Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/41927
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Zeng, Q. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Davis, B. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Abbott, D. | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Fluctuation and Noise Letters (FNL), 2007; 7(4):L439-L447 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0219-4775 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1793-6780 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/41927 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A reverse auction can be likened to a tendering process where a contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This is in contrast to a conventional forward auction where the highest bidder wins. In this paper we analyze a minority game version of the reverse auction where an extra condition is imposed that, namely, the bid must be unique. In other words, the bidder with the lowest positive unique integer (LUPI) wins. We examine and compare two extrema, namely, the case when all players are rational and the case when all players make random selections. | - |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Qi Zeng, Bruce R. Davis and Derek Abbott | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | World Scientific Publishing Co. Pty. Ltd. | - |
dc.source.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219477507004069 | - |
dc.title | Reverse auction: The lowest unique positive integer game | - |
dc.type | Journal article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1142/S0219477507004069 | - |
pubs.publication-status | Published | - |
dc.identifier.orcid | Abbott, D. [0000-0002-0945-2674] | - |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 6 Electrical and Electronic Engineering publications |
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