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dc.contributor.authorChun, Y.-
dc.contributor.authorPark, N.-
dc.contributor.authorYengin, D.-
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2016; 45(3):699-708-
dc.description.abstractThe fixed-route traveling salesman problem with appointments, simply the appointment problem, is concerned with the following situation. Starting from home, a traveler makes a scheduled visit to a group of sponsors and returns home. If a sponsor in the route cancels her appointment, the traveler returns home and waits for the next appointment. We are interested in finding a way of dividing the total traveling cost among sponsors in the appointment problem by applying solutions developed in the cooperative game theory. We show that the well-known solutions of the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value, the nucleolus (or the prenucleolus), and the τ -value, coincide under a mild condition on the traveling cost.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityYoungsub Chun, Nari Park, Duygu Yengin-
dc.rights© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015-
dc.subjectFixed-route traveling salesman problem; appointment problem; Shapley value; prenucleolus; nucleolus; τ-value; coincidence-
dc.titleCoincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.orcidYengin, D. [0000-0001-6848-111X]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Economics publications

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