Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Levels and explanations|
|Citation:||Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (ASCS09), held in Sydney New South Wales Sept 30- Oct 2 2009, 2010 / W. Christensen, E. Schier and J. Sutton (eds.): pp.270-276|
|Publisher:||Australian Society for Cognitive Science|
|Conference Name:||Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (9th : 2009 : Sydney, Australia)|
|Abstract:||It is a mainstay of the philosophy of science that reduction is a relationship between theories pitched at different levels of nature. But the relevant sense of “level” is notoriously difficult to pin down. A promising recent analysis links the notion of level to the compositional relations associated with mechanistic explanation. Such relations do not order objects by scale or physical type; one and the same kind of entity can occur at several levels in a single mechanism. I will sketch this approach to levels and consider some of its implications for our understanding of the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience.|
|Keywords:||reduction; explanation; levels of nature; mechanism; mechanistic explanation|
|Rights:||Copyright 2009 by the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy publications|
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.