Bodies and Becomings

*Human and Animal Encounters in Early Modern English Literature*

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Finally, a thousand thanks go to my partner, Chris. I will never be able to thank him enough for keeping me grounded and positive over the last three years of my studies. I am glad I was able to share this experience with him.
Abstract

In this thesis I undertake a poststructuralist study of human and animal relations in early modern English literature. I argue that the “type” of human we understand ourselves to be is directly related to the “type” of animal we encounter. Specifically, “bounded” and “essentialist” conceptions of the human depend on notions of animals as “territorialised,” “passive” “objects.” Instead of reinforcing the idea of “human being,” I attend to the “affective” materiality and mobility of human and animal bodies to suggest kinds of “human becomings.” I pursue this aim by using the “affective” philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. I use three different “affective” approaches to bodies—“cartographic,” “meaty,” and “machinic”—to explore representations of human and animal bodies within the early modern contexts of bear-baiting, hunting, and music-making. In Chapter 1, I consider representations of bear-baiting by John Stow and Edmond Howes, William Shakespeare, Robert Laneham, and Thomas Nashe. In these representations bears move from “objects” of the spectators’ gaze, to “actants,” which like the Heideggerian “thing,” exert their efficacy and autonomy through non-cooperation. As “actants,” the animals in these examples emit affects which, potentially, draw spectators into an experience of “becoming-dog.” In Chapter 2, representations of the stag hunt by George Gascoigne, William Shakespeare, and Margaret Cavendish suggest somatic continuity between humans and animals. I argue that the shared carnality between humans and stags in these texts creates an affective “zone of proximity,” which Deleuze labels “meat.” “Meat” allows us to read moments of “detrimentalisation” in which “affects,” produced both voluntarily and involuntarily, disrupt categorical distinctions between humans and stags. The categories of “human” and “animal” emerge, in this chapter, as contingent rather than essential. In Chapter 3, I challenge ideas of animal, and indeed material, passivity through a “vital materialist” reading of acts of music-making in poems by Christopher Marlowe and Shakespeare. In this chapter, “affects” are machinic—that is,
connective—flows or vibrations of matter, which Deleuze and Guattari label “non-organic” or “non-localised” desire. Desire creates connections between not only humans and animals, but also organic and inorganic matter, suggesting an ontology of “human becomings.”
List of Abbreviations and Notes on Editions

1. Abbreviations

These works will be cited in full on their first appearance. After this, I will use the following abbreviations.

**ABC** “L’abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze” or, “The ABC of Gilles Deleuze,” interview with Claire Parnet.

**ATP** *A Thousand Plateaus*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

**AO** *Anti-Oedipus*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

**CC** *Essays Critical and Clinical*, Gilles Deleuze

**FB** *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, Gilles Deleuze

**K** *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

**WP** *What is Philosophy?* Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

In quoting from Spinoza’s *Ethics*, I will be following the conventional method, which uses Roman numerals to refer to the parts of the *Ethics*, and Arabic numerals for axioms definitions, propositions, etc. Following the example of Edwin Curley’s edition of the text, I use abbreviations like: A = axiom, P = proposition, S = scholium, Post = Postulate, Pref = preface. So, for example, IIIP2Schol refers to the scholium of the second postulate in part two of the *Ethics*.

2. Notes on Editions

Details on the editions of early modern works are listed in the bibliography.

I have modernised early modern uses of “v” and “u.” For example, Thomas Nashe’s *Vnfortunate Traueller* becomes *Unfortunate Traveller*. 
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Introduction

1 “Human Becomings” and “Affective Animals”

“The lines of my body are / as well drawn as his”

(Shakespeare, Cym. 4.1.2295-2296).

“What is, or what was, the human?” ask Erica Fudge, Ruth Gilbert, and Susan Wiseman in their Introduction to At the Borders of the Human (1). According to these critics, “contrasting border figures” play an important role in marking-out the territory of the human (2). Animals are key examples of these “border figures.”

Keith Thomas writes that during the early modern period, “brute creation provided the most readily-available point of reference for the continuous process of human self-definition” (40). In this thesis, I undertake a poststructuralist study of human and animal relations in a range of early modern English literary texts to argue that the “type” of human we are, or understand ourselves to be, is directly related to the “type” of animal we encounter. More specifically, I contend that reductive and essentialist conceptions of animals, which describe them as “territorialised” and “passive” “objects,” correlate with post-Cartesian notions of the human as “a finite totality or essence represented by the idea of the individual organism” (Gibbs 187). Both the early modern period and the twenty-first century are times fraught with “border trouble.”

While many scholars might prefer the terms “human and other animals” and “humans and non-humans,” I employ the more conventional—if problematic—terms “human” and “animal.” Both terms dominate current discourse, and are thus a good starting place for a problematisation of categorical distinctions. As Andreas Höfele writes of human and animal relations in Shakespeare’s plays, while Shakespeare’s plays “show the superior rank or dignitas of man to be questionable and under pressure, even a delusion, ... this is the outcome, not the starting point of a process” (xi). I do, however, recognise that Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am, and Laurie Shannon’s “The Eight Animals in Shakespeare” might offer counters to this decision. Derrida’s critique of the reductive term “animal,” which fails to capture the diversity of creaturely life, is well-known. Shannon’s essay implies that the use of the term “animal” for early-modern studies may be slightly anachronistic, since the word appears just eight times in the whole of Shakespeare’s oeuvre. Instead, as Shannon notes, the terms “creatures,” “brutes,” “beasts,” “fish,” and “fowls” were more commonly used (474).


1 I expand on this point below.
human, animal, and even mechanical bodies. We find it, for example, in the hybrids and apes which populate Harriet Ritvo’s essay on the subject. However, there is a second kind of “border-trouble” by which the boundaries of the territories we mark out as “human” and “animal” are problematised imperceptibly and atomically: for example, in the transmissions of particles one finds in instances of contagion. Both of these forms of “border trouble” open onto broader philosophical questions about what it means to be a “human” inhabitant of the world. In this thesis, I undertake an “affective” of the second type of “border trouble” in early modern English literature, and consider how my findings might contribute to current conceptions of the human.³

I suggest that the early modern period and our present time are Foucauldian “crisis” moments in which “givens” become, as Carol Bacchi writes, “questions or problems, providing an opportunity to inquire into the emergence of what comes to appear as self-evident” (2).⁴ Andreas Höfele argues that during the early modern period “man was released from his role as flawed mimic reflection of God”; however, this “release” was not unequivocally positive (18). Instead, this new position resulted in a “profound destabilization” of human self-definition (Höfele 18). For example, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) describes how God distinguishes between man and animal, saying to Adam that, in contrast to animals, “you … may, by your own free will … trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature” (7). However, the freedom to trace one’s “lineaments” draws attention to the malleability of “the human,” which one might endeavour to categorically enclose. Höfele argues that

³ I will return to the concept of “affective” shortly.
⁴ On “problematisations,” see Bacchi; for “crisis” moments, or “moments of crisis”, see Foucault, lecture three.
Pico’s man is not only free to create himself, but also forced to do so because he is a ‘chameleon,’ a ‘Proteus,’ a ‘creature of indeterminate image’ with no shape of its own, a being without essence.

The conception of the human as a “being without essence” is also something we find in modern critical theory. In the early 1990s, Donna Haraway published the “Cyborg Manifesto” in which she affirms the “cyborg” existence of the creatures of the modern world: “By the late twentieth century, our time ... we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism” (292). Haraway identifies “three crucial boundary breakdowns”: boundaries between humans and animals, between “animal-human (organism) and machine,” and between “physical and non-physical” (“Cyborg” 293, 294). Haraway is not alone in questioning humanistic thought. In recent years, “it has become widely acknowledged that the reigning modernist ethos of humanism presents us with the problematic situation of environmental crisis and bioethical confusion” (Acampora, Corporal xiv). In response to the environmental concerns of the “Age of the Anthropocene”—that is, the period of time in which human activity has a noticeable influence on environment—scholars have begun to consider alternatives to anthropocentrism, a term to which I will return in part two of this Introduction. Yet, while we have begun to question the “givenness” of the human in fields as diverse as feminist studies and neuroscience, the anthropocentric narrative still governs mainstream theory and many contemporary cultural practices. I intend

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5 The essays within Borders of the Human all explore works by writers from the early modern period, which “probe the possibility of the absence of an innate human” (8, italics in original).
6 This term, central to environmental discourse, first appeared in The Global Change Newsletter in 2000 by Paul Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer.
7 Evidence for this mode of thought in practice can be found in the mass killings and exploitation of animals throughout the world. For facts and figures about this, see note 17. We also find a more subtle expression of anthropocentrism in the political movements of liberal humanism, like “animal rights.” In a rights framework, ethical concern is afforded based on an animal’s similarity to the human. I return to this point in Chapter 2.
this thesis as a literary contribution to the project of redefining human-world relations in non-humanistic terms.

In “Primate Visions and Alter-Tales,” Jane Bennett proposes the useful phrase “alter-tales” for works and studies which run above, below, through, and adjacent to the “grand narratives,” like anthropocentrism, which have come to dominate Western thought (250). Alter-tales, for example, suggest the absence of essential humanity, and consider animals “present” and active rather than invisible and passive. In “The Animal Face of Early Modern England,” Fudge also advocates alter-tales, arguing that the repeated telling of humanistic tales “reiterate[s] the centrality” of this type of thinking (178). She contends that humanistic tales “miss out on an alternative history that might offer an important early iteration of [posthumanist] ideas to current thinking” (“Animal Face” 178). In this thesis, I attempt to construct alter-tales. I am interested in investigating how current conceptions of “the human” might be altered by (re)readings of early modern texts which do not reinscribe the dominant narratives of early-modern humanism. I am especially curious to see how corporeal or materialist readings of animals, which I will shortly develop as “affective,” might help us to “take animals seriously,” and in forcing us to rethink essentialism, might encourage more sustainable and integrated relationships with the world.

In the following chapters, I seek alter-tales to anthropocentrism, using the materialist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992). Deleuze and Guattari’s work allows me to “affectively” read human and animal encounters in early modern texts. In these readings, the “borders of the human” appear “as dangerously flexible, and uncontrollable” (Fudge, Gilbert, Wiseman 5). I will argue that reading representations of human and animal encounters through “affect” moves us from a conception of “human

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8 I speak more about animal absence and invisibility in part two of this Introduction. Bennett also uses “alter-tales” to describe her later projects on “enchantment” and “vital materialism.”
being” to alter-tales of “human becoming.” I explore three different, affective conceptualisations of (human and non-human) bodies: “cartographic,” “meaty,” and “machinic.” I take from Deleuze’s “tool box” these conceptual, affective bodies and put them to work in thought experiments to see what they can do (Bouchard 208). These thought experiments are conducted on representations of practices which exemplify the elitist, “exploitative,” and “extractive” mode of relation that characterises anthropocentrism (Boeher 17); I examine bear-baiting, hunting, and (more surprisingly perhaps), music-making.

In this part of the Introduction, I introduce my conception of affect, and how I use it throughout this thesis. In part two, I draw attention to the issues associated with anthropocentrism and hierarchical, habitual, or what Deleuze and Guattari label “territorialised,” approaches to animals. I note how the interdisciplinary field of “animal studies” is working to challenge anthropocentric thought by moving animals from the margins of “critical inquiry” to the centre (Calarco 2). In the third part of this Introduction, I suggest how early modern and Deleuzian affective bodies trouble human separation from the natural world. In the final two parts, I offer an overview of this thesis and note the way in which I aim to weave together the chapters’ diverse affective threads to create an alter-tale of “human becoming” which avoids reiterating the dominant narrative of “human being.”

Since the 1990s, critical theory has experienced an “affective turn” (Clough 1). There are many different understandings of affect; however, following the work of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), and of Deleuze and Guattari, I understand affect corporeally. For
Spinoza, affects are non-subjective forces or intensities which have visceral, or material, effects. Deleuze and Guattari follow Spinoza’s conception of affect as both the capacity to affect and to be affected (Spinoza’s affectus and Deleuze and Guattari’s L’affect), and the encounter between bodies (affectio and L’affection). In the Ethics, Spinoza summarises: “[b]y affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections” (II.139.D3).13

Unlike Sir Thomas Aquinas’s (1225-1274) and René Descartes’s (1596-1650) conception of affects as “volitions of the soul,” Spinozist-Deleuzian affect is visceral.14 One of the reasons I am drawn to the affective turn is because, as Patricia Clough points out, it helps to “return ... critical theory and cultural criticism to bodily matter” (1). It is important to note, however, that an association between affect and the body touches on a key criticism of the affective turn. Ruth Leys has pointed out the tendency of many affect theorists to reinscribe body/mind dualism by elevating the bodily, precognitive world above the world of cognition and meaning-making. She notes that Brian Massumi “comes across as a materialist who invariably privileges the body and its affects over the ‘mind’ in straightforwardly dualistic terms” (468).15 Through the sustained use of an affective framework, and the practice of drawing conclusions from the texts I study, I demonstrate the mutual interaction of “affective” and “cognitive” worlds. In other words, my attempt to test out the viability of a

13 For more on Spinozist-Deleuzian affect, see Brian Massumi’s preface to ATP, xv.
14 Like contemporary debate, there was no consensus about the meaning of affect. Thinkers like Aquinas and Descartes divided passions and affects. For Aquinas, “affective perturbations [do] not show in the body” (James 61). And, in The Treatise on Man, Descartes discusses the “affectations of the soul” (140). In contrast, writers like Sir Thomas Wright used the terms interchangeably: “Those actions then which are common with us, and beasts, we call Passions, and Affections, or perturbations of the mind” (7). For more on affects and passions in the early modern period, see James.
15 On the “affective turn”, see also Papoulia and Callard, Martin, and Wetherell. While I recognise the substantial contribution Brian Massumi has made to the “affective turn,” I do not engage with his work in a sustained way here. By concentrating on the philosophic terrain of Deleuzian-Spinozist affect, I avoid one of the major areas of critique of the affective turn: the humanities’ appropriation of work from the sciences, in particular the neurosciences.
Deleuzian affective framework for (re)reading early modern human and animal encounters also functions as a response-in-practice to one of Leys’s major criticisms of the affective turn. However, responding to critiques of affect is not the key concern of this thesis. In part two of this Introduction, I introduce “anthropocentrism,” the main problem to which my thesis responds. I then briefly consider some of the ways in which the field of animal studies is beginning to trouble the boundaries maintained and reinforced by anthropocentric modes of thought.

2 Stalking the Boundaries: Anthropocentrism and Animal Studies

In *Shakespeare Among the Animals*, Bruce Boehrer writes that human relationships to the natural world “help human beings to define and conceive of themselves, both as groups and individuals” (3). According to Boehrer, early modern and modern relationships between humans and the natural world are typically characterised by three modes of relation: “absolute anthropocentrism,” “relative anthropocentrism,” and “anthropomorphism” (6). All of these terms derive from the Greek *anthropos*—ἄνθρωπος—which refers to “man” or that relating to man. The categories of anthropocentrism, “absolute anthropocentrism,” and “relative anthropocentrism” are closely linked. Boehrer explains that

> the only real difference between absolute and relative anthropocentrism is that the former distinguishes between humanity and the animal world without qualification, whereas the latter associates large and variable subsets of the human community to a greater or lesser extent with the realm of nature, while reserving full human status only for specific, arbitrarily defined social groups.

(17)

Anthropocentrism operates from the belief that “human beings are radically — at the root of their nature — different from all other life on earth” and that “this difference renders
humankind superior to the rest of earthly creation” (Boehrer 6). Such thinking elevates and isolates the human, and designates the natural world “as an exploitable resource, with the spheres of nature and culture replicating the traditional relationship between servant and master” (Boehrer 6). Anthropocentric thought helps to “frame” the natural world as “a consumable asset: in effect as human property to be employed at the human community’s behest and for the community’s convenience and advantage” (Boehrer 15). In *Vibrant Matter*, Bennett argues that the separation between human and world, which is associated with anthropocentrism, correlates with the binary of active/passive, and that “the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption” (ix). Following the publication of *Killing Animals* by The Animal Studies Group, we might suggest that these “earth-destroying fantasies” are more poignantly described as “life-destroying realities.”

René Descartes’s theory of the *bête machine* (“beast-machine” or “animal automata”) is perhaps the most famous articulation of anthropocentrism’s radical disjunction between humans and the natural world. The theory of the “beast-machine” is a product of Cartesian dualism which distinguishes between a material body and an immaterial soul. In *The Treatise on Man* (1662), Descartes supposes “the body to be nothing but a statue or machine made of earth” (99). Humans, according to Descartes, possess an immaterial soul, which gives them faculties like will and judgement, and the ability to “enjoy music” and “make it more perfect” (*The Description* 170; *The Treatise* 124). However, animals do not possess this soul and are

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16 Unlike anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism disregards notions of human superiority and instead emphasises “humankind’s animal nature and the unique capacity of human beings to sink below type—to become worse than they were created” (Boehrer 27). In *Vibrant Matter*, Bennett suggests that anthropomorphism can be used productively to break down species boundaries (see pages 94-100).

17 As the Animal Studies Group notes, animals are not only killed for food. The harm and killing of animals for “consumption” occurs in the production of clothing and other forms of “display” (2). While the figures of alimentary consumption are alone staggering (see cowspiracy.com, and the Compassion in World Farming Strategic Plan 2013-17), we can add to them the “enormous number” of animals “use[d] up” in hunting and science (compare humaneresearch.org.au). For more facts and figures see the Animal Studies Group’s *Killing Animals*. 
therefore “mere physical objects populating a material world”: “when swallows come in spring, they act like a clock” (Roberts 11; Descartes, *The Correspondence* 304). For Descartes, “the barking dog [is] really no different in kind from the grinding of the gears of, say, a giant mechanical loom: both are expressions of reflex mechanical actions subject to the laws of physics” (Roberts 8). Just as an external force is needed to operate a machine, animals are “passive” and moved by forces of nature: “nature that act[s]” in them “according to the disposition of their organs” (Descartes, *A Discourse* 48). This brief introduction to Descartes’s dualism alerts us to the concomitance of soul and activity; animals that do not possess a soul are passive and subject to natural motions. In this formulation, ensoulment enables the human’s self-movement, and, consequently, separation from the animal. We might ask, however, what happens to the sovereignty and separation of a Cartesian human when she encounters an affective and autonomous animal?

Descartes’s attempt to create a radical division between humans and animals indirectly discloses the proximity between human and animal during the early modern period. Höfele argues that the early modern period saw a “multitude of animals crowding the scene of human self-assertion” (20). Yet, “[i]nstead of serving the end of ‘anthropocentric vanity,’ the figure of the animal develops an uncontrollable power of its own” (Höfele 20-21).

According to Michel Foucault, during the middle ages “legions of animals, named once and for all by Adam, symbolically bear the values of humanity”; however, at the beginning of the Renaissance, the relations with animality are reversed; the beast is set free; it escapes the world of legend and moral illustration to acquire a

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18 Harrison notes the argument that “the relevant passages in the Cartesian corpus do not support the common view that Descartes denied feeling to animals” (219). Often, the work of Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) is misattributed to Descartes. According to Malebranche, “[i]n animals, there is neither intelligence nor souls as ordinarily meant. They eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing; and if they act in a manner that demonstrates intelligence, it is because God, having made them in order to preserve them, made their bodies in such a way that they mechanically avoid what is capable of destroying them” (494-495).

19 Roberts is here paraphrasing Matthew Senior, 61.
fantastic nature of its own. And by an astonishing reversal, it is now the animal that will stalk man, capture him, and reveal him to his own truth.

(Madness 21)

For Foucault, intentional movement distinguishes the “Renaissance” animal from that of the middle ages (Madness 21). Rather than functioning as fixed symbols, early modern animals are mobile: they “stalk,” “capture,” and “reveal” (Foucault, Madness 21). In this thesis, I consider how affective animals “reveal” an alter-tale of becomings which challenges the essentialism that sustains anthropocentrism, and anthropocentric theories like Descartes’s “beast-machine.”

In the Introduction to Animal Movements - Moving Animals, Jacob Bull argues that animal movement plays an important role in the problematisation of human and animal boundaries. In their movement, animals “challenge the seemingly rigid social, cultural, historical and conceptual boundaries which hold ‘us’ apart from ‘them’, animal from human, nature from society” (Bull 26). Animals are mobile and force us to “admit and register the creative presence of creatures and devices amongst us, and the animal sensibilities of our diverse human being,” as well as the “emergence and assemblage of being” (Whatmore 345; Bull 26). In animals, we find “the constant movement of cells, organisms, fluids and chemicals passing over, through and between bodies” (Bull 26). In this thesis, I aim to demonstrate that we become aware of animal “presence” when we pay attention to affective and corporeal movement.

While fields like “mobility studies” render animal present through attending to movement, in the contemporary world the animal is, more often than not, “absent.” In different ways, Carol Adams and Erica Fudge discuss animal absence and invisibility in Western culture and literary, cultural, and historical scholarship and criticism. According to
Adams, in cultural consumption, “meat” is the “absent referent” of the animal (13). “Absent referent,” a term originally derived from linguistics, is politicised by Adams in *The Sexual Politics of Meat*, and is used to refer to the absence which lies behind meat, “the death of the animal whose place the meat takes”:

The “absent referent” is that which separates the meat eater from the animal and the animal from the end product. The function of the absent referent is to keep our “meat” separated from any idea that she or he was once an animal, to keep the “moo” or “cluck” or “baa” away from the meat, to keep something from being seen as having been someone.

(13, italics in original)

Like “meat,” the textual animal is frequently a symbolic or metaphoric referent of the animal body behind the figuration. Fudge argues that in the modern humanities “the marginalization of animals … serves an important philosophical and moral function”:

It obliterates a way of thinking that raises questions about the nature of the animal and the human; that offers us another inheritance, another way of conceptualizing both ourselves and the world around us.

*(Brutal 4)*

The mobility studies in *Moving Animals*, and the affective readings I propose of animals in early modern texts, are part of the emerging field of animal studies that attempts to counter animal absence by giving the animal a central place in our attention through explorations of animal agency, ethics, and sentience. According to Cary Wolfe, the field of animal studies largely “owes its existence ... to the emergence of the animal rights movement in the 1970s and to that movement’s foundational philosophical works, Peter Singer’s *Animal Liberation*, and, later, Tom Regan’s *The Case for Animal Rights*” (“Human” 565). Along with these,
Donna Haraway’s *Primate Visions* offered “a remarkable interdisciplinary synthesis that in effect defined a new, resolutely cultural studies era in what would come to be called animal studies” (Wolfe, “Human” 565). The interdisciplinary quality of Haraway’s work is indeed reflected in the field of animal studies today; it comprises scholars from disciplines like philosophy, literary studies, art history, anthropology, psychology, political science, and more.  

Animal studies centralises “the animal question”; yet, as I indicated at the beginning of this Introduction, questions of animals and humans are tightly bound to one another. According to Matthew Calarco, the “animal question” is “but an opening onto a much larger and richer set of issues that touch more broadly on the limits of the human” (6). At first glance, my focus on “human becomings” may appear to once again marginalise or even instrumentalise the animal; however, a rethinking of the human is necessary in order to shake the anthropocentrism that traps animals into pejorative binary relations in which they are denigrated as passive objects. If we do not “rethink our identity in the most radical sense” we leave “unquestioned the humanist schema of the knowing subject,” which, in effect, “sustains the very humanism and anthropocentrism that animal studies sets out to question” (Gross 3; Wolfe 569). Rather than “using” animals, affective animals “propose” to the human kinds of becomings that “indicat[e] ways-out or a means of escape that the human would have never thought of by himself” (Deleuze and Guattari, *K* 35). In *Animals and the Human Imagination*, Aaron Gross argues that when rethinking the human we must refuse “to assume from the outset the usual categories of thought” (3, italics in original). In my study, affective animals destabilise notions of human essentialism. The fall of human essentialism involves a collapse of boundaries, which supports the assertion that “the human-animal distinction can no longer

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20 Notable scholars from these disciplines include Cary Wolfe and Matthew Calarco (philosophy); Erica Fudge and Laurie Shannon (literary studies); Diana Donald and Steve Baker (art history and criticism); Garry Marvin, Jonathan Burt and Tim Ingold (anthropology); Hal Herzog and Kenneth Shapiro (psychology); Robert Garner and Alasdair Cochrane (political science).
and ought no longer to be maintained” (Calarco 3, italics in original). In the next part of this Introduction, I consider how early modern and postmodern affective bodies are porous, and are integrated within the fluxes and flows of the world. Locating the human within the world poses a challenge to anthropocentrism’s elevation of the human above “brute creation.” In addition, rethinking the human as embedded within the material world helps us to begin to move from the vertical or hierarchical movement of “psychocentric” or intelligence-based ethics to non-hierarchical and horizontal modes of somatically-grounded ethics—something which I consider in more detail in Chapter 2 (Acampora, Corporal 4).

3 “Spunges”: Subjects and Bodies in Early and Post Modernity

According to Calarco, “the subject is never simply a neutral subject of experience but is almost always a human subject” (12). Both early modern materialism and Deleuze and Guattari’s poststructuralist work challenge the notion of the subject as “the autonomous, domineering, atomistic subject of modernity” through an alternative conception of “subject” (Calarco 12). While, on the one hand, “subject” denotes someone or something that “thinks, knows and perceives,” it simultaneously describes “someone or something under a person’s rule or control”: “[b]eing a subject also means being sub-ject, literally thrown-under something other than itself as a support” (Calarco 12, italics in original). In Zoographies, Calarco points out that thinkers like Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou have considered the subject as “sub-ject-to” (Calarco 12, italics in original). However, “it is not at all clear” that

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21 In this thesis, I follow Patricia MacCormack in associating what she labels “postmodern” and “post-structural” philosophy. According to MacCormack, both are “post-philosophies,” which have “celebrated and lamented the loss of the human and its residual humanism and transcendentalism” (115).

22 For a discussion of a shift to sentient rights, see Acampora’s Corporal Compassion, and “Toward,” and Cochrane’s “From Human Rights to Sentient Rights.” My use of the term “horizontal” is inspired by Bennett’s study of “vital materialism”: “[m]ateriality is a rubric that tends to horizontalize the relations between humans, biota, and abiota. It draws human attention sideways, away from an ontologically ranked Great chain of being and toward a greater appreciation of the complex entanglements of humans and nonhumans” (Vibrant 112).

23 OED “subject,” n. 9, and 1
“opening onto something other than metaphysical _humanism_ ... opens onto something other than metaphysical _anthropocentrism_” (Calarco 12, italics in original):

When these authors speak of the subject as being called into being as a response to an event of some sort, it is always a _human_ subject that is being described, and it is always an _anthropogenic_ event that gives rise to the human subject.

(12-13, italics in original)\(^{24}\)

According to Calarco, Deleuze’s work “can be used to expose” anthropocentric “blind spots and aid in the process of challenging and moving beyond them” (13). Deleuze and Guattari “rarely use the concept of subjectivity and when they do it is mostly in a negative way: Subjectivity for Deleuze and Guattari is a molar event, a closure against the process of singular individuation and molecular becoming” (Blackman et al. 15). In Deleuze and Guattari’s work, “molar” denotes perceptible “masses” or “aggregates.” Examples of “molar” include “the general patterns of behaviour taken by an organ or an organism” and “a trait of personality or the character of the ego” (Conley 175-76). In contrast, “molecular” refers to “micro-entities that transpire in the areas where they are rarely perceived: in the perception of affectivity” (Conley 176). In the essay “Creative Subjectivities,” Blackman et al. argue that “the focus on singularities and assemblages” in Deleuze and Guattari “offers possibilities to reconsider the content of the concept” (15); for example, “we could read subjectivity as decentred, as part of an assemblage, an emergent conjunction and an evolving intertwining of self-ordering forces and diverse materialities” (15).

One scholar who reconfigures subjectivity through Deleuze and Guattari’s work is Rosi Braidotti. Braidotti uses Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “nomadism” to propose that the “nomad subject” is conceived “in terms of a nonunitary and multilayered vision, as a

\(^{24}\) “Anthropogenic” describes something which has its origins in the activities of man (OED “anthropogenic,” adj. 2).
dynamic and changing entity” (5). Further, “[t]he point of nomadic subjectivity is to identify
lines of flight, that is to say, a creative alternative space of becoming” that avoids binary and
hierarchical thinking (Braidotti, Nomad 7). In this conception, “subjectivity is here and
active”; it is always “unfinished because it exists in the present, ... in the real-time unfolding
materiality of our body” (Blackman et al. 16).

Like Braidotti, I use the affective bodies which populate Deleuze and Guattari’s
philosophy to rethink subjectivity. As Blackman et al. write, the “concept of subjectivity” has
come to be “replaced with a focus upon bodies, where bodies are not singular, bounded,
closed and fixed, but rather open to being affected and affecting others” (16). In my thesis,
subjectivity is understood to be shaped by affective bodies, by “relational connections,”
which “alter bodies as they move and sense in the world” (Blackman et al 16). Like
Deleuzian affective bodies, early modern subjects are constituted by their embodied relations
with the world, relations in which they often figure in the dual roles of subject and “sub-ject”
(Calarco 12).

In Humoring the Body, Gail Kern Paster considers “the dynamic reciprocities between
self and environment” during the early modern period (14). Paster is strongly influenced by
Shigehisa Kuriyama’s notion that “the history of the body is ultimately a history of ways of
inhabiting the world” (237, cited in Paster, Humoring 7-8). According to Paster, the early
modern way of inhabiting the world is through “psychological materialism,” or what she
labels “psychophysiology” (12). Early modern “self-experience” is determined by the flows
of psychophysiological forces like “humours” and “passions” (Paster, Humoring 11). Humoural theory is “a system of explanation of the body’s composition and functioning
which held sway for centuries from the classical period until the start of a slow and
incomplete disintegration in the seventeenth century” (Paster, Embarrassed 6). Through
humouralism, “each subject grew up with a common understanding of her body as a
semipermeable, irrigated container in which humors moved sluggishly” (Paster, *Embarrassed* 8). The semi-permeability of this “container” means that, rather than being closed-off from the world, the body experiences “corporeal fluidity” and “openness” as it interacts with its surrounds; it is, as John Donne said in a Lenten Sermon in 1623, a “spunge” (Paster, *Embarrassed* 8; Donne 337). In the words of early-modern physician Helkiah Crooke, entities (both human and non-human) were conceived of as “Transpirable and Trans-fluxible, that is so open to the ayre as that it may pass and repasse through them” (175, italics in original).

