Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109483
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dc.contributor.authorLoertscher, S.-
dc.contributor.authorMuehlheusser, G.-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.citationRAND Journal of Economics, 2011; 42(4):639-663-
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261-
dc.identifier.issn1756-2171-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/109483-
dc.description.abstractWe study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone and - under some additional restrictions - hump-shaped and U-shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets, winner-take-all competition, trade-offs between profits in the short and the long run, and firms operating multiple outlets.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilitySimon Loertscher, Gerd Muehlheusser-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherWiley-
dc.rightsCopyright © 2011, RAND.-
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00148.x-
dc.titleSequential location games-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00148.x-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Economics publications

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