to the same degree as Earth Day 1970. This diminished engagement comes from the increased role of corporations and the limited role of the grassroots in the organisation of the campaign. Discussing Earth Day 2010, Leslie Kaufman of the New York Times, notes:

While the momentum for the first Earth Day came from the grass roots, many corporations say that it is often the business community that now leads the way in environmental innovation — and they want to get their customers interested ...

The original Earth Day events were attended by 20 million Americans — to this day among the largest participation in a political action in the nation’s history.
This year, while the day will be widely marked with events, including a climate rally on the Mall in Washington, the movement does not have the same support it had four decades ago (Kaufman 2010).

**Earth Hour**

Earth Hour, now the largest environmental event in history, saw more than, “7000 cities and towns in 152 countries and territories switch off their lights for Earth Hour 2012” (Earth Hour 2012a). Established in Sydney in 2007 by WWF Australia and advertising agency, Leo Burnett Sydney, with support from Fairfax Media, the event asks participants to turn off their lights for one hour on the last Saturday of March. Similar to Earth Day 1970, which came in the wake of Rachel Carson's book *Silent Spring*, Earth Hour was established soon after the release of Al Gore's popular documentary *An Inconvenient Truth* on the subject of climate change.

The success of the initial Earth Hour is again the culmination of many elements, including growing awareness of climate change, strong partnerships between business, government and environmental organisations, clear and concise message, credible management through the WWF Australia, an established network, and an issue with a clear causal chain. Earth Hour also received national media coverage through its partnership with Fairfax Media Limited. However, in contrast to Earth Day 1970 – 2000 is the symbiotic nature of Earth Hour’s relationship with traditional media and mass self-communication platforms.
Earth Hour is a comparatively young campaign that has embraced mass self-communication from its inception. Mass self-communication is an essential component of Earth Hour’s rapid ascension in scale and influence. With only eight global staff members, the campaign is characterised as open-source and uses Yammer\textsuperscript{117} – an enterprise social network platform – to enable autonomous volunteers and WWF teams around the world to pose questions, organise and share ideas for Earth Hour and other projects to undertake beyond the hour. Open-source means the public is instrumental in executing the Earth Hour campaign from the dissemination of information to establishing the network. Sid Das, CIO Earth Hour Global highlights the campaign’s willingness to relinquish control through open-source and the instrumental role of the public in the campaign:

> Everything we are building from a technology perspective as well, it’s tailored to be open-sourced, which means in a few years anybody can put their hand up and say you know what my skill-set lies in this so I can build this for the community, so it becomes more a community driven open-source project ... like Wikipedia ... everything we are doing is geared toward that [sic] (Earthhour 2012).

The campaign’s self-described use of “the power of social networks ... to promote the campaign” (Earth Hour 2012a) has resulted in Earth Hour receiving 769,140 “Likes” on its Facebook page\textsuperscript{118} compared to 108,333 “Likes” for the Earth Day Facebook page\textsuperscript{119}.

\textsuperscript{117}https://www.yammer.com/ (Retrieved November 30, 2012)
\textsuperscript{118}http://www.facebook.com/earthhour (Retrieved November 30, 2012)
\textsuperscript{119}http://www.facebook.com/EarthDayNetwork (Retrieved November 30, 2012)
and 81,049 “Followers” on its Twitter profile\textsuperscript{120} compared to 22,457 Twitter “Followers” on the Earth Day profile\textsuperscript{121} as of November, 2012. This comparatively high engagement on social network sites owes much to Earth Hour’s website\textsuperscript{122}, which features sharing and SNS prominently. In particular, the “Get Involved: Join the Community” (Earth Hour 2012b) (Image 19) and “Get Involved: Spread the Word” (Earth Hour 2012c) (Image 20) sections of the website.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image19}
\caption{Image 19}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{120} https://twitter.com/earthhour (Retrieved November 30, 2012) \\
\textsuperscript{121} https://twitter.com/EarthDayNetwork (Retrieved November 30, 2012) \\
\textsuperscript{122} http://www.earthhour.org/ (Retrieved November 30, 2012)
Earth Hour’s use of YouTube is another asset in spreading awareness and encouraging public participating. Earth Hour releases promotional videos on YouTube to inform people of the next Earth Hour (“Earth Hour 2011 Official video” (2010) and “Earth Hour 2012 Official Video” (2011a) with 1.7 million and 1.1 million views respectively) and city specific videos to encourage and promote that cities involvement (Hong Kong Earth Hour 2011 (2011b) with 438,000 views). Earth Hour’s use of YouTube also extends beyond promotion to the “I Will If You Will (IWIYW)” campaign which encourages people to submit videos that pose a challenge to the community (Image 21) (Earth Hour 2012d). Examples of which are “300 persons pledge to stop printing emails, I will shave my head in the shape of planet earth” or “I will do the polar bear swim if 2000 people agree to pick up trash by the beach”.

