Tax Audit Rules and Firm Behaviour
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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Ralph Bayer who has been immensely generous with his encouragement, advice and support. I cannot thank him enough. I acknowledge those who helped with the running of the experiments used in this thesis: Sookie Zhang, Mickey Chan and Alex Jarvis. I thank Pru Kerr, especially for her comments on my writing. I thank all those who have inspired my learning over the years, including Professor Ralph Bayer (again), Dr Virginie Masson, Dr Nadya Baryshnikova, Dr Eran Binenbaum, Professor Mark Weder, Dr Jacob Wong, Ian Graham and Dr Seungmoon Choi. Also, I thank everyone in my coursework cohort including Dr Anne Arnold, Dr Mark Dodd, Dr Brita Pekarsky, Sumit Dutta, Dr Kofi Otumawu-Apreku, Niti Rathod and Dr Hang Wu.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends—Mum, Dad and Dr Anne Hoey for everything they have done for me. Also, Nick Birch and Brian Monger for their explanations of comparative advantage and sunk cost! Last but definitely not least, my beautiful partner Carlyn Leaver. She has been unfailing in her love and support. I genuinely cannot thank her enough.
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