Like humours, “passions,” also known as “perturbations” and “affections,” are material forces which flow indiscriminately and transversally between body and world, and which therefore trouble notions of agency and autonomy. To use Miranda Burgess’ description of affects, they are “a phenomenon anterior to the distinction of persons: a flow of energy among bodies as well as between bodies and the world” (289). Unlike modern “emotions,” which can be categorised as “mental phenomena,” passions are conceived of as material, as “drowned in corporal organs and instruments” (Wright 95). The early modern passions were part of a complex system which consisted of the interrelation of “the six Galenic non-natural functions (air, exercise, the states of rest, sleep and waking, food and drink, repletion and excretion, and the passions),” bodily functions (for example, the humours), and the external world (Paster, *Humoring* 4). Early modern theories of the microcosm and macrocosm, inherited from the classical world, instead imagined continuity between self and world. For example, Paster cites Kuriyama’s description of “the breath’s relation to the wind” in ancient Greece and the “diacrical construction of inner and outer

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25 Ortoney et al. “construct a cognitive theory concerning the origins of emotions” (14). For more on the cognitive dimension of emotions, see Ortoney et al., 1-14.

26 Passions interact with humours; but, many early modern physicians found it difficult to determine whether the passions follow the humours, or whether passions are the antecedents of bodily change. In *Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1604), Thomas Wright articulates this confusion, writing that “Passions engender Humours and Humours breed Passions” (138).
worlds”: “the winds blowing around the body were often presumed to be related to the
breaths sustaining the life within” (Paster, Humoring; Kuriyama 236, italics in original).
According to Paster, during the early modern period

[t]he link between inner and outer is often described in the language of the
qualities since the forces of cold, hot, moist, and dry do not only determine a [sic]
individual subject’s characteristic humors and behaviours but also describe the
characteristic behaviours of other living things—animate and inanimate.

(Humoring 19)

In such a conception, it is difficult to say where the body ends and the world begins: “the
world is made of the same stuff as the body” (Merleau-Ponty 163). The theoretical
introduction to Deleuzian affects, and early modern material forces like passions and
humours helps us to begin to reconfigure bodies (both human and animal) as integrated and
relational. Early modern and postmodern bodies are therefore central to this thesis’ alter-tales
of “human becomings,” rather than the grand anthropocentric narrative of “human being.”

While authors like Michael Schoenfeldt and Mary Thomas Crane have also argued for
the materiality and porosity of early modern self-experience, Paster’s selective use of
Deleuze and Guattari’s work makes her study particularly useful for my own in that it offers
an example of how to draw early modern and postmodern bodies into proximity. In
Humoring the Body, Paster employs Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “Body without
Organs” (BwO) to read the material flows of humours and passions in Shakespearean drama.
For Paster, Deleuze’s “deconstruction of Western binaries such as reason and passion, body
and spirit, male and female, human and animal”

cohabits nicely with ... the dominant early modern understanding of the material
body as phenomenologically indistinguishable from its passions, indeed as
constituted by its passions and governed with great difficulty by the rational soul. The model of the Body without Organs is one that seems ... to go far—intuitively, as it were—toward explicating the material embodiment of the passions in pre-Enlightenment thought.

(22)

According to Paster, similarities can be found between early modern and Deleuzian conceptions of “organs.” During the early modern period, internal organs are understood as autonomous, rather than subjugated to the organisation of the organism. Organs “are assigned psychological functions,” and “are essential to representations of the body’s self-experience” (Humoring 22). For Paster, in some ways early modern “self-reports of emotional experience … coincide with the BwO,” upon which

[t]he organs ... distribute themselves independently of the form of the organism; forms become contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients. “A” stomach, “an” eye, “a” mouth...

(Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 191, cited in Paster, Humoring 22)

The BwO helps us to read the self as “a connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities” rather than as a “dominion within a dominion” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 187; Spinoza IIIPref). Like the “[t]ranspirable” and “[t]ransfluxible” early-modern body, the BwO is “a set of valves, locks, floodgates, bowls, or communicating vessels” (Crooke 175; Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 177). As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, “[f]lows of intensity, their fluids, their fibers, their continuums, conjunctions of affects, the wind, fine segmentation, micropereceptions, have replaced the world of the subject.
Becomings, becomings-animal, becomings-molecular, have replaced history, individual or general” (ATP 188).\(^{27}\) Making oneself a BwO is about “opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage”—that is, an “arrangement” or fitting-together of a heterogeneous collection of elements (Livesey 18). Conceiving of the body as an assemblage puts us in a better position to appreciate “the very radical character of the (fractious) kinship between the human and nonhuman. My ‘own’ body is material, and yet this vital materiality is not fully or exclusively human” (Bennett, Vibrant 112, italics in original). If people were more attentive to the fact that we are an “array of bodies” in constant processes of change and reciprocal relations, “would we,” asks Bennett, “continue to produce and consume in the same violently reckless ways?” (Vibrant 113, italics in original). My thesis does not endeavour to answer this question; instead, it seeks to pose similarly stimulating questions through literary studies, questions which might shake up the habitual patterns of anthropocentric thought. In the following section I briefly summarise the heterogeneous elements which compose this thesis, and note some of the concepts central to each.

4 Map and Keys

The selection of materials for this thesis is, to borrow a phrase from Boehrer, “self-consciously eclectic” (2). It is also important to note that the “definitions” of the key concepts I give here are not “fixed,” but are instead assembled in a certain way for the purpose of this thesis (Baker 118).

In Chapter 1, “An Unbearable Sight,” I use Deleuze and Guattari’s cartographic framework to create an alter-tale to the narrative of the bear garden as a site of human domination.\(^{28}\) Frequently, individuals maintain distance and distinction in ocular encounters

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\(^{27}\) “Subject” here refers to the psychoanalytic subject Deleuze and Guattari discuss in relation to desire in this plateau.

\(^{28}\) In Looking at Animals in Human History, Linda Kalof writes that “bear-baiting has also been connected to the need to dominate others. For example, it has been argued that a similar ideology of domination justified animal-
using a cluster of associated binaries: subject/object, active/passive, and human/animal. However, a cartographic framework potentially troubles these binaries through a focus on affective proximity and molecular crossings in experiences Deleuze and Guattari label “becomings.” In my readings of early modern bear-baiting, I investigate the potential for an affective framework to help us rethink animals not as “objects” of the spectator’s gaze but as “actants” which, like the Heideggerian “thing,” exert their efficacy and autonomy through non-cooperation (Latour 237). In my cartographic study of representations of early modern bear-baiting, I focus on three different types of gazes: the early modern materialist gaze, the different gazes of Deleuzian animal “types,” and theatrical gazes.

Chapter 1 has three parts. In the first part, I consider points of similarity between early modern materialist theories of vision and the affective transmissions which occur during the gazes of Deleuzian becomings. In part two, I introduce affective animals, and situate them within Deleuze and Guattari’s typology of animals, which also includes “State” and “Oedipal” animals. These animal types are differentiated from one another through their degree of territorialisation. Affective animals are the least territorialised, while State and Oedipal animals have greater degrees of territorialisation. Part two introduces this theory before exploring the oscillations between animal types in, for example, the set of literary texts labelled Roman de Renart, and John Stow’s and Edmond Howe’s The Annales, Or Generall Chronicle of England (1615). Part 3 expands on my study of the potential for becomings in visual encounters between humans and animals, to investigate whether it is possible to become-animal in human-to-human encounters. To explore this idea, I look at Macbeth’s simile of the baited-bear in Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of Macbeth (1611). While, like the

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29 Throughout this thesis, I have followed Deleuze and Guattari’s capitalisation of “State.” Captialising this word helps to convey the hegemonic and molar characteristics of the concept.

30 The Renart text I use in this thesis is The Most Delectable History of Reynard the Fox (1656).
bear in Thomas Nashe’s *Unfortunate Traveller* (1594), one may read Macbeth’s “bear” as a State animal, the metatheatrical references in the final two scenes of the play gesture to the “bear’s” capacity to “look back.” Given the close association between the practices of bear-baiting and theatre during the early modern period, I develop the idea that Macbeth’s reference to bear-baiting may be just as metatheatrical as his reference to the “poor player / That struts and frets his hour upon the stage” (5.5.24-25).\(^{31}\) The effect of such metatheatrical allusions is to create an active process of “looking back” which, through kinaesthesia, draws us, the spectators, into proximity with the play’s action. Macbeth’s functional alignment with the bear-as-actant evokes a comparison between the “English” who surround him—both as characters and spectators—and the dogs of a baiting. In addition, the proximity between packs of dogs and spectators, created vocally through cheering/barking, and functionally, through audience members sometimes taking the place of dogs in the baiting, opens onto the potential for the spectator’s “becoming-dog.”

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “becoming,” particularly “becoming-animal,” is central to the studies in Chapter 1. At its most basic, becoming is “change” or “the very dynamism of change” (Stagoll 25). Becoming is concerned with bodies—conceived of in the broadest sense—and relations between bodies.\(^{32}\) Deleuze and Guattari are careful to articulate that becoming is not “imitation” or a “graduated resemblance” of the animal (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 274). Imitation, for Deleuze and Guattari, functions at perceptible molar levels. In contrast, becomings occur at speeds which are “below and above the threshold of

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\(^{31}\) See Dickey, 261-64, and Höfele 3-12.

\(^{32}\) “Bodies” in Deleuze’s work are conceived of in the broadest sense. This is important for questions that might be raised concerning “real” and “fictional” or “imaginary” animals. According to Deleuze, “the imaginary is “a virtual image that is interfused with the real object,” and rather than being independent, they are *inter*-dependent: “the imaginary and the real must be, rather, like two juxtaposable or superimposable parts of a single trajectory, two faces that ceaselessly interchange with one another, a *mobile mirror*” (CC 63, 62, italics in original). The interrelation of real and imaginary in Deleuze’s work seems to be influenced by Spinoza’s work on the imagination. In *Ethics*, Spinoza writes that “[a]lthough the external bodies by which the human body has once been affected neither exist nor are present, the mind will still be able to regard them as if they were present” and will be “affected with the image of the thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present” (IIP17C, IIP18S1.)
perception,” even, as Deleuze hypothesises, “beyond the speed of light” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 327; Olkowski 118). These transformations are therefore recognisable through their “instantaneousness” and “immediacy” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 81). As an example, Deleuze and Guattari describe a plane-hijacking in which “the transformation of the passengers into hostages, and the plane-body into prison-body is an instantaneous incorporeal transformation” (81). During an experience of becoming, one “extract[s] particles between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness, that are closest to what one is becoming” (*ATP* 318, italics in original). In “1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…” Deleuze and Guattari argue that there are certain qualities that distinguish an experience of becoming from imitative relations between entities. These are: “the institution of an assemblage”; “a circulation of impersonal affects, an alternate current that disrupts signifying projects as well as subjective feelings”; and “an irresistible deterritorialization that forestalls attempts at professional, conjugal, or Oedipal reterritorialization” (*ATP* 272). Each of these encourages an experience of becoming, which according to Cliff Stagoll, Deleuze uses as an “antidote … to what he considers to be the western tradition’s predominant and unjustifiable focus upon being and identity” (25). As I have noted, thinking of the human as an assemblage wrapped up in processes of becoming is an alternative, and perhaps more sustainable, conception of our reality than notions of a stable and fixed essence, distinct from the natural world. I take a moment here to articulate the linear constitution of assemblages.

For Deleuze and Guattari, bodies are linear assemblages, “complexes of lines” (587):

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33 This conception is perhaps influenced by Spinoza’s explanation that he will “consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a questions of lines, planes, and bodies” (III Pref).
Individual or group, we are traversed by lines, meridians, geodesies, tropics, and zones marching to different beats and differing in nature. We said that we are composed of lines, three kinds of lines. Or rather, of bundles of lines, for each kind is multiple.

(\textit{ATP 237})

These “living lines, ... flesh lines,” which “compose us as they compose our map,” are divided by Deleuze and Guattari into the categories of “molar lines,” “molecular lines,” and “lines of flight” (\textit{ATP}, 238, 228-231, italics in original). Of these, it is the “\textit{line of flight or deterritorialization}” which is associated with Deleuzian becomings (330, italics in original).

This type of line, often referred to as a line of “becoming,” “cut[s]” across the assemblage and “open[s]” what Deleuze and Guattari call a “territorial assemblage onto other assemblages” (587). “Territory,” writes Kylie Massage, “refers to a mobile and shifting centre that is localisable as a specific point in space and time” (280). While a territory does “maintain an internal organisation,” it is an assemblage, which “exists in a state of process whereby it continually passes into something else” (Massage 280). These movements into the “something else” are what Deleuze and Guattari label “deterritorialisations.” The interplay between territory and lines of deterritorialisation puts us in a better position to understand the nature of experiences of becoming. Neither a territory nor a becoming is a fixed state. Rather, both are subject to change: a territory can be deterritorialised, and a line of flight can be reterritorialised. The reterritorialisation of lines of flight is something I explore in Chapter 3.

In \textit{Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature}, where the concept of becoming-animal is first introduced, Deleuze and Guattari describe the operation of “the line of deterritorialisation” in an experience of becoming. During a becoming,
there is no longer man or animal, since each deterritorializes the other … in a continuum of reversible intensities … There is no longer a subject … Rather, there is a circuit of states that forms a mutual becoming, in the heart of a necessarily multiple or collective assemblage.

(K 22)

In one of the most famous examples of becoming, from ATP, Deleuze and Guattari write of the wasp and the orchid caught up in molecular relations:

The line or block of becoming that unites the wasp and the orchid produces a shared deterritorialization: of the wasp, in that it becomes a liberated piece of the orchid’s reproductive system, but also of the orchid, in that it becomes an object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated from its own reproduction. … The line, or the block, does not link the wasp and the orchid, any more than it conjugates or mixes them: it passes between them, carrying them away in a shared proximity in which the discernibility of points disappears.

(342)

Indiscernibility is a feature of Deleuzian “meat,” a concept that guides my reading of early modern material in Chapter 2, “Subversive Somatology.” Meat, for Deleuze, is an affective, spatio-corporeal concept; it is a zone which encourages affective exchanges as well an affective body which draws entities into proximity. This proximity is often created through the shared potential for humans and animals to “suffer”: “the man who suffers is a beast, the beast that suffers is a man” and that “every man who suffers is a piece of meat” (FB 25, 23). In Chapter 2, I use Deleuze’s concept of meat to explore somatic continuity between humans and stags in early modern representations of the hunt. Deleuze develops the concept of meat
in one short but suggestive chapter in *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (20-26). Here, meat does not emerge as a unified concept. The polymorphous quality of meat offers me a diverse range of ways to suggest shared carnality between humans and animals. While I develop Deleuzian meat throughout Chapter 2, here I note three main features of the concept I explore: its “affective capacity,” its affinity with “suffering,” and its “acrobatic quality” (Deleuze, *FB* 23, 24, 25).

In part one of Chapter 2, I contrast a reading of Margaret Cavendish’s “The Hunting of the Stag” (1653), in which the animal is a symbol for both the human condition and the fall of the monarchy to an affective reading that explores how the material text of the poem is “corporeally invade[d]” by italicised body parts and, towards the end, metrical irregularities (Carson, “Hunted Stag” 542). The italicised body parts dismantle the structure of the “poem-as-organism,” and with it the symbolism attached to the unified animal. The poem’s “organs” become autonomous and affective entities which, along with metrical irregularities towards the end of the poem, impress on the reader’s body, drawing them into a zone of proximity with the stag through physiological mimesis. In part two, I problematise territorialised relations between humans and animals in George Gascoigne’s early modern hunting treatise *The Noble Arte of Venerie or Hunting* (1575). In Gascoigne’s text, the hunter’s body is understood as unified and stable, while the stag’s body is perceived as malleable; it is something which can be made and unmade at the discretion of the hunter. Using the performative element of Deleuzian meat, in conjunction with work by thinkers like Vinciane Despret and Rane Willerslev, I contest these assumptions. I suggest that in “mapping” the stag’s route, the hunter performs or somatically imitates the animal. In the experience, he

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34 To my knowledge, Deleuze’s “meat” has been the focus of extended critical discussion in just two works, Baker’s *Postmodern Animals*, where it is also treated over six pages, and Daniella Voss’ “The Philosophical Concepts of Meat and Flesh.” Baker draws connections between “meat” and “meaning” and considers the role “meat” plays in the deterritorialisation of meaning in contemporary art (86-92). Voss undertakes a comparative analysis of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh” and Deleuzian “meat,” arguing that the ‘universal meat’ is... a utopian aim, a micro-political agenda, and therefore differs radically from Merleau-Ponty’s mystical and contemplative notion of the flesh” (122).
potentially “undo[es] and redo[es]” the human body, creating “partial affinities” between entities (Despret 51). Further, I propose that in Shakespeare’s As You Like It (1599), like Gascoigne’s hunter, Jaques performs the motions of the stag, which “undo[es] the bounds of his body” (Baker 86). In the final part of Chapter 2, I explore parallels between the “undoing” or “breaking” of the stag in hunting treatises, and the rape, mutilation, murder, and cannibalisation of Lavinia’s, Chiron’s, and Demetrius’s bodies in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus to posit a contingent rather than essentialist conception of the human.35 I note, for example, parallels between the cutting out of the tongue of the stag and of Lavinia, and the removal of hooves and hands. I will also consider how Tamora’s ignorance about the cannibalisation of her sons shows that “meat” is not essentially “animal,” but contingent and relational; when put into a relation with “butchering,” all bodies are potentially meat, or as Bacon says, “carcasses” (DeMello 130). The studies within this chapter offer a literary contribution to work being done by thinkers like Ralph Acampora, which attempts to shift the grounds of our ethical consideration for animals to the soma, that experience of sharing a “live nexus” with another creature (Acampora, “Toward” 238).

The “acrobatic” and lively quality of Deleuzian meat foreshadows the “lively matter,” which populates Chapter 3, “Hydraulics and Hums.” In this chapter, I problematise notions of material passivity through “vital materialist” readings of kinds of music-making in Christopher Marlowe’s Hero and Leander (1598) and Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece (1594). The “vital materialist” readings of Marlowe’s Hero and Shakespeare’s Lucrece suggest experiences of “becoming-automata” and “becoming-drone” that trouble binaries like organic/inorganic and active/passive. Deleuze and Guattari’s vital materialism is distinct from traditional vitalism, which posits that organic entities are animated by a non-physical

35 The correct terms used for the dismemberment of the stag at the end of the chase were “undo” and “break.” See Gascoigne, 127.
“Immanence” is an important concept for Deleuze. Immanent philosophy is characterised by relations “in” something rather than a relation “to” something, a formulation that describes philosophies of transcendence (J. Williams 128). Following Spinoza’s argument that “desire” is the very essence of a thing, Deleuze and Guattari give the label “desire” to the affective flow of “matter-movement, … matter-energy, … matter-flow, … matter in variation” that enters assemblages and leaves them (ATP, 595, 474). Deleuze and Guattari’s version of desire is non-localised and is a force which exists beyond, independent of, and indifferent to the bounds of the organism. It is not a negative, “psychoanalytic” desire, one which refers back to “the negative law, the extrinsic rule, and the transcendent ideal” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 179). In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari write that desire “does not take as its object persons or things but the entire surroundings that it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined, introducing therein breaks and captures—always nomadic and migrant desire” (292). For Deleuze and Guattari, desire, which they also label “sexuality,” is “everywhere” (AO 293). Rather than male and female sexes, there are “a thousand tiny sexes”: the “molecular flux of sexuality motivates the endless ‘conjunctions’ of ‘n’ or ‘a thousand sexes, which are so many uncontrollable becomings’ (Deleuze and Guattari, AO 235). Desire’s conjunctive element leads Deleuze and Guattari to label this type of desire “machinic.” “Machinic” is characterised by connectivity and function, rather than organic essence; it denotes “an aggregate whose elements vary according to its connections,

36 Deleuze and Guattari write this concept as “material vitalism”; however, for the sake of consistency, I have chosen to use Jane Bennett’s version of “vital materialism” throughout this thesis.
37 In Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett develops Deleuze and Guattari’s work on “vital materialism.” Bennett uses the terms “affect” and “vital materialism” synonymously to describe the intrinsic capacity of matter for self-movement and affect (xiii, vii). There is an affinity between affect and movement in Spinozist-Deleuzian inspired work. Clough, whose conception of affect is strongly influenced by these thinkers, writes that “the turn to affect points ... to a dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter generally—matter’s capacity for self-organization in being informational” (1).
38 Spinoza argues that “desire is the very essence, or nature of each [man]” (IIIP56D, italics in original, insertion by Curley).
its relations of movement and rest” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 298). An understanding of Deleuzian desire and assemblages invites us to think of the human as something other than a coherent entity which acts upon the surrounding world. Instead, of being an *a priori* subject, the “human” is a temporary “slowing down” of molecular movement—which Deleuze and Guattari label an “intense germinal influx” (*AO* 162); the human is *subject-to* affective forces which promote change and connection, assemblages and alteration.

In Chapter 3, I take my cue from the hydraulic and vibrative vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari’s description of desire in *AO*, to offer readings of Marlowe’s *Hero and Leander* and Shakespeare’s *The Rape of Lucrece*, which operate through non-localised desire. In my reading of Marlowe’s Hero, I argue that parallels between the humoural flows and the hydraulic flows of the sparrows evoke a Deleuzian form of non-localised desire, which runs through and connects bodies, organic and mechanical. I propose this reading alongside Boehrer and Henley’s analysis of the automated sparrows, in which the mechanical devices operate analogically as an example of Hero’s attempts to control the flows of the passions, in particular genetically-localised ēros. In my study of *The Rape of Lucrece*, I propose a vibrative alternative to the hydraulic desire developed in my analysis of *Hero and Leander*. My reading of *The Rape of Lucrece* is affective rather than representational—that is, it focuses on the singularity of Lucrece’s experience rather than its significance in a broader historical framework. In this Chapter, I will follow a vibrative and vital line of humming through the different becomings of Shakespeare’s *The Rape of Lucrece*. Lucrece’s hum is understood as a sonorous form of non-localised desire which deterritorialises habitual relations and molar structures. I suggest that we come into contact with this molecular and musical line of desire after Tarquin’s rape of Lucrece. Subsequently, it threads through Lucrece’s different experiential states (states which correlate with the various musical modes of speaking, singing and humming) and opens up the potential for her becoming-drone,
variously insect, instrument, and sound. In the realm of the drone, Lucrece is able, if only momentarily, to experience a state untied to the formal structures of patriarchy, Oedipal triangulation, and the human body.

The purpose of both of these studies is to propose an alternative to agentic models of human hegemony and control. The vital materialist reading of human, animal, and machine entanglements which I develop throughout Chapter 3 troubles dualistic ontologies like Descartes’s by positing that even machines have efficacy—that is, the power to create connections and affect the entities with which they come into contact. Vital materialism encourages creative and affirmative approaches to and reconceptualisations of misogynistic and mechanistic literature like Semonides’s empty “Earth woman,” and Descartes’s animal automata in which the body is “suppose[d] … to be just a statue or a machine made of earth” (23; Treatise 1.120). In mapping affective alter-tales in early modern English literature, I aim to create “microcracks” or “microfissures” in the molar “human being,” cracks which might release lines of flight or becoming.

5 "Lines of Flight" and “Alter Tales”

In the first plateau of ATP, Deleuze and Guattari remark that a book has multiple sides. One side of the book-assemblage “faces the strata, which doubtless make[s] it a kind of organism, or signifying totality” (2). “Strata,” according to Deleuze and Guattari, are “Layers, Belts,” which “consist of giving form to matters, imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems or resonance and redundancy” (ATP 46). This side of the plane produces the animal-as-symbol and essentialist notions of the “human being.” However, the other side of the assemblage faces “a body without organs, which is continually dismantling the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 2, italics in original). On this side is the potential for creative lines of thought in which
“affective animals” encourage “human becomings.” Significantly, these sides are not binary opposites:

[w]e come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called the organism.

\( (ATP\ 184) \)

Indeed, “[i]t is through a meticulous relation to the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO” \( (ATP\ 187) \). This is an important point because it should dissuade us from adopting utopian fantasies or liberatory idealism. Recognition of this entanglement grounds my project in an awareness of the dominance of anthropocentric and dualistic structures. Therefore, I do not endeavour to paint a pre-lapsarian picture of human and animal communication and harmony, or a monistic picture of material similitude and equality. Rather, I suggest working from within, or at least beginning with, structures and practices like bear-baiting, hunting, and music-making, and the concepts of “human” and “animal” to locate affective potentials. The location of these affective potentials might allow me, if not to “crack,” at least to “shake” the hegemony of the grand narratives which currently define humans and animals (Deleuze and Guattari, \( ATP\ 14 \)).

I hope that in creating alter-tales which neither proceed from nor reinforce humanism, I “might,” to use the words of Erica Fudge, “support attempts to make another present possible —a present in which our resistance to the orthodoxies of anthropocentrism and the dualistic thinking that separates humans from animals can be strengthened” (“Animal Face” 178).
Chapter 1: “An Unbearable Sight”: Early Modern Bear-Baiting and Becoming-Animal

Introduction

John Berger’s “Why Look at Animals?” (1980) is one of the most influential (if not controversial) essays written on animals and vision. According to Berger, industrialisation and capitalism have created a “rupture” between humans and animals. As a result, and because humans and animals do not share a common language, the modern trans-species gaze must always traverse a “narrow abyss of non-comprehension” (Berger 3). Where animals had once been “proximate” and had given humans “invitations” for interaction, the animal of the modern era is silent; the animal’s “silence guarantees its distance, its distinctness, its exclusion from and of man” (4). For Berger, the animal is separate from the human, and its life, “never to be confused with man’s, can be seen to run parallel to his. Only in death do the two parallel lines converge” (4). In this chapter, I consider the potential for the “gazes” of the early modern bear garden to stimulate “proximate” and “invitational” experiences between humans and animals, experiences which Deleuze and Guattari call “becoming-animal” (Berger 4). I suggest that Berger’s argument of an irremediable rupture between humans and animals operates on a Deleuzian molar level, on a plane of formal structures, and perceptible movement. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of molecular “becomings” to read the ocular encounters of the early modern bear garden, I want to contest Berger’s assertion of a human and animal rupture.

39 See, for example, responses to Berger’s essay by Pick, and Armstrong.
40 Not all of the examples of bear-baiting within this chapter occur within the English Paris Garden on Bankside (often called the Bear Garden and later called Hope Theatre after the Paris Garden burned-down in 1614); whenever I am writing generally, I use lower case. All of the examples I give were written prior to the time the Paris Garden was burned-down in 1614; therefore, this is the name I will use when referring specifically to this theatre.
41 According to Deleuze and Guattari, “all becomings are molecular” (359).
The dominant narrative surrounding the bear garden and the baiting of animals is one which expresses and reinforces human superiority.\textsuperscript{42} Such a narrative has biblical roots. In Genesis 1:26,

\begin{quote}
God said, “Let us make man in our image according to our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea, over the fowl of the heaven, and over the beastes, and over the earth, and over every thing that creepeth and mooveth on the earth.”
\end{quote}

According to Harriet Ritvo, anthropocentric passages like this are problematic since, “so often, distinction is inevitably insidious; and separation is inextricable from hierarchy” (482). In contrast to this narrative, I endeavour to create an alter-tale by weaving together glimmers of animal affectivity in the early modern bear garden. Affective animals “look back,” and in doing so, disrupt binaries inherent to much discourse on spectatorship: for example, the binaries of active (human) subject/passive (animal) object.\textsuperscript{43} “Looking back” is an assertion of efficacy which, in a challenge to the molar structures which dictate ocular encounters, forces us to reconceptualise our relations with animals in non-binary and non-hierarchical terms. In this chapter, I argue that we might read the interspecies encounters of the bear garden as opportunities for molecular becomings.

I focus on bear-baiting because of the “complex interaction of looks” involved in the practice (Mulvey 26). Bear-baiting involves the exchange of gazes between a variety of bodies: bears, dogs, lions occasionally, bear wardens, and spectators. This chapter explores these interactions through three categories of “gazing”: the material and affective gaze; the

\textsuperscript{42} For a challenge to the notion that the bear garden is unequivocally a site of human domination, see Fudge’s “The Contexts of Bear Baiting” (1995).

\textsuperscript{43} Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975) played an influential role in drawing critical attention to the gendering of this binary. Thinkers like Pick and Szarycz have recently mapped this binary onto human and animal relations.
gazes of Deleuze and Guattari’s animal “types”; and the theatrical gaze. Each of these categories informs my reading of human and animal encounters, and my study of the potential for experiences of becoming. At a structural level this chapter separates these gazes; however, in the final section of the chapter, I demonstrate that these “lines of sight” are constantly crossing one another, creating molecular intersections or “crosscurrents of affect,” kinds of becoming. The tale of human and animal rupture, like the narrative of the bear garden as a space of human control and domination, is a story which reinforces human and animal separation and leaves untroubled the essentialist category of “human being.” In contrast, investigating the molecular intersections and crosscurrents of affect which occur in the bear garden troubles binaries and hierarchies, and consequently, anthropocentric patterns of thought sustained by these structures. Instead of human-centred relations with animals, we might consider, as Deleuze encourages, animal relations with animals: “une relation animale avec l’animal” (ABC). And, these animal relations, I will argue, promote an ontology of becoming and a more sustainable relationship between self and surrounds by reminding the human of her affective integration with the world.

