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Type: Journal article
Title: Reverse auction: The lowest unique positive integer game
Author: Zeng, Q.
Davis, B.
Abbott, D.
Citation: Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 2007; 7(4):L439-L447
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pty. Ltd.
Issue Date: 2007
ISSN: 0219-4775
Statement of
Qi Zeng, Bruce R. Davis and Derek Abbott
Abstract: A reverse auction can be likened to a tendering process where a contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This is in contrast to a conventional forward auction where the highest bidder wins. In this paper we analyze a minority game version of the reverse auction where an extra condition is imposed that, namely, the bid must be unique. In other words, the bidder with the lowest positive unique integer (LUPI) wins. We examine and compare two extrema, namely, the case when all players are rational and the case when all players make random selections.
RMID: 0020074337
DOI: 10.1142/S0219477507004069
Appears in Collections:Electrical and Electronic Engineering publications

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