Image 20
Earth Hour’s IWIYW campaign has had more than 200,000 (Earth Hour 2012a) individuals accept a challenge on YouTube. Gregg Yan, Earth Hour Philippines Communications Head, again observes that the success of the Earth Hour campaign comes from relinquishing control to the public through concepts like the IWIYW campaign, noting that “one of the key requirements for making a social campaign; make sure that anyone can repurpose it and make it theirs and make it fun [sic]” (Earthhour 2012).

Indeed, for Cayla and Arnould (2008, 97) the meaning of the Earth Hour brand has emerged “out of increasingly dispersed networks of users, producers, and other agents”. Earth Hour fosters the creativity of the event’s numerous local organizers by retaining “almost no control over the way the brand is used, how the event is advertised, or how business partners are picked to endorse the event in other parts of
the world” (2008, 99). Cayla and Arnould note that when a brand is conceived as evolving narrative, as is the case with the Earth Hour brand,

the construction of brands becomes a collective process involving a host of “authors” who all add up their own interpretations: not only consumers and managers, but also popular culture intermediaries in different cultural contexts (Holt 2003). A brand’s meaning emerges out of consensus and dissensus, between the collective sharing of what the brand means to all its stakeholders and the active and often conflictual negotiation of such meanings. As members of different interpretive communities (Fish 1980), stakeholders and consumers all add different elements (Cayla & Arnould 2008, 98).

Cayla and Arnould (2008) firmly embed the Earth Hour brand within mass self-communication, as people are encouraged to adapt the brand and its meaning to differing cultural contexts by selecting what they want, reshaping it and then disseminating it. Despite the brands strong connection to mass self-communication and open-source development, Earth Hour CEO and Co-founder Andy Ridley, discusses the symbiotic nature of the campaign’s relationship with traditional media:

As much as digital is a massive opportunity, is a massive driver for us, it’s very much still offline as well and were not, you know, shy of that ... the way I think about digital is the future and the opportunity to connect, so if our long term goal is this interconnected global community, the one thing that is going to really help us get there is the rise of digital. But that doesn’t mean in any way that old ways of communicating don’t work, but cause of course they do, and
you know photographs work, newspapers work, radio stations work ... to
overplay the digital thing is not kinda what we are trying to do, but it is such an
immense part of our opportunity going forward [sic] (Earthhour 2012).

The “opportunity going forward” to which Andy Ridley refers sees the comparatively
diminished role of traditional media in the Earth Hour campaign to that of the Earth
Day campaign come to the fore. This diminished role is not surprising; Earth Hour is an
open-source campaign that sees the public as instrumental to its success and its brand
continually reshaped by autonomous hubs through the principles of self-generation,
self-selection, and self-direction. Technological advances are responsible for many of
the significant changes to public interaction and communication since Earth Day 1970,
fragmentation, partisan selective exposure, selective exposure, and content
proliferation have fuelled the cost of public communication through traditional media
while diminishing its effectiveness. This decline in effectiveness has seen campaigns
like Earth Hour turn to mass self-communication platforms to complement their use of
traditional media. This has resulted in a more symbiotic relationship between a
campaign’s use of new and traditional media.

Nonetheless, realising normative change in this environment still means engaging with
a creative audience — buoyed by low cost and an unprecedented level of control in
their selection of content from a multitude of sources — that expects to be able to
interact and participate. Therefore, to use only traditional media is to covet top down
control in which information is dictated to the audience through a one-way medium.
On the other hand, engaging with a creative audience requires the formulation of a clear and concise message that retains meaning as control is relinquished over its ongoing meaning, form, shape, and platform, as people adopt it, reformulate it, and then disseminated it. To embrace this is to see the public become instrumental in executing the campaign.

**Changing Relationship: Campaigns Mediated through Traditional and New Media**

Change remains the only constant in the current information communication environment, but perhaps more than ever we are seeing constant, transformative change of which increased speed and decreased cost play integral roles. An environment in constant tension leaves us questioning the extent to which campaigns can continue to employ a symbiotic relationship between new and traditional media. While assessing the role of traditional media going forward ultimately depends on the needs and expectations of the individual campaign, we can begin to ask how much longer campaigns will continue to value traditional media alongside new media as a method of information dissemination.

This question seems more prevalent when people are creating, disseminating, selecting, and collaborating in diverse projects like never before. Testaments to this change are abundant in the platforms and spaces of mass self-communication; exemplified by open-source crisis mapping, crowd funding platforms, the creation of open-source legislation, and open-source problem solving communities like Avaaz\(^{123}\), OpenIdeo\(^{124}\) and Design for America\(^{125}\). The following non-symbiotic examples have

succeeded largely independent of traditional media and invite the possibility of campaigns being able to operate successfully within the sole confines\textsuperscript{126} of new media and mass self-communication platforms.

