Effective Voting:

AUSTRALIA'S OPPORTUNITY.

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AN EXPLANATION OF THE HARE SYSTEM
OF REPRESENTATION,

BY

Catherine Helen Spence.

"Broad Based upon the People's Will."

PRICE—SIXPENCE.

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SHAWVER & CO., PRINTERS, OFF PEEL AND CURRIE STREETS.

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THE Movement in favour of the system of Parliamentary Representation, which for nearly forty years I have advocated, has now made such strides that there is a wide-spread demand for a brief, clear, and practical exposition of the principles and methods of the reform. I have hitherto addressed by my pen and by my voice only the people of South Australia, but the near prospect of Federation demands that I should take a wider view, and show how the Hare system may be applied to the larger nationality of which South Australia will form a part. The Australian Commonwealth should stand—

"Broad based upon the people's will,"

and my hope is that the best possible means may be adopted to secure the representation of the whole people in the Federal Legislature.

The entrance of the question into the Parliaments of Tasmania, South Australia, New Zealand, and Victoria, proves that Proportional Representation, or, as I call it, Effective Voting, has advanced from its merely academic position as an admirable theory into the sphere of practical politics. The experiment tried in Tasmania in 1897 has proved that it was not difficult for the voters, or tedious for the scrutineers.
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But the average elector does not quite understand it, and most works on the subject are too long, and waste time and effort in explaining the growth of the idea, and describing minutely inferior methods, by which some portion of the advantages given by Hare's system have been sought for. My purpose is to emphasize the broad principles of Equity in Elections, and to follow up the explanation of the details by actual schedules, so that all who wish to understand the subject may be able to do so.

I confine myself to the Hare method of proportional representation, as that is what is before the public in Australia and New Zealand, though incidentally I may deal with other systems. Hare's principle is that of the election in large districts, of several members, by the single transferable vote. The elected member does not represent a majority or plurality in the district, but a quota. It is, by common consent of all writers on the subject, the best system ever devised or proposed, and it has been discussed in four Australian Parliaments. If inferior methods have been advocated, it has been due to the ignorance or prejudice of the people, or to mistakes and misapprehensions with regard to some of Hare's details.

I propose first to give the reasons why this change in our electoral methods is advisable, and to answer objections to the principle of quota representation. Next I shall describe the method of voting by the electors, and the method of counting by the Returning Officer and Scrutineers.

The importance of this question has been greatly enhanced by the discussion on Federation. It is only by using every vote, and making it an effective one, that we can make the representative body show the real majority of the people on which responsible government ought to rest, and also show the real strength of the minor parties, who are the critics or the opponents of the Government. By this equitable method we make parliament sensitive to the flux and reflux of public opinion. Just as a conviction waxes or wanes in general estimation, the representative body shows the gain or loss.

The Hare method has this great advantage that it would make Democracy not a fiction but a fact, by calling out everything that is original and special, instead of extinguishing it by the brute force of numbers. It is of supreme importance that we should avoid the mistakes that are now apparent in the methods laid down by the founders of the American Republic, and that the Australian Commonwealth should safeguard the liberties and the rights of all her citizens, by making use of the best machinery for representation in the Federal Parliament.
AUSTRALIA'S OPPORTUNITY.

Along with Australia's growth in wealth and in population, larger and larger interests are involved in the current of legislation, so that there should be an equitable and elastic mode of expressing the will of the people—of the whole people—in both Houses of the Federal Legislature; especially for the Senate, which stands for State rights, this is indispensable.

But it is not only for our Federal Parliament, but for all our local Legislatures, that this reform would benefit Australia. In every election—political or municipal, it would steady and moralise candidates and constituencies. It is also well adapted for electing several men as directors, trustees, and committees of public companies or societies of any kind, for it secures the just rights of minorities while ensuring that the major party have the greater number of the managing body. It is here and now that the Australian people should learn

WHAT IS EFFECTIVE VOTING?

Effective Voting, or Proportional Representation, means that instead of elections being decided by majorities in small districts, by which nearly half of the votes are wasted, all the votes are to be used in large districts, and the representatives are returned in proportion to the number of voters who hold certain opinions all over the enlarged constituencies. The reasons why we should seek to change our present system are as follow:

1. Effective Voting is Fair and Just.

In our two member districts under our present system a very few votes, even one single vote more, given to two candidates than to the others makes these men represent the district.

In one member districts the case is even worse. Sometimes, as in North Adelaide and East Torrens in 1896, one member of each of the main parties may be returned. If these had been split into two there is little doubt that in both cases the more numerous party would have elected both men. It would be a backward move for South Australia to follow the bad example of America, and make uninominal or one member districts. The minor party would be always and everywhere extinguished. Under present conditions all who do not vote for the successful candidate or candidates are unrepresented—indeed, they are misrepresented by men of different convictions and aims. Under the Hare-Spence system every vote counts for some one the elector approves of.
2. **Effective Voting is Peaceful.**

As no vote counts against any one—as no two or three votes can make thousands of votes useless, the bitterness of party strife will be lessened. Under our present method the business of party politicians and election committees is to make all votes ineffective but those given to their particular favourites. Under a system of absolute fairness each party will get the representation its numbers entitle it to—no less and no more.

3. **Effective Voting is Honest.**

Bribery and undue influence is often successful in securing as many votes as change a minority into a majority. No one would be foolish enough to bribe under the Hare-Spence system, because each bought vote would only count one in a quota of thousands.

