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dc.contributor.authorDamania, Richarden
dc.contributor.authorFredriksson, Per G.en
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2003; 52 (1):47-69en
dc.descriptionCopyright © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policy outcomes when collective action is endogenous. The polluting industry’s ability to undertake lobbying is shown to depend on the degree of competition in the product market, establishing a new link between trade and environmental policies. If trade liberalization causes industry collective action to become harder to sustain, the stringency of the environmental policy is likely to rise. These results highlight the role of trade liberalization on product market competition and its consequent impact on the incentive to lobby for less stringent environmental policies.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityRichard Damania and Per G. Fredrikssonen
dc.subjectCollective action; Lobbying; Political economy; Integration; Protectionism; Pollution taxen
dc.titleTrade policy reform, endogenous lobby group formation, and environmental policyen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Economicsen
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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