Crisis mapping leverages a number of tools, including mobile, web-based applications, participatory maps and crowd-sourced event data, to prepare, mitigate, and respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. It is a significant change in cartography that has more to do with time and cost than geography itself, as crisis mapping sees a shift in which maps go from being static or “dead” to live, dynamic and interactive. This shift comes as people with mobile phones become sensors, providing a growing volume of “georeferenced data” at nominal cost. Patrick Meier (2012) sees this “evolving network of human sensors ... as a new “nervous system” for our planet—a crowd-sourced nervous system that generates a significant amount of real-time data via short message service (SMS; text messages) and social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Flickr—particularly in times of crisis” (Meier 2012, 89-90).

On January 12, 2010, this “nervous system” was put into action when the Caribbean country of Haiti suffered a 7.0 magnitude earthquake. The earthquake saw the mass destruction of buildings in the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince and the town of Léogâne. The Haitian government claimed that more than 222,000 people died and 300,000 were injured (Heinzelman, Jessica, Brown & Meier 2011; Heinzelman, J. & Waters 2010). Aiding the massive international response from humanitarian organisations and

\textsuperscript{126} It is possible that new media will take a stronger agenda setting role and traditional media will simply cover the stories that they deem them newsworthy. It is of course difficult to quarantine anything from traditional media.
government was an open-source crisis-mapping platform called Ushahidi. Designed to map reports of violence in Kenya after the election fallout in 2008, Ushahidi, meaning "testimony" in Swahili, draws on mobile phone communication and social media to create an interactive map of a crisis situation. Four days after the earthquake first-responder teams and international organisations operating in Haiti were beginning to use Ushahidi for alerts on damage, road conditions, civilian needs, locations, and security concerns. Supplying the stream of information and updates to Ushahidi was an all-volunteer crisis-mapping team that largely searched social media sources (Twitter, Facebook, and blogs) for information that could be actionable and of use to people working on the ground.

If a piece of information was deemed useful and had a location attached to it, volunteers would find the GPS coordinates through Google Earth and OpenStreetMap and map it on haiti.ushahidi.com for anyone to view and utilize. Through the aggregation of individual reports, the crisis mappers were able to identify clusters of incidents and urgent needs, helping responders target their response efforts ... Ushahidi deployment was also publicized throughout social networks, including the Crisis Mappers Group; people were encouraged to submit reports via e-mail or through a form on the Ushahidi Web site. Many people posted information that they had received by phone from relatives in Haiti. (Heinzelman, J. & Waters 2010, 7)

Paul Conneally (TED 2011d), the public communications manager for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, also tells of thousands of

---

“digital volunteers” scouring the internet for information, tweets and converted SMSs, related to the Haiti and then compiling this information into other open-source maps — like openstreetmap.org and crisismappers.net128 — for everybody to participate in and use. For Conneally open-source crisis mapping and the “social power of sharing ... are challenging the old models, the old analog models of control and command” (2011d)

Birregah et al. (2012, 379) observe that “on such platforms there is usually no distinction between the producers and consumers of the information”, affirming the inherent connection between crisis mapping and mass self-communication. Indeed, open source crisis mapping also demonstrates the unequivocal advantage in relinquishing control to the public on a credible platform like Ushahidi. While its success also substantiates a number of claims made throughout this thesis, namely: the audience’s desire to participate and engage; the strength of an established network; the changing nature of leadership, in which individuals or organisations contribute to a project, not because they are being paid or coerced, but because they want to; and the audience’s ability to exercise creativity in its use and dissemination of information. It is ultimately this creative use of information that prompted US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton to illustrate the great practical benefit of crisis mapping in her speech “Remarks on Internet Freedom”:

---

Information networks have also played a critical role on the ground. When I was with President Preval in Port-au-Prince on Saturday, one of his top priorities was to try to get communication up and going. The government couldn’t talk to each other, what was left of it, and NGOs, our civilian leadership, our military leadership were severely impacted. The technology community has set up interactive maps to help us identify needs and target resources. And on Monday, a seven-year-old girl and two women were pulled from the rubble of a collapsed supermarket by an American search-and-rescue team after they sent a text message calling for help (Clinton 2010).

Crowd funding is another example of creation, dissemination and collaboration. Websites like Indiegogo\(^\text{129}\), Kickstarter\(^\text{130}\) and GoFundMe\(^\text{131}\) enable people to create a project proposal or a fundraising effort for a specific cause, set a fundraising target, disseminate it via SNS and pool the collective donations of people via the internet. Crowd funding has been used to great effect for disaster relief, business start-ups, music and film projects, scientific research, and software development. Examples include the $1.3 million raised for the “Let’s Build a Goddamn Tesla Museum”\(^\text{132}\) and the $700,000 raised for "Lets Give Karen -The bus monitor- H Klein A Vacation!" (Sidorov & Klein 2012) The latter resulted from a viral video (‘Making The Bus Monitor Cry’ 2012) with some 8.5 million views of Karen Klein suffering verbal abuse at the hands of school children on a bus trip.

