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Type: Conference paper
Title: Just a little bit more
Author: van de Pol, J.
Smart, N.
Yarom, Y.
Citation: Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 2015 / Nyberg, K. (ed./s), vol.9048, pp.3-21
Publisher: Springer
Issue Date: 2015
Series/Report no.: LNCS
ISBN: 9783319167145
ISSN: 0302-9743
Conference Name: Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference (CT-RSA) (21 Apr 2015 - 24 Apr 2015 : San Francisco, CA)
Editor: Nyberg, K.
Statement of
Joop van de Pol, Nigel P. Smart, and Yuval Yarom
Abstract: We extend the Flush+Reload side-channel attack of Benger et al. to extract a significantly larger number of bits of information per observed signature when using OpenSSL. This means that by observing only 25 signatures,we can recover secret keys of the secp256k1 curve, used in the Bitcoin protocol, with a probability greater than 50 percent. This is an order ofmagnitude improvement over the previously best known result. The new method of attack exploits two points: Unlike previous partial disclosure attacks we utilize all information obtained and not just that in the least significant or most significant bits, this is enabled by a property of the “standard” curves choice of group order which enables extra bits of information to be extracted. Furthermore, whereas previous works require direct information on ephemeral key bits, our attack utilizes the indirect information from the wNAF double and add chain.
Description: LNCS, vol. 9048
Rights: © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_1
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Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Computer Science publications

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