Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/69969
Type: Conference paper
Title: Does anchoring cause overconfidence only in experts?
Author: Bruza, B.
Welsh, M.
Navarro, D.
Begg, S.
Citation: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci 2011), held in Boston, USA 20-32 July 2011 / L. Carlson, C. Hoelscher and T. Shipley (eds.): pp.1947-1952
Publisher: Cognitive Science Society
Publisher Place: online
Issue Date: 2011
ISBN: 9780976831877
Conference Name: Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (33rd : 2011 : Boston, USA)
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Belinda Bruza, Matthew B. Welsh, Daniel J. Navarro and Stephen H. Begg
Abstract: The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) predicts elicitation of an initial estimate will prompt subsequent minimum and maximum estimates to lie close to the initial estimate, resulting in narrow ranges and overconfidence. Evidence for this, however, is mixed; while Heywood-Smith, Welsh & Begg (2008) observed narrower subsequent ranges, Block and Harper (1991) report ranges became wider. One suggestion has been that this reflects a difference between expert and novice reactions to elicitation tasks. The present study investigated whether the interplay between expertise and number preferences leads to the paradoxical effects of an initial estimate. Participants with high expertise make precise estimates whereas participants with less expertise prefer rounded numbers, which could, potentially, reduce the impact of anchors. We confirm that expertise affects the precision of estimates and observe results indicative of the theorized effect – an interaction between expertise and elicitation method on range widths.
Keywords: anchoring; overconfidence; number preference; precision
Rights: © the authors
RMID: 0020116607
Appears in Collections:Australian School of Petroleum publications

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