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Type: Journal article
Title: Characterizing welfare-egalitarian mechanisms with solidarity when valuations are private information
Author: Yengin, D.
Citation: The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics, 2012; 12(1):12
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
Issue Date: 2012
ISSN: 1935-1704
Statement of
Duygu Yengin
Abstract: In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line with characterizations of egalitarian rules with solidarity in other economic models. We also show that we can replace order-preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy (on the subadditive domain) and still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class. However, if we weaken order preservation to symmetry, mechanisms that are not welfare-egalitarian exist. We also study upper bounds on deficit and welfare lower bounds that characterize subclasses of the welfare-egalitarian class.
Keywords: welfare egalitarianism; solidarity; order preservation; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; distributive justice; NIMBY problems; imposition of tasks; allocation of indivisible (public) goods and money; the Groves mechanisms; strategy-proofness; unanimity; symmetry; fair allocation.
Rights: Copyright status unknown
RMID: 0020120471
DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1789
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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