I was once asked by an elector in the North if a rich man, who wanted very much to be a member for that district of Frome, was willing to give a thousand pounds for a thousand votes, would not these bring him in? I replied that even if the rich man were willing to bribe, neither in the district of Frome, nor in any district in Australia, would we find a thousand men willing to sell their birth-right—their political independence—for such a paltry mess of potage as a pound note. In every district there are a few weaklings who may be cajoled, and a few crawlers who may be bought, and these in a close contest might turn the scale, and bring in a candidate. This is the actual cause of much corruption in the United States. The floating vote, as it is called, the vote of the ignorant, the apathetic, and the venal is angled for by all the baits which money or craft can offer.

But the floating vote would have so little weight in an electorate six times as large, when a sixth part of the votes returns a candidate, that it would be let alone. This is the strongest argument which I used in favor of the reform for the United States. As a country advances in population and wealth, and as enormous interests may depend on a line in a tariff, or in the direction of a railway, wealth and astuteness work openly and secretly to secure adherents. Dangers quite unknown to the founders of the Republic have arisen, and the evils are often set down to their ultra democratic institutions, whereas in point of fact these institutions are not democratic enough. If this great idea of proportional representation had been presented to those grand men and adopted by them, it is probable that there would have been no civil war to preserve the integrity of the Union, and that slavery would have been gradually abolished.
Australia's Opportunity.

4. Effective Voting is educative to the Electors.

Instead of having to choose from four or five candidates, generally representing two parties only, the electors would have a choice of a dozen or more; and of these there is sure to be some worth voting for. There would always be independent candidates, so that that large body of opinion in every constituency, which cannot endorse extreme party views, would be represented. When independent candidates have a fair chance of election, independent thought will be strengthened all over the country.

5. Effective Voting would moralise the Candidates.

Instead of keeping back his real opinions, lest he should risk losing votes, the candidate would be encouraged to speak out the best that is in him to attract those who think with him, or who may be persuaded to think with him. If these are the sixth part of a six-member district or the tenth part of a ten-member district, he would be returned as their representative though all the rest differed from him. No one who has not watched the dodges and evasions of candidates and their committees can estimate the elevation of the character of public men if this cut-throat competition for votes were put an end to.

6. Effective Voting will be Cheaper for the Country.

The enlargement of the districts will greatly lessen the demand for the expenditure of public money for localities.

The only argument against the reform is that it is new.

It has been tried in Switzerland, where a form of proportional representation called the Free List is used in ten Cantons, and in the city of Berne. It is used in Brazil for the province of Matto Grosso, and the city of Rio.

The Hare system was most successfully carried out in Tasmania in January, 1897, when Hobart elected six out of twelve candidates, and Launceston elected four out of seven by means of the single transferable vote. This, as the first experiment in an English speaking country was well timed, as it came just before the election of the Federal Delegates to the Convention, showing a more excellent way than the multiple vote, the old discredited Scrutin de Liste which was imposed on all the colonies by the Enabling Bill.

The Hare system has been tried for election of trustees and directors in many societies and companies in the United States, Canada, and South Australia. In San Francisco, the Mechanics' Institute with 1,000 subscribers who come to the poll, have thus elected their seven trustees annually since 1893, and the Trades and Labour Council of Toronto have
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elected their executive committee half yearly since 1894, by what is
called there, the Hare-Spence method. Churches use it for elections
of deacons and managers. Michael Flürscheim incorporates it in the
Articles of Association for his Exchange Bank, Wellington, New
Zealand. This is not only valuable as securing perfect representation
of the views of the members, but has an important educational
function, and familiarises the public with the simplicity and certainty
of the process.

The real opposition comes from the rival parties, which fear that a
system of perfect righteousness would diminish their strength. Their
real strength could not be diminished, but fictitious strength caused by
split votes on the other side, or by the use of money and influence on
their own side, ought to be diminished. The Hare system would make
it impossible to affect the vote by gerrymandering or doctoring the
boundaries of constituencies, or in the case of Trade Unions, by sub-
dividing or amalgamating unions. By the Hare system, a party runs
no risk of losing seats if it puts up more candidates than it can carry
in. It thus widens the choice, but the votes fall ultimately on the
strongest and most popular men, and carry the full number which the
voters are entitled to.

The present leaders in Parliament understand the majority system
and can pull the ropes. They do not want independent members who
cannot be relied on in the day of battle. But "Representation" was
never meant to be "War by Election." Its true meaning, to re-present
as in a mirror the convictions and aspirations of the whole people, has
been lost in the majority fight. I appeal to the new voters—the women
of South Australia and of New Zealand, to change neck-and-neck
competition for all or nothing, into peaceful co-operation.

HOW IS THIS REFORM TO BE CARRIED OUT?

1. By enlargement of districts; by grouping, say three of our South
Australian districts, or, six or seven of the uninominal districts of the
other colonies into one electorate.

2. By voting by means of figures, showing preferences, and nominat-
ing as many names as there are members needed for the district, or
fewer.

3. By requiring a quota for the return of each representative, that is
the sixth part of a six member district, or the tenth part of a ten member
district.

4. By transferring any surplus over the quota, and the votes of those
who have too few to reach this quota, according to the wish of each
elector, as shown by his figures.
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HARE VOTE.

The principle of the single transferable vote may be made clear by a familiar parallel. Although the elector nominates six men, his vote is actually given for one of the six. In exactly the same way the subscriber to a circulating library, who has a right to one book, sends by a messenger a list of six books that he would like, in the order of his preference. If the messenger can get the first book, he asks no further, if it is out he asks for the second, if that cannot be obtained he asks for the third, and so on. He brings to the subscriber the first book on the list that he can procure. So with the Hare vote. If the candidate most preferred by the elector is returned, the elector asks no more. If the vote cannot be used for the candidate most preferred, either because he has the quota without it, or cannot secure the quota with it; the vote goes to the candidate whom the elector prefers second; and in the event of either contingency again arising, the vote is transferred to the next choice until it becomes effective, as it assuredly will. Just as the subscriber to the library is sure of obtaining one of the books he wants, if not the one he wants most, so the elector is bound to have, if not his whole political creed represented, at least a part of it. The library subscriber does not expect six books because he has six on his list, or half a book, or quarter of a book because it had come second or fourth on the list.

