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|Title:||Non-factorizable joint probabilities and evolutionarily stable strategies in the quantum prisoner's dilemma game|
|Citation:||Physics Letters A, 2009; 373(30):2537-2541|
|Publisher:||Elsevier Science BV|
|Azhar Iqbal and Derek Abbott|
|Abstract:||The well-known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen type setting. Earlier results report that in this scheme the classical NE remains intact as the unique solution of the quantum PD game. In contrast, we show here that interestingly in this scheme a non-classical solution for the ESS emerges for the quantum PD.|
|Keywords:||Quantum games; Prisoner's dilemma; Nash equilibrium; EPR–Bohm experiments; Joint probability; Quantum probability|
|Appears in Collections:||Electrical and Electronic Engineering publications|
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