Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/64411
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dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.en
dc.date.issued2010en
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (ASCS09), held in Sydney New South Wales Sept 30- Oct 2 2009, 2010 / W. Christensen, E. Schier and J. Sutton (eds.): pp.270-276en
dc.identifier.isbn9780646529189en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/64411-
dc.description.abstractIt is a mainstay of the philosophy of science that reduction is a relationship between theories pitched at different levels of nature. But the relevant sense of “level” is notoriously difficult to pin down. A promising recent analysis links the notion of level to the compositional relations associated with mechanistic explanation. Such relations do not order objects by scale or physical type; one and the same kind of entity can occur at several levels in a single mechanism. I will sketch this approach to levels and consider some of its implications for our understanding of the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityJon Opieen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherAustralian Society for Cognitive Scienceen
dc.rightsCopyright 2009 by the Australasian Society for Cognitive Scienceen
dc.source.urihttp://www.maccs.mq.edu.au/news/conferences/2009/ASCS2009/en
dc.subjectreduction; explanation; levels of nature; mechanism; mechanistic explanationen
dc.titleLevels and explanationsen
dc.typeConference paperen
dc.identifier.rmid0020107704en
dc.contributor.conferenceConference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (9th : 2009 : Sydney, Australia)en
dc.publisher.placeSydneyen
dc.identifier.pubid30099-
pubs.library.collectionPhilosophy publicationsen
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]en
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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