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dc.contributor.authorO'Brien, G.en
dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.en
dc.identifier.citationLanguage & Communication, 2002; 22(3):313-329en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition never implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a system of analog vehicles than for a symbol system. Natural language is therefore not required as a representational medium for abstract thought. Since natural language is arguably not a representational medium at all, but a conventionally governed scheme of communicative signals, we suggest that the role of internalised (i.e. self-directed) language is best conceived in terms of the coordination and control of cognitive activities within the brain.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityGerard O'Brien and Jon Opieen
dc.publisherPergamon-Elsevier Science Ltden
dc.subjectAnalog; Computation; Connectionism; Representation; Resemblance; Thoughten
dc.titleRadical connectionism: thinking with (not in) languageen
dc.typeJournal articleen
pubs.library.collectionPhilosophy publicationsen
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]en
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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