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Type: Journal article
Title: Thought insertion and self-knowledge
Author: Fernandez, J.
Citation: Mind & Language, 2010; 25(1):66-88
Publisher: Blackwell Publ Ltd
Issue Date: 2010
ISSN: 0268-1064
Statement of
Jordi Fernández
Abstract: I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way.
Rights: © 2010 The Author. Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
RMID: 0020100158
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01381.x
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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