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dc.contributor.authorCullity, G.M.-
dc.contributor.editorDare, T.-
dc.contributor.editorSwanton, C.-
dc.identifier.citationPerspectives in Role Ethics Virtues, Reasons, and Obligation, 2020 / Dare, T., Swanton, C. (ed./s), Ch.9, pp.173-193-
dc.description.abstractWhen we are acting in a professional capacity, that can restrict what properly features in the deliberation that guides our action. Three different possibilities need to be distinguished. First, there are cases of disregardable reasons, where fact F is a reason for action A, but F should not feature in your deliberation about A. Secondly, there are cases of context-undermining, where fact F fails to provide a reason for performing action A in one context, even though F is a reason for A in other contexts. And thirdly, there are cases of exclusionary reasons. When fact F is a reason for action A, another fact E functions as an exclusionary reason when it is a reason not to be guided by F in A-ing. The chapter begins by explaining the difference between these three possibilities, and then considers their various applications to the normative ethics of professional roles. Each of these different possibilities turns out to have important professional applications, and the differences between them are instructive.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityGarrett Cullity-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRoutledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory-
dc.rights© 2020 the author-
dc.titleDeliberative restriction and professional roles-
dc.typeBook chapter-
dc.publisher.placeNew York, NY; USA-
dc.identifier.orcidCullity, G.M. [0000-0003-4847-4304]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 4
Philosophy publications

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