Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/108647
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dc.contributor.authorKent, P.-
dc.contributor.authorKercher, K.-
dc.contributor.authorRoutledge, J.-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.citationAccounting and Finance, 2018; 58(2):445-475-
dc.identifier.issn0810-5391-
dc.identifier.issn1467-629X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/108647-
dc.description.abstractWe provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority- and majority-independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority-independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityPamela Kent, Kim Kercher, James Routledge-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherWiley-
dc.rights© 2016 AFAANZ-
dc.subjectRemuneration committee; CEO remuneration; shareholder dissent-
dc.titleRemuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/acfi.12222-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
dc.identifier.orcidKent, P. [0000-0003-3034-8051]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 8
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