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Type: Journal article
Title: Peculiarities of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement
Author: Anderson, K.
Citation: World Trade Review, 2002; 1(2):123-134
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Issue Date: 2002
ISSN: 1474-7456
Statement of
Kym Anderson
Abstract: The dispute resolution procedures of the World Trade Organization allow sanctions to be imposed when a country is unwilling to bring a WTO-inconsistent trade measure into conformity. Apart from the fact that the procedure for triggering the retaliation process has ambiguities that need to be removed, the retaliation itself has some undesirable economic features. This paper looks at why compensation is not preferred to retaliation and then examines five economic features of the temporary trade retaliation that WTO may permit under certain conditions. Both efficiency and equity concerns are raised. The paper concludes with some suggestions for reforming this part of WTO dispute resolution during the review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that is due to be completed by May 2003.
Keywords: WTO; dispute settlement; compensation; retaliation
Description: Published online by Cambridge University Press 19 Aug 2002
Rights: Copyright © Kym Anderson
RMID: 0020021497
DOI: 10.1017/S1474745602001118
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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