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|Title:||Characterizing welfare-egalitarian mechanisms with solidarity when valuations are private information|
|Citation:||The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics, 2012; 12(1):12|
|Publisher:||Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG|
|Abstract:||In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line with characterizations of egalitarian rules with solidarity in other economic models. We also show that we can replace order-preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy (on the subadditive domain) and still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class. However, if we weaken order preservation to symmetry, mechanisms that are not welfare-egalitarian exist. We also study upper bounds on deficit and welfare lower bounds that characterize subclasses of the welfare-egalitarian class.|
|Keywords:||welfare egalitarianism; solidarity; order preservation; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; distributive justice; NIMBY problems; imposition of tasks; allocation of indivisible (public) goods and money; the Groves mechanisms; strategy-proofness; unanimity; symmetry; fair allocation.|
|Rights:||Copyright status unknown|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics publications|
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