These are the principles of proportional representation. It is sometimes said as if it was an answer to these principles, that the majority must govern. But to apply that axiom to election of representatives by the people is to show confusion of thought. Representation is one thing. Legislation is another. First get a fair representation of the voters in your parliament; then let a majority of the representatives decide when any question comes to the vote after discussion, Yes or No.

There is much to be done in every governing or executive body besides the mere yes or no.

An intelligent minority of representatives has great weight and influence; its voice can be heard; it can fully and truly express the views of the voters it represents. It can watch the majority and keep them straight. These clear rights of the minority are denied by the use of the multiple vote.

It is also asked, can a government be as strong as it needs to be, when besides the organised ministerial party, and the recognised opposition, there may be a larger number of independent members than at present, who may vote either way? It is quite possible for a Government to be too strong, and this is especially dangerous in Australia, where there are so many of what are known as optional functions of Government undertaken and administered by the ministry of the day, resting on a majority in the Legislature. To maintain this ascendancy, con-
cessions are made to the personal interests of members, or to local or class interests of their constituencies, at the cost of the whole country.

When introducing a measure favorable to proportional representation into the Belgian Chamber, M. Bernhaert, prime minister, spoke well and forcibly on the subject of a strong Government:

"I, who have the honor of speaking to you today in the name of the Government, and who have at my back the strongest majority that was ever known in Belgium, I owe it to truth to say that our opinions have not a corresponding preponderance in the country. And I believe that if that majority were always correctly expressed, we should gain in stability what we might lose in apparent strength.

"Gentlemen, in the actual state of things, to whom belongs the Government of the country? It belongs to some two or three thousand electors who assuredly are neither the best nor the most intelligent, who turn the scale at each of our scrutin de liste elections. I see to the right and to the left two grand corps d'armée—Catholics and Liberals—of force almost equal, whom nothing would tempt to desert their standard, who serve it with devotion and from conviction.

"Well, these grand corps do not count, or scarcely count; on the day of battle it is as if they do not exist. What counts, what decides, what triumphs, is another body of electors altogether—a floating body too often swayed by their passions, by their prejudices, or worse still by their interests. These are our masters, and according as they veer from right to left, or from left to right, the Government of the country changes, and its history takes a new direction.

"Gentlemen is it well that it should be so? Is it well that this country should be at the mercy of such contemptible elements as these?"

M. Bernhaert is right. It is the party Government that is essentially the weak Government. It cannot afford to estrange or offend any one who commands votes. It is said that every prominent politician in the British House of Commons, is being perpetually tempted and tormented by his friends not to be honest, and perpetually assailed by his enemies in order to be made to appear dishonest. The opposition are ready to trip up the ministry at every step. They exaggerate mistakes, misrepresent motives, combat measures which they believe to be good if these are brought forward by their opponents; they bully in public, and they undermine in secret. They are always ready to step into the shoes of the ministry to undergo similar treatment. This is the sort of strength which is supposed to be imperilled if the nation were equitably represented in the Legislature!

In the colonies, votes of no-confidence are brought forward by weak men and by strong, and coalitions are formed of the most discordant elements. We hear it said that it is because there are no strong parties
to form strong governments, and because party discipline is too weak. But in the present state of the world, and especially in the colonies, where the functions of government have multiplied and are multiplying, it is of the first importance that the administration should be watched from all sides, and not merely from the point of view of those who want to sit on the Treasury benches. The right function of an opposition is to see that the Government does the work of the country well; the actual practice of the opposition is to try to prevent it from doing the country's work at all.

In order that government should be honest, intelligent, and economical, it needs helpful criticism rather than unqualified opposition, and this criticism may be expected from the less compact and more independent ranks in a legislative body which truly represents all the people.

Party discipline, which is almost inevitable in the present struggle for ascendancy or defeat, is the most undemocratic agency in the world. It is rather by liberating all votes, and allowing them to group themselves according to conviction that a real government of the people, by the people can be secured.

It may be asked what would be done in case of a by-election caused by death or retirement of a member in a large constituency. It could not be filled up by proportional representation, and it would be too troublesome and costly to contest the big district for a single seat by majority. The act may lay down that one man more than the number required should be elected at first, and kept as an emergency man. Better still, to take the ballots of the retiring member, and allot them according to further choice among the unsuccessful candidates. By adding these transferred votes to the original first choices given to the defeated candidates, it may be shown who is best entitled to take the retiring member's place.

If constituencies are fixed now on a fairly equal basis, what should be done in case of relative change of population? How shift the boundaries without temptations to gerrymandering? This is done in the United States always in the interests of the stronger party, and thus one district has wound round two or three others, and another has stretched like a long ribbon through the middle of a State. A single county belonged to five electoral districts in nine years. As this game is played by both Republicans and Democrats, it is lightly said that one injustice rectifies another. Injustice rectifies nothing! Satan cannot cast out Satan!

The larger electorate will be more stable as to population than the smaller one—but after each decennial census, a readjustment may take place, and instead of altering the boundaries, one member may be added to one district, and taken from another, to correspond with the relative rise or fall of population. There is no sacredness in the number six, which I have taken as the unit, because the city of Adelaide returns six men for three districts.
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It will be necessary to make the districts more uniform as to population than they are now. In New Zealand the country electorates are uninominal, and the cities return three members each. It is roughly estimated that there should be 28 per cent. more votes per member in the cities than in the country in New Zealand, and it will depend on the temper of the legislature in each colony whether this idea is followed. It would depend on the electors themselves whether they will vote for local or for national interests. Mr. Alfred Deakin, in the Victorian Assembly, speaking on Mr. Murray Smith’s motion for the Hare system, supported it mainly because it would tend to raise the people from the level of parish or district politics, and give them broad national views.

