Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109482
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dc.contributor.authorEnglmaier, F.en
dc.contributor.authorMuehlheusser, G.en
dc.contributor.authorRoider, A.en
dc.date.issued2014en
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Economic Review, 2014; 67:82-106en
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/109482-
dc.description.abstractAbstract not availableen
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityFlorian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roideren
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.rights© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en
dc.subjectKnowledge workers; moral hazard; limited commitment; ex post outside optionen
dc.titleOptimal incentive contracts for knowledge workersen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.006en
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 8
Economics publications

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