Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109549
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Pride and prejudice: a case for reform of judicial recusal procedure |
Author: | Appleby, G. McDonald, S. |
Citation: | Legal Ethics, 2017; 20(1):89-114 |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Issue Date: | 2017 |
ISSN: | 1460-728X 1757-8450 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonaldc |
Abstract: | Justice must both be done and be seen to be done. A legal principle designed to give effect to this fundamental proposition is that a judge must not sit to determine a dispute if he or she is biased, or if there exists a reasonable perception that he or she is biased. Across many common law jurisdictions – including the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many jurisdictions in the United States – the judge in question himself or herself is required to undertake the assessment of whether bias, or an apprehension of bias, exists. Drawing on insights from behavioural psychology and a series of case studies from across these jurisdictions, this paper offers an extended analysis of this practice and identifies and evaluates alternative proposals. |
Keywords: | Judicial ethics; recusal; bias |
Description: | Published Online: 7 December 2016 |
Rights: | © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group |
DOI: | 10.1080/1460728x.2017.1261521 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2017.1261521 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 3 Law publications |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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RA_hdl_109549.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 2.03 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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