Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/68710
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments |
Author: | Yengin, D. |
Citation: | International Journal of Game Theory, 2012; 41(2):271-299 |
Publisher: | Physica-Verlag GMBH & Co |
Issue Date: | 2012 |
ISSN: | 0020-7276 1432-1270 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Duygu Yengin |
Abstract: | Starting from her home, a service provider visits several customers, following a predetermined route, and returns home after all customers are visited. The problem is to find a fair allocation of the total cost of this tour among the customers served. A transferable-utility cooperative game can be associated with this cost allocation problem. We introduce a new class of games, which we refer as the fixed-route traveling salesman games with appointments. We characterize the Shapley value in this class using a property which requires that sponsors do not benefit from mergers, or splitting into a set of sponsors. |
Keywords: | Fixed-route traveling salesman games Routing games Appointment games The Shapley value The core Transferable-utility games Merging and splitting proofness Networks Cost allocation |
Rights: | © Springer-Verlag 2011 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-011-0285-7 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0285-7 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest Economics publications |
Files in This Item:
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RA_hdl_68710.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 551.1 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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