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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/53235
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy |
Author: | Bandyopadhyay, S. Oak, M. |
Citation: | European Journal of Political Economy, 2008; 24(3):554-561 |
Publisher: | Elsevier BV, North-Holland |
Issue Date: | 2008 |
ISSN: | 0176-2680 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Mandar P. Oak |
Abstract: | We analyse a model of coalition government in a parliamentary democracy where parties care both for ideology and perks from office, and examine how the magnitude of this tradeoff affects the nature of coalitions that form. It is shown that equilibrium coalitions can be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically disconnected. The types of coalitions that emerge depend upon the relative importance of rents from office and the distribution of party ideologies. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between ideological connectedness of coalitions and rents from office. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
Keywords: | Coalitions Ideology Rents |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.06.010 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.06.010 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest Economics publications |
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