I hear it said that the large districts would be costly to canvass, because under present methods, it is difficult for a poor man to gain more votes than a rich one. But the poor man would not require a majority, but only a quota—a sixth part of a six member district. With a respectable character and a bold and sincere platform, the votes would fall to the poor man from every part of the large electorate, where poor men or rich men agreed with his principles, or respected him personally. He must appear at a few main centres, and he must be prepared to answer questions on all lines, but he does not need to travel much, or to advertise as at present. It is only by means of proportional representation in large districts, that there is any chance of a poor man getting into most of the Australian Upper Houses.

In South Australia poor men backed by the Labour Party have won many seats in the Legislative Council, which is a paid Chamber, and the cost was no greater than for an Assembly district.

Sir Henry Wrixon seeks to widen the Suffrage for the Upper House in Victoria, and to introduce the Hare system, so as to make that house reflect public opinion, which it does not do at present. In August, 1898, 14 members out of the 48 who compose the Council retired by rotation, and there was not a single election. Thirteen of them intimated their desire to represent the district again, and were allowed to do so. In the case of the fourteenth, one new candidate offered himself as the old member did not, and he met with no opposition. It is an unpaid house, and there is a property qualification for candidates of £100 a year from freehold estate, but we hear that the great stumbling block is the cost of canvassing.

This Upper House throws out bills passed by overwhelming majorities in the people’s chamber; and this Upper House vetoed Sir Henry Wrixon’s motion, as it was perfectly satisfied with present conditions.

But the question cannot be shelved thus. It must arise again.

Indeed, the ideal Upper House in a truly democratic country would be one elected by adult suffrage, by proportional representation, by all the people in it.
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There is an idea that under the Hare system, the town would overpower the country, which arises from the known fact that a town like Gawler, Port Pirie, or Gambier-town, often virtually returns the two members for the large country electorate with which it is grouped. But, such a town would form a smaller part of the larger electorate, which the Hare system demands, and though each town voter would have the full benefit of his ballot, each country elector would have the same, and there are more rural voters than urban in these districts.

If the townsfolk are keener about political questions than the country people, they are likely to go to the poll in greater numbers. They have not so far to travel to record their votes, but polling places are pretty numerous, and once in three years some trouble should be taken by the people. When there is a wider choice of a dozen or more candidates, and when there is an absolute certainty that the vote will be effective, there would be a great stimulus to the lazy or hopeless voter.

President Garfield said men in his state had gone to the poll for thirty years, with no more chance of seeing a candidate of their own way of thinking in Congress than if they had lived under the Czar of Russia.

The localising or delocalising of politics is in the elector's own hands. All other things being equal, the local man is preferred, and a popular man will make up his quota, almost all in that part of the electorate where he is known. Even in Hare's vast scheme, where Great Britain and Ireland were taken as a single electorate, he expected that two-thirds of the members would be brought in by the local votes, but he sought to give full representation to the minority third, who were distinguished in detail in the different constituencies.

Every one, too, would know who is the strongest man in each part of the district, by the number of first choices recorded for him at the different polling places, which will be published as they are now.

Some oppose the Hare system because the act of voting is too troublesome for the voter, but I have taken fifteen thousand test ballots, which my audiences had no difficulty in filling up. Even the illiterate voter is trotted out as wronged by a more complex system, but he is provided for at present, and no doubt will be provided for in the future.

Then the time and trouble to the poll clerks is another lion in the path of those who do not like reform.

Mr. Johnston, Government Statistician in Hobart, gave twelve men an hour's previous instruction, and they carried out the count and the transfers on nearly 3,000 votes, letting the public know the result in four hours from opening the boxes, which were all polled at the Hobart Town Hall. I do not say that it would take as short a time to count 15,000 single transferable votes for the city of Adelaide, as it does to
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count 5,000 double votes in each of the three districts into which Adelaide is now divided, but the extra time is owing to the number of votes, and not to the slowness of the method. The principal part of the work will be done at the separate polling places, that is the separation into first choice votes. The finding of the quota and the transfers must be made at the central office, and for 15,000 votes I think it would take three or four hours.

All over the colonies there is at present such great inequality of districts that a majority of the Houses of Assembly may be elected by a minority of the votes. At the 1898 elections in New South Wales the Bartonites polled more votes than Mr. Reid's followers, and yet returned fewer members. At the last general elections in Great Britain, Sir John Lubbock shows that in the constituencies that were contested, the Liberals polled 19,000 more votes than the Unionists, and yet the latter returned 77 more members. Narrow majorities in small boroughs and county constituencies, and enormous majorities in populous centres, led to this surprising result.

In South Australia, Mrs. A. H. Young, Secretary of the Effective Voting League gave a demonstration of the anomalies under the present method, as follows:

"The anomalies which the Hare-Spence method would remove were apparent when it was stated that 26 members were returned in 13 districts with 88,509 electors on the roll, and 28 by 14 districts with only 48,412 electors on the roll. The six largest districts have on the roll 59,434 electors and only return 12 members, as against the 28 members returned in the 14 smaller districts with 2,000 fewer electors. Again, in East Torrens Mr. Hutchison secured 3,615 votes and was defeated, whilst the combined votes of six returned members representing three districts were only 3,391. Owing to the multiplicity of candidates the members for Yorke's Peninsula, Encounter Bay, Onkaparinga and Woorooroo were returned with a minority of votes—

7,664 votes elected eight members.

9,417 votes were thrown away on defeated candidates in the same districts.

