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Type: Journal article
Title: Modularity reconsidered
Author: Gerrans, P.
Citation: Language and Communication, 2002; 22(3):259-268
Publisher: Pergamon-Elsevier Science Ltd
Issue Date: 2002
ISSN: 0271-5309
Statement of
Philip Gerrans
Abstract: An orthodoxy in classical cognitive science is that representation is symbolic and that functional architecture is modular. That modular theory is the cornerstone of Cognitive Neuropsychology (CN), which identifies functionally discrete neurocomputational entities by observing psychological disorder. While the symbolic theory of representation is optional for CN, the modular hypothesis is essential to it and depends on a distinction between modular and central processing. Jerry Fodor has refined that distinction with the concept of Informational Encapsulation. This paper defends the encapsulation hypothesis against arguments that the interaction between modules and central systems requires its abandonment.
Keywords: Modularity
informational encapsulation
cognitive architecture
specific language impairment
Description: Copyright © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00006-X
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Philosophy publications

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