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Type: Journal article
Title: Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link
Author: Kent, P.
Kercher, K.
Routledge, J.
Citation: Accounting and Finance, 2018; 58(2):445-475
Publisher: Wiley
Issue Date: 2018
ISSN: 0810-5391
Statement of
Pamela Kent, Kim Kercher, James Routledge
Abstract: We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority- and majority-independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority-independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.
Keywords: Remuneration committee; CEO remuneration; shareholder dissent
Rights: © 2016 AFAANZ
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12222
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 8
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