Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
Type: Book chapter
Title: Kant-Nash equilibrium in a quantity-setting oligopoly
Author: Long, N.
Citation: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games: Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi, 2016 / von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (ed./s), Ch.12, pp.179-201
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Publisher Place: Switzerland
Issue Date: 2016
Series/Report no.: Springer Series in Game Theory
ISBN: 3319292536
Editor: von Mouche, P.
Quartieri, F.
Statement of
Ngo Van Long
Abstract: This paper studies oligopolistic equilibria when not all firms behave in a Nashian fashion. The Kantian firms act according to norms of behavior that reflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant- Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantian norm of behavior.
Rights: © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_12
Published version:
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Economics publications

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
  Restricted Access
Restricted Access239.07 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.