Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/16162
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dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.en
dc.date.issued2004en
dc.identifier.citationPsyche, 2004; 10(1):www 1-www 7en
dc.identifier.issn1039-723Xen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/16162-
dc.description© MIT Pressen
dc.description.abstractMangan makes a useful contribution to our understanding of the structure and function of the nonsensory fringe of consciousness. I offer a few friendly amendments and criticisms. In particular, I argue that the fringe/focus structure of experience is considerably more complex than Mangan allows, and that his account of the function of fringe experience doesn’t do justice to the emergent nature of the cognitive subject.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherMIT Pressen
dc.source.urihttp://www.theassc.org/files/assc/2593.pdfen
dc.subjectConsciousness; non-sensory fringe; attention; cognitive subjecten
dc.titleBeyond the fringeen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.identifier.rmid0020042025en
dc.identifier.pubid55868-
pubs.library.collectionPhilosophy publicationsen
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]en
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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