\(^{130}\) http://www.kickstarter.com/ (Retrieved October 31, 2012)  
\(^{131}\) http://gofundme.com/ (Retrieved October 31, 2012)  
\(^{132}\) http://www.indiegogo.com/teslamuseum (Retrieved November 1, 2012)
Finland’s Open Ministry\textsuperscript{133} (Avoin ministeriö)\textsuperscript{134} concerns the creation of crowd sourced legislation. The Open Ministry enables people to propose law online and once a proposed law has collected a minimum of 50,000 online signatures it is eligible to be addressed by parliament. In a similar program, “We the People”\textsuperscript{135}, enables the creation of online petitions in the U.S. Once a petition has received 25,000 or more signatures within 30 days it will be reviewed and then addressed by the U.S. government. This saw a somewhat infamous petition receive 116,039 signatures\textsuperscript{136} in which the state of Texas sought to secede from the union and form a new government. This petition was encouraged by what some perceived as a disappointing 2012 U.S. presidential election. An election which again illustrated the reach of public created content, particularly on YouTube, as a number of videos regarding the candidates achieved viral success, with “Mitt Romney debates himself” (Dkostv 2012), “Why Obama Now” (WhyObamaNow 2012), “Whedon On Romney” (WhedonOnRomney 2012) and “Barack Obama vs Mitt Romney” (ERB 2012) being viewed 2.1 million, 2.6 million, 6 million, 63.9 million times respectively. The reach of these videos again substantiates the loss of control over messages and information surrounding political candidates and campaigns alike.

Finally, open-source problem solving or direct action communities, typified by Avaaz\textsuperscript{137} —meaning “voice” in several languages — continue to grow in scope and influence.

\textsuperscript{133} http://openministry.info/ (Retrieved November 1, 2012)
\textsuperscript{134} http://www.avoinministerio.fi/ (Retrieved November 1, 2012)
\textsuperscript{135} https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petitions (Retrieved November 21, 2012)
Avaaz has close to 17 million global members and takes action through “petitions, funding media campaigns and direct actions, emailing, calling and lobbying governments, and organizing "offline" protests and events” (Avaaz 2012). It describes its model of internet organising as allowing “thousands of individual efforts, however small, to be rapidly combined into a powerful collective force” (2012). This model of mass self-communication engagement has seen Avaaz successfully address an impressive array of issues\(^{138}\) (2012).

The broader effects of these mass self-communication platforms have not gone unnoticed by world leaders. In August, 2012 US President Barack Obama participated in an open AMA (Ask Me Anything) on the social news website Reddit\(^{139}\) called “I am Barack Obama, President of the United States -- AMA” (Reddit 2012), of the experience President Obama noted that “I want to thank everybody at reddit for participating - this is an example of how technology and the internet can empower the sorts of conversations that strengthen our democracy over the long run” (Reddit 2012). While former US President Bill Clinton noted in the closing of the 2012 Clinton Global Initiative University\(^{140}\), "I learned all over again that all these young people, partly because of the social media and internet communication generally, have a much more global perspective on a person to person basis than any generation before" (Clinton Global Initiative U 2012). Offering a contrast with the traditional political system, President Clinton noted that, “what works in politics when we fight like the devil and call each other names, back everybody off in their corner and see who still cares

\(^{139}\) http://www.reddit.com/ (Retrieved November 1, 2012)  
\(^{140}\) http://www.cgiu.org/ (Retrieved November 2, 2012)
enough to go vote; conflict. But what works in real life; creative networks of cooperation” (2012). While on June 2nd 2013, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that “social media are the worst menace to society,” (The Economist 2013, 56) in light of the mass protests spreading across the country in 2013.

Examples of people creating, disseminating, selecting, and collaborating in diverse projects and protests sees debate concerning the onset of change in the communication landscape steadily become displaced with the need to investigate its effects. This need is elevated by the growing array of international issues that must be met with a global and systematic response if they are to be challenged with success (e.g. global warming, global financial crisis, environmental conservation, regional conflicts, world hunger and poverty). The core contribution of this thesis also originates from this need to understand the effects of mass self-communication. This contribution is threefold: (1) developing an interdisciplinary and systematic method of campaign analysis, (2) using it to examine the broader effects of mass self-communication on the techniques used to stimulate normative change, and (3) applying it to an original case study of the Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign. It is my hope that this can help strengthening world society campaigns and their ability to combat international issues.

**Final Considerations and Future Research**

Since the conclusion of my thesis a number of significant claims have been affirmed, none more so than the importance of international norms. On September 4, 2013 U.S. President Barack Obama held a press conference alongside Swedish Prime Minister
Fredrik Reinfeldt in Stockholm. President Obama used the press conference to back a punitive strike against Syria and the Assad Regime for its use of chemical weapons in Damascus on August 21, 2013. In doing so Obama reiterated his support for the long-standing international norm against the use of chemical weapons. In statements supporting the strike against Syria Obama added that “My credibility’s not on the line. The international community’s credibility is on the line, and America and Congress’ credibility is on the line because we give lip service to the notion that these international norms are important.” The President continued the defence of his decision by stressing, “I think America also recognizes that if the international community fails to maintain certain norms, standards and laws governing how countries interact and how people are treated, that over time, this world becomes less safe.”