In part one, I establish the context of Deleuze and Guattari’s work on becoming and vision and offer a theoretical grounding for the readings that follow. I begin with a human and bear encounter, described in Michel Pastoureau’s historical study of the bear (2011), that gestures to qualities of affect and reciprocity, qualities which allow me to set up the Deleuzian framework I use to analyse the gazes of the bear garden in parts two and three of this chapter. Unlike our modern abstract, geometric, and mathematical conceptions of vision, early modern thinkers frequently conceived of vision as a material and visceral phenomenon. Visual encounters were thought to involve the transmission of corporeal and humoral

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44I am aware that there is work, like Jacques Rancière’s “The Emancipated Spectator,” which operates from a different set of assumptions about the activity and passivity of actors and spectators in the theatre than the tradition of “exploitative” looking that grounds my work.
matter. In this regard, early modern ocular encounters are comparable to Deleuzian experiences of becoming-animal, which consist of affective transmissions between entities. Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s fictional “Lord Chandos” offers an example of an affective transmission between animals and human in a visual encounter and serves as a point of entry to this theoretical concept (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 280). As well as drawing together conceptions of vision, affect, and becoming, Chandos’s fascination with dying rats introduces “the pack.” According to Deleuze and Guattari, the pack is crucial to becomings. In part two, I consider how the animal pack fits into Deleuze and Guattari’s work on animal types, and how their typology of animals influences our analysis of experiences of becoming.

Part two uses Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of animal types to explore how alter-tales emerge “adjacent” to the grand narrative of the bear garden as a site of human domination (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 190). In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari identify three different animal types: Oedipal, State, and affective, or pack animals (279-284). Unlike the highly territorialised Oedipal and State animals, affective animals encourage deterritorialisations and becomings. Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is only with affective animals that humans are able to enter into becomings (ATP 284). They emphasise, however, that instead of being species-specific, an animal’s type is determined by its degree of territorialisation. However, territories are constantly changing, undergoing processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation; thus, an animal’s type is contingent upon historical, cultural, and singular forces. I begin this part by introducing the different Deleuzian animal types, and demonstrating how, from the medieval period, the affective

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45 Deleuze and Guattari argue that “[t]he BwO is not ‘before’ the organism; it is adjacent to it and it continually in the process of constructing itself” (190-191).
46 According to Deleuze and Guattari, “any animal is or can be a pack” and that “the pack is simultaneously an animal reality, and the reality of the becoming-animal of the human being” (ATP, 281, 283).
47 Deleuze and Guattari write that “[o]ur first principle was: pack and contagion, the contagion of the pack, such is the path becoming-animal takes” (284).
potential of bears was reduced through a variety of territorialisations. Increased territorialisation drew bears closer to Deleuze and Guattari’s Oedipal and State animals. As an Oedipal animal, the bear was anthropomorphised and given a personalised name. And, as a State animal, the bear functioned as an archetype for the victim and villain; it represented both the oppressed and the oppressor (Fudge, “Contexts” 27, 180). Fudge argues that “watching a baiting could serve as both a reversal and a reminder of the social structure of early modern England” (“Contexts” 27). Encounters with Oedipal and State bears do little to challenge the molar formation of the human. Instead, they reinforce the narrative of human superiority and separation. However, I use John Stow and Edmond Howe’s account of a 1609 bear-baiting to suggest a molecular alternative to a cultural practice commonly read along molar lines. The animals of this baiting refuse to “act out” human desires. I develop the affective potential of this example using Berger’s work on zoo animals. I suggest that, like the animals of the 1609 baiting, in refusing to cooperate with human desires, these animals become “actants”; that is, they have “efficacy” and the ability to “do things, ... produce effects, alter the course of events” (Latour 237; Bennett viii, italics in original). In the last section of this part, I consider some of the implications of affective animal encounters, and why we frequently turn a blind eye, so to speak, to molecular interactions, using the bear and human encounter of William Faulkner’s twentieth-century tale The Bear (1942). In different ways, the animals of part two “look back.” Unlike the Oedipal and State animals which populate dominant narratives of baitings, humans cannot find a reflection of themselves in the “look” of an affective animal. Instead, they are forced to forge an animal relation with animals (Deleuze, ABC). In the third part of this chapter, I test out the viability of this affective framework in a reference to bear-baiting in the final scene of Shakespeare’s Macbeth. I argue that in Macbeth’s lament, “They have tied me to a stake: I cannot fly, / But bear-like I must fight the course” (5.7.1-2), the capacity to “look back” plays an important
role in opening up the potential for the spectator’s becoming-animal. During the early modern period, the practices of bear-baiting and theatre were, according to Stephen Dickey, “culturally isomorphic” (255). The association between baiting and theatre therefore lends a metatheatrical quality to Macbeth’s simile. His reference to bear-baiting, and the number of other metatheatrical allusions which occur in the final two scenes of the play, constitute “acts of looking.” I argue that Macbeth’s acts of looking are movements which create proximity between Macbeth and the spectators. Within this proximate zone, I suggest a spectatorial experience of “becoming-dog.”

In “Border Trouble,” Ritvo contends that “[h]istorically speaking, and even speaking of relatively recent history” there has been a “passionate and committed refusal to place people within the world of nature” (488). Instead, we reinforce tales of separation and “rupture,” which perpetuate the myth of anthropocentrism—a myth which feeds, according to thinkers like Boehrer and Bennett, “exploitative” and “extractive” relations with the natural world (Boehrer 17). In contrast, attending to the molecular exchanges of the bear garden produces an alter-tale to human dominance, a tale which encourages us to rethink our bodies and subjectivity as porous and in process. Alongside the human relation to animals, which is separate and exploitative, thinking of our bodies as porous and in process promotes an animal relation with animals, which is proximate and invitational.

1.1 The Material and Affective Gaze

In The Bear: History of a Fallen King, Pastoureau writes that in the early modern period, females were advised to keep a distance from bears because “seeing a male bear too close up, even if he were chained, might awaken in girls and young women a kind of bestial and

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48 This “refusal,” says Ritvo, “has not been confined to the unlearned or even the unscientific” (488).

49 Proximate relationships are not unequivocally positive; indeed, many of the examples of proximity in this thesis are bound up with violence. What proximity does contribute, however, is a horizontal quality. Even in a violent encounter, neither entity is elevated above one another; humans and animals are both “subject to” affective deterritorialisations (Calarco 12).
repressed lust” (171-172). For a modern reader, thinking of the gaze of the animal as proximate, affective, or viscerally powerful is difficult. For example, the affective animal gaze appears implausible in contemporary conceptions of vision which describe the eyes as receptors of light. Vision, in the modern era, is a “mathematical concept” which involves “a field of intersecting vectors” (Armstrong 182). However, unlike this model, early modern theories of vision, inherited from the classical world, attribute physical power to the eyes; vision is understood as “an unpredictable, risky, corporeal network—a complex interchange of fiery rays, material atoms, contagious vapours and animal spirits” (Armstrong 182). Following Plato’s description of sight in *Timaeus* (c. 360 BC) as “a corporeal ‘stream’ or visual current [that] ‘issues forth’ from the eye,” vision, in early modern times is conceived variously as a “flame, fire, [and] stream of particles” (Lindberg 2-3; Armstrong 181). The eyes of animals, like those of humans, were believed to be physically powerful. Armstrong writes that the “eyes of animals were thought to emit a physical force, an irradiation with the power to transfix or infect those who encountered it” (178). This dynamic understanding of the eyes troubles notions of “human mastery over the animal in question” because it invests animals with powers beyond human control (Armstrong 178). The eyesight of humans and animals was “not just an active force in itself” but also a “vehicle for other kinds of effects: poisons, contagions, influences of various kinds” (Armstrong181). Reginald Scot’s *Discoverie of Witchcraft* (1584) recognises the material quality of the gaze, and its

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50 According to Pastoureau, the reciprocal exchange of lusty affects between bears and women is found in traditions as diverse as Celtic and German mythologies, and medieval English romances. For general discussion of “bears and women,” see 71-78, and for reciprocal relations, see 75-76.

51 In contrast to Berger’s rupture, Armstrong observes how a number of modern thinkers have written about the “unsettling power of the animal gaze” (178); for example, Derrida’s sense that “the gaze called ‘animal’ offers to [one’s] sight the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man…” (Derrida, quoted in Armstrong 178).

52 Euclidean geometry has a strong influence over the modern abstraction of vision: “Euclid believed that rays shone out from the eyes to illuminate the object on which they fell, and depicted them accordingly—as straight lines connecting the eye and object” (Ingold, *Lines* 159).

53 Two different, classical models of vision dominated visual theories of the early modern period: intromission and extramission. Plato’s model of extramission grants power to the gazing subject, and involves the projection of a beam-like stream of particles—residue of the individual’s internal fire—from the eye to a passive object. While similarly forceful, theories of intromission like Epicurean atomism reverse this model and suggest that objects continually produce atomic copies of themselves, which penetrate the eyes of the passive observer.
connection with Galenic humoralism: humours “ascending into the highest parts of the head, do fall into the eyes, and so are from thence sent forth, as ... beams and streams a certain fiery force” (350). Thus, early modern vision involves a projection of matter which belongs to self and world, making it difficult to determine where the self ends and where the world begins. The crossings of humours and humoural gaze are, I argue, comparable to the deterritorialisations of Deleuzian affects.

As noted in the Introduction, Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of affect is strongly influenced by the ethological approach of Spinoza’s Ethics. In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari conceive of Spinoza’s affect and affection cartographically as the longitude and latitude of bodies, respectively. Longitude describes “the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness,” and latitude describes “the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential” (Deleuze and Guattari 304). Like the humoural body, the cartographic and affective body is neither bound nor isolated. It interacts with the world; it is “a threshold, a door” between multiplicities (Crooke 175, italics in original; Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 291). Within proximate zones, “fibres,” or affects, stretch horizontally between multiplicities mutually deterritorialisating and desubjectifying them until the “discernibility of points disappears” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 342). As well as affects, animal fibres, like “horns, teeth, claws, tail, ears, sex organs, and hair,” “form ... protuberances” stretch beyond the confines of the body, reaching out into the world (Ingold, Lines 42; Pastoureau 206-207).

54 In other words, longitude involves the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness of extensive parts; for example, parts of a specific molar form, like arms and legs, which are divisible. Latitude pertains to affects, and intensities, those characteristics of the body which are intensive, or non-divisible.

55 This idea of “stretching out beyond the confines of the body” is something Paster considers in her study of the humoral body and the BwO. She also notes how, like the humoral body, the Bakhtinian “grotesque” body is “not separated from the rest of the world. It is not a closed, completed unit; it is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits...Like the humoral body, the grotesque body is a plentitude, full of activities apart from mind through which it expresses its unity with a sense of belonging to the natural world” (Embarrassed 14).
For Deleuze and Guattari, vision and affects play key roles in encouraging becomings. In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari argue that “[e]verything is vision, becoming,” and that in front of the gaze of the animal, affects radiate and circulate (169). According to Deleuze and Guattari, this affective circulation “throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel” (*ATP* 280). In “Following the Rats,” Leonard Lawlor explains that the experience of “becoming” is an encounter in which he finds himself

fascinated before something I cannot recognize, before something that has lost its molar form, something singular .... And it is this gaze from the singular animal and its cries that place the animal within me: one in the other.

(176, italics in original)

Affects, like early modern humours, are autonomous and mobile; they are “a flow of energy among bodies as well as between bodies and the world” (Burgess 298). The molecular quality of affects distinguishes the Deleuzian experience of “becoming” from “imitation” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 279). Becoming, is a change produced molecularly, through a circulation of non-subjectified affects, rather than a perceptible molar copying of forms. Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s “Lord Chandos” helps to elucidate the experience of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari describe a “circulation of impersonal affects” which creates “an alternate current that disrupts signifying projects as well as subjective feelings” (*ATP* 272). Fascinated by a pack of rats he has just poisoned, Chandos experiences an “unnatural participation” with the animal; as Deleuze and Guattari write, it is in Chandos, “through him, in the interstices of his disrupted self” that the animal “bares its teeth at monstrous [sic] fate” (280, italics in original). These rats give the fictional Chandos “an incredible feeling of an unknown Nature,” and it is this “incredible feeling” that Deleuze and Guattari call “affect” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 280, italics in original). In this example, the pack’s gaze disrupts Chandos’s sense of self, and encourages an affective animal relation
between Chandos and the animal pack. In the next two parts of this chapter, I test out the potential for the affective animal gaze to stimulate experiences of becoming in the early modern bear garden. These experiences of becoming, I will argue, offer glimmers of possibility for alter-tales to human essentialism, and anthropocentric and violent practices like baiting, which derive from this mode of thought.

1.2 Oedipal, State, and Affective Animal Gazes: Deleuzian “Types” and Becoming-Animal

A number of different animals populate early modern baiting arenas; thus, it is first necessary to spend a moment on Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical work on becomings and animal types. According to Deleuze and Guattari, only the gaze of affective animals has the potential to encourage becomings-animal (ATP 282, 284). Affective animals are “demonic animals, pack ... animals [which] form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population” and which, like the ocular transmission Scot describes, pass affects through “contagion” rather than “filiation” and “reproduction” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 281, 282). With these animals, it is “easier ... to discover the multiplicity,” or the “affects” or “molecules,” which “constantly construct and dismantle themselves in the course of their communications, as they cross over into each other at, beyond, or before a certain threshold” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 281, 37).

Affective animals are one of three types of animals described by Deleuze and Guattari in ATP. The other two types are Oedipal and State animals (ATP 281). Deleuze and Guattari argue that while every animal has the potential to be an affective animal, some animals are so heavily individualised and “integrated into family institutions and state apparatuses” that it is difficult to locate their “multiplicities,” and thus to enter into becomings with them (ATP 283-284). State animals are “animals as they are treated in the great divine myths, in such a way as to extract from them series or structures, archetypes or models” (Deleuze and

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56 For a detailed explanation of “multiplicity,” see Deleuze and Guattari’s plateau “1914: One or Several Wolves?” pages 29 to 44.
Guattari, ATP 81). Individuated, or Oedipal animals, are the most territorialised animal type described by Deleuze and Guattari. These animals “invite us to regress”—or to remain within the territories we inhabit (like, “human,” “female”)—a prime example is the pet: “my’ cat”, “‘my’ dog” (ATP 281).

In every pack of animals, there is an “Anomalous” animal which “has only affects” (ATP 284, 285). The Anomalous is a “bordering” figure which encourages “lines of flight” between multiplicities (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 286). Deleuze and Guattari cite H. P. Lovecraft’s term “Outsider” to describe the “thing or entity ... which arrives and passes at the edge, which is linear yet multiple” (ATP 286). To use Jane Bennett’s words, pack or affective animals express a Thoreauean “Wildness”—a “not-quite-human force,” an “irreducibly strange dimension of matter, an out-side” (Vibrant 2-3, italics in original). According to Pastoureau, the bear was once a wild and “intermediary creature,” a “being apart”; in places like Germany and Scandinavia it was venerated as an “incarnation of brute strength” and of “invincibility” (Pastoureau 2). However, during the Carolingian period, the bear’s wild and noble status was denigrated by means of “fighting, taming, and demonizing” (Pastoureau 136). The bear “descended from the throne” of the animal kingdom, and over time became a familiar, even submissive animal (Pastoureau135). In the Western world, the lion—an animal which remains to this day Britain’s symbolic animal—came to occupy the recently vacated throne.

In a “literary text, or rather a set of literary texts,” from the medieval period called Roman de Renart (thought to be compiled between 1175-1250), we observe the denigration of the bear. In the different branches of tales which comprise Roman de Renart, animals function as Deleuzian State animals: they are “allegorical and moral types, but also social types” (Pastoureau 167). Roman de Renart’s “Brun” the bear is portrayed as a gluttonous figure, “willing to do anything for a little honey” (Pastoureau 167). For example, in the early
modern version *The Most Delectable History of Reynard the Fox* (1656), Brun pledges his loyalty to Reynard the fox for the promise of some honey: “I am in that serious earnest, that for one lick thereat you shall make me the faithful’st of all your kindred” (n. pag.). Further, his gluttony is exemplified by his confident assertion that “had I all the honey betwixt Hibla and Portugal, yet I could in a short space eat it all myself” (n. pag). In *The Most Delectable History*, one tale in particular encourages comparison between the literary denigration of the bear, and violent physical denigration of the animal. In Chapter 5, Renart the fox takes advantage of Brun’s love of honey, convincing him to try to reach a glut of honey by sticking his head in a hollow tree: “The Bear with all hast entered the tree, with his twa feet forward and thrust his head into the cleft, quite over the ears” (n. pag). Reynard, taking advantage of Brun’s position, pulls wedges out of the tree “so that he lock’d the Bear fast therein” (n. pag). Brun starts to “howl” and “bray,” and the people of the village rush to him, weapons in hand. The villagers begin to violently beat him in a scene which evokes the iconography the “*ours bêté,*” or “baited-bear,” a trope which began to emerge during this century (Fig. 1; Pastoureau 174).

During the early modern period, bear-baiting was a means by which the bear was tamed and brought into cultural spaces. The bear provided entertainment; for example, if it was not in the bear garden, tied to a stake to be mauled by dogs, it was in the marketplace, chained and muzzled, forced to dance and perform acrobatic tricks (Pastoureau 171). According to Fudge, during the early modern period, animals of the bear garden are rarely considered as living, breathing entities; instead, the animal “is always a symbol of something else” ("Contexts" 13). For Thomas Dekker, the “Beares, or the Buls fighting with the dogs

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57 Many of the descriptive elements of this tale echo Robert Laneham’s description of the bear in his report of bear-baiting, which I discuss in part three of this chapter. For example, Brun is described as “scratching” and “tumbling” (n. pag.). And, when he manages to free his head from the tree, he loses the skin of his head, and his ears: “blood trickled down his face, he groaned, sighed, and drew his breath so short, as if his last houre had been expiring” (n. pag.).
was a lively representation … of poore men going to lawe with rich and mightie” (sigs. B1r–v). Using examples from works like Dekker’s, Fudge demonstrates how the violence of the bear garden “served an important ideological purpose in early modern society” (“Contexts” 6). The bears and dogs of a bear-baiting “are a representation of the spectator’s humanity,” and as representations, they do little to destabilise human essentialism (“Contexts” 180): “Nature must be rationalised here and a narrative must be created in order that such a rationalisation can take place: the bear becomes the symbol of the oppressor/the oppressed” (180). The representational status of animals is, I would argue, a territorialisation, which reduces an animal’s “Wildness” or affective potential (Bennett 2). In addition, it is possible to suggest that the personalised names of the bears of early modern English baiting is a further, Oedipal, territorialisation. In Bull, Beare, Horse (1638), John Taylor describes how bears were given names like “Robin Hood”, and “Ned of Canterbury,” and Nick Somogyi notes the “celebrity” status of three bears in particular, which rivalled that of actors of the period: “George Stone,” “Harry Hunks,” and “Sackerson” (61; 100).

While Fudge argues for the symbolic and analogical status of the animal in the context of the early modern period, I contend that a transhistorical and molecular reading need not be confined to analogical systems. Instead, we might consider, for example, how report of a bear-baiting in 1609 by John Stow and Edmond Howes in The Annales, Or General Chronicle of England (1615) opens up the potential for an affective animal alternative—an alternative in which animals demonstrate their status as autonomous living beings through non-action. In their report, Stow and Howes describe how in 1609, English authorities condemned to death by baiting a “fierce Beare, which had kild a child” (895). The animals chosen to perform this killing were lions. According to Stow and Howes, in this baiting, neither the bears nor the lions attacked one another; indeed, the symbolically “brave”
lions, “skipt up and downe, and fearefully fled from the Beare” (896). Instead of being territorialised Oedipal or State animals, which either act-out human desires, or function as symbols of brute strength and ferociousness, or a representation of the law (the lions) against wildness (the bear), the animals of the baiting, the bear and lions, have an affective capacity (Fudge, “Two Ethics” 109). To use Bruno Latour’s word, the animals are “actants” exerting their autonomy through non-action and by working contrary to human desire (237).

According to Latour, an actant is “any entity that modifies another entity in a trial,” and whose “competence is deduced from [its] performance” rather than, to use Bennett’s words, “posited in advance of the action” (237; Vibrant viii). Berger’s work on zoo animals helps to develop the idea of animal actants, and the tendency for typological oscillations. For example, Berger notes how the “responses” of zoo animals “have been changed” through being “isolated from each other and without interaction” (25). These animals “have become entirely dependent on their keepers” (Berger 25). Berger’s zoo animal is a territorialised (State or Oedipal) animal whose bodily movements have been conditioned by the keepers. Like many readings of the early modern bear, the zoo animal is no longer a Thoreauean “Wildness,” but is instead enclosed within the territory of the human—a territory physically manifested by the cages and bars which surround it (Bennett 2). Yet Berger’s example discloses an important element of Deleuzian types: the capacity for affective “lines of flight” to escape enclosed territories. Zoo animals, for example, assert their autonomy by refusing to act for us, in line with our desires: for the children who visit the zoo, the animals “appear, for the most part, unexpectedly lethargic and dull” (Berger 23). But, “[w]hat do you expect?” Berger asks. The animal “is not a dead object you have come to look at, it’s alive. It’s leading its own life. Why should this coincide with its being properly visible?” (24). When animals

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58 For a full account of the baiting, which includes the non-cooperation of other animals like horses and dogs, see Stow and Howes, pages 895-96.

59 While I read the lethargy of zoo animals affirmatively—that is, as a reminder of the animal’s autonomy and thus a reminder of our need to respect this—Berger reads zoo animals’ lethargy through an anthropocentric
stop working for humans they become Heideggerian “things,” which, independent of the human, are able to “look back” (Bennett, Vibrant 117). In other words, animals are affective actants, which have efficacy, the ability to “do things, ... produce effects, alter the course of events” (Bennett, Vibrant viii, italics in original). In Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of Chandos and the rats, we began to observe the potential of affective animals to destabilise human identity. In a Deleuzian reading of William Faulkner’s tale The Bear, the implications of encounters with animal actants and the affective animal gaze become even more apparent. While Faulkner’s text is not an early modern work, I briefly turn to it to suggest the transhistoricity of the affective animal gaze. In doing so, I challenge Berger’s assertion of the rupture which exists between humans and animals from the nineteenth century.

In my reading of Faulkner’s text, the bear is an affective animal, and the gaze between bear and human precipitates an experience of becoming-animal. Like the gaze that passes between the rats and Chandos, for Ike, Faulkner’s young hunter, the virtual gaze of the bear has a destabilising effect on his material being. Ike knew “that the bear was looking at him” but for some time, “he never saw it” (261). His admission, “So I will have to see him ... I will have to look at him,” gestures to an awareness of the risk that gazing upon the bear poses to his human identity (Faulkner 262, italics in original). This destabilisation is akin to that which Deleuze and Guattari locate in the work of Heinrich von Kleist. According to Deleuze and Guattari, Kleist “is fascinated by bears” (ATP 313). For Kleist, bears “are impossible to fool because their cruel little eyes see through appearances to the true ‘soul of movement,’ … or non-subjective affect” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 313). In a Deleuzian reading of Faulkner, the gaze of the bear draws Ike into a zone of proximity in which his human territory is

framework. Instead of seeing the animal as an entity which reminds us of its autonomy through non-cooperation, he reads it anthropocentrically, from a human perspective, stating that even if the animal were in front of us, we would not be able to see it because we are “looking at something which has been rendered absolutely marginal” (124).

60 For more on the difference between “objects” and “things,” see Brown’s essay “Thing Theory.”

61 Faulkner’s work is often cited in ecocritical commentary. See, for example, Sanders’s discussion of Faulkner’s The Bear, 190.
deterritorialised by the transmission of affects, those “prepersonal intensities,” which are bodily, experiential, and which “imply... an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” (Massumi, “Notes” xv). Through the gaze of the animal, Ike is shown a “snapshot of the flux,” or Bergson’s duration, that “irreversible succession of heterogeneous states melting into one another and flowing in invisible process” (Douglass 19). Ike’s reluctance to look at the bear can therefore be explained by the shock that comes from the way in which flows of becoming—processes or movements in which “the individual body is reabsorbed in the universal interaction of matter”—challenge the stability of human identity and claims of human essentialism (Powell 66).

In each of these examples, animals “look back.” However, they also demonstrate the broad and malleable conception of “looking” in the Deleuzian framework I employ. “Looking” is not restricted to the physical organ of the eye, since such a conception is a territorialisation which excludes entities on the basis of molar form; for example, if a thing does not have eyes, it can neither gaze nor affect. Instead, as posited in Bennett’s Vibrant Matter, humans, animals, and things all radiate powers. Therefore, the world is able to “look back [at us] even if we are not ‘seen’ by it in any anthropomorphic sense,” even if there is not a “locking of eyes” (Biernoff 87, italics in original). Ike, for example, encounters the “look” of the bear both virtually and in reality. And, in the examples of the 1609 baiting and Berger’s zoo animals, the returned gaze is constituted by the non-cooperation, and therefore the efficacy and autonomy, of the animals. In the third part of this discussion, I develop the affective potential of the non-anthropomorphic “look” in the context of the theatre.

1.3 Theatrical Gaze: Actants and Packs

In turning to the theatre, I want to test the Deleuzian framework of vision, affects, and becomings in a human-to-human encounter. I intend to argue that in Macbeth’s reference to bear-baiting in the final scene of Shakespeare’s Macbeth (1611), the ability to “look back”
plays an important role in opening up the potential for becomings. I begin by exploring Macbeth’s relation to the bear as a State animal. I then consider the ways in which early modern parallels between the theatre and bear-baiting give Macbeth’s allusion to baiting a metatheatrical quality. Macbeth’s metatheatrical allusions encourage us to read him and the relational bear as actants which actively and affectively “look back” at the spectator. Through his affective gaze, Macbeth draws spectators into the play, and through an association with bear-baiting, encourages their becoming-dog.

In Act 5, scene 7, Macbeth laments: “They have tied me to a stake: I cannot fly, / But, bear-like I must fight the course” (1-2). This simile describes the predicament in which Macbeth finds himself. Alone, Macbeth is trapped in his castle, surrounded by the English, and faces likely death. During the early modern period, literary texts frequently represent the bear as both courageous and as a victim. For example, in The historie of foure-footed beastes (1658), Edward Topsell contends, “Great is the fiercenes of a beare, as appeareth by holie scripture” (43). Similarly, John Taylor claims, “For whoso’ere comes thither, most and least, / May see and learne some courage from a Beast” (59). Writers use the association between bears and courage to increase the reader’s sympathy for the human victims depicted. In his essay on the use of bear-baiting in Shakespeare’s works, Stephen Dickey notes that as a “literary image” bear-baiting “offer[s] the writer” a straightforwardly heroic scenario of a lone defender who, though more powerful than any single antagonist, is both outnumbered by his assailants and hindered from using his full powers. This is essentially how Octavius wants to depict himself when he agrees to join with Antony before Philippi: ‘Let us do so; for we

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62 For a discussion of bears and humans in early modern literature, see Paster’s Humoring the Body, especially page 146.
are at the stake, / And bay’d about with many enemies” \( (\textit{Julius Caesar}, 4.1.48-49) \).

Alongside the example of Octavius, Dickey also gives the example of Macbeth-as-victim.\(^6\)

To understand how the trope of victimised bear works for Macbeth, it is helpful to look to the representation of bear-baiting in Thomas Nashe’s \textit{Unfortunate Traveller} (1594). Nashe offers a more sustained comparison between a group of humans and bears, and helps us to see how reading Macbeth’s simile through the trope of victimisation is a molar relation which maintains human and animal separation. Like Macbeth, Wilton uses bear-baiting as a simile. Wilton, who had originally “displayed hostility toward the rebellious Anabaptists,” likens their violent slaughter to the baiting of a bear (Paster 148):

\begin{quote}
Pittiful and lamentable was their unpitied and well performed slaughter. To see even a Beare (which is the most cruellest of all beasts) too bloudily overmatcht, and deformedly rent in peeces by an unconsionable number of curres, it woulde move compassion against kinde, and make those that beholding him at the stake yet uncoapte with, wisht him a suitable death to his ugly shape, now to recall their hard hearted wishes, and moan him suffering as a mild beast, in comparison of the foule mouthed mastifes his butchers …
\end{quote}

Paster contends that “[j]ust as sympathetic spectators at a bear-baiting revise their placement of the bear on an axis of cruelty, displacing cruelty from the bear to the dogs, so the narrator revises his judgment of the Anabaptists” (148). According to Paster, this example evokes a

\(^{63}\) In Shakespeare’s play, Macbeth is not a “typical” victim; however, as Darlene Farabee argues, audience members share a type of sympathetic identification with his character because, like Macbeth, we are the only ones to see Banquo’s ghost. See Farabee, pages 137-60.
“cross-current of feeling between bears and human victims” (147). The extremity of the violence inflicted on the victims (bear and Anabaptists) “woulde,” according to Wilton, “move compassion against kinde” (66). However, while it is possible to read a degree of sympathetic relation between Wilton and the bear, and by extension the readers of his story and the bear, I suggest that this is largely a sentimental moral effect created by the relationship between bears and victims. Rather than proximity, Nashe’s text creates distance between the bear and reader through the use of the conditional mood—for example, “to see even a Bear,” and “woulde” in the middle of the passage (66)—together with overtly emotive language.

In The Unfortunate Traveller and Macbeth, the bear is a Deleuzian State animal which is employed for a specific purpose: to either draw on its courage, or to evoke sympathy from the spectator through a moral association with victimisation. In Nashe’s work and Shakespeare’s play, the molecular lines of the bear and its capacity to “look back” have been “colonised” by molar lines which “territorialise” and “frame” the animals inside specific relations (Ingold, Lines 2).

Berger’s work on caged zoo animals is a modern analogue to this linear and affective “colonisation.” It also reminds us of the visual restrictions imposed by this type of human and animal relation. In relations between human and territorialised animals—State and Oedipal,

[a]nimals are always the observed. The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance. They are the objects of our ever-extending knowledge. What we know about them, is an index of our power, and thus an index of what separates us from them.

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64 Paster notes how in early modern literature, what we would now label, the “biological” and the “moral” frequently and “easily” intersect: “ostensibly neutral biological discourses mix with the overdeterminations of Aesopian moral discourse” (Paster 144).

