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|Title:||A minimalist model of federal grants and flypaper effects|
|Citation:||Journal of Public Economics, 1996; 61(2):229-246|
|G Brennan, J.J Pincus|
|Abstract:||This paper shows that ‘flypaper effects’ can be observed for unconditional federal grants, even in the absence of agenda-setters, voting intransitivities, informational asymmetries, etc. In a simple representation of a regime of federal, general revenue grants, median citizen-voters are decisive over the levels of grants, taxation and spending. By assumption, federal grants received equal federal taxes paid in each recipient locallity. The size of the federal grant varies endogenously with demand conditions and the efficiency of tax technologies. The apparent flypaper effects, positive or negative, vary with the source of the change in grants.|
|Rights:||© 1996 Published by Elsevier B.V.|
|Appears in Collections:||Aurora harvest 6|
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