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dc.contributor.authorKent, P.-
dc.contributor.authorKercher, K.-
dc.contributor.authorRoutledge, J.-
dc.identifier.citationAccounting and Finance, 2018; 58(2):445-475-
dc.description.abstractWe provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority- and majority-independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority-independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityPamela Kent, Kim Kercher, James Routledge-
dc.rights© 2016 AFAANZ-
dc.subjectRemuneration committee; CEO remuneration; shareholder dissent-
dc.titleRemuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.orcidKent, P. [0000-0003-3034-8051]-
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