65 For example, “compassion against kinde,” “hard hearted wishes,” and, “moan him suffering.”

66 In Lines, Ingold writes that “[c]olonialism ... is not the imposition of linearity upon a non-linear world, but the imposition of one kind of line on another. It proceeds first by converting the paths along which life is lived into boundaries in which it is contained” (2). Additionally, according to Berger, the zoos of the nineteenth century were “an endorsement of colonial power” (21).
Yet, unlike the example from Nashe, in *Macbeth* the “bear” of the simile does “look back.” In order to explain how this is so, it is necessary to contextualise Macbeth’s reference to bear-baiting within the practices of early modern entertainment. According to Dickey, during the early modern period, bear-baiting and drama were “culturally isomorphic” (255). And in “Contexts of Bear-Baiting,” Fudge writes that “in later descriptions [of bear-baiting], the entertainment offered in the Paris Garden (this name continued to be used after the original structure was replaced by the Hope Theatre in 1614) became more like a circus” (171). Animals became “actors” in a larger performance. 67 Therefore, Macbeth’s lines were originally delivered to an audience “accustomed not just to bearbaiting matches but, in particular, to witnessing them in structures that are architecturally similar to, and socially synonymous with, the Globe” (Dickey 264-65; Fig. 2). 68

Given this “cultural isomorphism,” Macbeth’s allusion, “would be, for his first audience, every bit as metatheatrical” as his reference to the theatre in act five, scene five (Dickey 264 n.42):

> Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
> And then is heard no more. It is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> Signifying nothing.

(5.5.24-28)

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67 Or, according to Lupold von Wedel in 1584, in a “play,” which also included “fireworks, and showers of fruit” (455).

68 Höfele notes how Hollar’s well-known misnomer of the Hope Theatre and the Globe Theatre in his depiction of the “Long View” of London, published in Amsterdam in 1647, is the result of the architectural similarity of the two buildings. For more information on architectural similarity, see Höfele, pages 3-12. For earlier works on the same subject, see Shapiro’s “The Bankside Theatres: Early Engravings,” specially page 34; and Braine’s argument in *Site of the Globe*, 57-60.
Considered through this metatheatrical lens, “this simile registers Macbeth’s bitter awareness that he has become a beast whose sole function is to perform in the spectacle of his own execution” (Dickey 264-65). Like the 1609 child-killing bear, mentioned in part two of this chapter, Macbeth is condemned to die “upon a stage” (Dickey 260). The effect of the metatheatrical reference to bear-baiting, one among a cluster of allusions in the final two scenes of the play, is that Macbeth demonstrates his awareness of the spectator’s gaze and his capacity to return it.\(^{69}\) Again, like the 1609 bear, he is an actant who surprises us with an affective gaze, rather than playing out a script we are accustomed to and which we expect. To reiterate, like affective animals, an actant is “any entity that modifies another entity in a trial” (237). Therefore, instead of being a passive object, Macbeth is active and his gaze challenges the binary of active spectator/passive object or actor, as well as the boundaries of the text. Unlike the 1609 bear, Macbeth asserts his efficacy through movement; each of the metatheatrical references evokes an act of “looking.” To demonstrate how this movement draws the spectator into a zone of proximity, I turn to Robert Laneham’s report of bear-baiting in his 1575 Letter.\(^{70}\)

In Laneham’s text, the dichotomy of active observer/passive object is challenged by the kinaesthetic quality of the event and of the writing.\(^{71}\) In his letter, Laneham describes bear-baiting as a “sport most pleasant.” It is a “goodly reléef”

\[t]o sée the bear with hiz pink nyez léering after hiz enmiez approach, the
nimbleness & wayt of the dog too take hiz avauntage, and the fors & experiens of
the bear agayn to avoyd the assauts : if he wear bitten in one place, how he woold

\(^{69}\)For example, “Roman fool,” “juggling fiends,” and the “monster,” which will “be the show and gaze o’the time” (5.8.1, 19, 25, 24). During the early modern period, juggling described magic, trickery, and deception (OED, juggling, n. a. and b.). For more on early modern juggling, see Owens, 115-123.


\(^{71}\)This moment comes as a kinaesthetic disruption to human and animal distance created by the law conceit Laneham employs in his Letter. For more on this, see Bach, 25-26.
Lambert 62

In this example, the bear’s mobility and its ability to parry the blows of the dogs, draws the reader/spectator into an affective relationship with the animal. After the initial infinitive “[t]o see,” we encounter a series of present participles, like “byting,” “clawying,” “roring,” and “tossing & tumbling,” which capture the motion of the event and draw us into the affective movements of the baiting. Unlike Nashe’s text, in which the moral function of the bear creates a distance between spectators and the event, here we are virtually drawn into the text. We can read the difference in the human and animal relation in Nashe’s and Laneham’s texts as one of contemplation versus embodiment. While the bear-baiting in Nashe’s text is a distanced, moral effect, Laneham’s work produces an immediate and bodily encounter. Like the physical “tossing & tumbling” of Laneham’s report of bear-baiting, we find a similar bodily relation, and potentially, the “molecular dance” of becoming, in Kleist’s nineteenth-century description of a battle with a bear (Laneham 17; Deleuze and Guattari, K 11):

I went at him with my foil; the bear made a slight movement of his paw and parried the blow. I tried to throw him off guard by feints—the bear did not stir. I went at him again with a renewed burst of energy; without a doubt I would have

In my thesis I use the more familiar term “embodiment.” However, prominent animal studies scholar Ralph Acampora states that he “refrains” from using this term, finding that “like ‘incarnation,’ such a word invites dualistic interpretations” that he “wishes to avoid” (Corporal 135-6 n.9). Instead, he favours the word “bodiment” when talking about “substantive or phenomenal bodily reality” (Corporal xiv).

72 In K, Deleuze and Guattari use the phrase “molecular dance” (11). Despite her critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, Haraway also uses the metaphor of dance for relations between bodies: in the locking of the gazes between humans and animals “all the actors become who they are in the dance of relating” (When Species 25). In a different context, the phrase is also used by B. Crandall in the book Nanotechnology. He writes that “[a]ll life … consists of an intricate molecular dance… That these festivities give rise to ant colonies and peacocks, computers and geodes, … is both bizarre and wonderful” (193-194). For a discussion of this quotation, see Bennett’s Enchantment, 86-89.
struck the chest of a man. The bear made a slight movement of his paw and parried the blow. … Not only was the bear able to parry all my blows like some world champion fencer, but all the feints I attempted—and this no fencer in the world could duplicate—went unnoticed by the bear. Eye to eye, as if he could see into my very soul, he stood there, his paw raised ready for combat.

(25-26)74

In Laneham’s and Kleist’s human and bear encounters, the bear draws the human, either spectator or fighter, into an active and mobile proximity through a functional relation to dogs. At work in these texts, and as I will argue, in Macbeth, is a theatrical assemblage—a collection of heterogeneous parts—in which shared function encourages “lines of flight” into new territories, including becoming-dog.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, “becomings” can be occur through the “organism enter[ing] into composition with something else”: “the animal’s natural food”, or “its exterior relations with other animals; for example, “you can become-dog with cats” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 319, italics in original). In Macbeth, Laneham’s letter, and Kleist’s essay, the experience of becoming-dog is encouraged through an exterior relation to the bear. The “aggregate thus composed” between the organism and the “something else” results in an emission of particles, which in this case, are “canine as a function of the relation of movement and rest” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 319, italics in original). As Deleuze and Guattari argue, “you become animal only molecularly. You do not become a barking molar dog, but by barking, if it is done with enough feeling, with enough necessity and composition, you emit a molecular dog” (ATP 320). Between the spectators of the play/baiting and the dogs there is bodily alignment: “an inhumanity immediately experienced in the body” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 319, italics in original). The movements of motion

74 This quotation is spoken by Herr C. in Kleist’s “On the Marionette Theatre.”
and rest, speed and slowness create proximity between spectators and dogs; to use Kleist’s words “affectation appears ... when the soul (vis motrix) locates itself at any other point than the centre of gravity of the movement” (24).75

Humans and dogs frequently inhabited zones of proximity within early modern bear gardens. Writing in “a digest in a letter in Latin” in 1639, “Honest William”

[w]as much delighted to hear that his lordship had recently visited the bear garden ... There you may hear the shouting of men, the barking of dogs, the growling of the bears, and the bellowing of the bulls, mixed in a wild but natural harmony.

(Hotson 59)76

The “wild but natural harmony” of shouting and cheering crowds and barking dogs is acutely rendered in the early seventeenth-century tune, “Of All Jolly Pastimes,” which also attests to the pleasure crowds derived from the practice of animal-baiting.77 In this “curiously elliptical” song, there are instructions to fetch the dogs and have them “cry bow wow”

(Dickey 259; Consort Songs 91).78 The singers of this tune potentially enter into a zone of proximity with the dogs of the baiting through their onomatopoeic cries. These cries create an

75 Hutton defines vis motrix as “moving force” of a body (568). He writes that the “followers of Leibniz”—like Deleuze and Guattari—“use the term vis motrix for the force of a body in motion, in the same sense as the Newtonians use the term vis inertiae” (568).
76 Quoted in Leslie Hotson’s The Commonwealth and the Restoration Stage, 59.
77 The animal-baiting in this song is “bull-baiting.” According to Dickey, descriptions of “the audience’s pleasure and ‘good contentment’ are sounded persistently” in texts from the early modern period (257): “in May of 1586, the Danish ambassador was given ... afternoon entertainment: “for upon a green, verie spatious and large, where thousands might stand and behold with good contentment, there beare-baiting, and bule-baiting (tempered with other merie disports) were exhibited; whereat it cannot be spoken of what pleasure the people took” (Nichols 67-68). Though, the sport was not unanimously enjoyed. Critics of animal-baitings included Phillip Stubbes, and William Perkins. However, frequently the objection rested on the grounds of endangering the human soul, rather than compassion for the animal. See Fudge’s “Contexts,” 8-10.
78 This song is found in Consort Songs, 91, and is quoted in Dickey, 257.

Of all the jolly pastimes good fellows do use,
Bull-baiting is best, I like it to choose.
And here cometh my dog, and hold thy own, my dog,
And then cry bow wow, and then cry bow wow.
And this is baiting of the bull,
A sport that pleaseth to the full:
Who likes it not let him go to fedge,
And seek his game at Coleman hedge.
aural proximity which challenges the narrative of the bear garden as a site of human domination; instead, in midst of the bear garden’s wild harmony, it is difficult to distinguish what is human and what is animal (Fig. 3). ⁷⁹

As well as vocal alignment in the practice of bear-baiting, humans and dogs were associated through function. For example, if a bear was “sufficiently incapacitated, like the blind bear,” it was likely to have “a future sharing the pit with human rather than canine tormentors” (Dickey 256 n.7). ⁸⁰ The “blind bear” which Dickey refers to here is “Monsieur Hunks.” In 1609 Thomas Dekker “supplied a gruelling account” of an encounter between Hunks and humans in the Paris Garden:

[A] blinde Beare was tyed to the stake, and in stead of baiting him with dogges, a company of creatures that had the shapes of men, & faces of Christians ... tooke the office of Beadles upon them, and whipt monsieur Hunkes till the blood ran down his old shoulders.

(⁷⁹ Bodily confusion is depicted in C. Walter Hodges twenty-first century drawing of the bear garden (Fig. 3). In this picture, members of the crowd and dogs are both bundles of lines; while, the bear in the foreground is a defined figure.

⁸⁰ While above I suggest that the bear is a State rather than affective animal upon whom Macbeth draws for associations of “courage” and “strength,” it may be possible to read Macbeth’s relation to the bear through subversive and affective molecular “lines of flight.” Firstly, as Steve Baker writes, entities enter into “becomings” to “do” things (133). Thus, Macbeth may be picking up on a “line of flight” proposed by the bear. Often, bears were not killed in a baiting; instead, as Macduff and Macbeth’s exchange 5.8.23-29 demonstrates, they were prized object of “entertainment” kept for the “rabble.” Therefore, bear-wardens frequently stepped-into the baiting to protect the bear. Secondly, we focus our studies on the aural dimension of the play to suggest an experience of “becoming-bear.” Towards the end of the play, there is increasing aural resonance of the word “bear.” Throughout the play there are thirteen uses of the word, and from these, Macbeth utters six of these (three in the final act), just over 46%; Ross 1.3.98, Angus, 1.3.110, Lady Macbeth 1.5.63, Macbeth 3.1.119 (bare-fac’d), Macbeth 3.5.8, Hecate 3.5.8, Macbeth 4.1.134, Malcolm (“o’erbear) 4.3.64, Macbeth 5.3.9, Malcolm (bear’t) 5.4.5, Macbeth 5.7.2, Macduff 5.7.19, Macbeth 5.7.43. Five of the uses occur in the final act. Prior to the final act, Macbeth only uses the word “bear” twice (3.1.119, 3.4.101). Finally, there is also a functional connection between the blind bear and Macbeth as a, perhaps, “tragic figure,” whose harmartia is an error in judgement, or a failure to “see.”

(B1⁴-B2⁶)
Like the company members of the Paris Garden, members of the audience frequently whipped Hunks (Somogyi 112). Audience participation was both voluntary and involuntary: the blind bear, Hunks, was renowned for breaking from his chain, crossing the physical barriers of the bear garden, and causing havoc among the crowd in a visible manifestation of the molecular “crossings” I have been suggesting in my study of Macbeth’s metatheatrical allusions (Dickey 256). The blindness of Hunks may appear to trouble my suggestion that his breaking of the chains is an act of “looking back”; however, Hunks’s blindness and, indeed, the general opinion of the period that bears were “much subject to blindnesse of the eyes,” makes little difference to the affective looking I have been developing over the course of this chapter (Topsell 39). “Looking,” as I have developed it in this chapter, is not restricted to a specific organ of the organism, but instead describes the capacity of a body to produce and transmit affects.

In this section, I have taken what to modern readers might appear to be a straightforward simile, and have read it within the cultural and historical contexts of bear-baiting in early modern England. For audiences of this period, the practices of drama and bear-baiting are closely aligned. This alignment gives Macbeth’s reference to “bear-baiting” in the final scene of Shakespeare’s play a metatheatrical quality and moves it beyond figurative language; Macbeth is an actant whose “affective gaze,” like the 1609 bear’s and Faulkner’s bear’s, “looks back.” Macbeth’s “looking back” draws attention to the relationship

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81 Nick de Somogyi notes how the audience whipping the bear is reported by the German tourist Hentzner in 1598 and Thomas Dekker in 1609 (112 n.25). See also Chambers, 456.
82 For an exploration of spectators and packs in a different context, see Dickey, 265-275, and R. Berry, 118. Both Dickey and Berry explore Malvolio’s “I’ll be revenge’d on the whole pack of you” in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night (5.1.378). While Dickey draws attention to a possible “philological objection” to the equation of “packs” of spectators and “packs” of animals (since the OED dates the first use of pack as “group of animals” to 1648, almost fifty years after Shakespeare composed Twelfth Night), he nonetheless agrees with Berry’s reading, which imagines Malvolio “surrounded on three (or all sides) by tiers of spectators, who are still perhaps jeering at him, and turns on his heel through at least 180 degrees to take in ‘the whole pack of you.’ That way the house, not merely the stage company, is identified with the ‘pack’” (Dickey 265; Berry 118).
83 Höfele argues that “the more Shakespearean drama became detached from its original semiosphere”—that is London with the Globe Theatre, the Bear Garden, and Tyburn—“the more the human-animal correspondences became, in a way they had not been before, just figurative” (231).
between the spectator and actor in a theatrical setting that closely parallels that of baitings in
the Paris Garden. Macbeth’s functional alignment with the bear as actant evokes a
comparison between the “English” who surround him—both as characters and spectators—
and the dogs of a baiting. In addition, the proximity between packs of dogs and spectators,
which is created vocally through cheering/barking, opens onto the potential for becomings.
Macbeth’s reference to bear-baiting and his metatheatrical gaze in the final scene of Macbeth
open onto the possibility for us, the spectators, to become the “curs” and “foul-mouthed
mastiffs” that “cancel and tear [him] to pieces” (Nashe 285; Mac. 3.2.49).84

The studies and examples within this chapter are “glimmers” of possibility, “thought
experiments,” or “drawn threads [which] invariably leave trailing ends that will, in their turn,
be drawn into other knots with other threads” and will be “loose ends for others to follow and
take in any ways they wish” (Ingold, Lines 169-70). In addition, by drawing attention to
similarities between early modern visceral vision and the Deleuzian concept of becoming, I
contest Berger’s idea of an irremediable rupture between humans and animals. While they
may be faint, or even “ghostly,” molecular lines of relation still thread through trans-species
encounters today.85 Through a perceptual shift, we might pick up this molecular line of
thought and (re)thread it through our twenty-first century approaches to human and animal
relations. In the following chapter, the shared corporeality of humans and animals comes to
occupy a “central place” in my attention, and, again, in contrast to Berger, I will argue that
the “parallel lives” of humans and animals are lines which intersect at the level of “meat”—a
proximity which involves, but is not only, “death” (Berger 4).

84 This “playing the pack” also occurs in a “violent human re-enactment of a bear-baiting at the Fortune
playhouse in 1612” in which “butchers’ playing dogs beat a man wearing a bear’s skin (Somogyi 110). See
Rowlands, F4. And, as Somogyi notes, in Bartholomew fayre (1614), Ben Jonson mentions “fellow i’the bear’s
skin” (3.4.149-50).
85 In Lines, Ingold writes that “it is possible to think of the line in a sense that is more visionary and
metaphysical” (47). Ingold writes, however, that “[s]ome kinds of ghostly line, ... can have very real
consequences for people’s movements” (49).
Figures

Fig. 1. Image from *The Most Delectable History of Reynard the Fox*. London, 1656. n. pag.

Fig. 2. Map of London in *Civitates Orbis Terrarum*, published by G. Braun and F. Hogenberg (Cologne, 1572). Reprinted in Hӧfele, 5.

Fig. 3. Bear Baiting at the Paris Garden. Twenty-first century drawing by C. Walter Hodges, from *Shakespeare Out Loud* <http://www.shakespeareoutloud.ca/>, Web. 10 Jun. 2014.
Chapter 2: “Subversive Somatology”: Deleuzian “Meat” and Human and Animal Bodies of the Early-Modern Hunt

Introduction

In the thirteenth-century English lyric “A Springtide Song of the Redemption,” the mutilated and butchered body of a stag is used to convey the physical suffering of Christ. Christ is drawn, or cut in pieces, like the deer slain in the chase: “he was to-drawe, / so dur islawe / in chace” (Egerton 58-60 in Brown 110). The lyric’s symbolic employment of the stag and stag hunt is consistent with the representation of animal bodies in classical and medieval literature. In “Animal Signs and Ethical Significance,” Tobias Menely argues that in renaissance poetry the stag is often employed as “a stand-in for Christ or monarch” (n. pag.). In this chapter, I shift my focus from such analogical and symbolic readings of human and animal bodies, to readings which attend to somatic continuity between humans and animals. Recognition of somatic continuity is a distinct feature of the representations of hunting during the early modern period and, to use Ralph Acampora’s words, is a “subversive somatology” that challenges categorical distinctions between humans and animals (Corporal 144). This chapter is an exercise in imaginative and creative literary investigation which considers the ethical grounds of our relations with animals. As noted in the Introduction, thinkers have begun to consider the ecological and moral consequences of anthropocentric thinking. One product of these meditations is the rise of trans-human ethical systems (Acampora, Corporal xiv). Yet, individuals like Cary Wolfe and Acampora have criticised

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86 Matthew Cartmill reads it thus: “He was toodrawe [cut in pieces] / So deer y-slawe [slain] / In chase.”
87 In classical times, the deer often symbolises cowardice. In the medieval period, perhaps as a result of “the increasing restriction of deer-hunting privileges to the aristocracy,” the stag underwent a “symbolic elevation ... to noble status” (Cartmill 68). For a detailed exploration of the changing representation of the deer, see Cartmill 67-8.
the humanist tendencies of these systems. Acampora argues, for example, that trans-human ethical systems, like “animal rights,” “elevate’ nonhuman beings into our still all-too-humanist sphere of moral concern, often by drawing attention to the ‘higher’ (i.e., humanoid) mental capacities of other organisms” (“Toward” 235). This is problematic because “the human being” is still at the centre of the relation. In addition, this type of ethical system promotes and reinforces humanism and hierarchy because the scope of our moral extension is restricted to animals we understand as psychologically akin to us—that is, animals that demonstrate advanced mental capacities. In order to “shed anthropocentric hierarchy,” it is therefore necessary to shift the grounds of relation from the “psychocentric” to the somatic (Acampora, Corporal 4). This shift moves us from anthropocentric separation and superiority, to recognition of the “live body [a]s the primary locus of existential commonality between human animals and other organisms” (Acampora, “Toward” 236). Following Acampora, my work is not intended to “justify” “transhuman morality” (Acampora, Corporal 1). Instead, I intend these literary studies to contribute to the idea that an understanding or “corporeal compassion” between species is necessary for the “rational” exercise of developing animal ethics (Acampora, “Toward” 241).

In this chapter, I use Deleuze’s affective concept of “meat” to suggest proximity between humans and animals in early modern English hunting literature. I want to argue that Deleuzian meat encourages one to attend to the carnality and vulnerability he or she shares with the natural world. Throughout this chapter, I explore how meat allows us to consider alternatives to reading animals through symbolism and essentialism—lenses which,

89 See Wolfe’s Animal Rites, for discussions of humanism and ethics, and Acampora’s works Corporal, 4-6, and “Toward,” 235.
90 In this chapter, I use varied terminology to describe experiences of proximity and affective and corporeal encounters between humans and animals. Acampora’s Corporal has a similarly “rich lexicon,” which includes, for example, the neologism of “symphysis” (xv). He writes however, that if his discussion of body-based ethics “appears to indulge terminology overmuch, the reader would be well advised to heed another contemporary body-thinker’s warning that,” because “corporeality is inherently difficult to discuss,” any worthwhile treatment must “unsettle familiar distinctions and stretch our conceptual vocabulary” (Acampora xv, citing Tambornino 10).
I will argue, are territorial and consequently involve a demarcation between human and animal. As noted in the Introduction, meat for Deleuze is an affective and spatio-corporeal concept. Inspired by the fleshy bodies which populate the twenty-first century painter Francis Bacon’s work, Deleuze argues that meat is not “dead flesh”; rather, it is “a mass of ambulating flesh” which “retains all the sufferings and assumes all the colors of living flesh” (FB 24, 23; Figs. 4-6). “Suffering” destabilises human and animal boundaries because, according to Deleuze, “the man who suffers is a beast, the beast that suffers is a man”; thus, “every man who suffers is a piece of meat” (FB 25, 23). Meat is a “common zone of man and the beast, their zone of indiscernibility” but it also involves “delightful invention, colour, and acrobatics” despite “manifest[ing] ... convulsive pain and vulnerability” (Deleuze, FB 23).

Deleuze’s conceptual development of meat is limited to a six-page chapter in The Logic of Sensation; however, such minimal treatment allows me to develop it alongside and through early modern examples, as well as contemporary work on corporal compassion by thinkers like Acampora, Vinciane Despret, and Rane Willerslev. In this chapter, meat is a conceptual body which takes on the specific relations of movement and rest, and speed and slowness, of different sections within this chapter. Thus, rather than “applying” a specific concept to early modern representations of human and stag encounters, I create a dynamic relationship between methodology and material by modifying Spinoza to ask, “what can meat do?” The implications of this approach are twofold. This chapter offers a literary contribution to the project of defining and promoting a somatically-grounded trans-species ethics. As well as this, it expands on Deleuze’s theorising of meat to suggest the concept can be employed as an affective tool for reading proximity and continuity in the literary representations of human and animal bodies. To do this, I take a different approach to Acampora’s study of corporeal compassion as “sharing with somebody else a live nexus” of

91 Acampora distinguishes between the more broadly employed term “ethos,” and the more theoretical “ethics” (xv).
experience, instead using Deleuzian meat to test out the affective potential and somatic
grounding of textual human and animal relations (“Toward” 238).

In part one, I use the affective quality of Deleuzian meat to suggest an alter-reading to
the symbolic stag of Margaret Cavendish’s poem “The Hunting of the Stag” (1653). While it
is possible to read the animal as a symbol for the human—generally, and specifically as
Charles I—the proliferation of italicised body parts throughout the poem, and the metrical
disruptions towards the end of it, transmit affects which trouble categorical distinctions
between human and animal. Affective transmissions create a “meating place” between
reader and stag, which forces the reader to recognise that because of her body, she is always
already “in sync” with animals (Acampora, “Toward” 242). I contextualise Cavendish’s
poem within a growing body of works in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which
critique the practice of hunting. Matthew Cartmill argues that in this period “sobbing deer ...
are subversive creatures, whose plaints are intended to cast doubt on the legitimacy of
established hierarchies,” such as human over animal (90-91). In my study of Cavendish’s
text, I aim to demonstrate that “one continually passes from one [plane] to the other”
(Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 314). We will see, for example, the potential for the
anthropocentric territorialisation of affects when humans begin to “interpret” animals.

Tobias Menely (2006) describes animal affects as “signs” of suffering, arguing that
“tears” and “moans” create “affective communication” and “interspecies community”
between the humans and animals (n. pag.). In a Deleuzian framework, the vocabulary of
“signs” and “signifiers” is problematic because it subordinates affect to the larger structure of
the organism: the affects are precursors to coherent and conventional emotions. This

92 For a symbolic reading, see Carson “The Hunted Stag.”
93 I am aware of the debates surrounding the demarcation of affect and interpretation. Rather than distinguishing
between affect and interpretation, I have attempted to gesture to the mutual affectability of the concepts, and
their associated planes of organisation and immanence with Deleuze and Guattari’s quotation. For more on this
issue, see Leys, and Wetherell. I will return to this topic in the Conclusion of this thesis.
vocabulary frames the animal as an expressive and signifying body, or object, which can be read or interpreted by the human. As Robert McKay argues, “the reader wants to make meaning but cannot without exhibiting his or her own desire to know, a desire that constructs the object of interpretation” (166). Put in alimentary terms, “the reader’s desire consume[s] the represented animal” (McKay 166). In contrast, I use Deleuzian meat to read affects as autonomous and immanent forces which encourage proximity between reader and textual stag.

In part two, I note how the development of the par force hunt, or hunting “by force,” was bound up with rituals and ceremonies documented and codified in hunting treatises. In these treatises, human bodies are conceived of as stable, while animal bodies are depicted as malleable. The “acrobatic” and “performative” quality of Deleuzian meat enables me to re-read territorialised relations between humans and animals in George Gascoigne’s The Noble Arte of Venerie (1575) and Shakespeare’s As You Like It (1599) as mobile and proximate spaces of interaction in which the human performance of animal bodies deterritorialises or “undo[es] the bounds” of the body (Baker 86). I begin by exploring the hunter’s mapping of the stag’s route in Gascoigne’s Noble Arte of Venerie. I will develop the performative element of Deleuzian meat through the work of Despret and Willerslev. Both Despret and Willerslev propose bodily “imitation”—a “human immersion in animal being” (Landry, Invention 35)—as a means of creating “partial affinity” with the animal (Despret 59). I also consider the potential for the performance of material “passions” to create zones of proximity between humans and stags. I look in particular at the well-known example of Jaques’s shared tears with the stag in Shakespeare’s As You Like It.

94 Sartre discusses the assimilative quality of reading practices. He writes, “the spidery mind trap[s] things in its web, cover[s] them with white spit and slowly swallow[s] them, reducing them to its own substance” (4). An alimentary analogue to this process is Leon Kass’s anthropocentric discussion of eating. According to Kass, eating discloses the hierarchical order of Creation: rather than becoming the “something” we eat, “the edible gets assimilated into what we are” (25). Cf. the early modern stag hunt where the stag’s (pharmacological) body parts confirm the wholeness of the human (Walker 336).
In part three, I consider how deterritorialisations involving violence and performance disturb the territory of essentialism. In particular, I draw on and develop meat’s relation to suffering. I explore how parallels between the “undoing” of the stag, which occurs at the end of the chase, and the rape, mutilation, and cannibalising of human bodies in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus* (1594), disrupt notions of essentialism. I argue that Demetrius and Chiron’s “breaking” of Lavinia’s body evokes the undoing of the stag which occurs at the end of the chase. I also consider human and animal substitutions and confusions in Titus’s processing of the bodies of Demetrius and Chiron, and Tamora’s unwitting cannibalisation of her sons. In this part, I demonstrate that meat is a deterritorialising force, which horizontalises relations between humans and animals. Like the animal, at any time, the human can become-meat.

In this chapter, the essentialist hunter enters the forest; however, after some Deleuzian intervention, the hunter who leaves is malleable, relational, and contingent. The shift from human essentialism to malleability and contingency is important for this chapter’s investigation of cross-species compassion. Deterritorialising the “human being” problematises the stable point of reference from which we typically orient our moral compass. It is no longer possible to base ethical inclusion on shared “humanoid” capacities like intelligence; instead, we are forced to develop new grounds of relation. Like Acampora, I will argue that these grounds are somatic, built on our shared carnality, or shared proximity of meat.

2.1 Reading: Symbols and Affects

According to Cartmill, “attacks on hunting started at the very beginning of the Northern Renaissance in the writings of Erasmus and Thomas More” (76). In *Praise of Folly* (1511), “Erasmus ridicule[s] the elaborate rituals of the medieval hunt, dismissing hunting as mere butchery and hunters as empty-headed, snobbish aristocrats,” who find nothing “so sweet as a beast being butchered” (Erasmus 53-54 in Cartmill 76-77). Similarly, Thomas More
describes the hunt as “butchery,” and describes with pity “a trapped hare thrown alive to a pack of hounds for the hunters’ entertainment cries out to condemn the human species” (Cartmill 77): “O stony-hearted race, more savage than any wild beast, to find cruel amusement in bitter murder!” (More 27). According to Cartmill, emerging critiques of the hunt are associated with the “erosion of power and prestige of the old landed aristocracy,” the rise of Protestantism, and the negative attitudes towards hunting expressed in “the literature of pagan antiquity,” a strong source of intellectual inspiration and influence for renaissance humanists (Cartmill 84-85). Cartmill argues that, above all, these critics were motivated by “a new skepticism about the place of human beings in the world” (87). For example, Michel Montaigne’s essays “Apology for Raymond Sebond” (1575-76, rev. 1578-80) and “Of Cruelty” (1578-1580) both express “doubts about man’s special status” (Cartmill 87). In “Of Cruelty,” Montaigne “refuses to acknowledge any important differences between people and other animals” (Cartmill 87). He challenges the idea that rational capacity distinguishes humans from animals, writing that “I find ... in many things ... my lust less depraved than my reason” (378). In one of the essay’s most powerful moments, Montaigne challenges the distinction between humans and animals by attending to somatic continuity, and thus shared carnal vulnerability and sensitivity, between species:

For myself, I have not been able without distress to see pursued and killed an innocent animal which is defenceless and does us no harm. And it commonly happens that the stag, feeling himself out of breath and strength, having no other remedy left, throws himself back and surrenders to ourselves who are pursuing him, asking for our mercy by his tears,

‘Bleeding, with moans / Like some imploring creature’ [Virgil]

95 According to Cartmill, More demonstrates antipathetic towards the hunt without calling it “downright immoral” (27).
96 For a more detailed discussion of this, see Cartmill 84-91.
that has always seemed to me a very unpleasant spectacle.