While this somewhat spirited defence of international norms turned out to be largely rhetorical it does not diminish the importance of these statements for international norms more generally. The U.S.’s support for the ICBL and the norm to ban landmines was also largely rhetorical but it was enough to help legitimise the concept of a ban. As rhetorical “support for an international prohibition in principle (albeit, once alternatives are developed) provides much in the way of delegitimizing ... [the norm’s target] and fostering the prescriptive status of the norm, especially compared with a situation in which opponents simply reject [the idea of the norm] as ridiculous” (Price, Richard 1998a, 636). The reaffirmed importance of norms within the international community is a boon to the potential influence of world society campaigns. The fact that the international community particularly the US is willing, at least rhetorically, to support international norms goes much in the way of legitimising the practice of
changing and creating them. World society can change international norms and this thesis has aided our understanding of how they do this by combining international relations and media literature. This combination of literature also underpinned the theoretical contribution made by the thesis.

This contribution comes from problematic tendencies on behalf of both IR and media literature that limit their respective analysis of non-governmental advocacy. For literature examining non-governmental advocacy with a political perspective it is the tendency to leave the media, particularly new media, absent from detailed analysis while for literature examining non-governmental advocacy from a media perspective it is their failure to systematically analyse the operation and techniques of a campaign. This project has avoided both these tendencies by focusing on mass self-communication and systematically analysing the ICBL and BLE campaign through the ICBL’s five techniques. By occupying Donatella della Porta and Dieter Rucht’s (2002, 3) research space “that is, below the level of general treatises and above the level of studying single groups or protests”, this project has offered a broad analysis of campaigning through the ICBL’s techniques and the general concept of mass self-communication. While a more specific and real world application of these techniques has been achieved through numerous examples and a case study of the Australian 2011 Ban Live Export campaign.

Lastly, there are three final points that need to be made, even if their implications must ultimately be left open.
First, readers of this thesis may object to the moral overtones evident in many of the world society campaigns cited throughout. Portraying world society campaigns as promoters of only ‘good’ norms has not been the intention of this thesis, world society campaigns can and do advocate for disagreeable issues of which the myriad of terrorist organisations certainly attest. This also speaks to a wider point: world society seldom holds a unified voice. However, the presence of competing views across world society itself or even within specific campaigns does little to detract from its capacity to influence the norms of the nation state.

Second, exponential growth in the number of people with internet enabled devices that are able, and seemingly willing to participate in campaigns by signing an online petition, viewing and sharing a video, or “Liking” a campaign on Facebook are arguably devaluing a once precious currency. The currency to which I refer is that of the number of participants in a campaign or movement. If 50,000 views or participants were once seen as significant, Kony’s 100 million or more views can be seen to devalue this figure.

Third, any project studying the modern information communication environment accepts that it develops and changes rapidly; platforms fade from use and new ones spring up at a dizzying pace. The specific examples illustrated throughout this research project, including YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, will no doubt be obsolete or challenged by new platforms in the coming months or years. While this project has attempted to circumnavigate this problem by employing the overarching concept of mass self-communication, there is little doubt that this too will be challenged sooner rather than later. It is in this sense that the opportunities for continued research in this field become exciting.
Appendices

Appendix One: Systematic Comparative Analysis of ICBL and BLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Techniques:</th>
<th>International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Network</td>
<td>Instrument of coordination to a largely professional, dense, diverse, autonomous range (1200+) of organisations free to pursue the campaign’s goals as they see fit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disseminating</td>
<td>Clear and concise message with powerful images and statistics centred on traditional media (TV, radio, documentary films, comic books, international conferences) and celebrity support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing &amp; Norm Grafting</td>
<td>Framed landmines as an indiscriminate danger to civilians, cementing them as a humanitarian crisis that violates international law. Norm grafted to ban on similarly indiscriminate chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaming</td>
<td>Nations yet to sign the treaty are relegated to out-group and subjected to shame alongside nations that had supported the idea of a ban rhetorically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse the Burden of Proof</td>
<td>Shifted dominant discourse in favour of ban and produced legitimate military reports outlining that the mines advantages did not outweigh humanitarian costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniques:</td>
<td>Ban Live Export (BLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Network</td>
<td>National network comprised of two key ideologically unified and credible organisations with a strong emphasis on interactivity and public participation through mass self-communication platforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disseminating</td>
<td>Traditional media (<em>Four Corners</em>) was important in initial awareness. Clear and concise message with powerful images disseminated across multiple platforms, while actively encouraging public participation in spreading the message across SNS through relinquished control, simplicity, weak ties and credibility of a person’s friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing &amp; Norm</td>
<td>Framed issue as humanitarian through the personification of animals on campaign website. The use of strong language and visual imagery to gain attention and give the perception of crisis. Norm grafted to animal cruelty through clear and concise messages, images and videos on SNSs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaming</td>
<td>Efforts centred on the dissemination of statistics via website, SNSs and videos, encouraging the public to share and participate in shaming. Community websites, public made YouTube videos, and Facebook pages also assisted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse the Burden of Proof</td>
<td>Graphic video helped establish new context in which live exports must now prove that they are not only important but warrant such cruelty. The use of open or semi-open methods of communication (Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter) sees the public’s questions and concerns presented and thus disseminated in an open forum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Two: Methods and Research Process

