Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/108448
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dc.contributor.authorGuo, M.-
dc.contributor.authorConitzer, V.-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationArtificial Intelligence, 2014; 216:287-308-
dc.identifier.issn0004-3702-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/108448-
dc.description.abstractAbstract not available-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityMingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherElsevier-
dc.rights© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.-
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006-
dc.subjectMechanism design; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism; payment redistribution-
dc.titleBetter redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
dc.identifier.orcidGuo, M. [0000-0002-3478-9201]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 8
Computer Science publications

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