(“Cruelty” 383)

According to Montaigne, “there is some relationship between us and them, and some mutual obligation” (“Cruelty” 385). The animal communicates its suffering through the body: “even in beasts that have no voice” we discover “full and complete communication” in their bodies (“Apology” 402). Montaigne’s quotation of Virgil’s *Aeneid* expresses the affective quality of bodily communication. Virgil’s animal is visceral rather than symbolic. The word “bleeding” is isolated at the beginning of the sentence, forcing us to momentarily linger over the “flesh and blood” of the animal. In what follows, I look for the “flesh and blood” of the animal in Margaret Cavendish’s poem “The Hunting of the Stag” (1653). While critics like Carson suggest an analogical reading of Cavendish’s poem, in which the animal is “humanised” in an attempt to elicit sympathy, I want to argue that the human is “animalised” in an affective encounter with the poem. In this reading, I look at aspects of the work which come into contact with the reader’s body and stimulate involuntary physical reactions. Affects, according to Jon Clay, have “the power to connect the individual to that which is non-human” (69). I argue that contact with this non-human element is the proximity of meat: an intensive state of carnal vulnerability reached through and because of the body. I begin by briefly expounding Carson’s reading of Cavendish’s poem—including the connections she makes between Cavendish and John Denham—before gesturing to the points at which her work opens onto my own. This integrated discussion helps to reinforce the idea that symbolic and affective readings are not mutually exclusive but are instead always interrelated. Affective lines of flight emerge from within structures, like binaries and hierarchies, which govern the symbolic readings of these poems. Like the studies in my first chapter, we can draw together these lines to create affective alter-tales. Alter-tales of somatic continuity between humans and animals in early modern English hunting literature contribute to the “truly post-humanist
task of reappreciating bodily animacy” and establishing shared bodily animacy as grounds for cross-species compassion (Acampora, “Toward” 237).

Cavendish’s poem was published in the aftermath of King Charles I’s beheading in 1649. The context of the poem’s production is significant. Carson argues that because the monarchy had protected the aristocrats’ luxurious relationship with the forest, its demise was equated with the loss of a pastoral ideal (551). This loss gave rise to a tradition of literature which used the forest, and its inhabitants, as a setting for various political views and analogies—what Carson calls “Royalist Melancholy” (551).97 One of the best known poems within this tradition is John Denham’s Coopers Hill (1642 and 1655).98 Cavendish’s work draws heavily on the allegorical stag hunt in this poem, and so it is worth spending some time considering symbolism, stags, and corporeality in Denham’s text.

There are two versions of Denham’s poem, the 1642 “A” text, and the 1655 “B” text; however, both can be categorised as part of the tradition of “Royalist Melancholy” (O Hehir ix).99 According to O Hehir, it is important that criticism recognises the difference between the two versions of the poems. He argues that, “adopt[ing] the premise” that there is “only one ‘real’ text of Coopers Hill, namely the ‘B’ text,” “grossly misrepresents the textual facts, for there is virtually no line correspondence between the ‘B’ and ... the ‘A’ text” (ix, x). For O Hehir, “the ‘B’ text did not ‘evolve’ out of the ‘A’ text, but was basically the product of a single drastic and radical revision, designed to alter fundamentally the tenor of the poem” (xi). One of the differences which changes the “tenor of the poem” is the “B” text’s treatment

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97 For information on the demise of the forest and aristocratic melancholy, see Bowerbank 53-62.
98 Coopers Hill was first printed in 1642. Along with the redrafts of 1643 and 1650, this text is categorised by O Hehir as the “A” text (ix). O Hehir writes that “[i]n 1655 the poem was published again, but the text of that edition differed drastically from the ‘A’ text” (ix). O Hehir calls the 1655-1668 versions of the poem the “B” text (ix). Unless otherwise specified, the quotations and examples given throughout this chapter are from the 1655 “B” text.
99 While in the 1655 “B” text the stag is not referred to as “royal,” the preface to the poem, written by the anonymous “J.B,” introduces it as “that excellent Allegory of the Royall Stag.” O Hehir suggests “the Royall Stag” is a “verbal echo of the “A” text (line 265), and is possibly a “slip” on “J.B’s part, suggest[ing] he may have viewed the stag hunt as an allegory of the death of Charles I” (138).
of the stag. In the 1655 version, Denham greatly increases the descriptive features of the poem. We can compare, for example, the passages below, which introduce the stag in each of the poems:

“A” Text:

Here I have seen our Charles, when great affaires

Give leave to slaken, and unbend his cares,

Chasing the royall Stagge; the gallant beast, 265

Rowz’d with the noyse, ’twixt hope and feare distrest,

Resolv’s ‘tis better to avoid, then meet

His danger …

(263-68)

“B” Text:

The stagg now conscious of his fatal Growth,

At once indulgent to his fear and sloth,

To some dark covert his retreat had made,

Where nor mans eye, nor heavens should invade 250

His soft repose; when th’unexpected sound

Of dogs, and men, his wakeful ear doth wound.

Rouz’d with the noise, he scarce believes his ear,

Willing to think th’illusions of his fear
Had given this false Alarm, but straight his view

Confirms, that more than all he fears is true.

(247-56)

While this section in the “A” text is equally divided between describing Charles’s leisurely interest in hunting, and the stag’s reaction to being chased, the “B” text gives an elaborate description of the stag’s thought processes. In the second passage, the stag displays sophisticated mental capacities of reflection, disbelief, and imagination: “the stag now conscious,” “he scarce believes his ear,” and “illusions of his fear” (247, 253, 254). Further, he is described as “indulgent,” and at other points within the poem, as “proud” and as possessing “courage” and “bold reserve” (248, 217, 291, 297). These descriptive features draw more attention to the deer. However, like Carson, I would argue, that human sympathy for the stag comes through the humanisation of the animal. In other words, we relate to the stag through human characteristics which “elevate” or “raise” it to our level of moral concern.

Like Denham, in “The Hunting of the Stag,” Cavendish “imbues the stag with distinctly human traits in her efforts to draw the spectator into th[e] tragedy” (Carson 542). Cavendish’s stag has “Courage,” “Pride,” “Hope,” “Griefe,” and “Care” (125, 14, 100, 121, 121, italics in original). In addition, both Denham and Cavendish create a picture of the stag as proud and vain through references to Narcissus:

**Denham:**

The stream is so transparent, pure, and clear,

That the self-enamour’d youth gaz’d here,

So fatally deceiv’d he had not been,
While he the bottom, not his face had seen.

But his proud head the aery Mountain hides

Among the Clouds; his shoulders, and his sides

A shady mantle cloaths; his curled brows

Frown on the gentle stream, which calmly flows...

(213-220)

Cavendish:

In Evenings coole, or dewy Mornings new,

Would he rise us, and all the Forrest view.

Then walking to some cleare, and Cristall Brook,

Not for to Drink, but on his Hornes to look:

Taking such Pleasure in his Stately Crowne,

His Pride forgets that Dogs might pull him downe.

(9 -14, italics in original)

Carson argues that Denham’s and Cavendish’s allusions to Narcissus “hold a mirror up to the reader’s face,” and “at the moment of the animal’s death, audiences are made to confront an all-embracing reflection” (“Hunted Stag” 543):

Presented with the image of the water, one cannot help but envision the deer’s face staring back, and in that image we recall his wistful remembrances, his isolation, his struggle, and his daring last stand, all things which endear the
creature to audiences, which make him more human than not, which help create
the allegory of the “martyred” king.

(Carson 543)

According to Carson, descriptions and passages like these humanise the stag in the poet’s
try to elicit the sympathy of the reader: “having seen something of ourselves in the
poet’s delineation of the deer, we are at last hemmed in with the king/stag and imaginatively
experience his dread and death” (“Hunted Stag” 547).

However, in both poems there is the potential for an alter-tale, a tale in which the stag
does not reinforce or reflect the human but, rather, problematises it. In both poems, the
“corporeal abruptly invades the symbolic” (Carson, “Hunted Stag” 542). For example, in
Denham’s poem the stag’s blood “darkens the stream” (Carson, “Hunted Stag” 542): “Proud
of the wound, to it resigns his blood, / And stains the Crystal with a Purple floude” (Denham
321-322). In Cavendish’s poem, the corporeal plays an even more prominent role. This
“corporeal invasion” manifests in Cavendish’s poem in the consistent italicising of body
parts, and in the kinaesthetic metrical variations at the end of the poem. Having established
the grounds of the dominant, symbolic reading of the stag hunts in Denham’s and
Cavendish’s works, I will begin to create an alter-tale of human and animal relations in
Cavendish’s poem by reading affectively.

Unlike Denham, Cavendish’s preoccupation with the animal as animal begins with
proximity. According to John M. Wallace, Denham’s Coopers Hill offers us a prospect view,
which allows us to see “all the problems of the crown and the capital in perspective” (497).
However, whereas Denham’s poem involves a degree of “poetic detachment,” Cavendish
“never lets go of the stag, and she never permits her reader to lose sight of the sublime
creature either. She is on intimate terms with this deer and forces her audience to be thus
also” (Carson, “Hunted Stag” 544). To use Carson’s words in a different context, Cavendish
“pulls the spectator momentarily from a comfortable vantage point, bringing her closer to the violence, closer to the stench of blood and death, and ultimately closer to the desperation and fear common to all ‘mortal creatures’” (Carson 540). Entities are drawn into proximity or a “meating place” by shared affects; though, affects and affective transmissions also emerge when bodies inhabit a proximate space. Cavendish’s use of italics and metrical irregularities create proximity in both ways. Italics and moments of metrical irregularity produce affects which draw reader and stag into proximity. At the same time, these variations appeal to a zone of proximity always already shared by humans and animals: the body.

There are over three hundred italicised words in “The Hunting of the Stag.” Of these, a third refer to the bodies and body parts of the stag, dogs, men, and horses.100 In the final passage of the poem, we see that each of the stag’s body parts is italicised: “Feet,” “Body,” “Head,” “Hornes” (121, 128, 130).

Yet they so fast went on with such loud Cries,

The Stag no hope had left, nor help espies 120

That his small Feet his Body could not beare.

Yet loth to dye, or yield to Foes was he,

But to the last would strive for Victory.

Twas not for want of Courage he did run,

But that an Army against One did come. 125

Had he the Valour of bold Caesar stout,

Must yield himself to them, or dye no doubt.

Turning his Head, as if he dar’d their Spight,

100 Specific body part references (from all groups: stag, dogs, men, and horses) comprise (54/305) approximately 18%. References to bodies including the words “stag, hart, men, dogs, horses” comprise (94/305) approximately 31%. References to the stag and the stag’s body account for nearly half of this 31% (14%).
Prepare’d himself against them all to fight.

Single he was, his Hornes were all his helpes...

(119-130, italics in original)

The italicisation of the stag’s body parts gives them a potentially affective quality. In The Body Embarrassed, Gail Kern Paster explores how during the early modern period individual body parts are “imbued with their own affective capacity” (11). In her more recent Humoring the Body, she likens this affective capacity to a Deleuzian “Body without Organs [BwO]” where, instead of being tied to the body, “organs distribute themselves on the BwO, … independently of the form of the organism; forms become contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients” (191). As noted in my Introduction, the Body without Organs (or BwO) is a “plane of consistency” which sits adjacent to and interacts with a plane of “organisation”—a plane of structure and molar forms. Yet, the two planes are not opposite: “[t]he BwO is opposed not to the organs but that organization of the organs called the organism” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 184). The affects of the italicised body parts encourage us to “dismantle the organism”—in other words, the poem’s “signifying totality” or its symbolic meaning (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 2). The bodies in an affective reading do not “confirm the wholeness of the human” through appropriation into the molar, or symbolic, structure of the poem; instead, they interact and affect one another (Walker 336).

Italics were first used in England in Wynkyn de Wordes’s edition of Robert Wakefield’s Oratio de laudibus trium linguarum (1524) (Loewenstein 224).\footnote{For more information on the history of italics in printed texts, see Loewenstein.} The italics, which appear sporadically amongst the Arabic and Hebrew letters of this early-modern text, had an “obtrusive novelty”: they “stood out, and continued to do so” (Loewenstein 224).
Joseph Loewenstein writes that in early modern texts, italics have an “alien aura”; however, they are also disruptive, for “to print in italics is to fracture the English body type” (224). In this section, I track Cavendish’s use of the italicised word “Hornes,” and explore its potential to fracture the symbolic “organism” or royalist allegory, releasing lines of flight into botanical, medicinal, and instrumental assemblages. The word “Hornes” appears in Cavendish’s poem seven times. We first encounter the stag’s horns in line two: “There was a Stag did in the Forrest yle / Whose Neck was long, and Hornes branch’d up high” (1-2).

Cavendish couples the stag’s horns with the adjective “high” twice more during the poem: “Full swift he was, his Hornes he bore up high” (69), and “Like Fishes, try’d to swim in the water low: / But out alas, his Hornes too high do shew” (85-86). In these examples, the adjective “high” reterritorialises the italicised and individuated “Hornes.” This reterritorialisation operates through an association between “high” and social elevation. Cavendish creates the link between the stag and royalty in lines twelve to thirteen where the stag ventures to the “Christall Brook,” “Not for to Drink, but on his Hornes to look: / Taking such Pleasure in his Stately Crowne” (11, 12-13). Here, the stag’s horns are framed as a synecdoche for the monarchy, a framing which reduces the horns’ affective potential, and their ability to plug into other assemblages. While in these examples the horns humanise the stag by incorporating its parts into the “whole” of the royalist allegory, other appearances of “Hornes” within the poem express potential for deterritorialising the “organism.” For example, in the first occurrence of the word “Hornes,” noted above, Cavendish’s use of the word “branch’d” draws the stag’s horns into a botanical, and I will argue, a medicinal, assemblage. In line thirty-six, Cavendish develops this entanglement by describing the stag’s difficulty in moving through the forest: “The bending Twigs his Hornes would often catch.” Just after introducing the stag, Cavendish lists the different trees of the forest and notes the medicinal use of the “Maple” and the “Poplar”: “The weeping Maple, and the Polar green, /
Whose *Cooling Buds* in *Salves* have healing been” (23-23). Like the “*Salves*” of the Maple and Poplar, the horns of stags were believed to possess medicinal powers. In *The Noble Arte of Venerie*, Gascoigne introduces the stag by listing the “Vertue” and “properties” of the animal (40). He writes that “the Harts horne burnt and beaten into a powder will kill wormes both within the body and without, and will drive Serpents out of their holes and dennes” (40). The stag’s horns have efficacy, both textually and medically: they “do things” (Bennett, *Vibrant* viii, italics in original). The italicised horns are a type of textual matter, “stuff that modifies the human matter with which it comes into contact” (Bennett, *Vibrant* 44).

As well as botanical and medicinal assemblages, the stag’s “*Hornes*” release lines of flight into territories of musical instruments and weapons. Between lines sixty-three and sixty-five Cavendish creates proximity between the stag’s “*Hornes*” and the hunters’ “*Bugle Hornes*”: “Full swift he was, his *Hornes* he bore up high, / Then the *Men* did shout, the *Dogs* ran yelping by: / And *Bugle Hornes* with several Notes did blow...” The term “bugle” derives from the Latin *bos*, which means “ox” (*OED* bugle, n.1). It was given this name because the instruments were originally made from the horns of the animal (*OED* bugle, n.2a). Here, therefore, the “*Hornes*” of the stag are taken out of a relation with the royalist organism and put into a relation with music. The connection between horns and weapons also operates through functionality and materiality: “*Single he* was, his *Hornes* were all his *helpes*” (line 111), and “with his *Hornes* he tosses some [dogs] away” (136).

The affective element of Deleuzian meat encourages us to read through the BwO. In this mode of reading, the poem’s “organs” are mobile potentialities which enter into an affective relationship with the reader: “the organ is exactly what its elements make it according to their relation of movement and rest, and the way in which this relation combines

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102 “*Bugle*” is also the English name “of plants belonging to the genus *Ajuga*, esp. the common species *A. reptans*” (*OED* “bugle” n.2).
with or splits off from that of neighbouring elements” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 175, 299).

As Anna Gibbs explains,

> Language is in fact highly dependent on the body’s physical capacities for its effectivity. It is also very selective, concentrating on evoking experience in one sensory channel at a time: in this respect, it treats the body not as a unified and indivisible whole, but as an ensemble of potentialities that can—and must—be selectively activated.

(201)

Reading affectively is a type of consumption in which “human and nonhuman bodies recorporealize in response to each other; both exercise formative power and both offer themselves as matter to be acted on” (Bennett, *Vibrant* 49). Like the gaze of the affective animal, the italicised “Hornes” strike us through their fracturing quality, forcing us to think. The assemblages produced from these affective encounters are determined by the specific qualities or tendencies of the bodies that interact: the textual parts, “acting in different ways in different bodies, and with different intensities even within the same body at different times, may produce patterns of effects, though not in ways that are fully predictable” (Bennett, *Vibrant* 42). This idea accords with Spinoza’s dictum that “no one has yet determined what the body can do” (Spinoza IIP1S).

The metrical irregularities which occur at the end of the poem also trouble the unity and wholeness of the “organism.” Cavendish’s poem is written in a relatively regular iambic pentameter; however, at the end of the poem we encounter a number of disruptions to the meter. The regular rhythm created throughout the poem heightens the effect of the metrical irregularities in the final passage. Here the metrical irregularities create a shared somatic

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103 I briefly return to ideas of consumption and pharmacology in part three of this chapter. In the Conclusion, I return to the question of botanical affect.
experience between reader and stag. In the passage quoted from Cavendish’s poem, we encounter spondees, pyrrhics, and trochees. The speed of the pyrrhic feet in line 125, “But that an Army against One did come,” for example, matches the lightness of the stag’s feet—a characteristic associated with the animal through Cavendish’s description of his feet as “Nimble” and “like to a Feather’d Arrow”, and, on two occasions, employing the adverb “swiftly” (62; 101; 78, 98). Variations in rhythm convey the physiological state of the stag and have the potential to encourage visceral or affective symbiosis between reader and stag. For example, in the contrast between lines 125 and 126, “But that an Army against One did come. / Had he the Valour of bold Caesar stout” (125-126), we find affects of escape and speed in the pyrrhic at the beginning, hesitation or halting in the end-stopped line, and then an expression of bodily strength in the following line with the spondee “bold Caesar stout” (126). As the lines speed up and slow down, rise and fall, we take on the movements of the stag by involuntarily “catching” the irregular breathing patterns of the pursued animal. This catching, or transmission, involves “communication” which is not the “transmission of information, but, rather, “[a]ction on bodies (or, more accurately, on aspects of bodies)—as, for example, when reading fiction produces new affect states in us, which change not only our body chemistry, but also—and as a result—our attitudes and ideas as we shape from narrative structure or meaning” (Gibbs 193). Even though we may not consciously register metrical variations and affects, “the body react[s] physiologically” through changes to “the

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104 Donna Landry writes that “English poetry had been attuned to hunting rhythms for some centuries” (Invention 153).

105 The existence of spondees and pyrrhics in English metre is contested. However, in contemporary criticism, the spondee seems to be generally accepted. Catherine Addison writes that in the opening essay to David Baker’s collection Meter in English, “Robert Wallace puts forward ten debatable ‘proposals,’” among them one that states: ‘The spondee is a good, and fairly frequent, foot in English’ (37). Of the thirteen writers who discuss this proposal in the book, eleven agree with it and two disagree” (153).

106 The breathing patterns of the reader are changed through a shortening of breath, which decreases the amount of oxygen in the blood. Consequently, the heart must pump faster to deliver oxygen to the muscles, creating a (relatively) similar physical state to one experienced after physical exertion, or in a fearful or uncomfortable situation. Landry cites Macdonald et al.’s “Managing British Mammals,” which describes a correlation between heart rate and fear: “the heart rate of foxes being chased was 18% higher than that of foxed running voluntarily” (130 in Landry 51)
rate of our breathing or heart beat” (Crystal 44). The rhythms within a poem “entrain and coordinate basal biological rhythms within the bodies of listeners” (Frey 43).\(^\text{107}\)

The reader’s susceptibility to the affects of the stag forces her to recognise that between human and animal bodies there is a “cross-species attunement” to “carnal vulnerability,” what Acampora labels “symphysis” (Acampora, “Toward” 240, 237; Corporal 23). According to Acampora, “empathetic” relations must “build a bridge across an inter-subjective chasm or gap”; however, “those aligned by symphysical encounter are already ‘in sync’ with each other” (“Toward” 242).\(^\text{108}\) Acampora’s concept of symphysis helps to expand on the spatial element of Deleuzian meat. A “symphysical” relationship, argues Acampora, is about “sharing territory” and “about becoming sensitive to an already constituted ‘inter-zone’ of somaesthetic conviviality” (Corporal 126, 84). This “inter-zone” for Deleuze and Guattari is “a zone of indetermination, of indiscernibility, as if things, beasts, and persons ... endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation” (WP 173). Reading through the affective quality of meat draws attention to the reality of our shared materiality with animals. It demonstrates the idea of the “givenness” of bodies, which supports the claim that embodiment offers a more reliable and non-exclusory site of transpecies compassion than intellect.

To read through the body, or Deleuzian meat, is not to humanise the animal but to “recogniz[e] our own vital status as animate zoomorphs” (Acampora, Corporal xiv). The animal “is not the untouchable king”; rather, it is “flesh and blood, vulnerable and exposed” (Carson, “Hunted Stag” 546). And it is this exposure which reminds the reader of her own vulnerability. In the next section, I build on the argument for bodily attunement, begun in my reading of Cavendish’s poem, by exploring the potential for early modern texts to disrupt

\(^{107}\) “Prolonged rhythmic stimuli provoke ‘simultaneous discharge of both autonomic systems [sympathetic and parasympathetic], generating not only ... sensation, but under proper conditions, a sense of union or oneness with conspecifics’” (d’Aquili and Laughlin Jr. 157 cited in Frey 43)

\(^{108}\) Despret and Willerslev use “empathy” to describe somatic affinity between humans and animals. This suggests that there is potential for the term to be used effectively in discussions of cross-species compassion.
territorialised relations between humans and animals on the hunting field. I will argue that the hunter’s mapping of the stag’s route, and his success in the hunt, depends on recognising and using somatic connection. In addition, using Jaques’s encounter with the stag in Shakespeare’s *As You Like It*, I consider the role that the performance of the “passions” plays in creating “meating places,” or zones of proximity between humans and animals. In these zones, malleable bodies—human and non-human—disrupt notions of essentialism.

### 2.2 Bodies: Territorialised and Performative

Early modern critiques of hunting specifically target the *par force* hunt of the aristocracy. The development of the *par force* hunt is entangled with changing attitudes towards the forest. From the medieval period to the early modern period, the forest underwent a shift from being a foreboding place of wildness to one of social occupation and structure (Cartmill 59). Cartmill describes this shift as a move from the “savage” to the “sylvan” (59).109 Hunting played an influential role in this shift. The practice

became associated with upper-class status, and … encrusted with courtly ceremony that served to demonstrate the genteel manners (or expose the pretensions) of the participants of the chase.

(Cartmill 61)

The “sylvan” forest was largely a product of two developments: Forest Law, which set aside land for activities like royal hunting; and the increasing ritualisation and ceremony of hunting practices, which are documented, in detail, in hunting treatises.110 Both Forest Law and ritualisation contributed to the territorialisation of relations between humans and animals. In

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109 According to Cartmill, “the difference between *savage* and *sylvan* is precisely the difference between the images of the forest in the legends of Beowulf and Robin Hood” (59).

110 For more on Forest Law, see Manwood’s *A Treatise and Discourse of the Lawes of the Forrest* (1598).
my study, I consider the potential for the performative element of Deleuzian meat to
deterritorialise human and animal territories in early modern hunting treatises.

In “Making and Breaking the Stag,” Suzanne Walker traces the ritualised processes of
the early modern stag hunt in treatises like Jacques du Fouilloux’s La Vénerie (1561)—an
important precursor to almost all early modern hunting treatises—and George Gascoigne’s
The Noble Arte of Venerie of Hunting. In particular, she explores the way in which du
Fouilloux’s and Gascoigne’s texts depict the hunter’s creation and dismemberment of the
stag. Texts about the ritualised stag hunt codify a model of human and animal relations in
which the animal’s body is “malleable,” and the human body is “stable”:

The stag first appears as fragments, diverse parts and traces that are gradually
assembled, like a puzzle, to construct a living animal. Over the course of the hunt,
bones and organs and antlers cohere into an individual, endowed with thoughts,
feelings and intentions.

(Walker 318)

In the chapter which introduces the stag (chapter fifteen in both du Fouilloux’s and
Gascoigne’s texts), the animal appears as a list of medicinally-beneficial parts. From this
state of bodily fragmentation, the stag becomes hoof prints or “Slot[s],” bodily imprints in the
grass, and paths left in the foliage, which are “a series of voids or empty spaces” that are
“filled in by the hunter’s knowledge in constructing a quarry” (Gascoigne 63; Walker 323).
Gascoigne notes, for example, that “[o]ld Harts leave commonly ... blemishes [and] tokens to
follow” and that “[a]ll the tokens are the true significations [and] marks whereby the
Huntsman may know and perceive the age of the Hart” (63, 65). During the course of the

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111 The Noble Art of Venerie is “traditionally ... attributed to George Tuberville ..., although some authorities
give it to Gascoigne” (MacGregor 115). In this thesis, I follow Walker’s example and attribute it to Gascoigne.
112 Dung was also another, more tangible, form of “evidence.” See Gascoigne, 66.
hunt, an individual animal is selected for pursuit, and this specific stag becomes physically, as well as “psychologically,” whole: the animal moves from passive object to active subject (Walker 317). Rather than simply “reacting” to being chased by dogs and the hunters, the animal “responds” by attempting to “abandon the special identity assigned to him by the hunters,” “taking refuge in the company of other deer” and retreating “into the generic class” (Walker 328): deer “will go see where other Deare do lye, by whom they hope to find safeguard: for if they should be hunted, they would flee among them for change, that so [sic] the hounds might be deceived” (Gascoigne 83). The par force stag hunt ends when the stag either collapses with fatigue or is forced into a confrontation with hounds and hunters, in which it is (inevitably) killed. After killing the stag, the hunter begins a complex phase of the hunt: the “breaking,” or “ritual dismemberment” of the animal’s body (E. Berry 40; Fig. 7). I focus in more detail on the “breaking” of the stag in part three of this chapter; here, however, I will note that the “breaking” or “undoing” of the stag’s body contributes to the circularity of the hunt by re-fragmenting the animal’s body into the set of symbolic and medicinally-beneficial parts it appeared as in the introduction to the stag in Gascoigne’s *Noble Arte of Venerie* (Walker 320).

Of the various phases of the hunt, here I am primarily interested in the hunter’s mapping of the stag’s body through the forest and the tendency to “make” a coherent animal through acts of interpretation. Walker writes that “the capacity to create a whole stag out of bits of evidence that may be difficult to interpret is a mark of the hunter’s skill. The generation of a complete animal is thus the result of human ingenuity, and is not inherent in

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113 Walker argues that the stag’s shift to an “active subject” is bound up with the hunter’s desire for a “dangerous foe,” a desire which transforms the hunting field into a battlefield (329, 332). For a discussion of hunting and war during early modern times, see Manning 4-35.

114 Derrida discusses the relationship between animal reaction, and human response in “The Animal that Therefore I Am,” and “And Say the Animal Responded?” For more on this, see Wolfe’s *Rites* 74-75.

115 Occasionally, in defending itself the stag killed hunters. Gascoigne offers the tale of “the Emperor Basil which had overcome his enemies in many battels, had done great deedes of Chivalrie in his Contry, was yet nevertheless slayne with an Hart in breaking of a Bay” (124-125).
the creature itself” (322). “Interpretation” forms the basis of an “evidential paradigm” at work in the hunt—through interpretation, hunters construct a “complex reality that could not be experienced directly” (Ginzburg 102, 103). Interpretation removes the hunter from “direct” experience. In contrast, I want to use the performative quality of Deleuzian meat because proximity challenges categorical distinctions between humans and animals.

While, as Walker explains, hunters “construct a living animal” from the fragments they find in the forest in a process of “mapping,” there is also a “fleshy” element to their relation with the animal (317; Mol 27). When hunters trace the “ghostly silhouette of the animal through the inspection of trees and shrubs,” they imitate the bodily motions of the stag they are seeking (323; Fig. 8). Dorothy Yamamoto notes that the medieval and early modern hunter would begin to track the stag by “placing his hand in the deer’s prints,” and touching imprints in the grass, feeling whether it was “still warm from [its] body” (105; Fig 9). This process of “mapping,” I suggest, deterritorialises the hunter’s human identity. In an attempt to create a “partial perspective” which attunes him to the body of the stag, the hunter opens his body to a process of “undo[ing] and redo[ing]” (Despret 61). According to Despret, humans and animals are “fleshy creatures” and their bodies perform one another through “embodied choreography” (Despret 69).

It is impossible to understand animals “unless you put yourself in their place—literally in their place. You have to go where the animal goes, and do what the animal does”—this will help you to “see what it sees and understand what scares it” (Grandin 31, italics in original; Despret 59).

