Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/2166
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dc.contributor.authorBarreto, R.en
dc.date.issued2000en
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Economic Review, 2000; 44(1):35-60en
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/2166-
dc.description.abstractThe following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent. The model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income, consumption, and growth are identifiable. Bureaucratic red-tape is then added to the model. The results suggest that, a priori, corruption is neither efficiency enhancing nor efficiency detracting with respect to growth but always results in some income redistribution.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityRaul A. Barretoen
dc.description.urihttp://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/505541/description#descriptionen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevier Science BVen
dc.subjectEndogenous; Growth; Corruptionen
dc.titleEndogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth modelen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.identifier.rmid0001000896en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00052-Xen
dc.identifier.pubid63524-
pubs.library.collectionEconomics publicationsen
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
dc.identifier.orcidBarreto, R. [0000-0001-8578-5131]en
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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