The selection of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) as my first case study was relatively straightforward. It was extremely successful, the literature on the subject was dense and intriguing, it achieved so much over a short period of time, it was internationally acclaimed, and it had targeted the security imperatives of the state. Scholars were particularly intrigued by the success of this international coalition of NGOs in forcing the state to re-examine its interests. The success of the ICBL becomes all the more impressive when it is realised that this new norm was propagated by organisations with no comparable material or economic might. Aside from the success of the ICBL was the literature that sought to explain how the campaign had achieved so much in such a short period of time. It quickly became clear that there was a common strand of “techniques” or “tactics” employed by the campaign. As I distilled this list down to five techniques (disseminating information, establishing a network, framing and normative grafting, shaming and reversing the burden of proof) I realised that this list would enable me to study campaigns as a generalised entity.

Conversely, the Ban Live Export (BLE) campaign was selected because I was informed of its existence through mass self-communication, rather than by traditional media. Someone in my network deemed the information worthy of sharing and I was fortunate enough to a recipient. Indeed, everyone that shared the campaign’s graphic video across their social network only seemed to have two things in common; a Facebook account and a slight concern for animals. Over the next few days my “Newsfeed” was inundated with people sharing this graphic and shocking video. At first it only annoyed me as I suspected another case of Morozov’s “slacktivism”. The
campaign then achieved two things that instantly tweaked my interest: (1) people actually took to the streets, and (2) the government took decisive action in response to the campaign when it banned live exports to Indonesia, one of our biggest neighbours and an important economic partner in the region. It was at this point that I realised that this campaign had achieved something special; it had made Australia reconsider its economic imperatives. This in conjunction with the campaign being Australian yet affecting an international neighbour, the campaign’s use of new media, its timeliness, and the fact that the issue was morally charged, all made the Ban Live Export campaign an extremely suitable candidate. I discovered early in the research, mainly through Legro (1997) that the campaign need not be successfully in the strict sense of the word to be worth studying. A failed norm provides just as much insight into a campaign as a successful norm. With this in mind I was not concerned with the ultimate outcome of the campaign, at least as far as my formal research interests were concerned.

Nonetheless, the BLE campaign was not the only consideration. I initially intended to study the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC), which aimed to ban cluster munitions, which are “weapons that open in mid-air and disperse smaller submunitions — anywhere from a few dozen to hundreds — into an area. They can be delivered by aircraft or from ground systems such as artillery, rockets, and missiles” (Feickert & Kerr 2010, 113). Similar to the ICBL, the CMC was another successful weapon prohibition campaign that played an instrumental role in the establishment and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the push towards Protocol V of the Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW). The CMC, which now comprises of some 350 member organisations, originated soon after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq
which saw forces utilise cluster munitions extensively. The founding NGOs had individually participated in the CCW process but viewed a unified, clear and concise voice as more influential.

The organisational structure and purpose of the CMC was modelled upon the Nobel Peace Laureate International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). In light of ICBL, the CMC took a strong and unambiguous stand against cluster munitions from the outset demanding an “immediate moratorium on the use of cluster munitions, an acknowledgement of states’ responsibility for the explosive remnants they produced, and a commitment to provide resources to areas affected by unexploded submunitions” (HRW 2010, 108). However, upon second consideration I felt that two campaigns focused on weapon prohibition would not be a good subject for the further development of my interdisciplinary analysis. I instead felt that studying two distinct campaigns with different subjects would better show that my method of study is as widely applicable as I claim it to be. Among my other considerations was the campaign against the ALP government, led by Kevin Rudd, to censor certain websites deemed inappropriate, the campaign to permit R18+ games in Australia, and legalising gay marriage. In retrospect, I must confess that my selection of the BLE campaign was actually based on quite limited research. This is partly because I usually research as I write, but more so because it just felt right. This proved to be a crucial decision. As I continued to research the BLE campaign it quickly became apparent that my interdisciplinary analysis was adaptable and provided interesting insights into the campaigning process.
The challenges I faced in gathering evidence came principally from the fast pace with which things moved and progressed. After I had invested considerable time into my research of the BLE campaign the Occupy movement started as well as the Arab Spring and then the Kony 2012 campaign. These instances of mass mobilisation fuelled by mass self-communication platforms not only fuelled my confidence, but also made me second guess my focus and overwhelmed me with things to discuss and research. I was bewildered by this barrage of case study opportunities. Evidence became plentiful to a fault. Keeping a narrow focus became paramount as I sifted through the ever mounting pile of evidence. I owe this narrow focus to the five campaign techniques (disseminating information, establishing a network, framing and normative grafting, shaming and reversing the burden of proof). These techniques enabled me to gather evidence that was directly related to the technique I was studying. Without this I would have been unable to stop myself from drowning in the evidence.