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116 For more on collecting clues, hunting, and the construction of narratives, see Ginzburg, 102-05.
117 Mol writes that, “[h]owever important feelings and interpretations may be, they are not alone in making up what life is all about. Day-to-day reality, the life we live, is also a fleshy affair” (27).
118 The examples of animals “performing” humans are fewer. One example of bodily performance, which opens onto the potential for becoming is Kafka’s ape “Red Peter,” who copies humans, eventually reaching “the level of cultivation of the average European” (234). For this tale, see Kafka 225-235.
119 Despret calls this process the “construction of empathic affinities” (59).
For Willerslev, the “embodied choreography” Despret speaks of involves the hunter mimicking the qualities of the animal, and is, he argues, central to the success of the hunt (639). Yet, the mimesis at work here is not the Platonic representational mimesis critiqued by Deleuze and Guattari; rather, it is imitation which has “a decisively corporeal, physical, and tangible quality from which [it] ultimately emerges and from which it derives its ‘material’” (648). Willerslev contends that there is something more to this encounter between the human and the animal than simple imitation. He draws on Michael Taussig’s *Mimesis and Alterity* to argue that “to mimic something is to be sensuously filled with that which is imitated, yielding to it, mirroring it—and hence imitating it bodily” (639). Rather than simply representing the animal, the hunter “performs” the animal, attempting to “deceive an animal by taking on its bodily appearance, movement, and smell” (635). For example, in hunting an elk, the hunter will cover his skis with “smooth skin from the leg of an elk” and walk in a “waddling manner” to imitate the animal (Fig. 10; Willerslev 639). In these examples, it is not about “feeling what the other feels, [but] rather making the body available for the response of another being” (Despret 70). This suggests that, despite Deleuze and Guattari’s denigration of imitation, there is potential for “embodied choreography” to create human and animal proximity (Despret 61).

Through the body, the hunter becomes attuned to the fleshy forces of the animal: its passions, or in Deleuzian terminology, its affects. Using the vocabulary of “emotion,” Ian Hacking discusses the interrelation of body and emotions. He suggests that

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120 See Gibbs for an exploration of the similarities between “mimesis” and transmissions of affect.
121 This individualised hunting is differs in form from the ceremonial style of the *par force* hunt; however, I argue that both offer opportunities for the hunter’s performance of the animal.
122 This “fleshy” relationship also has an association with animal and human destruction. According to Manning, the punishment for peasants who transgressed forest laws, or were thought to, was being sewn into deer skins, before being chased, and torn apart—Actaeon-like—by deerhounds. Details of this are given in Manning’s first chapter, 4-35.
[w]e sympathetically experience an emotion akin to another by picking up cues from the body. ... We perceive the emotions of animals when we attend to their bodies. ... We do not infer [as by analogy] that animals have emotions from the[ir] movements and dispositions.

(710, Acampora’s revisions in “Toward” 237-38)

In Aristotle’s conception of the tripartite soul, passions belonged to the “sensitive soul,” which was shared by humans and animals. In Shakespeare’s As You Like It, it is possible to read Jaques’s encounter with the deer as a bodily performance akin to that I have just explored between hunter and stag. Shakespeare’s play is based on Thomas Lodge’s prose work, Rosalynde (1590). Jaques, a “wandering philosopher gentleman” (Latham 161), is a figure invented by Shakespeare in his dramatization of Lodge’s material. Jaques offers a “counter-voice” to the idealised world of the pastoral—Cartmill’s “sylvan” forest—to reveal that this space is not exempt from violence and injustice (Latham 161). For example, Duke Senior’s “Come, shall we go and kill us venison?” (2.1.21) is directly followed by the First Lord’s report of Jaques’s encounter with a deer “that from the hunter’s aim had ta’en hurt” (2.1.35):

FIRST LORD: The wretched animal heav’d forth such groans
  That their discharge did stretch his leathern coat
  Almost to bursting, and the big round tears
  Cours’d one another down his innocent nose
  In piteous chase; and thus the hairy fool,
  Much marked of the melancholy Jaques,

123 Though, of course, the Duke does reconsider his desire to hunt (2.1.22-25).
Lambert 95

Stood on th’extremest verge of the swift brook,

Augmenting it with tears.

**DUKE SENIOR:** But what said Jaques?

Did he not moralize this spectacle?

**FIRST LORD:** O yes, into a thousand similes.

........................................................................

**DUKE SENIOR:** And did you leave him in this contemplation?

**SECOND LORD:** We did my lord, weeping and commenting

Upon the sobbing deer.

(2.1.37-49, 2.1.64-66)

While it is possible to posit a symbolic or analogical reading of the deer encountered by Jaques, I want to focus on the potential for an affective reading. In Erica Fudge’s analysis of this moment, Jaques’s compassion is body-based, a product of the sensitive soul. According to Fudge, throughout the play, the First Lord acts as “the voice of reason—the voice of the theory of inward government” (75). Because of his rational character, the First Lord represents “Jaques’ compassion ... as a failing” (75):

124 It this moment can also be read symbolically. Robert Watson argues Jaques’ encounter with the deer is narcissistic, and that the cognitive distance maintained by Jaques ensures that human-animal boundaries remain firmly in place: “conscious knowledge and complete symbiosis with nature are mutually exclusive” (83, 79). By projecting “his own social complaints” onto the deer, Jaques consciously controls and constructs the encounter, therefore undercutting the chance of sympathetic alignment between him and the deer (82). Indeed, Watson goes further to argue that Jaques becomes “all the more invasive the more he tries to be sympathetic” (82). Watson’s reading of Jaques and the stag appears to be influenced by work on “pity” and “empathy” by thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche and William James, for whom attempts to know what the other feels are made through imitation; yet, this imitation draws on personal past experiences and associations of the emotion, which means that “it is my feeling, and not the other’s, that I reproduce” (Wyschogrod 27).

125 The term “Inward Government” is used by Philip P. Hallie to describe the battle between rationality and the forces of the passions: “a good person is one whose passions are under control of his reason. To be good is to be self-controlled, or rather, reason controlled” (158). See Fudge, “Two Ethics,” 100-103.
In identifying with the animal, Jaques has failed to use the thing that distinguishes him from animals ...: reason. And acting without reason ... is acting with what is shared by human and animal: the sensitive rather than the rational soul.

(F brutal 75)

Fudge writes that “to identify oneself with an animal from the perspective of this theoretical framework is to limit oneself to the being of an animal, and thus a transformation has taken place” (Brutal 75). According to Fudge, Shakespeare “stag[es] Jaques’ compassion as unreasonable [to] show ... the limits of compassion in orthodox thought—it excludes animals” (Brutal 75). Yet, alternatively, this encounter might gesture to the inevitability of corporeal compassion between humans and animals that share a sensitive soul, and with it, passions.

In “Passion Signified,” Jacqueline Miller writes that while texts like Astrophil and Stella (1591) and Hamlet (1603) suggest a “passion ‘within’ that exists independent of its representation,” it is possible to “argue for a different conceptualization, one in which the representation precedes and produces the passion” (407). Miller offers two models for the external generation of passions: imprinting and imitation. In the first case, passions are “not so much elicited from within but impressed”—or “imprinted”—“as a copy from without”; for example, in the relation between an orator and the audience and, as we have seen, the stag in Cavendish’s poem and the reader. I focus here, however, on the more active and dynamic model of imitation. Following the imitative or performative model proposed by Miller, it is possible to argue that Jaques’s bodily proximity to the animal is, like the hunter who maps the stag, something he actively cultivates by “extract[ing] particles between which” he “establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to” the

126 In Pico’s version of this model, the human “molds, fashions and transforms himself,” generating passions through acts of imitation (11).
stag (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 318). Therefore, like the hunter, Jaques somatically performs the motions of the stag’s body—its “sobbing” and “weeping”—to enter into affective proximity or “partial affinity” with the animal (2.1.65, 66; Despret 61). Jaques’s performance “undoes the bounds of his body” to “construct or deconstruct the distinction between inner and outer and between one person and another” (Baker 86; Miller 409). In the encounter between Jaques and the deer, proximity emerges through the shared “fleshiness” of the sensitive soul and the material exchange of passions. Like passions, or affects, this type of mimesis does not occur at “the level of the individual or of the organism. It is not a property of either subject or object, but a trajectory in which both are swept up so that forms can be seen as ‘the sensuous traces of [the] amodal linkage’ between them” (Massumi 148, cited in Gibbs 194). Seventeenth-century philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) captures the connective potential of both the passions and the processes of their transmission in his assertion that the imitation of passions is something that makes people “exactly like one another not only in their mental disposition but also in the condition of their body” (377). In seventeenth-century thought, this connection extends beyond humanity: “Even such beasts as dogs, which must submit to those with whom they live, generally have their machine disposed in such a way that they assume the appearance they must in relation to those around them” (377). For seventeenth-century thinkers like Malebranche,

> The passions are … forces … that pass continually between us, binding us together in a sympathetic web of feeling … The boundary of the body is, for them, no boundary at all and they pass through space between one person and another.

*(James 119)*

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127 I return to the relationship between imitation and becoming in the Conclusion to this thesis.
These examples show that through performing the animal, humans create a proximate “meating place.” The performance used to enter this proximate zone involves “making” and “creating”; one actively “composes a body with the animal, a body without organs defined by zones of intensity or proximity” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 319). The models of relation between humans and animals treated here are multiple and dynamic, and express the “acrobatics,” or the performative quality of Deleuzian meat. My consideration of the malleability of the human foregrounds the central preoccupation of the final section of this chapter: the way in which meat challenges essentialism, particularly human essentialism.

### 2.3 Suffering: Essentialism and Contingency

During the early modern period, an increasing number of works expressed skepticism about human elevation over animals. Recognising the embodiment of humans and animals, and thus their shared carnal vulnerability, was a major challenge to human claims for superiority. In this part, I develop my study of early modern representations of somatic continuity between humans and animals by exploring parallels between the “undoing” of the stag in the early modern hunt, and the rape, mutilation, and cannibalism of human bodies in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus* (1594). Further, I will argue that parallels between the bodies of humans and metaphorical stags create a “meating place” which disrupts claims of human essentialism.

The use of the hunting metaphor in early modern literature changed as critiques of the practice drew attention to its brutality. Where previously the hunt had been used as a metaphor for the pursuit of courtly love, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was

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128 During the seventeenth-century, Charles’s “brutal beheading”—“a public figure whose name hitherto denoted invincibility, a strength emanating from the very hand of God”—left “poets and authors grappling with fears concerning the human condition” (Carson “The Hunted Stag” 539). A “divine” monarch could be killed like animals of the chase.

129 For more on early modern challenges to human essentialism see discussions by Bell, and Shannon “Poor, Bare, Forked.”

130 The “breaking” of the stag is detailed in Chapter 42, pages 127-135 of Gascoigne’s *Noble Arte.*
increasingly employed as a metaphor for violent acts like murder and rape. In Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus*, the hunt functions as a metaphor for rape. In 2.1 Aaron, Demetrius, and Chiron speak of sexual conquest as having “struck a doe” (2.1.97). The progression of Aaron’s speech (beginning line 110) is similar to the trajectory of the stag hunt in early modern hunting treatises; for example, Aaron advises Demetrius and Chiron to shift from chasing the general quarry to pursuing a specific stag, or deer—in this case—Lavinia: “Single you thither then this dainty doe / and strike her home by force, if not by words” (2.1.124-125). Here, Lavinia is brought into proximity with the deer through her construction as quarry. This alignment continues after her rape and mutilation, when Marcus tells Titus “I found her, straying in the park, / Seeking to hide herself, as doth the deer / That hath received some unrecuring wound” (3.1.88-90). Beyond figurative language, Lavinia is also associated with the deer through the mutilation of her body.

[Wythat stern ungentle hands

Hath lopped and hewed and made thy body bare

.................................................................

But sure some Tereus hath deflowered thee

And, lest thou shouldst detect him, cut thy tongue.

(2.4.16-17, 26-27)

Like the hunter with the killed stag, Demetrius and Chiron “undo” Lavinia’s body. As Gascoigne writes in *The Noble Art of Venerie*, “The cheife hunte[r] shall take his knife, and cut off the Deares right foot, and present it to the king” (127). After skinning the deer, the huntsman “shall take out the tongue and put it upon the Forke for it appertaineth to the King

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131 The hunt also functions as a metaphor for violent acts in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar* (1599) and *Macbeth* (1611).
or the chiefe personage” (Gascoigne 127-128). In 5.2 of Titus Andronicus, the enjambment of line 175 and the homophone “dear” reinforce this connection between Lavinia and the deer: “Both her sweet hands, her tongue, and that more dear / Than hands or tongue, her spotless chastity” (5.2.175-176). The parallels between Lavinia’s body and the stag, and their mutual “becoming-meat,” suggest somatic continuity between human and animal and thus force us to rethink the human in terms other than those of essentialist “being.”

It is not only Lavinia’s body which shares proximity with the stag: in Act Five the bodies of Demetrius and Chiron undergo a process of deterritorialisation and disarticulation. In this scene, Titus avenges Lavinia by killing Demetrius and Chiron. Meat, according to Deleuze is a point that precedes the natural differentiation of humans and animals. In “grind[ing]” the bones of Demetrius and Chiron “to dust,” Titus reduces the men to molecular and “meaty” levels in a manner similar to Gascoigne’s description of the uses of the stag’s body after death. We are reminded, for example, of the molecular reduction of the stag’s horns quoted earlier, which “burnt and beaten into a powder will kill wormes both within the body and without” (Gascoigne 40). Titus’s “processing” of the men’s bodies evokes alimentary as well as pharmacological resonances of the stag’s body. Not only does Titus kill and dismember Demetrius and Chiron, he also bakes them in a pie which he serves to their mother, Tamora:

SATURNINUS: Go, fetch them [Chiron and Demetrius] hither to us presently.

TITUS: Why, there they are, both baked in this pie,

Whereof their mother daintily hath fed,

Eating the flesh that she herself hath bred.

\footnote{For another reading of Lavinia’s proximity to the deer, see Ortiz 67-69. Ortiz argues that Lavinia is aligned with the stag through references to the Ovidian figure of Actaeon (in 2.2.55-64 and 3.240-41).}

\footnote{For more on the medicinal consumption of human flesh, see Noble.}
In this scene, Tamora’s ignorance shocks us into recognising that human and animal bodies, reduced to meat, are indistinct and interchangeable. In *Haven of Health* (1584), Thomas Cogan articulates this meaty confusion, writing that “the flesh of swine hath such a likenessee unto mans flesh, both in savour and taste that some have eaten mans flesh in steede of porke’” (116). Tamora’s cannibalism demonstrates that the “human” is a relational and impermanent assemblage rather than an unchangeable and identifiable “essence.” Meat is not animal-specific, but a product of a specific relation—the body’s relation to butchering. Margo DeMello argues that meat “is really just a disassembled or deconstructed animal” (131). Meat creates human and animal indistinction and interchangeability, drawing attention to the contingency of human and animal forms. This preoccupation with contingency and interchangeability resonates in painter Francis Bacon’s oft-cited quotation:

> I’ve always been very moved by pictures about slaughterhouses and meat … Of course, we are meat, we are potential carcasses. If I go into a butcher’s shop I always think it’s surprising that I wasn’t there instead of the animal.

(Bacon in Sylvester 46)

What my study helps us see, then, is that things are defined by the function they fulfil in a certain relation or “assemblage,” rather than what they appear to *be*. In other words, Deleuzian meat helps us to draw out the machinic, or connective function, of entities through a deterritorialisation of their perceived essentialism. A disruption of essentialism forces us to rethink the grounds of our ethical concern for other living beings. It is no longer privileged “human” capacities, like “self-reflection” and “intellectual intuition,” which dictate an

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134 DeMello notes that an animal can potentially become meat if it is considered “edible” or “consumable”—after being defined as such, “butchering” converts the animal to meat (131).
animal’s ethical inclusion; instead, “we may ground moral compassion for other animals in the sensation of sharing carnal vulnerability” (Acampora “Toward” 236, 237).

Chapter 2 introduced a number of concepts important for the studies in Chapter 3: “assemblages,” the “machinic,” and the “Body without Organs.” According to Deleuze and Guattari, the BwO is “that which one desires and by which one desires” (ATP 192). In Chapter 3, I develop ideas of machinic relations and assemblages through a focus on the flows and vibrations of Deleuzian non-localised desire. Here, “desire” emerges as “a powerful nonorganic life that escapes the strata, cuts across assemblages,” creating new relations, connections, and becomings between not only the organic, but also between the organic and inorganic (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 590).
Figures

Fig. 4. Francis Bacon, *Figure with Meat*, 1954. Art Institute of Chicago, United States.

Fig. 5. Francis Bacon, *Three Studies for a crucifixion*, 1962. The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York.

Fig. 6. Francis Bacon, *Painting*, 1946. The Museum of Modern Art, New York.
Fig. 7. “On the place where and how an assembly should be made, in the presence of a Prince, or some honourable person,” woodcut from George Gascoigne The Noble Arte of Venerie (London, 1575; 91).

Fig. 8. “How a huntsman may seeke in the highe woods” woodcut from George Gascoigne The Noble Arte of Venerie (London, 1575; 89).
Fig. 9. “The judgement and knowledge by the Slot of an Hart,” woodcut from George Gascoigne *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (London, 1575; 63).

Fig. 10. Hunter’s ski covered with moose skin, drawing by Mads Salicath in Rane Willerslev’s “Not Animal, Not Not-Animal” (2004; 640).
Chapter 3: “Hydraulics and Hums”: Vital Materialism, Non-Localised Desire and Becoming-Animal-Machine

Introduction

The notion of the bête machine—“beast-machine” or “animal automata”—received its first formal articulation in the seventeenth century in the philosophical work of Descartes. The longevity and pervasiveness of the idea of the animal automata is attested to by a modern-day practice like intensive farming, which treats animals as productive machines. This chapter adds “machines” into the human and animal mix. A radical reconceptualisation of machines and automata—generally assumed to be inanimate and unfeeling—as “vital” and “lively” disrupts the anthropocentric patterns of thought that sustain our “exploitative” and “extractive” relationship with the seemingly “dull” and “inert” natural world (Boeher 17; Bennett, Vibrant viii).

In this chapter, I focus on the vitality of matter, in particular the “hydraulics” and “hums” of non-localised desire that suggest vital materiality. I begin with the hydraulic, avian automata in Christopher Marlowe’s Hero and Leander (1598), turning then to the drone—variously insect, instrument, and sound—in Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece (1594). Winding its way through these discussions is Deleuzian “machinic desire.” According to Rosi Braidotti, the idea of the machine helps Deleuze “to free the flows of desire from their dependence on a normative vision of the embodied subject” (Metamorphoses 124). The machine—or, more specifically, a “desiring-machine”—“denotes the ‘conjoined operations’ and ‘interlocking arrangements’ of every kind of production” (Deleuze and Guattari, AO 216). As well as adding machines into the human and animal mix, this chapter explores female encounters and entanglements with animals and machines. Women are central to my

135 A precursor to Descartes’s animal automata is found in Nashe’s Unfortunate Traveller, in Jack Wilton’s encounter with avian automata. He describes the animal figures as “bodies without soules” (n. pag.).
consideration of vital machines and non-localised sexuality. During the early modern period, women are, paradoxically, aligned with both nature and artifice. The female body is thus a site of interaction between the organic and inorganic; the navigation of this paradox helps me to delimit a concept of vital materialism which encourages rhizomatic relations between humans, animals, and machines.136

In *AO*, Deleuze and Guattari write that desire “does not take as its object persons or things but the entire surroundings that it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined, introducing therein breaks and captures—always nomadic and migrant desire” (322). Taking the hydraulic and vibrative vocabulary of this quotation, I first develop a hydraulic model of Deleuzian non-localised desire. I will argue that the hydraulic and automated sparrows which adorn Hero’s buskins in the opening blazon of Marlowe’s poem *Hero and Leander* offer the potential for a vital materialist reading of human, animal, and machine bodies. I suggest that in the beginning of the poem, “immanent desire”—a desiring-machine—unconnected to organic genitalia establishes flows and connections between the materials and entities that constitute Hero’s assembled “body.” In the beginning of the poem, we see a form of desire (or sexuality) which contains the potential for non-hierarchical trans-species relations. Desire here, “may be animal or vegetal or both, a feature of swarms or particles, the human or the non-human, and arguably, from a gathering of these features, the trans-human also” (Blake 187). However, towards the end of the poem, Hero is reterritorialised by a blocking or channelling of this free-flowing desire—a restriction that is represented through a symbol of Oedipal triangulation: Leander’s phallus. In other words, Deleuzian desire is replaced by a regime of localised and libidinous “pleasure.” Desire thus transformed “is made to repress its flows in order to contain them in the narrow cells of the type ‘couple,’ ‘family,’ ‘person,’ ‘objects’” (Deleuze and Guattari, *AO* 293). At the end of the

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136 In the first plateau of *ATP*, Deleuze and Guattari write that the rhizome in concerned with “connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (5).
In a reading of Shakespeare’s *The Rape of Lucrece*, I will offer a musical alternative to the Marlovian model. I focus on Lucrece’s “hum[ming] on Tarquin still” to suggest that humming is a vibrative force with operations analogous to the hydraulic-desire of Marlowe’s blazon (1133). In other words, the hum is a sonorous form of non-localised desire which deterritorialises general codes of relation, or molar structures, like human, animal, and machine. The poem’s moments of deterritorialisation follow the movements of becoming-animal-insect-machine. These deterritorialisations correlate with the various “musical” modes of speaking, singing, and humming. After being raped by Tarquin, Lucrece experiences a Deleuzian “crack” in her human identity that opens up the potential for an encounter with a rhythmic and molecular line of music: humming. This line moves Lucrece through different experiential states, and encourages becomings that bring her closer to a “field of immanence of desire, the *plane of consistency* specific to desire” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 179, italics in original). In her address to Philomela (lines 1128–11134), for example, Lucrece moves from words to the “song” of birds, and then to the “hum” of insects and of instruments. Lucrece’s “hum[ming]” on Tarquin, and her ventriloquising of Philomela’s and Hecuba’s grief, draws her into the Deleuzian molecular realm of the drone, an insect to which she draws attention: “My honey lost, and I a drone-like bee, / Have no perfection of my summer left” (1133, 836–37). In the realm of the drone, Lucrece is able to momentarily experience a state of existence not tied to either the formal structures of patriarchy, localised sexuality, or the human body. Reading the drone and its associated “hums” through a Deleuzian vital materialist framework allows me to examine the ways in which Lucrece’s vocalisations, both linguistic and non-linguistic, trouble the distinctions between not only humans and animals,
but also the organic and inorganic. Yet like many Deleuzian becomings, Lucrece’s escape from human form and subjectivity is fleeting; at the end of the poem, Lucrece is reterritorialised—or, reabsorbed—into subjective, patriarchal, and Oedipal structures by the very words she uses to recount her plight.

I use the studies of this chapter to create another anti-anthropocentric alter-tale. In these examples, non-localised desire horizontalises and makes rhizomatic the relations between sexes, species, and the artificial and natural which are conventionally understood vertically or arborescently. Yet, what the reterritorialisations of both these studies demonstrate is that experiences of becoming and awareness of integration are not permanent conditions but glimmers of possibility which might encourage us to make shifts towards more sustainable patterns thinking and behaving.

3.1 Natural of Artificial? Hero and the Sparrows

Marlowe’s *Hero and Leander*, published posthumously in 1598, follows a similar narrative trajectory to its classical model. The protagonists are introduced through “competing” blazons—the contrast between their descriptions is frequently framed as artificial (Hero) versus natural (Leander) (Hyman 154). In *Metamorphic Verse*, Clark Hulse describes the difference between the depictions of Hero and Leander as one of bodily proximity: “While Hero is desired from afar and through her hair and her ornaments, Leander is stripped naked, exposed to the eye, his hand and neck and breast sipped, tasted, and touched” (107). Like many other men, Leander desires Hero “from afar” (Hulse 107). In this case, however, Hero cautiously reciprocates Leander’s love (all the while keeping in mind her “oxymoronic” vow of chastity to the goddess of love, Venus) (Boehrer and Henley 110). Throughout the poem, Leander demonstrates his rhetorical eloquence, eventually convincing Hero to revoke her vow of chastity. One night, Leander swims across the Hellespont and, after his perilous journey, the pair consummates their love. Unlike the classical tale, which involves numerous
night meetings between the lovers—meetings which culminate in Leander’s drowning and Hero’s suicide—Marlowe’s poem ends with the first night of their intercourse. While the poem was later “completed” by George Chapman (1598), here I treat only Marlowe’s work, and focus in particular on the poem’s opening blazon of Hero. Between lines 31-36, we encounter a magnificent description of the avian automata which adorn Hero’s boots and which, through a movement of water produced by her steps, “chirrup.”

Buskins of shels, all silvered, used she,
And brancht with blushing corall to the knee;
Where sparrowes percht, of hollow pearle and gold,
Such as the world would woonder to behold:
Those with sweete water oft her handmaid fils,
Which as she went, would cherupe through the bils.

(31-36)

In their essay “Automated Marlowe: Hero and Leander 31-36,” Bruce Boehrer and Trish Thomas Henley explore this part of the poem and suggest, following the doctrine of Galenic humouralism, that Hero’s mechanical buskins represent her “attempts to control her own sexual impulses” (107). In this analogical reading, the sparrow-adorned buskins are subsumed into the human realm as “emblems of the body, contrasting the humoral body’s organic creation of the passions with Hero’s attempt to repress the irrepresible” (107).

Paster’s work demonstrates the centrality of Galenic humouralism in early modern explanations of bodily function, and the construction of subjectivity (1993; 2004).

Constructions of gender and class were built on the perceived ability to control, or temper the material flows of these humours (Paster, Embarrassed 25). As Fudge writes in Brutal Reasoning, women’s capacity for bodily control was deemed inferior to men’s because of a “natural deficiency” (40). Unlike men, whose rational capacity controlled bodily motions like
humours and passions, women were understood as impressionable, sensuous, and bodily beings more closely aligned to animals (creatures moved solely by sensitive motions). Early moderns believed that “the external world impacts on women ... in a way that implies their control of the internal world is frail”; thus, while “always different from ... animals”, a woman’s “humanity was perceived to be more fragile” (Fudge, Brutal 41). We observe the tradition of female alignment with the natural world in literature from the period.137

As well as nature in general, through humouralism, women were aligned with water. As Anne Carson notes in “Putting Her in Her Place: Woman, Dirt, and Desire,” in the physiological model of humouralism, temperature is “rarely considered apart” from “wetness” (cold) and “dryness” (hot) (137). Women, who are understood to be cold, are therefore also seen as “wet”—an understanding which has important implications for their alignment with nature and sexuality:

The unfailing moisture and sexual drive of woman is part of a larger pattern, part of a larger harmony between women and the elements of nature in general. United by a vital liquidity with the elemental world, woman is able to tap into the inexhaustible reservoirs of nature’s procreative power. Man, meanwhile, holds himself fiercely and thoughtfully apart from this world of plants, animals, and female wantonness.

(Carson, “Putting Her” 142-43)

“The wet,” according to Aristotle, “is that which is not bounded by any boundary of its own but can be readily bounded” (De gen. et corr. 329b31-33). For women, characterised by porousness and penetrability, a “wet” constitution explains their greater vulnerability to the flows of passions, in particular of desire (erōs):

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137 In literature from the period, women are aligned with nature through functions like reproduction. Thomas Carew’s poem “Spring” (1640) is a particularly notable example of this tradition.
The assault of emotion was also thought to be an endangering wetness. Emotion pours into a person and melts, loosens, dissolves him [*sic*]. … The emotions of *erōs* are especially liquid and liquefying. *Erōs* pours, drips, heats, softens, melts, loosens, cooks, boils, dissolves.

(Carson, “Putting Her” 138)

Carson explores the intimate connection between women and water in the tales of Cyane and of Byblis in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*. In these tales, both women are transformed into pools of water through the flow of their tears:

woman’s boundaries are pliant, porous, mutable. Her power to control them is inadequate, her concern for them unreliable. Deformation attends her. She swells, she shrinks, she leaks, she is penetrated, she suffers metamorphoses.

(“Putting Her” 154)

The sensual alignment between elements of the natural world, like water, and women is important for Boehrer and Henley’s suggestion that it is “natural” for these desiring passions to be channelled into sexual activity. The water that flows through the sparrows is, for Boehrer and Henley, a symbol of Hero’s passions, which she mechanically controls. According to Boehrer and Henley, Hero tries to move further away from the “lusty” animal which adorns her buskins by attempting to “mechanically” control her sexual impulses. Hero’s feminine nature, “imagined as water,” is channelled; it is “driven out and forced through pipes, the arteries of her shoes” (112). In Boehrer and Henley’s reading, Hero is not a whore “because she is sexually incontinent”—“water, symbolically female, does not function here as a sign of Hero’s ‘leaky vessel,’ marking her inability to control her sexual urges” (111-112). Rather, “Hero is a whore because she attempts to manipulate what should

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138 Sparrows trouble Hero’s aspirations of abstinence. During the early-modern period, sparrows were linked with sexuality and promiscuity; for example, in John Donne’s “Epithalamion, or Wedding Song” (1633) and Shakespeare’s *Troilus and Cressida* (1609) (3.2.1680). For more on ancient and medieval influences for the lusty sparrow, see Todd’s discussion of Sappho’s “O’Aphrodite,” and Gaius Cattulus’s sexually ambiguous “Poem 2,” 69.
be organic: sexual desire” (112).139 While I appreciate the metaphorical function of water in Bohrer and Henley’s analysis, I propose a reading of the blazon that does not assume “desire” is organic. The organic and the inorganic are entangled in the figures of the automated sparrows, which combine elements of “hollow pearl and gold” (Marlowe 33). These sparrows, which adorn Hero’s body and add to her sexual allure, challenge purely organic conceptualisations of sexuality in two ways. Firstly, they function as a microcosm for the natural and artificial entanglements of Deleuzian desire. And, secondly, parallels between humoural flows and the hydraulic flows of the automata gesture towards a hydraulic conception of desire as a force which deterritorialises, or frees, desire from its localisation within the organic body, in particular the genitals. Desire freed from molar forms crosses or flows between organic and inorganic bodies. I approach this non-localised and connective desire, a desire which troubles categorical divisions like organic and inorganic, by first briefly considering female alignment with the artificial during the early modern period.

