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Type: Journal article
Title: Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay
Author: Anwar, Sajid
McMillan, Robert
Zheng, Mingli
Citation: European Economic Review, 2006; 50(2):307-322
Publisher: Elsevier Science BV
Issue Date: 2006
ISSN: 0014-2921
School/Discipline: Business School
Statement of
Sajid Anwara, Robert McMillan and Mingli Zheng
Abstract: Much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another, with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. However, in many online auctions, a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions, the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from eBay. Our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid, as the theory predicts. The paper also shows that winning bidders who cross-bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not.
Keywords: Competing auction ; Cross-bidding ; Auction empirics
Description: Available online 30 November 2004
Rights: Copyright © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.007
Appears in Collections:Business School publications

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