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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/122605
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Type: | Book chapter |
Title: | Stupid goodness |
Author: | Cullity, G. |
Citation: | The many moral rationalisms, 2018 / Jones, K., Schroeter, F. (ed./s), Ch.11, pp.227-246 |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Publisher Place: | Oxford |
Issue Date: | 2018 |
ISBN: | 9780198797074 |
Editor: | Jones, K. Schroeter, F. |
Statement of Responsibility: | Garrett Cullity |
Abstract: | <p>In <italic>Paradise Lost</italic>, Satan’s first sight of Eve in Eden renders him “Stupidly good”: his state is one of admirable yet inarticulate responsiveness to reasons. Turning from fiction to real life, this chapter argues that stupid goodness is an important moral phenomenon, but one that has limits. The chapter examines three questions about the relation between having a reason and saying what it is—between normativity and articulacy. Is it possible to have and respond to morally relevant reasons without being able to articulate them? Can moral inarticulacy be good, and if so, what is the value of moral articulacy? And, thirdly, can moral philosophy help us to be good? The chapter argues that morality has an inarticulacy-accepting part, an articulacy-encouraging part, an articulacy-surpassing part, and an articulacy-discouraging part. Along the way, an account is proposed of what it is to respond to the reasons that make up the substance of morality.</p> |
Rights: | (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. |
DOI: | 10.1093/oso/9780198797074.003.0011 |
Grant ID: | http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP130102559 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797074.003.0011 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 8 Philosophy publications |
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