In Engines of the Imagination, Jonathan Sawday discusses the relationship between women and works of art in early-modern texts. In Spenser’s The Fairie Queene (1590), Arcasia and “art” share the ability to “subvert and then over-master masculine reason” (Sawday 181). Additionally, like Marlowe’s blazon of Hero, in Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra (1606), Enobarbus aligns Cleopatra with artifice, as “Nature’s Rival,” describing her as “a piece of art, who is capable of creating ‘a gap in nature’” (Ant.2.2.224 quoted in Sawday 203). Similarly, Hermione in Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale (composed c. 1609-10, published 1623), is modelled on Ovid’s “Pygmalion,” a figure who, perhaps more than any other, expresses female alignment with art (Sawday 204).

In what follows, I will use a vital materialist framework to develop a non-localised, hydraulic conception of desire which allows me to consider female alignment with both

139 During the early modern period there was a “semitic connection between whores and the chamber pot” (Paster 38). For example, “it was thought that whores used urination immediately after copulation both as a form of contraception and as a preventative against venereal disease” (Henke 192). For more, see Henke 192.
animals and machines not as paradoxical, but as an example of the horizontalising potential of vital materialism. The avian automata adorning Hero’s artful buskins emerge as key players in moving from conceptualisations of Cartesian “unfeeling” machines to vital “feeling” machines.

3.2 Navigating the Paradox: Vital Materialism and Hydraulic Desire

In my discussion of women’s humoural bodies, I noted the gendering of water in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*: water is associated with female emotion and change. However, in Ovid’s work, water has a lively as well as changeable aspect. In book three, Diana sprinkles water on Actaeon and he is transformed into a stag. And, in book one, floodwaters destructively alter the landscape at the same time as they connect opposites like land and sea: “No difference was between the sea and ground / For all was sea” (Ovid 1. 343-44). The land and sea connection evokes Heraclitus’s paradox of the unity of opposites, and is a paradox which finds its correlative in Deleuze’s “disjunctive synthesis”—a concept central to Deleuzian immanent desire. Ovid’s water, like Heraclitus’s paradox, helps to demonstrate how the flows of immanent desire draw together paradoxes: “The same ... living and dead, and the waking and the sleeping, and young and old. For these transposed are those, and those transposed again are these” (Heraclitus Fragment XCIII). Water-like, immanent desire begins to erode categorical boundaries. Another important and related feature of Heraclitus’s work is the idea of flux. In Plato’s *Cratylus*, Socrates mentions Heraclitus’s discussion of rivers, change, and flows: “Heraclitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you

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140 For further studies on the liveliness and efficacy of water, see Bradley, and Glasgow.
141 Most basically, disjunctive synthesis is an immanent mode of thinking, which replaces the word “or” with “and.” For example, instead of being “white or black, male or female,” as we find in “exclusive disjunction,” in “immanent disjunction” or “disjunctive synthesis,” “I am male and female, white and black, all the sexes of the world” (Colebrook, *Understanding* 113).
142 Leonardo da Vinci’s writing about water also seems to capture the liveliness, connectivity, and “disjunctive synthesis” of Heraclitus’s work and Deleuzian desire. For Leonardo, “water is the driver of Nature,” it is “the vital humour of the terrestrial machine, moved by its own natural heat” (Sawday, *Engines* 32).
cannot go into the same water twice” (Plato, *Cratylus* 402a). Importantly, for Heraclitus, “all things flow and nothing stands,” or, “everything gives way and nothing stands fast” (*Cratylus* 402a). The verb “flow” denotes continuous and steady movement, which makes it particularly amenable to a Deleuzian ontology of becoming. In *Sex and Sensuality in the Ancient World*, Giulia Sissa cites Plato’s *Timaeus* and the notion of the body “as a torrential river” (43a-b); “Heraclitus’ river runs through our bodies” (46). The idea of the river flowing through, or crossing the body evokes the material humours and the water which passes through Hero’s avian automata, as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s immanent and free-flowing desire: “Desire traverses and constitutes us, our ways of being and becoming” (O’Donnell 225). In other words, “the operation of desire undoes presuppositions and depersonalises, making us see that we are less the one who *has* desires, than that desires have *us*” (O’Donnell 222, italics in original). For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is a material force which, like water—especially evident in the Ovidian deluge—sweeps past molar structures integrating them into its flow. As a material force, desire horizontalizes the relation between humans, biota, and abiotia. It draws human attention sideways, away from an ontologically ranked Great Chain of Being and toward a greater appreciation of the complex entanglements of humans and nonhumans.

(Bennett, *Vibrant* 12)

Deleuze and Guattari trace their own hydraulic vocabulary back to the ancient atomism of Epicurus, suggesting that “rather than being a theory of solids treating fluids as a special case;
ancient atomism is inseparable from flows, and flux is reality itself, or consistency” (ATP 415). According to Deleuze and Guattari, this world-in-flux can be approached through two different frameworks: State science and nomad science. These two models of “science” underlie the differences between my reading of Hero’s relationship to the avian automata which adorn her buskins, and Boehrer and Henley’s. Therefore, before continuing, it is necessary to delineate these differences and to explain the relationship between State science and restriction, and nomad science and the flows of material, impersonal, and horizontalising desire.

State science belongs to the plane of organisation. It is concerned with territorialisation and stratification and

subordinate[s] hydraulic force to conduits, pipes, embankments, which prevent turbulence, which constrain movement to go from one point to another, and space itself to be striated and measured, which makes the fluid depend on the solid, and flows proceed by parallel, laminal layers.

(Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 423)

Unlike State science,

the hydraulic model of nomad science …, consists in being distributed by turbulence across a smooth space, in producing a movement that holds space and simultaneously affects all of its points, instead of being held by space in a local movement from one specified point to another.

(Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 423)

For Deleuze and Guattari, “the sea is perhaps principal among smooth spaces, the hydraulic model par excellence” (ATP 451). It exemplifies their non-localised, non-teleological desire as it “no longer goes from one point to another, but rather holds space beginning from any
point” (ATP 451). The sea is the “in-between.” The flow of desire holds space, and rather than being forced through pipes for release, it is held on a level plane, a plateau. For Deleuze and Guattari, conceiving of desire according to the release model of pleasure/orgasm is a major impediment to understanding desire as a distributed, flowing, and productive force. Generally, understandings of sexuality or desire begin with the subject, and are subordinated to Oedipal structures. These structures, like the pipes and conduits of State science, “restrict sexuality to mean only certain things”; it is the linear trajectory the organism follows to a specific, localised, point of termination: gratification and pleasure (Beckman 3). On the other hand, immanent and machinic desire is productive, connective, and continuous: “everything is potentially sexualised through Deleuze’s philosophy” (Beckman 3). Like the sea, pre-genital sexuality is “distributed by turbulence across a smooth space.” It is a plane of consistency, simultaneously affecting and holding all of its points. Rather than being channelled into pipes or structures, like the individual organism, sexuality is a “productive-energy,” “a drive that makes us, or in Deleuze’s later terminology, that fuels becoming” (Beckman 9, 7-8).

We are able to put these ideas to work in Marlowe’s poem by comparing the hydraulic flow of desire in the opening blazon to the poem’s last reference to a bird, which “occurs near the end of the epyllion, at its moment of sexual consummation” (Boehrer and Henley 114):

Buskins of shels all silvered used she,
And brancht with blushing coral to the knee;
Where sparrowes percht, of hollow pearle and gold,
Such as the world would woonder to behold;
Those with sweet water oft her handmaid fils,
Which as she went would cherupe through the bils.
Lambert 118

(31-36)

Love is not full of pittie (as men say)
But deaffe and cruell, where he meanes to pray.
Even as a bird, which in our hands we wring,
Foorthe plungeth, and oft flutters with her wing,
She trembling strove.

(771-75)

These two passages juxtapose desiring flows to the release of “pleasure”—a model of desire which Deleuze and Guattari strongly reject. Like the bird trapped in the hands of the hunter, pleasure traps desire in the molar form of the organism. Desire is a vital force, which, independent of Hero and the automated sparrows, flows through them. While this hydraulic desire moves across and through the pipes of Hero’s buskins, and the arteries and veins of her body, it is distinct from the flows of State science because there is no point of termination. The water for the chirping avian automata cycles through the buskins, just as the humours and passions cycle from the outside of the body to the inside.

In the passage from Marlowe, this flow’s ability to create organic and inorganic connections between humans, animals, and machines is demonstrated through parallels between humouralism and hydraulic mechanisms. Rather than being an empty shell with no life or “story” to “string together,” the Hero of the poem’s beginning is a “joyous automaton” who represents “a world of transversal communications where the finally conquered nonhuman sex mingles with the flowers, a new earth where desire functions according to elements and flows” (O’Donnell 218; Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 319). Deleuze and Guattari envision the automaton as “one who trades in molecular flows, becoming undone, connecting once more, closer, … to matter, closer to inorganic life” (O’Donnell 228). The political implications of reading Hero-as-automaton derive from a decentring of the human, which
means that we do not have to “begin” with the human; rather, “we come to imagine new ways of beginning elsewhere, with desiring-machines or the earth” (O’Donnell 228). For example, we might think of the human as “emerging in and with”

the force of gravity, mitochondria, nutrients of the soil, the philological evolutions of our language, or the vibration of trees at a concert. By inverting our horizons, we are no longer zero point from which all life begins but co-participate in the genesis of the world.

(O’Donnell 228)

“A body in genesis, as process, in relation” is an automaton or machine created through flows of immanent desire (O’Donnell 119). Unlike the “bird, which in our hands we wring,” an automaton-body “cannot be pinned like a butterfly into ‘one orientation,’ one set of dispositions, or an identity” (Marlowe 773; O’Donnell 119). The automaton is a key figure in challenging the notion of human essentialism. Rather than being something that is, the automaton is a product of connections and defined by what it can do. Rather than categorical stasis, my vital materialist study of Hero has considered a more integrative alternative to the territorial constraints of gender, species, and materiality.

3.3 Musical Flows and Vital Hums

Like Hero, whose body “parts” are individually framed and held in certain positions and postures, Shakespeare’s Lucrece is introduced as a “static” figure: “a virtuous monument” (391). Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece is based on classical sources and follows the traditional narrative progression. While my reading aims to locate the deterritorialising, connective “hum” of non-localised desire in Lucrece’s lament after her rape by Sextus Tarquinius, there is circularity to Shakespeare’s poem because, at the end, Lucrece returns to the “static” figure of the beginning:
They did conclude to bear dead Lucrece thence,
To show her bleeding body through Rome,
And so to publish Tarquin’s foul offence.

(1850-1852)

I will argue that the vital force running through Lucrece’s lament is the vibrative “hum” of Deleuzian desire.\(^{146}\) Like the hydraulic desire developed in my reading of *Hero and Leander*, the vibrative hum offers an alter-reading of this poem through its disruption of male/female, human/animal, and organic/inorganic binaries.\(^ {147}\)

Shakespeare’s *Rape of Lucrece* differs from the traditional tale in giving a “voice” Lucrece. In book two of Ovid’s *Fasti*, the version from which Shakespeare’s play is largely drawn, Lucrece is a silent figure: in Tarquin’s grasp, “voice and power of speech and thought itself fle[e] from her breast” (2.797-798). In Shakespeare’s poem, not only is Lucrece given a voice before she is raped, but after the incident Lucrece begins a lengthy lament which, interspersed with narration, spans over 800 lines. Near the beginning of this lament, she considers how her husband Collantinus will be disgraced, and aligns herself with a drone bee:

“and I, a drone-like bee / Have no perfection of my summer left” (836-837). Considered alone, this moment could flit by almost unnoticed. However, we are drawn back to the bee three more times before the poem ends (lines 1133, 1297, 1769).\(^ {148}\) Of these references, I

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\(^{146}\) During the early modern period, the hum is used for both approbation and disapprobation. In Milton’s *Apol. Smectymnuus* (1642), the hum can be read as positive or negative: “Such as are most humm’d and applauded there.” Similarly, while in Shakespeare’s *The Rape of Lucrece*, it is possible to interpret the hum as an aggressive act through which Lucrece asserts agency, it might also express passivity. “Hum” describes the ring or vibration of an object, like a bell, which sounds out after being struck. Thus, it might describe the vibrative waves which resonate after Lucrece has been “struck,” and which would resonate through her life, and also, potentially, through those of her future children:

For sorrow, like a heavy hanging bell,
Once set on ringing, with his own weight goes;
Then little strength rings out the doleful knell.

(1493-95)

\(^{147}\) A similar suggestion of the enlivening potential of music is found in *The Winter’s Tale* in the animation of Hermione’s statue: “Music; awake her: strike! / ’Tis time: descend: be stone no more” (5.3.120-121).

\(^{148}\) Despite the number of apian images within the poem, bees and drones in Shakespeare’s *The Rape of Lucrece* have received little critical attention. In various editions of the poem, the notes subsume this moment into the
focus on the first, Lucrece’s statement “I will hum on Tarquin still,” which comes during her ventriloquising of Philomela’s and then Hecuba’s grief (1133). The machinic and musical line I follow threads through Lucrece’s different experiential states and opens up the potential for her becoming-drone. Lucrece’s progression through different becomings appears, from the outset, to adhere to a linear or hierarchical structure: human, animal, insect, instrument. However, I will demonstrate that running beneath and through these formal impressions is a molecular and vital line of humming or droning, which not only complicates such distinctions but also functions as a “desiring-machine” that deterritorialises fixed relations and encourages new connections, assemblages, and becomings. At the end of the poem, we observe that Lucrece does not “progress” to the “cosmic solution” of all becomings, which, for Deleuze and Guattari is “becoming-imperceptible” (ATP 325). Instead, her becoming falters and folds back on itself, reterritorialising her as a woman. Before I begin my study of Lucrece, I briefly consider the relation between Deleuzian desire and the hum. I then turn to a discussion of speaking, singing, and humming in Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece. In each of these sections, I will suggest what a molar reading might look like before considering in greater detail molecular and machinic alternatives.

Voice, during the early modern period, is conceived of materially. According to Bonnie Gordon, the voice was understood as “a kinaesthetic entity with physical substance,” or “vibrating air that flowed through the throat of the singer into the vulnerable ear of the listener” (10). Like the hydraulic desire explored above, the material voice functions as a

larger frameworks of Roman shame, Christian guilt, and chastity. Rowe’s edition of the poem (The New Cambridge Shakespeare), equates the drone bee with “proverbial worthlessness” (192). The only extended treatments of Lucrece’s reference to the drone are essays by Plant and Matsuda and. Plant argues that the bee is employed in the poem as a “sexual role model” and looks to classical and medieval precedents for the image of the chaste bee (51). Matsuda uses popular emblem literature of the period to consider the “personal and private struggle between Lucrece and Tarquin [as] … an extended metaphorical narrative of a military campaign” (134).

I am wary of glorifying the violent act of rape by implying that it is a precondition for becomings. Because of this, I want to articulate that becomings are not bound up with rape; instead, this is one example, in which the dispersal of “individual” grief offers us a glimmer of networks of becoming. In contemporary culture, rape support and discussion groups operate on the belief in the healing and transformative power of linguistic and emotional dispersal.
desiring-machine which connects and produces assemblages. For the first English phonetician, Robert Robinson, underlying seemingly discrete words is a continuous “stream of sound” (Smith 158): “The vitall sound ... whereof all the sounds of different quantitie doe arise” (Robinson n. pag.). According to Robinson, “vitall sound” aids in the expression of other sounds, like vowels and consonants. The “vitall sound” “is only used in composition, with the others of different qualities to expresse them more lively to the eares of the auditors ... [it] is made a lively helper to the other [sounds]” (n. pag.). In a reading of Robinson’s work, Bruce Smith observes that “when a person speaks, the vocal chords, the jaw, the tongue, and the palate are in constant motion. The result is a continuous stream of sound, not a chain of discrete sounds” (Smith 158). Thus, “however much early modern writers” like Francis Bacon and John Hart “wanted to describe speech as a sequence of discrete letters or voices, they nonetheless recognized that what gets articulated in articulate speech is continuous, undifferentiated sound” (Smith 160, italics in original). In Deleuzian terminology, this “vital sound” is the molecular which operates between, beneath, and through the molar.

Smith draws a connection between Robinson’s “vitall sound” and insects, suggesting that Edmund Spenser hears this sound as “the buzzing of bees” (160). In book two of *The Faerie Queen* (1590), Spenser writes:

And all the chamber was filled with flyes,  
Which buzzes about, and made such sound,  
That they encombred all mens eares and eyes,  
Like many swarmes of Bees assembled round.

(2.9.51)

Buzzing is a sound which “occurs both below and above the threshold of articulated speech. It is a kind of noise that is both less than speech and the sound of its surfeit” (Connor 164).
Like Spenser’s “buzz,” and Robinson’s “third sound” the related sound of the “hum” has, according to Steven Connor, a vital quality. He regards the hum as

The articulation of the nasality that otherwise lies hidden beneath and within all articulation, as its binding and enlivening principle. The hum is the melodic inner lining of all speech, a song that never quite bursts into song, nor ever fully differentiates individual melodies.

In other words, it is “the song of songs, the average and aggregation of all the tunes that lie latent within the voice” (Connor 95). These two points are particularly important for a conception of this vital sound because, as with hydraulic desire, it begins to suggest a force which plays us, or flows through us. It horizontalises relations by moving agency away from entities. Elizabeth Grosz articulates this idea musically, suggesting that “[t]he organism is equipped by its organs to play precisely the tune its milieu has composed for it, like an instrument playing in a larger orchestra” (43). I will now consider how the hum of desire plays out across Shakespeare’s Lucrece.

3.4 Musical B(e)e-comings: Words, Songs, Hums

Once contextualised within early modern conceptions of gender and vocality, Shakespeare’s allocation of “voice” to Lucrece is not as generous as it might first seem. The classical and early modern alignment of voice with rationality did not pertain to both sexes. As noted in my exploration of gendered humoralism, females were not believed to possess the same rational capacity as males, and therefore a woman’s speech could actually result in hierarchical denigration rather than elevation. According to Bonnie Gordon, the materiality of the voice tied it to the body and thus “the sexualisation of the female voice emerged from the sexualisation of their bodies” (5). In classical and early modern medical doctrines, “the uterus and the throat” were “analogous to one another”: “both mouths and sex organs could
‘swallow’ and ‘consume’” (Gordon 77). This association meant that a female who was free with her tongue was thought to be similarly liberal in her sexual conduct. The association between loquaciousness and sexual promiscuity was reinforced by the dual role of courtesans as musicians. Susan McClary observes that during the early modern period

[t]he majority of skilled female musicians practiced their arts as courtesans, in which case the selling of the voice attached directly to the prostitution of the body and vocal prowess operated quite literally as siren song.

In Shakespeare’s poem, Lucrece’s utterances are bound up with the relationship between speech and sex. Rather than deterring Tarquin, her speech increases his libidinal desire:

“‘Have done,’ quoth he. ‘My uncontrollèd tide / Turns not, but swells higher by this let’ (her appeals) (645-646). Lucrece’s words do not have the force to bring her to equal standing with her “rational” male counterpart. Instead, words “entomb” her inside the patriarchal structure.

The wolf hath seized his prey, the poor lamb cries,
Till with her own white fleece her voice controlled
Entombs her outcry in her lips’ sweet fold.

While the animal imagery is used for both Tarquin and Lucrece, the entombing of Lucrece’s voice is carried out by “her own white fleece”—the bed sheets, a site associated with sexual activity.

For Lucrece, words stratify her in a patriarchal model. In more musical terms, they construct a “territorial refrain” that seeks to “mark” or “assemble a territory”; in this case, the

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150 For examples of this association from early modern drama, see Loughlin.  
151 For more on this, see Newcomb; Feldman, and Gordon.
territory of the human female (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 380). This type of refrain “shape[s] the vibrations of milieus into the harmonics of territories”—in other words, it involves “the organization of a wall or barrier” (Grosz 54). From this, we see that a molar reading does little to destabilise categorical distinctions.

Alongside such a reading, however, we glimpse an alternative. Using a Deleuzian framework, it is possible to read Tarquin’s rape of Lucrece as a “big sudden blow... that come[s], or seem[s] to come, from outside” (Fitzgerald 69 quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 232, italics in original). The “cracks” created through these breaks bring us into contact with molecular lines which move away from molar structures like gender and humanity. The rape is a brutal physical violation; it also “breaks” Lucrece’s identity. She says that “her subjects with foul insurrection / Have battered down her consecrated wall” (722-723). In the interstices of this battered wall, or human “refrain,” we encounter a vital and connective line of humming. Even her “human” words appear to be traversed by a non-organic line of desire. Words are denounced by Lucrece as “cleanly coined excuses,” which, like little machines, have been “cleverly forged” (1073). Here, Lucrece disconnects “words” from human essentialism; instead, they become autonomous desiring-machines which “plug … into the territorial assemblage of a species and opens it to other assemblages” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 388). We get a better idea of this productive and connective conception of language through comparison with early modern analogical systems. Linda Phyllis Austern writes, for example, that language “represent[ed] the interconnectedness of things,” and, “through analogies, literally held the universe together” (5). In this way, it is comparable to Robinson’s “vitall sound”: it is that which enables connection and expression.

152 “Every refrain is marked by all three aspects or movements, a home, a yard, and a way out, which nevertheless vary in their incantatory force, in their combination, in their emphasis” (Grosz 52-53).
153 Theoretically, Deleuze and Guattari do not endorse analogical systems or relations which operate through resemblance; however, I aim to demonstrate that both share the basic principle of connection.
154 See Braune for a study of material and machinic language in a modern context.
In the linguistic continuity of the early modern universe, language is connected with music through an “intellectually inseparable continuity of rhetorical persuasion” (Austern 5). While language is understood as medium for the transmission of “rhetorical content,” music is regarded “as an extra-rational channel for memory or affect” (Austern 5). Music, for Deleuze and Guattari, is “a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain” (ATP 350). Reading language in this way allows us to follow the line of the hum as it threads through the most musical passage of Shakespeare’s *The Rape of Lucrece*: the “Philomela passage,” which comes after Lucrece has been raped:

My restless dischord loves no stops nor rests;
A woeful hostess brooks not merry guests.
Relish your nimble notes to pleasing ears;
Distress like dumps, when time is kept with tears.
Come, Philomel, that sing’st of ravishment,
Make thy sad grove in my dishevelled hair.
As the dank earth weeps at thy languishment,
So I at each sad strain will strain a tear
And with deep groans the diapason bear:
For burden-wise I’ll hum on Tarquin still,
While thou on Tereus descants better skill.

(1124-1134, Edward Naylor’s italics)\(^{155}\)

Discussing Shakespeare’s apparent fascination with music, Edward Naylor notes that, “[o]ut of thirty-seven plays of Shakespeare, there are no less than thirty-two which contain interesting references to music and musical themes in the text itself” (3). In the first chapter of his study, Naylor explores a number of musical “quibbles” in *The Rape of Lucrece* (22).

\(^{155}\) For a more detailed explanation of the musical terms used in this passage, see Naylor 22-27.
He focuses in particular on Lucrece’s address to Philomela. As Naylor’s emphases indicate, this example is filled with musical resonances. Near the beginning of her lament, Lucrece moves from words to “a well-tuned warble” (1080), momentarily performing the “song” of the bird. Following this, Lucrece introduces the “hum” and “burden.” My discussion follows the progression of this stanza. However, just as this progression is somewhat complicated by “descant” in the last line of the cited passage, in the final part of my study, I consider how this seemingly linear movement, and Lucrece’s becoming-drone, are complicated by the potentially territorialising force of words.156

Unlike words, “song” begins to trouble human and animal boundaries. While language is predominantly (though, not incontestably) believed to be restricted to the human realm, the capacity for song is observed in a range of creatures, most notably in birds.157 We can read Lucrece’s “well-tuned warble” as both Oedipal reterritorialisation and molecular deterritorialisation. For example, the menagerie of animals that populate Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece induce a Spring-like sense of animal abundance and life.158 If females are associated with nature through reproductive sexuality, we might read the birds’ “melodies” as mating cries. Lucrece’s “escape” from human subjectivity and patriarchal structures is also disturbed by the reference to Philomela who is transformed into a nightingale after being

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156 “Descant,” according to Naylor means “to sing or play an extempore second ‘part’ to a written melody” (24). The definition of extemporising as the spontaneous singing of a non-melodic part does seem to express the constant molecular movement and variation of becoming.

157 Indeed, for musical creation and performance, like the opera, birdsong provided a model par excellence. Grize explores the conflation of the human and animal in the supposedly “human” practice of the opera. He notes how in a performance by the Italian opera singer Francesca Cuzzoni (1696-1778), an audience member cries out: “D—her! She has a nest of nightingales in her belly!” (Highfill et al. 118). It is also useful to note Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer’s debate about language and music. For Darwin, “music precedes language and is the direct result of sexual selection not of natural selection” (Grosz 31)—in other words, it is something shared between the human and the animal (Grosz 30). Spencer, however, believed that “music is a playful but largely epiphenomenal residue of language” (Grosz 31). If music and song are seen to be creative offshoots of language, song is subsumed into the larger and biological framework of natural selection and reproduction. Music becomes a natural and “biological” function of organisms.

158 In Fasti, Ovid dedicates the twenty-fourth of February (just days before March and the beginning of Spring) to describing the events surrounding Lucrece’s rape and death. Evocations of Spring are also found in Shakespeare’s poem; for example, “April daisy” (395), and the “season” for the wolf’s hunting of the lamb (166).
“ravished and mutilated by her brother-in-law Tereus” (Hyman 158). The nightingale’s song, according to Austern, was “expressive and arousing,” and “became the symbol of orgasmic sexual pleasure as often as of divine rapture” (20). To support this association, Austern gestures towards the phallic nature of the “thorn” on which the nightingale pricks her breast. We find this in Shakespeare’s poem with the line “and whiles against a thorn thou bear’st thy part” (1135). Lucrece’s alignment with birds therefore puts her body at risk of “rational” male “colonisation.” Gordon argues that

> [t]he conflation of the ravishing female voice and equally ravishing bird song situate[s] both forces in the natural untamed world, a space ripe for colonization by some rational force.

(155)

In Shakespeare’s poem, notions of sexual conquest and territorial colonisation are fused in Tarquin’s description of Lucrece’s breasts as “ivory globes circled with blue, / A pair of maiden worlds unconquered” (407-408). In an alignment with birds, then, Lucrece risks reterritorialisation by a molar line that reorganises the flows of machinic desire into Oedipal, and thus localised and genital, structures.

Yet Lucrece’s address to Philomela does offer the potential for a molecular and machinic reading. In “Mathematical experiments of long silver pipes,” Wendy Beth Hyman shows that “as early as Pliny, the nightingale [is] associated with not just the mournful, but the mechanistic” (158). Pliny associates the nightingale with a “wind-organ.” The nightingale, varieth and altereth her voice to all keies … for at one time you shall heare her voice ful and loud, another time as low; and anon shrill and on high: thick and short when she list; drawn out at leisure againe when she is disposed: and then (if
she be so pleased) shee riseth and mounteth up aloft, as it were with a wind-organ.

(113)

Like Pliny, early moderns frequently described the nightingale in mechanical terms. For example, Diego de San Pedro wishes that his “Tongue were now with Silver tip’t” and that his “throate / Were lin’d with Brasse” to sing his mournful tune (10). Such mechanical conceptions of the nightingale promote the notion of the automaton with transversal flows of desire, rather than sexuality localised to the body and its parts. This shift to machinic desire correlates with the movement from the vocal to the instrumental in Lucrece’s Philomela passage. The nightingale’s body, and the tunes it sings, are uncoupled from Oedipal structures; the bird becomes an instrument, or assembled body, able to play any tune. In other words, it is a machinic Deleuzian Body without Organs—a sonic plateau—upon which and across which tunes, or desires, play.

The lines at the end of the Philomela passage indicate a shift from vocal to instrumental sounds:

And with deep groans the diapason bear:

For burden-wise I’ll hum on Tarquin still,

While thou on Tereus descants better skill.

