Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/16164
Citations
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
?
?
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorO'Brien, G.en
dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.en
dc.date.issued2004en
dc.identifier.citationBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 2004; 27(2):303-305en
dc.identifier.issn0140-525Xen
dc.identifier.issn1469-1825en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/16164-
dc.descriptionAuthor's responseen
dc.description.abstractMartínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/ process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityGerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opieen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2004 Cambridge University Pressen
dc.titleVehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousnessen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.provenancePublished online by Cambridge University Press 01 Apr 2004en
dc.identifier.rmid0020042027en
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0140525X04290070en
dc.identifier.pubid55866-
pubs.library.collectionPhilosophy publicationsen
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]en
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
O'Brien_16164.pdfPublished version76.65 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.