Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/64411
Type: Conference paper
Title: Levels and explanations
Author: Opie, J.
Citation: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (ASCS09), held in Sydney New South Wales Sept 30- Oct 2 2009, 2010 / W. Christensen, E. Schier and J. Sutton (eds.): pp.270-276
Publisher: Australian Society for Cognitive Science
Publisher Place: Sydney
Issue Date: 2010
ISBN: 9780646529189
Conference Name: Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (9th : 2009 : Sydney, Australia)
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Jon Opie
Abstract: It is a mainstay of the philosophy of science that reduction is a relationship between theories pitched at different levels of nature. But the relevant sense of “level” is notoriously difficult to pin down. A promising recent analysis links the notion of level to the compositional relations associated with mechanistic explanation. Such relations do not order objects by scale or physical type; one and the same kind of entity can occur at several levels in a single mechanism. I will sketch this approach to levels and consider some of its implications for our understanding of the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
Keywords: reduction; explanation; levels of nature; mechanism; mechanistic explanation
Rights: Copyright 2009 by the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science
RMID: 0020107704
Published version: http://www.maccs.mq.edu.au/news/conferences/2009/ASCS2009/
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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