Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/108905
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Type: Conference paper
Title: Obfuscated challenge-response: A secure lightweight authentication mechanism for PUF-based pervasive devices
Author: Gao, Y.
Li, G.
Ma, H.
Al-Sarawi, S.
Kavehei, O.
Abbott, D.
Ranasinghe, D.
Citation: Proceeding of the 2016 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communication Workshops, 2016 / pp.1-6
Publisher: IEEE
Issue Date: 2016
ISBN: 9781509019410
Conference Name: 2016 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communication Workshops (PerCom Workshops) (14 Mar 2016 - 18 Mar 2016 : Sydney, Australia)
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Yansong Gao, Gefei Li, Hua Ma, Said F. Al-Sarawi, Omid Kavehei, Derek Abbott and Damith C. Ranasinghe
Abstract: Low cost pervasive devices such as RFID (radiofrequency identification) tags and sensor nodes are increasingly becoming part of the fabric of life. Using these pervasive devices to store and collect data securely is becoming a challenge because stringent requirements on power and area constrain the implementation of standard cryptographic mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a secure and lightweight authentication protocol for resource scarce pervasive devices built upon a physical unclonable function (PUF) primitive termed Obfuscated PUF (OB-PUF) and a variant of a parameter-based authentication protocol. This protocol sends obfuscated challenges to an OB-PUF where the subsequent recovery of the obfuscated challenges by a server (verifier) is guaranteed. In particular, our approach exploits server (verifer) aided computations to reduce the hardware complexity on the pervasive device while still maintaining a high level of security and taking advantage of the known vulnerability of PUFs to model building attacks. Most importantly, the unclonability of the OB-PUF is preserved and, consequently, OB-PUF based pervasive devices are resilient to cloning. We also show through statistical analysis and model building attacks the infeasibility of constructing a model of our proposed OB-PUF by an adversary.
Keywords: Physical uncloanble function, RFID, hardware security, obfuscation, model building attacks, authentication
Rights: © 2016 IEEE
RMID: 0030048073
DOI: 10.1109/PERCOMW.2016.7457162
Grant ID: http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP140103448
Appears in Collections:Electrical and Electronic Engineering publications

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