Of the 160,873 votes cast at the last general election—

98,320 elected 54 members,

62,553 were thrown away on defeated candidates.

If each party had secured representation in proportion to its voting strength as provided by the Hare-Spence method the Ministerial and Country Party would have secured 15 instead of 21 seats

National Defence League " 17 21"
Labor Party " 13 12"
Independent Parties " 9 0"
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But startling as these figures are they represent but faintly the real injustice and inequality of the present system. Many thousands have no more representation than if the franchise were deliberately denied to them by law, and it is well known that removal from one electoral district to another may mean certain disfranchisement, and many refrain from voting because of the knowledge that the effort would be futile. Even when a candidate is returned, it is frequently only because he represents to the voter the least of two or more evils, and not because he reflects in any but the faintest degree the views of the voter. It may fairly be said that very few nominally successful voters have their genuine views represented, for electors vote for a candidate not because he is 'their man,' but because he is supposed to have, colloquially speaking, 'the best show.'

No doubt even greater anomalies could be quoted from the other colonies.

But the most striking difference is shown between election by the single transferable vote and that by the multiple vote, in the schedules subjected to public scrutiny at the annual meeting of the Effective Voting League, July, 1897, when the same ballot papers show a difference of two out of six, when counted by Effective Voting and by Defective Voting. At test elections for ten delegates out of twenty candidates, taken on the eve of the election for the Federal Convention, the difference was sometimes three and sometimes four, and therefore multiple voting is most inequitable as a means of electing an Australian Senate.

The instructions to voters at all my meetings were as follows;—

1. There are here twelve candidates. Six to be elected.

2. Vote by nominating the candidates in the order of your preference, that is to say.

   Place 1 against the name of the man you like best.
   Place 2 against the name of the man you like next best.
   Place 3 against the name of the man you like next best, and so on.

3. Nominate six names or fewer.

4. The same number must not be put against more than one name.

Memo.—Your vote will be used for one candidate according to your preference.

If a candidate you like most, either (a.) Does not need your vote—Has enough votes to elect him without yours, or (b.) Cannot use your vote—has so few votes that he cannot possibly be elected, your vote will be transferred to the man you like next (as shown by your numbers), and used not wasted.
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Effective Voting—Hare-Spence Method.

Representation of a Six-Member District such as the City of Adel- aide, taken as a whole, by 3,383 votes, under the Hare-Spence system, when the elector votes by figures for one man only, but the vote is transferable according to the wish of the elector, if the candidate he prefers cannot use his vote.

The number of ballot papers actually filled up at various meetings is 3,383, which divided by six, the number of members required, gives 564 as the quota, or the number of votes needed for each member.

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<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symon</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holder</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downer</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Exhausted votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{2,409} \\
\text{3,383}
\end{array}
\]

Not elected, transferred:

| Taylor       | 305 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 24 |
| Glynn        | 243 | 3 | 22 | 17 | 7 |
| McPherson    | 149 | 20 | 1 | 4 |
| Harrold      | 106 | 2 | 17 |
| Duncan       | 101 | 2 |
| Guthrie      | 70  |   |

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{974} \\
\text{3,383}
\end{array}
\]

* Ballot papers on which all the Candidates marked are either elected by full quotas or eliminated are called exhausted.
DEFECTIVE VOTING.

*Scrutin de Liste* or Multiple Vote.

Representation of the same district by the same ballot papers, when the figures are counted as crosses, showing no preference, and the figure 6 is a good as the figure 1.

The number of votes given is 18,221, and the six candidates who have most votes are returned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Not Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magarey</td>
<td>Guthrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>1,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleston</td>
<td>Symon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,132</td>
<td>1,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holder</td>
<td>Downer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>1,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston</td>
<td>Duncan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>1,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glynn</td>
<td>Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>1,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McPherson</td>
<td>Harrold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>1,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10,795</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,429</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE I.**—The Conservative minority secures the return of Symon and Downer by the Hare-Spence System, but by the *Scrutin de Liste* they are defeated on the same ballot papers. Votes transferred from Duncan and Harrold and others bring them in.

**NOTE II.**—The 7,429 votes given by the *Scrutin de Liste* to defeated candidates are absolutely wasted, whereas the 974 ballots given to defeated candidates by the Hare-Spence system are all used but 66—less than 2 per cent. as against more than 40 per cent.

**NOTE III.**—The first choices alone without any transfers would have elected Taylor instead of Holder, but in the distribution of the votes of four defeated candidates, Holder had so many more given to him that Taylor was 69 behind.

In this aggregate of votes there was no surplus. Not one of the twelve candidates reached the quota on first choice, though at the forty meetings or polling places there had been surpluses which loomed large in the minds of the audience. This will generally be the case in any real election in any six membered district. After the first count is made the Returning Officer declares Guthrie, who is lowest on the poll, not elected, and distributes his 70 votes according to second choice on each of the ballots, as may be seen in the vertical column. Next, Duncan is declared not elected, and his 101 votes are distributed similarly. Then follows Harrold with his 106, McPherson with 149, Glynn with 243. By this time Taylor has received so few transferred votes in comparison with Holder that he is 69 behind, though on the first count.
Effective Voting:

he was 35 ahead, so Taylor is the last man to be declared Not Elected. The re-transfer of the votes which on second choice were given to defeated candidates are shown in the last vertical column. All found men who needed them but 66 which are called exhausted votes. On these papers were generally several names of elected candidates.

