Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/121731
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dc.contributor.advisorZurbruegg, Ralf-
dc.contributor.advisorYu, Jeffrey (Chia-Feng)-
dc.contributor.authorJaroenjitrkam, Anutchanat-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/121731-
dc.description.abstractThis thesis examines firms’ strategies in response to more intensified product market competition. Specifically, three studies analyse: (i) the incentive dispersion within a top management team (TMT); (ii) the relative compensation of the CEO to the compensation of other top executives; and (iii) corporate complexity. These strategies are associated with cooperation among the TMT, the CEO’s power, and corporate complexity. The results from the first study demonstrate that TMT incentive dispersion decreases when firms experience intense competition in the product market and this effect is more pronounced for innovative and diversified firms. The implication is that firms promote cooperation in the team by reducing TMT incentive dispersion when facing pressure from product market competition and that cooperation in the TMT is even more essential for firms operating in a dynamic environment, which requires quick responses. The second study reveals that the compensation disparity between the CEO and other management drops, implying less CEO power when product market competition becomes more intensified, and the impact is stronger for firms with weak corporate governance and “good luck.” The results suggest that when powerful CEOs are entrenched, product market competition can act as a substitute for corporate governance and reins in the power of CEOs. The third study shows that corporate complexity reduces firm performance when firms face increased competition in the product market. Corporate complexity can be related to the inefficiency of resource allocation as the impact of the interaction between corporate complexity and product market competition is more prominent for firms that have strong financial needs but cannot easily access capital. From a theoretical perspective, the results of this thesis show how social comparison theory, agency costs, and resource allocation issues can explain the strategic choices that firms make in response to product market competition in order to stimulate cooperation in TMT, control CEO power, and enhance flexibility and efficiency, respectively.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectstrategic responseen
dc.subjectproduct market competitionen
dc.subjecttop management teamen
dc.subjectincentive dispersionen
dc.subjectCEO poweren
dc.subjectcorporate complexityen
dc.titleStrategic Responses of Firms to Product Market Competitionen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.contributor.schoolBusiness Schoolen
dc.provenanceThis electronic version is made publicly available by the University of Adelaide in accordance with its open access policy for student theses. Copyright in this thesis remains with the author. This thesis may incorporate third party material which has been used by the author pursuant to Fair Dealing exceptions. If you are the owner of any included third party copyright material you wish to be removed from this electronic version, please complete the take down form located at: http://www.adelaide.edu.au/legalsen
dc.description.dissertationThesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Business School, 2019en
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