(1124-1134, Naylor’s italics)

Naylor states that during Shakespeare’s time “‘diapason’ meant the interval of an octave,” arguing that Lucrece’s offering to “bear the diapason” signifies a “burden” or “bass accompaniment” that will be “hum[ed]” or “drone[d] in “some lower octave than the
nightingale’s ‘descant’” (Bate and Rasmussen 127; Naylor 22). In discussing the reference to “burden” in Lucrece’s lament, Naylor notes an early modern example involving the interplay of burden and melody, which is particularly relevant to my focus on the drone and humming. In “Richard Edward’s Damon and Pythias, 1565, Grimme, the collier, sings a ‘bussing base,’ and two of his friends, Jack and Will, ‘quiddel upon it,’ i.e. they sing the tune and words, while he buzzes the burden” (Naylor 14). In one sense the term “drone” carried a similar sonic vitality to humming and buzzing. Through its polyvalence, Lucrece’s “drone” becomes a point of intersection between the organic, the inorganic, and the purely sonic. Drone, for example, signifies a male honey-bee whose function is to impregnate the queen, a musical instrument—most often the bagpipe—and a “continued deep monotonous sound of humming or buzzing” emitting, for example, from a bagpipe, insect, “or the like” (OED “drone” n1, n2). “Drone” or “droning” during the early modern period is associated with both insects and instruments. In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari argue that through the insect the historical trajectory of vocal music has made a progressive move toward the molecular, the instrumental. Formerly, birds and birdsong ruled. However, insects have taken over: “birds are still … important, yet the reign of the birds seems to have been replaced by the age of insects” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 359). For Deleuze and Guattari, insects play an important role in the machining of music. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, during the early

159 Bate and Rasmussen note that the word “burden” also takes on a double-meaning as a signifier of both “bass accompaniment” and the sense of the “heavy load” left by Tarquin (127). For an extensive discussion of the etymology and various associations of “burden” during the early modern period, see Neill. 160 In the early modern period, the term is used in each of these three senses: in Shakespeare’s Henry V (1.2.348-50): “The sad-eyed justice, with his surly hum, / Delivering o’er to the executors pale / the lazy yawning drone”; in an entry from 1502 in Nicolas’s Privy Purse, “A Mynstrell that played upon a droon”; and in Shakespeare’s Henry IV (1.3.76): “I am as melancholy as … the drone of a Lincolnshire bagpipe.” 161 Robert Hooke writes that insects are “little Automatons,” which occupy a space between the “living and the merely lifelike” (194, cited in Sawday 226). For Braidotti, the insect “is non-human, but also somewhat non-animal” and is connected to the machine through the “speed” of their bodies and “their technological performativity” (Metamorphoses 153). The insect is particularly amenable to becomings, especially becoming-molecular and becoming imperceptible through “their power of metamorphosis, [their] parasitism, … and the speed of [their] movement” (Metamorphoses 149). Molecular becomings occur at speeds above and below human perception—something which Shakespeare himself draws attention to in Lucrece in relation to gnats. He compares the flight of gnats to that of eagles: “Gnats unnoted wheresoe’er they fly, / But eagles gazed upon with every eye” (1014-1015). According to Braidotti,
modern period the insect is aligned with the instrument. For Deleuze and Guattari, unlike the
bird the insect is “closer, better able to make audible the truth that all becomings are
molecular” (ATP 359). The music of the insect consists of molecular vibrations like “chirring,
rustling, buzzing, clicking, scratching, and scraping” (ATP 359). In the movement from vocal
bird music, to molecular insect music, the voice is deterritorialised or “machin[ed]”—it
“becomes less and less tied to language” and to the molar structures of “male” and “female”
(ATP 352). Thus the “machin[ing] of the voice” implies the “abolition of the overall dualism
machine, in other words the molar formation assigning voices to the ‘man or woman’” (ATP
353-4). The voice and the instrument are thus brought onto “the same plane” and the
deterritorialised voice “dispatches molecular flows” (ATP 358, 360, italics in original). Like
the “buzzing” that Deleuze and Guattari note, droning and humming are sounds which have a
powerful deterritorialising effect on the body that emits them. Unlike speaking and singing,
which are localised to air passages running between diaphragm and oral cavity, the hum has a
vibrative or resonating quality, just as “the sea,” in Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic model of
science, spreads out over the body: it “come[s] from everywhere and nowhere” (Connor 92).
The non-localised quality of the hum connects organic and inorganic bodies. Humming is
associated with both insects and machinery; if the source of the hum is able to be
determined at all it seems to have “a general rather than particular source” (Connor 91).

Vocal music of the period became “so virtuosic and ornamented that it would mold
the voice into a mechanized process severed from the spirit and disconnected from the inner
workings of the body” (Gordon 44-45). Particularly important to this mechanisation were

the following properties of insects get star billing: their enormous powers as music-makers and
producers of sounds, the speed of the vibrations they produce, their capacity to defeat gravity and
crawl vertically as well as horizontally, their hyper-active sexuality, with highly accelerated
rhythms and made up of many rhizome trans-species copulations with plants and flowers as well
as entities of the same species.

(153)

For more on the amenability of insects to becomings, see Braidotti’s Metamorphoses, 148-167.
techniques of patterning and pitch repetition. As Gordon notes, a singer’s acquisition of vocal ornaments like the “tremolo” and the “Monteverdi trillo” meant that the singer could “in theory make her voice do anything” (45).\textsuperscript{162} Vocal mechanisation brings voice and instrument onto the “same plane”; this deterritorialises molar forms and, like the nightingale, “performers of all kinds become instruments for the composer’s imaginings” (Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{ATP} 358, italics in original; Gordon 45).\textsuperscript{163} In a curious bee madrigal in Charles Butler’s \textit{Feminine Monarchy} (1623), we observe instrumental techniques like the tremolo. Butler’s madrigal opens with English words; however, as the piece progresses, these words dissolve into the droning sounds—both entomological and instrumental—of a bee swarm (Figs. 11 and 12). Austern argues that in his notation of the natural sounds of the bees, Butler takes “this primordial noise” and, through his “modern madrigalian aesthetic,” “metamorphose[s] [it] into the highest human artifice” (9). However, because the piece begins with recognisable human language and ends with the inarticulate “primordial” hums of bees, one can suggest a movement in the opposite direction. Rather than “controlling” the natural world through musical appropriation, the primordial hum, or sonic vitality, which underlies and connects entities, human and insect, and even organic and inorganic, deterritorialises categorical distinctions.

Like the vocalists of the seventeenth-century, Lucrece becomes an “instrument,” and the “composer’s imaginings” that she plays out are that of a connective and productive desire. From the Philomela passage, cited above, to just before the end of the poem when the assembly of men gathers in Lucrece’s room, Lucrece moves further along the molecular line of the hum, from insect to instrument, through a ventriloquising of Philomela’s and Hecuba’s

\textsuperscript{162} The “tremolo,” for example, is described as an “ornament” of music and is “one pitch sung repeatedly” (Gordon 26). This vocal technique is comparable with “droning,” which in one sense denotes “a continued deep, monotonous sound of humming or buzzing” (\textit{OED n.1}).

\textsuperscript{163} Rather than the composer being a transcendental figure like “God” or “Man,” we can conceive of the “composer” as the Deleuzian “plane of composition,” upon which bodies play out the vibrations and flows of desire.
through ventriloquisation, Lucrece becomes an entity without species, a sexless, unidentified instrument. Connor links the hum with ventriloquising, arguing that because one not only can, but must hum with closed lips, it is always a species of ventriloquism, or thrown voice that comes from everywhere and nowhere. More than an undertone, it is also an overtone, paratone, epitone.

Towards the end of Lucrece’s lament we note an increasing use of images of instruments. For example, there are repetitions of “tuning”: “These means, as frets upon an instrument, / Shall tune our heart-strings to true languishment” (1140-1141); “With untuned tongue she hoarsely calls her maid” (1214); “Poor instrument,’ quoth she, ‘without a sound, / I’l tune thy woes with my lamenting tongue” (1464-1465). Just as the hydraulically-conceived desire flows through the mechanical sparrows and Hero, desire here takes the shape of the hum—vibrating air, or *pneuma*—which flows through Lucrece, who like Pliny’s nightingale, is a wind-organ or instrument. As Connor suggests, “when employed musically” the hum, like Lucrece’s body, “can be seen as a kind of all-purpose instrument, that can be used to play any melody” (Connor 91). Lucrece becomes an “acoustic body-machine” upon which different tunes can be played out (Braidotti, *Metamorphoses* 220).

Music, or in this case, the vibrative hum, “acts on human beings, on their nervous systems and their vital processes … The man inhabited and possessed by this intruder [music], the man robbed of self, is no longer himself: he has become nothing more than a vibrating string, a sounding pipe” (Jankélévitch 1). In this molecular realm, “agency is negated, subject and object boundaries are dissolved: the organism is instrument and “musician”—yet, “a musician completely taken over by its tune” (Grosz 43).
animals, and machines are all *subject-to* affective flows; tales of “human becomings” have replaced the narrative of “human being.”

### 3.5 B-Flat: Reterritorialisation

Lucrece’s escape from molar forms is fleeting: her tongue, once an “untuned” instrument, reterritorialises her as it recounts her plight (1214). This reterritorialisation begins when her father, her husband, and a party of men arrive in her bedroom. Between this moment and the end of the poem, we observe a juxtaposition between her mechanised body, her “bloodless hand” (1597), and her body as a reterritorialised organism figured through the blood that gushes from her veins after she stabs herself. ¹⁶⁴ When the men first arrive, Lucrece is unable to utter “words” and instead emits “sighs”: “three times with sighs she gives her sorrow fire / Ere once she can discharge one word of woe” (1604-1605). Before we come to Lucrece as woman, with blood staining the ground, the narrator brings us back to the songlines of the bird: “And now this pale swan in her wat’ry nest / begins the sad dirge of her certain ending” (1611-1612). Dirge here refers to a funeral song: “swans were believed to sing before they died” (Bate and Rasmussen n.150). As if hovering above her own molar form, outside of herself, Lucrece refers to herself in third person: “thy Lucrece” (l. 1624). From when the men enter (l. 1583) until this third-person reference (l. 1624), Lucrece has only shown one glimmer of a return to her female form: the “my” that comes at line 1615. From line 1625 Lucrece begins to recount her story. She states how Tarquin crept into her room, threatened, and then raped her. When she comes to the detailing of her own emotions we observe her reabsorption into the plane of organisation—she is once more becoming a stratified, coherent, female self.

¹⁶⁴ In Chapter 5 of “Profitable Instructions of the Perfite Ordering of Bees” (1572), Thomas Hill writes that “the Bees have no blood, because they have neither heart nor lungs” (4).
However, as I suggested earlier, her reterritorialisation is not a simple linear process. Instead, there is a “crack” in language from lines 1716 to 1722:

Here with a sigh, as if her heart would break
She throws forth Tarquin’s name. ‘He, he,’ she says,
But more than ‘he’ her poor tongue could not speak,
Till after many accents and delays,
Untimely breathings, sick and short assays,
She utters this, ‘he, he, fair lords, ‘tis he,
That guides this hand to give this wound to me.’

(1716-1722)

The repetition of the “he, he” is like the instrumental tremolo of the singer and the repetitive droning of the bees rendered by Butler. Therefore, even in a process of reterritorialisation, something of the drone remains—a part of the insect that is, as Grosz suggests, always already accommodated on the body (45, my italics). In other words, the hum is a vital and connective line of life. Yet we do find something close to complete reterritorialisation after Lucrece’s death. After stabbing herself, Lucrece is positioned in specific gender roles by male voices—her father Lucretius, and her husband Collantine. In line 1805, the elision of the “s” in “Lucrece’s” (which involves a reading of “dispersed” as disyllabic) linguistically strips her of her agency. Metaphorically, it is an alimentary elision which swallows her back into patriarchal structures:

“My daughter” and “my wife” with clamours filled

The dispersed aid, who, holding Lucrece’ life,

Answered their cries, “my daughter’ and “my wife.”

(1804-1806)
The repossession of Lucrece is threefold, as daughter, wife, and as a figure for Rome. Brutus’s assertion that “Rome herself in them doth stand disgraced” is the culmination of Lucrece’s reterritorialisation, lending a cyclic quality to her experience of becoming. In the beginning, Lucrece is likened to a statue “where like a virtuous monument she lies,” and at the end of the poem Lucrece’s body becomes a “monument” once more—an exemplar of virtuous action when faced with disgrace (l.391, l.1833).

It is possible to read Lucrece’s suicide in two ways. Firstly, Lucrece’s becoming the event of her death can be read as a “becoming-imperceptible,” which Deleuze and Guattari describe as the “cosmic solution” of all becomings (ATP 306). However, this reading fails to take into account the reterritorialisations which occur at the end of the poem. Becomings are not always “successful”; indeed, many becomings fail, and suicide or accidental death often result from this failure. Not only do vital lines of flight bear the risk of “turning into a line of abolition, annihilation, self-destruction,” but the “plane of immanence,” or “consistency,” onto which human and animal are flattened out is at constant risk of reterritorialisation, or restratification by a plane of organisation (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 292). As Deleuze and Guattari write, “another plan(e) returns full force, breaking this becoming-animal, folding the animal back onto the animal and the person onto the person, recognizing only resemblances between elements and analogies between relations” (ATP 302, italics in original). Therefore, we may read Lucrece’s becoming-drone in a second sense as a “briefly successful line of flight from the stifling effects” of Oedipal and patriarchal structures (Baker 119). Upon finding herself “re-Oedipalized,” like Gregor Samsa in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Kafka’s Metamorphosis, Lucrece “goes to [her] death” (Baker 119).

Throughout this chapter, I have considered the potential liveliness of variously “statuesque” figures: Hero, Lucrece, animal automata, and other machines. Such a project is ethically important since it is likely that “the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized
matter feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption. It
does so by preventing us from detecting (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling) a fuller
range of the nonhuman powers circulating around and within human bodies” (Bennett,
Vibrant ix). A greater sensitivity to the vibrancy of the world around us increases the
likelihood of sustainable engagements. In a vital materialist approach the human is no longer
the director of the world’s musicians, but, like the animals and machines, is an instrument
bound up in a process of co-composing this phenomena we call “life.”
Figures

Fig. 11. Bee Madrigal Singing, from Charles Butler’s *Feminine Monarchie*, 2nd ed (London, 1623; n.pag.).

Fig 12. Bee Madrigal Swarming, from Charles Butler’s *Feminine Monarchie*, 2nd ed (London, 1623; n.pag.).
Conclusion

“Animals … are not nouns but verbs,” says Tim Ingold in *Being Alive* (175). Throughout this thesis, I have sought to bring a sense of movement back into our textual encounters with animals. Affective readings of animals have the potential to draw humans into relationships with animals that challenge notions of the “human being.” More specifically, I have demonstrated that Deleuzian concepts such as “cartography,” “meat,” and “machinic desire,” or “vital materialism,” all help to express kinds of “human becomings.” In this conclusion, I give an overview of the main findings from my research, and note some of the implications of my conclusions. I then briefly discuss potential limitations of an affective and Deleuzian study of human and animal encounters in early modern literature, and gesture to some points of departure for future studies.

In Chapter 1, I used Deleuze and Guattari’s work on affective and cartographic bodies to reread representations of early modern bear-baiting as spaces of unpredictable corporeal contact. Examining Stow and Howe’s report of a baiting, Nashe’s *Unfortunate Traveller*, Laneham’s *Letter*, and Shakespeare’s *Macbeth*, I showed how affective readings shift animals from objects of the spectator’s gaze to actants with their own affective gaze. The capacity of the animal to “look back” is often overlooked in literary representation and criticisms of animal spectacles. In a Deleuzian reading like the one I have posited, this omission might be explained by the potential for an animal’s affective gaze to draw humans into experiences of becoming which unsettle molar identity and notions of “human being.” We discover, in other words, that the ocular exchanges of early modern bear gardens might sometimes rattle, rather than reinforce, notions of human hegemony and dominance.
Focusing on the affective animal gaze, I problematised two related binaries inherent to many models of vision: active/passive, subject/object. Laura Mulvey’s study of narrative cinema drew attention to the pervasiveness of these binaries, writing that “in a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female” (19). In recent work from the field of animal studies, writers like Gregory Szarycz and Anat Pick have mapped these binaries from gender studies onto ocular encounters between humans and animals. Pick argues, for example, that Berger’s critique of animal imagery recalls Mulvey’s analysis of women as the object of the ‘male gaze’ and ‘bearer of the look.’ Like Hollywood women, the male/humanist gaze renders screen animals ‘absolutely marginal.’

(Pick n.pag.)

Thus, the conceptual framework of Chapter 1, which attempts to shift from the vocabulary of agency (active/passive, subjects/objects) to that of actants and affects might be trialled in different contexts—for example, gender studies. And, with closer regard to the present study, it might be tested on contemporary cinematic representations of animals, like the interactive and experimental film *Bear 71* (2012).

Like bear-baiting, hunting is a practice frequently associated with notions of human domination and mastery of the animal. While in Chapter 1 I read bodies cartographically, in Chapter 2 I developed Deleuze’s concept of “meat” to argue that early modern hunting literature expresses a degree of interspecies somatic continuity which disturbs human notions

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165 Plato’s model of “extramission” involves a subject/object relation in which a subject emits a stream of particles onto a passive object. However, as I demonstrated in the first part of Chapter 1, unlike many modern conceptions of vision, it was not unusual to think of the animal-as-subject.

166 See Szarycz 165, and Pick’s “Why Not Look at Animals?”


168 Pick writes extensively on this film in “Why Not Look at Animals?” and considers how it raises issues of “animal privacy.”
of superiority and separation from animals. Meat seems to me a conceptual tool well suited to navigating the spaces of early modern hunting literature because of its association with vulnerability and malleability. Thinking of bodies, particularly human bodies, as vulnerable and malleable, changed the dynamics of the human and animal encounters within the texts I considered. For example, meat allowed me to read Cavendish’s stag as an affective entity, rather than a symbol, whose molecular emissions, “caught” by the reader, drew attention to corporeal “cross-species attunement” and the openness and vulnerability of the human body (Acampora, “Toward” 240). In the final part of Chapter 2, I took this focus on bodily vulnerability to extremes, shifting from an exploration of molecular deterritorialisations in Cavendish’s poem to perceptible molar disarticulations and dismemberments of bodies in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus. My study of the parallels between the “breaking” or “undoing” of the stag at the end of the stag hunt, and the mutilation of Lavinia’s Demetrius’s and Chiron’s bodies in Shakespeare’s play, showed human and animal connection and continuity which disrupts essentialist distinctions. Reading through meat encourages us to understand bodies relationally—that is, as contingent upon the assemblages of which they are a part. Part two of this chapter had the strongest focus on the malleability of the human body. I suggested that the hunter’s performance of the animal’s body could be used to create “zones of proximity” with the stag. A significant conclusion to emerge from Chapter 2 is the notion that zones of proximity are created between humans and animals both involuntarily and voluntarily. The latter raises a number of interesting questions about the relation between imitation and becoming in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari openly denounce mimesis: “Mimicry is a very bad concept” (10). Deleuze and Guattari understand mimesis in a Platonic sense as “the production of an impoverished copy of a fixed self and self-present original” (Cull194). However, recent works by Gibbs and by Despret, for example, challenge a Platonic conception of mimesis. Indeed, it can also be argued that in
their overt attempts to demonstrate the distinction between these ideas Deleuze and Guattari potentially reinscribe what Zafer Aracagӧk suggests are “new binarisms” (286). In other words, even within the rhizomatic mode of thought binaries remain because Deleuze and Guattari engage in a process of privileging. Future work might consider whether imitation and becoming are indeed of distinct orders, or whether they are more closely linked and perhaps even more compatible than Deleuze and Guattari have allowed? Laura Cull, for example, asserts that “any complete disassociation of becoming from imitation is somewhat misleading, both ontologically and from the perspective of performance practice” (194). Rather, experiences are “varying mixtures of both tendencies, operating along a kind of continuum, with some tending towards further mimesis (at times) and others …tending towards becoming” (Cull 195). This notion is found in Deleuze and Guattari’s own work, in which “there are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots” (21); “if oppositions are in opposition, it only means that they are different but inseparable entities, for everything happens in a plane of immanence” (Deleuze and Guattari 286).

This “plane of immanence,” which Deleuze and Guattari alternatively label a “Body without Organs,” is constituted by flows of desire: “it is that which one desires and by which one desires” (179, 192). In Chapter 3, my studies of human, animal, and machine encounters in Marlowe’s Hero and Leander and Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece demonstrate that our conception of desire is ontologically significant. For example, desire localised to the organism, and even more specifically, the genitals, results in an agentic regime in which contained and separate bodies are defined according to degrees of similarity and difference to signifiers like “man” and “humanity.” In contrast, conceiving of desire as a free flow or vibration of “matter-movement” or “matter-energy” invokes a vital materialism “of sorts,”

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169 For more on this, see Cull, and Aracagӧk. See also Gibbs for a discussion of the similarities between “mimesis” and “affect”—the latter of which Deleuze and Guattari use synonymously with “becoming”: “affects are becomings” (ATP 299).
which moves us from a fixation on agency and control to a celebration of machinic
connections and affective assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 474; Bennett, *Vibrant* 57).
In the first half of Chapter 3, I compared the free-flowing hydraulic desire of Hero’s
automaton-body to the localised pleasure we find at the end of the poem. I argued that we are
able to chart this shift in the change from the lively automated sparrows of the poem’s
opening blazon to the organic birds “which in our hands we wring” at the poem’s end (773).
In the second half of the chapter, I read desire in Shakespeare’s *Rape of Lucrece* as a
vibrative force which threads through and connects Lucrece’s experiences of becoming-
animal-drone (variously insect and instrument). However, like Hero’s automaton-state,
Lucrece’s becoming-drone is not a permanent alteration or a utopian escape. Instead,
consistent with the Deleuzian ontology of becoming, it soon morphs into something else: in
this case, a reterritorialisation of her body as a female human.

The Oedipal reterritorialisations I explore in Chapter 3 support Steve Baker’s close
reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal. Baker argues that becomings
are productive relations which entities enter into in order to “do things” (133). Using an
example on which Deleuze and Guattari frequently draw in *ATP*, Baker contends that “[t]he
wasp and orchid, after their becoming, are still wasp and orchid” (133). Like my work in
Chapter 2 on performing animal bodies, Baker’s reading of becoming-animal appears to
suggest a degree of voluntariness or intentionality. This is important because it reframes
becoming as an experience, which is not unequivocally accidental and involuntary, but as
something which, in some cases, can be actively cultivated. Knowledge gained from these
experiences, both involuntary and voluntary, can then be employed to reshape conceptions of
the “human being” to the more sustainable and ecological kinds of “human becomings.”

Conceiving of becoming as both involuntary-voluntary and pre-cognitive-cognitive
responds in part to Ruth Leys’s critique of the “affective turn” (2011). Leys argues that a
thinker like Brian Massumi “comes across as a materialist who invariably privileges the ‘body’ and its affects over the ‘mind’ in straightforwardly dualist terms” (468). She states that for some theorists “the affects must be viewed as independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideology—that is, prior to intentions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs” (437). Over the course of her essay, she critiques the contested “Basic Emotions” model employed by affect theorists like Tomkins, and warns of the risks of a “shameless form of borrowing by the humanities from the sciences” (443). To support this critique, she offers an extended study of Brian Massumi’s “creative misreading[s]” of empirical data (467). My thesis is intended as a response-in-practice to Leys’s critiques of the tendency for affect theorists, like Massumi, to demarcate between body and mind. In particular, I have attempted to demonstrate the entanglement of body and mind in the points I have begun to make about imitation and becoming. For example, Deleuze and Guattari write that the plane of organisation, with its arborescent structures like binaries and hierarchies is constantly interacting with a plane of immanence, which consists of rhizomatic movements of intensities and affects. In fact, for Spinoza, upon whom Deleuze and Guattari frequently draw, “body” and “mind” are different modes which express the same single substance: “Nature” or “God.” More research into the entanglement of concepts like imitation and becoming might help us to consider whether affective approaches to literature can have social and political significance. In an attempt to consolidate the apparent incompatibility of affects and meaning-making, discourse analyst Margaret Wetherell has turned to social psychology to develop the concept of “affective practices” (2015). For Wetherell, “affective activity is a form of social practice” which is “affective-discursive,” involving “seamless feedbacks ... between accounts, interpretations, body states, further interpretations, further body states,

170 Leys also gives the example of William James, for whom “the categorization we choose is a pragmatic question and not a constitutive one”: “in practical life no urgent need has yet arisen for deciding whether to treat them [affectional experiences] as rigorously mental or as rigorously physical. So they remain equivocal” (468, Leys referencing James’s Essays in Radical Empiricism, 73).
etc.” (147, 152). Wetherell supports the idea of the “socialisation” of affect by drawing attention to the limitations of affective transmission: “Why does affect not leap across some barriers?” (154). According to Wetherell, we are most likely to share affects with those “we recognise as authoritative and legitimate sources. Context, past and current practice, and complex acts of meaning-making and representation are involved in the spreading of affect, no matter how random and viral it appears” (154, italics in original). Wetherell’s work is stimulating, and will likely be a point of reference for future studies that attempt to navigate the contested relationship between affect and representation—or, put another way, the apparently “automatic body” and the “deliberative mind.”

The materials chosen for my study are, to use Boehrer’s useful phrase, “self-consciously eclectic” (2). As well as eclectic, I would add that the studies and conclusions of the thesis are by no means definitive. Instead, to cite Ingold once again, “drawn threads invariably leave trailing ends that will, in their turn, be drawn into knots with other threads” (Lines 169). A future study might, for example, pick up the trailing end of a cultural thread. We might stretch this thread beyond the confines of Western culture and philosophy to investigate both affective animals and human becomings in the traditions, literature, and philosophy of the Eastern world. For example, what might we learn about human and animal relations from traditions such as Buddhism in which, like notions of human becoming, the self is conceived of as fluid and changeable? Alternatively, we might pick up a dangling historical thread that encourages us to test out the productivity of an affective approach to human and animal encounters in another historical period—say, for example, the

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171 Wetherell cites Andreas Reckwitz’s useful notion of the individual “as bodily and mental agent,” as “a carrier of patterns of patterns of bodily behaviour” and “certain routinised ways of understanding, knowing how and desiring” (249-50). For more, see Reckwitz 249-50.
172 See also Scheer for a study of emotions as practice.
173 There is little work which investigates connections between Deleuzian thought and Eastern philosophy and culture. The most notable being, perhaps, Chiu, Lee, and Bogue’s Deleuze and Asia. However, within this work, only one chapter which looks at human and animal relations: Sebastian Hsien-hao Liao’s “Becoming-Butterfly: Power of the False, Crystal Image, and Taoist Onto-Aesthetics” (1-28).
Enlightenment. Finally, and perhaps most radically, we might choose to follow the vital materialist thread, left dangling at the end of Chapter 3, into the terrain of plant or “vegetal affect.” In the space remaining in this Conclusion, I briefly consider where pursuing a line of vegetal affect might take us.

Besides Bennett (2010), who suggests a world filled with affective and vibrant material and assemblages, thinkers like John Ryan and Laura Marks have begun to explore the notion of plant efficacy, and to consider human and plant proximity and relations. In “Passive Flora?” John Ryan proposes “human-plant studies (HPS)” as an interdisciplinary framework for researching flora (104). Studies which operate through this framework would consider how “plants act upon us” to “co-generate our milieus of sustenance” (104, italics in original). An obstacle to these types of studies is the assumption that plants “lack intelligence and volition”; instead, they are construed as “inactive objects—decorative, aesthetic, and utilitarian” (Ryan 105). The passivity of plants is something Laura Marks addresses (and counters) in her keynote talk “Vegetable Locomotion” at the Third Annual Deleuze Studies Conference “Connect, Continue, Create” (2010). Marks takes her title from Hollis Frampton and Marion Faller’s 1975 photographic series of the same name, which juxtaposes the seeming passivity and vulnerability of plants with a reality of “unstoppable plant growth” (1, Fig. 13). Drawing on the work of Bergson, and Deleuze and Guattari, Marks explores the activity of plants: for example, the connective and rhizomatic *Eltygia repens*, or couch grass, and the “locomotion” of plants biologically in seeds attached to animals’ coats or excreted, and textually in recurring plant motifs (3, 11). Studies such as Ryan’s and Marks’s appear to promote, to adapt Ingold’s idea, the “verb-ness of vegetables.”

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174 An early precursor to this movement is Peter Tompkins and Christopher Bird *The Secret Life of Plants* (1973)—though, Ryan argues that the sentience and mobility of plants is also found in Darwin’s work *The Power of Movements in Plants* (1880) (108). More recently, we find Michael Pollan’s *The Botany of Desire: A Plant’s-eye View of the World* (2001); Matthew Hall’s *Plants as Persons* (2011); and Ryan’s and Marks’s studies.
We might begin to reconsider the idea of “plant passivity” with the work and thinking of Margaret Cavendish. For example, in Cavendish’s *The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World* (1666), herbs are described by the Empress’ herbalists as having “inherent, corporeal, figurative motions” (157). Like Lucretius, Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari, and Bennett, Cavendish sees the world as filled with “things” which have their own efficacy but which move at different durations and velocities to human bodies. A vital materialist approach to plants and other things traditionally conceived of as inert or passive, like metal and wood, “invokes a relativity of sorts”: the “stones, tables, technologies, words, and edibles that confront us as fixed are mobile, internally heterogeneous materials whose rate of speed and pace of change are slow compared to the duration and velocity of the human body” (Bennett, *Vibrant* 57, italics in original). In other words, objects are not immutable; rather, they “appear as such because their becoming proceeds at a speed or level below the threshold of human discernment” (Bennett, *Vibrant* 57). In the philosophical *Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy* (1666), to which *The Blazing World* is attached, Cavendish states that things like wood and metal possess an inherent vitality:

> That there is no such thing as rest or stoppage in infinite matter; but there is self-motion in all parts of nature, although they are not all exteriorly, locally moving to our perception; for reason must not deny what our senses cannot comprehend. Although a piece of wood or metal has no exterior progressive motion, such as is found in animals; nevertheless, it is not without motion, for it is subject to generation and dissolution, which certainly are natural corporeal motions, besides many others …

(131)

Anthony Trewavas makes a similar point in “Aspects of Plant Intelligence,” arguing that the temporal difference for plants, animals, and humans “frequently makes plants seem
unmoving” (1). According to Ryan, because of this, “many of the dominant cultural metaphors for passivity are botanical” (106). Thus, a revision of assumptions about the passivity of plants will have significant implications for readings of literary figures such as Shakespeare’s “lopped” and “hewed” Lavinia, who are metaphorically aligned with the botanical.  

At the close of this study, I find that I am no more confident in answering the questions with which I opened it: “what is the human?” and “what is the animal?” The bodies I have explored throughout this thesis appear to elude the territorialisation of the “what.” I am tempted to suggest instead moving from essentialist questions to a functional one: “why?” For example, “why are these questions so important to us?” and, “why is it that they have been historically privileged?” Such questions might prove to be more productive at literary, cultural, philosophical, individual levels, but this is for future studies to determine. What this study has demonstrated is that anthropocentrism is sustained through the territorialisation of animals. This containment, I have suggested, is a preventative measure to ensure that affective animals do not shake the cage of essentialist “being,” and unleash alter-tales of “becoming.”

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175 For botanical studies of Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, see Zamir, and Bladen. Both of these writers draw attention to the function of “trees” as “boundary markers” in the early modern period. They also note how acts like “pruning,” capture the duality of the tree which simultaneously expresses “life” and “death” and “creation” and “destruction” (Bladen 47, Zamir 282). Following the suggestions of Zamir’s and Bladen’s work, “trees” might be productively read as expressions of the disjunctive synthesis of Deleuze’s immanent ontology.
Fig. 13. Apple advancing (var. “Northern Spy”) from Sixteen Studies from Vegetable Locomotion, Hollis Frampton and Marion Faller, 1975. Walker Art Center, Minneapolis.
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