We see in the Hare-Spence scrutiny that five men were returned by full quotas of 564, and one by an approximate quota of 497, a much larger number of votes than the seventh man had. We also see that more than two-thirds of the first choice votes are effective, and therefore are of greater value than any further choice. People who are used to the multiple vote imagine they are doing a great deal for a man by marking him two or three. It is only when No. 1 cannot use the vote that No. 2 comes in, and it is only when neither 1 nor 2 can use it that No. 3 has it offered to him. In Hobart, a certain candidate had a great many second and third choices, but in almost all the cases the first names needed the votes. The party was not strong enough to bring him in also, but by the multiple vote they would have carried him in, and probably another too. It took three times as long carrying out the Defective Voting counts as the Effective Voting, for everyone of the former had to be searched for six votes, and all six to be recorded, whereas 2,400 first choice votes were counted once only, 778 were allotted according to second choice, 130 were searched for third or further choice, and 66 were Exhausted, all the names given being either elected on full quotas of 564 or eliminated as hopeless. It took a little more than an hour to make the transfers.

The transfers are taken first from the surplusage if there is any. There was no surplus at Launceston, although there were only seven candidates and four to be elected. The surplus at Hobart in favor of Sir Philip Fysh was small, only 44 over the quota of 475. No one is likely to have a surplus but a popular party leader, and the further choices go to the party. At every one of my forty meetings there was the keenest questioning as to the uncertainty of allotting surplus, when after all, the central polling place found none.

The original method laid down by Mr. Hare for dealing with surplus, was—as soon as the candidate had polled a quota of first choice votes he should be declared elected, and further votes given primarily to him should be given to No. 2 on his paper, unless No. 2 had also reached the quota, when it should be passed on to No. 3. When Mr. Hare drew up the clauses of his Bill, there was open voting in England, when the state of the poll was published every half hour. Under proportional representation, if the voter saw that his favourite man was already elected, he would certainly divert his vote to some one of similar views; if he also had been brought in by the votes of others, the elector would make a third choice, perhaps not so absolutely in agreement with him as the first two, but better than any other in the list of candidates. The transferable vote with its six nominations puts into the elector's own power to vary

18
AUSTRALIA'S OPPORTUNITY.

his action when his favourite is popular, and what is of far more importance when his favourite is unpopular, for the minus votes are about a third of the whole, while in the two elections in Hobart and Launceston the surplus was only 44.

Thus what is sought by party organisation and party discipline, is effected automatically, and each party gains all that it is entitled to.

But the objection most frequently brought forward against the system propounded by Hare was that by taking the forty-four last polled votes, or the votes last taken out of the ballot box for Sir Philip Fysh for surplus, instead of the forty-four first polled, there might be a difference in the result. People who see every day the certainty that nearly half of the votes polled are wasted, are disquieted lest White's second vote for Brown should be taken instead of Black's second vote for Grey. Votes might be shuffled and manipulated, and one candidate might get an advantage over the other! Even without the Clark clause in the Tasmanian Act, which absolutely eliminated all uncertainty, I deny that any shuffling would make a difference where thousands of votes are dealt with. Sir John Lubbock, consulted with an eminent mathematician, and his answer was that in a five member district in England, once in 44,000 elections, there might be a chance in the fifth man in and the sixth man out, through the operation of the chance element. In scores of small elections I have taken the surplus votes by chance at the meeting and by science afterwards, but except in the case of 79 at Port Adelaide, when that eminent mathematician Captain Patrick Weir took up this point, there was no difference. Sir John Lubbock says that with 70 votes it is possible, with 700 less possible, and with 7,000 he would take the 44,000th chance. Still the Clark clause was a valuable contribution to the impregnable position of proportional voting.

Miss A. M. Martin, of Adelaide, unconsciously following Mr. Gregory of Melbourne, satisfied Captain Patrick Weir by reckoning surplus votes fractionally. Suppose A. had polled 600 votes, which was 100 beyond the quota of 500, each of A.'s voters had used five-sixths of his power to elect A., leaving one sixth for second choice. A redistribution of all A.'s votes according to second choice was made, and each such transferred ballot was reckoned as one-sixth of a vote. But this entailed the necessity of transferring fractions, and it also disturbed the allotted quota for A, and distributed it amongst the others.

Mr. Attorney General Clark, who has been subsequently raised to the Tasmanian Bench, secured the same result by rule of three. All Sir Philip Fysh's 501 votes were searched for second choice. His colleague A. I. Clark was second on 305 ballots, Bradley on 41. Anything over a half was counted as one, anything less than a half was disregarded. The method was as follows:—If Bradley is second on 41 of 501 votes, how many should he receive of a surplus of 44. 41 x 44 divided by 501
**Effective Voting:**

comes to 3\(\frac{3}{4}\), or disregarding fractions to 4. The returning Officer took 4 of the votes on which Bradley was second, and gave them to Bradley, leaving 37 as part of Fysh's quota. Clark's 305 x 44 divided by 501 comes to 27. Twenty-seven of these are given to Clark, leaving 278 for Fysh.

**The Following Schedule Shows the Result.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Surplus</th>
<th>Fysh' Quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisp</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillon</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiddlestone</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulcahy</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paton</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Hill</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>501</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Surplus votes for a leading Conservative will not help Labour Candidates. Surplus votes for a Labour Democratic Minister will not have second choice for Conservative Candidates. This probability is disregarded by the people who protest against the chance element, now happily disposed of for ever.
### HOBART ELECTION.

