Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Scopus||Web of Science®||Altmetric|
|Title:||Thought insertion and self-knowledge|
|Citation:||Mind & Language, 2010; 25(1):66-88|
|Publisher:||Blackwell Publ Ltd|
|Abstract:||I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way.|
|Rights:||© 2010 The Author. Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy publications|
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.