These five campaign techniques also helped me design my study. I had the five techniques and I knew that I wanted to see how they were affected by mass self-communication and then apply them to case studies. This prima facie was a simple proposition. While the reality was far more complicated, the research parameters provided to me by the five techniques really did enable me to keep a simple research design. While the techniques did keep the overall design of the project relatively simple, they were not simple to acquire. As previously mentioned, the literature on the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was dense and covered the campaign from a seemingly endless number of perspectives. My first year of study was dedicated to deciphering this myriad of perspectives into the five techniques that I deemed the
most important. This importance came principally from the number of sources that discussed each technique in addition to my own feelings.

Sources

The sources consulted for ‘Chapter Two: International Relations’ and ‘Chapter Four: International Campaign to Ban Landmines’ came principally from constructivist international relations literature and often dealt directly with world society and their efforts to change norms (Clark, AM 2001; Clark, Ian 2007; Finnemore 1996b; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996b; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Price, Richard 1998a). While the sources consulted for ‘Chapter Three: New Media’ and ‘Chapter Five: Mass Self-communication and Campaign Techniques’ came principally from mass self-communication literature or literature that focused on the effects of new media technologies on campaigns (Castells, M. & Cardoso 2006; Chaffee & Metzger 2001; Schulz 2004). Another key focus of Chapter Three was partisan selection literature (Mutz 2001; Stroud 2007; Sunstein 2007; Tewksbury 2003) and fragmentation literature (Bennett & Iyengar 2008, 2010; Castells, M. 2007; Lawrence, Sides & Farrell 2010). Literature was selected through a largely organic process of reading and then finding sources that were referenced or similar to the original.

The almost complete use of secondary sources throughout my thesis was a result of two factors: resources and time. The project was ambitious in its scale and considerable time was needed to conduct research into both international relations and media literature. I decided early on in my project that I would principally consult secondary sources. Therefore I invested no time in finding potential primary sources. In retrospect I believe this was the right decision and was essential to my timely completion of the project. I believe this need for timely completion was particularly
important for this project. The project’s focus on new media technologies and mass self-communication platforms leaves it vulnerable to the rapid rate with which they change. To study an old and obsolete platform would leave the reader questioning the study’s relevance. The same can largely be said of old campaigns, as their relevance can also diminish at a dizzying pace. Despite the benefits of a timely completion I do feel that that primary data would have strengthened the thesis as a whole. I would have liked to ask campaign managers if the things I observed in my research were conscious decisions or if they were simply viewed as the obvious thing to do and involved no conscious decision making process. This question would have added another layer of insight into my research. I fully intend to ask this question when I publish the thesis in an effort to add primary data to my research.

Comparisons

Any comparison of the two campaigns had to be simple. As previously mentioned the ICBL’s five campaign techniques were important in keeping the scope of the research narrow. Therefore the techniques also formed the basis for any comparison in the thesis. The techniques enabled me to study world society campaigns as a generalised entity while emphasising the benefits of my interdisciplinary research design (as the techniques stemmed from IR while the effects came from media literature). In order to help the reader easily follow and fully understand the comparisons I tried to keep the five techniques as a common theme throughout the thesis.
Appendix Three: Google Metrics and the BLE Campaign

Increase in the interest of “ban live exports” as a search term through the search engine Google.
Bibliography

AAP 2011a, 'Activists march against overseas abattoir cruelty', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, June 18.

—— 2011b, 'Live export ban won't end cruelty: cattlemen', *The Age*, June 8.

—— 2011c, 'Indonesians brand cattle ban 'discrimination' as diplomatic tensions grow', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, June 8.


—— 2011e, 'Live exports backed but not compulsory stunning', *The Age*, December 5.


— 2011c, 'Labor stops short of outlawing brutal slaughter', *media release*, October 11.


— 2011m, 'Wilkie introduces new live export Bill', *media release*, October 31.


Australian Veterinary Association 2011, 'Cattle export to Indonesia should be suspended until welfare ensured', media release, June 1.


Carroll, R 2012, 'Kony 2012 Cover the Night fails to move from the internet to the streets', The Guardian, April 21.


Castells, M 2009, *Communication power*, Oxford University Press, USA.


Chadwick, A 2009a, 'The Internet and Politics in Flux', *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 195-196.


Clark, I 2005, *Legitimacy in international society*, Oxford University Press, USA.


