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Type: Journal article
Title: Chance, determinism, and unsettledness
Author: Eagle, A.
Citation: Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition, 2019; 176(3):781-802
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Issue Date: 2019
ISSN: 0031-8116
Statement of
Antony Eagle
Abstract: A previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments.
Keywords: Chance; determinism; unsettledness; indeterminacy; laws; undermining; context-dependence
Rights: © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-018-1039-1
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 8
Philosophy publications

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