#### ANALYSIS OF VOTING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total Votes Distributed</th>
<th>Bradley</th>
<th>Clark</th>
<th>Cox</th>
<th>Crisp</th>
<th>Dillon</th>
<th>Fulton</th>
<th>Fysh</th>
<th>Hiddlestone</th>
<th>Mulcahy</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Paton</th>
<th>St. Hill</th>
<th>Exhaust Papers</th>
<th>Particulars of Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2746</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>First Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Fysh’s surplus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Lowest Out (Cox)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Next “ “ (Fulton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(—145)</td>
<td>Bradley’s surplus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(—145)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Lowest out (St. Hill)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Clark’s surplus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(—171)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Lowest out (Hiddlestone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(—221)</td>
<td>Next “ “ (Dillon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mulcahy’s surplus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 3742</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Obtained quota</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Elected**: Votes cast for the candidate.
Effective Voting:

In the complete scrutiny of the Hobart election may be seen a still further adjustment of artificial surpluses, caused by giving to any candidate more second choices of defeated candidates than were needed to make up the quota. Bradley received 26 votes more than he needed for his quota, so all the 28 votes transferred from Fulton were searched for third choice, and allotted in proportion in the same way. Clark had 29 of St. Hill’s second choice votes, 19 more than he needed, so the 29 were searched in like manner. It appears to be tedious in description, but would take a few minutes to do it, and as it carries out the principle of absolute fairness with all surplusage, it was worth doing.

In case of a tie, as to which candidate is the lowest on the poll, the Returning Officer decides. But I think no absolute tie will ever occur. In a large number of votes, it is most improbable that the two at the foot of the poll should be equal, and as votes of higher class are preferred to lower, there is less and less likelihood of a tie as the count proceeds.

Smith may have 90 first choices and 10 transfers, and Brown 84 first choices and 16 transfers. Brown would be eliminated and declared not elected before Smith.

In case of votes transferred successively from candidates who are lowest on the poll, there is no uncertainty at all—it goes as a whole vote to the next choice. It cannot be passed on to any candidate whom the elector did not nominate.

Mr. Hare anticipated that the counting and allotting all the votes in the United Kingdom would take a fortnight or three weeks, but for an Australian six member district, it would be a matter of a few hours. In South Australia and New Zealand the women’s vote nearly doubles the number of votes to be counted. The average of votes at the last general election of 1896 in South Australia for the return of a member was 2,000, but each voter could vote for two, though he could not give two votes to one candidate. There were 20 per cent. of plumpers, by which the elector sacrificed one half of his voting power, in order to direct the other half as he liked. There is no need for doing this by the Hare system.

Contrasting Effective with Defective Voting, both Mr. Johnston, of Tasmania, and myself see that the single transferable vote gives adequate and independent representation to minorities, while the multiple vote extinguishes them.

The multiple vote, called in America “Voting at large,” is used by States to choose the electors who decide who is to be President of the United States. In 1884 a majority of 1,150 votes in New York State, which returned 36 men to an Electoral College of 447, made a difference of 72 votes and could nullify a nearly unanimous vote of six smaller States. New York State virtually elects the President, and as M. Bernhaert would say—the history of a great nation takes a new direction at the bidding of 1,150 voters, assuredly neither the wisest nor the most intelligent.
Multiple voting stands condemned by all the thinking people in the world, and it was an insult to the intelligence of Australia and Tasmania to impose it on us for the election of the Federal delegates. We gave as much weight to the tenth man for whom we did not care, as for the first man for whom we did care, and in many cases our later choices defeated our earlier. By figures we could have differentiated, and by the Hare system of transfers, every vote would have been utilised.

A grave objection to the multiple vote is the large and real element of chance in it. Many curious combinations of the tenfold vote take place. Monopolisation of all the representatives by a mere majority of the votes may result from the inherent viciousness of the method itself, and not from a deliberate organised attempt on the part of the majority. Instead of, being represented in a clear and definite way by one man, we have, so to speak, only a tenth share in ten different delegates, who are persons of diverse views and opinions as to many matters in which we are interested. Some have the idea that a man's voting power is lessened by giving him one vote instead of ten, but when everyone else has ten votes as well as you, your additional votes are swamped and neutralised by the additional votes of the others, so you have all the drawbacks of the multiple vote without any increase of your voting power.

The election of the ten delegates to the Federal Convention was an object lesson to Australia and Tasmania. Scrutin de liste has hitherto been the only method of electing several members for a large district, and its anomalies and injustices have brought such electorates into disrepute. It was found so intolerable to ten cantons of Switzerland that they adopted the free list, an inferior method, suited to their habits of giving many votes, but the veteran proportionalists, Ernest Nâville of Geneva, and Karl Burkli of Zurich, assure the writer that the Hare system is much better. The Swiss draw up party lists with more candidates in each than they can hope to see elected. The voter may discriminate and give all or part of his votes to the candidates he prefers, but the common practise is to throw all the votes 8, 12, or even in Geneva, 40, into the Conservative, the Liberal, the Labour or the Socialist list, and according to the number of votes for each list, is the number of deputies which that party gains.

Preference as to transfers is given to the candidates who have most individual choices. It was so great an improvement on the old vicious system that the cantons which use it are peaceful and progressive, and it is expected to extend over all the cantons and to embrace ere long the Federal Legislature.

The reform has most important bearings for the Federal Legislature of Australia. Hare's scheme of taking a whole country as a single electorate may be carried out in the Senate of the Commonwealth, as it should have been in the Federal Convention. That, in most of the colonies, was somewhat of a compromise. It was desired that the
Effective Voting:

foremost men of the Liberal and of the Conservative parties should be sent as delegates, but the strange result was shown, that in Australia, where Labour is believed to be politically stronger than anywhere else in the world, there was but one Labour representative from the five colonies, Mr. Trenwith, by special favour of the Age newspaper.

That newspaper nominated the ten successful men for Victoria, and thus showed us clear as day what can be done with the multiple vote if the strongest party observes party discipline. They can carry every seat.

It may be said that Labour men are not likely to be the most competent to frame a constitution, but they are invaluable as critics, and modifiers. Their numbers entitled them to a minority representation in every colony, and their exclusion is one main cause of their objection as a party to Federation. Labour surely has something to say on this great question of an Australian Commonwealth.