CNN October 10, 1997, *Crossfire*, October 10, CNN.


Coorey, P 2011, 'MP backlash puts live cattle trade in doubt', The Sydney Morning Herald, June 1.


Crane, R & Sornette, D 2008, 'Viral, quality, and junk videos on youtube: Separating content from noise in an information-rich environment'.

Croll, M 1998, The History of Landmines, Leo Cooper, UK.


health/welfare/regional_animal_welfare_strategy_for_asia, the_far_east_and_oceania/regional_animal_welfare_strategy_asia, the_far_east_and_oceania>


Eastin, MS & LaRose, R 2000, 'Internet self-efficacy and the psychology of the digital divide', *Journal of Computer Mediated Communication*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 0-0.


Fish, S 1980, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.


—— 2007, 'The role of site features, user attributes, and information verification behaviors on the perceived credibility of web-based information', *New Media & Society*, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 319.


Gueorguieva, V 2007, 'Voters, MySpace, and YouTube: The impact of alternative communication channels on the 2006 election cycle and beyond', *Social Science Computer Review*.


Hauser, M, Cushman, F & Kamen, M (eds) 2006, *People, pets, or property*, Purdue University Press, Lafayette, IN.


Heinzelman, J & Waters, C 2010, Crowdsourcing crisis information in disaster-affected haiti, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, DC.


HRW 2010, Meeting the Challenge Protecting Civilians through the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Human Rights Watch, New York, NY.


Jackson, R 1990, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World, Cambridge Univ Pr.


Jones, B 2011, The slaughter of Australian cattle in Indonesia: An observational study, RSPCA Australia.


Keating, J 2012, 'Guest post: Joseph Kony is not in Uganda (and other complicated things)', *Foreign Policy*, March 7.


—— (eds) 2002b, Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota.


Lacy, M & Wilkin, P (eds) 2005, Global politics in the information age, Manchester University Press, Manchester, UK.


Malcolm, A 2009, 'Iran ambassador suggests CIA could have killed Neda Agha-Soltan', *Los Angeles Times*, June 25.


Minister for Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2011a, 'Minister Ludwig announces suspension of trade to certain facilities', *media release*, May 31.


'Mix messages on red meat sales' 2011a, *ABC Rural*, June 10.


'MP calls for RSPCA funding to be cut' 2011c, *ABC News*, August 12.


— — 2011b, 'Australia increasingly uncomfortable with animal cruelty', The Conversation, September 20.


Ohl, F & van der Staay, F 2011, 'Animal welfare: At the interface between science and society', The Veterinary Journal.


Özgültekin, B 2013, '[ENG SUB]BU BIR HALK DIRENISIDIR // Occupy Gezi. Here's what's been happening in Turkey.', YouTube Video, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=899d2F0i0kE>.


Papacharissi, Z 2009, 'The virtual sphere 2.0: The Internet, the public sphere, and beyond', Routledge handbook of Internet politics, pp. 230-245.


Reddit 2012, I am Barack Obama, President of the United States -- AMA, reddit, viewed November 1, 2012,


Rintel, S 2013, 'Slacktivism’ vs ‘snarktivism’: how do you take your online activism?’, *The Conversation*, April 10.


<http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/z1c9z/i_am_barack_obama_president_of_the_united_states/>.
RSPCA 2011a, 'Indonesia deal will not protect cattle from cruelty', *media release*, August.


—— 2012, 'Rallies against live export', *media release*, Ocober 2.


Selwyn, N 2004, 'Reconsidering political and popular understandings of the digital divide', New Media & Society, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 341.

Shaffeem 2011, 'Bahrain's army deliberately kills peaceful protesters with live rounds (automatic weapon )', YouTube Video, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwnUQcKXmMM&bpctr=1369300677].


Shirky, C 2010, Cognitive surplus: Creativity and generosity in a connected age, Penguin Pr.


Slubogo 2012, 'Kony 2012 Video is Misleading', YouTube Video, YouTube, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7DO73Ese25Y].


Thörn, H 2007, 'Social Movements, the Media and the Emergence of a Global Public Sphere: From Anti-Apartheid to Global Justice', Current Sociology, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 896-918.


Tremayne, M 2007, Blogging, citizenship, and the future of media, CRC Press.

Trevaskis, L 2012, 'Exporters must use Facebook, Twitter to save industry: grazier', ABC Rural, March 8.


'Uncertainty after live export ban lifted' 2011, 702 ABC Sydney, July 7.


Wapner, P 1995a, 'Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics', *World Politics*, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 311-340.


Warkentin, C & Mingst, K 2000, 'International institutions, the state, and global civil society in the age of the World Wide Web', *Global Governance*, vol. 6, p. 237.

Warschauer, M 2002, 'Reconceptualizing the digital divide', *First Monday*, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 0-0.


——— 2011b, 'Live export decision stuns animal rights groups', *The Age*, October 12.


