Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Type: Thesis
Title: Voters' Partisan Behaviour and Government's Election Strategies for Local Funding Provision: Theory and Empirical Evidence in Australia
Author: Norazman, Muhammad F
Issue Date: 2013
School/Discipline: School of Economics
Abstract: Abstract Firstly, this thesis aims to demonstrate theoretically that different proportion of partisan and non-partisan voters entails different election strategies for the government when it provides local funding. Secondly, this thesis aims to find the empirical evidence of the existence of government's election strategies and if they do exist, what are the exact strategies chosen by the government. These election strategies are whether to fund marginal or safe electorates, and whether to fund aligned or unaligned electorates. Four predictions are yielded from the theoretical model discussed in this thesis and two of them are empirically tested in Australia. The empirical results contradict the theoretical predictions.
Dissertation Note: Thesis (B.Ec.(Hons)) -- University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2017
Keywords: Honours; Economics
Description: This item is only available electronically.
Provenance: This electronic version is made publicly available by the University of Adelaide in accordance with its open access policy for student theses. Copyright in this thesis remains with the author. This thesis may incorporate third party material which has been used by the author pursuant to Fair Dealing exceptions. If you are the author of this thesis and do not wish it to be made publicly available, or you are the owner of any included third party copyright material you wish to be removed from this electronic version, please complete the take down form located at:
Appears in Collections:School of Economics

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
01FrontECONHon.pdf122.81 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
02WholeECONHon.pdf677.17 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.