Many who do not see the advantages of proportional representation for anything else, advocate it for the Federal Senate. At the Sydney session of the Convention, the N.S.W. branch of the Australasian National League, petitioned for the Hare method of electing the Senate. At the last session held in Melbourne a petition signed by 1,651 electors, men and women of South Australia, was presented by Mr. P. McM. Glynn for the use of the Hare method for Federal elections, and especially for the Senate.

The cause has received a great impetus in Victoria from the wholesale success of the nominees of the Age newspaper; for both the Conservative party and the Labour party were wronged by it.

Professor Bryce in his great work on the American Commonwealth, says that the indirect election of the Senate by a majority of the local State Legislatures in joint session, and the election of the President by elected delegates, furnish the most striking proofs of how a written and rigid constitution bends and warps under the influence of party. I may remark that it is still inflexible as to anything like radical reform. The indirect or distilled election meant to steady and moralise politics, has been made an additional instrument of corruption. The caucus settles the matter without deliberation, generally before the Houses meet to elect the Senate or Senators for Washington, and the Presidential campaign is as exciting and more corrupt than direct elections could possibly be, because a narrow majority in each State decides the block vote for the State. There is a wide-spread demand for direct election of both President and Senators. The last would improve the local Legislatures, as men are chosen often less for business of the state itself, than in order to vote the right ticket for the men who represent the State in the strongest Upper Chamber in the world.

No system of graduated values is so simple or so accurate as Effective Voting. Tuckerman's idea that a first choice should count six, a second five, a third four, a fourth three, a fifth two, and a sixth one, is much
more tedious for the poll clerks, and my experience is that the graduation of choice is more accentuated than by sixths.

The Cumulative system by which the multiple vote may be distributed according to choice leads to great waste of voting power, though it does in an inaccurate way represent minorities. Not to speak of the first School Board election, when Miss Garrett had four times as many votes as any other candidate, even now, when the system is well understood, people must vote blindly.

At a School Board election in 1894 for four members for the City of London, the Progressives were so anxious to make Miss Davenport Hill secure that they gave her twice as many votes as she needed, leaving the other Progressive behind the three Moderates. This was the result:

Miss R. Davenport Hill ... 18,932
Duke of Newcastle ... 10,608
W. R. Key ... 9,102
P. H. White ... 8,195
C. J. Montefiore ... 6,234
J. Kensit ... 1,134
Mrs. Thomson ... 693

If this is the result in a four member district it is more disastrous still where 10 or 15 are to be elected.

Somewhat the same result would follow the use of the single untransferable vote, which was introduced into Japan, this year, 1898, by which many membered districts were to be created, but only one would be voted for or nominated.

It would not be so disastrous as the Cumulative vote, but there would be the same risk of giving unnecessary votes to a popular candidate, or leaving him out in the cold, because he is sure to get sufficient votes from others.

The Rev. C. E. Garst writes that a strong party in Japan, at their head Count Itagaki and Mr. Nemoto, who translated Proportional Representation into Japanese, hope to introduce clauses for transfers of surplus and minus votes into this measure.

Another mode of voting which is often confused with Hare's is that practised in Queensland in its one member districts. The voter has a contingent choice in case his first man does not win a majority. This was an admirable device to secure that the man elected had an absolute majority of the votes polled, without the trouble, cost, and risk of a second ballot.

A familiar illustration may show the need of it. The shearsers in the sheds elect their cook. At a certain shed there were so many candidates that with 50 voting, the cook was chosen by 13. Naturally 37 were dissatisfied. The following year they settled that no cook should be chosen on less than 26 votes. Five competed, and three ran each other close. A second ballot threw out one, but neither of the others had 26, the absolute majority, so it had to be settled by a third ballot.
Effective Voting:

The marking of the first ballot with the figures, 1, 2, 3, would have brought out an absolute majority at once, and while it is comparatively easy to have successive ballots for 50 shearers assembled at one shed, it is a different thing to collect thousands of electors on successive days. The second ballot which is always used in Germany and in France when no candidate has an absolute majority, gives a second chance for political agents with money and craft to divert the votes towards their candidates.

Queensland then has the honour of showing a perfect plan for the election of a single man, whether he is the President of the United States or the cook at a shearing shed. But for the representation of the people in any legislative or municipal body, this contingent vote in uninominal districts, everywhere and always excludes the minority, even more than the ordinary method used elsewhere. It has quite a different effect when it is proportional as well as preferential, for then it represents minorities as well as the true majority.

All good things which we have won in the ages have come from minorities, nay, originally from a single mind, so that the system of representation which offers the least hindrance to the spread of ideas must be the best. I call this “Australia’s opportunity,” because she may now show the world that she means to utilise, not a part only, but all the elements she possesses. Australia never has been afraid of new things. We can point to a dozen directions in which she has been the pioneer of reform. And in a young and comparatively small community, experiments may be tried which lead older and more populous nations in the path of progress.

In the United States, which need the reform far more than we do, the watchers for the dawn look to Australia and New Zealand to lead the way.

We are not working for ourselves only, but also for seventy millions of American citizens who may follow with Effective Voting as they have done with the Australian Ballot!

It is because my own colony of South Australia gave the first example of quota representation in the world by electing the municipal councillors for Adelaide in 1840, that I hoped she would lead in this reform. The clause in the first Municipal Act was drawn up by Rowland Hill, afterwards the post office reformer, who was then secretary to the Colonisation Commissioners. My father was town clerk at the time, and explained the unique provision to me. When in 1859 I saw Mr. Hare’s project, it was like an old friend; but he completed and perfected it by adding to the principle of the quota the power of transfer which makes every vote effective.

Thus would our democratic institutions be made real, and safe, and progressive. Every year I live strengthens my conviction of the importance of the reform.

One man one vote is good,
One adult one vote is better,